

Insert for the Reflections Section or Perhaps Elsewhere

In our 1 October 1963 paper on strategic arms' control limitations, Paul Nitze and I had projected trend as follows: "Projections through 1968 of programmed U. S. strategic forces, on the one hand, and NIE (National Intelligence Estimate) estimates of Soviet forces, on the other, indicate^{that} without arms control the U. S. should be able to maintain a two- to three-fold superiority in numbers of inter-continental alert weapons, and a superiority in the average survivability factor of those forces. The megatonnage of the Soviet strategic forces may, however, come to exceed those of the U. S. forces and under all but the most favorable circumstances the percentage of the U. S. population expected to be casualties after a nuclear exchange might exceed that of the U.S.S.R. Under no foreseeable circumstances, however, could the U.S.S.R., even if it struck first, have high confidence in ending the initial exchanges with a superiority and surviving strategic forces. In the absence of arms' control the U. S. should therefore be able, at least through 1968, to

maintain a very credible deterrent, a deterrent adequate, not only to
protect the U. S. against a premeditated nuclear attack, (class 1 deterrents) /but also to keep
lower the risks of escalation the Soviets could prudently face in bringing
pressure against Europe while in support of their policy in other areas
vital to the West. (class 2 deterrents) The sacrifice of this advantage
in any "strategic arms agreement" would have to be weighed against U. S.
non-zero sum and other zero-sum gains."

(Note to Bob: this can be used either at the point I came in
1970 to update where we then stood or can be used at the end
of SALT I or again at the end of the SALT II Chapter as to
draw a comparison what things were projected to be in '68,
as early as '63, and how they have turned out as a result of
a combination of inadequate power and poor policy.)