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Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 C

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

C O N T E N T S

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The Honorable James R. Schlesinger Secretary of Defense	14
General George S. Brown Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff -- Accompanied by -- Colonel Zane E. Finkelstein Legal and Legislative Assistant to the Chairman	31
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*ask Capt Cochran office to see CG*  
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S. RES. 160

TO DISAPPROVE CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS

ON THE ISLAND OF DIEGO GARCIA

- - -

Tuesday, June 10, 1975

- - -

United States Senate,  
Committee on Armed Services,  
Washington, D.C.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:10 a.m., in Room 1114, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John C. Stennis (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Stennis (presiding), Symington, McIntyre, Byrd (of Va.), Culver, Hart (of Colo.), Leahy, Thurmond, Goldwater and Bartlett.

Also present: T. Edward Braswell, Jr., Chief Counsel and Staff Director; W. Clark McFadden, II, Counsel; John T. Ticer, Chief Clerk; Nancy J. Berg, John A. Goldsmith, Robert Q. Old, James C. Smith, III, Professional Staff Members; Susan J. Clark, Roberta J. Killgare, Clerical Assistants.

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The Chairman. Our Committee will please come to order.

Members of the Committee, this is an open hearing. It may be that we will have to go into closed session later. That will depend upon what facts may develop. Anyone can,

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1 of course, make any suggestion they wish about it, including  
2 the witnesses if we get into matters that are classified.

3 We are glad to have our photographer friends with us,  
4 and we will ask them to remember the rule which they more  
5 or less helped to adopt.

6 I have a one-page statement here, very brief, that I  
7 dictated myself that I will briefly read.

8 We open hearings today under the special resolution  
9 of disapproval of the funds for Diego Garcia in the Indian  
10 Ocean. This is under the special arrangement as to procedure  
11 that was worked out last year by the House and Senate  
12 conferees on the authorization bill.

13 I think it goes without saying that we certainly need  
14 some presence in the Indian Ocean. I have never been one to  
15 be frightened by every movement of the Soviets, but the  
16 Soviet expansion in the Indian Ocean seen in the last few  
17 years, and especially in the last 12 months, or near thereto,  
18 has been extensive. They have recently had ships in the  
19 Indian Ocean tremendously and, of course, they have a right  
20 to do that, and with the opening of the Suez Canal, this  
21 will also make a difference.

22 Further, there is no doubt any longer about the nature  
23 of their missile base at Berbera. Without a doubt this is  
24 a missile base. And I believe I will leave it to the witnesses  
25 to how far they go in disclosing intelligence in this field.

1           Our proposed installation on Diego Garcia is a relatively  
2 small and low profile installation. Our testimony last year,  
3 some of which at least will be brought forward this year,  
4 limits the Navy to a very small installation on this tiny  
5 island, which is really no more than you might call a filling  
6 station, and which in the olden days was called a coaling  
7 station.

8           I was somewhat lukewarm on this matter when it was first  
9 proposed several years ago, but in view of the overwhelming  
10 facts now that have developed, the evidence is clear and  
11 convincing that we need this service station in the Indian  
12 Ocean, and that no more time should be lost. Of course,  
13 it goes without saying that our country and the rest of the  
14 free world have a truly great interest in the oil in the  
15 Middle East, and we certainly cannot afford to be cut off  
16 from there.

17           Now, I extend a welcome to the witnesses today. I  
18 want to ask Senator Symington if he wants to say something  
19 before we start. Senator Symington.

20           Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman, in reading your  
21 memorandum, if everybody felt the way that you do about it  
22 there really would not be any need for a hearing. As you  
23 know, we passed this up in the military construction program  
24 in the Subcommittee approving money subject to the Mansfield  
25 resolution to disapprove the island.

1 I have been involved in this myself for some seven years  
2 I guess or longer. At one time it was presented on the basis  
3 of taking installations out of Ethiopia, especially Eritrea,  
4 which might be a substitute, and since then it has grown in  
5 interest on the part of the Defense Department.

6 Many countries have opposed it. It is not entirely clear  
7 to me whether we have title to the island or whether title  
8 to the island, whether it is without question that it belongs  
9 to us instead of to the British. I have been told by the staff  
10 actually in this ocean the French have as much influence in  
11 the way of position in the ocean as anybody.

12 I heard the Prime Minister of Australia, which is supposed  
13 to be a friend of ours, say that not only did his country  
14 oppose it, but that every country on the Indian Ocean opposed  
15 development of this naval base.

16 You talk about a very small installation on this tiny  
17 island. A carrier can be based on the island, as plans go,  
18 and also it has a 12,500 foot runway. So regardless of how  
19 small it is, it is a creation of a major strategic base in  
20 an ocean which at times has been called the one remaining  
21 ocean of peace.

22 I really do not think it makes much difference what we  
23 do here now on it. I understand that we are developing. I  
24 think it is going to be developed. But I notice that Senator  
25 Mansfield put in the record of June 2nd a statement from

1 Kuala Lumpur that the United States is going ahead with  
2 construction of an air and naval reconnaissance facility on  
3 Diego Garcia Island on the Indian Ocean despite opposition  
4 from Congress, according to Philip Habib. Philip Habib said  
5 at a news conference that the United States "has no aggressive  
6 intention at all in the Indian Ocean and that the move is to  
7 ensure the safety of U.S. ships and commitments in the area."  
8 Mansfield said, "I do not know what the commitments are. I  
9 do know that Congress has not yet approved the proposal to the  
10 President of the United States. I hope here again the words  
11 would be muted until the facts are laid out and a decision  
12 is reached."

13 And when Mr. Whitlam, Prime Minister of Australia had  
14 a press conference in New York at the U.N., and then Mr.  
15 Spivak asked him on Meet the Press: "Mr. Prime Minister,  
16 you have been critical of United States plans to strengthen  
17 naval facilities in the Indian Ocean at Diego Garcia. Do  
18 you think it is unnecessary for the United States to do that  
19 in order to meet increased naval pressure in that area?"

20 "Mr. Whitlam: As I said, when I was asked at a press  
21 conference at the U.N. on this three days ago, there is no  
22 nation around the Indian Ocean which welcomes a buildup on  
23 this uninhabited British group of islands.

24 "Mr. Spivak: Would you like to see the United States  
25 withdraw entirely from the Indian Ocean regardless of what

1 the Russians do?

2 "Mr. Whitlam: No. Certainly not. Certainly not.  
3 Russia and America are the world's great naval powers. They  
4 can sail wherever they choose. That is clear. But, we don't  
5 want a proliferation of armaments in the Indian Ocean, which  
6 up until now has been freest of all of the world's oceans  
7 of this American-Soviet confrontation."

8 I noticed in the paper this morning in a story in the  
9 New York Times that we are selling three submarines to Iran.  
10 And it seems to me that once again we are expressing, despite  
11 our problems in the Far East, and our possible problems in  
12 other parts of the world, we are going against the advice of  
13 the late Walter Lippman who warned this country that we did  
14 not, the United States did not have any mandate to police the  
15 world.

