

INSERTS TO WORK INTO THE HONEYMOON CHAPTER:

INSERT #1: My preparation to deal with the Jordan Crisis began ~~d~~ during that very first meeting of the JCS which I have described, the one ~~which~~ that took place on 6 July 1970. In that meeting I had had to deal with requests for equipment to Isarel which in some cases involved giving away items that were deployed on aircraft. In other words, I had learned in that very first meeting that our cupboard was so bare that not only did we not have a surge tank from which to provide Israel but, infact, we had to deny our own fighting forces capability in some cases. This was a shocking revelation as to just how thin our logistic lighter had become as a result of austere budgeting. I also became aware in that first meeting <sup>of</sup> ~~that~~ the split between the State Department and the Defense Department. State generally being of the view that the Israelis ought to be provided the equipment without strings whereas the Pentagon was generally of the view that the Israel- is should be required to agree to certain concessions consistent with US foreign policy in exchange for the equipment which we in the Penta- gon found so precious. And then again just four days later, ~~at/then~~ on 10 July 1970, my operational deputy for JCS matters, VADM "Champ" Blou- in, informed me that on the 9 June the Secretary of State had forward- ed to the President a paper concerning "next steps in the Middle East", which was not cleared with anyone in the Pentagon. Among other items it had recommended " earmark--four additional Skyhawks per month out of future productions for delivery starting in Septmeber through the end of the year". This memorandum had been considered by the NSC on the 10th of June and on the 18th of Junde an NSC Decision Memorandum was issued by Henry Kissinger conveying the Presidential decision, which was to approve the Secretary of States recommendation concerning the four per month of these A-4 aircraft. Only after the NSDM had been

signed and made available to the Pentagon was the Pentagon aware of the problem, aware of the requirement. Unfortunately, current production would not support four planes per month commencing in September. When the Israeli ambassador learned that the US could not deliver the new A-4s in the time frame specified, he of course protested to Henry Kissinger.

Our impression was that Joe Sisco of the State Department, then an Assistant Secretary of State, and Henry Kissinger on the one hand had differed for some time with those in the Pentagon on the question of aid to Israel. The JCS and the Secretary of Defense had favored demanding a quid pro quo in the form of political concessions prior to granting aid while State had generally favored unconditional aid in the expectation of achieving desired political aims. The Presidential directive in this instance had caused the Pentagon to implement an impossible Presidential decision which resulted from inadequate staffing. The incident caused harsh ~~word~~ words on all sides. A special task group, chaired by Secretary Warren Nutter, the Assistant Secretary of State for International Security Affairs, was therefore appointed to serve as a single point of contact for all questions concerning Israeli assistance. And although this did not resolve the A-4 issue, by the time of VADM Blouin's report, he was able to tell me that "tempers have cooled and relative calm has been restored".

I also need to work into the previous paragraphs the fact that at a meeting held at the White House on the 10th of July when Henry Kissinger had been highly annoyed by the fact that DOD had not taken action on the Presidential decision.

By the 17th of July of 1970, the JCS were spending an appreciable amount of time studying Middle East problems. There was

discussion of possible US courses of action for a show of force to get the message across to the Soviets that the US opposed their moves in Egypt. There were continuing questions as to what to provide Israel in the way of capabilities. The Pentagon was prepared to provide what was needed within its capability but lacked policy decisions at the national level and there was a continuing desire not to rock the boat while cease-fire efforts were in progress. At a JCS meeting in the latter part of July, Adm Moorer indicated that there was considerable discussion continuing at the national level with respect to additional equipment for Israel but that the current administration position seemed to be to "drag its feet while awaiting the outcome of progress being made with negotiations".

