

B-2 July 2

p. 2

National War College

Study Group 1st to 4th 1977

SOVIET UNION FIELD STUDY REPORT 1977

Attached is the field study report of the 1977 National Defense University visit to the USSR. Prior visits had been made by National War College groups in 1960 and 1964, but this was the first to be hosted by the Soviet Ministry of Defense. The delegation, led by Lieutenant General R. G. Gard, Jr., President, the National Defense University, visited the USSR during the period 11-18 May 1977. Every member of the study group considered the field trip to be the highlight of the academic year at the National Defense University. This report emphasizes information gained on the trip and does not contain knowledge acquired by the students during the extensive pre-trip study.

The report is organized as indicated below:

	<u>Page</u>
- Study Group Organization	2
- Field Study Preparation Plan	3
- Trip Itinerary	5
--Itinerary Comments	8
- Student Impressions.	9
--General	9
--Militarization of Society	10
--Soviet Civil-Military Relations	11
--Military Officer Education	12
- Conclusion	15
-	A-1

Good man! PhD from Harvard on Sonnets,
Submariner, intellectually tough, ---
Now an intelligence specialist -
I would rec'd him to you -
He wants to get into NSC or CIA,
You met him in an interview re Slavic
studies, etc -
PRD is Summer '78 - Perhaps Adm Turner
could use him -

STUDY GROUP ORGANIZATION

LTC Robert G. Gard, USA
CDR Steve Kime, USN

Trip Director
Study Director and Trip Supervisor

STUDENTS

<u>Rank</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Service</u>	<u>Trip Duty*</u>
COL	David J. Cade	USAF	Student Leader
COL	Robert A. Gazzola	USAF	Finance
LTC	Richard G. Head	USAF	Photographer
COL	Arthur S. Loughry	USMC	Transportation
COL	Leonard S. Marrella	USA	Medic
CDR	Robert C. Powers	USN	Gifts and Correspondence
COL	Arthur C. Stang III	USA	Rapporteur

FIELD STUDY PREPARATION PLAN

<u>Date</u>	<u>Subject*</u>	<u>Speaker</u>
15 Mar	Introduction/Assignments/ Administration	Steve Kime
22 Mar	Soviet Military Education, and Senior Military Personalities	Bill and Harriet Scott
29 Mar	The GRU and Other Intelligence Considerations	CIA
5 Apr	American View of Soviet Life	Bill Davis
12 Apr	Discussion with USSR First Minister	First Minister Vasev
19 Apr	State Department-US-USSR Relations	Bob Berry
26 Apr	Facets of Travel in USSR (What to Expect)	Steve Kime
26 Apr	The USSR - An Overview	Dave Cade
2 May	SALT	Bob Powers
2 May	MBFR	Art Loughry
2 May	The Soviet Threat	MG Keegan (Ret.)
3 May	Technology Transfer	Bob Gazzola
3 May	Soviet Economy and Defense Budget	Len Marrella
3 May	Soviet Economy and Defense Expenditures	Bill Lee
4 May	Soviet Military Doctrine and Strategy	Art Stang

*In addition to the subjects listed, CDR Kime conducted "tutorial" sessions, with all students, on the required readings, during the period 25-29 April.

5 May DIA Briefings on Soviet Forces, Briefers and Topics
 Issues, and Trends are at Tab C

Although the Soviets would not permit discussion of specific issues, the students agree that the pre-trip preparation was a valuable learning experience and outstanding in every respect. In addition to the knowledge acquired, it permitted a better understanding and perception of what was seen and discussed during the trip.

TRIP ITINERARY

<u>Date</u>	<u>Time</u>	<u>Event</u>
9 May	1745	Depart Dulles Airport, Washington, D.C.
10 May	1120	Arrive Copenhagen, Denmark
11 May	1116	Depart Copenhagen, Denmark
	1525	Arrive Warsaw, Poland
	1621	Depart Warsaw, Poland
	1822	Arrive Sheremetyevo Airport, Moscow
	2110	Billeted at MOD hotel - tour Red Square
12 May	0930	Laid wreath at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, at Kremlin Wall, in Moscow
	1010	Visit Gen Col V. A. Makarov, Chief of the General Dpt of Military Education, USSR, Ministry of Defense
	1135	The Malinovsky Armor Academy, Commandant, Marshal O. A. Losik
	1900	Bolshoi Theatre, attended revolutionary opera
13 May	0910	WWII and War of 1812 memorials
	1000	USSR Exhibition of Economic Achievement
	1700	US Armed Forces Day Reception, Spaso House
	2355	Depart for Leningrad on "Red Arrow" Train #1