16 Now, I did not know I was going to make a statement,  
17 Mr. Chairman, because I did not know that you were going to be  
18 as strong an advocate for the Island prior to testimony. But  
19 I would say that one of the reasons that I am taking this  
20 position at this time is that I believe that a sound economy  
21 and a sound dollar are as important to national security as  
22 the location of any additional bases in the Far East. And  
23 I would hope that we would be as interested in Soviet sub-  
24 marines off our coast and in the Caribbean as we are in the  
25 Indian Ocean. It seems to me that it is becoming increasingly

1 clear that this system we have can no longer exist over an  
2 indefinite period with the 60, 70, 80, 90 billion annual  
3 deficit, not debt, and the predictions that we already have  
4 of a deficit for next year of over \$70 billion.

5 So for these reasons that I have just taken off the top  
6 of my head I am sorry that I cannot agree on the important  
7 necessity of this proposed additional expansion of the United  
8 States in the part of the world which is so far away from the  
9 United States.

10 And one other point. If it is necessary for us to spend  
11 the tens of billions of dollars that we are spending in order  
12 to launch missiles anywhere from 4 to 6,000 miles with the  
13 TRIDENT, and with the retrofitted POSIEDON, provided we reduce  
14 the number of warheads in the POSIEDON, then we are not only  
15 wanting to eat our cake but to have it too at the same time.  
16 Of course, it is just another expense that I do not think is  
17 necessary, and I am becoming increasingly worried about the  
18 economic, fiscal, and monetary problems of the country.

19 I am sorry that I cannot agree with Senator Stennis on  
20 that, but as long as he asked me to make a statement and let  
21 me give my position on it, I want to say in all good humor  
22 that this is the way I feel about it and has been the way  
23 that I have felt about it for some years as the Chairman of  
24 the Military Construction Subcommittee and based on the  
25 overall situation I find developing in the testimony on the

1 Foreign Relations Committee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

2 The Chairman. Thank you, Senator.

3 Let me just say this, especially in view of the fact  
4 that we have additional members of our Committee, gentlemen  
5 who have shown a very fine interest in the subject matter  
6 early, and we have been at it since January and diligently,  
7 the money, the primary money -- I will wait until I can have  
8 their attention -- the primary money for Diego Garcia was in  
9 the authorization bill and the appropriations bill last year.  
10 But there was a special agreement that this matter would be  
11 subject to a resolution of disapproval before the money could  
12 be spent. At that time there was some question about the  
13 position of the British government with reference to this  
14 island.

15 Now, this year, the second increment of some \$10 or \$12  
16 million I believe it is --

17 Senator Symington. I think it is \$13.

18 The Chairman. \$13 million, but it was part of last  
19 year's justification, but left out with the understanding that  
20 it could be presented. It is in this year's authorization  
21 bill, and I want to thank the Senator from Missouri for his  
22 cooperation in just letting that ride along with whatever  
23 happens to this resolution. And that is the authorization  
24 bill for military construction that passed the Senate yesterday.

25 So this is a special proceeding under this special

1 resolution.

2 Now, Senator Thurmond, you have come in since I opened  
3 the meeting. You are the senior member of the Minority, and  
4 I call on you if you wish to make some remarks now.

5 Senator Thurmond. Mr. Chairman, I supported this matter  
6 previously, I support it now. I do not think there is any  
7 question about it that the Soviets are expanding in the Indian  
8 Ocean, and especially in the last 12 months, and that it is  
9 important for us to proceed with this installation.

10 The Chairman. All right, unless there are some other  
11 remarks that wish to be made, gentlemen, we will proceed.

12 Senator Goldwater. Mr. Chairman?

13 The Chairman. Senator Goldwater.

14 Senator Goldwater. Mr. Chairman, I feel very strongly  
15 about this Indian Ocean. I do not think there is any question  
16 in the minds of anyone who studies strategy that the Indian  
17 Ocean has become the focal point of global strategy with the  
18 opening up of the Suez Canal, with the importance of the  
19 Straits of Malacca. He who controls the Indian Ocean is going  
20 to control the economy of the world as long as oil is needed  
21 to run the economy of the world.

22 Now that we have lost South Vietnam, and I hate to say  
23 this, are about to lose Thailand, and the Straits of Tai  
24 go to the enemy, they can do with their massive army what the  
25 Japanese could not do with their massive Navy; namely, take

1 the Straits of Thai, take Indonesia, take all of the countries  
2 down through and including the Straits of Malacca, at which  
3 time those straits could be denied to any country in the  
4 world not friendly to Red China or any of her allies.

5 And now as to the Indian Ocean itself, too many of us  
6 forget the geography of that vast ocean. We have Afghanistan  
7 and Pakistan bordering Iran, standing between the southern  
8 Soviet border and the northern shores of the Indian Ocean.  
9 I do not think it is any secret that Afghanistan and the  
10 Soviets have been talking; they may even be in the process  
11 now, I am not sure, of building highways or railroads down  
12 to try and make an agreement with Pakistan, which at the  
13 present time is not any possibility to the end that Asia will  
14 have access to the Indian Ocean by rail or by highway or  
15 by both.

16 Now, Mr. President, when we sit here and realize that  
17 the closest naval installation that we have to the Indian  
18 Ocean is Subic Bay, and it is 4,000 miles away, and that if  
19 the Straits of Malacca are closed to us we have absolutely  
20 no control over the importance of the Indian Ocean.

21 Now, I have the same apprehension about the economy of  
22 this country as my friend from Missouri. And in fact, I  
23 think it is just as strong, it might even be greater, and I  
24 suggest that the money we spend on defense is not the major  
25 cause of the decline of the dollar or of inflation. It is

1 the money that we waste on every other thing that we do in  
2 this country. The money we spend on national defense becomes  
3 a smaller part of our Gross National Product and a smaller  
4 part of our budget than it has been at any time, and I think  
5 it has reached a dangerous level. And I merely bring that in  
6 so that we all know where we stand.

7 I support the effort to open Diego Garcia.

8 The Chairman. All right, gentlemen, if there is  
9 nothing further, we will ask the Secretary to proceed. Now,  
10 Mr. Secretary, I have asked them to put those charts down  
11 on the floor so that the gentlemen at the table can see and  
12 hear better. But I am glad that you have some charts, which  
13 I hope are good ones. Sometimes it looks like they are kind  
14 of drawn lefthanded, but I hope you have some. I am a third  
15 grader, I barely got beyond the third grade, you understand.

16 Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman, I would hope that if  
17 there are any other members of the Committee, my good friend,  
18 Senator Goldwater has expressed his position, you have yours  
19 and I have mine, that they be allowed to express their position  
20 also at this time.

21 The Chairman. I do not think anyone has to ask permission,  
22 Senator.

23 Senator Symington. Somebody raised their hand.

24 The Chairman. I had not noticed that Senator Hart's  
25 hand was raised, and I thank you for calling that to my

1 attention.

2 All right, Senator Hart.

3 Senator Hart. Mr. Chairman, I do not have an opening  
4 statement. I would just like to register my continuing  
5 frustration at not being able to get these statements according  
6 to Committee rules a day ahead of time so that we can study  
7 them.

