

Insert for "SALT II" Chapter - End of Chapter

In the 1 October 1973 paper on strategic arms' limitations, Paul Nitze and I had written that there were certain basic considerations that applied in dealing with the issues "stacked without which the entire disarmament effort would have collapsed long ago, is that control and reduction of armaments can benefit both sides, that it is not entirely a zero sum game. But in part it is a zero sum game; what improves the relative position of one side, harms the relative position of the other. The Soviets will certainly attempt to optimize their relative position. Not only must we attempt to optimize ours as an offset to their attempt, but also to offset a very real asymmetry in the position of the two blocks: We proclaim, and are, a defensive alliance; they proclaim and are an offensive alliance, in which the debate is only as to the level of violence to be used in pursuing the aims of the alliance. Our task in devising a " strategic arms' agreement "is therefore complex. It involves fully exploiting the potential of the non zero sum aspects of arms control (those which benefit both the U.S.S.R. and ourselves) while

preserving or improving the relative Western position on the zero sum aspects.

Principal U. S. interests are: (1) the maintenance of our ability to contain Soviet or Chinese expansion; (2) a reduction in the risk of nuclear war, either from escalation of undeterred Soviet or Chinese expansionism under (1) above or in the form of a direct nuclear attack on the U. S. or its allies, and (3) a reduction in the destructiveness of nuclear war should it nevertheless occur, and (4) continuation of the prospect that U. S. (nuclear and other) forces surviving a nuclear war would be able to insure a settlement of hostilities favorable to the United States.

Principal Soviet interests are: (1) a reduction in the prospect that the U. S. might escalate the general nuclear war, a local confrontation resulting from what the Soviet leadership would consider the inevitable expansion of the area of communism; (2) a reduction in the prospect that the U. S. forces surviving a nuclear war would allow the U.S. terms of settlement of hostilities and (3) a reduction in the destructiveness of nuclear war should it nevertheless occur. From the

Soviet standpoint, very substantial cold war gains could occur if we fail to preserve our objective (1) while they succeeded in achieving their objective (1). In such a situation, they could expect a rapid disillusion of NATO and a loosening of the ties holding together the forces standing in the way of clear communist domination of the European-Asia land mass. They could then concentrate their full efforts on securing their primacy over their Chinese "partners." "

Over a period of eleven years, by a combination of: (1) massively outspending the United States in strategic weaponry; and (2) a superior arms negotiating strategy - in part the result of (1) and in part the result of the perversion of our democratic process for achievement of consensus, the Soviet Union had made substantial progress on all three of her objectives and we had lost substantial ground on all four of the U. S. objectives.