Ø On the 27th of August 1970, the JCS received a briefing from the "Middle East Task Group" (METG), which had been set up as a result of the failure of the State Department and NSC to coordinate previously with the Pentagon. After that briefing Adm Moorer reported that Israel was "up to its ears in debt" and that he didn't know how they were going to pay for the equipment they've already received or for what they would be getting in the future. He stated that nevertheless the question keeps arising at the White House and in the Washington Special Action Group (WSAG) concerning how we can get Israel enough weapons to make her feel secure during the cease-fire period, yet not give them so much that they would feel confident enough to march off across the Canal into Egypt. He reported that the real threat to Israel at the Canal came from the UAR's artillery and their surface to air missiles against aircraft. He also discussed beyond the immediate problems, a long range problem. If the cease-fire succeeded, then what if Israel did agree to withdraw from the territory she held, then what would the US have to give Israel over the long range? If the US per-

what would the US have to give Israel over the long range? If the US persuaded Israel to withdraw, they will certainly make heavy demands for more equipment. The previous week, the Deputy Secretary of Defense Dave Packard, had met with Ambassador Rabin of Israel and they had reached agreement on a small package of equipment. Funding, however, is a problem which has not been resolved. And Israel ~~is~~<sup>was</sup> looking for an additional package. Therefore, the Task Group was going to be examining what they ought to be given over the long term. Adm Moorer was concerned over the cost of the provision of this equipment. The briefing by the METG was to demonstrate what was being done and what the Israelis could do in defense against a UAR invasion across the Canal and what kind of equipment might be needed in the future. It was pointed out that Israel already owes the US about \$700,000,000. For determining just what would be in the equipment packages for Israel, the Chairman, Adm Moorer, had been urging Henry Kissinger to tell us just what it is we want Israel to be able to do. ~~The work of the~~ The work of the Chiefs involved examining the various alternatives that the National Security Study Memoranda had suggested might be considered with regards to the Middle East, we had to examine the intelligence concerning the artillery strengths of both Israel and the UAR as they faced each other across the Canal, of relative capabilities of various artillery pieces, the options that might be open to Israel to cope with the UAR, and in the light of the foregoing, determining the criteria for the types of equipment which might go into possible packages for the Israelis and the costs of those packages. We had to examine relative capabilities of each side for crossing the Canal and the likelihood that either side might decide to do so. In August it was our view that Israel might very likely want to cross.

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD:

Baby called on 20 November to report that he would leave within a week, that the White House Staff was still largely under the control of Nixon appointees with almost no movement to date at rolling them over, and that he had personally remonstrated with Marsh about the slowness of the removal of Nixon appointees and with the appointment of Ford men. He states that Marsh is planning to have two deputies, one a lame duck congressman, to work on legislative liaison and the other, Bill Baroode, to work with civilian organizations and in addition he will have an executive assistant coordinating both. He states that this is the first feeble move to depart from the previous overall centralized chief of staff system. He stated that Rumsfeld had never debriefed Marsh on the Nitze-Zumwalt visit and that ~~the~~ no action had been taken to date on any recommendations made by us. He assumes that Kissinger is still completely in control of the President on foreign policy. He reported that Frank Bartlett had lunch with him and Marsh recently and ~~B/~~ said to Marsh, "Jack, you know that Henry couldn't even win a case in New York divorce court, that ~~he~~ is very bad news for the President and the country, and you ~~AK~~ know that ~~I/know/that~~ I know it and I know that you know it." He said that Marsh was embarrassed but agreed. He feels that the President is just simply not able to get the idea that he is in charge and is drifting waiting for others to give him the message.

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD: (SUBJ: TELCON WITH STEVE MINIKES)

1. Steve reports his intention to talk to Gov-elect Brown and to John Price re; Walter HOADLEY. ~~to/Steve/telephone/that~~
2. Steve reports that Adm Rickover stopped him once in the corridor of the Pentagon and subsequently, has called him ~~four~~ times on the telephone four days running to try to destroy Zumwalt in Steve's eyes. He says that Rickover sounds crazy to him. He each day has ranted and raved about how Zumwalt has a superb brain but had his mind made up about the sea control ship and the

surface effect ship and was never willing to listen to the analysis and that he (Rickover) could have kept Zumwalt from ruining the Navy if Zumwalt had been willing to listen. Steve says that he has been unable to figure out what Rickover's objectives are and can only concluded that he is really a nut.