8 The Chairman. Well, Senator, I said this as soon as  
9 we got through with the authorization bill, and that was  
10 Friday at 6 p.m., a little after, as you know. And I did not  
11 see many around here on Saturday. I did not come myself  
12 Sunday. Frankly, I did not think about it. I am sorry that  
13 we did not have a statement for you, but I do not think they  
14 knew we were going to hold the hearing until I believe I  
15 announced it Friday night. I am sorry. We will do better  
16 next time. I am glad you brought it up, and I stand behind  
17 you on it.

18 Do you have something else?

19 Senator Goldwater. No. I would just like to know when  
20 the meetings are. That's all.

21 The Chairman. Yes. We will get a trumpet, Mr. Clerk,  
22 and call Senator Goldwater in and let him know when we are  
23 having it over here in this building especially, and all of  
24 the rest. I think it would be nice to give a special telephone  
25 call, whether there is additional notice or not when we are

1 meeting outside of the regular place.

2 Senator Goldwater. I would like the trumpet.

3 The Chairman. All right, Mr. Secretary, you may proceed.

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1 STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JAMES R. SCHLESINGER,  
2 SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3 Secretary Schlesinger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

4 Mr. Chairman, if it is the pleasure of the members of  
5 the Committee, I shall read selectively from the statement  
6 so as to consume less time.

7 Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee --

8 The Chairman. All right. We have your statement here  
9 now as I understand before us?

10 Secretary Schlesinger. Yes, Sir.

11 The Chairman. All right.

12 Secretary Schlesinger. I am here today to clarify the  
13 purposes for which we seek an augmentation of our facilities  
14 at Diego Garcia. This is pursuant to the special legislation  
15 in the Military Construction Act of 1975. In Section 613,  
16 in accordance with Section 613, the President has certified  
17 on grounds of military and foreign policy the necessity of  
18 this facility. \$13.8 million is requested for the facility.

19 At the present time we have a limited communications  
20 station on Diego Garcia. The purpose of the new construction  
21 would be to expand this station to include certain support  
22 functions beyond the present communications role.

23 The runway would be lengthened to 12,000 feet from  
24 8,000 feet. Fuel storage would be increased for aviation  
25 fuel from 60,000 barrels to 380,000 barrels, and there would

1 be 320,000 barrels of fuel oil for ships.

2 The anchorage would be dredged in the shallow coral  
3 lagoon which could accommodate the ships of a carrier task  
4 force. The pier would be lengthened to 550 feet of berthing,  
5 primarily for the rapid loading or unloading of fuel.

6 There would be further improvements of the air field,  
7 additional quarters for approximately 300 officers and men,  
8 and additional storage power and other ancillary facilities.

9 The military construction funds required for this project  
10 would approximate \$37.8 million to be carried out by SEABEE  
11 units through fiscal year 1979. At the present time, there  
12 are approximately 600 SEABEES on the island completing pre-  
13 viously authorized work on the communications station and  
14 harbor, which is expected to be finished during this  
15 calendar year. There are about 430 U.S. military personnel  
16 currently assigned to operate the communications station and  
17 the airstrip. Under the expansion program this number would  
18 rise to approximately 600.

19 Our principal objective in requesting this facility is  
20 to provide secure access to logistical support for our  
21 forces operating in the Indian Ocean. Our naval forces  
22 operating there today must rely either on local sources of  
23 fuel or else must be replenished by a chain of tankers  
24 stretching over 4,000 miles from U.S. facilities in the  
25 Phillipines. The additional fuel storage we have proposed

1 would permit a normal carrier task group to operate for about  
2 30 days independent of other sources of supply. That margin  
3 of time could spell the difference between the orderly resupply  
4 of our forces and a hasty improvisation which could place  
5 unwieldy demands on our support assets in other areas. The  
6 same is true of the repair and maintenance which could be  
7 performed on ships and aircraft.

8 In short, the proposed facility would provide the  
9 assurance of U.S. capability to deploy and maintain forces in  
10 an area which has become increasingly important over the past  
11 decade.

12 Mr. Chairman, for nearly two centuries the Indian Ocean  
13 was the military preserve of Great Britain, which exercised  
14 control over the vital sea lanes to India and the many out-  
15 posts of the British Empire. From the early Nineteenth  
16 Century, Britain opposed Czarist attempts to extend Russian  
17 rule into South Asia, just as it later cooperated in countering  
18 postwar Stalinist efforts in Azerbaijan to extent Soviet  
19 influence in the direction of the Persian Gulf.

20 In the economic environment of the 1960's the British  
21 were forced to reorient their priorities toward Europe and  
22 away from Asia and the Indian Ocean. It is an interesting  
23 coincidence that 1968 -- the year the British announced their  
24 intention to withdraw -- was also the year when the USSR first  
25 established what has now become a permanent naval presence in

1 northwest Indian Ocean.

2 While this transition from British dominance to a more  
3 diffuse power structure has been in progress, the interests  
4 of the United States in the Indian Ocean region have been  
5 growing. We have become increasingly dependent on the oil  
6 which is constantly moving in tankers along the sea lanes in  
7 the Indian Ocean, and our allies are even more dependent. We  
8 have an immediate stake in the stability and security of  
9 this very large body of water where half of the world's sea-  
10 borne oil is in transit at any given time.

11 Consequently, we have been concerned at the steady  
12 growth of Soviet military activity in the region. I would  
13 like to review briefly the sequence of events by which this  
14 increase of Soviet military presence has developed.

15 The first Soviet deployments to the Indian Ocean in  
16 1968 were small and tentative in nature. Lacking any shore  
17 facilities, the original contingents of Soviet ships were  
18 satisfied to remain mostly quiescent, spending most of their  
19 time at anchorages in international waters, with only  
20 occasional brief port visits to break what must have been a  
21 monotonous existence. This cautious probing of unfamiliar  
22 waters is very reminiscent of Soviet initial deployments into  
23 the Mediterranean some five years earlier.

24 When the Soviet Navy began to deploy to the Mediterranean  
25 in 1963, following an abortive earlier attempt to introduce

1 submarines into Albania, there were very few ports open to  
2 them and they spent most of their time sitting idly at anchor.  
3 But the Soviets grew more confident with time, and when  
4 Egypt made port and airfield facilities available to them after  
5 1967, they were quick to increase the scope and intensity of  
6 their operations. By the time of the Arab-Israel War of  
7 October 1973, they were able to introduce and sustain an  
8 armada of more than 90 ships, including the most modern in  
9 their inventory.

10 As early as 1962, the Soviets agreed to assist the  
11 government of Somalia in constructing port facilities in  
12 Berbera, a small port overlooking the entrance to the Red  
13 Sea. The harbor was completed in 1969, and by 1971, 16  
14 Soviet ships paid visits to the port. In 1972, Marshal  
15 Grechko visited Somalia for the signing of a Soviet-Somali  
16 Agreement, and this was soon followed by an increase in Soviet  
17 use of facilities at Berbera, including the establishment of  
18 a naval communications site and the arrival of a barracks and  
19 repair ship which has remained as a permanent feature ever  
20 since. In late 1973, the USSR began initial construction of  
21 what has subsequently been identified as a missile storage and  
22 handling facility at Berbera, suggesting that the Soviets had  
23 plans for such a facility even before the events of the  
24 October 1973 war and the introduction of a more frequent U.S.  
25 presence.

