

1 increase in the ramp area, will that be capable of accommodat-
2 ting the C-5A and a 747?

3 General Brown. Yes, Senator, but in relatively small
4 numbers. There is only 110,000 square yards of parking area.

5 Senator Goldwater. If the runway will not sustain the
6 weight of the B-52, how do you propose to have it sustain
7 the weight of a loaded 5 or a 747?

8 General Brown. Well, as you remember, the C-5 is built
9 for off-runway operations, and we are getting around an awful
10 lot of landing area. It is really very lightly loaded in
11 relation to the runway. I have forgotten the exact weight
12 per square inch of tire pressure, but it is very low, much
13 less than the C-141.

14 The restrictive feature on the B-52 operation there
15 for sustained operations is obviously the runway is too
16 weak, but for emergency operations it is too narrow. It
17 only will exceed the outriggers on the B-52 by a little over
18 one foot, one foot, seven inches, so that would be a pretty
19 risky operation to take a B-52 in.

20 Senator Goldwater. A little sharp.

21 Why is it advantageous for the Navy to be able to operate
22 land based long-range antisubmarine warfare aircraft and
23 petroleum aircraft from Diego Garcia?

24 General Brown. Merely to sustain their operations of
25 surveillance throughout the oceans of the world where we have.

1 major shipping activities.

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1 Senator Goldwater. Would this become only the anti-submarine
2 warfare aircraft, would then this not become increasingly
3 important if threats to the streets of Malacca grew?

4 General Brown. No question about that, yes, sir.

5 Senator Goldwater. I want to point out the Straits of
6 Malacca are very, very narrow. Getting one of our large
7 carriers through there is really an act of seamanship. It
8 looks like a wide strait but it is very narrow in the center
9 and very shallow, and so we are talking about something almost
10 like the Suez Canal or the Panama as far as making it possible
11 or impossible to traverse.

12 General, without Diego Garcia are we unable to protect
13 long range patrol aircraft to the extent required in order to
14 protect any United States Navy operating forces we may have
15 there?

16 General Brown. I would say we definitely would be unable
17 to, and definitely the answer would be yes, we would be unable
18 to.

19 Senator Goldwater. You would be unable?

20 General Brown. That was an awkward question.

21 Senator Goldwater. In fact, there is no other base that
22 you have for a land-based aircraft, is there? You know that
23 we have lost the friendly places that we had on the eastern
24 shore of Africa, and now that we have pretty well lost the bases
25 in Pakistan, there are not many bases that we have left that

1 we can launch land-based aircraft on, is there?

2 General Brown. No, sir. We are restricted in the number of
3 bases that will take land-based aircraft in that part of the
4 world.

5 Senator Goldwater. How accessible is Berbera to air
6 taker ships and lines of communications from the Persian Gulf
7 to the United States?

8 General Brown. Well, as you realize, Berbera is just a
9 few hundred miles to the west of the main shipping line from
10 the Persian Gulf around the east coast of Africa.

11 Senator Goldwater. If this is not classified, I would
12 like to have you answer.

13 Is it not true that the Soviets are building another naval
14 base east of the mouth of the Persian Gulf?

15 General Brown. Well, they are, they are participating,
16 as the Secretary testified in his statement, in the preparation
17 of another base. Whether it is for their use or other use
18 I do not know yet.

19 Senator Goldwater. Is it not true they are looking at
20 still another site east of that?

21 General Brown. I am not aware of that. I just do not
22 know, Senator.

23 Secretary Schlesinger. There has been an intermittent
24 use of facilities in Bangladesh and in India. We do not know
25 the status of those facilities, whether they would be available

1 further east.

2 Senator Goldwater. I am not talking about the immediate
3 future. I think this was tied in with the ability of the
4 Soviets to convince Afghanistan and Pakistan that it would be
5 to their advantage to pay attention to the Soviets and forget
6 about the free world, so to speak.

7 I think it is one of the major concerns of Iran, by the
8 way.

9 Secretary Schlesinger. Yes, sir.

10 Senator Goldwater. Is the naval base at Subic Bay, Philippine
11 essential to the support of our operation at Diego Garcia?

12 General Brown. Yes. The principal support of our fleet
13 movements into the Indian Ocean, those operations are sustained
14 in the main from the Subic Bay. Diego Garcia really will only
15 be, when this construction is completed, almost a satellite of
16 Subic because the supplies will flow by ship and by air into
17 Garcia from Subic Bay in the main.

18 Senator Goldwater. Now, if we are denied Subic Bay, and
19 I really think it is fairly logical to assume that we may be,
20 will we not also be denied the use of our air bases in the
21 Philippines?

22 General Brown. Well, I can only speculate, and I would
23 hope not, but I think, I cannot see any reason to close us off
24 from one base and not all bases.

25 Senator Goldwater. I admit that it is speculation, but

1 from the comments of President Marcos a few days after the loss
2 of South Vietnam, and his recognition of Peking yesterday, I
3 think we have to do more than just speculate on this possibility.
4 I think it is a very, very serious threat to the United States.
5 I do not believe the Philippines any longer look to the United
6 States as a dependable, viable friend. I hate to say that, but
7 I think we have to look at reality.

8 The Chairman. The gentleman has used his time. Do you
9 have one more question?

10 Senator Goldwater. I do not have any more. You have just
11 run me out.

12 The Chairman. All right. Senator McIntyre.

13 Senator McIntyre. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

14 Mr. Secretary, is there any reason for all of that ship
15 days presence in the Indian Ocean that are depicted in your
16 chart in 1972, 1973, and 1974, any particular reason?

17 Secretary Schlesinger. Well, as I indicated, there has
18 been a study expansion. The special reasons are at the dark
19 area at the top of the curve which reflects the mine clearing
20 operations in Bangladesh and the northern Red Seas. Those areas,
21 of course, would represent a transitory phenomenon and we
22 would expect them at least to disappear.

23 Senator McIntyre. Those mining operations all over?

24 Secretary Schlesinger. Yes, sir.

25 Senator McIntyre. You know, 170,000 barrels of POL is

1 not a very significant amount of POL storage.

2 Secretary Schlesinger. That is what we see at the present
3 time.

4 Senator McIntyre. Therefore, the question that was raised
5 by my colleague here seems to be very significant, that the
6 installation at Berbera has 130, and they are going to 170,
7 something like that, barrels, and the modest installation that
8 we are going to have at Diego Garcia, you are requesting something
9 like 640,000.

10 Now what is the explanation for that?

11 Secretary Schlesinger. I think the explanations are two.
12 The first is that Diego Garcia will be operating 5,000 miles
13 away from Subic at best, as Senator Goldwater has indicated.
14 There is some question about that. If Subic would not be
15 available, you would have to operate at a very considerable
16 disadvantage from the east coast of the United States. Our
17 lines of communication are vastly longer than those of the
18 Soviets. The Soviets' line of communication will shrink from
19 11,500 miles to 2,500 miles.

20 In addition, it is intended that we have the support
21 facilities for a carrier task force which is a high consumer
22 of fuel as compared to the ships of the Soviet navy, the
23 combatants, which are primarily missile carriers of much
24 smaller dimension.

25 So I think that you have a different character of the problem.

1 in the two cases, the length of the lines of communication and
2 the type of facilities that would be supported, the type of
3 capabilities that would be supported.

