

MEETING AMONG RUMSFELD, PHN AND ERZ
on 2 October 1974

1. At 1200 on Saturday 2 October 1974, Paul Nitze and I met with Don Rumsfeld at the White House.
2. Paul Nitze summarized his views concerning SALT, detente, and general state of the world as reflected in his short paper attached, and concluded that he had never in his years in public service felt that we were in a more dangerous time than right now.
3. I then summarized the change in the military balance and reported that I had been speaking out on these years, and urged that we be aware of the pitfalls of not speaking out.
4. Rumsfeld took careful notes. He made the observation that Henry had a tough problem of trying to get from where we're at to where we need to get in negotiations, and was limited by the capabilities that the country had. I pointed out that that had been true for each of the six years he has been warring with the problems, and that whereas that may be an appropriate position for a negotiator it seemed to me that clearly the position of the President ought to be a different one - a broader scope, looking at what to do about the negotiator's position.

Rumsfeld thought a few seconds and then said he agreed emphatically that, for example, the Minority Leader in dealing with Congressmen had to ask for their votes on issues coming up six or eight months in the future. When these Congressmen reported that they had difficulties in their districts that would not let them vote that way, the Minority Leader would certainly say to them, "Fair enough, but during the six months that you've got, get out there and talk to your people and get the political factors changed so you can vote for it. He suggested that they cannot always get there and sometimes their negative votes have to be understood, but that the process was relevant and that is probably the way President Ford ought to be looking at it. Paul Nitze and I agreed.

5. We discussed the general state of the world and then I made three

recommendations:

- (a) The President should have a National Security Summit Conference (classified) to bring together all of the conflicting views on what the military equation is, - no significant reaction to this.

- (b) The President should never go to a Summit without having the deal all negotiated ahead of time. In retrospect, if one looks at what happened to Mr. Nixon, he went to the Summit with issues still to be resolved and compromised in favor of the Russian position without any real technical support. I suggested that in the future the deal should be cut, checked out by the various branches of the Government, and then announced at the Summit meetings.- Rumsfeld seemed to like this proposal.
- (c) Paul Nitze intervened to make my third recommendation which was that they ought to split the job of SEC STATE and Special Assistant for National Security Matters. I joined in the recommendation. Rumsfeld pointed out that the President had already addressed this issue and had decided ^{it;} ~~that~~ the President's position had been if he were starting over himself to paint the mural now he would never keep the two jobs together under one person, and that if Kissinger leaves the jobs would be separated. But to separate them at this point, at a time

when politically Kissinger's area is one of the few areas with which they are not having difficulties, would be very unwise thing since it would reduce Kissinger's prestige both domestically and internationally. Paul Nitze and I both stated that we understood the basis for the decision but made the point that this put a very special onus upon both the President and Rumsfeld to watch Henry's operation since there was no check and balance. Rumsfeld agreed.

6. Rumsfeld pointed out that Kissinger sees the President everyday and that he, Rumsfeld, has been trying to schedule meeting with Schlesinger and the President weekly to try and compensate. He said that he, Rumsfeld, has not been sitting in because of the spate of rumors that Rumsfeld would relieve Schlesinger in Defense, and therefore he couldn't say how they were coming out but he doubted that Schlesinger was as articulate as Kissinger, and therefore probably not getting across as well. He urged Paul Nitze and me to get to Schlesinger and to suggest to him there ought to be more written memos coming across to the President, since the President is a

very good reader. Rumsfeld also said that memoranda from Nitze and Zumwalt directly to Rumsfeld, if the subject matter was useful, could be sent in.

7. Rumsfeld pointed out that he still had the miniature of the U.S.S. Constitution which I had given him when he went to the NATO Ambassadorial post on his shelf in the White House. I asked him if he had dusted it off and gotten it out in anticipation of my visit to which he gave me a smiling negative.