

Not a syndicate file

THE PROPER ROLE OF MILITARY POWER

In this imperfect world people have organized into nation states. The aims of nations, like those of individuals, frequently clash. But nations have not yet perfected a system which will permit fair and impartial settlement of their disputes. Therefore, among nations, settlements are sometimes imposed by combinations of power and policy, applied unilaterally, bilaterally, regionally, or through the United Nations.

Two overriding considerations have in the modern era combined to ~~push~~ upward the level at which conflict will break out between major combinations of nations. One is the increasing economic interdependence of the globe which makes war increasingly distasteful for even Communist powers to consider. The second is the increasing destructiveness of modern weapons. These two considerations seem to be driving the U.S. and the USSR in opposite directions with regard to their current attitudes toward the proper role of military power.

The USSR, which is and proclaims to be an offensive alliance, openly states that it intends to continue its massive strategic and conventional armament programs in order to insure that the "correlation of forces" which ~~the~~ *the Soviets* believe have shifted to their advantage, are irreversible.

While supporting ^{its}~~their~~ own version of detente, a "differentiated" detente, the Soviet Union uses its vast military power in the following ways:

(1) In the strategic field, through a marriage of skillful weapons system planning and negotiating cunning, the Soviet Union has laid the basis for strategic superiority in the years immediately ahead. Already, as the Soviets deploy the vast de facto superiority in both numbers and sizes of missile warheads that resulted from the Interim Offensive Salt I and Vladivostok Agreements, they proclaim their superiority in ~~that~~ field to their friends and foe alike. My travels have taught me that many free world leaders perceive this superiority. These leaders recognize that the answer to Henry Kissinger's plaintive question, "What is the meaning of strategic superiority--what do you do with it?" is that you do exactly what the Russians do with it, proclaim it, and use it to frighten opposition, weaken free world alliances, and foster new ties to Moscow.

(2) In the conventional military field the Soviet Union uses its huge armies and air fleet^s to insure the Brezhnev doctrine, pouncing massively on client states when it must; e.g., invasion^s of East Germany, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, deterring by threat^s when it can. It uses similar force along the PRC border to contain this burgeoning power.

(3) At sea, the dramatically growing Soviet navy is used to portray a similar capability. The ever increasing number and size of fleet exercises off Scandanavia have served to shift the countries of that peninsula, glacially, in political orientation in a manner that can most tersely be stated as follows: Finland is becoming a Latvia, Sweden is becoming a Finland, and Norway is becoming a Sweden. Soviet Exercise OKEAN, 1975, possibly the largest fleet exercise in history, just completed, demonstrated a capability to cut allied sea lanes in all the major oceans including the Indian Ocean, where the Soviets have acquired a remarkable series of naval and air facilities. Perhaps one day the Soviets will set an upper limit on what they believe they can accomplish with military power. But with rubber stamp ^{control} of their congress and press, ~~they~~ ^{able to} ~~will~~ hold down the aspirations of their people, they have a much higher threshold of opportunity to exploit their military power.

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The United States ^{has} learned that there is a limit to the patience with which her people will support the use of military power. In World War II, the sneak attack at Pearl Harbor brought total support for total victory. In Korea, ^a ~~the~~ war ^{entered} ~~initiated by President Truman~~ with well articulated but limited aims, initial public support in 1950 had eroded by 1954 to great impatience and led to

Eisenhower's election in the expectation that he would terminate it. The Southeast Asia war was already on the brink of failure before Watergate as a result of a decade of internal debate over a war, the entry into which was clouded in uncertainty over the issues and over the selected military strategy. The vigorous public support of President Ford's reaction to the Malagay seizure demonstrates that there is a type of issue and act for which the people will demand action. But the ^{recent} erosion of confidence among our allies and the imminent loss of or extra constraints upon base structure in Thailand, Philippines, Azores, and the relative lack of concern about what these changes portend, contributes to our loss of military options in support of foreign policy. Most informed military experts agree that the balance of military power in the conventional field is shifting against the United States. We face a future in which, for the first time, the Soviets have strategic and conventional military superiority.

What is the role of ^{dwindling} U.S. power in that world?

Clearly we must main^{tain} a surviv^{able} second strike strategic force so that the Soviets, despite their superiority, must continue to worry about miscalculation and ^{must protect} positive caution in their ^{offensively oriented} ~~aggressive~~ foreign policy. Less clearly, but equally certainly in the minds of those of us who have been closest to it, we must have improved accuracy in the TRIDENT submarines, B1 bombers, and Minuteman III missiles

to demonstrate that a U.S. President has response^s to Soviet military acts short of city busting.

In an era of weakened alliance^s and constrained access to ^{overseas} bases, an increasing percentage of U. S. conventional military capability must go into maritime systems. Our democratic system drives us toward greater dependence on sovereign facilities. We can and must exploit sovereign real estate such as the Marianas and hopefully the United Kingdom's unpopulated and strategic atoll in the Indian Ocean, Diego Garcia. But, increasingly, ships and aircraft at sea are going to have to carry the load as our policy of retrenchment and the ^{consequent} uncertainty of our allies ^{works} ~~looks~~ synergistically to reduce our flexibility ⁱⁿ ~~and~~ overseas land areas.

(Then a couple of paragraphs of specifics about the type of force we have to use it as to bluff/deter) (or a whole other passage)