

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Subject: Meeting Among Paul Nitze, Secretary of Defense Schlessinger, and ERZ at 1100, 27 November

3. I confirmed with Schlessinger that the agreement will give about a two-to-one MIRV throw-weight superiority to the Russians, and about a four-to-one advantage in aggregate superiority to the Russians in missiles.  
Summit.
1. Subject meeting was at the request of Nitze and Zumwalt for the purpose of ascertaining Schlessinger's views on the Vladivostok Summit.
4. I urged Schlessinger to come up with assurances from the Chiefs and the Secretary of Defense as part of the deal as we've done in the past; that is, a requirement to accelerate the movement sea, were prepared to sign at the June-July Summit this year.  
the backfitting of Trident I into Polaris missiles. The achievement of greater accuracies both at sea and ashore, and the accelerated development of Trident II in order to compensate for the throw-weight advantages of the Russians. Schlessinger stated that these were all good points.  
category could only be assured if we put some lower limit on
2. Schlessinger expressed himself as satisfied that the Agreement represented an improvement over that which Nixon and Kissinger had then gone on to say that arms' stability as a second category could only be assured if we put some lower limit on MIRV constraints and achieved in some way a rough equality of throw-weight of the SS-19. Schlessinger said we were not doing Mirv megatonnage. He stated that Kissinger had flatly said anything and that it was important that we get cracking with this.  
that his, Kissinger's, proposals were not negotiable and had
5. I asked if it continued to suit him that Paul Nitze and Bud come with a proposal, the earlier one I have the record of, which in essence would have then reflected in the direction

of arms' stability or giving up arms' balance, and would have given us neither in actual fact.

3. I confirmed with Schlessinger that the agreement will give about a two-to-one MIRV throw-weight superiority to the Russians, and about a four-to-one over all throw-weight superiority to the Russians in missiles.
4. I urged Schlessinger to come up with assurances from the Chiefs and the Secretary of Defense as part of the deal as we've done in the past; that is, a requirement to accelerate the movement sea, the backfitting of Trident I into Polaris missiles, the achievement of greater accuracies both at sea and ashore, and the accelerated development of Trident II in order to compensate for the throw-weight advantages of the Russians. Schlessinger stated that these were all good points.
5. I asked what we were doing about the Soviet cheating with regard to volume of the SS-19. Schlessinger said we were not doing anything and that it was important that we get cracking with this.
6. I asked if it continued to suit him that Paul Nitze and Bud

Zumwalt take a more pessimistic view than he of the outcome. In  
was and much more honest with the people about the impact. In  
Schlessinger said he didn't think that there really was much  
reply to by criticisms of the euphoria created by the President's  
difference between our pessimism and his, yet it was just a  
misstatement, he said that what was really from critics, that  
question of how we would word ours. He was confident that we  
would word ours to sound more pessimistic than his, but that we  
shared the pessimism with regard to the future. He agreed with  
our formulation that we had come from "low horrible" to "very  
poor," but he was very pleased that the President had departed  
from his "guru" Kissinger and had moved toward the Secretary of  
Defense and, in fact, had adopted in essence the new JCS position.  
I reminded him that the older JCS position had insisted on that  
equality of megatonnage. He had forgotten that this was a  
change by the new regime.

7. Schlessinger urged that Nitze and Zumwalt in their discussions  
not paint the President into a corner for fear that we would  
drive him back into Henry's camp. He feels that President Ford  
got a much better deal than Mr. Nixon could have, and that he  
was willing to be much tougher with the Russians than Mr. Nixon

was and much more honest with the people about the impact. In reply to my criticism of the euphoria created by the President's announcement, he said that that was really Press officers, that Nessen was "a fool," but he did agree that the situation on Capitol Hill was quite bad as a result of the euphoric press accounts. He believes that Scoop Jackson's hearing will help to put this all into context.

8. After this was shifted to a discussion of the Navy situation, Schlessinger said that the budget looks good for next year; he had had a long talk with Stennis and pointed out to him that although he can agree with certain elements of "the speech" that clearly the reductions he made in the <sup>FYDP</sup> "fit-up" have insured that we cannot regain our capability against the Russians. He said that Stennis said, "Well, we gave you some of the ~~PE~~," and Schlessinger replied, "Yes, only three of the seven."  
Schlessinger believes that George <sup>Nebm</sup> ~~Mayhew~~ is the real nemesis behind the death of the sea-control ship, and that there is no real prospect of bringing it back to life. I reminded him that

we've got to have some way of getting air power to sea more cheaply since we can't afford to build large numbers of nuclear-propelled aircraft carriers, and he agreed. With regard to accuracy of Trident, I suggested to him that he ought to get an advisory committee in to advise him on the technical aspects because I didn't think that the Navy would ever be able to get Levering Smith to deal with accuracy in an enlightened way since he opposes it so much. Schlessinger said that he really does feel that '76 is the year of the Navy, and that ~~is~~ the kind of sloganeering that can be helpful . . . . .

9. Schlessinger talked about the fact that the worst period of his whole stewardship as Secretary of Defense was the period from the 27th of June to the 30th of June, when I was in my final hours. He reported that the instructions from Haig and Kissinger had been to fire me with only two days left in my watch. He said, "How high profile can you get?" He said that their "paranoia" reached an all-time high. I said, "Not only did you refuse to fire, but you were also under orders to not say anything favorable

at my change of Command, and not a word about the Department of Defense's Service Medal, and you managed to get both of those done.

9. Paul Nitze and I both complimented Schlessinger on his success against Kissinger and urged him to keep up the good work.
10. I asked Schlessinger whether Rumsfeld, being in Peking with Henry, was a sign that the President wanted someone "riding shotgun" on Henry. This actually was Paul Nitze's idea and Paul seconded the thought. Schlessinger said that it was not an illogical thought, but that he just didn't know. He went on to say that Rumsfeld is bright and able, and he does not have the personal relationship with Henry that Haig did, but that nevertheless as Chief of Staff in the White House he does come somewhat under Henry's spell.
11. I reported to Schlessinger that Henry's latest backgrounder tells another lie about Zumwalt's recommendation on <sup>B</sup>SSPN's and SALT I's. Schlessinger said, "Yes, I agree." He said the trouble with Henry is he tells a story, and then nine months'

later when he remembers it, he thinks that that's the truth.

I said, "In other words, you're saying that he only lies the first time. After that, it's just his remembrance of the lie."

And he said, "Yes, except that generally the first when he thinks of is just a little white lie through the tactical emergency of the moment."