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30 April 1975

Admiral,

--The following is from Capt. Cockell which he said is applicable to your discussion this morning.

--From New York Times, 30 Apr 75 issue, pg. 20
Quotation from William J. Porter, former Deputy
Ambassador to Saigon and Chief Negotiator in Paris
Peace Talks and now Ambassador to Canada

--Concerning what has happened in Vietnam

"All of my worries of all these years about how it was going to end have materialized. We didn't understand the place, we didn't know how to fight there. It was a sad epoch. There are lessons to be drawn from it, very clear lessons. We should never have tried to get by with half measures because you can't to that and control the outcome. The national moral is is that you apply power if you have it."

*V.R.
JRM*

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STATEMENT ON DEFENSE BUDGET

The Defense Budget Committee of the Washington Chapter of the American Jewish Committee has studied America's defense needs during the last six months, focusing more recently on the F.Y. 1976 Defense Budget. While our interests are obviously directed broadly at the future of our country and its defense capability, there is no doubt that the Yom Kippur War provided the major stimulus for our efforts under the aegis of the American Jewish Committee. We feel that the events of October 1973 demonstrated the close relationship between American military strength and readiness and Israel's security.

We found that our general concerns as Americans coincided with our particular interest in Israel's future. Our country's capacity effectively to assist and support Israel is in large part measured by the overall military balance between the United States and the Soviet Union rather than depending solely on the flow of American military equipment to Israel. Ultimately, only a very strong America can deter direct Soviet intervention in the Middle East, limit Soviet aid to the Arab side, and exert a stabilizing influence in the Arab world. A vital concern for the United States position in the Middle

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East is thus one of a number of compelling reasons which bring us to advocate an unequivocal policy of support of U.S. military strength.

Secretary of Defense Schlesinger has this year released an unusually detailed and frank report along with his budget submission. He recognizes that there is formidable opposition to his proposed defense budget in the new Congress. He points out that present U.S./^{international} commitments cannot be maintained unless the defense budget is kept at the requested level, that the Congress can lower the budget if it is prepared to make the explicit decision to forego some of these commitments. We feel that it is both logical and reasonable to relate military spending to foreign policy objectives.

In our analysis of the defense budget, we proceeded from the assumption that the Soviet Union is genuinely interested in avoiding a nuclear war. But we also assume that the Soviets will make every effort, short of a nuclear war, to expand the scope of their influence. We noted with deep concern the Soviet Union's strenuous and evidently successful efforts to attain military superiority over the United States.

To be sure, we do not believe that the United States should attempt to police every corner of the globe. But we do believe that the United States must,

where there is a reasonable chance of success, prevent Soviet expansion in our own interests and those of friendly countries which may be directly threatened.

We note that the F.Y. 1976 budget calls for only a ^{very} modest increase in U.S. force capabilities -- far less than a continuing Soviet buildup of both strategic and general purpose forces.^{1/} It would be pointless to pretend that an equally compelling case can be made for every program element embodied in the defense budget; nor should one pretend that the budget is entirely free of inefficiencies and duplication. But we disagree with those who believe that these facts justify deep cuts in defense spending. We recall that on several occasions in our recent history our perceived weakness has inspired Soviet actions to which we were then required to respond at a level (and cost) much higher than would have been necessary had we consistently maintained a strong and well-balanced defense posture. Korea, Sputnik, the Berlin Wall and the Yom Kippur War come readily to mind.

1/ While the total obligational authority sought is \$102 billion, proposed actual expenditures for F.Y. 1976 are \$94.7 billion. The analyses prepared by the Brookings Institution divide this budget request approximately as follows:

strategic nuclear forces (strategic bombers, missiles, submarines and ICBM's)	21%
strategic mobility forces (air lift)	4
general purpose forces (tactical ground, sea and air forces)	75
	<u>100%</u>

(In F.Y. 1964, 33% of the budget was allocated to strategic nuclear forces.)

If we were to define U.S. defense needs in their narrowest possible sense -- deterring attack on U.S. territory alone -- one would have to conclude that the defense budget is indeed too large. But we do not live in an age in which such a narrow definition (which also implies great risks to Israel) can be considered at all realistic. Our national security interests require that we deal with a much broader range of threats to our interests in many parts of the world. We must also make certain that in the perception of others -- particularly the Soviets -- we have both the means and the will to conduct our foreign policy in such manner as to assure our own security in this broader sense, and our vital interest in human dignity and the democratic way of life the world over.

It is our hope that the contingencies against which much of our defense budget attempts to protect us will never occur. We believe that a farsighted approach to defense spending can help achieve that end. At the present, the resources devoted to defense, 6% of our gross national product, are at a level which can be maintained by the economy without undue strain. If we were to view our investment in defense as a form of insurance (and it is more than that), we are by no means overinsured. If anything, we are underinsured in light of the potential

hazards. While the defense budget undoubtedly contains a certain amount of waste, a prudent approach might be to reallocate such funds as the six knowledgeable committees of the Congress dealing with defense matters might trim from the budget to other defense programs, hardware as well as research and development, thus utilizing defense expenditures more productively. We are aware that haphazard cuts or reallocations pose risks out of proportion to the potential short-term benefits.

We also are aware that a number of specific suggestions have been made for substantial cuts in the defense budget. We are familiar, in particular, with the counterbudget proposed in The Defense Monitor, published by the Center for Defense Information. We believe that the counterbudget would produce considerably smaller savings than claimed. Moreover, and more importantly, the recommended cuts would place the United States in a position where, should a subsequent, quick response to Soviet moves be required, it may not be feasible at all, or if it is feasible, only at much greater expense. We are convinced that cuts on the order of those proposed in the counterbudget, or anything approaching it, would require adoption of an outdated and unrealistic Fortress America concept and consequent abandonment of America's interests in much of the world.

The question as to whether the United States can "afford" defense expenditures at the present level, given our high priority domestic objectives, must be kept in perspective. Defense expenditures now constitute the lowest percentage of our gross national product since 1941, with the exception of F.Y. 1950.^{2/} The ~~entire~~ ^{defense controversy} budget ~~debate~~ revolves around a figure which is ~~less than~~ ^{about} one percent of our gross national product. We would rather pay that insurance premium than take the risk.

^{2/} The Brookings Institution analysis shows that from F.Y. 1960 to F.Y. 1975 the percentage of the budget allocated to "defense space and foreign affairs" declined from 53.7% to 31.6%. During the same period the allocations to "cash income maintenance, helping people buy essentials, and aid for social programs" increased from 24.9% to 49.1%. In terms of G.N.P we witnessed during this period a decline in the "defense, space and foreign affairs" category from 9.8% to 6.4% and an increase in the social program category from 4.5% to 10.0%. (We are not suggesting that it is wrong to increase social programs. We believe the American economy is strong enough to support both improved social programs and an adequate level of defense expenditure.)

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Address: _____ Leg. Dist.: _____

_____ Precinct: _____

Telephone _____

Here is how you can be of help in the Jackson-for-President campaign. Check whatever is applicable in your case.

I am willing to donate time:

- full-time or nearly full-time _____
- half-time or about half-time _____
- a substantial amount of evening and/or _____
- week-end time (about 15 hrs/mo.) _____
- some spare time _____

I am willing to do the following work:

- recruiting volunteers _____
- telephoning voters _____
- clerical work _____
- headquarters work _____
- other (specify) _____
- _____
- _____
- _____

I am prepared to make my house available for

- organizational meetings _____
- small fund-raising events _____