4 Senator McIntyre. We certainly have longer distance.
5 There is no doubt of that. However, is our lease being pulled
6 out of us, the least at Behrein? Is it going down the drain?

7 Secretary Schlesinger. We certainly hope that that will
8 not occur. At the present time that is still up for discussion.

9 Senator McIntyre. But I am impressed by the fact that
10 a number of these nations, I think that Senator Goldwater
11 refers to them as not small, but some other language, that
12 what they want, they have something going and I have never
13 seen it or how many signatories there are to it, but it is to
14 try to establish that the Indian Ocean will be an ocean of
15 peace. And yet, I understand that the reason we have got to
16 further our position in the Indian Ocean is, number one, that
17 we have got to keep those oil lines, the foreign oil in a
18 position where we can obtain it; and second, that we need to
19 be in there as a superpower to oppose the challenge of another
20 superpower in order to protect these little nations around the
21 area there that some say they do not really want, either us or
22 the Russians there.

23 It just does not make any sense. It does not make any
24 sense to me. I do not understand.

25 Secretary Schlesinger. Well, Senator, it makes diplomatic

1 sense, if I may put it that way. It may not make sense logically.

2 Senator McIntyre. I am not satisfied that we have made
3 the effort at the top to try to get some sort of an agreement
4 with the Soviets as to the amount of activity that we are going
5 to have to put on the Indian Ocean.

6 Now, Mr. Vest has said that they turn a cold and a deaf
7 ear, they are not interested, and that seems a shame. Here
8 we are doing what Richard Russell, according to Mansfield,
9 said we should never do. We are going to make it easier to
10 get in the Indian Ocean, easier to float around there, and
11 easier to get into trouble.

12 So it is a real problem to me. I somehow have the feeling
13 that the case is being overstated, Mr. Secretary. I could
14 not back that up with any testimony. I just do not have the
15 time. But, you know, when I was a kid I started collecting
16 stamps, and one of the first stamps that really interested me
17 was a commemorative stamp put out by Great Britain and it
18 was a map of the world, and down at the bottom it says, "The
19 Sun Never Sets on British Soil."

20 And here were all of these little places in red around the
21 globe, and that is what happened. The sun has set for Great
22 Britain, and we have had to pick up the marbles. And believe
23 me, there is a lot of resistance coming up to this, Mr.
24 Secretary, a lot of resistance.

25 Thank you very much.

1 The Chairman. Yes, sir. Thank you, Senator. Thank you
2 very much.

3 Senator Bartlett.

4 Senator Bartlett. Mr. Secretary, what is the nature of
5 our agreement with Britain on Diego Garcia? How much time has
6 to run, what position do we have?

7 Secretary Schlesinger. Basically, it is a 50-year agreement
8 for joint lease. There are some requirements for consultation
9 with regard to specific types of use. In general, in general
10 for the purposes that we intend the facility to be used, there
11 are no restrictions other than to inform them.

12 Senator Bartlett. Is this similar to other agreements we
13 have reached for bases of operation with other countries?

14 Secretary Schlesinger. I think it is similar to other
15 agreements that we have reached with as intimate an ally as
16 the British, and it is similar to some of the agreements we have
17 reached elsewhere. Agreements cover a very broad spectrum,
18 and some of them are quite restrictive. This is not.

19 Senator Bartlett. Mr. Secretary, in your opinion, why
20 are the Soviets building up their strength in the Indian Ocean
21 and building up the base at Berbera?

22 Secretary Schlesinger. Well, Senator, I would like to
23 stress that we cannot define precisely what the Soviet motives
24 are. All that we do know is a growth of capability, and that
25 growth of that capability does concern us, and we must counter-

1 balance it.

2 Under the heading of speculation, one can talk about the
3 warm water drive of the czars back to the time of Peter the
4 Great. Or one may say that the Soviets have now become a global
5 naval power and they wish to express that. Or one may suggest
6 that they prefer to be astride the oil lines of communication
7 with the implicit threat that that holds for the oil lines of
8 communication.

9 I would not care to attempt to identify precisely what
10 the Soviet motive is. It could be a number of things. We do
11 note the capability, however, and that concerned us.

12 Senator Bartlett. Mr. Secretary, does the rapidity of the
13 build-up in Berbera, which seems to me to be rather fast, does
14 that and any other reason indicate a further expansion of
15 Berbera, a build-up?

16 Secretary Schlesinger. We do not know whether there will
17 be further expansion beyond that which we have indications of
18 from the high altitude reconnaissance.

19 Senator Bartlett. In your opinion will this facility --

20 Secretary Schlesinger. There could well be, however.

21 Excuse me.

22 Senator Bartlett. Is this facility at Berbera primarily
23 for naval activity or a combination of air and naval?

24 Secretary Schlesinger. The very substantial air strip
25 indicates that maritime surveillance is one of the intentions

1 of the Soviets. The missile support facility has the potential
2 of supporting air to surface missiles as well as surface to
3 surface missiles, so that in all probability it will have a
4 substantial air presence as well as naval presence.

5 Senator Bartlett. The Senator from Arizona asked you
6 questions about other bases that the Soviets have, but trying
7 to ask the question a little differently, how does this
8 addition, with what they already have, including what they have
9 in the Soviet Union itself, add to the total presence of the
10 Soviets, including their ability to overfly other nations to
11 the Indian Ocean?

12 Now, just what does this give them compared to what we
13 have or what we would have with this addition at Diego Garcia?

14 Secretary Schlesinger. They have substantially greater
15 capability for support of their vessels and their requirements
16 because of the size of the vessels in their fleets. They are
17 more modest than our own, their lines of communication are
18 shorter.

19 As a result, if it were their design, and they transited
20 the Suez Canal, they could rapidly build up their presence in
21 the Indian Ocean.

22 As Senator Symington has observed, in the event of conflict,
23 the Suez Canal could indeed be closed. It is for that reason
24 I believe that the Soviets will be interested in expanding their
25 logistical capabilities in the Indian Ocean as a contingency.

11 1 Senator Bartlett. Mr. Secretary, thank you very much.

2 The Chairman. Yes, Senator. Thank you.

3 Senator Culver.

4 Senator Culver. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

5 Secretary Best, in 1971 and 1973, the U.S. General Assembly
6 passed resolutions calling for the establishment of an
7 Indian Ocean zone of peace. I was concerned by your statement,
8 therefore, that we have made no overtures to the U.S.S.R.
9 regarding the Indian Ocean since 1971.

10 As the Senate demonstrated last week, we want specific
11 evidence on the relationship of foreign policy to military
12 force structure request on missions. Is this expansion at
13 Diego Garcia related to specific foreign policy requirements?
14 What commitments would be hindered if the Congress were not
15 to take this action or have military desires for flexibility
16 prevail over foreign policy interests in maintaining friendships
17 with nations in the area, in supporting U.N. calls for a peace
18 zone and in building on detente, supposed detente, by seeking
19 and initiating, not just awaiting proposals leading toward
20 agreement for military limitations in that area?

21 Now, I would just like to add to that question a follow-on
22 to Senator Symington's about the attitude of countries toward
23 this development in the littoral area.

