



Insert for "Honeymoon" Chapter or "SALT" Chapter

In our 1 October 1963, paper on strategic arms' limitations, Paul Nitze and I had written that there were three schools of thought among those thinking about such arms' control proposals. We suggested that one school "tended to look at the problem primarily from the standpoint of what appeared to be negotiable with the Soviets, judged primarily in the context of" the formal arms' control negotiation. A second school, we thought, had "become convinced that none of the" strategic arms' limitations "so far suggested" were "to the U. S. interest but had tried," within the assumption that none be agreed to, "to accommodate to the propaganda demands" of the negotiations. We had placed ourselves within a third school which had "held that the U. S. G. should seek out and analyze the substantive elements of the potentially desirable" strategic limitations, "one the U. S. could live with, before considering the tactical and propaganda issues of negotiations."

In his approach to his responsibilities as the Secretary of Defense's representative on the SALT Delegation, Paul Nitze clearly was continuing

seven years later when I became C.N.O., his thoughtful effort to be a member of that school. After most of the SALT sessions, he produced evaluations for the Secretary of Defense of what each side had accomplished in a negotiating sense, and what policy options ought to be considered for later on - which were extremely helpful in sorting out within the bureaucracy the wheat from the chaff. Both overseas at the negotiating sites, and in-between sessions in Washington, he continued his analyses of proposals suggested by each side, he initiated new suggestions, and through written word and discussions with a large number of the principal players in Washington, he served as an intellectual catalyst for those who believed in sound arms' control to improve U . S. security. I continued, as C.N.O., to consider myself a member of that same school. I wanted to see the U. S. and the U.S.S.R. make progress in arms' control, but only on the basis of well-considered, and thoroughly analyzed staff work. I had seen many superficially impressive ideas in the arms' control field fail to survive the test of searching analysis during the period when I had responsibility in the test ban negotiations. I knew that we were on a much more potentially,

fruitful, potentially dangerous game in SALT.

I concluded that to be a good working member of that third school, and given the relatively modest amount of time that I could devote to it, I should do the following things: (1) keep in close touch with Paul Nitze - which I did throughout my four years, (2) develop greater expertise within the Navy staff in the field of strategic arms' limitations - we developed some very competent analysts during that period, (3) bring into the CEP (C.N.O. Executive Panel) some individuals whose intellectual qualifications to help me evaluate and analyze the proposals were superior. I therefore asked to join the panel: Mr. Fred S. Hoffman, of the Rand Corporation, formerly a strategic analyst in the Department of Defense; Mr. Seymour Weiss, a defense and foreign affairs analyst of many years' experience and for my first as a special assistant and later four years serving in the Department of State/as head of the Political Military Branch; Professor Albert Wohlstetter, of the University of Chicago, one of the nation's foremost strategic writers and thinkers; Dr. Thomas Wolf, of Rand, formerly an Air Force officer, one of the nation's best criminologists. This group, who was later joined by Dr. Henry S. Rowen of Stanford, also a nationally recognized defense

analyst. All were friends of many years with whom I had associated in the test ban era and subsequently, and they served as a superb strategic panel.

(Note to Bob: depending on where we decide to put this, we can describe Henry as being a member of the first school and overriding and cancelling out the value of Paul Nitze contributions and, indeed, all substantive contributions.)