<u>Date</u>	<u>Time</u>	<u>Event</u>
14 May	0829	Arrive Leningrad, billeted at Leningrad Hotel
	0945	Visit with Chief of Staff, Leningrad Military District
	1040	Laid Wreath at Piskaryovskoye Memorial Cemetery
	1145	The Frunze Naval College, Commandant, VADM V. V. Platonov
	1510	Cruiser Aurora
	1550	The Hermitage
	1930	Kirov Theater, attend opera Don Carlos
15 May	0945	The Grechko Naval Academy
	1130	St. Isaac's Cathedral
	1210	Russian Museum
	1340	Fortress of Peter and Paul
	1650	Depart Leningrad, Aeroflt. Flight #8549
	1947	Arrive Volgograd
16 May	0910	Laid wreath at Fallen Fighters Memorial
	0940	Sgt Pavlov's "House"
	0950	Mamayev Hill Memorial Complex
	1105	V. I. Lenin Hydroelectric Power Station
	1305	Visit with the Mayor of Volgograd
	1510	Military Museum
	2035	Depart for Moscow, Aeroflt. #1310

<u>Date</u>	<u>Time</u>	<u>Event</u>
17 May	0900	WWII Workers Monument
	1000	Gagarin Center for Cosmonaut Training
	1110	Laid wreath at Gagarin Memorial
	1430	Armed Forces Museum
	1800	Reception hosted by GEN Gard and Mr. Brown
	1930	Light buffet, COL Vernon's quarters
18 May	0900	METRO
	0952	Lenin's Tomb
	1045	The Armory Museum, Kremlin
	1117	Walk around Kremlin (outside)
	1215	Final meeting between US delegation, GEN Makarov and staff
	1315	GEN Makarov hosts final luncheon at MOD
	1745	Depart Moscow, USSR
	1929	Arrive London, England
19 May	1242	Depart London, England
	1509	Arrive Dulles Airport, Washington, D.C.

ITINERARY COMMENTS

The students recommend that Commander Steve Kime be commended for his efforts in developing the field study itinerary. Considering the fact that our group was the first MOD-hosted military student delegation to the Soviet Union since World War II, and the difficulty coordinating with the Soviets, the itinerary was excellent. The Soviets established the itinerary to change what they perceived to be a hostile mind-set of US officers toward the Soviet Union. They limited the itinerary to visits of military educational institutions and tours of economic, cultural, and military exhibits. While our Soviet hosts were generally candid, the typical Soviet penchant for secrecy was evidenced by their consistent evasiveness in responding to harmless questions. In addition, free from personal expense, the delegation was wined and dined in royal style. Soviet hospitality was impeccable.

Consistent with Steve Kime's efforts this year, the Soviets should be pressed again next year to schedule visits to the Voroshilov General Staff Academy, to Soviet military units, and seminar type discussions with Soviet student officers, in the itinerary. Visits to a factory and an agricultural commune would also be beneficial.

A stopover in Europe prior to entering the USSR is essential to adjust for jet lag, in preparation for a hectic schedule.

STUDENT IMPRESSIONS

General

This section will address the delegation's general impressions of the USSR. Specific items of possible intelligence interest are at Tab A. The Soviet Union is a strange mixture of massive construction, modernization, and backwardness. It is a nation of beautiful cities and oppressive government, a country verbally desiring peace, while advocating the overthrow of opposing political systems. The hard-working Soviet people are willing to accept an oppressive political system in the belief that without it their country could not compete in the modern world.

On the surface, the Soviet Union is clean, orderly, and well managed. This, combined with the beauty of the cities, the plentiful parks, monuments, and recreational areas, provides the casual observer with an excellent overall impression. The only advertisements seen are Communist Party propaganda. There is much activity in the cities, but they are relatively quiet by Western standards. There is no hubbub of voices, no hawking of goods, no competition in traffic (except for the squeal of limousine tires as they bully official delegations through vehicles and pedestrians).

It is difficult to describe the oppressive atmosphere in the Soviet Union. After a few days it is felt, but seldom seen. The foreigner following a rigid itinerary is isolated from it by the Soviet system, a system that controls the areas you can visit and seals off the Soviet people from contact with you. The Soviet people seldom seek contact with foreigners.

The people in the cities are better dressed than expected, but display a naivete regarding wearing of modern clothes of any fashion. The older men wear dark, ill-fitting suits, often bearing ribbons and medals for worker and World War II achievements. Officially everyone is required to wear their awards, but it is mostly the older men and women who comply. The older women wear plain clothes and were observed, on a routine basis, performing heavy labor. The younger men and women are better dressed, but at least a decade behind the West in style. Soviet department stores had a greater selection of goods than anticipated, although quality was lacking in the goods we saw.

Soviet communism has manipulated nationalism to meet its needs. The vehicle utilized is the "Great Patriotic War" (World War II). World War II provides national pride and unity and generates support for a strong military to defend the motherland against recurrence of such a tragedy. The fervor with which the sacrifices of the Russian people are recalled and enshrined approaches that of a rigidly doctrinal religion. Soviet leaders say that the losses suffered in life and material during the Great Patriotic War have made the people into a peace-loving nation. The government appears to have used the sacrifices of the Great Patriotic War to build into the people a willingness to fight and die for the state, knowing that glory will be theirs and their memories will be enshrined forever.