1 In July of last year, the USSR signed a Treaty of  
2 Friendship and Cooperation with Somalia, similar to those  
3 signed with Egypt, Iraq and India. Several months later,  
4 approximately coincident with a visit by the Commander of the  
5 Soviet Navy, Admiral Gorshkov, we noted the beginning of a  
6 significant expansion of Soviet facilities at Berbera, including  
7 expansion of the POL storage, construction of additional  
8 housing ashore, and the beginning of a very long airstrip.  
9 The emerging configuration of a missile storage and handling  
10 facility became apparent: It is evident that the USSR is in  
11 the process of establishing a significant new facility capable  
12 of supporting their naval and air activities in the northwest  
13 Indian Ocean.

14 The USSR has also provided assistance to the government  
15 in South Yemen in managing the former British port of Aden,  
16 which was the fourth largest bunkering port in the world when  
17 the Suez Canal was in operation. This port lies directly  
18 across the Gulf of Aden from Berbera and commands the northern  
19 side of the entrance to the Red Sea. In addition, the USSR  
20 is assisting Iraq in the construction of a port, Umm Qasr, at  
21 the northern tip of the Persian Gulf. However, Soviet  
22 development and use of these two facilities have been much  
23 more modest than at Berbera.

24 The Soviet Union has become a major sea power only in the  
25 last decade. The first display of Soviet global naval power --

1 the so-called OKEAN Exercise in 1970 -- was intended to demon-  
2 strate Soviet capability to conduct coordinated naval operations  
3 in every ocean of the world. A similar worldwide exercise was  
4 held in April of this year. For this event, the number of  
5 Soviet ships in the Indian Ocean was approximately doubled.  
6 Activity was centered in the northern Arabian Sea, at the  
7 crossroads of the tanker lanes from the Persian Gulf. The  
8 exercise was supported by long range aircraft operating from  
9 the Soviet Union, and for the first time, by maritime patrol  
10 aircraft operating from airfields in Somalia.

11 It is worth remembering that the entire Soviet buildup  
12 in the Indian Ocean which now averages approximately 19 ships  
13 on a regular basis, has occurred during the period since the  
14 Suez Canal closed in 1967. We anticipate that, with the canal  
15 once again open as of last week, we will see an increase in  
16 the level of Soviet merchant ship traffic and commercial  
17 activity with South Asia. We will be watching very carefully  
18 for any change in the pattern of their naval deployments.

19 As you know, Mr. Chairman, the opening of the canal reduces  
20 the distance from the Black Sea to the Arabian Sea from  
21 11,500 miles to only 2,500 miles -- a difference in sailing  
22 time of 24 days. It also reopens to the USSR a warm water  
23 transit route from European Russia to the Soviet Far East,  
24 which will undoubtedly be important for the transfer of naval  
25 units between eastern and western fleets. Whether this will

1 mean an increase in Soviet naval presence on a regular basis  
2 is not certain, but it will certainly increase Soviet  
3 flexibility in supporting or reinforcing its units in the  
4 Indian Ocean.

5       The level of U.S. presence in the Indian Ocean has been  
6 prudent. We have had a small permanent presence in the  
7 Persian Gulf and Red Sea since 1949, consisting of the command  
8 ship, an LSD and two destroyers of the Middle East Force  
9 centered in Bahrain. In addition, since October 1973, we have  
10 conducted more frequent and more regular deployments to the  
11 area from our Pacific Fleet. Over the past 18 months, there  
12 have been seven such deployments, including five visits by  
13 carrier task groups and two visits by major surface combatants.  
14 Over the past year, we have had an augmented presence in the  
15 area approximately one-third of the time.

16       Although we would strongly prefer to see no Soviet  
17 buildup of military presence in this region, it appears that  
18 the USSR intends to undertake such a buildup. Since an  
19 effective military balance is essential to the preservation of  
20 regional security and stability in this area of great impor-  
21 tance to the economic well being of the industrialized world,  
22 we feel we should have logistical facilities which will permit  
23 us to maintain a credible presence. In a period of historical  
24 transition toward a new set of power relationships, only the  
25 United States among the Western nations has the stature to

1 insure that the balance is maintained.

2 Mr. Chairman, that completes my formal remarks. However,  
3 since the question has been raised about the ongoing activities  
4 at the port of Berbera, I have here some photos and charts  
5 which should illustrate for you the source of our concern.

6 (The prepared statement of Secretary Schlesinger in  
7 full follows.)

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1 The Chairman. All right, Mr. Secretary. Of course,  
2 you can show those. Just watch your speaker there, please,  
3 so we can get the benefit of what you are saying.

4 Secretary Schlesinger. Yes, Sir.

5 Mr. Chairman, the photos that we have here indicate the  
6 activities that are now going on at Berbera. Berbera is  
7 located on the Gulf of Aden in the Horn of Africa, across  
8 from Aden, and helps to control the approaches to the Red  
9 Sea. Most of the Soviet naval activity has taken place in  
10 the Gulf of Aden region, from Aden to Berbera, to the Island  
11 of Socotra, approximately 85 percent of their naval activity.

12 From the Persian Gulf around the Horn of Africa, around  
13 the Cape of Good Hope goes all of the oil from the Middle  
14 East to Western Europe, and a substantial fraction of our  
15 own requirements. And in addition, from the Persian Gulf  
16 most of the oil going to Japan through the Straits of Malacca.

17 I will briefly indicate to you construction of six  
18 types. On the Port facility, on housing facilities which  
19 include new barracks on land as well as a barracks ship. The  
20 communications facility, including both transmitter and  
21 receiver at separate locations. POL storage expansion. The  
22 new airfield construction. And finally, the most sophisticated  
23 of these facilities, the missile storage and handling capa-  
24 bility that is just about operational.

25 Senator Coldwater. Would you tell me what type of

1 missiles are you talking about? In the mid-range?

2 Secretary Schlesinger. These are surface-to-surface  
3 missiles at least for their ships, and probably air-to-surface  
4 missiles as well. We do not know the latter, but we presume  
5 that it is that intention.

6 Senator Goldwater. SAMS?

7 Secretary Schlesinger. As yet there is no indication  
8 of SAMS, Senator Goldwater.

9 This photograph represents strips from a high altitude  
10 reconnaissance mission taken toward the end of April of 1975.  
11 The general layout of the Berbera area is indicated, including  
12 the port facility which is one mile across and two miles. It  
13 is reasonably deep water. The draft is 30 to 60 feet, and  
14 indicated in there are the six facilities that we shall  
15 discuss.

16 Not indicated at this time is the existing sand airstrip  
17 which lies between the POL storage and the high frequency  
18 communications receiver site. That airstrip will be replaced  
19 by the new airfield under construction.