24 In hearings before the Committee on March 12th, 1974,
25 Deputy Secretary Clements was asked by Senator Symington to

12 1 provide for the record a country-by-country analysis of the
2 positions of the littoral nations regarding the proposed U.S.
3 expansion of Diego Garcia. The results of that analysis are in
4 the Committee report of June 9, 1975, and they report a summary
5 of those 29 countries conducted by our own government which
6 resulted in a finding that none of the 29 were favorable.
7 Supposedly balanced were four: Iran; Kenya; Pakistan; and
8 Singapore. And interestingly enough, on the Iranian one,
9 press reaction has been balanced, but expressed desire that
10 a great power arms race in the area be avoided.

11 There has been no official Iranian position, but our
12 embassy believes the GOI would not object unless pressed for
13 public position; if it were, it might have to express public
14 regrets. Unfavorable, twelve, unknown, thirteen.

15 Now, is this another case of the tail wagging the dog,
16 Mr. Vest?

17 Mr. Vest. Senator, let me say at once I do not consider
18 that it is a matter of the tail wagging the dog. I think that
19 there are specific policy reasons why we have favored Diego
20 Garcia.

21 To begin, you must look at, we would look at the whole area.
22 Our policy relationships to this whole area are dependent in
23 the first place on freedom of the seas. We wish to maintain that
24 freedom of the seas.

25 I go beyond that. Our relationship to the area is dependent

13 1 on the balance. We wish to maintain that balance. Without
2 that, there is no stability.

3 Now, as far as the Indian Ocean zone of peace, which the
4 resolution which you referred to speaks of, we oppose this very
5 simply because it does involve the matter of the freedom of the
6 seas. If we are limited in one area, we will find such an
7 activity affecting us in other areas, and there are broad
8 policy considerations calling for freedom of the seas, not
9 simply the Indian Ocean but elsewhere as well.

10 Now, as far as the countries themselves, I am familiar
11 with the itemization you have mentioned. I would merely go back
12 to my statement. There are a large number of countries there
13 that for political reasons will say one thing publicly, but in
14 private conversations, under the present circumstances, do wish
15 us to maintain a balance with the Soviets in the area.

16 Senator Culver. Mr. Vest, how many times did you hear
17 that during the whole agonizing course of our experience in
18 Southeast Asia and Vietnam? Is that not a pretty painfully
19 familiar refrain?

20 Mr. Vest. Yes, sir. But I am not saying it in that context.

21 Senator Culver. You are saying a now potential disaster
22 context, and you have not learned any of the lessons of the
23 past ten years.

24 Mr. Vest. Respectfully, sir, I disagree with you. I
25 am talking about another area and I do not consider that I am

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1 repeating propoganda or chivalrous on this particular area,
 2 and I can go straight to Iran. You picked Iran. Of course Iran
 3 has said it would like third-party forces removed and that is
 4 their avowed ultimate objective, that there is a wide distinction
 5 between saying that the Shah would like our policy today to
 6 take acts that would leave him in a prejudicial situation in
 7 relation to what he wishes ultimately.

8 Senator Culver. Do we have any initiatives toward the
 9 Soviet Union in terms of conrete proposals emanating from
 10 our own government to bring out a peaceful resolution of this
 11 situation and try to stem these disturbing and dramatic
 12 developments that have been described as dramatic developments
 13 today?

14 Mr. Vest. In this particular area, we have not.

15 Senator Culver. You have not.

16 Mr. Vest. No, sir.

17 Senator Culver. Well, that has not changed either.

18 Now you mentioned Iran. There are two items in today's
 19 New York Times, one that reports of U.S. plans to sell Iran
 20 three diesel submarines, "To give the Iranian navy the ability
 21 to operate in the Indian Ocean."

22 Then there is a second one entitled, or headlined, "Persian
 23 Gulf States Seeking Closer Ties."

24 This is a report of increasing solidarity among the Persian
 25 Gulf states where Iran is seeking a gulf free of outside powers.

1 Now this article points out, Mr. Vest, that we have a
2 continuing flow of armaments to our friends, so called friends,
3 to the nations of the Upper Gulf region, including \$400 million
4 in U.S. material, an amount to Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Oman
5 alone during United States Fiscal Year '75. Preliminary figures
6 recently made available suggest Iran's disbursements for
7 military equipment during the 12 months ended in March this
8 year come to \$4.7 billion.

9 Now this report goes on to say that it is expected that
10 in a collective security pact to be signed this fall, the
11 signatories will guarantee each other's territorial integrity
12 and keep the two super powers away from the region.

13 In view of these developments, why does the United States
14 need to police the Gulf and the Indian Ocean?

15 Mr. Vest. Sir, we are not policing the Gulf. We are
16 maintaining our ability to be there. There is a distinction
17 between the two.

18 Senator Culver. Our ability to be in the Indian Ocean?

19 Mr. Vest. We are --

20 Senator Culver. We have trouble being in the Indian Ocean
21 today?

22 Mr. Vest. With Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean it makes
23 it easier and more economic to carry out a function which we
24 consider advisable.

25 Senator Culver. Specifically, would this base be vital for

1 military contingency in Iran?

2 Mr. Vest. I do not specify that Diego Garcia is specifically
3 designed for any area in the Indian Ocean.

4 Senator Culver. It is just out there, an island, and why
5 not have a navy base there?

6 It is not tied to any commitments, not tied to the
7 implementation of any specific foreign policy objectives, just
8 the vague thing that we have a rock, let's build something.
9 We have an airplane that can take pictures of some place in the
10 neighboring area, and we can manufacture all kinds of horse
11 stories on the eve of Congressional consideration, and why
12 not muscle up and let the political types just roll along.
13 We do not have to link that to any foreign policy objective.
14 That is not really ever called for. Let us just escalate this
15 situation and above all do not dare go into any serious
16 negotiations with the Soviet Union where we supposedly have all
17 of these cozy relationships currently to try to bring about
18 restraints and save the American taxpayer and world peace and
19 those prospects, and what do you do over there in that shop
20 of yours? Wait until the Defense Department gives you your
21 marching orders and try to figure out some half-baked rationale
22 which you have not even offered today?

23 Israel, would this base be vital for military operations
24 to defend Israel, Mr. Vest?

25 Mr. Vest. I turn that over to the --

1 Senator Culver. No, I am asking you. You know, you read
2 that Constitution again. We have got what is called civilian
3 control of the military. Mr. Schlesinger's job is to respond
4 to your judgment and determination in consultation with the
5 President and the Congress as to what our foreign policy is.
6 I am trying to find out from you what our foreign policy is,
7 and I think it would be a great assistance to the Secretary of
8 Defense. He has got a tough enough job with one hat, much less
9 two.

10 I am asking you would this base be vital for military
11 operations to defend Israel and would this lack of a base
12 prevent operations to defend Israel?

13 Mr. Vest. Senator, if you will let me answer your question,
14 you have asked a military evaluation, and I think it is preferable
15 to allow the military representative to answer your question.

16 Senator Culver. I would like to hear what you think. Do
17 you have an answer at all?

18 Mr. Vest. Sir, I have a personal opinion. I have not
19 studied the strategic ability there, but I do not think Diego
20 Garcia has a particular role to play.

21 Senator Culver. May I misunderstand your job description?
22 May I misunderstand your job description at the State Department?
23 I understand that you are Deputy Director of Political-Military
24 Affairs. I cannot think of a more intimate nexus upon which
25 to address a subject than the particular portfolio you carry.

1 Mr. Vest. I agree with you, Senator, but I thought it was
2 appropriate to invite the responsible military authorities
3 of this country to give their advice.