The Soviets tried to impress the delegation in the following areas:

- A national desire for peace, as reinforced by the horrors of World War II.
- Soviet economic, technologic, and military achievements, warranting equal "superpower" status.
- Russian cultural heritage.
- A feeling that Soviet motivations and intentions are not understood in the West.
- Their show-and-tell itinerary clearly exposed the well-known Soviet inferiority complex vis-a-vis the West.

Militarization of Society

Although fully prepared and advised as to the prominent role of the Soviet military, no amount of academic preparation can prepare the student for the shock of experiencing a totally militarized society in operation. Coupled with this militarization is the degree to which institutionalization of the Great Patriotic War is used to motivate the people and to integrate the efforts of the population with the objectives of the state. This militarization of Soviet society is apparent by the visibility of the Young Pioneer groups, the passive, uncritical acceptance of Marxist-Leninist ideology, armed children standing guard at war memorials, the enthusiasm of Komsomol cadres, and the pervasiveness of the Party in the military officer corps. These aspects of Soviet society constitute self-serving programs for the military and the

Party, as they justify and enhance the power of the ruling elite. The uncritical acceptance of Party decisions in all matters of state regulation and programs, in the name of defense of the motherland, result in a national state of blind obedience, thereby creating the conditions for dangerous international adventurism and possible Party-justified aggression. "Strike first as a last resort" is a Soviet slogan, but the "last resort" will be defined by the narrow ruling elite, not the Soviet people. No amount of study can impress upon the US student the emotional weight of 20 million dead Russians in World War II. Only after seeing first-hand the mass graves, bombed-out and now rebuilt cities, and the expressions on the faces of the Soviet people visiting memorials, can the militarization of society be understood. The Party must insure that the youth of the Soviet Union never forget the sacrifice of their forebears. New monuments are still being dedicated and several are under construction. The living memory of World War II is critical to the survival of the Party.

Soviet Civil-Military Relations

The relationship of the military to the Communist Party appears to be a mutually beneficial, close-tie relationship. Virtually every officer we talked to was a member of the Communist Party, and the infusion of the Party and Party objectives within the military seems to be quite complete. Similarly, the infusion of Party objectives within the population appears to be widespread. The relationship of the military to the society is one of definite hierarchy with the military being accorded benefits and a leadership position that is both consistent with the Party objectives and by the permission of the population. At no time during the trip did we see or hear of any disagreement or dispute between the military and the Party. Some of the officers did mention that in Khrushchev's period there was Party-military competition, but since then it had all but disappeared. The military is, in the words of one US attache, "A satisfied customer." The most dangerous aspect of the military's relations with the society appears to be the overwhelmingly martial nature of the society itself. What the Soviets have done is to take World War II and the study of military history and developed, in conjunction with the political ideology, a nationalistic glorification of martial values which not only strengthens the Party's grip upon the population but sustains the military in a position of undisputed authority.

*Very
accurate*

Soviet Military Officer Education

On the surface it appears that the Soviets have a more extensive military education program than the U.S. Soviet generals and colonels clearly demonstrated a thorough understanding of the US military educational system. On several occasions Soviet officers expressed the opinion that US officer schools are too short in duration.

Information acquired during the field study indicates that the Soviet military education program consists of three school levels: commissioning schools, of which there are over a hundred; intermediate service schools (a combination of US basic, advanced and C&GS); and the Voroshilov General Staff Academy (war college level). Attendance at one of the three- to five-year-long commissioning schools is required to achieve high rank. Attendance at the intermediate schools of two to three years' duration is sufficient to make brigadier general. Only those officers possessing outstanding potential are selected to attend the two- to three-year general staff academy. X

All schools visited by the delegation were clean, freshly painted, well organized, and appeared adequately funded.

Faculty members appear older and more experienced than their US counterparts. Most instructors are generals or senior colonels, at least half of whom fought in World War II. In addition to experienced commanders and staff officers, recent graduates are also retained as instructors. These graduates are those with science degrees and appear to be technically oriented. All instructors have degrees in science, engineering, or military science. To achieve the rank of "full professor," a doctor of science degree or "great" experience in combat and teaching is required. In addition to teaching, faculty members develop tactics and to a limited degree participate with research institutes in weapon and military system development.

Soviet officers take school entrance examinations and upon completion of school must pass state examinations. The examinations cover Communist ideology, military art, strategy, and military doctrine.

Training aids were abundant in all schools. All schools visited by the delegation make their own movies and have portable television and video replay equipment. Computers, both analog and digital (late 1950 vintage) are utilized. Automated simulators

in which students play various command and staff roles in battle are utilized to test all aspects of communications and combined arms training. Brigadier General Rinsky Korsakov explained a communications training device that could monitor and jam up to eight nets. World War II scenarios are the major training vehicle.