20 Senator Goldwater. What is the approximate scale of  
21 that photograph? In other words, how wide is each one of  
22 those strips?

23 Secretary Schlesinger. Approximately two miles wide,  
24 Senator, each of the strips.

25 The Chairman. All right. Proceed.

1 Secretary Schlesinger. The first authority that has  
2 been in operation since 1970 is the Berbera support facility,  
3 actually since 1969. They have had Soviet naval presence  
4 since the early 1970's.

5 The sea wall is approximately 1,400 feet long, and there  
6 are cranes which you can see in the photograph which permit  
7 the rapid unloading of the vessels. At the time this photo-  
8 graph was taken there was present the barracks ship that had  
9 been towed from Vladivostok in 1972, I believe, a submarine  
10 tanker, a submarine repair ship as well as a freighter which  
11 had just unloaded military equipment for the facility. Soviet  
12 naval vessels were not present in Berbera at the time because  
13 they were participating in the OKEAN exercise, a global  
14 naval exercise, which doubled the number of Soviet naval  
15 vessels operating in the Indian Ocean.

16 There are new facilities which are located ashore. The  
17 total storage area is about 165,000 feet at the port. That  
18 is 165,000 square feet.

19 We have a steady expansion of the housing facilities  
20 at Berbera. The original construction consisted of ten  
21 units which would house approximately 500 men. This would  
22 be in addition to the 300 that can be housed on the barracks  
23 ship. More recently there has been construction of an  
24 additional six facilities that could house an additional 550  
25 men approximately, and there is room within the fence perimeter

1 for two additional such barracks. And even more recently  
2 there has been introduction of Soviet housing trailers which  
3 can house approximately 200 additional personnel. This is  
4 a standard form of Soviet housing. The illustration at the  
5 right is taken from open Soviet literature.

6 All of this area is enclosed in a way that is typical  
7 of the Soviets security assistance operations. There are  
8 guards at the gates in order to protect the Soviet personnel.  
9 Total, including the barracks ship which is indicated at the  
10 port, it would permit the Soviets to house approximately  
11 1,500 people in the area.

12 Next, please.

13 The long-range communications facilities which are  
14 operated at Berbera and has operated at Berbera since 1972  
15 is directed by and large towards the North and to the West,  
16 North for communications with Moscow, West and East for  
17 communications into Africa and into the Indian Ocean area.  
18 These two areas also are fenced, as indicated in the perimeter.

19 At the receiver site there is a special security area  
20 within the compound which has air conditioning facilities.  
21 This is probably an area for coding and decoding, and it is  
22 under special security arrangements.

23 Next, please.

24 Originally there was a petroleum storage area with a  
25 pipeline to the harbor permitting refueling of ships in the

1 harbor of approximately 40,000 barrel capacity. This was  
2 built by Royal Dutch Shell. More recently there has been a  
3 further expansion of the capacity amounting to approximately  
4 130,000 barrels of capability which will result in total fuel  
5 capacity of 170,000 barrels approximately. The construction  
6 you see once again is drawn from established Soviet practice  
7 in which a large spool of steel is transported. It is 42  
8 feet high and its base is established, and then construction  
9 proceeds with the unwinding of that spool of steel. This  
10 illustration is taken from open Soviet literature. We have  
11 seen similar construction activities in Vietnam and Cuba,  
12 and more recently in Syria.

13 Senator Goldwater. What is the base?

14 Secretary Schlesinger. It is steel, too, Senator.

15 Senator Goldwater. How long does it take them to  
16 construct that tank?

17 Secretary Schlesinger. It is about three months or  
18 four months, something of that sort.

19 Senator Goldwater. How long does it take to build such  
20 a tank with our methods?

21 Secretary Schlesinger. Excluding the time in getting  
22 Congressional approval, it would take us approximately nine  
23 months to a year, Senator.

24 The Chairman. All right. Let's proceed, please.

25 Secretary Schlesinger. Next chart, please.

1           We have under construction a new airfield and the cleared  
2 area amounts to 16 to 17,000 feet, and lies to the north of  
3 the city itself. The runway is now under construction. In  
4 addition, the runway is about 16,050 feet across. There is  
5 also a taxiway which is apparently under construction. We  
6 would estimate that the ultimate airstrip will amount to  
7 14,000 to 15,000 feet.

8           Next chart, please.

9           Here you see construction activities underway at the  
10 airstrip. The grading can be seen at the left. The next  
11 phase after the grading is the spreading of oil, and then  
12 several layers, up to seven layers, depending on the weight  
13 of the aircraft, of crushed rock will be put on top of the  
14 oiled area. The crushed rock in this case comes from a quarry  
15 that has recently been developed approximately one mile  
16 south of the airfield.

17          Next chart, please.

18          This is perhaps the most interesting and sophisticated  
19 facility that we have seen at Berbera. It is the missile  
20 handling and storage facility. This facility is a fenced,  
21 secured area. Each of the three component areas within the  
22 main fenced area is also separately fenced. There is a  
23 checkout and an assembly area, a component storage area and  
24 a missile handling and fueling area. This facility is similar  
25 to those that have been constructed in the Soviet Union. You

1 will note the wide roads, the drive-through facilities, the  
2 very large aprons, the hard pans that permit the handling of  
3 missiles, and a high bay facility which permits the rapid  
4 handling of missiles.

5 Most recently we have noted the presence of missiles at  
6 this facility. Until recently we were only aware of the  
7 construction activities, which is quite parallel to that which  
8 exists in the Soviet Union.

9 Generally speaking, there has been a substantial increase  
10 in the activities in this area. We do not believe that the  
11 missile storage and the missile handling and storage facility  
12 is in any way connected with the operation of the Somalis.  
13 Proceeding with room for the housing of up to 1,500 Soviet  
14 personnel is an indication, with the secure fencing arrange-  
15 ment, the secured areas that the Soviets intend this to be  
16 a very substantial facility.

17 In terms of manpower, in terms of certain types of  
18 facilities, it is far larger than the facility intended at  
19 Diego Garcia.

20 Mr. Chairman, I thought that these reconnaissance photos  
21 would be of interest to the Committee in setting the stage.

22 The Chairman. I hope you have some now showing us  
23 Subic Bay and the distance to the Subic Bay and so forth.

24 Now, gentlemen, I have just a few questions.

25 Let's see now, there is no use in us having any trouble

1 here. The Chair announced the rule about photographers.  
2 We will let you come in later, but not during the hearing.  
3 We think the testimony is the primary thing for consideration.

4 We hope you have charts showing the distance to Subic  
5 Bay.

6 Now, I will be very brief in my questions and we will  
7 move on to the other members. But we have General Brown,  
8 and General Brown, we are glad to have you. You, of course,  
9 are Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and you have a  
10 prepared statement which we have before us here. If it is  
11 agreeable to the Committee, I believe that it works well to  
12 get both statements out here before we have the questioning.