4 Senator Culver. I am trying --

5 The Chairman. Gentlemen, the time has run over. In
6 deference to other members --

7 Senator Culver. Well, Mr. Chairman, I have a number of
8 questions, some to Mr. Vest and also to Secretary Schlesinger,
9 and I would respectfully hope that we could have another full
10 committee hearing.

11 The Chairman. We will get back to you just as soon as
12 we can. We have a responsibility to the other members.

13 Senator Hart.

14 Senator Culver. I understand that.

15 Senator Hart. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

16 The Chairman. We will get back to you.

17 Senator Hart. Secretary Schlesinger, a year ago the
18 position of the intelligence community was, I think, strong
19 and uniform that the necessity for the request here today was
20 fairly minimal and that the possibility of a substantial Soviet
21 presence in this area was, I think in Mr. Colby's words, the
22 presence was relatively small and inactive, they kept a minimal
23 force in the ocean, and the assessment at that time was that
24 this was not a very important matter, and that the Soviet Union's
25 presence did not necessitate any substantial change on our part.

19

1 And I point to an exchange in hearings roughly parallel to
 2 these a year ago when my predecessor, Senator Dominick, is
 3 quoted as saying: "If we should pass the Diego Garcia enlargement,
 4 would we by doing so increase the force of the Russian fleet?"

5 And Mr. Colby at that time said: "I think our assessment
 6 is that the Soviets would match any increase in our presence
 7 in that area."

Tape 4

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1 in that area."

2 Now, I take it from the remarks by the distinguished
3 Senator from Missouri, that the CIA has changed its position.
4 Is that the case, and could you explain why?

5 Secretary Schlesinger. Well, let me start with the
6 observation that there was no vast difference, in my judgment,
7 between the positions taken by Mr. Colby and by the representa-
8 tives of the Department of Defense. A selective reading of
9 Mr. Colby's statement might have led to that conclusion.
10 But Mr. Colby said on that occasion, "the Soviet Union is
11 likely to increase its continuous deployments there whether
12 or not the Suez Canal is reopened. If there is a substantial
13 increase in U.S. Naval forces, we believe the Soviet increase
14 will be gradual. If there is no substantial increase in U.S.
15 Naval forces in the area, we believe that the Soviet increases
16 will be gradual, say one to two ships a year."

17 The reference to the inactivity, of course, reflects the
18 absence at that time of a logistical support structure which
19 the Soviets are in the process, apparently, of repairing.
20 So, I would not, I would not see the vast gap between what Mr.
21 Colby said and what DOD spokesmen said at that time. But, I
22 would emphasize the fact that there has been substantial change
23 since last August, when Mr. Colby gave his previous testimony.
24 The growth of the facility at Berbera, most of the earmarks
25 of that have come in the period since November.

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1 We live in a period of change in the Indian Ocean.

2 Senator Hart. What increase in the number of combatant
3 ships in the last 12 months has occurred?

4 Secretary Schlesinger. I think that as indicated, we
5 can give you, since it is a variable thing, typically it has
6 been increasing at the rate of one or two a year on a permanent
7 basis, but there are variations.

8 Senator Hart. An increase of one combatant ship a year,
9 so there were eight last year and there are nine this year,
10 and that is the basis --

11 Secretary Schlesinger. No, the basis for what we are
12 talking about is a very substantial increase in the logistical
13 developments of the Soviet Union in the area. The operations
14 of the Soviet Union are approximately five times those of the
15 United States, normally speaking. The suggestion -- I will
16 pause.

17 Senator Hart. Is a ship-day of a mine sweeper equal to a
18 ship-day of an aircraft carrier?

19 Secretary Schlesinger. No, sir, it is not.

20 That is why I mentioned the number of ships they normally
21 deploy. They normally deploy about 19 ships, as opposed to
22 our three ships stationed in the Persian Gulf. The change that
23 you see, I think, is a change that does effect the security
24 of the economies of all of the industrialized world, and I
25 would be hesitant to be in a position in which the United States

1 is not able to counterbalance the forces that the Soviets are
2 increasingly bringing to bear.

3 This development has been going on on the part of the
4 Soviet Union since 1962. There is no indication that the
5 Soviets have any plan other than to go on with this development.

6 Senator Hart. Well, this development you have cited, is
7 a missile capability. What kind of missiles are those? What
8 can they do?

9 Secretary Schlesinger. The surface to surface missiles
10 are anti-ship missiles designed presumably to sink other
11 combatants, but could be used against merchant men or tankers.
12 Air to surface missiles similarly have a similar purpose. The
13 photo that I showed indicated the bunkering area for warheads.
14 Those would be high explosive warheads, and therefore, at the
15 present time, we see no possibility, no probability I should
16 say, of nuclear warheads.

17 Senator Hart. General Brown, are we members of the
18 CENTO agreements?

19 General Brown. We participate, but we have no defense
20 or security commitment. We participate in the staff work and
21 the meetings and discussions.

22 Senator Hart. Well, in that regard, then, I think at the
23 top of page 3 of your statement, where it says that we are
24 related to Iran and Pakistan through the commitments of the
25 Central Treaty Organization, is not quite accurate.

1 We are not, in fact, legally related or committed to them.

2 General Brown. Well, I think the statement is accurate.

3 I regret if the statement misled you into thinking that I was
4 saying we were full partners of the Central Treaty Organization.

5 Senator Hart. Well, in fact, I think something you said
6 a few minutes ago suggested that also. We can look back in the
7 record, but I think the strong suggestion that we have abiding
8 international --

9 General Brown. No. We have no security commitments as
10 we have with NATO.

11 The Chairman. Speak a little louder, please, General.

12 General Brown. I say we do not have the same commitments
13 in the Central Treaty Organization that we have in NATO, for
14 instance.

15 Senator Hart. At the top of page 5 of your statement,
16 you talk about implementing a decision to act in the interest
17 of the United States in this area. Could that or would that
18 possibly include an invasion of any portion of the area, the
19 Persian Gulf area?

20 General Brown. No. I know of no commitment that would
21 be binding on the United States to call for military action
22 in the Persian Gulf.

23 Senator Hart. I did not use the word commitment. I said
24 could that phrase include that kind of an operation?

25 General Brown. No, sir.

1 Senator Hart. I do not know what you mean by implementing
2 a decision to act in the interests of the U.S.

3 What does that mean?

4 General Brown. The Mayaguez is perhaps a case in point,
5 a typical example; not typical, but an example of the type
6 we have in mind.

7 Senator Hart. Finally, Mr. Secretary, I have been constantly
8 confused in these deliberations on the issue of quantity versus
9 quality, and many of the weapon systems we buy are sold to the
10 American people on the grounds that they are more cost effective
11 than the Soviet Union's, they are more capable, that the
12 nuclear powered ships can steam more days without refueling, and
13 we are going to have to rely less and less on foreign bases
14 because the countries are going to be less willing to cooperate
15 with us, and so forth and so on.

16 We buy these with the understanding that they have that
17 capability, and, therefore, we would not have to have these
18 reliances; and yet, we are still talking about expanding our
19 bases in new places like the Indian Ocean, and perhaps the
20 Marianna Islands, and so forth. And ship-days, which are apples
21 and oranges as far as little ships and big ships, I am constantly
22 thinking that we are shifting from quantity to quality and
23 confusing the issue.

