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SALT INTERVENTION

On Saturday, 26 October, I met with Senator Buckley of New York to run over the current negotiating situation and the concerns that Paul Nitze and I felt for the likely outcomes of Kissinger's trip to Moscow and the following visit by President Ford to China. Senator Buckley shared my concern and agreed to do the following two things: (a) to take a position of concern in the speech that he'd use to the Overseas Press Club in New York this next week for which I am to provide the data by next Tuesday and (b) to try to set up a meeting with the President among Tower, Buckley, Nitze, Zumwalt and Wohlstetter, to run through the consequences of our continual movement toward the Soviet position in the SALT arena.

Following the meeting, I arranged for the inserts to be provided to Senator Buckley and later Senator Buckley called to say that he had asked Senator Tower to try to set up the meeting. Saturday night, Senator Tower and I spoke - he was in Dallas at the Ramada Inn Central. He agreed to try to set up the meeting, if possible.

On Sunday, October 27th, Senator Tower called back to report the

following:

- (1) It would not be possible to meet with the President until after the election. This is something that can be done.
- (2) In any event, he's been assured that the JCS will get a chance to review anything that Kissinger came up with from Moscow.
- (3) He said that he would keep in touch with me.

I offered to meet with him when he gets back to town.

HAIG VISIT TO STENNIS

General Haig went to visit Senator Stennis last week (this is dictated on 26 October) to beg Senator Stennis not to hold hearings on him in connection with his appointment to NATO Command. Apparently General Haig is most concerned about what might turn up in any investigation.

Prior to the President's appearance on the Hill concerning Nixon's pardon, Haig spent a day in the White House trying to get Messrs. Marsh, Rumsfeld and Hartmann to agree the President ought not to go.

THE SOVIET SUBS IN CUBA

Soon after I took over as Chief of Naval Operations, I began to get concerned about the frequency of visits by Soviets to Cuba and there were reports of building at Cienfuegos which could well have been, at that time, the result of an understanding between Cuba and the Soviet Union that base facilities would be provided, in violation of the original Kennedy-Khrushchev understandings. I made my concern known to Admiral Moorer who indicated that he was going to make his concerns known to SEC DEF and the White House. Subsequently, I expressed the concern to SEC DEF. Subsequently, on hearing nothing back from either direction I contacted Admiral Rem Robertson to find whether anything was going on. A few days later Admiral Robertson came to see me to consult concerning a paper that he had been tasked to do by Henry Kissinger, a paper which would recidivate the Kennedy-Khrushchev understandings, making it clear to the Soviets that we would not accept a base facility at Cienfuegos or anywhere else in Cuba out of which ships carrying nuclear weapons could operate. I indicated satisfaction with the original draft. Subsequently, Admiral Robertson showed me the draft as it had been reworked by Henry

Kissinger and used (as a talking paper or aide memoir to Dobrynin). The wording in it in its final form was unfortunate. It read: Nuclear submarines would not be considered acceptable in its key words. I pointed out to Admiral Robertson that this left a confusion: (1) Were diesel-propelled submarines carrying strategic missiles to be prohibited? (2) Were nuclear-propelled submarines not carrying missiles to be prohibited? Admiral Robertson shared my concern and said that he had not been able to get the paper corrected and that when he had talked to Henry Kissinger, Henry Kissinger had indicated that it was too late to do anything about it. As a result, we have seen subsequently over the ensuing years the Soviets proceed to test these uncertainties by putting diesel-propelled submarines into Cuba, nuclear-propelled, non-missile submarines, a tender of the type which sometimes carries nuclear warheads but which allegedly did not have warheads in it, all under the guise of visits not yet suggested as operational bases. This action was part of their ongoing operating and diplomatic initiatives which, had they been able to bring it off, would have been useful to them as a trade-off for forward bases in Europe in the SALT arena or in the MBFR arena where NATO is trying to keep it, and in any

event would have indicated a significant accrescent of power capability on their part.

R. Maybe it would be useful to say, the best you can, how you knew what was going on down there.

Z. I don't recall the source of my intelligence information, whether it came through in the daily high-level intelligence that comes out from CIA or whether it was relayed to me by those who were aware of intelligence that would not normally have come to my attention.

R. You haven't any ships sailing around down there looking at what's happening to them?

Z. Yes, we do have surveillance by Navy aircraft and by Navy ships.

R. Then it's something they weren't trying to keep a secret, too, probably.

Z. The construction was being done by Cuban personnel and the fiction they were trying to present to us was that it was a Cuban Naval facility.

R. That means the ship visits, too, would not be _____. If they were testing you, they would want you to know.

The recent newspaper article fits my recollection that the TASS announcement of, I think it is 13 October, there was a kind of final line in that

negotiation, that is, the Soviet government had never announced they were building bases; they didn't, therefore, want to announce that they weren't building bases, and so TASS - an unofficial organ, the validity of which they could always deny - was used to cut the deck on that deal.

THE MOUNTBATTEN VISIT

In November of 1970, Earl Mountbatten visited the United States where he was wined and dined royally by many people. I first joined him at a dinner hosted by many of his World War II comrades at the Alibi Club. There were some 30 of us in attendance, my classmate Jim Calvert and I were the two youngest there. During the cocktail before dinner I commented to Earl Mountbatten he was the only speaker who had come to the Naval Academy during my tenure as a Midshipman whom I could even remember, and credited him with having the charisma and stage presence that really put himself across to a young and generally disinterested group of Midshipmen in that era. During the dinner, after the host toasted Earl Mountbatten and said some favorable things for him, he got up and gave a long and brilliant speech about the ties of World War II comradeship, and then went around the room and with a remarkable feat of memory referred to each person at the table by his name and gave a short summation of his relationship to them. He had already put in his computer and sorted out that he should comment on the fact that Zumwalt and Calvert had been midshipmen when he spoke there in 1944. A few days later I was invited to a stag dinner given by the President in the White House for Earl Mountbatten, attended

by many of the leading dignitaries in Washington. After a very formal dinner and proper exchange of toasts, we proceeded to the entertainment room where instead of the usual concert, Earl Mountbatten showed films and gave a running commentary on one of his current major interests, a college, the name of which eludes me. I guess it is a high school combination for international students, that is, he has high schools in several parts of the world (I need to get the name of the school), but he made quite a strong pitch for financial support for this institution. When he got completed, one of the Cabinet members turned and spoke to another and said, "He's the only man in the world who could practice salesmanship in the White House at a formal dinner."

MORE ON PROBABILITIES FOR 1970

After generally laying out for both my own staff and my seniors the way in which I intended to put probabilities on prospective outcomes in war in which the Navy was involved, and receiving general concurrence with this way to go, we went to work to try to ascertain what these probabilities would be. On June 26, 1970, I actually did a memo indicating that based on a conversation with the Joint Staff it was clear that Mr. Packard was proceeding with force level planning for the budget in a way consistent with seeking to estimate the risks involved. After coming up with the general conclusion that our probabilities for a reasonable range of assumptions was about 55% at the moment of my taking over, but that with budget levels currently being discussed they would probably go down to 30%, I then received advice from my staff that numbers like these would be so unpopular that I probably ought not to use them less they interfere with my ability to get things done at least, and with my tenure at worst. The Secretary of the Navy, John Chafee, urged that I stay away from probabilities. Initially, Mr. Packard was quite upset by them,

however, after I explained the rationale of their development in a memorandum to him (dictation on this already in the tapes), he seemed inclined to accept them. I gave the exact replica of the briefing I would give Mr. Nixon to Mr. Laird before I went over and he found no problem with both my present and estimated probabilities.

Following the briefings in the White House, I received word through several different members of the White House staff that the President, the Vice President, and Dr. Kissinger, had all been impressed with the briefing and with the method of putting probabilities on the risks, and that in significant measure as a result of this briefing the decision had been made that the Navy needed some budget help, as a result of which a significant number of ships (about 50, as I recall, of the 106 that were scheduled for reduction) were restored to the Navy budget. These probabilities I began to use in my classified discussions with key members of the Congress in connection with the budget being discussed in the Fall of 1970, that is, the fiscal year '72 budget.

R. Were these probabilities always classified material and unavailable for public consension?

2. These percentages which I continue to use remained classified until the last year of my tenure, by which time I became convinced that the situation was so dangerous that one had to begin to make more than just the senior leadership in the Executive and Congressional branches aware of them. They were not used as specific numbers as I recall, but rather as such statements as "the odds are very high" that we will not be able to win a war at sea or prevail in a NATO war, et cetera.

WHAT HAPPENS WHEN YOU HAVE A SUDDEN
SURGE DEPLOYMENT

The on this newspaper reads that the Sixth Fleet has been reinforced in a crisis as in the Yom Kippur War, and that's about the only message he gets. In actual fact when the Commander in Chief makes the decision to initiate a surge in deployment of this type, major evolutions must immediately get underway in the services affected. If a carrier task force is about ready to deploy, it means speeding up the delivery of equipment which was scheduled to arrive at the last moment. In any event, the ships' stocks of spare parts and other supplies are never fully outfitted due to budgetary limitations. When the crisis begins emergency expenditures are made for emergency withdrawal from other sources to bring the ships up to full outfitting which must deploy. Men are recalled from emergency leave and from routine leave in order to fill up the allowance of the ship. Normal leaves are cancelled for the period of the crisis, training is either curtailed or eliminated, and heroic efforts made enroute to make up for the training which has been missed. The decision to deploy in this modern era with systems as complex as those of the capital intensive services is one that reaches right down into all aspects of the Navy in order to provide.

TO THE BAROODY

C. The Presentation.

The Baroody presentation demonstrated the change in power and therefore in strategy over several administrations.

D. DPEC - last Friday - how to prepare for Presidential review.

a. Two results

1. Present how cuts could be made - K. asked good questions -

how will it impact on negotiations - we have strategic

equivalents yet we are reducing general purpose forces? -

UAF and Helms concern -
2. To go to the NFC - a new fit-up based on NSDM-27 -

but deficits increasing.

NOTES OF CONVERSATION WITH DR. KISSINGER

Enroute to Army-Navy Game

1. K. became very interested in Dave Halprin after talking to him at length - asked me if I thought if he would make a good replacement for David Young, as special assistant to K. I gave Dave top marks. Would like to get Dave into his shop ASAP. Said he had to get rid of Dave Young.
2. He stresses that he wants someone who is not Army in the above job. He says he can't trust Al Haig who is "piping" around him to get to the President. He is high on Fern Robertson.
3. Long talk on the presentation I gave President at budget time on probabilities. I gave him run-down on the President's remarks to me privately in the Sixth Fleet re his priorities. K. does not agree with the President that American people can be turned around. He states strongly that the President misjudges the people. K. feels that U. S. has passed its historic high point like so many earlier civilizations. He believes U. S. is on downhill and cannot be roused by political challenge. He states that

his job is to persuade the Russians to give us the best deal we can get, recognizing that the historical forces favor them. He says that he realizes that in the light of history he will be recognized as one of those who negotiated terms favorable to the Soviets, but that the American people have only themselves to blame because they lack stamina to stay the course against the Russians who are "Sparta to our Athens." I took him on strongly on this, saying that I couldn't accept the decision to grant the Soviets superior capability in either strategic or conventional fields should be made without putting the issue to the people. K. said, "You don't get re-elected to the Presidency on a platform that admits you got behind. You talk instead about the great partnership for peace achieved in your term."

He asked a number of questions about the probabilities as briefed to the President in August and in the Sixth Fleet. He said he considered it to be the most intellectual briefing the President had gotten from the Pentagon but that it was the kind of factual information that must be concealed from the public while we negotiate the best deal we can get.

4. I went into the POW issue. He confirmed that the President is solid in his resolve to keep the pressure on Hanoi to get them back.
5. K. Manifests scorn for Secretary Rogers.
6. I couldn't get him interested in the economic issues. Nor in Latin America.

29 November

1. Also K. stresses that he felt that MIRV's and ABM's were inevitably linked in SALT and that we must freeze MIRV's if we could freeze ABM's.
2. K. spoke again about his pleasure that he was able to overturn the bureaucracy to keep SALT going, last August. I suggested that one could always be successful in negotiating with the Russians if willing to move to their position. He smiled and said, "Only three-quarters of the way." I urged that we take longer to debate the Soviets on each position and not move too fast. K. said, "That's easy for you to say, you don't have to run for re-election."
3. K. is convinced that Soviet intransigence at Helsinki is a result of splits in the Presidium. I gave him my Soviet succession thesis and pointed out that Brezhnev is too clearly in command for this to be a likely prospect. I came out that the Soviets are waiting for us to move to them.

T. There were, of course, many things which led up to that period that later culminated, I think, in the Fall of '72 in the kind of fleet problems that bubbled up. Many of them were very definitely mis-attributed to the leadership and command policies that Admiral Zumwalt had put into effect. They were sickening to some of us because we had seen, that the erosion had really been in an awful lot of the leadership at middle-management level; certainly when I say middle management I include myself there.

R. What do you mean by erosion?

T. The almost willing to do a cop-out and let somebody else be responsible so that I don't have to step forward and say, "Young man, you've gone beyond the limits of good grooming that the C&O has specified," in other words, accepting that command responsibility of correcting on the spot and of enforcing the existing regulations.

R. Wouldn't it be going the other way, too, in some respects, not taking the responsibility for really implementing '66⁶⁶ federation requirements.(?)

T. I'm not real sure, Bob, that I track your question. The point that I was making is that I believe the regulations that we had by no means took away from us the authority to do our job and we had existing regulations for good order and discipline which had not in any way reduced the authority of the commanding officer,

T. and the division officer and the petty officer. Now, there's a whole other subject to side here, it is more difficult for any command these days to enforce legal justice because of complexities under which the lawyers and courts have got us, but by no means did Admiral Zumwalt contribute to that. He was trying to slice through a lot of this and show the commanding officers they had both the authority to do those things which contributed to moral and proved acceptance of individual responsibility and this was not done at that lower level. There was, as I said, a cop-out almost to the point of saying "Well, if they want to run it from Washington, let them do it." and then stepping back. That where the "Dungaree" thing - the authorization to wear dungarees from ship to home didn't work, and I don't think it was as bad from ship to home as it was from shore station to home, and it's simply easier to correct because you've got a quarter deck to police these things out on the ship. But, nevertheless, a lot of the shore station people just threw up their hands and it wasn't necessary and it would have been backed by the C&O to any extent that needed it.

Well, now there were a host of things that people blamed the C&O's humanizing programs on for what amounted then to the disorders in the Fleet and, of course, I was tremendously sensitive to those disorders because, this setting the stage, I took this job as Navy Recruiting Command in April '72. Those disorders broke

T. out in the Fall '72 at a time when we were gaining momentum in our recruiting program and we were picking up.

R. Do you want to talk a little more about the circumstances which induced Zumwalt to put you in that job and what the two of you saw as the principal challenges of the job at the time. What was the scene of

T. O.K. I had been up in Newport making a Commencement speech for a class of OCS graduates, 4 February 1972, and having just completed that speech I got a call that the C&O wanted to talk to me.

R. You were still his aide?

T. No, sir. At that time I was Commander of Cruiser-Destroyer, Flotilla 6, home ported at Charleston, having been at sea about six-months then, following a tour as his OPPELS 9 Charlie - which is another story, but the way I first got my sailing orders is fairly interesting, I think, in the recruiting job. He had to go on to a JCS Meeting but the word was given to me that he would contact me when I got back to Charleston that night, knowing that I was going to fly back from Newport. This was the second time in Newport that I had gotten a call from him which had affected my life. The first one being three years before that when I was told that I was going to Vietnam at his request - that, too, is another story - but staying with this, in February '72, when we got back to Charleston late night the phone was ringing as I came in the house about 22:30. I subsequently

found he had been suffering from a bad bout with the flu and sounded as sometimes - very rarely - tired but nevertheless with that sparkle in his voice. He said, "Emmett, I'm going to ask you to come to Washington and take Command of the Navy Recruiting Command." And there was my long pause and my first comment to him was, "Well, what have I done wrong, Boss?"

R. Then that recruiting had, up to then, always been considered the "dog house" or something?

T. It had been considered not career enhancing, certainly not for an officer. And I had, of course, only been in my job afloat - just having completed what I'd considered a successful deployment to the Mediterranean with one of our Carrier striking Forces (in fact, quite pleased ^{with} some of the things that we had done) and so this sudden uprooting after I had only talked to him about two Months before and felt that I was safe to be where I was for another year anyhow, but he said, "No, we're in a critical condition. The President is most anxious to end the draft so that he could take this torn out of the side of the people that are finding so many things to create unrest and unhappiness on the campuses. And the Navy is in fourth place in making its percentage goal; we're falling further and further behind in December '71." He recounted we had made only about 50 per cent

of our quote, and that was correct, and he was so concerned because the trend was still looking bad he didn't see any of those things taking place which he felt confident was going to be a turn around to get the Navy back where it should be.

R. Was this just numbers or was he concerned at that point with quality, too?

T. He was concerned with quality because that was a facet of it, but of course in that very brief phone call he was talking numbers because that's all you could address at that stage with my ignorance of the subject.

R. You really didn't know anything about recruiting, did you?

T. No. Not at that point. I said, "Well, Admiral, wherever I can help you is where I want to go. I'm surprised, but nevertheless I'm willing. When will I be there?" And he said "I'll have a relief on the way for you fairly soon, and just as soon as you can be relieved, I want you up here." Well, as it turned out I was relieved by Admiral Bob Wellington, who as you may recall was the Admiral who had the position as White House Liaison Officer.

R. Was that the one who succeeded Robinson?

T. That's right. Relieved Robinson..

R. who was in the flap about the yeoman, the spy ring, and all that?

T. Right. Exactly, and just a foot note on that story. When the news broke that he was being sent to outer Siberia, well, nothing can be further from the

truth because he was getting what every Line Officer wanted, I mean Flag Officer, that's a Command at sea. I had one that I was very proud of, Flock 6.

R. Does that assignment have to be approved by the civilian hierarchy or C&O?

T. This, I'm sure, the Secretary of the Navy gets in to, I must confess, because it was a two-star billet. That kind of rotation pretty much, I'm sure, is left to the C&O but does get a Secretary of the Navy clearance. If he had ideas to the contrary certainly they would prevail, but I'm just not in that orbit, Bob, so I can't elaborate on it. At any rate, ...

R. Just another small question. To whom is the Director of Recruiting directly responsible to - right to the C&O or

T. I report - the only echelon in between me and the C&O is the Chief of Naval Personnel, so it's what's known as the 3rd Echelon Commander; C&O is 1st Echelon; Chief of Naval Personnel, 2nd; then I'm 3rd Echelon. So, that was the introduction I had of what he wanted, he wanted it very soon. Now, let me be very sure because I had mentioned this before to Admiral Zumwalt and I think my predecessor, Rear Admiral Bill Greene, was done a great disservice by many people who gave me a lot of credit for some of the things that started happening shortly after I took over. Bill Greene had made many requests through the echelon and had been denied many of these things. This was before Admiral Dave B_____ became the Chief of

Naval Personnel, and I know that the then Chief of Naval Personnel was operating under certain constraints of the budget, and total personnel

R. That was , right?

T. No. At that time Tex Gwynn had relieved Admiral Duncan, and so Admiral Gwynn was then the Chief of Naval Personnel, but under this terrible cut-back that was going on in numbers and dollars he was having to put his priorities where he saw them. But at some place there was just a disconnect in that long orbit between the C&O and down to the recruiting command as to the fact that the C&O had recognized the priority for what it was. He had sent over to Admiral Greene, a good year before that, in 1971 in a memo which said, "I want heroic actions made to get us ready for the reduction in draft and yet prepared for the all- volunteer force.

R. When did the draft actually end?

T. The draft actually went off the books 30 June of '73, just a year ago, so we finished one fiscal year, but the last draft calls were in December of '72.

R. Then for the last year they hardly drafted at all.

T. It went down very precipitantly and that's when it got the Navy in its trouble; draft calls were as high as 300,000 a year for the total needs of the Army back in '69, and then they started decreasing from that peak so that is when those lines of volunteers started disappearing from recruiting offices

and it was during that stage then that they had to lower some of the quality standards. And at that period where Navy was going down, down in making its percentages with the lowering of the standards trying to broaden the market, was when there were some people that got in who were just not of the caliber, and the second thing you've got to bear in mind is that our recruiters at that time had been trained only to process people who came in the door - virtually to that extent, select those from among the line of volunteers. But when the line disappears you don't have much selectivity.

R. Oh, I see, I see. They had just been trained to sit in the office and wait for somebody to come to them. They hadn't been...

T. That's an over-simplification of it, but in fact that's what it was in contrast to what we're doing these days.

R. They weren't real good at going out...

T. They didn't know how to identify the market; they did not have the assets, Bob, to go out and find that market. They were not permitted to use paid advertising, they did not have the vehicles they needed, they were still in the basement of the old County Courthouse with bad plumbing and lighting...

R. Adequate post office...

T. That's right. And, so, in that kind of atmosphere you can't blame those

recruiters who were not trained for this new job of marketing merchandise.

R. How were people selected for the recruiting school - recruiting duty?

T. Well, an awfully lot of them were selected because it was a twilight tour they were going to have to be moved sometime to their home of records so that was a good time to do it if they so requested. Gave them the chance to get set up in their second career job.

R. What officers are you talking about now?

T. Primarily men, enlisted personnel. The officers generally were just not what you'd call the top performing officers because we had priorities in Vietnam at that time that just had to take first call.

R. Was this true before Vietnam.

T. Sure. Because a Navy man joins the Navy to go to see or to fly airplanes and if you're not doing that somebody wonders what you are doing back in your home State, and this is not demeaning for us to say that all people associated with recruiting work superior, but it was not getting the priority because priorities had to be assigned elsewhere.

R. Were there other periods when recruiting was difficult?

T. Depression was an easy time, people couldn't get jobs, and during World War II there clearly wasn't no problem. I just don't have that kind of background,

Bob. We've had the draft in effect for 33 years, except for about an 18-months' period following World War II, and we were cut back so badly then that still was not a great problem. There's just been nothing similar to this in the combination of having to get the numbers that we're after and a full equality standard. So, it was this period of coming in, inheriting organization and again, my predecessor had tried so hard to get up through the system to get things done and was turned down - again because I give credit because undoubtedly there were other restraints on Admiral Gwynn - but I found at the Staff level there were too many people who would give a cherry-eye-eye when some clerk over in BuPers would turn him down, and when coming aboard my first sailing orders to this staff was, "anytime you get a no from any level at anyone in the chain of command up above us, you come to me and that's what we'll use those two stars for." And I set up weekly sessions- Admiral Bagley then was Chief of Naval Personnel from the time I got aboard - and I had direct entre' to him at any time, day or night, by phone or office call- and he made that very clear to his staff. Admiral Zumwalt told him in privacy that any time this program was getting stymied that I was to request from Admiral Bagley an opportunity to see him, that I was to see him. Now, I at no time under Admiral Bagley had request to short circuit the system. He has always been the first to say when we reached disagreements, and we did on the priority of certain things,

because he had many other personnel problems tugging at his limited assets so he would be the first to suggest "I don't agree, but let the C&O understand our points of view on it. And then every time that we took one of these issues forward, Admiral Dave Bagley battled very strongly as to why he thought it should not be done but when it was finally decided, and if the decision fell my way, I could not have had finer or more loyal support from an individual than I did Dave Bagley. Now, that represents his loyalty to Admiral Zumwalt, who has been a great object lesson to me and I would hope I could follow as well. And this was so necessary that we get the answers quickly because in this town if you are not supporting something almost avidly it is so easy to let it sit in the basket and die its natural death, which is the reason for that 9 Charlie job, which we'll talk about later. But with these weekly sessions as a minimum that I was having with the Chief of Naval Personnel and he would call in his key staff people and I was running a list of what we called problems in inhibiting recruiting - pure lists - so that we could have visibility when we circulate those to the staff quickly and after a few sessions that they would have with the Chief of Naval Personnel and they saw his support for the program, a lot of those have to come to the top then, and very quickly got settled at the staff level which is where it should be.

R. It might be interesting to see a random sample of such letters.

T. I'm sure I can get some of those

R. It will make the whole thing a little more dramatic with specific problems - would these be just lists of interior Navy things or also outside things?

T. Some of them were outside which I would be reluctant for Admiral Zumwalt to publicize at this stage and I just don't think there would be no need for it, but I think there are enough examples and just to tick off a few of them - when we were trying to get our new budget authorized to accommodate paid advertising that came in the middle of a cycle of the budget which meant....

R. The ban on paid advertising was strictly an internal Defense Department matter, Navy thing, it wasn't a

T. It was a Navy thing because at that stage no real prohibition on it but here again Navy has held off on going for paid advertising because the story given to me used both in recruiting and in the Office of Information there was the feeling that if we went paid advertising we would immediately loose all this free advertising that we were getting as public service advertising from the printed medium. We were barred at one time by a congressional writer which prohibited it but then subsequently by the applied desire of the congressional committee that we not pay for electronic media advertising.

R. What kind of money is involved in the paid advertising?

T. Well, we're running a total agency budget now of about eighteen million

dollars a year and this is some sixteen million dollars with our major agency and another two million dollars with our minority agency. And to get this kind of a program underway...

R. That's a substantial amount of money.

T. Sure it is, and it's still only about half of what Army runs. The point that I was making here is the difficulty of getting a budget line item approved when you're in the middle of a budget cycle it takes virtually two years as a minimum, you know, from the time you get it started in the Navy system and then OSD approve it, and then finally Congress approve it. Under the continuing resolution which Congress uses, you know, when they are waiting for one budget to be approved - although the fiscal year has already started - you cannot introduce a new program until you've got approved budget and then you have to go forward and get reprogramming authorized by Congress. And so I came in and was caught without a budget line item, operating under the continuing resolutions. I couldn't even get reprogramming done.

R. The new fiscal year starting.....

T. That's right. I came in in April and the new fiscal year started in July.

There was no line item...

.. There was no way of getting into that budget.....

