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And -

Enclosed.

1 - Copy of the Dorsey
funding sample articles.

2 - Last draft I wrote;
pls let me know if it
gives you any problems.

Worth

ADMIRAL WORTH H. BAGLEY, USN (RET)

27 January 1977

Mr. Thomas Dorsey
Editor and Director
Los Angeles Times-Mirror Syndicate
218 S. Spring Street
Los Angeles, California 90012

Dear Tom,

Following on from your kindness in providing lunch and your time, I am enclosing a number of sample articles on which Bud Zumwalt and I have collaborated. They serve to test the diversity and editorial guidelines you suggested and may provide commentaries you consider useable now.

In any event, our immediate purpose is to start an exchange of views with you and develop an appropriate editorial assist arrangement along the lines we discussed. Bud and I have a number of ideas for additional pieces, but we will adjust our enthusiasm to your first reactions.

Beyond that, there is the question of Bud's first trip. He will depart for South Africa about 20 February for 17 days at the invitation of a local group. If you agree, he will put together several articles on the situation there, getting the series to you soon after his return.

As you know, we are grateful for your interest in our proposal for a joint column and look forward to working with you to give it reality.

With kind regards...

Sincerely,


WORTH H. BAGLEY

THE MONDALE MISSION AND ITS UNVEILING OF CARTER POLICIES

For those watching the Mondale visits overseas for clues to Carter security and diplomatic policies, the statements at NATO raise more questions than they answer.

In Brussels, the Vice President promised the planned cuts in U.S. defense would not affect combat muscle in Western Europe. He foresaw a strengthening of U.S. forces in NATO if our allies undertake comparable defense improvements.

The Mondale précis of U.S. intentions is best judged against the background of related views in the Carter camp.

Just before departing for Europe, the Vice President was briefed on Senator Nunn's report of NATO readiness. Nunn sees the alliance as unprepared for a surprise Soviet attack. He is urging that ground forces be strengthened along the NATO center and that logistical stocks be increased. He would rely on strong forces in place, downgrading the utility of mobilization and reinforcement, looking to a short conflict whose indecisive course facilitates political solution. The aim apparently is to concentrate sufficient conventional arms to contain aggression without using nuclear weapons. Nunn emphasizes that point by suggesting the U.S. tactical nuclear capability in Europe is inferior to that of the Soviets.

Within a day of the Mondale visit in Brussels, the U.S. press reported on arms cuts being considered by Secretary of Defense Harold Brown. The options included curtailing construction of ships designed to fight the Soviet Navy, a slowdown in the B-1 strategic bomber, and a reduction in Army troop strength. These tentative proposals imply support for the Nunn concept of a short war in Europe. There will be less dependence on

achieving control of the seas for reinforcement. Ground forces -- U.S. and allied -- will be larger along the NATO front and better prepared logistically; supply support troops designed for long-duration wars will not be needed and can be reduced.

Expressed Carter intentions to draw down U.S. forces in South Korea are consistent with the Mondale thesis that NATO will be strengthened despite U.S. defense cuts. The President has said a lower U.S. profile in Korea will be undertaken only with the cooperation of Seoul and Tokyo, implying a greater defense contribution by those nations as a substitute for U.S. forces, but the policy clearly signals a lower American strategic interest in the Pacific.

And, finally, there is the background of Democratic campaign declarations that the U.S. must depend more on the contribution of armed force by our allies for common security.

If these considerations are the genesis for Mondale statements of U.S. NATO policy, then Carter will have to deal with a series of strategic and political issues.

NATO, with the recent exceptions of the UK and the Netherlands, increased its defense expenditures in the past few years while the real value of U.S. defense budgets went down until Ford reversed the trend in 1976. Economic problems in the UK and Italy particularly will lead to lower defense expenditures in the foreseeable future. Even if Bonn is capable of temporarily filling alliance defense deficiencies, our NATO allies will oppose a predominant German armed strength.

For its military strategy, NATO has relied on a balanced deterrent structure of conventional, tactical nuclear, and strategic nuclear weapons.

In Western Europe there is a consensus that no single component in this triad can replace another. Conventional defense forces alone would limit the risk to an attacker. Effective deterrence depends on the escalatory linkage of all three components. For our allies, this concept offers a ceiling on conventional forces that must be funded, integrates American nuclear strength with the alliance force structure enhancing their confidence in the U.S. commitment, and reduces the prospect that national territories in NATO Europe will be ravaged by conventional war before conflict can be politically terminated.

If Washington seeks to disrupt this balanced military strategy by calling for high cost increases in conventional strength, NATO capitals will begin to suspect U.S. intentions. No one in the West, least of all nations coping with domestic political and economic disputes, sees a feasible way to match very large Soviet conventional ground and air forces. Since the credibility of our tactical nuclear armament depends on an unambiguous will to use it, even implied views that the capability is insufficient suggest the U.S. is backing off from its critical alliance role. The thrust of the Mondale principles will attract allied concern to the Carter resolve to reach an agreement with the U.S.S.R. on limiting strategic nuclear arms. Our friends in Europe are intimately acquainted with the hard Moscow SALT negotiating positions and recent improvements in Soviet strategic nuclear forces. While NATO wants control of arms, West Europeans cannot accept it on Soviet terms inconsistent with the alliance ~~concept for~~ military strategy to defend their territories. If Carter appears to be establishing conditions for SALT concessions, political relationships in the West will begin to deteriorate.

Similar considerations affect strategy outside Europe. The route of the Mondale mission over the Atlantic Ocean, the Mediterranean Sea, and the Indian Ocean to the Pacific and Japan illustrates the dependence of the Western industrial nations on links by sea. As free societies have grown to expect better standards of living, industries have expanded, and all Western nations depend critically on resources that are moved on the oceans. In order to give priority to ground forces in Western Europe, our allies have reduced their armed strength overseas relying more and more on U.S. sea power. If a turn in U.S. strategic perceptions is to downgrade that capability, our allies will argue that NATO is losing the means to deter the Soviets from isolating Europe by giving Moscow the advantage at sea.

These issues and sensitivities are raised by what Mondale has said and by what, at least publicly, is left unsaid. There is an image of Carter policy that reaches towards the long-term desirable objective while ignoring the short-term possibilities. The hazard in embracing the ideal is that practical security and diplomatic arrangements, always tenuously put together, may begin to unravel under the pressures of misunderstanding. On the evidence one can see now, the President needs to explore and reflect more on options and slow the pace of judgments until all the facts are digested.