24 Secretary Schlesinger. I agree entirely, Senator, that
25 that is one of the most difficult problems to sort out.

1 If we have nuclear propulsion, then the bunkering
2 requirements for the vessels declines. The requirements for
3 aviation gas or jet fuel remains unaffected by nuclear propul-
4 sion, so one has to sort out those items.

5 Now, I would emphasize we are not talking about constant
6 or steady deployments into the Indian Ocean. We are talking about
7 a small expansion of a facility that will provide us with the
8 support capabilities in the event that they be needed, not any
9 permanent deployment in the Indian Ocean for purposes of
10 counterbalancing the Soviets. This is a small insurance
11 investment with regard to logistical capability.

12 The operational savings, not operating out of Subic
13 Bay, results in a small annual cost saving, which, over a
14 period of years, will repay the initial investment.

15 Senator Hart. If the Soviet Union --

16 Secretary Schlesinger. We are dealing with \$100 million,
17 rather than vast expenditures.

18 Senator Hart. If the Soviet Union increases their
19 presences there, you would not want to increase ours?

20 Secretary Schlesinger. It would depend upon the
21 circumstances. We might, indeed. We do not know what the
22 results will be in the deliberations in the Persian Gulf.
23 We have, as I indicated, maintain two destroyers, and an LSD
24 in the Persian Gulf since 1949. We have had a very substantial
25 growth of permanently deployed Soviet forces without any growth

1 of U.S. forces. We would have to look to the future to see
2 what the risks are in order to decide on such deployment prospects
3 But, it is not now our intention permanently to deploy ships
4 into the Indian Ocean.

5 The Chairman. Gentlemen, I am sorry, but you have used
6 up your time.

7 Take another minute.

8 Senator Hart. Could I just make one request of Mr. Vest
9 to supply the Committee on a classified basis evidence to
10 support his statement that the littoral nations do come in fact
11 on a behind the scenes basis, want our presence there, other
12 than just allegations of that?

13 Mr. Vest. Certainly.

14 The Chairman. Senator Leahy, you are next, please.

15 Senator Leahy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

16 I apologize for the fact that I had to miss part of
17 your testimony. We were marking up part of the Agricultural
18 Bill today, and I am also on that Committee, and it was a
19 guns and butter situation. I do apologize.

20 Secretary Schlesinger. You cannot buy much butter for
21 the sum we are requesting today, Senator.

22 Senator Leahy. Yes, but we could buy more than we could
23 without the money.

24 I know that Senator Symington has raised some questions
25 of the foreign policy problems involved here, and I must admit

1 that I am concerned about that. As I understand Diego Garcia,
2 our involvement with Diego Garcia is by an Executive Agreement
3 and not by treaty. Is that correct?

4 Secretary Schlesinger. That is right.

5 There was a revision of the Executive Agreement in
6 February of 1974.

7 Senator Leahy. It seems that some of these major items
8 tend to go by Executive Agreement, and other things, like
9 fishing-rights and what not, go by treaties. If, indeed, it
10 is in the best interest from a foreign policy point of view
11 of the United States Government to be in the Indian Ocean
12 and in Diego Garcia, then the expenses that you are suggesting
13 here are very realistic. But, Mr. Chairman, we have not had
14 a discussion at some length, and I would like to hear in more
15 detail from the Department, from the State Department, as to
16 just how far we go on this foreign policy interest.

17 As it is now, we operate carriers in the Indian Ocean,
18 what -- six months of the year approximately?

19 Secretary Schlesinger. We have been there about three
20 months of the year or four months, one-third of the year in
21 the last couple of years.

22 Senator Leahy. If there are surface to surface missiles
23 in Berbera, how vulnerable are these carriers to such surface
24 to surface missiles?

25 Secretary Schlesinger. I think that there are a variety

8

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1 of views on that, and on that question I would prefer to answer
2 in Executive Session.

3 Senator Leahy. Could we have some material?

4 Secretary Schlesinger. Yes, we can have some material
5 on a classified basis.

6 Senator Leahy. Thank you.

7 Now, the Soviet ships so far this year, I understand, are
8 at a lower annual rate than the last three years, '72, '73, and
9 '74. Is that correct, or am I misreading the chart?

10 Secretary Schlesinger. I think the rate is a little bit
11 higher than it was previously. This is the first three months
12 of this year, and by these kinds of statistics, as Senator
13 Hart has pointed out, they are not necessarily conclusive. But
14 those kinds of statistics, it looks that over the period of
15 a year, their presence is up rather than down.

16 Senator Leahy. You say it is up?

17 Secretary Schlesinger. That is my recollection, number
18 of port calls, and that sort of thing.

19 Senator Leahy. Has there been any suggestion publicly
20 or privately in developing a base at Diego Garcia -- perhaps
21 I should rephrase that. Did we have any public or private
22 discussions underway or in the past underway with Iran in relation
23 to our base at Diego Garcia, either to supply them eventually
24 with any kind of facilities from that base?

25 Secretary Schlesinger. No, sir. And of course, it is a

1 joint base, and that would require an agreement with the British
2 under any such circumstances.

3 Senator Leahy. Has there been any discussions with the
4 British along those lines?

5 Secretary Schlesinger. I believe the answer to that is
6 no.

7 Mr. Vest. That is correct.

8 Senator Leahy. Has Iran in any way broached the subject
9 with us?

10 Secretary Schlesinger. Not to my knowledge, and I have
11 followed this very closely.

12 Senator Leahy. If we put in, you know, if we expand,
13 as you indicate, and the request indicates, what eventual
14 expansion is planned now for our Navy in the Indian Ocean?

15 Secretary Schlesinger. We have no plans at the present
16 time for expansion of Naval deployments in the Indian Ocean.
17 What we are providing here is a logistical base on which the
18 intermittent arrival of task forces on an intermittent basis
19 could be supported at lower costs than out of Subic Bay, and
20 more efficiently. But we do not plan additional Naval deployments
21 at the present time.

22 Senator Leahy. None have been planned? Have there been
23 any contingency discussions, at least, as to what we might
24 eventually build up to in the Indian Ocean?

25 Secretary Schlesinger. On a permanent basis, no, there

1 has been no discussion of that because there has been no
2 intention to do so.

3 Senator Leahy. How do we react to the statement made,
4 for example, by Australia indicating very much of a reluctance
5 in having us in the Indian Ocean?

6 Secretary Schlesinger. Well, I think that we might have
7 an Executive Session at some point to discuss the reactions,
8 the diplomatic activity that has taken place in this area about
9 the entire problem, not necessarily Australia.

10 Generally speaking, I would react to many of these
11 statements in the following manner: that all of the governments
12 in the area, when given an opportunity to support a profession
13 of peace will do so quite naturally, driven by political
14 considerations, both international and domestic. The problem
15 that one faces is that all of these statements about the
16 zone of peace have taken place in the face of a fairly persistent
17 Soviet increase of their capabilities in the Indian Ocean and
18 have not affected those results. It is generally recognized
19 that protest directed to the Soviet Union has no effect
20 whatsoever; they do not influence the press of the Soviet Union
21 or the parliamentary conditions in the Soviet Union, and that
22 the only place that one can acquire political leverage is by
23 directing such comments against the democracies in which one
24 can acquire political and parliamentary and press leverage;
25 therefore it is not surprising that the weight of these

1 directives are directed toward the prospective American bases
2 as opposed to the bases that have been utilized by the Soviet
3 Union over a period of years, and one of which is a major
4 undertaking.