T. That's right. And no way to get it in because it had been in Congress and

on the Hill under discussion for several months, so it was one of the greatest hand-to-mouth feats you've ever seen of trying to run an annual advertising program but of that scale/on an almost day-by-day basis with our agency that would still stay within the continuing resolution of funds that I did have, but that were there for a whole year's basis. The Secretary of the Navy was writing to members of the Committee telling them that we were starting a paid media advertising and we wanted to make a reprogramming just as soon as we could get a budget approved that we could go in and ask for reprogramming those funds. So, it was one of the great shell games that makes it so complicated in Washington and it was one of those reasons I just had to do an awful lot of desk pounding to keep our position forward with the budgeters to reprogram these funds.

R. How soon did the first ad appear?

T. The paid advertising was just starting; as a matter of fact the week that I came aboard to take over from Admiral Greene was the presentation by the advertising agency of their first proposed program...

R. It had been in training before you....

T. It had been in training for about a month, for a contingency program but the authorization just came through from the Secretary of the Navy during that period then to start, so

R. That was Warner, then?

T. Mr. Warner had just taken over as Secretary of the Navy then.

R. Here's another thing to clear up in my own mind and that is did Greene finish out his tour or was he relieved early?

T. No, he'd been aboard two years and Bill had done a tremendous job of creating this command. You see, it had been a division of Bureau of Naval Personnel, and he was a Captain at the time. He came onboard, was then selected for Admiral so they decided to leave it as a Rear Admiral fill it and keep him in it, as part of the preparations for transitioning to the all-volunteer corps and then...

. Is that Zumwalt's action to make it a separate command?

T. It was on his watch, yes sir, and he supported it; Bill Greene made the recommendations as to one of the ways for them to better manage the organization, but then he was constrained to do this with no increase in assets which meant that he was functioning as a separate command with still great dependence upon the Bureau of Naval Personnel staff to support him: budget-wise, personnel-wise, many things like this, and he could not do the expansion and appeal that he needed without increasing the personnel. Now, authorization started coming through for small, implemental increases but it was certainly insufficient for doing what he needed. And, so, my big multi-pronged effort was to get an increase

in budget, to get to add on the personnel we needed..

R. They had to fill that staff post...

T. Staff, then trying to get this heterogeneous outfit under one roof if we can because we were scattered in five different buildings in town, and with the office over here that alone made it very difficult.

R. I suppose it would be helpful to have some of the statistics in the book about the money and personnel about, from where to where...what is the total staff budget now?

T. It's on the order of \$120,000,000 and this depends on how you count some things, but within this part of our build-up was to take over reserve recruiting after a study in which we had full reserve participation with it. My desire was to try and get as many reserve people supporting it down in community as possible while trying to man those reserve numbers with quality people but not always our reserve recruiter and regular Navy recruiter competing for the same body, but to expand our points of contact by going out after more bodies. And the point I'm making is that our budget, unique among the services, includes cost of recruiting for regular and reserves, and I actually have in my budget the personnel costs for reserve recruiters, the vehicles that are provided, the advertising that is provided; these things which if you look only at our regular Navy excessions

will make a very erroneous comparison on the cost per recruit relative to the other services, but when you add in what we do with those assets we come out very favorable then. This is one of the jobs, that we frequently run into and have to be sure that the budgeters understand this difference. Sometimes this is not understood as much as we'd like.

R. Can you say a little of your understanding what the whole reserve situation ?

T. Well, it's really not that difficult and those who work with the numbers could understand it sometimes better.

R. Is there somehow you can kind of describe what a recruiting operational procedure was like in the past and what it's like now? What people do and what resources they have? Is that the wrong way to go at it?

T. No, I think there's some points here that Admiral Zumwalt and I got into it. Just as an example of not accepting "no" from a clerk level, there had been for about 2 months a NAVOF, a message to all Naval Operating Forces, that Bill Greene had wanted out which would specify the priority that the C&O had established for recruiting. It had been bouncing around through every office in the Pentagon, in the staff, then stabbed to death and watered down to virtually nothing, and fortunately a week after I was onboard with this kind of personal contact between

Admiral Bagley, then with the C&O, we were able to get this NAVOF out on the street.

A. It was a NAVOF, not a "Z?"

T. It was a "Z" 109. We got that established to it. That was within one week but that was because again of telling some of these four millions in the system that we are just bottle-necking things but the Boss wants it, you chop it or we'll march on, so we got it out.

R. How long has that been done now?

T. Two months, at least. Bill Greene was heart broken because he didn't get chipped loose to help me with the start, and I never had a finer turn-over from an officer, a more conscientious desire to try and get this job done and that's why I've always been tremendously disappointed that Bill went out under a cloud. So many people said he was being relieved early. Well, that's an injustice to him because he had worked his heart out for this thing. You've got to be able to know the sensitive pressure points in this town and how to get the Boss' priorities carried out.

R. Is he retired now?

T. No. He went on to another job - Fleet job - Commander of the Inshore Warfare Group, set up that command, did a good job of it, and then subsequently I think about a year later retired because he had a very outstanding offer from a private business. Now, with that kind of priority assigned by the C&O, Greene very clearly

said that recruiting is our No. 1 priority. See, he had not been able to say that before when he had this terrible build-up in Vietnam required at a time the Fleet had been drawn down by some 20 to 30 per cent and it was only in that transition period in '72...

R. That was just at the time the Fleet over there was doubled, the DMZ invasion,

T. The DMZ Invasion....the doubling the size of the 7th Fleet, the mining of Haiphong Harbour and all of these, and he had been drawing down and only then would he be able to come out and say recruiting is my No. 1 priority and then to show how he stood by it.

R. By drawing down, you mean reducing the size of the Navy?

T. Yes, the total size of the Navy. Right. He just had pure assets to draw on to bring in top-level people to put in these recruiting jobs, and to do the kind of things with leadership, selling was necessary. Now, when he gave me that priority I was able to start building my staff then with some of these top, ten percenter-type individuals.

R. They'd be willing to come along?

T. That's right. Some of them had their doubts but nevertheless they believed in us that we said it was going to be No. 1 and they went along with them.

T. What is the structure of the recruiting thing? How is it built up?

- T. With the pyramid starting in Washington and then, you can see from the chart over there, were gritted into apparently 7 major recruiting areas and then 43 recruiting districts.
- R. What kind of an officer would be in charge of an area?
- T. A Captain in charge of an area, a Senior Captain - now subsequently designated as a Major Shore Command - and the 43 recruiting districts are headed by Senior Commanders or Junior Captains, in the case of some of them, and it is the main station - Navy Recruiting main station - Oklahoma City. For instance, here again Bill had been trying to get the approval without having to change the name of this so that it could be a Commanding Officer instead of Officer in Charge, and inside of a month we got that changed and got it approved. Again by this direct contact with the Admiral, we had that piece of paper in his basket, the knowledge that I wanted to take this to Admiral Zumwalt to get it approved. Magically, that moves it kind of quickly.
- R. What's the slowness all about?
- T. Everybody's different. You've got to sort priorities out and know how to get them to their proper places. It's that simple.
- R. How many reluctance to inovate or scared to do anything controversial or not wanting to move on something there's flack about, or not do much about it then?

T. I guess it's human nature, Bob, that people, unless they're thoroughly sold on what the Boss is doing, they want to help protect him and this protection can turn into a long delay. Now, how much of it is sincere protection and how much of it is a delaying factor is one of the individual answers that is for the Good Lord to judge him on but we got this blasted out so that the..

R. Anyway, you do have to blast.

T. You've got to know when to blast, when to rock that boat, got to know when to pulse the system. This is something, fortunately, I think I learned under Admiral Zumwalt. It doesn't mean disloyalty to anybody, it means giving those people up the staff echelon a chance to know what you're going to do and that you're not going to sit and wait for the eternity of the system to work it out. You simply say, "All right, I understand your orders. Now, who'se your boss because I need to talk to him because I know what my sailing orders are." And you are thoroughly in a favorable position being known as somebody.

R. having been put there specifically by him.

T. And I believe that this is certainly one part of his having brought me in because people knew me, dating back to having been his Chief of Staff in Vietnam and the OPPELS 9 Charlie job setting that up in Washington, so they recognized that he put me some place where he wanted this job done, so that certainly

Tape Side A
 Part 9

did help - got through any capability of mine that sometimes...

R. That is thoroughly the best way for him to signify that you trusted in him.

T. Right. We got those things done, set the command structure up, got it off
the band standing, really in fact. You see, I did what Bill Greene had been
trying to get done.

R.

T. (Impossible to understand due to screech - Position 9 on Tape)

T. Concurrent with this, by my own setting down of which I saw of the job to
be done, we were again in the marketing business, had to set up a marketing,
merchandising orientated organization. This we did, angled our structure of
the field organization that were equally important as headquarters' organizations
and make it absolutely clear to the group at headquarters that this is the job -
the bureaucratic headquarters which the field forces serve - that it's the other
way around. It existed to serve at the bottom of that pyramid the recruiter in
the field. Everything that people were going to do was to be oriented toward
supporting that figure in the field to getting his job done. We created one
division in recruiting support department, the entire department devoted to
helping to review things like promotion being a drag race,
recruited its contacts to help people; he could get in trouble

quicker than he could get himself set up as a true promoter. We organized the educator tours for him to the extent of making contact, getting the Navy Air Transportation for a how quickly and legally done - all of these things important out in the field - so he could then put all his time in on the job of recruiting, getting up and going out and finding the market. Now, this required men ofrecruiter in the field, selection of the proper individuals to do this, training them because it had to be completely done differently than it had in the past, and the selection of the individual.

R.

T. No. Again, I got good people who did this, working with the Bureau of Naval Personnel their understanding we saw as the things a good recruiter should possess and getting a commercial sales aptitude test and we need personal qualities an applicable person should have. These tool, and again getting total support from the Chief of Naval Personnel, Admiral Zumwalt, made it very clear that we would get top selection of personnel. The detailed men going over these criterion would pick people with good records.

(Last few sentences unintelligible)

T.command which meant again another longloop trying to break those chains in things like this. 7 weeks course. Now Bill Green had been working on a plan to try and perhaps decentralize those and get those assets divided up among the then 8 area commanders and let them run their own individual schools. This had not been approved, worked on that, got it approved, got the individual courses set up, had contract commercial sales motivation training people.....

R. Contracted the course?

T. That's right, on this commercial sale motivation part of it with Navy enlisted instructors, two of them in each of those 8 locations, providing the fundamental training. Now, that program gave the area commander great flexibility, not only in training the people that were being ordered to him but also to bring people in and re-train them.

R. Did you mostly send people to their old home neighborhoods?

T. If they request - let's say, if they don't request it we try to do it - if they don't request to go elsewhere we try to put them in their home town, but sometimes Johnny says, "Hey, I'm not necessarily that loved back in my home town, I'm a much better guy today than I was as a teenager, you know."

But by and large that's not true and generally they request to go to their home town because they know the people there; a home town boy come home, made good, and so we get a very high percentage of them that do go there. Now, the area commanders ran their training, they can re-cycle people through for re-training if necessary, where before we didn't have that flexibility. We cut the length of the training down so that we could get them out in the field quicker. We had to with this build up that we were trying to make.

R. This still sounds like an awful long time.

T. Well, the Air Force still uses that long a system and the Army, also. We have stuck ours the first 2 weeks during that crash period; we've now gone to a 4-week period, one of which is in the field at their local district - so 3 weeks in that school.

R. Now, let me get it perfectly clear in my head. At the time that you took over there really was a kind of crisis period in terms of recruiting. They didn't turn around recruiting, kind of yesterday?

T. Like Admiral Zumwalt inherited, he had retention rates below 10% and it was going down. This had to be changed.

R. Right away.

T. Yes. And I can give you some charts on this that show how our curves were

just going down and down percentage-wise, and what our goal line was and it had to be turned up. And so here was this multi-prong attack on that; getting the training and re-cycling of those we had, removing the non-producers, getting better leaders in, getting people - many of whom we didn't know and say that they were going to be charging individuals. As an example of the kind of priority that Admiral Zumwalt put on it, I told him that the point had been reached where a key member of our staff was at a point where his future and his approaching retirement should be changed then or he would not be able to move to a new job, so Admiral Zumwalt said, "Who do you want to fill that spot in recruiting now?" I said, "Well, that happens to be Captain Lando Beck who works on your personal staff," and he looked at me with that typical look in his eyes and said, "You son of a bitch!" and then said, "Well, I'll show them that I mean business, you can have him Monday," and with that Lando came over to work for me. He had just brought Lando down from the Office of Legislative Affairs, working under Admiral Snider, and put him in charge of his direct office preparing his hearings, testimony, etc. That was like on Thursday, and Lando Beck was working for me over here the next Monday, which agains shows his personal commitment to the thing and his willingness to show them that he meant business.

R. One thing is for sure about him that he does treat the people he work with pretty well.

T. Yes, he never expects any more out of you than he has already put out himself, I assure you. And we were both very hopeful that Lando would get promoted to Rear Admiral in the future. He's one of our great officers.

R. Is he still there?

T. He is. Just recently - he's finished two years as my deputy and so he's moved up to top 13, he been submariner - that's a very important spot with that Trident phase going through up there in the . That's really a tricky job to do and then with the decision made last year that they wanted to promote me but did not want me to leave the job which normally a promotion to three stars would entail, they then decided to make the job a three-star billet and then they Lando in it; he'd better go on so that my next deputy would be able to lead up and relieve me, hopefully, which may well be done and without making it a three-star job. Deputy , who was the area commander on the West Coast, commander of my 10 Western states in recruiting - the man I brought in with one week's notice to take over that western portion out there - served not a year and a half out there and he was selected for Rear Admiral. So this kind of thing - there was another officer on my staff selected for Rear Admiral, Reserve Captain, whom I brought in to this Reserve Board for coordinating our recruiting efforts, most respected of service reserve officers, he subsequently

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was selected in the job for Rear Admiral and that caught the attention of the reservists and last year when Bob was selected also, the officer in charge of my Budget Department, Tom Hughes, grand officer, a good combat record, he was selected for Rear Admiral in BuPers, head of the Budget Department.

R.help my understandinghow
selection boards work? How do you ?

T. Well, the Secretary of the Navy convenes the Board, the president is approved by the Secretary of the Navy and there's the appointing letter then and the Chief of Naval Personnel, I'm sure wouldn't the C&O select people to go on those boards. The Secretary of the Navy approves of the Admiral.....

R. For all ranks?

T. For all ranks. In this procedure then, with representation for the various technical areas of the candidates, that Board meets in absolute privacy before having access to their deliberations. Full access to all the records on all the individuals in the program is administrative; reviewing the records and the general procedure is that one officer will brief the record and then give an oral presentation to the other - say 12 members or 20 or however big it is - while that of the record standard format is projected on a board. He then points out what he's noted in going through in detail and he will explain this. Although this looks like a low mark here, here is the reason for it,

I've read its record. Then, generally there is a second review of that record and again somebody else the next time around will brief that record.

R. Does the Board have....

T. 16, Yes. It has a maximum number which it cannot exceed and it is given certain directions that you are authorized to select from below the zone of certain numbers which Admiral Zumwalt had just raised 5%.....

R. There's no way to transfer when you've held it?

T. When you've held it, that's right. Yes sir. With this line-up, people might ignore you, some start to cheer you, some are considered, some are passed over.
Next year that number goes down further.

R. There are a certain number of years in a grade?

T. Those with a very minimum number who are below the promotion cylinder can be picked up. Now up to 15%, they never selected that high a number, but if you are in this category of the promotion zone somebody who is selected over you may be junior to you and you're not, that's an official pass-over for you. And basically if you've been passed over twice you have to go out. But if you're down below the zone category and somebody is selected below you, that's not an official pass over. It's the early selection that counts.

R. Does everybody sooner or later get put out ?

T.

R. The same people can sit over and over again on the Board?

. Not frequently does a person serve on more than 1 Board. Now they will maybe start out and serve on a very junior Board at one rank and two or three or six years later serve in another rank on a higher Board. But they are always somewhat different.....

K. But that really is judgment by your peers ...by your superior...

T. Yes, never by your peers because they're up for selection also. By peers, you mean anybody with the same rank so it's always a junior member on the selection Boards must be well senior to the most senior person up for consideration.

All, right, it had for years been that people in recruiting if they are below the motion potential line and then when the Calvert people - putting in recruiting jobs, for example, I'll name for you those three people who were promoted while in recruiting command jobs: I went from 2 stars to 3 stars in the job, next you have naval reservists going , that's correct, and then within the reserve organization there are these recruiting district assistants counselors that I have organized which is one drill paid billet, something like a Commander or Captain Reservists, who gets drill paid credit for serving as chairman of the council and he in turn is responsible for assisting that Commanding Officer who is supposed to tell him, "Look, I've got these

ten top problems and I need help on them and I don't have time to go out and get the volunteer help. You take it over." One of them may be getting into high school, John Free Brown, another one may be got a on the eastern side of the county but that's not how he gets his advertising class ready for the local newspaper, the weekly, that counts a lot. I need somebody to help him. I need to raise a little kitty for an award for a recruiter who has done an exceptional good job so he and his wife can have a week end at a Holiday Inn in a big city and the Navy people can't raise that money but the Recruiting District Assistant Council Chairman ARDAC Chairman can. He then says, "O.K. here the tense problem. Out in this community here's a civilian I know that's on the School Board. Talk to him. Here's a Reserve Officer up on the Eastern part of the county who can help that Chief, and happens to work in one of the Advertising agencies. He can help that Chief one night a week." This kind of volunteer help being brought together in a very flexible organization, sort of like a Navy phantom person, he uses the assets that you can muster to accomplish the job that has been set forth by the Boss. And with those 43 District Council formed getting good reserve officers, preserve unity, they have a reserve division and a group, and then they get voted out of a job by the time they're Captain, young Captain, and this guy still would like to stay active in the reserves and get

him voted where there's not any jobs for him. So those are the ones we are going to have to bury in the prime of their life who are generally active in the community; they are ambitious, love the uniform and it does help them probably in their business, but they want an excuse the cream of this crop. And out of that group now we've had 8 men in 2 years selected for Rear Admiral. So that can be a reason to stay in the reserves And then on this last selection board for Commander to Captain, our percentage of officers who were in this eligible promotion rank was higher than Fleet average in selecting.

Now, this says two things, Bob. One, that what we're getting in recruiting is really top quality coming in, and secondly coming into recruiting is not a . . . the way it used to be.

R. Basically what it took was the top guy in the Navy that put a high priority on recruiting. Changes everything around.

T. Sure it does. But you know we've heard these things before and the lesson, the proof of the pudding, is in the most promotion Board results so the kids see that happening they don't care how much you say this is an important job - we've heard about important jobs every time somebody had a big, new idea - but it's got to be the results of the Selection Board that really turns out to be facts for these youngsters.

R.

T. Yes sir. He has already given him his very strong support. He was Admiral Zumwalt's Vice Chief of Naval Operations for that year; he gave it the same continued kind of support and he recognized that to achieve those objectives that he set out he has got to recruit for best possible equal numbers he needs in order to have the good ones to retain.

R.

T. That's true. Every recruiter was concerned about that also, but fortunately knowing Admiral Holliway and watching him during these years, you'll C&O and receiving his direct pledge of personal support now and backed up by his teams - he travels and everywhere he's travelled he tried to get around to see the local recruiters- he has supported me significantly in my many tasks and administrative requirements. Vice Chief of Naval Operations, , had been totally supporting him, and this doesn't mean that the things come free, Bob. It is still short on budget in relation to what we need but they are giving it more than a fair shake. Our case is heard - it's heard at the top and it's heard promptly. You can get answers and if it is a negative we get it quick enough so we can then take the alternative course. That's where you can die in this town if you don't get carried through in what the Boss has decided.

R.

T. First, you get a good guy and put . You got a no good thing recruiting two guys and then go fishing the rest of the month. You're in trouble. So that's the source effort. Secondly, it's the middle management supervision that's necessary and that means that he's got to know what's going on out there. We call these basically the zone supervisors. Each of these districts are broken down into zones: one district may be divided into 4 zones. For instance, there's a chief recruiter, and under him there's a zone supervisor. That zone supervisor should know what every man is doing...

R.

T. The Army is Information Officers in this category but we're using E-8's and E-9's for this job.

R. Over supervisors?

T. Yes, over supervisors. I, very frankly.....

R. He's got a car?

T. He runs the wheels off getting around, too.

R.

T. That's right. Start boiling things down to square miles for eligible recruits and it gets pretty big.....

R. Is that how the set up, you know?

T. No. We look really at the total population and then we have what you call qualified military available, that's population. Once you sort out the over-age and the under-age, the institutionalized, college students not eligible, etc., we try to then assign assets based on that sub-jay factors of this mileage Another factor then is where the fishing is good you try to do more fishing, so when you call it profitability to enlist, the success factor.....

R.

T. That's right. Could be different factors. Geography is a factor; still the number one district in the nation last year was San Antonio. They have a lot of square miles down there with sagebrush. Well, that's part of the marketing job that we got into. We had to do a lot of marking out in the middle of this, you see, because assets weren't available. The question of marketing research to identify the market, to find out what advertising fields would attract the young people - I completely re-did our advertising Department - the outstanding were not used, had management capabilities to keep all of the in the air.

R.

T. Right. The problems with advertising is stronger chances for things mis-firing and this I was very concerned with in picking out the staff then. To

keep track of how this was being done in class, multiple media approaches were necessary. In the meantime it takes 4-6 months to get printed stuff off the press. So you've got to note what the entire time of the program is, had to have it in for the market research, what deals are necessary to get the quality people into those programs and

(Rest of tape fades out and impossible to hear)

~~Rice-Zumwalt on SALT~~

The JFK Story

When we got the word that President Nixon wanted to meet in the 6th Fleet we also got the word that he did not want John F. Kennedy to be the flagship on which the meeting took place. There was considerable shuffling and maneuvering to try to be sure that we had a different flagship on which we met, (I need to research to see what ship we actually finally ended up on.) It was our understanding that the President did not want this very public event to remind people of J. F. Kennedy.

Back to Rice-Zumwalt on SALT

R: This evidently came up because there was various self-righteous material in the Joint Chief minutes about while we are fiddling around, the Russians in not reaching an agreement, the Russians keep building and building. And the question simply is, weren't we building and MIRVing and doing all this all at the same time. I mean, if it was both ~~sides~~ sides continued to improve their strategic forces during that time is that correct?

Z: Yes the problem as we saw it though is the following one: we saw ourselves headed for a deal where there was going to be a set number of missiles given to the Russians and to ourselves and no constraints on MIRV's.

R: This was after Nixon-Brezhnev, you're talking about?

Z: Yes, after the May 71 announcement. And it was clear that both sides would therefore be able to continue to MIRV and that the Soviets would have a great superiority in total numbers over time because of their throw-weight advantage. And therefore the desire on the part of the JCS was to get the deal on numbers set with a date early enough

that it held down the total numbers into which they would have the continuing right to MIRV.

R: I see. Meanwhile however we were going ahead and xdeploying the safeguard out here in North Dakota. . .and we were doing ~~xx~~ various things ourselves. And effectively MIRVing submarines too, right?

~~xx~~

Z: That's right.

R: Now what I wish ~~x~~ you would do now is give a kind of a narrative of the dynamic of ~~xxx~~ your getting involved in SALT over the first year and a half, you know, some of the things you said about you knew there was a tiger in the jungle and the early business, and also the defects in the JCS system and your inexperience with the JCS system as ~~xxxxx~~ contributing factors to their not being as good a military input into SALT in the beginning as they should have been. Just go on about that.

Z: When I began to think about the challenges that I would face after my nomination to be Chief of Naval Operations, one of the things that concerned me ~~x~~ was the knowledge that there was an unseen tiger in the jungle, namely the ~~xxxxx~~ Strategic Arms Limitation TALKs were already getting ready to start and did in fact start before I took over as CNO. I had a very healthy respect for the ~~x~~ intricac~~ies~~ of this because I had been involved in negotiating the Test Ban Treay when I was Director of Arms Control back in 1962, and as a matter of fact together with Paul Nitze I had done about a 69 page analysis of the complications~~x~~ involved in trying to get what we then used to refer to as a separable first stage disarmament agreement, and I have a copy of that paper which will be coming to you Monday, to show that I had thought through to a pretty fine grain the complexities of the problems why I had a healthy respect for it. I therefore considered that ~~xx~~

one of the things I ought to do in laying out my orientation trip back home, which involved going first through the rimlands of the Western Pacific and then over into the Mediterranean and Europe, a visit to Vienna where the SALT delegation was already ensconced, and an opportunity to get briefed by two of my old ~~friends~~ friends, Paul Nitze, Alexis Johnson ~~was~~ not there yet, on the status of things to that point so that I would be better able to run the Navy's part of the problem. However, soon after sending a message back suggesting that this is one of the things that I would like to do, I received a telephone call from Governor Chafee's office stating that they had heard from Admiral Moorer that this was a bad sign that I was getting ~~a~~ ready to have a meeting with Paul Nitze ~~with him~~ before ever taking over in view of the closeness of our previous association. And it was suggested that I not visit him so instead, General Allison flew into Brussels to brief me while I was there, (I'd better check to make sure it was Brussels and not Stuttgart). I say this to demonstrate that I started out with a fairly healthy concern about the complexities of the problem. . .

R: Did you ~~write~~ write a memo about that briefing?

Z: I believe that there is a memorandum of the details of that briefing. I need to get a copy of that paper if it's available. I then came back to the JCS to take the job and to be a member of the JCS, and had the problem that I was somewhat of a novice with regard to the way in which JCS procedures worked. My previous experience had been at a level in the hierarchy when I worked for Paul Nitze as Assistant Secretary of Defense and again when he was Secretary of the Navy, where one could get things done by getting to a ~~single~~ single decision made and I ~~was~~ ^{was} not ~~not~~ initially well indoctrinated into the committee solution approach of the JCS. But after a few meetings, it became

clear that this was going to be a very bureaucratic ~~xxx~~ process, and it was going to be very hard to grapple in a clear and precise way as each one of us as individual members of the JCS were capable of doing with the issues as a corporate body.