3. Steve meeting with Dick Shifter to talk about politics.

~~MEMO~~ MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD: (SUBJ: MEETING WITH ATTORNEY GEN. SAXBE)

On 19 November, I met Att Gen Saxbe at Atlanta as we were both returning to Washington. I asked him whether he ~~know~~<sup>thought</sup> that Pres Nixon was guilty when he took the Att Gen's job. He said no, that as a matter of fact he had asked the President specifically whether he was and the President had looked him in the eye and assured him that he was absolutely not guilty. Saxbe went on to say that he had heard from others in the Cabinet that later the President ~~had~~ got so vehement in protesting his innocence that he would grab them by the lapels and shake them and insist that he was innocent. Saxbe went on to say that of course Nixon was guilty as hell. I commented that I thought that ~~the~~<sup>the</sup> emotion in the country about Mr Nixon's pardon ~~Ford~~ had begun to abate. Saxbe said yes but that Ford had taken a hell of a beating at a time when he really couldn't afford to take it. He went on to say that in his judgement, Ford's problem was that he had almost a hero worship of Mr Nixon, that he had loved to spend hours with Mr Nixon when Ford was Minority Leader and later when he was Vice President and that in his judgement Ford would have done even more for Mr Nixon had the Staff and Cabinet not restrained him. I asked Mr Saxbe whether he intended to stay on for the duration and he said yes he intended to stay until 1976 unless he got fired sooner.

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD: (SUBJ: CONVERSATION WITH BABY)

One additional item reported was that the economic agency initiative proposed by me had been staffed by the NSC staff and the CIEP...

CONVERSATION WITH CHUCK WARDELL (SENSITIVE)

1. Chuck Wardell was a young ex-Army officer who was recommended to Gen Al

Haig to be his special assistant by David Halperin. On 24 November, we had the opportunity to spend several hours with him, § (24 Nov 74). He had the following things to say, recorded not necessarily in the order that they were stated: A) An FBI agent guard or ~~agent~~ agent going through the White House one evening found Pres Ford and his secretary, both insensible from drink, lying on the floor of the President's office. B) With regard to the President and the tapes, ~~the~~ Chuck states that the President permitted no one to have access to them once they became a matter of controversy other than Haldeman. It is his belief that they were typed up by ~~those~~ Rosewood or Rosewood's personal secretary, that deletions to eliminate the guilty matter were made by Buzhardt and that no one else saw them. Chuck states that ~~was~~ he and Al Haig were leaving the President after the President had been told that he had lost the Supreme Court case with regard to turning over the tapes and would have to do so, he authorized (the President) Al Haig to look at them and said, "you might want to listen to that tape of the 23rd first (this demonstrating that the President realized that that was the one that really would nail him)". // C) At the meeting at ~~San~~ San Clemente, when the final last ditch strategy was being discussed and the President was ready to resign it was Pat Nixon who fought like a tigress against it, insisting that he should go down the hard way. D) Concerning my appearance in the White House to be offered the VA job, Chuck states the following: Haig's assistant (some LCol Geo. \_\_\_) who came up to me and said, "now's the time for you to be patriotic and stiffen your spine with regard to the Directorship of the VA was a Haig synchophant and Chuck was quite embarrassed to hear this fellow telling the Chief of Naval Operations how to behave. Chuck states that there is no doubt in his mind that Haig offered me the post as Director of the VA as I had contended in my letter declining the job. Chuck said that Haig was ~~settled~~ furious that it was made to look as though the post had been offered and insisted that a reply go back ~~worded~~ worded in the vane that I was just one