5 Senator Leahy. Mr. Secretary, would you agree with me,
6 however, that the question in being is not by any means solely
7 a military one, but must take into consideration some very,
8 very substantial foreign policy questions?

9 Secretary Schlesinger. Absolutely.

10 I would also state that it must take into account the
11 underlying foreign policy questions as opposed to the surface
12 questions. Talk is cheap, and various nations around the
13 littoral have found it easy to make these statements, hoping
14 privately that those statements will not be observed by the
15 United States.

16 Senator Leahy. Mr. Secretary, I have no problem in
17 agreeing with the military advantage of Diego Garcia. I have
18 none whatsoever. I have no problem in seeing the advantages
19 as a fueling station, an air strip, and so forth.

20 My concern is, however, again, the whole foreign policy
21 question. Do we want to be in the Indian Ocean at all?
22 I am quite frankly concerned, Mr. Chairman, I am concerned that
23 while I realize that we have to answer the military question
24 in this Committee, I am concerned that that whole issue has
25 not been debated at length.

1 I know Senator Goldwater and I have expressed concern
2 at different times, and while both Senator Goldwater and I may
3 have different views as to what may be the foreign policy
4 decisions on some of these questions, I really feel that it is
5 impossible to make a solid judgment on something like Diego
6 Garcia without the full debate on that foreign policy issue.

7 I am not trying to lecture you in any way, Mr. Secretary,
8 at all.

9 Secretary Schlesinger. I agree entirely, Senator.

10 We have thought about the foreign policy issues, and in
11 our judgment those foreign policy issues argue in favor,
12 strongly argue in favor of this facility. In the longer
13 run, if we were to observe the public professions of various
14 littoral states on this issue, most of those states would
15 regret our reactions under those circumstances, and that
16 our foreign policy position, given the enormous dependence that
17 has developed with regard to all of the industrialized world
18 on the oil resources of the Persian Gulf, that we cannot
19 afford to be relatively naked.

20 The Chairman. Gentlemen, I am sorry, but your time is
21 up. I wish you would phone the cloak room and see if they would
22 allow us to sit 15 additional minutes, please.

23 Senator Leahy. Mr. Chairman, I just would ask only --

24 The Chairman. Well, one other question?

25 Go ahead.

1 Senator Leahy. No, I just want following the material
2 that is going to be submitted, the classified material, I
3 suspect it was a result of that I may have further questions
4 that I would like permission to be able to submit subsequently.

5 The Chairman. Permission for what?

6 Senator Leahy. To submit further questions after the
7 submission of the classified material that we are going to be
8 receiving.

9 The Chairman. Yes. All right. All right.

10 We will have to put some kind of a time limit. We
11 will have to put some kind of a time limit, gentlemen, on
12 these submissions. We have to report this back to the Senate
13 under the agreement not later than June 18, which is a week.

14 Senator Leahy. Well, my time would be contingent upon
15 the time that it takes to get their answers.

16 The Chairman. All right.

17 I will ask you gentlemen to get your material in on that,
18 and ask unanimous consent that Senator Culver's questions
19 be submitted in the record for answering. Without objection,
20 it will be so ordered.

21 Now, I am not going to take but a minute or two here
22 gentlemen. We have a vote coming up by the way, for your
23 information, at 1:30 according to this memo, final passage of
24 the Food Stamp bill. I thought that bill already passed.

25 Gentlemen, just a word. I seldom make any arguments,

1 but this matter about the commitments, where is the commitments.
2 I learned rather early in life that you have a commitment
3 to yourself to protect your own hide, and look ahead and prepare
4 to do it. I think nations better follow the same rules.

5 In any thinking I do not have to get to any treaty
6 or commitment in matters of these large areas where items that
7 are so necessary to our economy and a large part of our
8 present supplies of oil in the free world and our allies are
9 concerned, and I am not thinking in terms of taking oil.
10 Not at all. The very opposite. But I just feel like it is
11 clear that we ought to be somewhere around in that area of the
12 world with some force in order not to have an empty gasoline
13 tank.

14 I think that one word -- O-I-L -- is, after all, the
15 most practical part of this matter from the standpoint of
16 America, and the average American citizen.

17 When I was a new member of the Senate, I will just
18 illustrate one thing, in Western Europe for the first time
19 in 1949, I believe it was, talking to a so-called minor official
20 in one of the Scandinavian countries, he said that you people --
21 meaning America -- are acting in all good faith, but when you
22 force all of the European nations out of the Pacific area, at
23 the same time you are going to create a void over there, and
24 other influences are going to come in and fill that vacuum,
25 Communism of one kind or another, and you people are going to have

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1 to defend against it, and most probably you will have to do it
2 alone. I do not remember who the man was, I cannot remember
3 for certain what country it was in, but it certainly did get
4 my attention. Since then we have had the war in Korea, and I
5 remembered what he said. Since then we have had the war in
6 Vietnam, and I still thought about what that man said. I
7 just bring it up now because I think it is highly relevant.

8 Senator Goldwater?

9 Senator Goldwater. I only have a short comment, Mr.
10 Chairman.

11 Being conservative, I am always interested in history.
12 I was a very young man in the 1920's and 1930's, but I am
13 carried back to those days by what I am hearing in the Congress
14 and across the nation today. We paid no attention to the threat
15 of Germany, we paid no attention to the threat of Japan, and
16 we fought a world war. We paid no attention to the threat of
17 Korea, and we paid no attention to the threat of Cuba, or of
18 Vietnam, and we fought three more, or two more wars and got
19 in trouble in another one. And now we are questioning whether
20 or not the Soviets have any intentions.

21 Now, my final comment is based on the statement made by
22 my good friend from New Hampshire, Mr. McIntyre, who told us
23 about the stamp that he bought once that says the sun never
24 sets on England. The sun has set on England because England
25 became weak, and I am sitting here wondering where the sun is

1 about now with the United States. It may be over the yard-arms
2 it may be too late. I hope not.

3 The Chairman. Thank you, Senator.

4 Senator Symington?

5 Senator Symington. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

6 I have some questions here.

7 The Chairman. All right, sir.

8 Senator Symington. Mr. Secretary, if the Soviet Union
9 has deployed a portion of its fleet in the Indian Ocean at the
10 outbreak of hostilities, and the Suez Canal were subsequently
11 closed, how far would the Soviet Fleet have to travel in order
12 to obtain necessary supplies such as ammunition, replacement
13 parts, and so forth, and how does this compare with the distance
14 which the United States Fleets would have to travel say to
15 Subic Bay in the Philippines or any other naval facility we
16 may have closer?

17 Would you supply the answer to that for the record?

18 Secretary Schlesinger. I can give you a rough approximation
19 now, Senator.

20 Senator Symington. I just did not want to use up my time.

21 Secretary Schlesinger. It is about 11,000 miles for the
22 Soviet Union under those conditions, 11,000 or 10,000; and it
23 is about 4,500 miles to Subic Bay.

24 Senator Symington. Thank you, sir.

25 What plans does the Air Force have to operate airplanes

1 from the expanded field at Diego Garcia?

2 Secretary Schlesinger. We are planning to operate
3 transport aircraft, Senator.

4 Senator Symington. That answers my next question also.
5 Why is it necessary that the Air Force have ammunition storage
6 on Diego Garcia?