R: Was this complicated by the fact that your initiation to the JCS was also Moorer's initiation as Chairman?

Z: It was... Some of my initial reticent was a result of the fact that Admiral Moorer was there both as a Chairman and as a more experienced naval officer, and former JNC. So I tended...

R: What I meant was did Moorer in his early days, never having been to supervise and run the Joint Staff before, did he find this Joint Staff a tiger whose tail he hadn't quite managed to get a hold of?

Z: No. I think that Adm Moorer was well equipped after 3 years as CNO to step in. He had been acting Chairman a number of times, and he was pretty well up to speed on the SALT issues having grappled with them as CNO. But nevertheless what he could do as a person was different from what he could do as chairman of a committee. And so there was a kind of a floundering process, and it was the early discovery of this and the recognition that it was going to be very hard to get the kind of clear and precise work that I'd been used to doing in the Arms Control field, that led me to conclude that one of the things that the CNO executive panel ought to get busy on was strategic issues in order so I could have a source of information.

R: It is also true isn't it that however important you thought the SALT was you would not have made getting on top of this issue one of your very first priorities in taking over the Navy right?

Z: Yesk this is correct because we all visualized at that time that it was something that would be fairly slow moving as indeed it was. It

really didn't get going with a vengeance until May of 71, nearly a year later. However, the surprising thing at that point was to discover the extent to which there had been discussions going about which the Chief knew nothing, and the extent to which ~~the~~ decisions could be made which committed the Chief after the fact to support Presidential policy before we had gotten ourselves on record with the President.

R: When did you begin to discover that?

Z: Well, it was when the May 1971 announcement came out. In other ~~the~~ words it was apparent that the President was going to be willing to make decisions in the Arms Control Field without having firm knowledge of the JCS positions on those ~~a~~ specific decisions.

R: may it have been put out with very little input from the (inaudible).

Z: That may be accurate. My recollection is, Bob, I'll have to re-search the papers that Option E had really been signed out as a ^{??} ~~system~~ ~~before~~ before I took over.

Ex

R: Yes, but it's signed out without much consultation with ~~the~~ the Chiefs?

Z: Yes, but coming into a relay ~~race~~ and picking up the baton at the point that I did, either I was not properly briefed or ~~XXXX~~ not properly seized myself with the extent to which this process was taking place. I ~~felt~~ felt both that there was time for me to get read in and get a body of people developed that could advise me, and that the Chiefs were going to be able to get a specific ~~XXXX~~ position into the President on specific issues. ~~Sh~~ Subject to reviewing the papers and correction, I believe that it was the May '71 ~~bomb~~ bomb that really accelerated my intensity of focus in the SALT area. That point I need

to review all the papers on to be sure. The very first weekend, or ~~the~~ the ~~the~~ very first ^{two} ~~the~~ days after I took over on 1 July, on the 4th of July, President Nixon signed NSDM 69 which contained within it Option E, an option known only to the White House, prepared by Henry Kissinger; and option designed not to be acceptable to all agencies in Washington, but rather one which was designed to be negotiable. ~~It~~ It provided for no MIRV ban, for no reduction in strategic vehicles, that is 1900 were to be authorized, and provided bombers numbers equal to the number of Soviet bombers, and for 250 SS9's. This was a ~~x~~ ~~rather~~ rather significant development of a proposal and one which was developed in a manner completely bypassing the JCS.

R: What did it contain with regard to numbers for the military. Did it mean reductions, did it ~~mean~~ cutting ~~x~~ back ~~the~~ plans or. . .?

Z: It meant that the U. S. would keep ~~the~~ 1,054 ICBM's and the 656 SLBM's but that we could then only keep 190 B-52's instead of the 250 that had been planned as a reduction from the existing 500. And so it had a significant impact on force levels for which the Chiefs had not been consulted. Now, this was of course an option among a series of options, but the fact that it was there ~~x~~ as an option which the White House was planning to put forward to the Russians meant that force level changes had been potentially decided on by the White House without consultation with the Chiefs.

R: Was there a wailing and gnashing of teeth in the JCS over this, or did you all accept it with undue ~~serenity~~ serenity?

Z: The NSDM was actually dated 9 July, although it had apparently been signed on the 4th of July. ~~The~~ In the JCS Admiral Moorer reported that the NSDM had been worked in such a way that the reduction in bombers was required and ~~that~~ that no new silos could be constructed.

The latter was considered by the JCS to be specially serious, since it denied us the opportunity of the two-way flow to build large mega-tonnage missiles. But also forced us to give up our superiority in ~~xxxxxxx~~ bomber mega-tonnage. In other words by the reduction in bombers we ~~xxx~~ were giving up mega-tonnage by the fact that we couldn't have any way to change the silos themselves we ~~xx~~ weren't able to pick that mega-tonnage back up in terms of larger silos as the Russians had.

P: . . .one way to mix part of this so that presumably there was one body that thought that the one-way mix which ~~xxxxxxx~~ ^{drove} ~~xxxx~~ the Russians ~~xxx~~ out to sea was an advantage to the U. S. is that right?

Z: That was considered to be an advantage to the U. S. if the Russians took it, but the fact that we froze the Russian large mega-tonnage silos and closed off that route to ourselves was again considered a serious setback.

P: Now put ~~a~~ yourself and your reactions about all this, I mean what were they?

Z: My reaction at the time was one of concern at the theory of the way in which it was done, and. . . (end side B).

2: Then there is the Joint Force Memorandum (JFM) which is a reflection of the strategic forces that can be procured for the budget level that the Secretary of Defense has authorized for the current and succeeding four years after, in theory, looking at JSIOP and deciding that that's just more than he can afford to do. And the JSIOP JFM tries to estimate then what capabilities you are going to have as a result of these expenditures and to warn about them, as we have had to do each of the last several years, about the increasing Soviet strategic capability, and decreasing US capability, and the fact that the Soviets are enroute to getting superiority. Now, for whatever that means, at the same time in theory the arms control efforts which are going on ought to be getting evaluated in the same context. That is, there are two ways in which you can have an impact on the relative strategic balance. One is the way in which the Russians spend their money and we spend ours to build forces and the other is the way in which we negotiate limits on those arms, and when we finally get--if ever--a completely efficient process, arms control calculations and Joint Force Memoranda ought to sort of go hand in hand, but they don't yet.

R: You've described how the theory works now how closely in practice does it work?

Z: I'd say that it works a very long way in practice from the theory I have outlined. First...

R: For example, at all times during SALT when numbers proposals^{limiting the} about war heads and things like that came up, were you able to react almost immediately and say, "Hey, if we have this many and they have this many, here's what happens"?

Z: There were calculations made throughout the SALT process by the Joint Staff and by separate teams in the Arms Control and Disarmament

Agency and OSD. They all had to done very crudely because to do a full war game calculation is something that takes months to do to play it out in all its fine grain detail. And therefore many simplifying assumptions are used in these crude quick calculations that are done and they're in my opinion somewhat dangerous. And one of the risks that you take in moving as rapidly as this government has moved from one position to another is that you don't get adequate analysis, therefore, of the significance of the changes in terms of war outcomes.

R: Well, does your intelligence indicate that the Russians have the same war-gaming capability, analytic capability, that you have?

Z: The Soviets are behind us in computers but all that really means in my judgment is that they have somewhat less sophistication and have to use much more manual input and much more manpower with the computers they've got. And traditionally, the Soviets have been willing to take the brute force approach. And I, therefore, would feel quite confident that the Soviets have a competence comparable to ours with regard to the accuracy of their calculations but perhaps slower. So the thing that happens in fact then, is that, I've outlined the theory of how things work, in actual fact a Secretary of Defense each year makes decisions ^{with} ~~as~~ regards to the budget which are ~~not~~ based on recommendations he gets from a money man, the Assistant Secretary of Defense--the Comptroller--which in the final analysis depart from all the analytical work that has been done by the Secretary's Assistant Secretary for Systems Analysis and in his final budget calculations he may have some kind of hunch, and indeed this is true ^{of} ~~not~~ the Service Chiefs as well, he may have some kind of hunch as to what this is doing to his military capability based on the analysis that he's gone through at a higher ^{as} budget level but he doesn't know exactly what the consequences are ^{and} ~~and~~ he has to make these hasty final budget decisions.

R: Are the war games timed so that the results come out at the proper time for budget consideration?

Z: Yes, there is an annual process that is ponderous but theoretically appropriate that leads to calculations that emerge in time for the JSOP (Joint Strategic Operations Plan). That is the services make their calculations and put them into the Joint Staff where the debate goes on and then conclusions and decisions come out. And the JSOP goes up to the Secretary of Defense and then fiscal guidance is issued which tells everybody go back and start cutting it back.

R: Never mind about fiscal guidance. Suppose just towards the end of this highly elaborate, complicated, war game suddenly 27 new Poles are found over there in some Russian plane. Then what happens to your game?

Z: Because the state of the art isn't yet good enough to keep up with sudden changes that way, you don't have a rapid response....but where the concern caused by that is sufficiently great, you react imperically. That is by doing something in the right direction. For example, the decision to go back to the original schedule with regards to ULMS or Trident which Sen Symington promptly dubbed the accelerated Trident schedule was really in reaction to the fact that our negotiators came back and said the reason we are going to have to have an unsatisfactory outcome in SALT I is that we are not building strategic systems rapidly enough to impress the Soviets.

R: One other thing on this. You were talking about incremental changes, increases and decreases. What order of magnitude are you talking about when you are talking about incremental. I mean obviously one new missile is not going to make any difference but do 5? Do 10? Do 20? What kinds of numbers are involved?

Z: Well, the major decisions that impact on incremental changes are kind of cyclical. For example, when I was the Executive Assistant to

the Secretary of the Navy, who was Paul Nitze, ~~w~~e were in that era where Mr McNamara was taking as a matter of policy that he would no longer increase the numbers of missiles. And was trying to signal the Soviets in his policy articulations, in his speeches, that ~~X~~ they should have no incentive to try to go beyond the number of missiles that we had--1054 land based missiles and 650 sea based missiles. And faced with that kind of major policy decision that were not be increased in numbers, the services began to look for ways to get increasing capability and also there was a desire to find a cheaper way to get this capability and this led to the concept of MIRVing, that is putting numbers of warheads in the missiles. Kind of major calculations were made at that time to demonstrate the dramatic improvement in capability that could be gotten if you could MIRV.

Q: Of course MIRVing isn't incremental. If you have a hundred missile with a hundred warheads and suddenly you end up with a hundred missiles with a thousand warheads that scarcely could be called incremental.

A: Well, it is in this sense: we, at the time of this MIRVing decision back in 1965 or so, knew based on the design ^{studies} ~~studies~~ could put 14 in each Polaris missile and make it a Poseidon. And we knew that there was some number in that vicinity that we probably ought to install. And we could calculate what would be the impact of that increase by ten-fold of the number of warheads that we could drop on the Russians. But in each given year, as you proceed to implement that decision, there were small numbers coming on the line and small changes at the market.

Q: I suppose you also don't increase throw weight by that?

A: No, as a matter of fact total megatonnage goes down and throw weight stays the same.

Q: Or, well, that's sort of that part of it. There's a whole other subject now that came up while I was reading the thing. Because I was

reading so much OPDEP stuff, I suppose, I got very impressed by how parochial everybody was. And I began to think of military people^s being in a sense culturally deprived or occupationally, almost incapable of taking a broad view and so forth. And I know that that's overstating the case. What deterrents are there, if any, that prevent the military from being parochial? Not only parochial in the sense that maybe parochial Air Force, parochial Army, but just military parochial?

Z: I guess the first point to make is that as one goes through the files of a series of discussions that for example, operational/ deputies might be having on issues, you would tend to get the same flavor of parochialism about their positions on issues that you would get if you listened to a group of labor leaders discussing their problems. They're fighting very hard to accomplish specific objectives within a very narrow environment and they're concentrating on that. Even those same gentlemen, if you took them to another room and said now let's talk about the national problems and what are we going ~~to~~ to do about it, would immediately adopt a different frame of reference and clearly their superiors who are the Service Chiefs do~~x~~ and have to because all of the Service Chiefs are as conscious as the Secretary of Defense is of the very serious nature of the strategic problem and the rate at which the Soviets are gaining superiority, for whatever that means. And the need for us to get the very best from our dollar in order to be able to deter the Soviets. In other words, there is very great concern on the part of everyone of the service chiefs that we be able to continue to assure ourselves that we can so damage the Soviet Union in a second strike that they won't strike first. And because of ~~y~~this you tend to get more rapid agreement on SALT issues than you would for example in a budget discussion.

R: I'm talking also about a certain amount of a general political so-

phistication. I call to mind that one discussion~~s~~ right in the Chiefs where one of the Chiefs was carrying on something furious about a number of books that have been written about atrocities in Vietnam and really acting up something fierce about it. Or another time when somebody said, "do you think it's bad under Nixon, what would it be like if Muskie were President?", and somebody else said, "Oh my god!" It all sounded a little bit parochial from the point of view of

Z: Well, part of the problem there, Bob, is in the Tank people tend to scratch the places that itch just like a group of journalists would sit ting over a cup of coffee bitching and then they would turn right around and write their story differently than they would over that coffee clash. But, and also the particular fellow who was bitching about those books was the theater commander who was being attacked.

R: I guess that's true. I ~~gathered~~ gathered that. It seems to me an enormous lack of sophistication to think that, you know, McCarthy may be one thing but to think that a man like Muskie~~x~~ would be a total disaster for the military. That's what I mean about a narrowness of vision. How much of that is there? How much of it did~~x~~ you encounter? How much of it did you suffer from or did~~x~~ you have to fight against because of your situation?

Z: There are levels of sophistication that are as dramatic as can be. As one tends to go up higher in the military and gets forced more and more into civilian and domestic problems, he tends to become more broad gauged. I think in my own case, because I served as a Commander and as a Captain under civilian Secretaries, I was forced to go through this process much earlier. But two successive Chiefs of Staff of the Army were as dramatically different in that regard as could be. Westy on the one hand was very narrow gaged. Abe was a very broad gaged guy who did

understand the problems of civilian authority.

R: Did he have any civilian experience much in the Army?

Z: No, I don't think his experience was much different to Westy's in regard to the extent of his exposure. He was just a more balanced and better read man.

R: Well, does naval service or military education in the service impede this kind of broadening?

Z: I would say that in general, the norm is to be impeded. That a man has to ~~work~~ work hard at being broader gauged than his professional environment. But I think, Bob, this is true in many other professions. The requirements associated with getting ahead in a military profession requires ~~such~~ such detailed study and knowledge ~~and~~ of your specialty that it's easy in one's spare time to let the other things suffer. And those of us who have kept ourselves broader in perspective are either those who had an interest in other kinds of reading as a hobby or who were just able to do the extra hard work to stay qualified.

R: Well, let's talk about some of the principal players in the SAIT ~~1~~ thing. There's Gen Mogue. There's Gen Allison; there's Adm ^{Blouin} ~~Blouin~~ and there's Gardner ~~Tucker~~ ^{Blouin} for four. I guess ~~Blouin~~'s deputy and then Van Owen, right? What kind of guys were they?

Z: Adm Blouin was the Navy OPDEP or operational deputy. His official title was Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Plans and Policy. And as such he ~~was~~ was the one who met almost daily with the OPDEPS from the other services. He was a man who had had very broad gauged preparation for this job both operationally and through having worked in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs as a Rear Admiral.

R: Did you inherit him?

Z: He was there when I came to the job and I was delighted to have him

and to keep him. He was a very sage individual and made my transition into the JCS system much smoother than it would have been otherwise because I had had absolutely no experience with that milieu. His deputy at that time...

Q: You want to put that anecdote in...?

A: Yes, Adm Blouin was a classmate and good friend of Adm Moorer with whom he used to play golf and I believe that he filled a useful role in because of his great friendship for Adm Moorer and his loyalty to me as the JMC in helping rapidly to insure that the two of us were working together well in the JCS arena. He was a man who was deficient and infatiguable but who apparently early on felt ~~that~~ some of the pressure of my numerous questions and requests as I took over. One of his staff associates reported to me at an appropriate time that Adm Blouin went back to his desk one day after meeting with me and said, "Bud ~~Adm~~ wants to be JINCPURLO and the only problem is we're not staffed for it." The next name mentioned was Gardner Tucker who was an Assistant Secretary of Defense--he was at the level of an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Analysis although at that time because of Congressional pressure the office had not yet been restored to the grade of Assistant Secretary of Defense. He was a man who had worked initially for the Director of Defense Research and Engineering and then shifted over to the Systems ~~Analysis~~ Analysis post. He was a man of technical competence but one who seemed to those of us who worked closely with him really to get lost in the forest for the trees and...

Q: What does that job involve doing?

A: Well, in ~~the~~ theory, it involves doing all the analysis to structure force levels in the pre-final budget process for the Secretary of Defense. In actual fact, Gardner Tucker devoted himself almost exclusively to SALT and his ~~deputy~~ deputy, John Christie, became the

man who worked on the non-strategic force levels. Tucker...

R: So he presumably was giving both the Secretary and the Chiefs some data base to work with?

Z: Yes, his line responsibility was to the Secretary of Defense but he met from time to time with the Chiefs and briefed them on studies he had done. And as the 1972 minutes of the SALT meetings with the Chiefs will indicate, he frequently rejected the Chiefs recommendation with regard to what we ought to be doing in SALT I because it was not negotiable. In other words, his whole thrust was to get a deal by progressively reducing US positions and moving toward the Soviet positions as I could perceive.

R: To whom was he being loyal in that?

Z: In that he was really being responsive to pressures from Henry Kissinger and seemed to be working as part of the Verification Panel as kind of an autonomous agent.

R: 'Cause there's stuff that appears in the Joint Chiefs stuff that I've read that indicates that Kissinger himself was extremely suspicious of Systems Analysis as a method of finding anything out.

Z: Yea, That was part of what Kissinger was saying to those who wanted to hear that point of view. At the same time he was telling Systems Analysis that the military mind was impossible to deal with and to go right ahead and do what they were doing.

R: In any case there was a certain amount of conflict between the Chiefs and Tucker?

Z: Yes there was. I think that the Chiefs by and large came to consider that Tucker, who was a fine US citizen, was just so eager for an arms control deal that he was taking his eye off what the long term stability arrangements required.

R: Well, where was Laird in the middle of all that kind of conflict?

Wouldn't you think that...

B: Laird, as I perceived him, tried to keep himself above the daily wrangling on the Verification Panel. He had Dave Packard attending the meeting. Dave Packard seemed to me to pretty closely in tandem with Adm Moorer who representing the Chiefs. So you had the situation where frequently a paper, sort of tentatively agreed on among Gardner Tucker and Kissinger's guy Phil Odean on the NSC Staff, would then be attacked Packard and Moorer in the formal Verification Panel meetings with Kissinger trying to see how far he could push in the direction that would sell to the Soviets without precipitately overruin the Chiefs or the Defense Department.

R: Cockell did make the point that Laird was sort of not interested in getting into the details of this whole SALT business.

Z: That's correct but Laird did keep in close touch with Paul Nitze whom he had personally asked to take the job as his ~~personal~~ representative on SALT and Paul Nitze would meet with him and brief him and talk to him each time he came home. And I personally have the strongest confidence that Laird's decision ~~g~~ precipitly to go back to the original Trident building schedule was based on Paul Nitze's view that we were in real trouble with regard to the SALT discussion.

R: I suppose probably that goes on in the OPDEPS, the parochial part of all this was something Laird didn't want to get himself tangled up in

Z: No, he clearly wanted to stay out of that. He clearly ~~had~~ had a problem of not trusting Henry Kissinger and not knowing when Henry Kissinger was going to come up on his blind side. And therefore, he didn't consider himself, and properly so, in any way subordinate to Kissinger and he wanted to maintain his line access to the President, Commander-in-Chief, by having Packard participate in meetings, keeping him informed and then Laird saving himself to bring his pressure to bear on the

President.

R: OK. Now who was General ^{Voigt} Voight?

Z: Gen ^{Voigt} Voight was at that period the Director of the Joint Staff and he was an Air Force general.

R: Was he a 4-star general?

Z: He is now a 4-star general. He was at the time a 3-star general. He also had had a tour of duty as a 2-star general in ISA in the era of Paul Nitze.

R: His first name was?

Z: Johnnie. He was a Nitze trained man and showed the sophistication that always results from that kind of polish. A very broad gauged guy who subsequently became the Air Force 4-star commander in Vietnam and then inherited the whole theater when the Army forces were withdrawn and is now our Army NATO Commander in Europe. In so far as I could see Johnnie Voight was about as non-parochial as any military man can be in the SALT and strategic discussions.

R: He was an able guy then? He ran the Joint Staff right?

Z: Yes. And he was the team captain of the CPDEPS.

R: And the Navy had no complaint with him at any time?

Z: No. I think the Navy was very satisfied.

R: Well, I noticed that one of the things that bugged him was apparently he was very annoyed that Allison didn't come under his purview.

Z: Yea, the problem was that Gen Wheeler, when he sensed the early SALT efforts were not being well handled by the Joint Staff, felt a need for a special approach to this problem. And he apparently knew Gen Roy Allison personally and felt that he was a kind of sophisticated intellectual guy who could do the job and deal with civilian whiz kids and so forth. And so his position in the hierarchy was that he was a Special Assistant to the Chairman. He didn't come under the JCS as a corporate

body and therefore he didn't come under the Director of the Joint Staff. This left Gen Voight in the ~~p~~ status of a guy who was really sort of the executive officer to the corporate bosses, the JCS, responsible for getting the work done and yet not having any real control over Gen Allison who was involved in a significant fraction of the problems that the Joint Staff was dealing with. So he had properly ~~Y~~a bitch.

Q: Actually, a negotiator in that position off with a delegation is not just a Charlie Mc Carthy for the Chairman or the Joint Chiefs. He doesn't ~~s~~~~y~~ just simply say what he is told to say from back home?

A: He has lot's of room to talk but very little room to budge from the policy position. In other words...

Q: Whose policy position? He's ~~really~~ ~~under~~ under control of whoever controls the Delegation from the White House to...

A: It's kind of an interesting point. First, because there is so much difference of view within the various agencies of the government, the Joint Chiefs have always felt more comfortable having their own man on the scene listening to the nuances and flavor so he can report whether he agrees with the rest of the delegation as to what the actual situation is. And occasionally ~~yy~~...

Q: Within the delegation he can speak for the Chiefs?

A: That's right. And occasionally, if he doesn't agree with a message being sent back, and whenever he doesn't and occasionally he didn't, he will have the message say that the SALT delegation less the JCS representative have the following view and the JCS representative has the following view. And this was considered an appropriate technique. Similarly the ~~ACDA~~ ACDA representative or Mr Nitze as the Defense representative could take a position differently than ~~the~~ the delegation. But they were all under one overriding constraint and that was that ~~any~~ any

time a NSDM was signed that then represented a Presidential decision which they were all bound to support. It was only as they began to get into areas that went beyond the constraints of the NSDM and to explore new areas that dissent was possible as new policy decisions were being considered.

Q: Was Allison a satisfactory representative as far as you and the Chiefs in general were concerned?

A: I thought that Allison was not a stand out. I think he did a satisfactory job but not an outstanding job. First, I think Allison, unlike Wright, did get somewhat parochial from time to time trying hard to throw in a flavor that would support Air Force Minuteman when the national decision making probably should have held up less for Minuteman. Second, I didn't think he was quite bright enough to deal with the tricky nuisances that had to be dealt with.

Q: How about his Soviet counterpart? Was he...decently with that guy?

A: So far as I could see, he dealt satisfactorily with his Soviet counterpart. Bill Cockell might have an additional judgment on that. He was closer to reading the daily message traffic. I noticed that in going through the hearings that were held after the SALT deal was signed that Allison was not a particularly good witness. And I recalled in reading it that Sen Jackson had been very disenchanted with him after those hearings.

Q: Is he a 3-star general?

A: He was yes. He's now retired.

Q: Then the only other one is Y Blouin's successor.

A: Blouin's successor was the man who had been his deputy, LADM Frank Vannoy who moved up and became a Vice Admiral when Blouin retired. Frank was an old hand at the Joint business having been on the Joint Staff an

had several tours in the Plans and Policy shop. And although he didn't have quite the philosophical depth of ~~Adm~~ Blouin he was a very able and useful deputy.

R: Alright, there's another mysterious reference--mysterious to me--about MARCS. Tell me about MARCS. That's the radar. Apparently there was a difference between Navy and other services about what to do about radars in SALT I negotiations.

Z: And you say it's referred to as MARCS?

R: M-A-R-C-S. Masts something or other radar control system or something.

Z: That term doesn't stand out in my mind at all. It must ^{have been} ~~be~~ something that was used for just a brief period in the dogma because it doesn't stand out in my mind. You'll have to ask ~~about~~ Bill Cockell about it/

R: We don't need, I suppose, to go into the Army wanting change the whole strategy from offense to defense, but that's a little much. You've already explained all these other things, all the SAG&A and SIOPs and all. Then intelligence. I have here various issues, PBS and NCA; I don't know what I meant by it when I put it down. But do you have something to say about it?

Z: You'll find PBS standing out through the whole period of SALT both before and after the May '72 agreement. But the big issue was that the Soviets had very brilliantly developed this as their device for getting around what ~~we~~ they knew we were going to be demanding, parity. And they were claiming because the US had nuclear systems in Europe both in its tactical aircraft and in its aircraft carriers, it could reach Russia, whereas the Soviets tactical weapons in Europe could not reach the United States. That this was an asymmetrical advantage on our part that had to be taken into consideration when discussing central systems.

R: Cockell has a lot about that on a tape we got already so I'm not concerned about that. However, about National Command Authority, apparently the Navy did differ with the other services...

