

Possible Insert to the JIB Chapter or SALT Chapter

In October 1963, I gave a lecture to the Rocky Mountain-Great Plains Research Conference, entitled Problems of Transition to a Disarmed World from a Defense Viewpoint.

My assignment was to discuss the problems that would be involved in a transition. I described, first, that future disarmed world and what it might be like; second, the transition into that world; and third, how we must conduct ourselves in order to begin that transition.

In the speech I reported that "recent testimony before the Congress in connection with the test ban hearing has made it clear that over the next five years the U. S. should be able to maintain a two- or three-fold superiority over the U.S.S.R. in numbers of inter-continental alert weapons and the superiority in the average survivability of these forces. Under no foreseeable circumstances could the U.S.S.R., even if it struck first, have high confidence in ending the initial exchanges with a superiority in surviving strategic forces. In the absence of arms' control the U. S. should therefore be able, at least through 1968,

to maintain a very credible deterrent - adequate not only to protect the U. S. against premeditated/^{nuclear}attack, but also to keep lower the risks of escalation the Soviets could prudently face in bringing pressure to bear against Europe, or in support of their policy in other areas vital to the West.

We have also to concede that during the same five-year period the megatonnage U.S.S.R. could bring to bear against the U. S. could, under all but the most favorable circumstances, result in a very high percentage of casualties for the U. S. The vital question for resolution with regard to whether or not to begin the transition to a disarmed world in this time frame (?) is whether the U. S. would improve its security in giving up the present strategic relationship. For no matter how awful the potential casualties on our present track, we have to remember that no rational opponent would initiate the holocaust under his present disadvantage. And we must be very sure that in departing a strategic relationship in which there is a very excellent chance we will not receive the very high casualties resulting from the failure of the relationship to deter, we do not enter a strategic arrangement

in which there is a much greater chance that we will undergo casualties nearly as severe."

Further in the speech, I asked "Have we reached a turning point toward the beginning of the transitional phase? Suddenly after seventeen years of arms' control negotiations two agreements have been achieved - the Moscow-Washington teletype and the three element test ban.

It is important at this point to speculate upon the factors involved in the final change of mind of the Soviet Union which led them to accept a test ban proposal which they had firmly rejected on numerous occasions. Obviously we can only guess. It would be my opinion, however, that important elements were the firmness which we and our NATO allies, particularly the U. S. and German governments, for others as well, showed during the Berlin crisis of 1961 and 1962; and the U. S. firmness in the Cuban missile crisis which forced Khrushchev to withdraw his offensive weapons from Cuba. The background for these two checks to Soviet policy and the aggravation to split in the communist ranks resulting from these checks, was the very substantial increase in U. S. military strength, both nuclear and non-nuclear which took place during that period.

Another element may well have been President Kennedy's speech of 10 June indicating the possibility of another road. The Soviets may have hoped to exploit divisions within the West in connection with ratification of the treaty. The isolation of Germany, or the separation of Germany and France from the rest of the Alliance would be an obvious objective. This could then have been followed up with renewed pressure on Berlin and the possible signing of a Warsaw Pact peace treaty with East Germany. Another Soviet objective might be to exploit an exaggerated euphoria in the West, springing from a mistaken belief that a test ban treaty guaranteed a real abatement in the Cold War. What I am suggesting is that a major question we have to ask ourselves at the present time is whether the Soviet decision to accept our long standing test ban proposal represents any basic change in the Soviet aims or whether it represents a change in tactics similar to many earlier excursions towards temporary detente they have made. In light of our answer to that question and the way the Soviet change came about, we would guide our subsequent efforts in arms' control and(?) negotiations. I should like to make clear at this point my view that

Soviet acceptance of the U. S. test ban proposal is the result of U. S. firmness and of growing cooperation and strength within NATO, and that it is not an occasion for relaxing our efforts to maintain any of these. Despite continuing efforts towards relaxation on the part of our allies, it is of utmost importance that the U. S. and her allies resist the temptation to reduce the free world defense capability unilaterally. Only as the Soviets become persuaded that there are no easy gambits for them to exploit by rapid changes of political tactics can we expect to move forward to the sound negotiation of more serious issues with them.

I am aware that there are a number who look hopefully to the test ban treaty as the occasion for reviewing our very high defense expenditures in diverting some of the money we now spend on armament toward another more appealing aim. Often this point of view is associated with the use of the term "overkill." There is no uniform meaning of the term "overkill" but most of those who use the term argue that we have an incredible amount of destructive nuclear power, enough if all exploded at particular points of population concentration to kill everyone in the world several times

over. This seems to me to miss the point. The Army, of course, has enough rifle and machine gun bullets to kill all of mankind several times over if each reached an individual target. In neither case is it conceivable that all available weapons could be used. I must say that all military men feel infinitely more secure, now that we have Polaris submarines and minute-men in numbers, a BNEWS system, and now that we know the Soviets know that they must under all circumstances consider SAC with respect. We feel much more secure than we did during the period when our SAC bomber bases were few and vulnerable. More important for that future world in which this conference is interested, the Secretary of State can be much more confident in negotiating with the Russians with the backing that this power gives him than if it were otherwise.

It is my view that the maintenance of this superiority - the avoidance of uncompensated unilateral measures to reduce our military posture - will be the best way and very probably the only way to keep the U.S.S.R. sincerely interested in the detente without which the transition to disarmament can never begin. If we remain strong while holding forth every

reasonable offer the Soviet Union to negotiate with us, we may begin to travel the road I have been discussing. The signposts we would expect to see before we could say we were on that road would be a comprehensive agreement not to permit diffusion of nuclear weapons, an extension of the test ban agreement to underground testing, some improvement in the Berlin-German reunification situation, and satisfactory resolution of the political situation in Southeast Asia and Cuba. Concurrently with or after the achievement of these objectives we might aspire to start the transition road.

And the maximum that must guide us every mile of the way is the one we have learned in winning the Cold War these last few years: to maintain the military strength of the United States and the free world, superior to that of the Communist Bloc, every step of the transitional way. This strength is the armor that has protected the free world from the aggression of the Communist Bloc. It is the armor that has protected our way of life and maintained a world order in which nation states have been allowed to flower in reasonable conformity with their national aspirations. I hope

that we can reduce our arms. I hold, that as we reduce them it would be the highest form of idealism to aspire to maintain that superiority - the result of our great national substance - every step of the way toward the creation of a new system for the less dangerous support of the world order in which we believe."