The Malinovsky Tank Academy, founded in 1932, trains captains, majors, and some lieutenant colonels. Commanders and staff officers graduate in three years and engineer officers in four years. Many graduates of the academy have reached the highest positions in the Soviet military and government. The political officer at the academy, a general, was quick to point out that all students and faculty are members of the Communist Party. Instruction at the academy includes political and military theory and practical application. Marshal Losik, the Commandant, stated that the curriculum includes tactics at regiment, division, and field army level. Major subjects taught are engineering, tactics, and political training. World War II is used extensively as a teaching vehicle and the tactics of foreign armies are studied. Communist political training comprises 12 percent of the curriculum and is integrated into field training and supplemented by "cultural trips" to museums, monuments, ballet, and the opera. Field training comprises 60 percent of the curriculum and includes live fire tank and anti-tank training, tank driving, and maintenance. Field maneuvers are conducted in the Moscow area. Military history is the thread which binds the curriculum together. Under questioning, several members of the faculty admitted the presence of students from other socialist countries at the school. In sum, the training at the Armor Academy is technical and tactical and stresses military history. As was the case in all schools visited, international relations per se and geopolitical training are not included in the curriculum.

The Grechko Naval Academy is the Soviet Navy's senior school. Students are lieutenant commanders, commanders, and some captains with ages of 30 to 35 years. The curriculum, which is two to three years in length, consists of tactics and operations, political training in Marxism-Leninism, force structure, and ship construction. Students can specialize after completing the common core studies. The students also do research and contribute papers. In addition, all students study foreign languages (English, French and German). The school is handsomely furnished and equipped, reflecting a larger operations and maintenance budget than the Frunze Naval College. The facility included a submarine torpedo laboratory with analog and digital computer simulation. A hydrodynamic laboratory was also seen which included a four foot by four foot water tunnel where the faculty demonstrated the effects of

wave action upon mines. This training device is also used to study pneumatic firing mechanisms of submarine torpedoes. In discussions with Vice Admiral Keechev he revealed several elements of the school program: 1) naval aviation officers attend the Grechko Academy as students, and all regimental (which is wing and higher) command officers are graduates. They use extensive table-top simulations of tactical exercises as their primary teaching method. There are three or four exercises per year so that every student can play all the important roles--air force commander, submarine commander, surface forces commander. 2) Air Force officers on exchange duty are members of the faculty, but no Air Force or Army officers are detailed as students. All attempts to ascertain the number of students or faculty at the academy were in vain. In sum, the curriculum at the Grechko Naval Academy appears technically oriented (missiles, etc.) and approximates the last year at the US Naval Academy plus the first year of a technical postgraduate school and includes tactics similar to those taught at US Naval Command and Staff College.

At the Frunze Naval College, Vice Admiral Platonov briefed the delegation. The school was established in 1701 in Moscow and in 1715 moved to its present location in Leningrad. It is an undergraduate academy commissioning lieutenants of 22 or 23 years of age. Admiral Gorshkov and all of his assistants are graduates of this academy. They have a five-year training program with one year on board ship and two or three months of shipboard duty during the summers. Their graduates are specialized in three areas: navigation, for surface and submarine vessels, hydrography for research ships and weapons. The students spend 25 percent of their time undergoing political indoctrination and have 150 hours on the history of naval tactics. They give no priority to amphibious operations and in fact the naval infantry officers are not trained by the Navy, but are trained by the Army and then are detailed to the Navy (see Tab A for discussion of naval infantry). Military doctrine is taught as a part of naval tactics. They seem to neglect naval aviation by saying that they have no naval aviation students but have some Air Force exchange officers as instructors. In addition, they do not train officers for nuclear submarine duty. This is the only school where they said how many students they had, and that number was between 800 and 1,000 cadets. In contrast to our system, the cadets may get married at any time during their five-year program, but they still must live in the dormitories. Their faculty consisted of all male officers except for several women civilians who are used to teach foreign languages. This was also true at the Grechko Academy.

The Gagarin Space Center is the training school for Soviet cosmonauts. The standard of living for the cosmonauts at the Center was the highest seen in the USSR. The school was founded in 1960 and dedicated to Yuri Gagarin in 1968, following his fatal aircraft crash. Thirty-nine cosmonaut graduates have flown in space, and nine US astronauts have trained at the facility. Most cosmonaut students are pilots, doctors, engineers and space researchers. Both test pilots and regular pilots are accepted for training. The ratio of engineers to pilots is one to three. Six students from Czechoslovakia, Poland, and East Germany are undergoing training at the Center. The study program is two years in length. The Center was void of ideology rhetoric and Lenin's picture was seen only in the museum. The delegation was accorded outstanding hospitality at the Center. Excellent rapport was immediately established with the cosmonauts, probably because of their previous exposure to the Western world and American astronauts.

In summary, the Soviet system of higher military education seems to be overwhelmingly devoted to teaching and reteaching military history with great emphasis upon tactics and technical weapons characteristics. This training probably limits the initiative, research efforts, and actual decisionmaking capabilities of their officers rather than enhances them.