END OF SIDE A TAPE 41

TAPE 41 SIDE B

2: I don't recall the basis for the difference. Do you recall what it was?

1: I think the Navy was sort of for it. But again maybe this had been the OPD&P parochial level.

2: I suggested that we ought to be interested in the NSA after discussions with Paul Nitze when it became evident to me that the only real virtue in an ABM system if you were going to be held down to the numbers that we were talking about was to gain some additional time clearly to overwhelm a Minuteman field that was defended 100 ABMs. All you needed was 101 warheads to come at it. The 101st would get through if all the first 100 were shot down. And yet when you looked at that as 100 missiles protecting Washington and having to wait for 101 that gave you a few additional minutes to evacuate the President and to get a decision made as to what form of retaliation to take.

1: It seems to me there's some study there that said it might give you ten minutes.

2: I think we ended up considering somewhere between 5 and 10 minutes was the time you might get.

1: And that was a worth while amount of time to work for?

2: Yeah, when you're talking about those critical final moments in a Presidential decision, it could really make the difference.

1: You couldn't get the President out in 5 minutes, could you?

2: If you were in a period of strategic crisis, you would probably have a helicopter stationed on the White House lawn.

1: Yeah, I guess he probably could get out in 10 minutes. Was there some parochialism in this too? Was it the Air Force's missiles that we're protecting?

2: No. I don't think that that was a consideration at all. I never

felt that Minuteman was surviveable with or without ABM. ABM just took a few more Soviet missiles to get it.

R: What is the safeguard that was ~~de/lay/ing~~ being deployed then?, presumably is now deployed out there in Grand Forks? Is that an area defense thing?

Z: The safeguard is capable of defending an area as extensive as the area in which the Minuteman at Grand Forks are located. It's ~~not~~ a site defense for small areas or an area defense for small sites. In order for it to have provided national coverage you'd have had to had many more than were planned.

R: There seemed to be an argument that I didn't quite understand about two was not enough but four might have been enough. That I don't understand.

Z: I never had any great interest in that. It seemed to me, you know the original scheme was to have 12 sites and that could have given you some respectable thin defense against China or against an accidental strike. But when you got down to four you were talking about just...

R: Well then you were talking about four Minuteman fields weren't you? Well that's what they were talking about?

Z: Yeah, so ^{it's} ~~the~~ difference between four and two. But again you're talking about a very small additional expense on the offensive side to be able to override it. So that's why I kept ~~being~~ ^{getting} driven back to the fact that the NCA seemed to be where you seemed to get the most for your money, that 5 or 10 additional minutes to get the President out ~~of~~ and to get decision time.

JCS MEETING 7/8/70

Extract From

CJCS

1. No words of cheer - situation not good - are involved in taking major cuts.
2. Have feeling we are at the end - like it or not - we will be forced into a fortress America concept - quite obvious must keep strategic forces at high readiness and capability - SALT not producing startling results. Something quantitative but not qualitative - Congress will be highly critical - it will be hard time to get dollars to retain an improving strategic posture - we are inviting a disastrous situation.
3. When you look at what the Soviets are doing across the spectrum - I feel very insecure.
4. I questioned Packard - Tucker on leave - Harrington.
5. CJCS asks Z how goes it - Z replied.
6. Still well - war years and out years - can't possibly in '72 - Chape - personnel - all bad.
7. Air Force - closures of installations - 19-25 installations - hue and cry from Congress - 15 Tract-8 in Navy.

8. Westy - we're getting back to a Louie Johnson era -

Ryan - the Soviets won't rescue us this time.

Westy - looking for our fat - got none - DOD thinks we do.

We need to tell our allies that we will support them if they

support us, we will leave 3 divisions in the U. S. - stay in

NATO if you pay.

Westy - need to do more cross-servicing within the Services.

Ryan - we need to exploit R&D to the fullest.

Westy - UK anti-tank gun is great, FRG APC is getting better -

NATO needs more cross-servicing.

SEC DEF STAFF MEETING 7/13/70
(Extracts From)

1. Regarding the Middle East.

Soviets continue to put materiel in - the U. S. doesn't want to
spoil the talks - looks like the USSR will talk this week -
President says the situation is tougher than Southeast Asia -
a confrontation - there are questions regarding their strategic
build-up - attempting to say the SS-9 was their response to our
MIRV - don't fall for it - momentum the same as in '69 - all
SS-9's are in the first and second quarters - 4 new in '70 versus
9 in '69 and 7 in '68 - not a response to MIRV.

2. Budget.

. routine matters.

(Beginning of sentence cut off by recording equipment)

SEC DEF STAFF MEETING 7/20/70

(Extracts From)

D. Long Range Defense Planning.

1. Several visits with President in the last 10 days.
2. Dealt with European trip - visits with military and FM -

NATO problems - realistic U. S. Forces manpower, dollars,

strategy, policy - Allies understand.
3. Explain that the strategic study is going forward in the U. S.
4. Last fall we asked all to contribute to a "stock taking memo" -

have discussed in the last few months - both have been con-

sidered carefully.
5. In discussions with President, I stressed participatory manage-

ment in DOD - transmitted to President the capabilities of

the many here.
6. Stressed to the President and to others in the room - the

picture of all major problems - placed in prospective -

especially since DOD under attack from various quarters - we have

to stand together.

7. Stressed as the primary point - DOD funding is being considered on a residual basis - although the Federal Government is responsible for society - an allocation of resources - it looked like the primary responsibility has been shifted aside - most important to stress the Federal Government - the President did well in his statements Saturday - used DOD material - no peace dividend.

(Vice President and Wineberg both commented on this.)
8. Getting to the crux of decision - no decision reached - no SEC DEF irreversible conclusions - won't do so without advise and counsel of the team - need full discretion - practical basis - in order for President to have full picture.
- 9.
10. Today - brief look together at problems before us - this short brief - has no answer - raises problems - Bill Baroody will give the brief.

SALT

29 July 1970 - JCS Meeting

General Holloway and his staff briefed the JCS on the results of the latest study they had done concerning the outcomes of the strategic exchange. This is part of the very detailed computer war gaming that JSTPS does in connection with its responsibilities. It involves analyzing what the Soviets' capabilities are in the strategic field, what our own are, calculating what we should do in a second strike situation and how the Soviets would likely bring their weapons to bear against us. It involves estimating what kinds of weapons the Soviets would fire at specific targets in the United States, and then does an analysis of the damage and consequences of execution to both sides. The briefing made it painfully obvious that the relative strength of the United States at that time in an exchange with the Soviet Union for the assumptions used was less than that of the Soviet Union. It made it further obvious that although we frequently hear about over kill, the United States as of that moment did not have sufficient weapons in a second strike to insure that we could kill all the Russians once. Indeed, it was obvious that the number of U. S. casualties was greater than Soviet casualties. We discussed ways in which changes might be made to improve the outcome, and it was clear that General Holloway and his staff felt that not much could be done with the

weapons then available to change these results.

I was personally startled to discover that for this particular calculation the assumption was made that no weapons would be held in reserve; that is, there was not a planned strategic reserve. It had been the thought rather that those weapons which, for one reason or another, did not get off would be available for such reserve purposes. It seemed to me that this was a very dangerous assumption. First, the probability of the United States being able quickly to sort out what it had available on a random basis after catastrophic series of nuclear explosions seems very small and, second, it seemed to me to very unwise to assume that one would have time to do so during that period when any surviving command authority might be involved in seeking to negotiate with the other side. It seemed to me to be quite clear that after a massive exchange if one side had weapons left, knew where they were and knew it could control them, and the other side did not, that that would be the side that won. And I set for myself the task of getting this national assumption changed. I concluded that one of the major changes that needed to be done with regard to national planning was to bring the Joint Strategic Targeting System to Washington where both the Joint Chiefs of Staff and senior military authority could work with the _____ to insure that there was a much more intimate relationship between

Weapons Systems Development and the requirements for the future as determined from these calculations. I was unsuccessful in ever getting this change achieved. I shared the view of another member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who said, after receiving that briefing, that it is very obvious that the Soviets will "soon be able to blackmail and we will have a Cuba in reverse."

I urged that this briefing be given to the Secretary of Defense in light of budget reductions that were currently being made and resolved that I needed to worry about both sides of the strategic equation, that is, limits placed on us because of dollars and limits placed on us because of strategic arms arrangements, both of which could contribute to worsening the relative balance I had just observed. I expressed my concern to both Admiral Moorer and the Secretary of Defense privately about the need for him and the President to be briefed on these conclusions.

Within a week Admiral Moorer reported to the JCS that many things were churning in the wind concerning the plan that we had been briefed on. Our NATO allies were concerned about the use of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe and wondering how many would be used and how. General Spivey had indicated the military committee was working on that subject. Much interest had been developed at the White House concerning the strategic exchange. The National Security

Council had been asking questions with respect to missile sites. The President himself had noticed when getting briefed on the exchange that there were some several hundred Soviet missile sites not targeted and asked questions as a result. There were others who were questioning the value of the kind of planning that was being done at Omaha, how was it prepared, under what kind of guidance and what kind of criteria. The chief concern on the part of the Joint Chiefs seemed to be one of concern about the need to hold the information quite close, rather than the legitimacy of the questions being asked by civilian authority.

At the NSC meeting of 19 August, it had been brought out quite clearly that the relative nuclear strengths of the Soviets and the United States were far different today than at the time of the Cuban crisis. The Secretary of Defense was asking for formal replies to many of the questions. We were all properly concerned about not getting many people into the details of the exchange calculations but I thought, as a group, not adequately concerned about the need to get civilian authority more fully involved in the same kinds of frequent briefings in analyses as the members of the JCS.

I concluded, after that 26 August meeting, as stated in the minutes, that we should have asked the Secretary of Defense to go over the President's questions

with him and to insure that only limited numbers of people were brought in to the calculations in view of the sensitivity of the actual data.

On 26 August 1970, the very day that we were discussing the consequences of the President, having been briefed on the results of the strategic exchange, General Allison was debriefing the JCS on SALT II, pointing out that the Soviets were using the talks for exploring and probing what the United States is willing to go for, and how important it was that we consider SALT in our strategic planning. This seemed to me to be a significant step forward from the earlier position that the Chiefs should not propose arms control positions. General Allison went on to stress that we needed to remember that while we're talking at SALT the Soviets continue to build and improve their armed forces.

Note to Bob: There is some good local color in the 26 August 1970, write up on General Allison's comments about the SALT II operation.

With regard to the 10-12-70 item, early in the SALT negotiations one or two people referred to the Alms or Trident as a bargaining chip as ABM had been. I tried to make it clear to everybody, including SEC DEF and the SALT delegation, that we were never going to trade off Trident because we had to have it in any event as a replacement for Polaris and Poseidon, and therefore we should call it a negotiating incentive; that is, that the numbers we were building and the rate

could provide an incentive on the Soviets to negotiate but we should not call it a bargaining chip which implies something to be given away completely. This came to be the Government view, and negotiating incentive came to be the general use for Trident.

The views that Paul Nitze expressed to me privately on return from SALT II were that we were, as a Government, offering the Soviets too many changes in our position in too short a span of time. I use as an example the situation in which we had two ABM positions in conflict at the same time, and also the great repetitiveness with which we gave up Options C and D without demanding any kind of counter action in a negotiating arena with the Soviets. It was his view that the Soviets had been given the impression that we were over-eager for a deal, and that this would have very serious consequences in toughening up the Soviet stand in the SALT's of the future. He believed that the Congressional elections were causing Mr. Nixon and Secretary Kissinger to seek to have substantive progress about which they could talk at the time of the elections, and they were therefore short-circuiting a sound negotiation process and giving the Soviets a negotiating advantage, as a result. He also felt that one could already perceive that the Soviet military were playing a significant role with regard to their decision

makers, and he urged that the JCS seek to do better analytical work in order to have more impact on policy. Paul Nitze suggested that the U. S. had adopted its classic negotiating stance of knowing all and revealing all too soon.

Following this discussion with Paul Nitze, I met with Tom Moorer and relayed this advice. After the discussion, we agreed that the JCS did need to try harder than it had in previous years to have an impact in the arms control area, and to improve its analytical capability. He initiated a special study group within his office to examine various U. S. force structures which would be allowed by the U. S. Government's August 1970 proposal, and the JCS received the results of that study on 3 October. After examining the report, the JCS requested the study group to optimize the strategic force structure under the 4 August proposal. However, the study group, each/^{member}representing a service interest, could not reach agreement on the optimum force structure but did determine that there should be no reduction in Poseidon, Minuteman III or B-52's in connection with the SALT proposals.

With regard to the 10-26-70 item, the significance here is that OSD, meaning really Laird and Nitze in pushing for the zero ABM level, as a tactic to open up Option ECHO because they didn't believe that ECHO was to the advantage of the United States in the long term, were taking on a policy decision,

by the President.

The 11/4/70 business on war games is one more indication that in addition to the unsatisfactory outcome that would result from the July 29th strategic exchange briefing, we also were badly outpointed by the Soviet command in control. And this further points out that the situation is already, as of that date, worse than the calculation because of additional cut backs.

Note: Bob - that we're relying on warning to get to our command posts

manned. Note again that I am the one that pressed for

SEC DEF to get the briefings and that I followed it up with

a request for a CNOM, the purpose of which was to go after

the JCS to do more.

The SALT delegation got its guidance for SALT III in NSDM-90, which was published on 2 November 1970, the day that SALT III began. SALT III lasted until 18 December .

30 SEPTEMBER LUNCH WITH DR. THEBERGE AND BURT MARSHALL, PRESIDENT OF SAIS

The lunch dealt with Cuba policy. I suggested that the forthcoming policy formulation drill on Cuba policies for the Rockefeller panel on critical choices might be made a "test of detente" in which we structured a deal, for a change, favorable to the United States, and put it to the Soviets as a test of their willingness to continue detente after having gotten the better of us in a series of recent deals. I suggested that part of the package would have to be Cuban and Soviet acknowledgement of the unchanged status at Guantanamo. Both Marshall and Theberge were intrigued with this position and, on examination, didn't find anything wrong with it. Marshall reported his conversation with Dean Acheson years ago after Dean Acheson had had a long chat with Castro, over brandy, when Castro was making his post coup visit to the United States. The conversation took place at Princeton where Castro was visiting. The bottom line was that Castro made it quite clear to Acheson that there was no way in which he could be a friend to the United States. He said that he needed the United States as an enemy in order to solidify support for his regime in Cuba - that Cuba had never been a nation - that it was made up of a series of disparate societies - that its middle class was fairly non-homogenous and needed to be dispersed - that ~~the~~ all previous leaders had found themselves forced into a capitalistic form of tyranny

unable to retain power through support of policies and that he proposed, therefore, to do his thing by having a close-at-hand and viable enemy. Acheson reported himself as very impressed with Castro's mental ability and knowledge of the technical aspects of governing. Marshall went on to point out that Castro had to be given high marks for accomplishing what he set out to accomplish, having been in power for 15 years with no end in sight.

Marshall discussed the general trend of affairs. He found himself to be a historical pessimist. He quoted Voltaire that history is replete with men going upstairs in wooden shoes and coming downstairs in silken slippers. He questions whether this democratic society any longer retains the flexibility to withstand the Spartan Soviet society. He drew the comparison of the United States after World War II in terms of ten criteria - not all of which I will remember but which included one! - a ^{Western} ~~society~~ which had overwhelming ^{superiority} ~~superiority~~ to a society which was proud of what its Government had accomplished and ~~was~~ convinced that the Government could do almost anything. Two, wartime effort which had been accomplished without serious inflation and without major repercussions on the standard of living. Three, ^{access} ~~access~~ to the energy reserves of the world; four, a demonstrated massive production capability; five, control of massive supplies of food; six, financially ~~able~~ ^{able} to

provide major foreign aid support; eight/ a military which had fought a "just war" and was high in popularity and in morale. He went on to suggest that out of all of these factors only our ability to produce in a massive way remains today and that all the others have been turned around.

Marshall quoted Jay Weiss as having said "despite everything in some subtle way, Henry remains an alien" - referring to Henry Kissinger. Marshall suggested that Henry is brilliant but not wise (at least ~~of~~ the latter of these two, Bob, we ought to use).

The evil rose to alarming proportions during Grant's presidency - partly because of the immense extension of the Civil Service partly because of the growing tendency to alliance between spoilsmen and the persons benefited by protective tariffs and partly because public attention was still so much absorbed in southern affairs that little energy was left for curbing rascality in the North. The scandals indeed were rife in Washington and affected persons in close relations with the President. Grant was ill-fitted for coping with the difficulties of such a situation. Along with certain high intellectual powers, he had a simplicity of nature charming in itself but often calculated to render him the easy prey of sharpers.

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BABY CALLS (70.1.74)

Baby called to report that Haig spent the day in the White House yesterday trying to convince the President that he should not go up before the Congressional Committee to discuss the pardon. Haig is concerned that the revelation that he, Haig, offered Mr. Ford a resignation from Mr. Nixon in exchange for a commitment that Nixon would be pardoned would cause Haig problems with regard to his return to uniform. Apparently, there are a number of points in which Haig will not look very good. Further, the whole problem of how Mr. Ford himself is willing to come across is a worrisome one to his staff. Apparently, he will have to report that it was 24 hours ^{after} made ~~Haig~~ had the offer before he, Ford, called back to reject the offer and although everyone believes that Mr. Ford is truthful, they are concerned for how the picture will look. When they tried to answer the written questions from the Committee, there were so many unanswered facets that would lead to additional questions that the staff and the President decided that the least worst alternative was for him to volunteer to go up and talk which would have the advantage of giving him the opportunity to come across with the integrity that he had and also would tend to foreclose the studied additional questions. The staff believes that this is the big week of the Ford presidency. He is not only going to have to testify unless the Watergate trial jury selection requires it to be delayed (Jarowski is

coming in with a strong plea that Ford not go up until the jury has been selected and sequestered) but this is also a week in which Mr. Ford will kick off the Congressional elections with three appearances around the country, and it is also the week of his economy message so Rumsfeld and Marsch(?) see this as a maker or breaker.

MEETING WITH KISSINGER

6 November '70

1. Did MIM COMS^u of all action items.
2. K. urged me not to go to Haig but to deal direct because he did not trust Haig. Not to cut him out and deal directly with the President.
3. He said Rem Robertson had his full confidence and was authorized to tell Admiral Moorer and me everything K. was doing.
4. I stressed importance I attached to the Malta initiative, Mediterranean COMS, and HP since all had been mentioned to the President and had his support. He said not to be concerned, he, K., speaks for the President on all these matters. I also stressed that _____ and _____ improvements were mentioned to the President. Same answer.

TAPE #3

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS AT THE SAM SEMINAR, BY ADMIRAL E. R. ZUMWALT, JR., USN (RET.), NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL, MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA, 5 SEPTEMBER 1974

QUESTION: There's been a lot of criticism of the Navy's management of the ships acquisition process. This has come, in recent times, from a lot of our contractors testifying before the Status of Seapower Subcommittee, and, I guess, Admiral Rickover recently has had some comments also. I just wonder, do you feel that there may be some fundamental deficiencies as to how we conduct this ships acquisition process?

ZUMWALT: Yes. There's just got to be a better way to do things than we've been doing them. The problem is how to do them better, given the bureaucratic constraints.

First, an economic backdrop is that for many years the shipyards were under-utilized. Labor was so much cheaper in Europe and Japan that the shipyards were constructed - went to European shipyards to get their ships. During this period, the U.S. shipyards were hungry, and it was fairly easy for us to place our work. Now, the labor rates are rising in Europe and Japan. I've forgotten exactly what they cost, but they're close enough now and the work backlog is sufficient in these shipyards... Is this whole thing...

QUESTION: No. I think we're interested in your observations.

ZUMWALT: They're going to overtake regular costs, I think,

fairly soon, and the work is beginning to come back to this country. So that, suddenly, there is a tremendous scramble for priorities or material and for labor.

In an area where we're not building ships, they're having trouble getting material because we're fighting it - we get ours off the top. In areas where they're building commercial ships, we're fighting them with regard to priorities for labor, as well as for materials.

Admiral Rickover has taken a very strong stand in a place like Newport News, which is kind of the complex one, that no person who has been trained in the field of nuclear construction can be taken off of nuclear construction and put into commercial construction. He finally forced Pennifill to sign a deal on that . This has caused them sufficient distress of spirit that they've been up lobbying to get Congressional hearings. So that's one source for that hearing.

Backing away from my own parochial concern with getting naval ships built faster, we do have to worry about the United States also getting its commercial ships built so that we'll have the capability to bring ore and energy in - and that's an important national consideration. So you have NIRAD (?), the priorities agency of the government, and defense, and Navy all squabbling among themselves over just this issue.

It amounts to inefficiency because there's decisions and redecisions and changes.

I guess the next point that one has to make is that the old "womb to tomb" contracting system is just now generating the equipment that generates the headlines, and we're looking at kind of the worst example of that in the shipbuilding business - Grumman's another one in the aircraft business.

As the Laird/Packard concept of "fly before buy" begins to work its way through, it recontract, after an R&D period and gives a more reasonable inflation factor than the contractors were permitted to get. I think we'll see that problem, we we get better and better trained people into the weapons systems business. We will, of course,

this through the subspecialization that I was referring to to in my talk to you earlier. I think we'll see the management efficiency beginning to come along. All of this is dog-hard, slow work, and I don't look for dramatic improvement. But it's just got to get better - it can't get worse. (Yes.)

QUESTION: Admiral, I'd like to ask you about the requirements determination process for some of our naval systems. Specifically, the F-14. It seemed like the requirements were founded on the study that you were involved with - the Navy fighter study in 1967 and '68. We went ahead with this program even though, at very high levels of OSD, there was comments that the effects was being approached on a quick-fix basis, and that, although we conducted trade-offs between several alternatives, we didn't utilize a clean-sheet of paper approach in order to get another dimension on what we really needed the next 15 or 20 years. Why is there such an advertence of opinion at these

high levels? I mean, one of the comments was made in

that the FX was considered more important than the VFX
in protecting our CVAs.

ZUMWALT: First, let me talk about the theoretical problem and then the practical side of it. Intelligent naval officers, both operators and technical people, sat down, I guess, a decade before I ever got into , and said to themselves, if you assume that we're going to have to fly off of airfields that are very crowded and constrained because they have to them, and if you assume that the Soviets are going to throw lots of targets against them - both aircraft and cruise missiles - we've got to have some way of dealing with this very saturated environment, whether it's a platform that has very high unit effectiveness - it's kind of the mirror image of the problem that we were dealing with in ships; part of the problem was to get lower cost units and more effectiveness across the ocean. To guarantee the survival of a critical task force was going to take ability to deal with a large number of targets. That led to the design of the aug 9 fire control system in the missile.

This was good, sound conceptual work. The Navy had a program to build that kind of an airplane. Mr. McNamara came along and said - lets marry that mission to the Air Force mission - and that led to the air frame; the F-111, which was a real frog in our throat because the very first study that I was given to do when I was brought back to create the Systems

Analysis Division was a study directed by Mr. McNamara, which said study the cost effectiveness of the F-111B under the assumption that it can land and take off of an aircraft carrier.

the aug 9, Phoenix or combination, you couldn't find an airplane in the world that could compete with it, given that assumption. The only thing that was wrong was that the assumption was wrong. The only answer, then, was to put an air frame around that same missile fire control system, which could land and take off of an aircraft carrier, and the following year

We did another study which just kind of showed - it was very conservatively done because we were to kill the F-111B - which said more mildly than it really should have, probably, in truth, that the VFX was the way to go in competition with the F-111B, but that we ought to keep the F-111B going until we knew for sure - whereupon Congress killed the F-111B, and that solved the problem for us.

I have continued to be of the view, based on all work that I've seen done since - we're up to fighter study No. 6 or 7, I guess - and I pay a lot of attention to it - that we've really got a winner, here.

That Phoenix missile has just done remarkably in the tests - the Phoenix aug 9 system - and I believe we do have what intelligent men set out to get us a decade and a half ago - a system that can deal with mass bomber raids and large numbers of cruise missiles from inadequate square feet, deck space.

It's one of the few things we have going for us that tends to compensate for the dramatic reduction in numbers of carriers.

The problem with people who say we should sit down and take a clean sheet of paper and start over is that they forget that's exactly what men did a decade and a half earlier. By the time you go through the bureaucratic process of fixing this and fixing that, and deciding you're going to build this in or that in, you've got another F-14 only you're a decade and a half behind. We had the missile and the firing ready to go at the time the bee was filled. We were able quickly to bring an air frame into being that would house them and, given the fact that the Soviets have brought 5 or 6 different generations of fighters in and that the F-4 was designed in 1954, it just didn't seem to me that there was any competition.

QUESTION: So then would you just comment on the idea that perhaps in the higher levels in OSD this big war politics and engineering involved...

ZUMWALT: There's just no doubt about it. In OSD-you say that there is more politics? (More politics, I'm sorry) There's more politics in OSD, in my judgment, than there is in the Navy. For a number, I'll say it's 70% engineering and 30% politics in OSD. In the Navy, it's about 95/5, I think. OSD has people who come in from the manufacturers knowing they're going to spend two or three years there and then go

back to a manufacturer. You just can't get any more natural conflict of interest and you see evidence of that all over the place. I, myself, wonder why the Congress has never put a stop to that. I think it's absolutely unethical.

QUESTION: Admiral, on the quick system, defense started off with a Navy Volkswagon and it answered our needs within our money constraints and true impotence from above that really, really

What was your perspective of what happened and why it happened ?

ZUMWALT: The was unlike the F-14 when I felt I was driving - one to which I felt I was hanging on for all it was worth just to see if I could vaguely keep track of what was going on. So I don't feel competent to go into the details of it. I share your discomfort about how it is.

I guess six months before I left we initiated an effort to see if we couldn't get that plain sheet of paper - that I've just finished criticizing - and what we could come up with. I don't know whether anything useful has resulted.

QUESTION: Could you comment a little bit on the management program - both in the Navy and the sort of lessons we've learned - things in particular?