7 General Brown. It is a contingency requirement, and we have
8 no plans to stock at the moment, but we would provision for
9 facilities to take stockage in in the event that it was required.

10 Senator Symington. I think the next question had better
11 be answered in Executive Session.

12 Last year, Mr. Secretary, there was an attempt made to
13 place the money for Diego Garcia in the Emergency Supplemental,
14 and the attempt was made to have the money in the regular
15 appropriation bill, and now the Department of Defense is asking
16 for \$13 million more. Apparently you feel that the request for
17 the facility on Diego Garcia is quite urgent?

18 Correct?

19 Secretary Schlesinger. I think it is very important.

20 Senator Symington. Mr. Secretary, would you please detail
21 the presence of the fleets of other nations in the Indian
22 Ocean, and I am speaking particularly about India, Iran,
23 Great Britain, France, Australia, and of course, particularly
24 the Soviet Union?

25 Secretary Schlesinger. For the record?

1 Senator Symington. For the record.

2 Secretary Schlesinger. Yes, sir.

3 Senator Symington. And the nature of the ships.

4 Mr. Secretary, when major combattant ships only are
5 considered, how do the Soviet and the American forces in the
6 Indian Ocean compare?

7 Secretary Schlesinger. The Soviets have an edge, probably
8 a substantial edge in terms of the forces permanently deployed.
9 When the United States introduces a carrier, the balance
10 shifts.

11 Senator Symington. What facilities do the British still
12 use in the Indian Ocean, and to what extent?

13 Would you supply that for the record?

14 I know that they have other bases in the Indian Ocean,
15 and how active is Iran in the Indian Ocean?

16 Secretary Schlesinger. Yes, sir. It is relatively
17 inactive, Senator, but its naval capabilities are growing.
18 We will supply some additional information for the record.

19 Senator Symington. Thank you, if you would.

20 Have the Japanese self defense naval forces used the
21 Indian Ocean?

22 Secretary Schlesinger. No, sir.

23 Senator Symington. Mr. Secretary, is Pakistan being
24 considered as an alternate location for a naval base if
25 Diego Garcia is not approved?

1 Secretary Schlesinger. It is a possibility, undoubtedly,
2 for consideration. We have not given any consideration to it
3 up to this point.

4 Senator Symington. Is the view of the Pakistani Government
5 concerning -- well, you have not given it consideration up to
6 this point, so I withdraw that question.

7 Obviously the opening of the Suez Canal will enable the
8 naval forces of the Soviet Union, as well as the naval forces
9 of the United States greater access to the Indian Ocean during
10 peace time. It would appear in both cases a commitment of
11 additional ships on the Indian Ocean would have to come to the
12 utilization of a portion of respective Mediterranean fleets,
13 is that correct?

14 Secretary Schlesinger. Yes, sir, with the limitation
15 that a U.S. carrier cannot go through the Suez Canal.

16 Senator Symington. Thank you.

17 While the Suez Canal would serve to make Soviet access
18 to the Indian Ocean relatively a simple matter in peacetime,
19 it also could serve in wartime as a barrier or a trap for a
20 large portion of the Soviet fleets if the canal were sealed.
21 Thus, would the deployment of a sizeable portion of the Russian
22 fleet into the Indian Ocean present a risk to them?

23 Secretary Schlesinger. Undoubtedly, Senator. I think
24 you put it very well, implicitly put it very well in the question.

25 Senator Symington. In view of the obvious risks which

1 the Soviet Navy would incur while with the large deployment
2 in the Indian Ocean, do you believe that the Soviets would
3 substantially increase their naval forces in the Indian
4 Ocean in preparation for a general war with the United States,
5 or assuming their naval forces were already deployed there,
6 that they would withdraw this from the area, withdraw their
7 ships from the area before attempting to tackle the U.S. Navy?

8 Secretary Schlesinger. Sir, I think that that is a
9 question that is very dependent upon the scenario. With regard
10 to a global war, I think that they might conclude that a
11 withdrawal might be desirable. With regard to a war of a
12 different scenario, they might reach a different conclusion.
13 So, I do not think you can have a hard, fast answer to that
14 question.

15 Senator Symington. I do not want to get into any
16 counter-force discussion at this time, but I do look forward
17 to discussing that aspect with you further.

18 I thank you for your answers, and General Brown, for
19 your tolerance and understanding.

20 I have no further questions.

21 The Chairman. Gentlemen, on the question of getting
22 additional time to meet, I think that is arranged all right,
23 even though it has not been formalized, and we will go into
24 Executive Session on the request of any member or any witness,
25 any of those three, as soon as we finish our questions.

1 Senator Leahy, that brings us back to you, sir.

2 Senator Leahy. The only question I had, Mr. Chairman,
3 was basically the same question that Senator Symington has
4 regarding the Suez Canal.

5 I have nothing further.

6 Secretary Schlesinger. I think that the underlying
7 point that Senator Symington has expressed is that the Suez
8 Canal reopening gives greater access; but in the event of
9 conflicts, serious conflict, it implies additional risks.

10 Senator Leahy. Precisely.

11 The Chairman. Did you wish to go into Executive Session,
12 Senator Leahy?

13 Senator Leahy. No. There is going to be some material
14 that is going to be supplied for the record.

15 The Chairman. All right.

16 Now, gentlemen, we want to cover as much of this as we
17 can now. We are all here together and all in good humor, and
18 we will just cover as much as we can.

19 Now, of you three witnesses, do either or you wish to go
20 into Executive Session?

21 Secretary Schlesinger, At this time, Senator?

22 The Chairman. Yes, at this time?

23 Secretary Schlesinger. I think that is unnecessary,
24 unless the Committee wishes.

25 The Chairman. General Brown ?

1 General Brown. I feel the same way.

2 The Chairman. Mr. Vest?

3 Mr. Vest. Same way, sir.

4 The Chairman. All right.

5 I thank you everyone for your fine cooperation here
6 this morning.

7 Wait just a minute now. Wait a moment.

8 The Committee is still in session.

9 I will not thank you. I will withdraw my thank you until
10 the last.

11 We appreciate you gentlemen coming and being here, and
12 being prepared.

13 Now, on these charts, I did not see the one, and I was
14 just out only a minute or two, showing the Subic Bay area
15 on the same chart as Diego Garcia. Did you present that chart?

16 Secretary Schlesinger. The world map has that on it,
17 Senator. The stretch runs through the Strait of Malacca to
18 Diego Garcia, which lies approximately 1,000 miles southwest
19 of India.

20 The Chairman. Well, I want one as large as that chart
21 there is just pointing out and bringing forward that distance
22 there.

23 Now, another thing, on this Subic Bay matter, and anyone
24 may leave who wishes, that is all right, on the Subic Bay
25 matter, what rights so-called do we have there?

1 I have been there. I know what a beautiful place it is
2 and how essential it is to us. Is there any kind of special
3 commitment to us, or on our part to them, regarding Subic Bay?

4 Secretary Schlesinger. Of course, we have the general
5 treaty of mutual defense with the Philippines. In addition,
6 we have special treaty rights applying to both Clark Air Force
7 Base and to Subic Naval Base, and we can specify those in the
8 record.

9 The Chairman. Yes. Those are stated in a positive form,
10 and I wish you would put that response in the record.

11 Now, as always, I let each witness have a chance to add
12 any additional point or any observation that he might wish.