of the candidates. He said that he could never understand the reason for Haig's animosity because he had a lot of respect for me professionally but considered it a matter of personal jealousy. E) Chuck told Dave that Pres Nixon had telephoned Pres Ford to state that if Ford ~~did~~ did not grant him a pardon, he (Nixon) was going to go public and claim that Ford had promised the pardon in exchange for the Presidency, because Ford had been so eager to get the Presidency. Chuck reported to Dave that this was the reason behind Ford's frantic decision to pardon Nixon. F) During the last month of Nixon's regime, he became so paranoid and so emotional that no one could bear to spend the long hours with him required to give him his therapy. On one occasion, ~~Big~~ Zeigler was called by the President. Chuck received the call and went in to ~~the~~ tell ~~the~~ Zeigler the President wanted to talk to him. Zeigler told Chuck to tell the President he was out. Chuck left the room and then realized the operator had told him that she had just tracked Mr Zeigler down to that office. He went back in and told Zeigler ~~that~~ that the operator knew he was there. Zeigler then took the call but gave Chuck unmerciful hell for his stupidity and incompetence. On another occasion when Nixon sent for Haig Haig instructed Chuck to break him out with a note in about 20 minutes. After about 20 minutes, Chuck went in and handed Haig a blank piece of paper. Haig, apparently forgetting that he had asked to be broken out, looked at the paper and said, "There's nothing on it." Chuck, in embarrassment, said "Oh, I picked up the wrong paper", went back to his desk, picked up another piece of paper, and wrote "There's nothing on this either", folded it up and took it back in to Haig who, furiously crunched it up and stuck it in his pocket. G) With regard to taping, Chuck has the following to say: Both Kissinger and Haig were fully and completely involved. The former assistant Director of the FBI, Mr Sullivan, who knew all about it, wrote a memorandum for the record to specify who had told whom to do what as a matter of protection ~~for~~ for himself and sent a copy of this memorandum to the President.

tion for himself and sent a copy of this to Kissinger, who was furious. It is Chuck's belief that Kissinger knowingly lied and that Haig then felt that he had to lie to the committee since Kissinger had already done so. It is Chuck's belief that taping continues. He believes that I may very well be taped. With regard to the Mideast alert, I informed Chuck that during the Yom Kippur War when the Chairman and the Secretary of Defense came back to the Pentagon from the decision to give the alert that I had said to Bill Clements that it sounded to me as though the President was not ever really consulted, that although Henry had left the room it seemed to me that that was probably a deception. And Clements had said that he had had the same concern and had confronted Schlesinger with it and Schlesinger had admitted that the President had ~~not~~ never been consulted. Chuck said that this was a matter of such great sensitivity that he did not believe that he should comment on it. (It is my belief that this means that Haig made the decision and that the President was incompetent to make the decision at the time--whether ~~not~~ drunk or in an ~~emotional~~ emotional state I'd only have to guess.) Chuck told Dave Halperin, Dave thought, that Pres Ford made a ~~deal~~ deal with Haig that he would become the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff after his NATO tour. In conversation with me when I raised the report that I had that Howie Kerr had heard Al Haig say that the President wanted to make him Chief of Staff of the Army, Chuck said that that was right. It may be that Dave misunderstood Chief of Staff for Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but in any event it is clear that Ford has promised Haig a move to one or the other after a period in NATO. It is Chuck's belief that if Haig is ever required to testify on all he really knows about the period when he was working for Kissinger that he'll never get confirmed. Chuck reports that when Haig took command of the European command, that the slurs were worst then recorded in the newspapers. He states that most of the high ranking officers did not show up, that Haig gave a "fire and brimstone speech" and that no one clapped, almost everybody walked