ZUMWALT: Yes. It was a fascinating one. My association with it was first the analytical one when I was Director of Systems

Analysis and then come back to the CNO job and I had to wrestle with this main problem for the first three of the four years. Now the problem was that Grumman had under bid. Now whether they did it because it was done as handshake and said we'll take care of you, as has been rumored but never proven to my knowledge, or whether they did it through error or whether they just figured that there was a way to beat the system over time, as has come to pass, I don't know. But, in any event, they clearly under bid. They had dropped their bid by some 400 million I think, at the last minute. My position, coming back after the contract had been signed and seeing that Grumman was trying to digest how it was bigger than that Boa Constrictor's mouth, was that we had, in order to have any creditability to the Congress, to damn near bust them before letting them re-negotiate. But that we couldn't bust them or we would not have the goose to lay that golden egg. And so, it took an awful lot of analysis, and frankly, on this one, I couldn't get it out of material and I had to use private support from the Center of Naval Analyses and others in order to do the many jobs that I felt needed doing. There was so much intermittence jungle warfare within the Material Command that I had no confidence in the papers coming over and frequently with justification. So that, I'll guess the audit trail will show, but I'll guess there were at least 6 or 7 times on my three years when I disapproved Material Command recommendation that they had drawn out. And on one occasion I had to insist to the Deputy Secretary of Defense that if I couldn't get him to reverse his position that we would tear up the contract and go to the F-14B.

I wanted to see the Secretary and if necessary, the President on the issue. This was David Packard and he is all-man. He figured if I felt that strongly about it, he ought to sit down with me. He did and we readily convinced him that it was a mistake and we didn't go that route which would have accelerated those costs immeasurably and I don't figure it would have gotten through the Congress. So what we ended up doing was forcing Grumman to take losses on five lots and lose, I think it was 289 million or 85 million after taxes and they had about 20-25 million dollars worth of equity left and arrange at that time to re-negotiate the contract. It was the most unbelievable long-drawn out pains taking thing of wrangling within the Navy, wrangling with OSD, and then wrangling with Congress. Everybody distrusting everybody's motives and just a damn hard problem.

QUESTION: Admiral, I wonder if I could ask you to comment a little more on that. It seemed to me in observing this thing the Navy F-14 say compared to where the Air Force stands on the C-5. In the final analysis we were almost carrying out the will of Congress. What I mean by that is that people who may be critical like maybe Senator Javits who are obviously looking for the Navy to do something to help that contractor out.

ADMIRAL: Well, I would say this. If what we did was keep Senator Cannon, who is one of the better members of the Senate, I put him in one of the top five in professional capability, we kept him so well informed and so knowledgeable that he supported us every step of the way and was able, not by explaining it to

the rest of the Senate

understand

at all, but by his personal integrity and the fact that he was trusted within the Senate to carry it forth. Now when it got to the point and that was support for doing the kind of blood-squeezing going on for the first three years, and we got to the point where we could bail out then get Senator Javits their help.

QUESTION: Could you comment on the design to cost and the white cycle cost concepts. I feel that in trying to apply them both to a project and project managers are they're in view of the way he budget sometime opposing each other rather than looking at a program over its entire funding it which allows him to choose the least costly alternative. Where budgeting on a year to year basis and driving the program manager to attempt to minimize yearly cost particularly if we can string him with a design to cost, delivered cost of this production unit. He is trying to pack as much capability into a system and in order to do this maybe giving up some inherent features, we could bring down later operation and support costs in bringing down the total light cost.

ADMIRAL: I agree 100% with what you said in theory. The problem I think, is that we are a hell of a long way from having a state of the arc to the point where we really can do well in estimating life cycle cost and in estimating the pay-off in life cycle cost for reliability of fixes. I saw nothing in my four years that would satisfy me that we were doing anything except

guessing on that. If we can ever get on top of what must be a million different factors and computerize ourselves to the point where we really have confidence that we're knowing what we're doing in the life cycle cost field then we can do some intelligent trade-offs between life cycle cost and design to cost. Until the, I think we are going to have to err in favor of design to cost and just try to use judgment that we had with the life cycle cost changes.

QUESTION: I'm just digesting what you said about the shipyard problem and everything you said is quite logical and the thing that was I remember reading the study addressing the issue of private versus Naval Shipyard and it appears that the Counsel of shipbuilders pointed out several reasons why they should and Adm Shonenshine in a response to that study countered with some very valid arguments. At any rate, it appears that we're basically out of the ship building business with regard to our yards for whatever reason, it's not clear to me. I wonder if we shouldn't reconsider it and get back into that business because now these same people that were screaming for contracts wouldn't even respond to a request for proposal.

ADMIRAL: It's a good question. I'm glad you asked because I really intended to make that point in part of this earlier answer and that is because of this returning to America of the commercial workload, we are limiting our ability to place work in the private yards. They don't want us. Admiral Rickover is insufferable to have to work with. They much prefer to

to ride with him-commercial work and so you've got a problem that I think over time is going to manifest itself in increasingly high bids as they can afford more and more to thumb their noses at us. We look as part of a general overview that I insisted on giving the Secretary of Defense before he made up his mind on the nuclear work on this last year's budget at our capability and it was clear that we are really stretching to do just what we've got today and notwithstanding that the forcast still showed quite an inclemental cost factor in place work in public yards. But my conclusions after we got all through doing it was that we ought to try to sell Congress on paying that premium in order to get requalified in public shipyards construction in Philadelphia, Grumman possibly forcing --- In order to deal with what clearly is going to be a crisis situation in a few years. Given the way in which the Democratic process works we'll waive that. I suspect we're just in desperate straits.

QUESTION: It's quite disturbing that some of the trades that required to bring it to speed -they turn on like a facet.

ADMIRAL: That's right. I passed on to Admiral Holloway my view that that was his number one management problem. The problem of how to solve this whole shipbuilding mess and that was one of the things that I felt we ought to do was get the Naval shipyard back in business.

QUESTION: Do you suppose we've ironically considered that we helped train the civilian community to put together their nuclear capability?

ADMIRAL: That's right.' And it's also ironic when you think of the intense effort that MacNamara made to eliminate shipyards. If he had his way, Philadelphia would be gone today.

QUESTION: Admiral, a couple of years ago, I think, in an area Council address, you said that we needed to revolutionize the conceptual phase of acquisition. Do you feel like that the new procedures which are delineated in OPNAV 5000.42% are going to succeed in doing that? .

ADMIRAL: I was looking at that piece the other day, and I found myself learning what old men when I said it.

I think that I don't have much to add. You know, what we've tried to get done is pretty well known in the record. I think probably this is more dramatically stated when we were capable of delivering .

QUESTION: ' Shifting back to the Navy under action time arena, in a recent thesis done school here, two officers concluded that the program manager were somewhat uncertain what Congress actually wanted to know and how to approach and treat Congress during hearings and further that the program managers were not properly prepared in general to go to on this, Congressional Committees and staffs. And result led to find cuts and stretch out the program and increasing new . Looking back now from your view at the point of CNO, how do you feel about the preparation and conduct of the Navy Program Manager?

ADMIRAL: Every year there were certain Navy witnesses were criticized by the Congress for not being good witnesses.

I always looked into it very carefully because it seemed to me that was just where our bread and butter were. I came to the conclusion that there were one or two exceptions where a guy had to his own mind, but in almost every case it was a fellow who was very knowledgeable, very technically competent, very able to present his case, but through in some way or another had offended the raging sons-of-a-bitches who are members of the staff to those committees. The people who were the most successful witnesses--I'm not referring to the Secretaries or the Service Chiefs, because we all kind of get a free ride, they don't take us on--but the people who were the most successful witnesses at the working level were those who had looked to their meeting with regard to maintaining liaison relationships with these guys. There is a dictatorship on the part of those staffs that is just unbelievable. In the case of the Mahon Committee, Mr. Mahon was just over the years by default, kind of abdicated. His staff is grossly incompetent. There're leinal. They like a guy whose program flys and if they don't, his program doesn't, and I can't conceive that there is any correlation between program and the way in which they are not on. I want to back away from categorizing them all that way because there're a lot of very competent people. Frank Slantenshik was the House Line Services Committee, he's a guy. A fellow who just retired who was the great supporter of Senator Cannon, that some of you will know, was one of the great all time professionals voer there. We've got some really big ones who are objective and who try to work with all of us. There are others who just are representative of the old adage, "with power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely."

QUESTION: While here in this particular curriculum we're taught there are certain procedures, processes, logical decision flows that hopefully will help produce some better systems acquisition problems and a couple of questions from my point -- in December 72, DSARC II for TRIDENT was completed. In January 73, CNO approved the ships characteristics based on the preliminary base line design. knowledgeable people and taking some out of our class lectures, it seems as though logically the base line ship characteristics should have been approved and completed prior to completion of DSARC II. While this may be a bad example itself, it brings me to the questions I have in mind. One, could this be simply a reverse just of formalization of informal understanding. Two, could it be that certain highly visible projects with a great deal of support overwhelmed and outweighed the hopefully proper procedures. Three, could these procedures have become, especially in a higher level maybe over all levels, simply, in many cases, paperwork drills. Four, does the DSARCs really accomplish anything more than just preparation for the DSARC accomplish.

ADMIRAL: I think each one has to be discussed almost The TRIDENT was a very special case. There was all kinds of bureaucratic infighting . The single overriding factor that led that meaning come out of phase

It became quite clear about that time that we were going to get our fingers whipped in SALT I, and we had to have that WOMPUM coming along, that I referred to in the principal

I didn't want to say it in there, but the Chiefs had really to

atroture the logic to call SALT I asymmetrical parity.

We got whipped, and we will not give him a chance at the SALT I. The numbers were run up beyond the leap in the last 24 hours without even the SALT negotiators being there. It was a deal that was signed off at such a high level--Kissinger and Nixon--but they didn't know what they were doing. And the whole deal still has control. When it became apparent that we were facing that kind of a problem, and that the reason for it was that they were building and we weren't building. We just had to get tracking on TRIDENT and so after lots and lots of analyses and thousands of , Mel Laird just sat down and said put 24 missiles on and get going, and that is the way it was done.

QUESTION: In terms of OPNAV it seems to be taking more and more decision making authority into their wing. At times it appears that people in the field who are being relegated role of real estate agents rather than managers. I myself think that is a mistake, but how do you feel about that of this continual growth in OPNAV?

ADMIRAL: I think there's some today . I think that there has been--there is a continuing problem between the requirement and the . I was working for Paul Nitze as his Executive Assistant when we got the decision through under General Order 90 and 19 to merge, and I strongly believed in it. The reason that I believe in it is because the persuasive argument that I gave Paul Nitze that convinced him was that you've got to make the CNO be responsible for being rational about those requirements, and I still believe that that's right.

I believe that the CNO and the VCNO have got to be in position where they can listen to the adversary dialogue between a strong sponsor and a strong producer. Inside we're held, we can't

requirement, it's just too costly. We've got to back off and let the Material Command go ahead and give us the 80% that they say they can give us. The way that breaks down is for example in the case of Admiral Rickover who is on the requirement side, he's on the producer side, on the Congressional side and everywhere, he's Speedy Gonzales and everytime you look around he's saying, senor please to remove your finger. So that's one place where it can't work and never will. In the Aviation side I think that the requirements be still too strong.

On the ship side, minus nuclear, I believe that there's about a fair balance. I believe there is a very good balance for it between Admiral Price on the one hand and Ships Systems Command on the other. I think what CNOs have to keep working for is to continue to try to make this adversary process work so that they and through the VCNO and O90 and weakening requirements, reduce requirements for a cross feasibility.

QUESTION: Wouldn't it be better if we had the CNO and VCNO at the overall level and had another guy who's essentially the user equivalent to the CNM so the CNO doesn't play that heavy role as it now shows that he is the boss and wouldn't that help us a bit?

ADMIRAL: So you've got to be CNO to be your

QUESTION: Have someone there who's equivalent to CNM.

ADMIRAL: I think I would not have problems with revising the charter to read that way. The way it now reads, of course, is that

CNO is responsible for requirements and is responsible for producing; and tell his Deputies--CNM for one-- we've got a Deputy VCNO for the other. So in essence, it works that way. I tried to make it work that way, to reach the Vice Chief and to reach 090. So the more important programs--minus again the nuclear--the smaller the program the less you are able to deal with it and maybe the system isn't working well there.

QUESTION: Get back to shipbuilding for a moment. It seems we're getting squeezed on both ends, if the shipyards are going to be raising their levels, which Congress is really peeling off quite a few funding of ships. The hi-low mix approach is started, of course, being a controversial issue it seems right now, last Congressional cuts came across that they're kind of tearing off the low mix and are really going after the high. Does this in some way undermine the approach?

ADMIRAL: Yes, I've mentioned to the earlier group--the ASW group--I believe that this is the result of the fact that Adm Rickover was very effective in lobbying against the Sea Control Ship, which is now a cinch he'll get, and seditiously brought to the attention of Congress, every problem we had in the Control Frigate Bureau and seditiously hid from the Congress the problems we have in the nuclear construction. This made it possible for the Congress to reduce the Patrol Frigates from 7 to 3. I believe that the intelligent leadership in Defense and in the Navy is going to continue to try to press for those lower cost ships, because you can't simply run away from the fact that it's clear as the nose on your face and all the analyses that numbers of platforms and higher pay offs

and degrees of excellence with regard to propulsion. I've done the studies and I can tell you, you've just have to pressure them to get the nuclear endurance supplement to the major fleet escort study to come out to make DLGNs look cost effective.

QUESTION: Along the same lines as that hi-low mix, did you address it to the fighter community where the conversations with George Vandenburg and others, said that with the R&D cost, if you have the initial R&D is so high, that if you'd bring in, let's say a high side of the mix like the F-14 and you just get the learning curves down while you're getting your unit cost down to a level which is acceptable and you stop it there and go in with a low mix, the R&D cost put it out so high that it's not constipated, can you comment on that?

ADMIRAL: Yes, in the factory that's what happens and that's why Systems Analyses came along in time to help us save the F-14, because there's a high degree of support for the fact that some costs are sunk -- it's money that's spent and the house is half built and when you have that compete against the new system, it is fair to charge in the new case with a new R&D. The F-14 is, I think, the one weapon system where I come out in favor of high unit cost, because of that problem of adequate space on board enough platform. On all other kinds of aircraft I came to favor going more towards the lowering of the mix. I think we have to be very nervous about trying to turn anymore A-6s and instead push for A-7s. I think that we need to look, in the case of our ships for much more in the low cost end. The F-14 because of its very special relationship to being able to fend everything from inadequate deck space.

I like to look at the F-14 as a low-cost DLGN.

QUESTION: Admiral, I'm a CEC Officer, but I've perform the section leader for about half of the System Acquisition Management students that are here and the 18 months I've been with them, in my view at least, are high performers and highly orated, I think that the kind of questions we've seen here shows the level of education and interest that we're getting in this area. It's gravely concerned me that, recently, as these officers have attempted to obtain duty assignments, had them signed-- those that wanted to go into the Systems Acquisition Management Area have either been counseled or obtained other kinds of information was found difficulty in being detailed into these areas. I'd say from your remarks, you're concerned about this and I'm very, very concerned . The kind of remarks lead us to number one: We've difficulty getting to the jobs in the first place. Sencondly, other remarks from senior officers we've talked with sometime indicate that our performance, certainly we'd probably get support on performance markings, but the recognition level for that type of performance as compared to others, may hurt us in the long run. I wonder, and we've made this know certainly to the sponsors and the people yet available to talk with effect, do you have any recommendations as how we might dare bring our problems to the attention of others who might then go about getting these jobs?

ADMIRAL: I'm disappointed to hear that that's the case. It's certainly not in accordance with policy as Admiral Bagley, Chief

of Naval Personnel was intending it to be carried out. I guess two things are required, one if for all of you to keep pressure on through the various contacts and the other is I'll try to make it a point to give him a call and see if he's aware personally of the fact that it's off-track.

QUESTION: Having just spoke about it, I feel that it's not getting down far--it's not getting to the actual detailers level where he's trying to put out prior to what people

ADMIRAL: Policy not getting down?

AUDIENCE: Yes sir.

QUESTION: I'm a deep qualified submarine. I commanded, and I was very happy to have had the opportunity to have come to this School, it's a pretty exciting school. I found it that when I went back to the detailers that basically they were very good reasons, as far as they're concerned, more than sending back to some type of operational billet. But I felt that the P-Code should have been considered, based upon where I stand and why not continue to do something for the Navy. But the detailee was under great pressure, I could tell. He was under great pressure to send me to an operational billet tour and I think that's very representative of what's the next time out.

ADMIRAL: I think the phenomenon is to carry some pressure in the other direction.

QUESTION: There's a memo that isn't two-weeks old from Adm Bagley/Adm Kidd saying that everything is going fine and dandy and for the area, but down at the working level, things aren't going so fine and dandy as far as the people in the program----

In fact the incentive really is a negative incentive to the people especially. The real incentive is to send the people to the staffs because they lack people. I think that the Aviation Community is a little better as far as putting people in key billets.

ADMIRAL: It was going to be my policy as well as Admiral Bagley's policy, there worse could be better, because by in large, the shop is just as lousy as you and I .

QUESTION: The benefit of this discussion come away and holding this education to Systems Acquisitions, I think you begin to similiar education appliance I could say at Harvard Business School. I've been in the Navy long enough to consider myself mature enough to know that I'm not going to be the young guy who leads the financial portion of Harvard Business School, and go correct the entire financial policy of a country overnight. We see some of the problems and you have reiterated a lot of these problems with the system that the non-rational approach that people take in this problem here and what, are we as bill manager--what I'm searching for is what recommendations, single recommendation would you have for a graduate of this curriculum?

ADMIRAL: I think that the point I made in the larger group about approaching each job as though it's your last--it's the only way to operate. Particularly in the kinds of businesses for which you people here are being trained. There's just no other way to operate. Perhaps, the classic example of that is Bud Eggis . I don't know whether you know him or not.. He was

an obnoxious S.O.B. for a superior, you know, to deal with. And he was so dammed right, that you just couldn't call him and he forced us to listen to his problem and you ended up making it, because he was just willing to be hard nose and tough. And if he had let the system lean on him, the system would have, because nobody was willing to understand his problem until he sat there and pounded away at it.

QUESTION: It was mentioned a couple of other things that you should consider yourself--previous remarks--one was the Congressional staffs being very cordial--project managers.

Now as successful, weren't we dealing with the staff. Are we looking at, not necessarily how the system is suppose to work, but how the system does work. I guess the whip cream on the frustration pie deals with the business of promotions. You touched on it in there somewhat, right? I don't have my figures in front of me and I'm sure you're probably more equipped to discuss it than I am. We see a few guys with the ODOMS specialties making captains and admirals out of this business, but still, by in large, it's the guys that are out there driving the ships around, are the guys that are getting promoted. I just wonder, you know, are we leveled off on the ODOMS things or is it on the up-swing or where do you see us in full cycle?

ADMIRAL: The policy drive is still there. Those kinds of changes always take awhile to show up. The selection boards have to have their noses rubbed in it two or three times from lines, before they really come around, but there's just no doubt in my mind that it's here. If the Navy tried to walk away from it, the Congress and OSD will be all over them, because of the

high degree of belief that we need this group. I'd say, press on.

QUESTION: I guess, it's just sort of a gut feeling that here we are back to launching we have to decide, are we going to really pursue the ODOMS things all the way or are we going to go out there and drive airplanes and drive ships around - -do it that way.

ADMIRAL: After we announced that command ashore would be good for flag rank, the first year it didn't turn out very well. Always they could tell us that the system had to change in this term. The second year was better, and this year was a good year, and I think it's going to be the same way.

QUESTON: In all fairness to BUPERS detailers, the problem that you just mentioned, I think, has an awful lot to do with the fact that the BUREAU does not want to send us to jobs in Acquisition Field straight from this school. I wrote a letter to the Bureau and there was a job I had all picked out, it was going to come open in Acquisition Shop in 96 and 96 was in favor of it and it looked really great and the Bureau just said flat, you will not get promoted if you spend 6 years on shore duty. That was it and they wouldn't move.

ADMIRAL: Your rank is Lieutenant? Yes. I can see why they would worry about it at that rank. We haven't gone so far that you can afford 6 years away from sea duty at a time. That's not to say that the system isn't going to persevere and ODOMS isn't one of them. In time, 6 years for a Lieutenant will become routine, but I guess we're five to ten years away from it.

QUESTION: Do you think we'll ever see another carrier program come along, or continuation of the carrier programs as we know it, large CVA's?

ADMIRAL: Mel Laird told me that we would never get another carrier when I went after him on the CVN-70. I kept after him and kept after him and made the obvious case that we had no alternative coming along and even under my program, which was advocating low-cost system of the Sea Control Ship, and so he finally backed away and got behind us and we got it through. When that was over he said, you'll never get another one. That no other Secretary of Defense could help you get it through. And he's a shrewd judge of the Congress. This is why I feel that the decision that can kill the Sea Control Ship is the one which Admiral Rickover and his Committee

What the Congress is saying is give us a little larger ship with an arresting gear and catapult and what Admiral Rickover is going to see it happens and that will never come to pass unless the snake pit fell and then they'd back up into a billion dollar or more. If you had the combinations coming along so that you could sell the high-low mix, you could get some more. Without it I just think the Navy is dead. It's a great tragic--what--they're going to have to back off and start over again. Aviation is going to have to get to sea in the future on Destroyers and LPH's and that kind of thing.

ADMIRAL ZUMWALT'S ADDRESS TO THE
BACHE ASSOCIATES AT THE CENTURY PLAZA
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 28 AUGUST 1974

WHAT I WANT TO TRY TO DO TONIGHT IS TO TALK FIRST ABOUT THE STRATEGIC BALANCE AND THEN THE NON-STRATEGIC BALANCE IN THE MILITARY EQUATION AND RELATE WHAT IS HAPPENING WITH REGARD TO BOTH OF THEM TO SOME FOREIGN POLICY AND ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS.

FIRST, WITH REGARD TO THE STRATEGIC PART OF THE EQUATION, LET ME GO BACK TO THE EARLIER PERIOD OF DETENTE. HENRY KISSINGER HIMSELF, HAS WRITTEN THAT WE HAVE HAD A PERIOD OF DETENTE WITH THE RUSSIANS EACH DECADE SINCE THE SOVIETS CAME TO POWER. AT THE END OF WWII WE WERE CLOSELY ASSOCIATED. THE UNITED STATES WAS IN SOLE POSSESSION, ALONG WITH OUR BRITISH COUSINS OF ATOMIC WEAPONS. AND YOU WILL RECALL THAT MR. TRUMAN ANNUNCIATED THE BARUCH PLAN WHICH PROPOSED TO INTERNATIONALIZE THE CONTROL OF ATOMIC WEAPONS AS A WAY OF ASSURING THE RUSSIANS THAT WE WOULD KEEP THESE THINGS FROM BEING USED AGAINST THEM. THIS WAS REJECTED BY THE SOVIETS AND THE SUBSEQUENT ARMS RACE IN THE STRATEGIC FIELD BEGAN WITH THE EXPENDITURE OF VAST NUMBERS OF BILLIONS OF DOLLARS ON BOTH SIDES. THE UNITED STATES ENTERED THE FUSION ERA WITH HYDROGEN WEAPONS. WE WERE FOLLOWED FRIGHTENINGLY QUICKLY BY THE SOVIETS ACROSS FIRST THE FISSION AND THEN THE FUSION BARRIER, AND THEN OTHER NATIONS. THE SOVIETS HAD 17 LONG YEARS OF WATCHING OUR STRATEGIC SUPERIORITY WHEN, IN 1962, NIKITA KHRUSHCHEV DECIDED TO TRY TO DO SOMETHING ABOUT IT QUICKLY BY DOUBLING THE MEGATONNAGE AND CUTTING IN HALF THE WARNING TIME BY INSTALLING MISSILES IN CUBA. AND, WHEN HE GOT CAUGHT WITH HIS MISSILES DOWN AND AS MR. RUSK SUGGESTED THAT WE STOOD EYE BALL TO EYE BALL UNTIL THEY

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BLINKED, YOU CAN BE VERY SURE THAT HE DID SO BECAUSE HE AND HIS ASSOCIATES MADE THE RATIONAL CALCULATION, WHICH WE HAD ALSO MADE, THAT WE HAD SOMETHING BETWEEN 4 AND 10 TIMES THE NUCLEAR POWER THAT THEY HAD, AND THAT THEY ALSO HAD RUN DOWN THE LADDER OF POWER AND HAD CONCLUDED THAT THEY COULDN'T BULL THEIR WAY TO CUBA FACING OUR TREMENDOUS SUPERIORITY AND MARITIME CAPABILITY. THE SOVIETS AT THAT POINT PROCEEDED TO DO THREE THINGS. FIRST, THEY PRIVATELY MADE IT CLEAR THAT THEY WOULD NEVER AGAIN BE CAUGHT IN SUCH A PREDICAMENT TO US. THE FIRST PROGRAM THEY ANNUNCIATED WAS A MASSIVE STRATEGIC PROGRAM, LARGEST IN HISTORY WHICH HAS BEEN GOING ON EVER SINCE. THE SECOND THING THEY DID WAS TO BEGIN THE SECOND LARGEST MARITIME CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM IN HISTORY, EXCEEDED ONLY BY OUR OWN WWII CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM. AND A THIRD THING THEY DID WAS A TACTIC. THEY GRAPPLED THEMSELVES INTO A TEST-BAN TREATY. I WAS DIRECTOR OF ARMS CONTROL IN THE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE AT THE TIME AND WE HAD BEEN TRYING TO NEGOTIATE A TEST-BAN TREATY FOR A LONG PERIOD OF TIME. RATHER RAPIDLY AFTER THE CRISIS, WE BEGAN TO RECEIVE INTERESTING LITTLE SIGNALS HERE AND THERE FROM VARIOUS EMBASSIES AROUND THE WORLD. IT BECAME CLEAR THEY WERE INTERESTED INSTEAD OF TALKING AND NEGOTIATING, AND WITHIN A MATTER OF MONTHS, WE HAD THE TEST-BAN TREATY. NOW THIS WAS A TACTIC OF THE SOVIETS. WE VISUALIZED IT AS A CONTRACT BETWEEN OURSELVES AND SOMEONE WE DIDN'T TRUST VERY MUCH, BUT AS ESTABLISHING A BASIS FOR FINDING OUT WHETHER IT WAS POSSIBLE TO GET ALONG IN WAYS THAT WOULD MAKE IT POSSIBLE