Conclusion

Soviet officers gave every indication that they were keenly interested in expanding US-Soviet military contacts. As the visit progressed, Soviet officers "opened-up" to the US delegation more and more. With each passing day the toasts became more spontaneous and cordial. At lunch on the last day of the visit, with visible emotion, Lieutenant General Braiko swore on the lives of his children that the Soviet Union would never attack the US. It was apparent the Soviets considered our visit a success. Colonel Rogov, escort officer, stated that his chain of command up to Colonel General Makarov was pleased with the visit. Colonel Rogov's boss, General Major Gilenko, promised Rogov a case of cognac for his performance of duty with the US delegation. Rogov stated, " . . . this was the best foreign military visit in five years . . ." All members of the US delegation were as pleased with the visit as their Soviet hosts appeared to be. When the US hosts the Soviet delegation on the reciprocal visit, no stone should be left unturned in making their visit to the US equal to the hospitality we received in the USSR. Further, the Soviet delegation should be taken to see

US tactical units in the field and urged to participate in seminars on US/USSR issues with students at the National Defense University. Every effort should be made to schedule another trip to the Soviet Union for NWC students next year.

ITEMS OF INTELLIGENCE INTEREST

Soviet Naval Infantry

(C) The Soviet Naval Infantry is part of the Soviet Army. The Soviet Army, according to General Markarov, studies amphibious warfare. He used the Normandy example. The naval infantry are assigned based on high skills and physical condition. They are trained in assault operations, air support, embarkation, and landing techniques. General Krupchenko stated that their naval infantry officers are trained on PT-76 and T-55 tanks. Admiral Platonov said that no naval infantry officers were trained at any naval schools. He said that naval officers were instructed in how to participate in amphibious operations. Colonel Rogov said that the Army is responsible for amphibious doctrine and tactics. He said the naval infantry is responsible for the assault up to 3-5 kilometers. He indicated they are about 12,000 in strength and have 4-5 regiments. A captain at the Grechko Naval Academy said he had heard the naval infantry is experimenting with hovercraft. Major Alexanderov said he had never seen a naval infantryman in the North Caucasian District, but that he could transfer to the naval infantry if he could meet the standards. (He was about 5'7" and of slim build, but not athletic in appearance.) Lieutenant Colonel Marks, Marine Attache, stated he has a hard time seeing naval infantry. We did not see one on the trip despite repeated requests. In Moscow, we were told there would be naval infantry officers to see us in Leningrad. In Leningrad, they said if they had known a Marine was coming, they would have had some naval infantry officers to see us. Apparently the problem is rank. Colonel Rogov says their naval infantry commanders are very young. A lieutenant colonel is around 30 and a colonel around 35. He says this is necessary to be in physical condition. During the trip we were exposed to very few officers who were not generals, and in almost every case when a colonel or below was available, there were generals listening. Therefore, exposure to a young naval infantry officer would have been out of context. Finally, Colonel Rogov says that the Navy only supports amphibious operations. It appears that Soviet Naval Infantry is an integral part of the Soviet Army.

BMP Assault Vehicle

(C) Observed a cutaway training version of the BMP that was used for student gunnery training. The model has front wheel drive.

A-1

TAB A

CONFIDENTIAL

Front armor plating is about 3/4-inch of simple steel. The engine is about one inch from the front plate. Loading time is about ten seconds, using an automatic loader. Firing ports for riflemen are extremely difficult to observe from and probably do not provide a contamination-free compartment.

Training Aids

(U) School training aids were effective. Three schools admitted to making their own movies. The Grechko Naval Academy has a portable TV system and instant video replay. A normal number of tape recorders, viewgraphs, and training aids were observed. Calculators were available for issue. Computers (analog and digital) were available in the schools to assist in instruction and to use by students in research. At the Frunze Naval Academy, the students have basic radio tube circuits and test equipment to troubleshoot a tube, resistor, and capacitor circuit. At the Malinovsky Tank Academy, a computer was used to provide situations to teach tactical nets and counter jamming procedures.

Civil Defense

(C) The Mayor of Volgograd stated that there is sufficient protection for the workers. Volgograd is extending its subway system to about nine miles. Other conversations revealed that shelters are provided for political and military leaders, some industry and the masses; however, there was a general feeling that no one would survive a nuclear war.

Engineers

(U) Every aviator and naval officer is graduated as an engineer. !

Ideology

(C) Leninism was clearly missing at the Gagarin Space Center and appeared to be a facade at the naval academies.

Soviet Land Offensive Capabilities

(C) Colonel Siderenko's book, The Offensive, apparently reflects a true spirit and desire on their part. The films seen

Naval officers gave impression of eliteness, separate from Army and "Toleration" of Communist dogma.

showed rapid action forces and Marshal Losik is unwilling to accept the proposition that modern AT weapons have reduced the value of armored warfare. Furthermore, their adamant reflection of history will make them quick to take the battle away from Soviet soil. However, there are several factors which greatly impair this capability. These are logistics, artillery direction, and military training of the individual soldier.

Logistics

(C) Conversations with Generals Braiko and Krupchenko indicated that officers pay little attention to the subject and neither was able to grasp the tonnage required to support the movement of 80 km/day. Followup conversations with the Indian Military Attache indicate his belief that they lack staff coordination to handle logistics in a rapid movement situation where initiative at low levels is required.