off and didn't come up to congratulate him. He states further that Goodpastor not only wrote the other nations that he did not desire to be relieved but that he had also written a letter to the President and had made it public, saying the same thing. J) Chuck states that when Haig began to sense that Nixon was going to be impeached he began then to court Ford assiduously for the last eight months. He said that the day of the decision for Mr Nixon to resign, it was fantastic to see the adroitness with which Haig moved bureaucratically to insure that he had his future job nailed down with ~~xxxx/xxxx/~~ prospective Pres Ford during a period when Ford was completely dependent upon him. K) Chuck states that Gen Haig is a man without any real integrity. He believes that Gen Haig hates himself for the way in which he has clawed his way to the top within the Army system, using his White House connection. He states that he knows of no one of Haig's Army peers who has any friendship or loyalty to him. He states that nevertheless that during that last eight months when it was clear that the President was emotionally incapable of acting as President, that Haig did so and was quite conscious of the fact that he was well above his depth. He said that he felt that Haig was a frightened man during that period of time and that it was clear that he was desperately trying to do his best to hold it together. L) Chuck remembered George Anderson only as the man who refused to turn in his ~~xxxx~~ telephone credit card, after Chuck had come to the decision that he had to take it away from him because George Anderson was running up such huge bills, making personal business calls on the White House telephone. He said that finally, not able to retrieve the card from George Anderson, he wrote a memorandum that after January 15, the telephone credit card would no longer be honored, thus effectively revoking it. M) With regard to Pat Nixon, Chuck said that she hated the President, that on several occasions when he was sitting in the outer office he heard her shrieking at the President in the office saying, "You've ruined my life. I've sacrificed my whole life for you" and obviously having a violent

reaction to the President. He says that Tricia is a prime "bitch", very demanding of the staff, dissatisfied with the quality of cars being provided even in her father's dying hours as President. N) Chuck says that the President is completely broke at the present time in San Clemente (Pres Nixon). And that his bills ~~are~~ <sup>have</sup> so far overtaken his income that the heating has been turned off at San Clemente. O) Chuck says that during the June/July summit meeting in Moscow, things were at an all time worst. Kissinger was petulant in Moscow after his violent temper tantrum in Austria where he threatened to quit. He was being cut out of the conferences by Nixon who was, with increasing frequency in those final months, insisting petily that he was President and that no one was going to assume his prerogatives, that Kissinger really was not permitted to sit in on some of the discussions and was therefore bitching to the press about being cut out. Chuck saw the messages or telephone calls coming in from Moscow about getting Zumwalt off the Meet the Press program and threatening to destroy him. He says that these were primarily the result of Kissinger inflaming the President and that Haig was of course involved. P) Chuck confirms what I had heard from Dick Camel and Dave Halperin that the President tended to vacillate between the dovish line of Kissinger and the hawkier ~~line~~ line of Haig and that Haig, as he had told me at our lunch, did have to slip in and get to the President when Kissinger was not around to try to buck him up on issues all in support of the Pentagon position. Q) Chuck had responsibility for insuring that after Mr Nixon's resignation speech, all access to his walk back from the Executive office ~~building~~ building to his family quarters in the White House were cut off so that the President would not have to see anyone. R) Chuck confirms what we had heard from several other sources that Mr Nixon never watched television or read the newspapers and was therefore cut off from all except those items that his staff ~~spoon~~ spoon fed him. S) During the course of his last several months,

Chuck heard the President in telephone and direct conversations castigate every ethnic group in the US as being against him--the Jews ,the Niggers, the Catholics, the Wasps, etc. T) Chuck reports that he and Haig worked every day very frequently til midnight or one o'clock and Sundays from nine until six yet Nixon had an almost paranoid resentment any time Haig wasnot available. Once in awhile Haig would get off to the tennis courts and the staff had to lie about where he was and to get him to scrabmle back to answer the telephone call. On one occasion when Haig and Chuck were in the sauna the President called. There was an air conditioned phone in the sauna. Haig took the phone and when the President would ask quzestions that Haig couldn't answer, he would say, "Just a minute, I'll have my staff bring in the file," where upon Chuck, with a towel around his naked body, would dash ~~to~~ to another phone and call the office to get the information and bring it back to Haig. The conversatiann went on for almost an hour and Haig nearly fried in the sauna rather ~~than~~ than to tell the President where he was. Chuck said that Haig was very vain about his balding hair, that the President's barber use to cut his hair with a hair net on ~~it~~ so that he could spray it and keep the bald spot covered and that Haig would always throw Chuck or anyone else out who came in when this was being done, not wanting them to see it done. Haig further told one of Chuck's contacts after Chuck came in for his first job interview with a moustache, that if he wanted the job he better get rid of the moustache. Chuck described the President as ~~being~~ invariably being so heavily made up that he looked almost like a corpse and by the end of the day like a woman of the evening, he would look very haggard as his make-up began to run. U) Chuck said that under Pres Ford, Kissinger was totally unconstrained with regard to foreign policy whereas Nixon use to get in and overrule the softer parts of his foreign policy. V) Chuck states that as of 24 November, Higbee is still on the White House payroll. He said that no one can stand Higbee and that he has begged to stay on because as a very young