13 General Brown, do you want to put your statement in  
14 the record and summarize it, or would you rather read it?

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1 STATEMENT OF GENERAL GEORGE S. BROWN, CHAIRMAN,  
 2 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, ACCOMPANIED BY: COLONEL  
 3 ZANE E. FINKELSTEIN, LEGAL AND LEGISLATIVE  
 4 ASSISTANT TO THE CHAIRMAN

5 General Brown. Mr. Chairman, I would prefer to submit  
 6 it for the record and make just three brief points.

7 The Chairman. All right, if it is agreeable, submit  
 8 that for the record, and it will be admitted in the record  
 9 at this point. And make your points and then we will start  
 10 questioning by the Committee members.

11 (The full prepared statement of General Brown follows.)

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

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1           General Brown. The points I would like to make, Mr.  
2 Chairman, are that the Indian Ocean is obviously of tremendous  
3 strategic importance, not only from the lines of communication  
4 across the sea that carry the oil from the Persian Gulf, both  
5 as the Secretary mentioned, around Africa and through the  
6 Straits of Malacca to Japan, but the minerals that move from  
7 the coast of Africa to the United States, and the air routes  
8 that cross the Indian Ocean. And Diego Garcia would serve to  
9 help with those lines of communication in support of any air  
10 or sea movements that the United States might wish to make  
11 into the Indian Ocean..

12           The second point is that we do have an important interest  
13 in the area in addition to the materials that I mentioned.  
14 First, we have friends in the area who look to us for some  
15 support, principally Iran and Pakistan with whom we are  
16 members and participate in the CENTO organization.

17           And the third point is that I think in summary we seek  
18 to demonstrate our interest in the area and our concern that  
19 it not be dominated by any single outside power. Diego Garcia  
20 will be a modest facility, far less in extent than the  
21 Secretary has indicated the Soviets have developed and are  
22 developing at Berbera.

23           It was not intended that we would have any military forces  
24 deployed or stationed at Diego Garcia. It is intended only  
25 that the support facility be manned by those personnel needed

1 to conduct the support activity, communications, servicing  
2 of aircraft and ships, in total about 600 personnel.

3 The Chairman. All right.

4 General Brown. Those are the points that I wanted to  
5 make.

6 The Chairman. Members of the Committee, I will be quite  
7 brief here. We have with us too Mr. George S. Vest who  
8 came at the suggestion of the Chairman, that is someone from  
9 the Department of State.

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1 STATEMENT OF GEORGE S. VEST, DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF  
2 POLITICO-MILITARY AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

3 The Chairman. You do not have a statement, as I under-  
4 stand, Mr. Vest?

5 Mr. Vest. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.

6 The Chairman. Well, but you are subject to questioning?

7 Mr. Vest. Correct, Sir.

8 The Chairman. All right. And we thank you for being  
9 here and we will proceed now.

10 Mr. Secretary, last year in preparing this matter for  
11 the bill and everything, the debate on it, I wrote a letter  
12 or made a request at least to the Chief of Naval Operations  
13 and have a reply dated November 26, 1974, from J. L.  
14 Holloway, III, Admiral, U.S. Navy, setting forth the items  
15 and the amount requested. And it says in effect that they  
16 have further plans for an expansion of any consequence at  
17 least in this facility in Diego Garcia. What is the situation  
18 now, Mr. Secretary, as to any further plans for an expansion  
19 of this into a more formidable base?

20 Secretary Schlesinger. The plans are unchanged, Mr.  
21 Chairman. The improvement costs and the request costs amount  
22 to about \$37 million. We intend an austere support facility.

23 The Chairman. Well, that is in keeping with the letter,  
24 and I ask unanimous consent that the letter which appears on  
25 page 16 and 17 of this selected material on Diego Garcia,

1 that was put together at my request so that we would have  
2 access to these items rather than looking them up, be included  
3 in the record at this point.

4 (The letter referred to above follows.)

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1           The Chairman. Now, by the way, I want to know now do  
2 you have any reason now, according to your calculations, to  
3 ask for a closed session today?

4           Secretary Schlesinger. No, Sir.

5           The Chairman. All right.

6           Secretary Schlesinger. Unless some question should  
7 arise.

8           The Chairman. Gentlemen of the Committee, I got permis-  
9 sion for this Committee to sit today until 12:30. At that  
10 time the Leader thought that it ought to all be terminated,  
11 as I have understood him, all Committee meetings should be  
12 terminated at 12:30. Anyway, I just mention that now.

13           Now, I yield to Senator Thurmond.

14           Senator Thurmond. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

15           Dr. Schlesinger, in your letter of February 16, 1974  
16 to the Chairman on Diego Garcia you referred to, and I quote,  
17 "growing Soviet naval and air presence and capability in the  
18 region." I just am wondering if that presence has increased  
19 significantly since that time?

20           Secretary Schlesinger. Yes, Sir. As indicated, the  
21 Soviet presence in the region started in 1968, the year that  
22 the British announced withdrawal. It has gradually been  
23 growing, one or two ships per year. At the present time there  
24 are 17 ships in the Indian Ocean, eight combatants and nine  
25 support vessels. The darkest red area since 1972 indicates

1 ship days for mine sweepers which have operated both in  
2 Bangladesh and in the Red Sea, so that may be a temporary  
3 manifestation. It is generally agreed, however, that the  
4 Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean is likely to rise by one  
5 or two ships a year, and at the present time is about five  
6 times as large as our permanent presence.

7 Senator Thurmond. Mr. Secretary, what is our primary  
8 concern if the Soviet Union is allowed to operate in the  
9 Indian Ocean unchallenged?

10 Secretary Schlesinger. Our concern is first with the  
11 stability of the nations of that area. We would not want them  
12 to be overshadowed by the naval presence of the Soviet  
13 Union. And secondly, with regard to the very critical depen-  
14 dence of the entire industrialized world on the oil shipments  
15 coming out of the Persian Gulf, some 75 percent of Western-  
16 Europe's requirements comes from the Middle East, and some  
17 85 percent of Japan's requirements, and a threat against the  
18 security of those lines of communication could be of cata-  
19 strophic significance for the United States and its allies.  
20 That is our primary concern.

21 Senator Thurmond. Mr. Secretary, can a direct relation-  
22 ship be established between our presence on Diego Garcia and  
23 our national security other than what you have mentioned?

24 Secretary Schlesinger. I would believe so, Senator. The  
25 necessity is for the United States to maintain the capacity

1 for the logistical base for a naval presence that would  
2 maintain the naval balance in the western part of the Indian  
3 Ocean should that need arise.

4 Senator Thurmond. Mr. Secretary, explain how, if at all,  
5 we could use Diego Garcia without these requested expenditures?

6 Secretary Schlesinger. We have, of course, the present  
7 communications facilities that were previously authorized by  
8 Congress. But we would not be in a position to use Diego  
9 Garcia as a support facility for naval forces of the character  
10 indicated unless there is approval by the Congress of the  
11 funds that were voted in fiscal year 1975 and are now subject  
12 to the measure of this approval introduced by Senator Mansfield.

