

fact that they had dinner together, Radford and Anderson, the night before the first leak appeared. Another wheel within a wheel, Admiral Moorer suggested, is that one of Laird's people had been used to investigate this. A fellow by the name of Stewart who wanted to become head of the FBI, ~~and~~ when he didn't get the job, ~~he~~ started leaking to the Watergate Committee to try to demonstrate what a good investigator he was, even though he was still working for the Executive Branch of the Government. Admiral Moorer said that on hearing this he called both Hebert and Stennis, both of whom offered to do everything he thought was necessary including hearings, ~~and~~ They finally agreed to watch the course of things to see how they developed before making a final decision on having a hearing. Admiral Moorer said he had talked to Kissinger just the night before. Kissinger then called Hebert and Stennis to emphasize that Admiral Moorer could not have had a motive because Kissinger was always keeping him informed and keeping the JCS informed. Admiral Moorer said he had had a number of inquiries from the Press and had told them it was ridiculous, and since it is alleged that he is conspiring on Kissinger and since that does not involve him and Kissinger, his answer is that it is ridiculous, so why don't they try

Kissinger. He believes they are going to ask Kissinger in Egypt tonight. He said that the White House has been getting into the act and has been discussing making some kind of a prospective statement but he is not sure they will. Senator Baker is apparently involved in it, Admiral Moorer said. All of the leadership has been briefed previously on this episode, apparently fairly recently, and none of them expressed any interest in going any further into it except Senator Baker. He reminded us that about this time some society columnist printed a story about Rear Admiral Robinson showing up at a White House party in a uniform coat and no pants, whereas the fact was that Robinson had not even been at the party. He came back to the Laird and Ehrlichman report, both turned in at the same time to the President, and in the same room, both having their own version of what took place. Admiral Moorer said, to quote Al Haig, there seems to have been some sinister force at work - there are several lower level civil servants still on employment at the White House, still loyal to Halde~~man~~ and Ehrlichman, and willing to leak in their behalf. Then Moorer went on to say that the Post had had the story for some period of time and that he believed they may even have leaked this story and garbled a version to other newspapers so that

they could come in with the accurate dope. I commented that I thought it would be very hard for the Post to come in with a story that would help the military in any way, and Admiral Moorer said he agreed with that normally, but that in this case it gave them a further chance to discredit the White House. He thought they might do so. Admiral Moorer said the Radford interview with Ehrlichman was taped but that it was his understanding that the investigation reports turned in by Ehrlichman and Laird were only three or four pages long, and he believes that both may have been very well slanted in each case to sell what the other guy was out to solve - cutting the umbilical between the White House and the Chairman in the case of Laird, and discrediting Kissinger in the case of Ehrlichman. Admiral Moorer concluded by saying he was going to wait a few more days to see how this thing played out, that it had been beaten up a lot, and that he felt that he had an obligation to insist on a hearing. His present intention was to request that they be open hearings. I pointed out to him that he would have a tough problem because one of the things that the hearings would probably bring out of him is that the President thought that Laird was disobeying him, and that the President was having to send for Admiral Moorer

and direct him to do things directly, and that it would bring out a lot of additional dirty linen. Admiral Moorer said that he agreed with that and he felt the basic thing was that ten years from now no one would remember that Kissinger hated Laird and that Laird hated Ehrlichman and Haldeman, but the important thing was not to let the JCS get sullied by this.

On 14 January 1974, Yeoman Charles Radford was interviewed by the Press in Salem, Oregon. In a straightforward interview he denied all allegations of passing secret papers to Jack Anderson.

On 15 January 1974, John Warner, now Secretary of the Navy, raised the subject of the Wellender/Radford problem with me. He stated that he was "not able to remember anything concerning his involvement in the matter." I reminded him that he had given me a series of orders concerning what to do with first Radford and then Wellender, but had never wanted to tell me who the orders were coming from (always claiming they came from the Commander in Chief). On being reminded of this, Mr. Warner stated that he recalled the orders had come from "Laird and Buzhardt."

On 21 January 1974, General Wickham ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> military exec. to/Secretary of Defense, informed the Secretary of the Navy and me that SECDEF intended

to withhold the Flag selection list for several weeks until it became clear whether or not Captain Knozien would come under fire for the "JCS spying." John Warner agreed to this. I disagreed. I went to Admiral Moorer. The two of us went in to see the Secretary of Defense. I pointed out that Captain Knozien was being tried by hidden accusers, if we withheld the list, and that the withholding could become a newsworthy item very soon. I said that Admiral Moorer had informed me that SECDEF had stated that the investigation done in Defense under Mel Laird's regime had apparently revealed that Captain Knozien had "praised Radford for his good work." Admiral Moorer pointed out that this was normal for Captain Knozien, who was a good leader, and it should not be construed as suborning Radford to do anything. SECDEF stated that a copy of the investigation in its semi-final form was available in Mr. Hoffman's files, and that I could go through it to assure myself as to whether there was any reason to withhold Knozien's promotion. (He further stated that there were a couple of items which peripherally brought my name into the investigation.)

I endeavored for several days to get Mr. Hoffman to show me a report of the investigation. He finally brought it to me, permitting me to read only

very brief portions. I was completely satisfied, based on what I saw, that there was no reason to withhold Captain Knozien's promotion.