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TO MAKE ARMS CONTROL PROGRESS IN THE FUTURE. AND AT THAT TIME, WE VISUALIZED A NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY WHICH HAS COME TO PASS. WE VISUALIZED THE HOT LINE WHICH HAS COME TO PASS. WE WERE TALKING ABOUT A BAN ON WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION IN OUTER-SPACE WHICH HAS COME TO PASS. AND WE TALKED ALSO AT THAT TIME, ABOUT A SEPARABLE FIRST-STAGE DISARMAMENT. SOMETHING THAT LATER BEGAN TO BE DISCUSSED BUT CALLED SALT, STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS. THESE WERE CRANKED UP INITIALLY UNDER THE JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION, DIDN'T GET ANYWHERE. WHERE AFTER AN INITIAL PERIOD OF DISTRUST, BY THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION PICKED UP, AND NEGOTIATIONS TOOK PLACE. WHEN MR. NIXON AND DR. KISSINGER FINALLY GOT TO THE POINT OF BEING READY TO SIGN ON THE BOTTOM LINE, THE SOVIETS HAD BEEN BUILDING FOR MANY YEARS THIS IMPRESSIVE PROGRAM WHICH THEY KICKED OFF AFTER THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS, WE HAD NOT BEEN BUILDING. YOU WILL RECALL THAT MR. MACNAMARA ANNOUNCED THAT THERE WOULD BE ABSOLUTELY NO INCENTIVE UPON THE SOVIETS TO GO BEYOND THE 1,054 MISSILES THAT WE HAD ASHORE. THEY GOT TO 1200, AND TO 1400 AND TO 1600 AND AT THAT POINT, WE GOT THE BEST DEAL WE COULD, WHICH GAVE THEM A 60% ADVANTAGE IN LAND BASED MISSILES AND THEY WERE AUTHORIZED A 30% ADVANTAGE IN SEA BASED MISSILES PROVIDED THEY DESTROYED 209 OF THOSE LAND BASED MISSILES TO COME DOWN TO A 40% ADVANTAGE IN LAND BASED MISSILES. THEY WERE AUTHORIZED ANOTHER 40% ADVANTAGE IN STRATEGIC SUBMARINE PLATFORMS. THEY HAD, AT THAT TIME, A 300% ADVANTAGE IN MEGATONNAGE. WE HAD, NOT UNDER THE TREATY, A MODEST ADVANTAGE IN BOMBERS, AND WE HAD NEARLY A 100% ADVANTAGE IN WARHEADS. NOW, AT THE SAME TIME, YOU WILL RECALL

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WE SIGNED AN ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE TREATY ON THE DEFENSIVE SIDE. BOTH SIDES ACCEPTED THIS AS A PERMANENT CONDITION, TWO SITES EACH. THE SOVIETS WERE DELIGHTED TO ACCEPT PARITY BECAUSE THEY WERE BEHIND US IN THE ABM FIELD. IN THE OFFENSIVE SIDE WHERE THEY WERE AHEAD OF US, THEY WERE UNWILLING TO ACCEPT PARITY, AND WE WERE THEREFORE, INSISTING THAT THEY SIGN ONLY FOR FIVE YEARS. AND THOSE ADVANTAGES THEY WERE GIVEN WERE CONSIDERED AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL TO BE ROUGHLY MATCHED BY OUR SUPERIORITY IN MIRVS, THE MULTIPLE INDEPENDENT RETARGETABLE VEHICLES AND IN BOMBERS; BUT IT WAS MADE CLEAR BY THE PRESIDENT, BY THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE AND BY THOSE OF US IN THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, BOTH PUBLICLY AND IN OUR TESTIMONY BEFORE THE CONGRESS, THAT THIS DEAL ONLY MADE SENSE IF ONE RECOGNIZED THAT IT WAS JUST THE BEST WE COULD DO WITH THE SOVIETS HAVING BEEN BUILDING FOR MANY YEARS; AND US NOT HAVING BUILT. AND THAT IF WE WERE GOING TO GET TRUE ESSENTIAL EQUIVALENCE IN SALT II, THERE HAD TO BE VIGOROUS FUNDING OF STRATEGIC PROGRAMS. IN OTHER WORDS, WE HAD TO SPEND MONEY IN ORDER TO DEMONSTRATE TO THE SOVIETS THAT WE WERE GOING TO HAVE PARITY IN THE FUTURE WITH A TREATY AND REDUCE EXPENDITURE OR WITHOUT A TREATY. THIS NATION WOULD TWICE THEIR GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT. THAT SEEMED TO BE A REASONABLE PROPOSITION. THE CONGRESS DID NOT FUND THE STRATEGIC BUDGETS OF THE PRESIDENT. DRAMATIC REDUCTIONS IN THE DEFENSE BUDGET HAVE BEEN MADE. 2 BILLION 3 BILLION, 5 BILLION AND 3 1/2 BILLION IN THE LAST FOUR YEARS. THEREFORE, WHEN IT CAME TIME FOR MR. NIXON, BADLY WEAKEN DOMESTICALLY, TO GO TO THE LAST SUMMIT IN JUNE AND JULY OF THIS YEAR, HE

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FACED TWO VERY POOR ALTERNATIVES. ONE WAS TO SIGN PERMANENT INFERIORITY WHICH THE RUSSIANS WERE DEMANDING. THEY WANTED THEIR NUMERICAL ADVANTAGES TO BE FROZEN WHILE THEY CONTINUED TO OVERTAKE US WITH REGARD TO THE MIRVS AS THEY ARE NOW DOING OR TO FUZZ UP THE COMMUNICA AND SUGGEST THAT WE WOULD SIT DOWN AT A LATER POINT, AND THE LATTER, LESS WORSE ALTERNATIVE WAS SELECTED.

NOW WITH REGARD TO THE FUTURE IN THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION FIELD, I CAN GIVE YOU MY PERSONAL ASSURANCE THAT WE WILL END UP ACCEPTING PERMANENT INFERIORITY IF THE CONGRESS CONTINUES TO CUT THE PRESIDENT'S BUDGETS IN THE DEFENSE FIELD AS THEY HAVE IN THE PAST FOUR YEARS.

SHIFTING NOW TO THE NON-STRATEGIC SIDE, AND AGAIN GOING BACK TO THAT LAST PERIOD OF SO-CALLED TRUE DETENTE AT THE END OF WWII, YOU WILL RECALL THAT WE ENDED THE WAR IN A POSITION OF OVERWHELMING SUPERIORITY, MILITARILY AND IN THE CONVENTIONAL FIELD. THE UNITED STATES, IN ADDITION TO HAVING PUT FORWARD ITS BAROQUE PLAN, PUT UP ANOTHER SERIES OF BONAFIDES TO DEMONSTRATE THAT WE WERE INTERESTED IN MAKING DETENTE WORK WITH THE SOVIETS. WE LEANED ON OUR OWN FRIENDS TO RELINQUISH THEIR COLONIES. TO PERMIT NATIONS TO BE FREED AND TO COME INTO THE UNITED NATIONS, WE SUPPORTED THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER ON TERMS THAT WERE UNFAIR TO THE UNITED STATES AND EXTREMELY FAIR TO THE SOVIET UNION. AND, WE ALSO PROCEEDED TO DEMOBILIZE OUR FORCES ALMOST OVERNIGHT. PARTLY UNDER DOMESTIC POLITICAL PRESSURE, ALL OF US WHO WANTED TO GET BACK HOME, BUT ALSO PARTLY AS A BONAFIDE TO THE SOVIETS. STALIN DID NOT DEMOBILIZE AND IN A MATTER OF JUST MONTHS, SUCCEEDED TO THE POSITION OF PRIMARY POWER IN THE WORLD WITH THE SINGULAR RESTRAINT

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THAT WE HAD A FEW ATOMIC WEAPONS. HE USED THIS SUPERIOR POWER TOGETHER WITH POLICY TO MANEUVER HIS WAY ROUGH-SHOOD OVER THE NATIONS OF EASTERN EUROPE UNTIL, AS MR. WINSTON CHURCHILL SUGGESTED A IRON CURTAIN FALL ACROSS EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES BEGAN ITS LONG CLIMB BACK WITH THE POLICY OF CONTAINMENT ARTICULATED SO WELL BY GEORGE CANNON IN THAT ERA. THE MARSHALL PLAN WAS ANNOUNCIATED. YOU WILL RECALL THAT EVEN THEN AT THAT LATE DATE AFTER ALL THIS HYPOCRISY AND CHICANERY BY STALIN, IT WAS MADE AN OPTION THAT THE COMMUNIST NATIONS COULD ACCEPT AND STALIN REJECTED IT. THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE WHICH BOOSTERED THE SOUTHERN TIER OF EUROPE. THE NATO TREATY WHICH MADE IT POSSIBLE AFTER THE BILLIONS HAD BEEN POURED IN TO RESTORE THE ECONOMIES OF THE WESTERN EUROPE, THROUGH THE MARSHALL PLAN, MADE IT POSSIBLE TO BRING ARMIES AND AIR FORCES TO BEAR IN EUROPE TO OPPOSE THE COMMUNIST POWER. THE BEGINNING OF THE BUILDING OF THE BI-LATERAL SERIES OF TREATIES AND ARRANGEMENTS IN THE PACIFIC, WITH JAPAN WITH KOREA, WITH TIAWAN, WITH THE PHILIPPINES, WITH THE ANGES NATIONS, UNTIL THE CIRCLE HAD BEEN DRAWN. THE FIRST MAJOR TEST OF THIS POLICY OF CONTAINMENT WAS INITIATED WHEN STALIN LED THE NORTH KOREANS TO INVADE SOUTH KOREA IN THE KOREAN WAR. AND UNDER THE SPECTRA OF THE RISKS OF NUCLEAR WAR, WE FOUGHT A LIMITED WAR FOR LIMITED OBJECTIVES AND WE HAD TO WIN IT TWICE. ONCE AGAINST THE NORTH KOREANS AND ONCE AGAINST THE CHINESE COMMUNIST IN ORDER TO DEMONSTRATE THAT NOTWITHSTANDING THE RISKS OF NUCLEAR WAR, WE WOULD REPEL OPEN OVERT AGGRESSION ACROSS OUR SIDE OF THE LINE. AT THE END OF THIS PERIOD, THE COMMUNIST TOOK A BREATHING

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SPELL, AND THEY ANNUNCIATED A NEW DOCTRINE. NIKITA KHRUSHCHEV REFERRED TO IT WHEN HE SAID, THE WARS OF NUCLEAR EXCHANGE ARE BAD, WARS OF CONVENTIONAL NATURE ARE BAD, BUT WARS OF NATIONAL LIBERATION ARE GOOD; AND BY THAT HE REFERRED TO THE FACT THAT WHEREVER THEY COULD FIND AN INSIPIENT REBELLION AND COULD FEED IT WITH MEN, MONEY AND AGENTS, THEY WOULD DO SO; AND USING OUR CIVILIZED RULES OF FOREIGN POLICY CONSTRAINTS WOULD REMOVE THE REAL ESTATE FROM US AND PUT IT BEHIND THEIR IRON CURTAIN. THE LATE UNLAMENTED DEFENSE MINISTER OF CHINA, LIN PAO, SAID THE SAME THING IN ASIATIC LANGUAGE WHEN HE SAID, JUST AS WE CHINESE HAVE CAPTURED THE CITIES BY SEIZING THE RURAL AREAS, WE WILL CAPTURE THE CITY CONTINENTS OF THE WORLD, EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA, BY SEIZING THE RURAL CONTINENTS OF THE WORLD, ASIA, AFRICA AND LATIN AMERICA. THE MAJOR TEST OF THIS NEW DOCTRINE TOOK PLACE IN A VERY INFORTUITOUS AREA IN SOUTH VIETNAM. IN MY JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT THE UNCERTAIN TRUMPET AND THE INTEREST BY THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION IN COUNTER-INSURGENCY AND THE INCREASE IN OUR CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITY OF THAT PERIOD, GAVE US THE CAPABILITY TO DO SO. IT WAS A SERIOUS STRATEGIC ERROR FOR US TO GET BOGGED DOWN IN THAT LAND WAR IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. IT WAS DONE, AND THE CONSEQUENCE WAS THAT FOR THE EXPENDITURE OF A BILLION OR TWO PER YEAR ON THE PART OF THE SOVIETS, THEY WERE ABLE TO BOG US DOWN IN A SITUATION WHICH WAS GRADUALLY ESCALATED TO CONVENTIONAL WAR WHILE WE WERE SPENDING FOR A DECADE FIRST 10, THEN 15, then 20 AND FINALLY 30 BILLION DOLLARS ANNUALLY. AND, OF EVEN GREATER SIGNIFICANCE WAS THE FACT THAT THOSE EXPENDITURES WERE FOR BOMBS, BULLETS AND ATTRITION AIRCRAFT AND OPERATING EXPENSES

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WASTAGE, WHILE THE SOVIETS WERE INCREASING THEIR CAPITAL INVESTMENTS IN STRATEGIC AND CONVENTIONAL HARDWARE. AND SO THE TWO LINES THAT THEY HAD DRAWN, STRATEGIC AND CONVENTIONAL POWER DESIGNED TO OVERTAKE US SOMEWHERE IN THE LATE SEVENTIES, OVERTOOK US MUCH EARLIER AS WE THREW AWAY THIS MONEY AT THE MARGIN AND AS THEIR TOTAL EXPENDITURE OF DOLLARS PER YEAR BEGAN TO OVERTAKE US, AND HAS FOR THE LAST TWO OR THREE YEARS. NOW, NEVERTHELESS, THE SOVIETS AND THE CHINESE BEGAN TO SENSE DIFFICULTY WITH REGARD TO THE WAY IN WHICH THAT WAR IN SOUTHEAST ASIA WAS BEING FOUGHT. THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION CAME TO POWER, AND I THINK YOU OUGHT TO GIVE THEM HIGH MARKS FOR THE WAY IN WHICH THEY OPERATED IN THAT FIRST ADMINISTRATION IN THE FOREIGN POLICY FIELD, THE RAPPROCHMENT OF MOSCOW AND WITH PEKING, MADE IT POSSIBLE FOR THE UNITED STATES TO OPERATE IN THE POSITION OF ATTRITUS TRADING ONE OFF AGAINST THE OTHER; AND WINNING THE SUPPORT OF EACH FOR FEAR OF THE OTHER. FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF OUR FORCES FROM SOUTHEAST ASIA ON TERMS THAT WERE OF SUFFICIENT HONOR, THAT OUR ALLIES ELSEWHERE IN THE WORLD COULD NOT ACCUSE US OF HAVING BUGGED OUT OR DID NOT FEEL THAT WE WOULD FAIL TO HONOR OUR COMMITMENTS TO THEM. THE NET OF THIS WAS THAT THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION WAS IN A POSITION, HAVING LIQUIDATED OUR BAD INVESTMENT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, TO BEGIN THE LONG CLIMB BACK WITH REGARD TO OUR STRATEGIC AND CONVENTIONAL POWER WHEN THE IMPACT OF WATERGATE DESCENDED UPON THEM. AND IN ESSENCE, FOR THE LAST TWO YEARS, ALMOST ZERO PROGRESS, AS A MATTER OF FACT NEGATIVE PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE WITH REGARD TO MAKING THE

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PEOPLE AWARE OF WHAT THE TRUE SITUATION WAS. NOW, AS WE REACH THE POINT WHERE IT IS NECESSARY TO LOOK FORWARD, WHAT IS THE TACTIC FOR THE FUTURE. JUST AS THE SOVIETS SOUGHT WAYS TO OVERCOME OUR STRATEGIC ADVANTAGE, WERE DETERRED IN THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS AND HAD TO SIT DOWN FOR THE LONG HAUL TO DO IT THE HARD WAY; JUST AS THEY SOUGHT A WAY TO BREAK THROUGH THE CONVENTIONAL CONTAINMENT THAT HAD BEEN PUT AROUND THEM AND WERE DETERRED THROUGH OUR EFFORT IN KOREA; JUST AS THEY SOUGHT TO COME UP WITH A THIRD LEVEL OF AGRESSION AT THE SUB-LIMITED OR INSURGENCY LEVEL AND HAVE SEEN THE RISKS INHERENT IN THAT FROM THE WAY IN WHICH WE REACTED, BUT THAT GOT GREAT BENEFIT THERE FROM. THEY ARE NOW IN THE PROCESS OF PERFECTING A STILL LOWER LEVEL OF AGRESSION AGAINST US, AND ONE WHICH GIVES EVERY EVIDENCE OF BEING SUCCESSFUL.

LET ME DESCRIBE FOR YOU THE WAY IN WHICH IT HAS HAPPENED THROUGH THE CRISIS IN WHICH I HAD PARTICIPATED DURING MY FOUR-YEAR WATCH AS CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS. THE FIRST OF THESE WAS THE JORDAN CRISIS OF SEPTEMBER 1970. IN THAT CRISIS, YOU WILL RECALL THAT THIS WAS THE FRUITION OF THE PERIOD OF INVESTMENT BY THE SOVIETS IN HARDWARE FOR THE SYRIANS AND OTHER OF THE ARAB NATIONS. THE SYRIANS WERE LED TO SEND THEIR TANKS INTO JORDAN IN AN INVASION. HAD IT WORKED, THERE WOULD HAVE BEEN AN ENCIRCLEMENT OF ISRAEL WITH A SOVIET TINGED REGIME. IT FAILED FOR THREE REASONS. ONE, THE JORDANIAN ARMY FOUGHT BETTER THAN HAD BEEN ESTIMATED. SECOND, THE ISRAELIS MOVED THEIR FOCES NORTH AND WERE READY TO PLAY A ROLE. AND THIRD, THE UNITED STATES MOVED FORCES INTO THE MEDITERRANEAN. I WAS IN THE SIXTH FLEET, IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE CRISIS WITH THE PRESIDENT WHEN GENERAL

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BURCHINAL BRIEFED THE PRESIDENT ON THE WAY IN WHICH IT WOULD HAVE BEEN NECESSARY TO FLY TROOPS IN FROM EUROPE HAD THAT BEEN THE COURSE SELECTED. AND THEY WOULD HAVE HAD TO FLY FROM GERMANY INTO THE NORTH SEA, THROUGH THE BRITISH CHANNEL, AROUND THROUGH THE STRAITS OF GIBRALTAR AND 2200 MILES ACROSS THE MEDITERRANEAN BECAUSE OUR NATO ALLIES WOULD NOT GIVE US OVER FLIGHT RIGHTS. AND YOU COULDN'T GET THERE WITH THE NUMBER OF AIR TANKER WE HAD. AND SO THE PRESIDENT HAD TO USE THE DEVICE OF REINFORCING THE MEDITERRANEAN WITH A THIRD CARRIER AND WITH MARINES EMBARKED ON VERTICAL LIFT. AND THAT CALCULUS OF FACTORS LED THE SOVIETS TO LEAN ON THE SYRIANS TO WITHDRAW THEIR TANKS. THE SYRIANS WERE PROMISED THAT THEIR LOSSESS WOULD BE REPLACED, AND THAT PROCEDURE WAS SET IN TRAIN AS THE EGYPTIANS WERE ALSO MORE FULLY EQUIPED. THE NEXT MAJOR CRISIS WAS THAT OF THE INDIAN SUB-CONTINENT WAR IN 1972. YOU WILL RECALL THAT THERE THE SOVIET ALLIES, THE INDIANS, FOUGHT OUR ALLY, THE PAKISTANS. THE PAKISTANIS LOST HALF OF THEIR TERRITORY. BOTH THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES REINFORCED THE INDIAN OCEAN WITH NAVAL POWER, BUT THE SOVIET UNION, IN ADDITION, HAD AIR POWER AVAILABLE THAT COULD FLY FROM RUSSIA OVER THE LITTORAL NATIONS INTO THE INDIAN OCEAN, SINCE THE SOVIETS DO NOT HAVE TO GET PERMISSION TO OVER FLY. AND, THE POWER BALANCE WAS SUCH THAT THE INDIANS DID NOT FEEL DETERRED FROM DISMEMBERING ONE HALF OF PAKISTAN. ONE CAN CLAIM, AS WAS DONE AT THE TIME, THAT OUR FORCES DID HAVE SOME RESTRAINING QUANTUM OF IMPACT ON THE INDIANS WITH REGARD

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TO THEIR DECISION NOT TO GO IN AND DO THE REST OF THE JOB ON WEST PAKISTAN.

THE NEXT CRISIS IS THAT OF THE YOM KIPPUR WAR IN OCTOBER 1973. BY THIS TIME THE TRAINING AND THE EQUIPMENT OF THE ARABS HAD CONTINUED AND HAD BEEN ACCELERATED. THE SOVIETS HAD TRAINED THEM IN THE FIELD OF STRATEGIC SURPRISE. THEY ACHIEVED IT BRILLIANTLY. NOT ONLY THE ISRAELI INTELLIGENCE BUT OUR OWN WAS MISLEAD. THE ISRAELIS WERE ALMOST UNDONE. AGAIN, IN THAT CRISIS AS WE PUT 65 SHIPS INTO THE MEDITERRANEAN, WE FOUND OURSELVES FACING 50% MORE, A SOVIET FLEET OF 98 SHIPS IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN. IT IS TRUE THAT WE HAD 3 AIRCRAFT CARRIERS THERE AND THE SOVIETS HAD NONE. BUT AGAIN, WE HAD NOT A SINGLE AIRFIELD AVAILABLE TO US. THE AZORES, IN THE ATLANTIC, MADE IT POSSIBLE TO FLY THE AIRLIFT IN, BUT NONE OF THE NATO ALLIES IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN WOULD PERMIT US TO FLY OUT OF THEIR AIRFIELDS. AND THE SOVIETS HAD AIRFIELDS AVAILABLE TO THEM IN CRIMEA, SYRIA, EGYPT. AND HAD WE GONE TO WAR IN THAT CRISIS, THE ODDS ARE QUITE HIGH THAT WE WOULD HAVE LOST IT IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN. AND SO WHEN THE SOVIETS SAID TO US, AS THE ISRAELIS ENCIRCLED THE EGYPTIAN THIRD ARMY AND WERE READY TO DESTROY IT, WE ARE COMING IN UNLESS YOU HAUL THEM OFF. QUITE APART FROM THE POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS, WE HAD NO RATIONAL CHOICE EXCEPT TO HONOR THAT DEMAND; BECAUSE WE LACKED THE POWER TO DO ANYTHING ABOUT IT. NOW, THE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM AROUND THE COUNTRY HAS BEEN THAT WE WON A TACTICAL VICTORY IN THAT CRISIS. THAT THE SOVIETS WERE REMOVED FROM EGYPT AND THE SYRIANS ARE TILTING TOWARD US.

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MY OWN VIEW IS THAT THE SOVIETS MUST BE VERY VERY CONTENTED
INDEED. THEY SUCCEEDED IN THE TRIPLING OF THE OIL PRICES AND THE
OPENING OF THE SUEZ CANAL, WHICH HAD BEEN A LONG TERM STRATEGIC
OBJECTIVE OF THEIRS. THE OIL PRICE INCREASES ARE LEADING ONE
BILLION PEOPLE IN 30 COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD TO STARVATION AT A
DRAMATIC RATE. YOU KNOW BETTER THAN I WHAT THOSE SAME OIL PRICE
INCREASES ARE DOING TO THE ECONOMY OF THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN
EUROPE. AN IMMENSE STRATEGIC VICTORY FOR THE SOVIET UNION, WHICH
SEES AS ITS LONG TERM OBJECTIVE THE DISESTABLISHMENT OF SOCIETY
CONSTITUTED AS WE KNOW IT. THE RADICALIZATION OF REGIMES AS THEY
BEGIN TO STARVE, AS THEY WILL IN THOSE 30 NATIONS. AND EVEN AS
THEY BEGIN TO GET CONCERNED WITH THEIR FINANCIAL SITUATION, AS
FOR EXAMPLE, IN ITALY, SO THAT IN A WAY IN WHICH THEY ARE ABLE
TO HIDE THEIR HAND FROM THE COMMON MAN ON THE STREET, THE SOVIETS
HAVE HIT UPON A NEW TACTIC, A TACTIC WHICH IS FAR LESS DANGEROUS,
FAR LESS LIKELY TO LEAD TO THE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WAR OR THE
CONVENTIONAL WAR WHICH WE ALWAYS AVOIDED WHEN WE HAD SUPERIOR
POWER, BUT WHICH AS THEY GAIN SUPERIORITY IN THE STRATEGIC FIELD
AND IN THE CONVENTIONAL FIELD, WILL MAKE IT INCREASINGLY POSSIBLE
FOR THEM TO TAKE MORE AGGRESSIVE ACTIONS IN THE ECONOMIC AND
FOREIGN POLICY AREA.

ADM ZUMWALT'S ADDRESS TO THE BACHE ASSOCIATES AT THE
CENTURY PLAZA, LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA, 28 AUG 1974

QUESTION: AS A COUNTERING OF , ARE WE TRYING TO IMPROVE
RELATIONS WITH CHINA?