13 Mr. Secretary, do you wish to say anything further?

14 Secretary Schlesinger. Yes, sir.

15 I have made two brief observations.

16 The Chairman. All right.

17 Secretary Schlesinger. The first was the question of
18 Senator Russell's statement of a decade ago. I believe that
19 Senator Russell, were he alive at the moment, would without
20 question support the necessary protection and the military
21 measures to provide us with security in an area of the world
22 on which the future of the entire industrialized community
23 depends. I have no question that he would see now that it is
24 now in our interests to be in the Indian Ocean, as opposed to a
25 decade ago, when our interest in the Indian Ocean was far

1 narrower.

2 Secondly, and related to that, Senator Symington mentioned
3 a sound economy. A sound economy for the industrialized world
4 will depend upon a continued growth of imported oil. Without
5 the security for that flow of oil, the soundness of that
6 economy comes into question.

7 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

8 The Chairman. General Brown, do you have anything?

9 General Brown. I have nothing to add.

10 The Chairman. Mr. Vest?

11 Mr. Vest. Nothing, sir.

12 The Chairman. Well, I will not make any comment on this
13 statement attributed to Senator Russell, but I am not going to
14 sit idly by if that thing becomes an issue. I knew him and I
15 knew him right well.

16 All right, gentlemen, we thank you again for your
17 testimony.

18 We will take a recess subject to the call of the Chair,
19 and we do want copies of those charts that we can put into our
20 record, if necessary. We also have some questions left by
21 Senators Thurmond and Culver which we would like inserted into
22 the record at this point, and answered by you gentlemen.

23 Senator Thurmond. General Brown, what is the present
24 position of the government of Thailand on our use of Utapao
25 Air Base to fly P-3 patrol flights to the Indian Ocean?

1 Answer.

2

3

4

5

6

 Senator Thurmond. Assuming there was no objection by the Thai government, are operations from Thailand to cover the Indian Ocean practical?

7

 Answer.

8

9

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11

12

 Senator Thurmond. General Brown, assuming the go-ahead on Diego Garcia is received, under what conditions do you visualize B-52 or KC-135 aircraft using the facilities?

13

 Answer.

14

15

16

17

 Senator Thurmond. General Brown, how does the opening of the Suez Canal impact on the requirement for Diego Garcia?

18

 Answer.

19

20

21

22

23

 Senator Thurmond. Mr. Vest, why is the Indian Ocean and what the Soviet Union does there important to our national interest?

24

 Answer.

25

1 Senator Thurmond. Mr. Vest, have any of the Indian
2 Ocean littoral states asked for the United States to increase
3 its presence there?

4 Answer.

5
6
7 Senator Thurmond. Mr. Vest, what is the position of the
8 following countries relative to the U.S. and Diego Garcia:
9 India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Burma, Sri Lanka, Saudi Arabia,
10 The East Africa littoral states?

11 Answer.

12
13
14 Senator Thurmond. Mr. Vest, to the best of your knowledge,
15 how have these countries expressed themselves on the increasing
16 presence of the Soviet Union in the Indian Ocean?

17 Answer.

18
19
20 Senator Thurmond. Mr. Vest, what steps are the United
21 States taking with the Soviet Union to reduce mutual military
22 presence in the Indian Ocean?

23 Answer.

1 Senator Culver. Mr. Secretary, what specific foreign
2 policy commitments will be served by this planned expansion on
3 Diego Garcia?

4 Put another way, what specific commitments would be
5 substantially hindered if we do not approve this expansion?

6 Answer.

7
8
9 Senator Culver. Would this base be vital for military
10 contingencies in Iran?

11 Would deployment of forces for Iran be hindered substantially
12 if we did not expand Diego Garcia?

13 Answer.

14
15
16 Senator Culver. Would this base be vital for military
17 operations to defend Israel?

18 Would lack of this base prevent operations to defend
19 Israel?

20 Answer.

21
22
23 Senator Culver. Is this base essential for military
24 operations to secure oil supplies from the Persian Gulf?

25 Given the global capabilities of the U.S. Navy, could we

1 not protect the sea lanes without Diego Garcia?

2 Answer.

3

4

5 Senator Culver. Since Britain retains sovereignty over
6 Diego Garcia, can you assure us that the British will have no
7 veto power over the use of Diego Garcia in the contingencies
8 specified?

9 If that question is not resolved, will the Congress
10 be informed of any British veto rights whenever a treaty
11 governing Diego Garcia is submitted to the Senate?

12 Answer.

13

14

15 Senator Culver. At one time it was argued that this base
16 would be used for KC-135 tankers which could refuel B-52's from
17 Thailand. Since B-52's have now been withdrawn from Thailand,
18 what use does this base still have?

19 Answer.

20

21

22 Senator Culver. Is this the opening wedge in a planned
23 expansion in the Indian Ocean, or will this limited expansion
24 be sufficient?

25 Answer.

1 Senator Culver. Do you still agree with the Defense
2 Department answer given to Senator Hughes in 1974, that: "The
3 improvement plan for Diego Garcis would provide austere
4 facilities capable of supporting up to a carrier task group, which
5 would more than offset an increase of Soviet presence by 50
6 percent."

7 Answer.

8
9
10 Senator Culver. If this is the only major U.S. facility
11 in the Indian Ocean, would it not be highly vulnerable in the
12 event of military operations for which you claim it is essential?

13 Answer.

14
15
16 Senator Culver. The British have announced their plans to
17 pull out of their bases in Gan and Mauritius.

18 Do you plan to move into those installations?

19 Answer.

20
21
22 Senator Culver. At one time, I believe, it was argued that
23 a major U.S. presence in the Indian Ocean required bases on the
24 Farquhar and des Roches Islands as well as Diego Garcia.

25 Is that the opinion of the Defense Department?

1 If so, are we planning to have such facilities?

2 Answer.

3
4
5 Senator Culver. Last year, Navy witnesses claimed that
6 the opening of the Suez Canal would enhance Soviet capability
7 for deployment into the Indian Ocean.

8 Do you agree?

9 Answer.

10
11
12 Senator Culver. Could not the U.S. Sixth Fleet also use
13 the Canal?

14 Answer.

15
16
17 Senator Culver. Would a prudent Soviet planner realistically
18 assume that the Canal could be used for military operations in
19 the Indian Ocean?

20 Answer.

21
22
23 Senator Culver. What rules now govern the use of the Canal
24 by military ships?

25 Answer.

1 Senator Culver. Is it not significant that the only
2 military ship to participate in the Suez reopening was the
3 flagship for the U.S. Sixth Fleet?

4 Answer.

5
6
7 Senator Culver. Do you agree with the testimony by
8 CIA Director Colby last year that: "Our assessment is that the
9 Soviets would match any increase in our presence in that area?"

10 If so, what have we to gain by this expansion?

11 Answer.

12
13
14 Senator Culver. Why is it necessary for expanded U.S.
15 military presence since our "friends" are buying so much in
16 armaments?

17 After all, 42 percent of our foreign military sales
18 went to nations in the Persian Gulf in 1967 - 1974, and in
19 1974, they were 60 percent.

20 Answer.

21
22
23 (Whereupon, at 12:30 o'clock p.m., the Committee recessed
24 to reconvene upon the call of the Chair.)

25
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