13 Senator Thurmond. Mr. Secretary, what are the alterna-  
14 tives for the United States in the Pacific and Indian Ocean  
15 areas if Subic Bay in the Phillipines was not available and  
16 Congress rejects the Diego Garcia request?

17 Secretary Schlesinger. We have no alternatives that  
18 would represent facilities on which we could count other than  
19 those that you have mentioned, Senator Thurmond.

20 Senator Thurmond. From what you said then, do you feel  
21 that if these expenditures are withheld by the Congress that  
22 it would jeopardize the national security of the United States?

23 Secretary Schlesinger. I think such action would be a  
24 serious blow to the possibilities of maintaining a naval  
25 balance in the western Indian Ocean, which I regard as

1 important to the national security of the United States.

2 Senator Thurmond. I have a few questions here of General  
3 Brown. I do not know how my time is running, Mr. Chairman.

4 The Chairman. You have some few minutes left, Senator.  
5 Proceed.

6 Senator Thurmond. General Brown, I thought I would ask  
7 a few questions to you here too. The Soviet Union is expanding  
8 its capability to operate in the Indian Ocean with the building  
9 of the naval support base at Berbera, Somali. We had maps  
10 there a few moments ago showing that. Now, from an opera-  
11 tional point of view, which facility, Berbera or Diego  
12 Garcia, will be better suited for Indian Ocean operations?

13 General Brown. Well, I think they are both well suited.  
14 The Soviet position at Berbera is obviously closer to the  
15 flow of oil from the Persian Gulf than Diego Garcia, and it  
16 is also in a position to interdict the flow through the Red  
17 Sea and the newly opened Suez Canal.

18 But more importantly, it seems to me that the character  
19 of the two installations differ greatly. The character of  
20 the base at Berbera, as we have just seen, will support and  
21 sustain naval combat operations, whereas the base, the  
22 facilities that we hope to put on Diego Garcia are far removed  
23 from that. They are far less extensive. I would contrast  
24 Berbera as the initial investment for building a base such  
25 as we have at Subic Bay in the Phillipines.

1 Senator Thurmond. General Brown, what is the present  
2 position of the government of Thailand on our use of Utapao  
3 airbase to fly P-3 patrol flights to the Indian Ocean?

4 General Brown. Well, I think that is probably better  
5 passed to Mr. George Vest of the State Department, since it  
6 is a political question, Senator.

7 The Chairman. The gentleman's time is almost up, not yet,  
8 but just be brief.

9 Senator Thurmond. Would you care to answer that?

10 Mr. Vest. At this point, Sir, we supply, we send supply  
11 flights through Utapao to Diego Garcia, and that is the  
12 primary function that we carry out through Utapao.

13 Senator Thurmond. I believe my time is up.

14 The Chairman. All right, Senator. Thank you very much.

15 Senator Symington.

16 Senator Symington. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

17 General Brown, you have had a lot of experience in  
18 bombing. It just occurs to me that one of the easiest targets,  
19 especially with the development of the new missilery to  
20 interdict, would be the Suez Canal. I have been on it many  
21 times, and I presume you have seen it, and you can never be  
22 less than considerably surprised at the narrowness of it.  
23 With our Mediterranean position, and the air-to-sea and  
24 ground-to-sea missilery, if anybody bases the desire for this  
25 expansion of this base on the logistics aspect incident with

1 the Soviets if a war came, which heaven forbid, then would  
2 it not be relatively an easy target to interdict?

3 General Brown. Oh, yes, Sir. The Canal could be closed  
4 without any great difficulty.

5 Senator Symington. It is like General Spaatz said in  
6 the Korean War, if we could interdict those airfields then  
7 they could never have gotten the Migs down, and so I think  
8 that argument, to my mind, is pretty theoretical. When this  
9 provision was passed, the President did not certify it for  
10 five months, Mr. Secretary. Is there any significance in  
11 that delay? Was it discussed?

12 Secretary Schlesinger. I do not think that there is  
13 any substantive significance in that delay, Senator Symington.

14 Senator Symington. Have you had anybody visit Somaliland?

15 Secretary Schlesinger. I would have to check. George,  
16 do you know of any?

17 Mr. Vest. No.

18 Senator Symington. Has anybody seen these things that  
19 we have got these pictures of?

20 Secretary Schlesinger. No, Sir. Our ambassador I  
21 believe is confined to the area of Mogadiscio.

22 Senator Symington. Well, the Somalian Ambassador came  
23 to see me and had said that these stories of what they were  
24 doing were not right, and it was my impression that he would  
25 be glad to have somebody really look at it. What worries me

1 is that in the beginning when the Defense Department presented  
2 their position on the importance of Diego Garcia, and that  
3 has been in the last 12 to 18 months, then we requested the  
4 CIA to do a review of it, and the CIA review at that time was  
5 almost directly opposite to the Defense Department's review.  
6 Later on the CIA was massaged, and they have changed their  
7 mind on some bases, and it was different as to what their  
8 position was. But I would ask unanimous consent, Mr. Chairman,  
9 that the original position of the Central Intelligence Agency  
10 on Soviet expansion in the Indian Ocean be inserted at this  
11 point in the record.

12 The Chairman. That is taken from last year's hearings?

13 Senator Symington. Yes.

14 The Chairman. Yes. All right, as taken from last  
15 year's hearings, without objection, it will be approved.

16 (The material referred to follows.)

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1 Senator Symington. The French own more islands than  
2 anybody in the Indian Ocean, do they not?

3 Secretary Schlesinger. They have facilities in the  
4 Indian Ocean. Whether or not they own more islands than the  
5 British, I would have to check the record.

6 Senator Symington. Well, both the British and the French  
7 have islands?

8 Secretary Schlesinger. Yes, Sir.

9 Senator Symington. That is my understanding. Are they  
10 doing anything to protect their position?

11 Secretary Schlesinger. Yes, Sir.

12 Senator Symington. They are building a naval base?

13 Secretary Schlesinger. They have a naval facility in  
14 Djibouti. The refuel and they have a rework facility I  
15 believe in Madagascar. They maintain the second largest  
16 fleets in the Indian Ocean after the Soviets, about nine  
17 vessels.

18 Senator Symington. You mentioned 19 vessels being more  
19 than we had. What kind of Soviet ships are those 19?

20 Secretary Schlesinger. I mentioned that there were  
21 eight combatants and nine support vessels.

22 Senator Symington. What kind of combatants?

23 Secretary Schlesinger. There are several destroyers,  
24 several submarines, a cruiser, that kind of thing. We can  
25 fill that in.

1 Senator Symington. You have the submarines in there,  
2 and you feel you know all of the submarines that are there?  
3 Well, I don't want to use my time. If you would supply that  
4 for the record?

5 Secretary Schlesinger. Yes, Sir.

6 Senator Symington. I would appreciate it.

7 Senator Mansfield quotes the late Senator Russell as  
8 saying, and I quote, "If we make it easy for the Navy to go  
9 places and do things, we will find ourselves always going  
10 places and doing things." If this expansion of Diego Garcia  
11 is approved, would it not automatically satisfy a desire to  
12 go places and do things?