On 26 January, Jim Schlesinger referred to the Tauth article concerning "ferreting information" and said that this was not the right word but that it was almost right. He said apparently Admiral Robinson did not ever send papers but merely briefed the Chairman. I stated that this did not surprise me. But Secretary Schlesinger stated that Senator Baker had told him that Wellender delivered various papers to the Executive Assistant to Admiral Moorer. I stated that this may have been the case, but that Captain Knozien's report was that he always assumed such papers were there with the knowledge of Kissinger until the Radford story broke. SECDEF stated that Senator Baker was saying "Zumwalt was being quoted on the Hill as having said recently 'Sure, Tom Moorer does it - he had every right to.'" I told the Secretary of Defense that this was an absolute falsehood, and asked whether I could confront Senator Baker. He instructed me not to do so at this time for fear it would look like overreaction. I asked Secretary of Defense whether he was ready to release the selection board in view of what I had said about Captain Knozien. He said he would.

On 26 January 1974, Schlesinger, after reading the Tenth article in the Los Angeles Times, of 25 January, stated that in his judgment this article was pretty accurate regarding what went on in the "spy ring," although some of the information about the Kissinger versus Haldeman feud was exaggerated.

Also on that day, I reported back to Schlesinger in response to his earlier request that Admiral Wellender had informed me that the story he hears from Senator Stennis was in conformance with the fact that he had reported to me - i.e., Wellender knew about some information not being legitimately provided, but Admiral Moorer did not know that it was illegitimately provided.

On 29 January 1974, Schlesinger asked me <sup>at a JCS meeting</sup> what the attitude of Navy people was toward the spy charges. He seemed to be preoccupied with that because he had asked me a couple of times privately. I told him that I felt there was not any great concern about it at the present time because people consider this to be part of the usual newspaper distortion, but that it could be serious if Ehrlichman counterattacked. Abe said that he had just come back from Huntsville and people could care less. Schlesinger pointed out that

the article which said that Tom Moorer had tried to get Radford court-martialed was helpful. Schlesinger went on to say to the Chiefs that he thought it would be a 90-day thing during the hearings and trials, and then he thinks in the long run it will look all right. Clements said, hold your fire, don't shoot until you see the whites of their eyes. He said: "I know you guys have lots of contacts on the Hill and in the Press, and my advice is to hold it until we've seen everything they have got. That is a good strategy in any event." SECDEF said that White House motivation was a little unclear to him. General Ellis said that way back during the Bay of Pigs, the Chiefs held back like good soldiers and didn't even speak up though they had a hell of a good story, and then the good story never did get out. Schlesinger pointed out that this was a little different. At that time you had a President who was the darling of the Press, and now you've got a President who the Press is trying to crucify, so they won't have any trouble getting the story out.

While I was with Secretary Schlesinger, Senator Stennis called him to talk about the need for Radford as a witness. After concluding the phone call, Schlesinger stated to me that he was concerned with Clawson and Colson

who, with other White House attorneys, were stepping up the drag against Admiral Moorer. He stated therefore he thought it was even more important than <sup>The</sup> last time <sup>he</sup> ~~to~~ mention <sup>ed</sup> it to me to have a counterfire among the Press.

He said he sees the strategy of the plumbers to be one of establishing the kind of proposition that they were ~~s~~aving national security and that if the Chairman of JCS had to be targeted <sup>for</sup> ~~in~~ spying, that wasn't too bad, that they went after Elmsberg. He said that if the plumbers make their stand it would put the military behind the eight ball and reemphasized his view that we need a counter-campaign. He said he believes that Hirsch has been given a copy of the Young report by Ehrlichman or Young.

On 21 February 1974, after we completed briefing SECDEF on programming, he raised with me the question of the "spy charges" and asked me what I thought of the status of things. I told him I had read Wellender's statement and thought that if one believed it that it made clear that Admiral Moorer was in the clear, and there was quite a discrepancy between Radford's testimony and Wellender's. SECDEF agreed, and said that he felt that Radford had ample motivation to be covering himself. SECDEF stated that he was concerned that the continuation of these hearings is degrading the military

image, and particularly the Navy's, since they are all naval personnel. He pointed out that in the final analysis it adds up to a naval admiral versus a navy yeoman, and it doesn't make any difference which one you believe, it is still Navy. I told him I agreed, but felt that ~~if~~ between the alternative of permitting a Congressional investigative process to grind inexorably and the alternative of reacting in some way through the Press, et cetera, it seemed to me that the preferred course was to let events take their course and count on the essential fairness of Senator Stennis to put all things in context. SECDEF agreed. He said that he is clearly unhappy with the course of events.

Also, on 21 February 1974, in a conversation with Admiral Moorer, Admiral Moorer gave his view that the conflict between what Radford said ~~and~~<sup>in</sup> the Buzhardt investigation and what he said in front of Senator Stennis' committee would indicate that Radford had perjured himself one place or the other.

On 24 June 1974, Schlesinger, in commenting on the President's attitude towards me and his concern about the speech I had given at the Naval Academy, told me I shouldn't feel that I was unique, however, that the President was

every bit as upset in a different way with Admiral Moorer. The President had been sounding off about the fact that Tom Moorer had spied on him.

This provides all the background information and should be used in conjunction with the story that I dictated called "JCS Spy Ring" on Tape 21, Side A, part 6.