ADMIRAL: YES, THE OPENING THAT WAS MADE, BOTH TO PEKING AND TO
MOSCOW, HAS BEEN A SIGNIFICANT FACTOR. TODAY, THE COMMUNIST
CHINESE WHILE BEING DEJURE, A MEMBER OF THE COMMUNIST BLOC ARE
DE FACTO ALLIES OF THE UNITED STATES. AT THE PRESENT TIME,
THEY ARE STRONGLY ADVOCATING THAT WE KEEP OUR FORCES IN KOREA,
JAPAN AND IN TIAWAN, REDUCING SLOWLY IN TIAWAN TO SUIT THEM, AND
IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. A FEW MONTHS AGO I WAS UP IN ICELAND TALKING
TO A THIRD OF THE MEMBERS OF THE ALTHUM UP THERE, TRIED TO
PERSUADE THEM OF THE IMPORTANCE OF KEEPING OUR BASE IN ICELAND,
AND IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION, I MADE THE STATEMENT, YOU KNOW
I HAVE NO IDEA WHAT THE CHINESE AMBASSADOR, NEWLY ARRIVED HERE
TO ICELAND, IS SAYING TO YOU FELLOWS, BUT I'LL WAGER WITHOUT
KNOWING THAT HE IS URGING YOU TO LET US STAY IN THIS BASE. AND
THEY ALL NODDED. THE CHINESE AMBASSADOR TO ICELAND ADVOCATING
THE RETENTION OF THE U.S. BASE IN ICELAND, URGING THE TURKS AND
THE GREEKS TO GET ALONG, BECAUSE THEY SEE THE STRENGTH OF NATO
AS BEING ONE OF THE POWERFUL DETERRANCE TO A SOVIET ATTACK ON
CHINA. NOW THAT IS A TACTICAL SITUATION. IT WILL LAST FOR 10
MAYBE 15 YEARS. THE CHINESE ARE PUTTING DRAMATIC PERCENTAGES
OF THEIR GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT INTO DEFENSE, AS ARE THE SOVIETS,
FAR GREATER PERCENTAGES THAN WE ARE. AS THEY GET MORE AND MORE
CONFIDENT OF THEIR MILITARY CAPABILITY, WE SHOULD BEGIN TO SEE
THEM DIVERGING FROM US. MY OWN VIEW IS THAT THE FIRST SYMPTOM

BACHE LOS ANGELES

WILL BE WHEN THEY COME TO US AND SAY, ALRIGHT FELLOWS, WE'RE READY FOR THAT DEAL YOU PROMISED US ON TIAWAN, MOVE OUT, SECOND, KOREAN, THIRD JAPAN, FOURTH SOUTHEAST ASIA. I THINK IT WILL BE LONG, LONG TIME IF EVER, BEFORE THEY'LL ADVOCATE THAT WE WITHDRAW IN NATO, BECAUSE THEY WILL ALWAYS SEE THAT AS MORE OF A PROBLEM FOR THE SOVIETS THAN TO THEMSELVES.

QUESTION: ADMIRAL, WHO ARE THE MEMBERS OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION OTHER THAN GREAT BRITAIN AND FRANCE?

ADMIRAL: YOU MEAN, THE COUNTRIES ARE ALL THE COUNTRIES OF WESTERN EUROPE AND THE MEDITERRANEAN LITTORAL, TURKEY, GREECE, ITALY, SPAIN IS NOT, FRANCE, THE BENELUX COUNTRIES THREE OF THEM, NORWAY, DENNMARK, ICELAND, THE UK, GERMANY.

QUESTION: AND THEY ALL REFUSED TO ALLOW THE UNITED STATES TO FLY OVER THEIR COUNTRIES?

ADMIRAL: THE GERMANS WOULD HAVE PERMITTED US TO TAKE TROOPS OUT OF GERMANY AND FLY IN ANY DIRECTION. THE BRITISH HAD NO PROBLEM WITH US. THE FRENCH DENIED, THE ITALIANS, THE GREEKS, THE TURKS.

QUESTION: THE SOVIETS, I JUST HEARD ON THE RADIO, JAMES ON SHIPS, THE SOVIETS ARE WAY SUPERIOR THAN WE ARE IN NUCLEAR SUBMARINES.

DO YOU AGREE ON THAT ALSO? THE SOVIETS, IT SAID, DON'T HAVE MANY AIRCRAFT CARRIERS, IS IT TRUE THAT IF WE CAME TO A CONFRONTATION THAT OUR AIRCRAFT CARRIER FLEET WOULD PROBABLY BE WIPED OUT BY SOVIET SUBMARINES AND THEY WOULD BE ABLE TO MOVE IN WITH THEIR NUCLEAR CAPABILITY AND DESTROY MANY OF OUR LAND BASES?

ADMIRAL: WELL, LET ME COME AT IT THIS WAY. FIRST, --

QUESTION: ONE OF THE THINGS WITH THAT, LET'S SAY YOU DON'T AGREE WITH THAT, SHOULD WE BUILD MORE NUCLEAR AIRCRAFT CARRIERS. WOULD YOU ADVOCATE THAT?

ADMIRAL: OK, THE ANSWER IS THIS. IF THE AIRCRAFT CARRIER CAN'T SURVIVE, THEN THE UNITED STATES CAN'T SURVIVE. THE SOVIET UNION IS A LAND POWER. IT'S ABLE TO DEFEAT ITS TWO PRIMARY ENEMIES, THE NATO ALLIANCE TO THE WEST, AND THE CHINESE TO THE SOUTH, OVER LAND LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS, IT'S ABLE TO SUPPORT ITS PRINCIPAL ALLIES, THE WARSAW PACT OVER LAND LINES. IT DOESN'T MEET THE OCEANS FOR ANYTHING VITAL. THE UNITED STATES IS A WORLD ISLAND. NOT ONLY DO WE NEED TO BE ABLE TO USE THE SEAS IN ORDER TO REINFORCE OUR ALLIES AND OUR OWN FORCES OVERSEAS, BUT TO BRING IN THE OIL, 15% OF WHICH COMES IN FROM THE PERSIAN GULF TODAY AND 50% OF WHICH WILL COME IN BY 1980. TO BRING IN THE 69 OF THE 72 RESOURCES JUDGED CRITICAL BY THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, WHICH ALREADY HAVE TO COME IN ON THE SURFACE OF THE SEAS. SO IF AN AIRCRAFT CARRIER CAN'T SURVIVE, THEN THE COUNTRY CAN'T SURVIVE TO KEEP ITS ECONOMY GOING, BECAUSE THE AIRCRAFT CARRIER IS THE TO KEEPING THOSE SEALINES OPEN. THE UNITED STATES DOESN'T HAVE THE LUXURY THAT THE SOVIET UNION DOES. THEY WIN IF THEY CAN CUT OUR SEALINES 50 MILES FROM EUROPE, OR 50 MILES FROM JAPAN. WE CAN'T WIN UNLESS WE CAN KEEP THOSE SEALINES OPEN ALL THE WAY. AIRFIELDS FROM THE UNITED STATES CAN'T REACH THOSE AREAS. IT TAKE FLOATING AIRFIELDS TO REACH THEM. NOW, LET ME COME AT THE QUESTION OF VULNERABILITY OF THE

AIRCRAFT CARRIER. YOU NEED TO LOOK AT THAT IN THREE FRAMES OF REFERENCE. FIRST, IS THE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR EXCHANGE. IN A STRATEGIC NUCLEAR EXCHANGE ANYTHING THAT GETS HIT IS GONE, WHETHER IT'S AN AIRFIELD ASHORE, THE CITY OF LOS ANGELES OR WHAT HAVE YOU. I WOULD RATHER BE ON A MOVING TARGET WHEN THE MISSILES START TO FLY THAN ON ANY IMPORTANT FIXED FACILITY IN THE WORLD. SOME MOVING TARGETS WILL SURVIVE AND NO FIXED FACILITY WILL SURVIVE. LET'S SHIFT NOW TO A CONVENTIONAL WAR. IN A CONVENTIONAL WAR, WE HAVE GOT THREE LABORATORY CASES TO LOOK AT IN OUR LIFE TIME -- MY LIFE TIME. THE SOUTHEAST ASIA. WAR, AIRCRAFT CARRIERS WENT INTO THE GULF OF TONKIN AND PROVIDED AIR SUPPORT FOR THE FIRST YEAR WHILE THE AIRFIELDS WERE BEING BUILD ASHORE, AND FOR 10 YEARS TOTAL, AN AIRCRAFT WAS NEVER DESTROYED ON AN AIRCRAFT CARRIER. WE LOST 400 DESTROYED ON THE AIRFIELDS ASHORE AND 4,000 DAMAGED DURING THAT PERIOD OF TIME. THE EARLIER LABORATORY SAMPLE - KOREAN WAR. THE AIRFIELDS OF SOUTH KOREA OVERRUN IN THE FIRST THREE WEEKS, THE AIRCRAFT CARRIERS SAVED THE PUSAN PERIMETER AND COVERED MAC ARTHUR'S LANDING AT INCHON WHICH MADE IT POSSIBLE TO TURN THE THING AROUND. NOW, WHAT'S WRONG WITH THAT IS THAT AIRCRAFT CARRIERS WERE GIVEN SANCTUARY, IT DIDN'T GET ATTACKED IN EITHER OF THOSE TWO WARS, BECAUSE OF THE OTHER SIDE FEARED OUR RETALIATORY ACTIONS. SO, LET'S GO BACK TO WORLD WAR II, WHICH WAS THE LAST WAR IN WHICH AIRCRAFT CARRIERS WERE STRUCK. THERE THE MOST ANCIENT AIRCRAFT CARRIER WE HAVE TODAY, THREE OF THEM LEFT, THE ESSEX CLASS CARRIER WERE STRUCK BY AS MANY AS FOUR OF THE MOST INTELLIGENT CRUISE

MISSILE WE'VE EVER HAD -- THE KAMIKAZE AIRCRAFT -- AND NO AIRCRAFT CARRIER OF THE ESSEX CLASS SANK. THEY ALL COULD HAVE BEEN BACK IN ACTION IN A MATTER OF DAYS. SINCE THEN, WE'VE BUILT MUCH MORE REDUNDANCY AND SURVIVABILITY INTO THE LATER CARRIERS. THE MOST RECENT LABORATORY EXAMPLE WAS A TRAGIC FIRE ON THE NUCLEAR CARRIER ENTERPRISE WHEN THE EQUIVALENT OF 8 TO 10 CRUISE MISSILES, U.S. BOMBS EXPLODED AND THE ENTERPRISE COULD HAVE BEEN BACK IN ACTION IN A MATTER OF HOURS. FINALLY, THE THIRD OF REFERENCE IS A COLD WAR. WE'VE LOST LAND FIELDS ALL AROUND THE WORLD IN COLD WAR. HAVING COME FROM 1100 DOWN TO 50 OVERSEAS IN THE LAST 25 YEARS. WE'VE NEVER HAD TO GIVE AWAY A CARRIER IN COLD WAR. SO THE ANSWER IS YES, WE SHOULD BE DOING MORE WITH REGARD TO CARRIERS IF WE ARE GOING TO DETER THE SOVIETS FROM AGGRESSIVE FOREIGN POLICY INITIATIVES.

QUESTION: WOULD THIS BE AT THE EXPENSE --WE HAVE CONGRESSMEN AND SENATORS WHO HAVE SO MANY DOLLARS THEY'RE GOING TO SPEND ON NATIONAL DEFENSE, WOULD YOU ADVOCATE BUILDING THESE AIRCRAFT CARRIERS AT THE EXPENSE OF NUCLEAR SUBMARINES ? HOW WOULD YOU FEEL ABOUT THE ISSUES IF YOU HAD YOUR CHOICE, WOULD YOU BUILD MORE NUCLEAR SUBMARINES, OR BALANCE BETWEEN THE TWO?

ADMIRAL: FIRST LET ME DISCOUNT ASPIN AND PROXIMERE. I THINK THEY SHOULD BE SORTED OUT OF THE DATA BANK AS A NO TEST. THEY ARE BOTH DEMAGOGUES WHO HAVE NEVER HAD ANY RESPECT FOR THE FACTS. SO IF YOU THROW THEM OUT AND THEN TRY TO DEVELOPE A CONSESES WITHIN THE REST OF THE CONGRESS, I THINK YOUR COMING CLOSER TO THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS, ALTHOUGH ADMITTEDLY, THEY DO CAUSE AN

AWFUL LOT OF HARM BECAUSE A LOT OF PEOPLE READING WHAT THEY HAVE TO SAY, BELIEVE THAT THEY ARE TRUTHFUL MEN, WHICH THEY'RE NOT. NOW, WITH REGARD TO WHAT WE OUGHT TO BE DOING, IN MY VIEW, WITH THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE HAVING DRIVEN COST OF PERSONNEL UP TO 56% OF THE DEFENSE BUDGET, AND INCIDENTALLY THE RELEVANT FIGURE FOR THE SOVIET IS 27% OF THEIR BUDGET FOR PEOPLE, SO THEY HAVE TO SPEND HALF AS MUCH AS WE DO TO START OFF EVEN WITH PEOPLE. WITH THAT HAVING HAPPENED, WE REALLY SHOULD HAVE DONE MORE ABOUT DRIVING OURSELVES AWAY FROM THE LABOR INTENSIVE SERVICES AND INCREASING OUR EXPENDITURES IN THE CAPITAL INTENSIVE SERVICES. TO ME THIS SAYS THAT THE MARINE CORPS AND THE ARMY SHOULD HAVE COME DOWN MORE THAN THEY HAVE, AND WE SHOULD HAVE BEEN DOING MUCH MORE TO BEEF UP THE RESERVE FORCES TO HAVE MINUTEMEN SPRINGING INTO ACTION; AND WE SHOULD HAVE BEEN INVESTING MUCH MORE IN THE AIR FORCE AND THE NAVY. IF THAT KIND OF THING HAD HAPPENED, WE WOULD HAVE BEEN, NOT ONLY CONTINUING OUR NUCLEAR SUBMARINE CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM, BUT BUILDING MORE NUCLEAR AIRCRAFT CARRIERS AND AIR FORCE TACTICAL AIR AS WELL.

QUESTION: YOU REFERRED TO THE SOVIETS STRATEGIC VICTORY IN THE QUADRUPLING OF OIL PRICES OR WHAT HAVE YOU. WOULD YOU GIVE US YOUR IDEAS OF THE MOST LIKELY SCENARIO TO DEVELOPE IN THAT AREA, OR PERHAPS ONE OR TWO MOST LIKELY ALTERNATIVES TO DEVELOPE?

ADMIRAL: WELL, I THINK IT'S LIKELY TO BE A CONTINUATION OF THE KIND OF PHENOMENON THAT WE SAW IN THE YOM KIPPUR WAR, WITH THE SOVIETS USING THEIR POWER VERY, VERY GENTLY, JUST ENOUGH TO BE SURE THAT WE'RE RESTRAINED, KNOWING THAT WE KNOW THAT WE'RE

INFERIOR, BUT KEEPING THEIR HANDS AS DIGUISED AS THEY POSSIBLY CAN AND LETTING THIS VOLATILE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST CONTINUE TO CREAT OIL EMBARGOES AND OIL PRICE INCREASES OF GREATER DEGREE. THEY'RE RECOVERING FROM THE TACTICAL SET BACK IN EGYPT BY SUPPORTING THE SYRIANS, THE PALESTINIAN REFUGEE GOVERNMENT BY INVESTING BILLIONS IN IRAQ AND LIBYA TO GET TWO NEW MAJOR FOOT HOLDS IN THE AREA, AND THEY, I THINK, ARE NOT ANY MORE ALL SEEING THAN WE ARE WITH REGARD TO BEING ABLE TO PICK OUT EXACTLY HOW IT'S GOING TO HAPPEN; BUT THEY ARE DEDICATING THEMSELVES IN EVERY WAY TO KEEPING THE WOUND OPEN BETWEEN THE ISRAELIS AND THE ARABS KNOWING THAT SOONER OR LATER, ADDITIONAL TROUBLE WILL BREAK OUT AND THEY WILL BE ABLE TO THEN, AS THEY DID IN THE LAST CRISIS, URGE THE ARABS TO LAY IT ON US WITH EMBARGOES AND OIL PRICE INCREASES. THE RECENT OFFER BY THE ARABS TO BUY OUT OUR BASE IN THE AZORES BY OFFERING 400 MILLION DOLLARS TO THE PORTUGUESE IS AN EXAMPLE OF THE WAY SHORT OF CRISIS IN WHICH THE SOVIETS ARE URGING THE ARABS TO MOVE, AND THEY'LL BE THERE BACKING THEM UP WITH POWER WHEN WAR BREAKS OUT AGAIN, AND THEIR OBJECTIVE WILL BE NOT TO LEAD TO WAR, BUT TO GET THOSE OIL PRICES UP. THEY SEE THAT AS A BEAUTIFUL TACTIC IF THEY CAN KEEP IT GOING AT A FAST ENOUGH RATE, THEY CAN WASH OUT THE IMPACT OF ANYTHING USEFUL WE DO TO TRY TO GET A HANDLE ON INFLATION OR TO SOLVE OUR GENERAL ECONOMIC PROBLEM.

QUESTION: YOU'VE MENTION OUR WEAKNESS RELATIVE TO RUSSIA'S. WHAT DO YOU THINK THE ACHILLES HEEL OR HEELS IS OR ARE ON THE RUSSIANS? WHAT WOULD WE DO OR COULD BE DONE?

ADMIRAL: I PERSONALLY SUPPORT OUR EFFORTS TO HAVE A DETENTE ARRANGEMENT WITH THE SOVIETS. WHERE WE HAVE GONE ASTRAY, IN MY JUDGMENT, IS NOT TO KEEP THE PEOPLE SUFFICIENTLY AWARE OF THE FACT THAT WE'VE LET THE EUPHORIA OF DETENTE LED TO A LOWERING OF OUR GUARD. IF WE ARE ABLE TO MAINTAIN DETENTE AND SUFFICIENT MILITARY STRENGTH TO DETER THE RUSSIANS, THEN OVER TIME AS THEIR CLOSE SOCIETY COMPETES WITH OUR FREE AND OPEN SOCIETY, THE SOLVNISSANS, THE SOHARAS, ADDING TO THE FERMENT ON THEIR SIDE MAY BE ABLE TO CREATE CONDITIONS WHICH WILL LEAD TO RISING EXPECTATIONS BOTH WITH REGARD TO THEIR OWN STANDARD OF LIVING AND WITH REGARD TO A DESIRE FOR FREEDOM THAT CAN CHANGE THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN RUSSIA. I WOULD NOT PUT VERY HIGH ODDS ON THAT, BECAUSE UNLIKE OUR SITUATION IN WHICH WE FREELY ELECT A GOVERNMENT EVERY FOUR YEARS, AND THEY HAVE GOT TO BE RESPONSIBLE TO THE PEOPLE. THE TECHNIQUE THAT SUCCESSFUL LEADERS IN THE SOVIET UNION HAVE USED SINCE STALIN'S DAYS AND BEGINNING WITH KHRUSHCHEV AND AGAIN WITH BRESNEV IS TO SEEK THE SUPPORT OF THE MILITARY. AND TODAY A SITUATION EXISTS IN RUSSIA WHERE MARSHAL GRESKO AND HIS COHORTS CLEARLY HAVE A VETO ON WHO WOULD SUCCEED TO POWER AND ARE CLEARLY IN A POSITION TO MAINTAIN BRESNEV IN POWER. AS THEIR CAPABILITIES CONTINUE TO IMPROVE, THOSE MILITARY MEN ARE GOING TO BEGIN TO DEMAND THAT THEY PICK UP SOME BENEFITS FROM THEIR SUPERIOR POWER. AND UNLESS THE SOVIET UNION CONTINUES THE KIND OF TACTIC THAT I'VE BEEN DISCUSSING, THE MILITARY IS QUITE LIKELY TO BE INVOLVED IN DUMPING THE COMMUNIST LEADERS. SO THESE ARE THE TRADE OFFS. YOU CAN HOPE AND PRAY

ON THE ONE HAND THAT THEIR SOCIETY WILL GRADUALLY BE CONVERTED TO ONE WHICH IS MORE OPEN AND FREE AND LESS ABLE TO CARRY OFF THIS KIND STRATEGY, BUT YOU'VE GOT TO WORRY.

QUESTION: SOMETHING WHICH WE DON'T HAVE MUCH CONTROL, RIGHT?

ADMIRAL: THAT'S CORRECT. WE HAVE ONE OTHER THING GOING FOR US. AND THAT IS THE MILITARY OVER THERE BEING RATIONAL PEOPLE ALWAYS HAVE TO WORRY ABOUT THE INSCRUTABLE OKONIANAL MIND. THEY GOT A REAL SHOCK WHEN MR. NIXON INVADED CAMBODIA. THEY GOT ANOTHER REAL SHOCK WHEN HE MINED HAIPHONG AND BOMBED SO BRUTALLY HANOI. AND THEY CAN'T QUITE FIGURE US OUT, SO THEY WORRY ABOUT KICKING OFF A CONVENTIONAL CRISIS WHICH COULD LEAD TO NUCLEAR EXCALATION AND DESTROY THEIR SOCIETY. SO THAT IS SOMETHING THAT WILL MAKE THEM GO VERY SLOWLY AND WILL MAKE THEM TRY VERY HARD TO ACHIEVE THESE ECONOMIC SUCCESSES BY THREATENING US WITH SUPERIOR POWER, BUT NOT USING IT.

QUESTION: DOES THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT HAVE ENOUGH LOBBYING POWER IN WASHINGTON TO KEEP THE DEFENSE BUDGET FROM BEING CUT AT THE PRESENT ECONOMIC CIRCUMSTANCES?

ADMIRAL: NO. THESE MAJOR REDUCTIONS IN THE BUDGET OF TWO BILLION, THREE BILLION, FIVE BILLION AND THREE AND A HALF BILLION IN THE LAST FOUR YEARS ARE WITNESS TO THAT. THE PRESIDENT EACH YEAR DESCRIBED THEM IN ESSENCE AS BARE BONE'S BUDGETS WHICH WERE THE BARE MINIMUM AND PROVIDE A BASES FROM WHICH TO REBUILD OUR POWER, AND EACH THE CONGRESS HAS CUT THEM. WHEN WE WERE CONDUCTING THE MASSIVE LOBBYING EFFORT TO GET THE TRIDENT SUBMARINE THROUGH UNCUT, AND YOU MAY RECALL, WE AVOIDED AN 885 MILLION REDUCTION

IN THAT BUDGET BY JUST TWO VOTES. THE CONGRESS SET UP A GREAT CRY. SOME OF THE LIBERAL SIDE AND SENATOR SYMINGTON ABOUT THE UNETHICAL PRACTICE OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY BEING OVER THERE LOBBYING, WHILE THE SOVIET EMBASSY HAD PEOPLE ALL OVER THE HILL LOBBYING.

QUESTION: HOW DO YOU, IN LIGHT OF WHAT YOU SAID, HOW DO YOU ACCESS OUR NEW PRESIDENT ?

ADMIRAL: I'VE HAD THE OPPORTUNITY OF BRIEFING MR. FORD EACH YEAR THAT HE WAS MINORITY LEADER. I SOUGHT OUT THE LEADERSHIP OF BOTH HOUSES EACH YEAR BEFORE I EVER STARTED COLLARRING THE REST OF THE MEMBERS OF CONGRESS AND EACH YEAR HE EXPRESSED HIMSELF AS VERY CONCERNED ABOUT THE DETERIORATION IN OUR POWER, AND WILLING TO HELP WITH THE BUDGETS, AND EACH YEAR HE HAS IN THE CRUNCH, HELPED US AVOID GREATER CUTS. THE DEMAGOGUES WOULD HAVE CUT US 20-25 BILLION AND PEOPLE LIKE MR. FORD STEPPING IN GOT CONSENSSES AT MUCH LOWER FIGURES. I TALKED TO HIM AFTER HE WAS VICE PRESIDENT AND HE WAS OF THE SAME VIEW AND HIS PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENTS HAVE INDICATED A WILLINGNESS TO -- A STRONG DESIRE TO SEE STRONG DEFENSE. IF YOU SAW HIS PRESS CONFERENCE TODAY, YOU'LL NOTICE THAT HE DID SAY THAT IF THERE IS ANY FAT IN THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT, HE WANTS IT CUT. BUT HE APPEARED TO BE TALKING MORE STRONGLY ABOUT THE NEED TO SHAPE UP OUR DOMESTIC PROGRAMS THEN OUR DEFENSE PROGRAMS.

QUESTION: IN A CONFRONTATION, EYE BALL TO EYE BALL,, HOW DO YOU ASSESS HIM?

ADMIRAL: I THINK THAT HE WILL BE A VERY TOUGH GUY. HE'S LIKE MOST OF USIN THIS COUNTRY WHO LACK INTELLECTUAL GENIUS, WE HATE TO LOSE.

QUESTION: WHY DO YOU THINK THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS HAD SO LITTLE SUCCESS IN PERSUADING THE ARAB COUNTRIES WHO DO NOT APPEAR TO BEIN THE RUSSIAN CAMP -- THAT'S MY EXPRESSION -- FROM REDUCING THE PRICE OF OIL, RECOGNIZING THE DAMAGE THAT THE PRICE OF OIL IS CREATING AND WHAT DO YOU THINK THE POSSIBILITIES ARE THAT THE PRICE OF OIL CAN BE REDUCED?

ADMIRAL: THE PROBLEM IS THIS. CLEARLY, THE CONSERVATIVE ARAB REGIMES HATE THE SOVIETS MORE THAN THEY HATE THE ISRAELIS. BUT THE ISRAELIS ARE A REAL PRESENT THREAT AS THEY SEE IT AND THEY DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THE SOVIETS ARE YET THAT MUCH OF A THREAT, NOR DO THEY REALLY APPRECIATE THE EXTENT TO WHICH WE HAVE BEEN BROUGHT TO OUR KNEES. THEY STILL THINK OF US AS A COLOSSUS THAT THEY CAN PUNISH A BIT WITHOUT IMPACTING ON THIS BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OURSELVES AND THE SOVIET UNION. A GREAT DEAL OF EFFORT HAS GONE IN TO TRYING TO CONVERT THEM, BUT THERE'RE TOUGHT NEGOTIATORS AND THEY ARE USED TO HEARING SMOOTH ARGUMENTS AND LET THEM ROLL OFF THEIR BACK AND THEY ARE CONTINUING TO DO SO. I AM VERY PESSIMISTIC THAT WE'LL GET A ROLL BACK IN PRICES. I BELIEVE A YEAR FROM NOW WE ARE GOING TO SEE MUCH HIGHER OIL PRICES.