Artillery

(C) Conversations with Major Alexanderov, DOSFF coordinator with the North Caucasian District, revealed that the battery commander still acts as the forward observer, that only one gun per battery is laid with all others being placed parallel to the base piece, and that all technical data computation is performed by the battery commander while on the move. The Canadian Attache confirmed this observation.

Military Training of the Individual Soldier

(C) Major Alexanderov and Colonel Rogov were most critical of the individual soldier's state of training. The major says that the generals expect too much of the DOSFF, that they are just children who get 148 hours of training in two years, and that marksmanship is optional. Boys and girls participate except those with a physical handicap. He viewed it as not an important program. Colonel Rogov was most critical of soldiers' attitude, dress, and physical fitness. He said it takes 6-8 months to get a city soldier into shape. Farm boys are all right, but there are very few of them.

Rogov is
an
"old soldier"
Type,
probably
KGB

CONFIDENTIAL

The Navy and Politics

(C) The Soviet Navy in Leningrad portrayed a more relaxed attitude than the rigid environment at the Malinovsky Tank Academy. The impression is that the Navy is less dogmatic in its politics and considers itself separate and elite from the Soviet Army. However, it is apparent that they recognize the dominant power of the Soviet Army.

School Technology

(C) The level of technology displayed in the training aids at the Frunze Naval College and the Grechko Naval Academy was that of training aids found in the US in the late 1950s. Electrical simulation devices were mostly analog, with some primitive digital equipment. Accuracy of simulation was poor in the shiphandling trainer, which used a cord connection to the model rather than RF communication.

(C) Discussion with Admiral of the Fleet Smirnoff (13 May 77)

(C) At a reception at Spaso House, Commander Powers had the opportunity to talk (through a US interpreter) for about 15 minutes with Admiral of the Fleet Smirnoff. Recently Commander of the Soviet Pacific Fleet, he is now apparently the number three man on the naval staff in Moscow under Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Gorshkov. After a discussion of Commander Powers' background and some social niceties, Powers asked Admiral Smirnoff if it is true that the Soviet Navy is building an improved under way logistic force, and, if so, would it be possible to support large ships as far away as the Indian Ocean. The question apparently took him by surprise, and he pondered the answer for about 20-30 seconds. His reply was to the effect that "all navies seek to improve their capabilities, and so it was with the Soviet Navy in this area." The discussion with Admiral Smirnoff turned to the writings of Admiral Gorshkov. With respect to further discussion of power projection into the Indian Ocean, Admiral Smirnoff said that Commander Powers had "read too much into Admiral Gorshkov's writings." Admiral Smirnoff asked him what he thought of Admiral Gorshkov's writings. Commander Powers replied that they were an accurate description of the use of seapower by the US over the past several decades, but that he thought Admiral Gorshkov's evaluation of Soviet naval capabilities vis-a-vis the US Navy were overoptimistic. This answer obviously displeased the Admiral, and further conversation became social and without substance.

A-4

CONFIDENTIAL

This conversation was highly charged, and though he was very guarded in his comments, it was obvious that he was very interested to talk to a USN core who had studied Gorshkov -

Foreign Students Attending the
Malinovsky Tank Academy

(U) Several officers stated that officers from other socialist countries attend the school. Only Bulgaria and Romania were identified.

(C) Discussion with Mr. Arbotov, Director, Soviet
Institute for the Study of the US and Canada
17 May 77

(C) Discussion between Colonel Gazzola and Mr. Arbotov--Mr. Arbotov stated that the NATO and PRC threats justify the Soviet military build-up. When queried about the NATO threat, Arbotov stated that NATO is always talking of strengthening its forces and that history justifies the need for well-defended Soviet borders. Arbotov stated that the USSR still desires most-favored-nation (MFN) status but is in no rush to get it. He believes that trade would accelerate and MFN status would be a by-product of evolving mutual trust between the US and USSR. Colonel Gazzola asked Arbotov, as a student of US politics, whether he had ever considered establishing a lobby in the US. Arbotov replied that he had, but it might have negative effects if publicized.

(C) Commander Powers had the opportunity at the reception hosted by Lieutenant General Gard to talk for about 10-15 minutes to Mr. Arbotov, a well-known Soviet expert on the US, and a participant in the SALT talks. Powers asked Mr. Arbotov why the Soviets had so theatrically rejected the first Carter proposals rather than working to seek an acceptable compromise. Mr. Arbotov began to say that the US delegation had come to Moscow without any consideration of previous Soviet proposals. Powers dismissed this as nonsense and political window dressing, and pressed Mr. Arbotov as to whether the Soviets are serious about SALT. The remaining time was spent discussing the politics of SALT. Mr. Arbotov would not be drawn into specific issues. Mr. Arbotov finally broke off the conversation and left the group. An Assistant Naval Attache standing nearby commented that it was unusual to get Mr. Arbotov to talk even that much regarding SALT.

(C) Personality Impressions

General Colonel Makarov

(C) Articulate; highly professional; gives the appearance of being "on top" of all situations; very formal and proper in all dealings with the delegation.