13 Secretary Schlesinger. I appreciate the question,  
14 Senator.

15 Senator Symington. It is a quote from the Leader and  
16 former Chairman of this Committee.

17 Secretary Schlesinger. Yes, Sir. And in the earlier  
18 phase I was inclined to question the need to extend our  
19 facilities into the Indian Ocean. There have been dramatic  
20 developments that have occurred in recent years which I think  
21 has transformed the character of the problem, and so my  
22 position today is of strong support. If there were not  
23 important national interests in the area, whether or not the  
24 Navy were inclined to go places and do things, they would  
25 not be permitted to do so. But, we have important national

1 interests in the Indian Ocean.

2 Senator Symington. There is a story in this morning's  
3 paper that we are selling three submarines to Iran.

4 Secretary Schlesinger. Yes, Sir.

5 Senator Symington. And they are on the Persian Gulf,  
6 and they are our friends, correct?

7 Secretary Schlesinger. Yes, Sir.

8 Senator Symington. Would you file for the record the  
9 amount of money that has actually been spent, based on  
10 Secretary Habib's statements on Diego Garcia up to this time,  
11 and under sound accounting principles?

12 Secretary Schlesinger. Yes, Sir.

13 Senator Symington. Thank you.

14 Mr. Vest, one of the arguments against any expansion of  
15 Diego Garcia is that the littoral nations do not want us  
16 there. Certainly that was a position taken by the Prime  
17 Minister of Australia at the U.N. and here in an interview  
18 on Meet the Press. Do you agree with his statement that no  
19 country on the Indian Ocean wants us there, and if you do  
20 not agree, why not?

21 Mr. Vest. I do not agree entirely, Sir. In general --

22 Senator Symington. What do you mean not entirely?

23 Mr. Vest. Because I would say he has made an absolute  
24 statement to which I do not think it works out exactly that  
25 way. There are countries in which there are public statements

1 which have taken a more balanced attitude. There are those  
2 as well which for their own reasons have seen fit to express  
3 the view privately to us that they wish us to be there and  
4 maintain a balance with the Soviet forces, but they do not  
5 wish for their own reasons to make those points public. That  
6 is the actual balance of the situation in the area.

7 Senator Symington. Mr. Secretary, you mentioned, did  
8 you say 120,000 barrels of oil at Berbera?

9 Secretary Schlesinger. The expansion is between 120  
10 and 130,000 barrels added to the existing 40,000 barrels,  
11 and the total would be about 175,000 barrels.

12 Senator Symington. How many barrels do we plan at  
13 Diego Garcia?

14 Secretary Schlesinger. We plan an expansion of 640,000  
15 barrels.

16 Senator Symington. I think those figures speak for  
17 themselves. Will B-52's be able to, can the runway that you  
18 built take B-52 bombers loaded?

19 Secretary Schlesinger. No, it would not take a B-52.  
20 It would have to be strengthened considerably.

21 Senator Symington. There was previous testimony in  
22 1971 that the Soviet Union made overtures to the United States  
23 inviting negotiations to prevent an Indian Ocean arms race.  
24 Last year this Committee in its report on the Military Con-  
25 struction Bill, in discussing Diego Garcia, said, "Because

1 of the importance and complexity of issues raised by Diego  
2 Garcia, the Committee felt it was important for the new  
3 Administration to make a full reevaluation of this matter.  
4 It is the hope of the Committee that such an evaluation would  
5 include a thorough explanation of the possibility of achieving  
6 with the Soviet Union mutual military restraint without  
7 jeopardizing U.S. interests in the Indian Ocean area."

8 Now, I am Chairman of the Arms Control on the Foreign  
9 Relations Committee and Military Applications in the Joint  
10 Atomic Energy Committee, so this is of particular interest  
11 to me in other work. I am wondering, has anything been done  
12 to initiate with the Soviets a discourse on the possibility  
13 of mutual arms restraint?

14 Mr. Vest. Senator, as you know, in '71 we had negotia-  
15 tions with the Soviets within which we pursued it after their  
16 first mention of the matter, and got no followup from them  
17 whatsoever. There has not been a specific overture to the  
18 Soviets in the intervening time. We have said repeatedly  
19 that we are willing to consider any constructive position or  
20 suggestion, and nothing has come forward that we have con-  
21 sidered fell into that category.

22 Senator Symington. So the answer to my question would  
23 be no, correct?

24 Mr. Vest. Correct, Sir.

25 Senator Symington. Assuming that talks are initiated

1 with the Soviet Union on mutual arms restraint in the Indian  
2 Ocean, would not our negotiating position be strengthened  
3 if the expansion of Diego Garcia did not proceed?

4 Secretary Schlesinger. Senator --

5 Senator Symington. I think Mr. Vest might answer that,  
6 if I may.

7 Mr. Vest. I would say no, Sir.

8 Senator Symington. You do not think so?

9 Mr. Vest. No, Sir.

10 The Chairman. All right, Senator. Thank you very much.

11 Senator Goldwater, that brings us to you.

12 Senator Goldwater. Yes. Just a point or two to begin  
13 with. At one time before the downfall of Portugal we had  
14 access to I believe 16 ports around the perimeter of Africa.  
15 That may be one or two off here or there. Today we have to  
16 assume those ports are no longer available to us. Now, the  
17 Suez Canal to me is not really a contributing major factor  
18 to the importance of the Indian Ocean to our strategy in this  
19 world. But yesterday the Phillipines signed an agreement  
20 with Red China. They pulled themselves out of Taiwan.

21 Now, I am interested in an answer to this question. Could  
22 not the Red Chinese, using their new relationship with the  
23 Phillipines, use this obvious influence to force the Phillipines  
24 to get us out of Subic Bay?

25 Secretary Schlesinger. That is a possibility, Senator

1 Goldwater. We certainly hope it does not materialize that  
2 way.

3 Senator Goldwater. I know we hope that, but it is a  
4 possibility that you have to use in the long range planning.

5 Now, General Brown, you have answered the question about  
6 B-52's. What is your assessment of the increased stability  
7 of the Soviets to operate from Berbera now that the Suez  
8 Canal is reopened? I am particularly interested in the  
9 astounding statement or picture that the runways are 14 to  
10 17,000 feet at sea level, and the longest runway we have in  
11 the United States is 13,500 feet at about 75 feet above  
12 sea level. What are they going to use this for?

13 General Brown. I do not know, Senator. I share your  
14 interest in it. It seems excessive even with the temperature  
15 conditions they get at sea level. But even for very heavy  
16 loaded, long-range patrol, naval aircraft, I would not think  
17 that they would need the total runway length.

18 Secretary Schlesinger. May I say, Senator, to clear  
19 a 100-foot obstacle for the Soviet BEAR requires 13,000 feet  
20 at 105 degree temperatures, which is not infrequent at  
21 Berbera. The temperatures tend to drive the airstrip require-  
22 ments.

23 Senator Goldwater. I realize that, but I doubt that  
24 there is a 50-foot obstacle within 500 miles of the runway.

25 General Brown, relative to Diego Garcia, the planned