QUESTION: WHAT DO YOU MEAN BY PRESSURES ON EFFORTS TO TRY TO PERSUADE IN THE ROLL BACK IN PRICES?

ADMIRAL: AT THE LEVEL OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE, AT THE LEVEL OF ALL THOSE OF US WHO HAVE CONTACTS WITH ANY OF THEM. IT'S ALMOST

A LITANY. THE OIL COMPANIES THEMSELVES ARE DOING SOME OF THESE. AND WE ARE JUST GETTING NOWHERE.

QUESTION: THE NEWS MEDIA WAS ABLE TO BE SORT OF PRECEDENT, THEY ALL CAME UP WITH SOME ARTICLES ABOUT HOW MANY FLAG OFFICER AND GENERAL OFFICERS WE HAVE IN THE MILITARY AND THEREFORE IF WE GOT RID OF QUITE OF THOSE DOWN TO MAYBE WORLD WAR II LEVELS OR LESS, WE COULD CUT OUR MILITARY BUDGETS, AND THIS HURTS THE MILITARY'S EFFORTS TO GET AT LEAST LEVEL BUDGETS OR HIGHER BUDGETS AND THE PROBABLY THE SOUTHERN COMMAND IN PANAMA EPITOMIZES THIS. HOW DO YOU FEEL ABOUT THE NUMBER OF FLAG OFFICERS, GENERAL OFFICERS IN THE ARMED FORCES AND SHOULD THEY BE CUT DOWN , ARE THEY BEING CUT DOWN? WHAT DID YOU DO ABOUT IT WHEN YOU WERE CNO?

ADMIRAL: FIRST, THIS AGAIN IS ONE OF THOSE THINGS THAT HAS BEEN BADLY DISTORTED BY PROSMIRE AND ASPIN. IN THE NAVY'S CASE FOR EXAMPLE, WE INCREASED FLAG OFFICERS -- THERE ARE 301 AT THE HIGH POINT THERE WERE 301 -- AND THAT REPRESENTED AN INCREASE OF ONLY 14 IN A 24 YEAR PERIOD. WE, ABOUT A YEAR AGO, BEGAN TO COME DOWN AND WE'RE NOW BELOW ANY FIGURE THAT WE HAD SINCE WWII. IN THE MEANTIME, ALL THE SERVICES HAVE HAD A GREAT DEAL OF INCREASES IN THE REQUIREMENT FOR FLAG OFFICERS AND GENERAL OFFICERS IN NATO STAFF, INTERNATIONAL STAFFS AND SO FORTH, ALL OF WHICH HAVE PROLIFERATED. NOW, THIS JOB DOWN IN PANAMA IS A KIND OF A GOOD EXAMPLE OF WHAT HAPPENS AS WE MOVE INTO A POSITION OF WORLD LEADERSHIP. THAT FELLOW IS NOT ONLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DEFENSE OF PANAMA, HE'S GOT THE WHOLE SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE FOR CONTINGENCY PLANNING AND HE'S THE MAN WHO TRAVELS FROM COUNTRY TO COUNTRY

DEALING WITH THE MILITARY IN THE LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES. IF HE WERE A THREE-STAR MAN INSTEAD OF A FOUR-STAR MAN, THERE ARE DOORS HE COULDN'T GET INTO IN LATIN AMERICA WHERE PRESTIGE IS CONSIDERED TO BE SO VERY IMPORTANT. HE'S, AS IT IS, IS ABLE TO GET IN AND SEE THE PRESIDENTS OF MOST OF THE COUNTRIES, AND IS A SIGNIFICANCE ASSET TO US.

QUESTION: THE NEWS MEDIA MAKES IT SOUND LIKE THEY'VE A LOT OF FLAG OFFICERS, GENERAL OFFICERS DOWN THERE AND THE NAVY HAS A LOT OF DEEP SEA FISHING BOATS -- THIS IS THE KIND OF LIFE THEY LIVE.

ADMIRAL: I DON'T KNOW OF A SINGLE BOAT OTHER THAN A AIR SEA RESCUE CRAFT THAT THE NAVY HAS IN THE PANAMA AREA. THE NAVY HAS REDUCED ITS SHIPS FROM 976 TO 508, A 47% REDUCTION IN FIVE YEARS. IT WILL CONTINUE TO GO DOWN IN THE YEARS AHEAD. THE SOVIETS HAVE FOUR TIMES THAT NUMBER 2054. THE ASPINS AND PROXMERES REALLY OUGHT TO START WORRYING ABOUT WHAT THEY'VE DONE TO THIS COUNTRY. THEY HURT IT BRUTALLY.

QUESTION: IS IT -- MOST OF THE TALK YOU HEAR ABOUT THE DEFENSE BUDGET IS GENERALLY IN THE AGGREGATE EXCEPT FOR AN OCCASIONAL KNIT PICKING THING, ASPIN OR PROXMIRE, IS THERE FACT IN SOME SECTORS OF THE BUDGET, HAS THERE BEEN COURT BARRELING AMONGST THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF -- YOU KNOW, LET US HAVE OUR DIVISION AND WE'LL SUPPORT YOUR CARRIERS-- THERE WAS A KIND OF ALLEGED ABUSES THAT HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN YEARS PAST?

ADMIRAL: LET ME SAY FIRST THAT I'VE LISTENED TO A CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE AIR FORCE TELL THE PRISIDENT TWICE THAT IN HIS JUDGMENT, THE ODDS ARE THAT THE SOVIETS COULD WHIP US IN AN AIR WAR. I'VE REPORTED TO A PRESIDENT FOUR TIMES THAT IN MY JUDGMENT, THE SOVIETS COULD WHIP US IN A SEA WAR. SO WHAT WE'RE TALKING ABOUT IS WHETHER WE CAN IMPROVE THE ODDS FROM SOMETHING WELL UNDER 50%, CLOSER TO 50% IF WE GET PERFECT EFFICIENCY. NOW, NOBODY CAN CLAIM THAT WE'RE PERFECTLY EFFICIENT. WE'VE GOT ALL KINDS OF EXAMPLES OF ERROR AS ANY BIG BUSINESS DOES. YOU READ MUCH ABOUT OVERRUNS IN THE NEWSPAPERS AND THIS IS ANOTHER AREA IN WHICH OUR FRIENDS ASPIN AND PROXMIRE HAVE LIED TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, BECAUSE THE NATURE OF THOSE OVERRUNS, THEY'VE NEVER TRIED TO PUT ACROSS WHAT THEY REALLY ARE. OUR OVERRUNS WHICH OF THE RESULT PRIMARILY OF THE OLD WOUND TO TOMB CONTRACTING SYSTEM OF THE MACNAMARA ERA WHERE COMPANIES WERE REQUIRED TO MAKE A FIRM BID ON PROCUREMENT COSTS OF THINGS BEFORE THEY HAD EVER RESEARCHED AND DESIGNED ONE. AND THEY WERE ALSO TOLD BY THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WHAT RATE OF INFLATION THEY COULD ASSUME, AND YOU KNOW HOW BAD AN ERROR THAT WAS. SO YOUR'RE READING TODAY ABOUT THE RESULTS OF THOSE KINDS OF CONTRACTS. NOW, WHEN THE LAIRD/PACKARD TEAM CAME TO WASHINGTON, THEY CHANGED THAT CONCEPT AND HAVE GONE IN FOR WHAT IS CALLED THE "FLY BEFORE BUY"CONCEPT WHICH OVER-SIMPLIFIED MEANS, FIRST YOU RESEARCH AND DEVELOPE A NEW SYSTEM; YOU THEN HAVE SOME FEEL FOR WHAT IT'S GOING TO COST AND THEN ANNUALLY ON PROCUREMENT, YOU RENEGOTIATE TO ALLOW FOR INFLATION AND OTHER UNFORESEEN FACTORS. SO THAT WHEN THOSE WEAPON SYSTEMS BEGIN TO COME ALONG, YOU WON'T BE READING NEARLY AS OFTEN ABOUT

OVERRUNS. WE WILL NEVER ELIMINATE INEFFICIENCIES IN ANY ORGANIZATION WHICH IS SPENDING 80 BILLION DOLLARS A YEAR. BUT, IN MY JUDGMENT, WE'RE TALKING ABOUT IMPROVING AN AREA WHERE IF WE WERE ABLE TO GET ABSOLUTE PERFECTION, WE WOULD INCREASE THE REAL DEFENSE CAPABILITY BY A VERY FEW PERCENT.

QUESTION: DO YOU FEEL THAT THERE'S A MUCH OF AN INEFFICIENCY AMONG DEFENSE CONTRACTS, ARE THERE TOO MANY? IS THE GOVERNMENT RIGHT IN KEEPING LOCKEED OR GRUMMAN IN BUSINESS ALMOST AT ANY COST OR COULD THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT SURVIVE IT THE

LIMITED NUMBER OF

CONTRACTORS AVAILABLE TO DO THE JOB?

ADMIRAL: MY VIEW IS THAT WE'VE ELIMINATED A VERY SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF DEFENSE CONTRACTORS. IN THE CASE OF LOCKEED, FOR EXAMPLE, THERE IS NO OTHER COMPANY THAT CAN BUILD OUR STRATEGIC MISSILES FOR US WITHOUT YEARS OF TRIAL AND ERROR IN THE SAFE. THEY'VE DEVELOPED CONFIDENCE GOING ALL THE WAY BACK TO THE 50'S IN POLARIS, POSEIDEN MISSILES AND NOW THEY'RE BUILDING THE TRIDENT MISSILES. IF YOU LET THEM GO UNDER, THIS COUNTRY WOULD BE IN VERY REAL TROUBLE WITH REGARD TO THE STRATEGIC BALANCE IN A SHORT TIME. IN THE CASE OF GRUMMAN, THE AIRCRAFT, F-14 THAT THEY'RE BUILDING IS THE FIRST NEW FIGHTER AIRCRAFT THIS COUNTRY WILL HAVE HAD IN 20 YEARS. DURING THAT SAME PERIOD, THE SOVIETS HAVE BROUGHT FORTH 6 OR 7 DIFFERENT FIGHTER AIRCRAFT. IF THE GRUMMANS WERE PERMITTED TO GO UNDER, I DON'T KNOW HOW THE SEAS COULD BE KEPT OPEN, BECAUSE THE F-15 CAN'T FLY FROM AN AIRCRAFT CARRIER; AND IF IT COULD, IT COULDN'T SHOOT DOWN THE FOXBAT AIRCRAFT WHICH CAN OUTFLY IN ALTITUDE. WHAT WE DID

WITH GRUMMAN WAS WE FORCED THEM TO LOOSE 250 or 80 MILLION DOLLARS BEFORE TAXES, 85 MILLION DOLLARS AFTER TAXES, AND TO TAKE LOSSES IN FIVE CONSECUTIVE YEARS BEFORE WE LET THEM OFF THE HOOK AND RENEGOTIATE A CONTRACT WHICH WILL PERMIT THEM TO SURVIVE. QUESTION: I'M INTERESTED IN HEARING YOUR THOUGHT PROCESSES THAT WENT INTO A MORE LIBERALIZED APPROACH TO THE STYLE IN WHICH WENT ON THIS. NOT IN A DISCIPLINARY WAY, BUT JUST ON THAT. THE MANNER IN WHICH -- THE TONE OF THE COUNTRY OR THE STYLE OF THE PEOPLE THAT YOU HOPED TO GET INTO THE NAVY. INTERESTED IN THE THOUGHT PROCESS IN HOW YOU MAKE A RADICAL DEPARTURE FROM ---

ADMIRAL: LET ME GO THROUGH IT THIS WAY. FIRST, I HAD COME TO THIS JOB FROM 20 MONTHS IN COMMAND OF OUR NAVAL FORCES IN SOUTH VIETNAM WHERE I HAD UNDER ME 37,000 YOUNG OFFICERS AND SAILORS. I WAS OUT IN A HELICOPTER EVERY DAY VISITING BASES AND BOATS. I ESTIMATE THAT I RAPED WITH BETWEEN 15 OR 20,000 DURING THAT 20 MONTHS PERIOD. I CHANGED THE RULES OUT THERE AND WE PERMITTED LONG HAIR AND BEARD, BECAUSE WHEREVER I WENT, EVEN INTO THE HOSPITAL TO VISIT A WOUNDED MAN WHO HAD A VERY REAL QUESTION AS TO WHETHER HE WAS GOING TO SAVE HIS ARM OR LEG, ALMOST INVARIABLY, THE QUESTION WAS, WHY IS IT THAT WE WHO HAVE VOLUNTEERED TO SERVE IN THE NAVY AND HAVE FURTHER VOLUNTEERED TO COME AND FIGHTE IN THIS WAR ARE NOT PERMITTED TO LOOK LIKE OUR GENERATION. AND IT SEEMED TO ME TO BE A HELL OF A GOOD QUESTION. WHEN I CAME BACK TO TAKE THE TOP JOB AND SAW THAT OUR REENLISTMENT RATES FOR THE FIRST CRUISE SAILORS WERE 10%--THE LOWEST FIGURE IN MY MEMORY-- AND THAT THE DRAFT PRESSURE WAS ABOUT TO BE ELIMINATED WITH THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE AND THAT THE NAVY WAS GOING TO HAVE TO

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COMPETE IN PEACE TIME WITH THREE OTHER SERVICES THAT CAN GET THEIR PEOPLE ALMOST EVERY NIGHT, IT JUST SEEMED TO ME THAT WE HAD TO MAKE SOME HEROIC CHANGES. AND SO WE DID. THE MOST CONTROVERSIAL OF THESE WERE THE HAIR CHANGE. I CONTEND THERE THAT WHAT WE'VE DONE IS TO HAVE DEPARTED FROM THE LIBERAL PERMISSIVE STANDARDS OF THE 1920'S AND 30'S AND HAVE RETURNED TO THE CONSERVATIVE STANDARDS OF THE 1880'S AND 90'S AND IT HASN'T HURT OUR PEOPLE TO LOOK LIKE THEIR GREAT GRANDFATHERS. ANOTHER HIGHLY CONTROVERSIAL ONE WAS THE BEER IN THE BARRACKS. A MARRIED PETTY OFFICER HAS ALWAYS BEEN ABLE TO GO HOME AND REACH IN THE REFRIGERATOR AND HAVE A BEER. WE'VE AUTHORIZED THE SINGLE MAN TO HAVE IT. WE'VE ELIMINATED DISCRIMINATION AGAINST BACHELORS. THE REAL SOURCE OF THE CONTROVERSY, THE THING THAT THE OLD GUARD MEANT WHEN THEY SAID "LIBERAL PERMISSIVE NAVY" WAS THAT THEY RESENTED THE INTEGRATION OF THE NAVY. THE NAVY HAS THE POOREST RECORD OF ALL THE SERVICES. WE HAD LESS THAN A PERCENT OF OUR OFFICER COMMUNITY FROM MINORITY BACKGROUND, LESS THAN 4% OF OUR ENLISTED COMMUNITY OF MINORITY BACKGROUND. THE OTHER SERVICES WERE APPROACHING THE NATIONAL FRACTION AND WE JUST SIMPLY HAD TO MAKE OURSELVES REPRESENTATIVE OF THIS COUNTRY IF WE WERE GOING TO HAVE SUPPORT OVER THE LONG HAUL FROM THE COUNTRY. NOW THE BOTTOM LINE IS THAT THESE CHANGES--AND THOSE WERE JUST THE CONTROVERSIAL ONES, YOU KNOW, THERE WERE LITERALLY 120 CHANGES IN THE FIELD OF EDUCATION AND PROMOTION OPPORTUNITIES AND SO FORTH-- HAS BEEN THAT REENLISTMENT RATES WENT FROM 10% IN 1970 TO 17% THE NEXT YEAR AND 23% THE NEXT TWO YEARS, AND FOR THE LAST THREE OR FOUR MONTHS HAVE BEEN RUNNING CLOSE TO 30%. SO THE

NAVY IS ONE OF THE TWO SERVICES THAT IS MAKING IT UNDER THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE.

QUESTION: HAVING LIVED ABOARD SHIP, I CAN APPRECIATE PROBLEMS OF TRYING TO INTEGRATE A CLOSE UNIT FOR PROLONGED PERIODS OF TIME. DO YOU THINK THIS WHY THE NAVY HAS SEEMED TO HAVE, AT LEAST IN TERMS OF HAVING MORE PROBLEMS ON RACIAL THINGS THAN THE OTHER BRANCHES OF THE SERVICE?

ADMIRAL: WELL, THE INTERESTING THING IS THAT IF YOU GO BACK, THE AIR FORCE HAD A CONGRESSIONALLY INVESTIGATED RACIAL RIOT FIRST. THE ARMY HAD ONE SECOND, THE MARINES THIRD, AND THE NAVY WAS THE LAST. MY OWN RATIONALIZATION OF IT IS--NOT THAT THAT'S TO OUR CREDIT--WE WERE JUST THE LAST OF THE SERVICES TO START INTEGRATING. WHEN YOU HAVE 1% OF YOUR CREW OR 4% OF YOUR CREW WHO ARE BLACK, THAT'S SUCH A SMALL NUMBER THAT BIAS TENDS TO GET OVERLOOKED. IT JUST BURNS INSIDE. WHEN YOU GET 12% OF YOUR CREW BLACK, THERE IS A SYNERGISTIC AFFECT WITHIN THOSE BLACKS SAYING, BY GOD, WE'VE PUT UP WITH THIS FOR 25 OR 30 YEARS, LET'S START A BEEF. NOW, THE ONES THAT STARTED THOSE BEEFS GOT DISCIPLINED, BECAUSE THEY DIDN'T USE THE RIGHT RECOURSE. THERE ARE LEGITIMATE WAYS TO GET THEIR GRIEVANCE AIRED. AND WE THINK THAT EACH OF THE SERVICES, AS THEY FACED THIS TRAUMA, HAVE ACCELERATED THE RATE AT WHICH THEY PUT EVERYBODY THROUGH THE TECHNIQUES OF UNDERSTANDING HOW TO DEFFUSE RACIAL PROBLEMS AND HOW TO DEAL WITH THEM. IN THE LONG HAUL, WE'RE ALL GOING TO BE BETTER BECAUSE WE ARE IN TRUTH REPRESENTATIVE OF THE COUNTRY.

QUESTION: JUST PRIOR TO YOUR RETIREMENT, YOU WERE ON "MEET THE

PRESS" AND THE QUESTION WAS PUT TO YOU WHETHER OR NOT YOU WOULD TAKE OVER THE HEAD OF THE VETERANS ADMINISTRATION AND NOW BUDGET CUTTING IS VERY TOPICAL. YOU SAID YOU REALLY DIDN'T WANT THE JOB BECAUSE YOU COULDN'T BE CREATIVE IN THE JOB. IF YOU TOOK THE JOB NOW, WHAT WOULD DO AND IF YOU DID, WOULD YOU BE ABLE TO REFUSE THE VETERANS ADMINISTRATION EXPENSE?

ADMIRAL: I HAD MY PRINCIPAL CONCERN AT THAT TIME THE FACT THAT THE SOUTHEAST ASIA VETERANS HAVE NOT BEEN TREATED EQUALLY WITH THE VETERANS OF EARLIER WARS. I WAS TOLD WHEN I WAS OFFERED THAT JOB THAT -- BY GENERAL HAIG -- THAT THERE WOULD BE NO SUPPORT FROM OMB OR THE WHITE HOUSE FOR IMPROVING THE VETERANS' BENEFITS. I MADE IT CLEAR THAT I FELT THAT THAT WAS AN UNACCEPTABLE SITUATION, AND THAT I WAS WILLING TO LOOK FOR OTHER WAYS TO ECONOMIZE BUT THERE HAD TO BE AND EQUALIZATION OF BENEFITS FOR THE SOUTHEAST ASIA VETERANS. I FURTHER FELT THAT THE OPPORTUNITY TO TURN THAT SITUATION AROUND WITHIN THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION WAS DIMINIMOUS . I MADE ONE ERROR IN CALCULATION. I DIDN'T THINK MR NIXON WAS GOING TO REVEAL THE TAPE THAT PROVED HE HAD BEEN INVOLVED IN CRIME AND I THOUGH HE WOULD SURVIVE FOR MUCH LONGER THAN HE DID.

QUESTION: FIRST OF ALL, THERE HAS BEEN A LOT OF CONTROVERSY JUST RECENTLY ABOUT GIVING NUCLEAR CAPABILITY TO SOME OF THE SMALLER COUNTRIES, VIA LACK OF IN THEM BEING ABLE TO DISSOLVE EXCESS NUCLEAR MATERIAL TO DEVELOPE ATOM BOMBS OR THE EQUIVALENT. I WOULD LIKE YOU TO COMMENT ON THAT AND ALSO I'D LIKE TO HAVE YOU COMMENT ON THE FACT THAT OUR SUBMARINES AND THERE'S JUSTIFICATION, VERSUS THE OVER POWERING NUMBER

OF RUSSIAN SUBMARINES, IN OTHER WORDS, BECAUSE WE DEVELOPED NEW SOPHISTICATED SUBMARINES AND VARIOUS CLASSES, HOW THEY CAN KEEP-- EVEN THOUGH THERE'RE SMALLER NUMBERS COMPARED TO AND SUBMARINES. ALSO I'D LIKE YOU TO COMMENT ON, YOU'D MENTIONED THE F-14, OUR MISSILE SYSTEM, THE PHEONIX AND THE F-14, HOW DOES THAT COMPARE TO THE SOVIET CRAFT AND THAT CAPABILITY AND THEN LAST OF ALL, DO YOU THINK THAT ANYTHING CAN EVER BE RESOLVED IN THE LEAST?

ADMIRAL: WITH REGARD TO THE FIRST QUESTION, I DID NOT SUPPORT THE POLICY OF GIVING NUCLEAR REACTORS TO THE COUNTRIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST FOR EXAMPLE. I THOUGHT IT WAS A DREADFUL MISTAKE TO PUT REACTORS WHICH NO MATTER WHAT KIND OF SAFEGUARD YOU PUT ON THEM CAN BE NATIONALIZED, AND THE MATERIAL ACQUIRED AND USED TO MAKE ATOMIC WEAPONS. IT JUST SEEMS TO ME THAT WHAT WE WERE TRYING TO DO THERE WAS BUY BOTH SIDES BY GIVING THEM EACH A PIECE OF CANDY TO PURSUADE THEM TO STOP FIGHTING, AND THAT CAN ONLY HAVE A VERY LIMITED IMPACT OVER TIME. THE BASE CASE THAT CAN BE MADE FOR IT IS THAT IF WE DIDN'T SOMEBODY ELSE WOULD. BUT, I WOULD HAVE PREFERRED TO SEE US TRY MUCH HARDER THAN WE DID TO GET ALL HANDS TO AGREE NOT TO EQUIP THEM. WITH REGARD TO THE SUBMARINE QUESTION, LET ME COMMENT THAT IN A STILL BROADER MOLD AND THAT IS THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE DONE A MUCH BETTER JOB THAN WE HAVE OF MAINTAINING A MIX OF SYSTEMS. SOME VERY COSTLY AND VERY EFFECTIVE AND IN LARGE NUMBERS OF LESS COSTLY SHIPS IN ORDER TO HAVE THEM IN MANY DIFFERENT PLACES AROUND THE GLOBE. THE

REASON FOR THIS IS THAT THEY DON'T HAVE AN ATOMIST NUCLEAR CZAR--
THEY DON'T HAVE THE EQUIVALENT TO ADMIRAL RICKOVER. ADM RICKOVER
THROUGH HIS INFLUENCE IN THE CONGRESS HAS, I THINK, AFTER INITIAL
PERIOD OF 10 OR 12 YEARS WHEN HE WAS VERY BENEFICIAL, BEGUN TO
HAVE SOMEWHAT THE SAME EFFECT WITH REGARD TO THE NAVY THAT J. EDGER
HOOVER DID ON THE FBI TOWARD THE END, AND WE ARE EXPENDING MONEY
UNWISELY, PUTTING FAR TOO MUCH OF OUR MONEY INTO VERY HIGH COST
NUCLEAR SHIPS. THE SOVIETS FOR EXAMPLE, STILL BUILD SOME DIESEL
SUBMARINES. AND THE VIRTUE OF THOSE SUBMARINES IS THAT ALTHOUGH
THEY CAN'T STAY UNDER AS LONG AND THEY CAN'T TRAVEL SUBMERGED
AS FAR, THEY ARE QUIETER THAN ANY NUCLEAR SUBMARINE AND CAN
SINK SOUNDLY IN WAR TIME. THE SOVIETS HAVE NEVER BUILT A NUCLEAR
PROPELLED SURFACE SHIP. WE ARE BUILDING FAR TOO MANY NUCLEAR
PROPELLED SURFACE SHIPS AND THIS WAS A CONSTANT BATTLE BETWEEN
ME AND ADM RICKOVER ON CAPITAL HILL. I WOULD SAY WE'VE HAVE
DONE BETTER THAN ADM RICKOVER WOULD LIKE WITH REGARD TO CONVENTIONAL
PROPULSION AND LESS GOOD THAN I WOULD HAVE LIKED WITH REGARD
TO CONVENTIONAL PROPULSION. WITH REGARD TO THE PHEONIX AND F-14
MISSILE SYSTEM, LET ME SAY THAT IT'S THE BEST FIGHTER AIRCRAFT
IN THE WORLD. THE VALUE OF IT IS SUCH THAT WE RECON: IN TERMS
OF OUR ANALYTICAL (END OF TAPE)