A-5

CONFIDENTIAL

Marshal Losik

(C) Commanding appearance and manner; outwardly personable; gave the impression he could be cold and calculating; talked freely in one-on-one situation.

Vice Admiral Platonov

(C) Perfect gentleman and host; easy manner, friendly and outgoing; the only senior officer who did not mention Marxist-Leninist ideology.

General Lieutenant Shatalov

(C) Brilliant; three space missions, friendly but guarded in conversations.

General Major Gilenkov

(C) Diamond-in-the-rough; generally friendly and pleasant; impulsive; can be crude and boorish; demanding.

General Major Leonov

(C) Worked with US astronauts; bright, witty, relaxed, friendly; understands the West.

(C) Discussion with Marshal Losik, Commandant Malinovsky
Armor Academy (13 May 77)

(C) At a reception at Spaso House, Colonel Stang had the opportunity to talk for about 35 minutes with Marshal Losik. Losik asked Stang if the war in RVN was difficult. Stang replied no because the combat was not sustained nor intense and the enemy poorly trained. Losik asked what was meant by poorly trained. Stang stated that the NVA were poor at coordinating combined arms in the offensive and did not use Soviet-built tanks very well. Losik stated there were no Soviet tanks in RVN. Stang responded by identifying three battles where Soviet tanks were encountered. Losik appeared confused, consulted with three other Soviet generals and then changed the subject. Losik stated that the coordination of combined arms was very difficult to teach to young officers with no experience. Losik identified young officers as company and battalion commanders. Stang stated that operations would be more difficult during nuclear war. Losik responded yes--if forces are trained for nuclear battle,

*A real gentleman
Sailor —
Knowledgeable —
Perfect ionist
Type — Hobby
is cuisine/cooking
etc — Put
on The best
"feed" of the
Tour!*

conventional war would be easy. Losik stated that the calculations had been done but artillery and logistics remain problems. Stang asked Losik if the Soviet Army had quality logistics schools. Losik replied yes, but hinted that the schools weren't really top quality. Stang asked Losik why Siderenko placed such little emphasis on logistics in his book. Losik replied Siderenko's book was on tactics, not logistics. Losik then said communications would be the biggest problem during a major war as both sides would employ EW and ECM. Losik stated that officers must be taught initiative in the absence of orders. Losik then switched back to logistics and said attacking units had to carry their own supplies. Stang then asked Losik if conventional war was more probable under conditions of relative nuclear parity. Losik fired back. "What do you think?" Stang said he thought any war between the superpowers would become nuclear but that conventional war in peripheral areas was possible. Losik responded that they had already discussed nuclear war. Stang asked Losik what he meant the day before when he said the tank was still the major weapon on the battlefield, despite new AT weapons. Losik responded that firepower will neutralize AT teams and that tanks were essential for victory. The M-113 and the BMP were also discussed. Losik also demonstrated confusion over possible US troop withdrawals from the ROK.

This is a problem redundantly stated by many Army Types - Not so in Navy (different situation)

Confusing topic in view of Their doctrine. Yet, I firmly believe that, despite the abundance of writings on nuclear war, etc., that there exists a yet unpublished Soviet Thinking ~~of~~ on a doctrine for conflict short of nuclear war in peripheral areas, or at sea - I can't prove it. It's based on what makes sense from Their viewpoint and a "feel" —

LIST OF SOVIET OFFICERS WHO HOSTED*
THE US DELEGATION

Soviet Officials, Ministry of Defense of the USSR, taking part in the reception of the US Military Delegation during the period of May 11-18, 1977

1. Marshal LOSIK, Oleg Alexandrovich, Armored Force of the USSR

Chief, Marshal of the Soviet Union Malinovsky Military Academy of the Armored Forces. He was born in 1915. Higher education. He has the degree of a professor. He joined the Soviet Army in 1935. For his bravery and heroism displayed in the Great Patriotic War, he was given the title of a Hero of the Soviet Union. While in the service he held various commanding posts.

Awarded some orders and medals of the USSR and, also, of some other states.

Married, three children.

He earned it.
Wiped out 13
Tanks, Tank a
Town, etc -

2. Colonel General MAKAROV, Vladimir Alexandrovich

Chief, Department for Military Education, Ministry of Defense of the USSR. He was born in 1919, in the family of a worker. Military higher education. He joined the Soviet Army in 1937. A participant of the Great Patriotic War. While in the service he held various commanding posts.

Awarded some orders and medals of the USSR and, also, of other states.

Married, two daughters.

3. Lieutenant General BRAIKO, Ivan Yakovlevich, Armored Force of the USSR

Deputy Chief, Department for Military Education, Ministry of Defense of the USSR. He was born in 1919, in the family of a peasant. Higher education. Candidate of Military Science, assistant professor. He joined the Soviet Army in 1938, a participant of the Great Patriotic War. While in the service he held various commanding-staff posts.

Awarded some orders and medals of the USSR.

Married.

B-1

TAB B

*This tab provided by USSR Ministry of Defense.