man making a very high salary and smeared with his association with Haldeman he's not able to get another job. W) Haldeman insisted that wherever he went that the guards stand at attention as he walked by a la Prussian. X) Chuck states that Dan Rather was removed from the White House presscorps out of paranoid concern ~~after~~ <sup>for</sup> what he knew after his first attack on the Watergate.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD: (SUBJ: TELCON WITH SECDEF SCHLESINGER ON 25NOV74 --JUST BEFORE JIMMY BABY'S PARTY):

1. He was returning my call placed earlier in the day to him.
2. He reported that he had heard good things about my speech to the Coalition for a Democratic Majority and that I had really laid it on the line.
3. I said that that eliminated the need to report one thing so that the only thing I needed to know was his reaction to the Vladivostok summit meeting.
4. Schlesinger said that he was pleased with it, that there was no talk of inequality, ~~that~~ there was freedom to mix and that ~~there~~ were equal aggregates. I asked him what about the question of their megatonnage superiority and throw weight superiority. Schlesinger said that was a good point and they have that superiority but we got more arms stability than ~~we~~ I would have thought. He~~s~~ said we have begun the unmaking of the unequal aspects of the previous agreement. He said there are no limits on forward basing, no compensation for the Soviets because ~~of~~ of the Chinese problem, no compensation to the Soviets because of the UK or French strategic weapons. He said that he would have preferred more arms stability. I asked him what he meant by arms stability and he~~s~~ said that he would have preferred more constraints on megatonnage and RVs but that nevertheless he thought we were considerably better off than we all felt we would be when Kissinger was about ready to have Nixon sign the disastrous alternative that the June/July summits that both Nitze and Zumwalt had opposed. ~~He~~ I asked him why the Russians had any reason to have come our way and he said testing the ICBMs from the C-5 had worried them.

the Trident program had worried them, and they were getting frightened that the US was beginning to move out. I asked him what about the violations and how can we continue to sign new agreements when they are cheating on the old ones. He said that's a good point and we need to work on that. He said, however, I wouldn't say they're cheating but just that there are some ambiguities. I said what about the increased volume of the SS-19, which is a 50% increase in violation of the deal that 30% increase in volume would be a maximum. He said that is a valid point and we need to make more of it. He then qualified his pleasure to say all we really got was numerical equality and the freedom to mix. But that compared to where we were in July we had done pretty good. He said what we need to do now is to go after the megatonnage inferiority. I asked him if he was telling me that I should be optimistic or praiseful in my comments on this and he said no that there were important admonitions that needed to be made. I said that I would site these. I told him that I thought it was important for him to do a backgrounder to make sure that the press knew that the reason for the improvement in our position at Vladivostok over Moscow was that he (Schlesinger) and the Defense Department had hung tough against Henry. He said that he would rather just have the country be pleased with the deal. I said that I think that it's important with regard to future negotiations that Henry not be judged to be the architect of this one. He said that's a good point and it's the kind of point that you and Paul and others can make. I congratulated him for his success in moving somewhat toward sanity from the Kissinger position.