4. Lieutenant General TOUZAKOV, Evgeny Alexandrovich

Chief, Leningrad Military District Staff. He was born in 1922. Higher education. He joined the Soviet Army in 1939. A participant of the Great Patriotic War. While in the service he held various commanding-staff posts.

Awarded some orders and medals of the USSR.

Married, three sons.

5. Lieutenant General GUDZ, Pavel Danilovich, Armored Force of the USSR

Deputy Chief, Marshal of the Soviet Union Malinovsky Military Academy of the Armored Forces. He was born in 1919. Higher education. Doctor of Military Sciences, professor. He joined the Soviet Army in 1939. A participant of the Great Patriotic War. While in the service he held various commanding-staff posts.

Awarded some orders and medals of the USSR and, also, of other states.

Married, two daughters.

6. Lieutenant General INDENKO, Ivan Nikolaevich

Assistant to the Commander, Department for Military Education, the Northern-Caucasian Military District. He was born in 1924. Higher education. He joined the Soviet Army in 1942. A participant of the Great Patriotic War. While in the service he held various commanding-staff posts.

He has governmental awards of the USSR.

Married, a daughter.

7. Vice-Admiral PLATONOV, Vitaliy Vasilievich

He was born in 1925, in the family of an officer. Higher education. He joined the Soviet Army and the Soviet Navy in 1943. While in the service of the Soviet Navy he held various commanding posts.

Awarded some orders and medals of the USSR.

Married, two children.

8. Major General BAITUGANOV, Michail Andreevich

Assistant to the Commander, Department for Military Education, Leningrad Military District. He was born in 1921. Higher education. He joined the Soviet Army in 1940. A participant in the War with Japan. While in the service he held commanding-staff posts.

Awarded some orders and medals of the USSR.

Married, two children.

9. Major General GILENKOV, Yuriy Vsevolodovich

He was born in 1922, in the family of an office employee. Higher education. He joined the Soviet Army in 1940. A participant of the Great Patriotic War. While in the service he held commanding-staff posts. Since 1973 he has been working in the Office of Ministry of Defense of the USSR.

Awarded some orders and medals of the USSR.

Married, two children, sons.

10. Major General KRUPCHENKO, Ivan Efimovich, Armored Force of the USSR

Chief, Wars History and Military Art Faculty, Malinovsky Military Academy of Armored Forces.

He was born in 1920. Higher education. Doctor of Historical Sciences, Professor. He joined the Soviet Army in 1938. A participant of the Great Patriotic War. While in the service he held various commanding-staff posts.

Awarded some orders and medals of the USSR.

Married, two children.

11. Colonel ROGOV, I. A. - an officer, Foreign Liaison Directorate

12. Colonel Volkov, D. S. - an officer, Department for Military Education, Ministry of Defense of the USSR.

AGENDA
FOR
DIA BRIEFING TO NWC STUDENTS

5 May 1977

<u>Topics</u>	<u>Briefers</u>
0800-0815 - DR's Opening Remarks	
0815-0835 - Soviet Military Doctrine and Strategy	Dr. Dziak, DB-1
0835-0845 - Civil Defense	Mr. Wood, DB-4D
0845-0900 - Discussion	
0900-0925 - Capabilities and Trends in Soviet Ground Forces	Maj Betit, DB-1B
0925-0950 - Discussion	
0950-1010 - Coffee Break	
1010-1040 - Trends in Soviet Aviation	Mr. Gunther, DB-1D
1040-1105 - Discussion	
1105-1135 - Soviet Naval Forces to Include SLBM	Mr. Miner/Mr. Straub, DB-1C
1135-1200 - Discussion	
1200-1235 - Break: Prep for Working Lunch	
1235-1250 - Soviet Missile Trends	Mr. Hartman/Mr. Kula, DB-1F
1250-1300 - Discussion	
1300-1345 - Soviet Military R&D Effort	Mr. Roth, DT-1A
1345-1400 - Discussion	
1400-1420 - New Aircraft	LtCols Herrick/Chevalier DT-2B
1420-1430 - Discussion	

<u>Topics</u>	<u>Briefers</u>
1430-1440 - New Missile Technology	Mr. Dorr, DT-2A
1440-1445 - Discussion	
1445-1505 - ABM Defenses	Mr. McCrery, DT-4A
1505-1515 - Discussion	
1515-1520 - Coffee Break	
1520-1550 - ASAT and Ocean Surveillance	Maj Lopes/Mr. McCrery, DT-4A
1550-1600 - Discussion	
1600-1620 - Particle Beam Weapons	Dr. Berman, DT-1C
1620-1630 - Discussion	
1630-1645 - High Energy Lasers	Mr. Berler, DT-1A
1645-1650 - Discussion	
1650-1720 - Electronic Warfare	Mr. Newman, DT
1720-1730 - Discussion	
1730-1750 - Nuclear Test Ban Treaty	Capt Mills, DT-1B
1750-1800 - Discussion	

SERVICE REPRESENTATIVES

AF	Colonel Robert L. Block
A	Mr. Carol Swenson
MC	Colonel H. L. Jackson
N	Captain R. E. Bilyeu