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System Plan
1500
Wilson and
Penthouse
top end

Paris
Atticus
Kassell
over by way
of train

Mr. Jones
wife Ann's
sister

I. The Greeting

At 1:20 PM Peking time, the Air France plane disembarked its passengers one quarter of a mile from the terminal building after a cursory look at the passengers by a custom official.

We walked with hand baggage to the station.

At the entrance to the terminal we were met by the following people: Madame Kang Tai-sha, Deputy Secretary General of the Institute of Foreign Affairs; Mr. Fan Kuo-Lsiang, Deputy Chief of Division, Institute of Foreign Affairs; Mr. Ni Yao Li, Department of American and Oceanian Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Mrs. Ho Chu-Ling, Institute; Mr. Cha Pu-Chun, Institute; Mr. Ting Yuan-Lun, Chief of the US Division, Department of America and Oceanian Affairs, Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Mr. Pi Keng, Institute. These officials were well briefed. They knew our names and the details of our background.

They took us inside the terminal to a well appointed guest lounge where tea was served. After polite exchanges, Madame Kang explained that we would all go to the Peking hotel together, our party would check in and have lunch, we would be given a short rest, and that Madame Kang, Mr. Fan and Mr. Ni would return at 4:30 pm to go over the schedule for our visit.

We proceeded in three cars to the hotel.

The entire greeting party helped us to our rooms with our hand luggage while our checked luggage was collected by others and brought to the hotel during lunch.

We were escorted from our rooms on the tenth floor to a small private dining room on the second floor. After introducing us to the waitress and explaining that the room and waitress would be ours for each family meal in the hotel, the hosts departed.

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Name of
Hotel 2
Describe it

II. Negotiating the Agenda

At 4:30 pm on 29 June, Madame Kang, Mr. Fan, and Mr. Ni returned to our suite.

Madame Kang asked how we should begin. I suggested that she start by telling us what they had in mind for us. She agreed. She said that based on my letter to Mr. Kuo (attached) and reports of discussion with the PRC UN officials, she had the following tentative schedule in mind:

5-6 days in Peking -- discussions with officials, visits to a (PLA) unit, university, commune, Great Wall, Palace Museum, Ming tomb

3 days, Inner Mongolia -- see economic developments, civil defense, pastoral activities

8 July - return to Peking

3 days - Shanghai as part of concentration in Northern China

Proceed to Harbin briefly

2 days - Taching oil fields (where she said the Vance party in 1975 had visited and we would be the second American group to visit)

Back to Harbin by train - visit factory, primary school, handicraft factory, Then to Shenyang by train for half-day

Then to Dairen/Port Arthur - civil defense, return to Peking

She asked for comments. I stressed my interest in discussions with the Foreign Minister, senior defense officials, and the Minister of Foreign Trade. Madame Kang replied that she could not commit these officials but that my requests would be relayed. (By 30 June the Foreign Minister had invited my party to dinner on 2 July; by 1 July Mr. Fan had informed me that I would meet on 2 July with the Defense Vice Chief of Staff, Mr. Li Ta, Mr. Tchai Cheng-wen, Director of the Department of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defense, and other military officials. By 3 July I was informed that I would meet with senior Vice Premier Li Hsien Nien on 4 July to deal with "state" level questions.

I expressed a desire to see Tibet and Outer Mongolia as well as Southwest (Kwangsi Province). Madame Kang pointed out that our original request had led them to concentrate on Northeast China (Shanghai, Harbin, Peking, Dairen), but that if we wanted to drop parts of that area, we could add Tibet and Sinkiang. I elected to stick to the proposed schedule in order to place first emphasis on my desire to visit with the three sets of officials.

By 30 June the schedule had been refined to give us the details of the first 3 days and to add Soochow and Mukden to our schedule to meet our desire to see more cities, shortening the stay in Taching.

III. The First Skirmish

At 7:00 pm on 29 June, Mr. Pe of the Institute picked us up to take us to the dinner hosted by Mr. K'O Po-rien, Vice President, Institute of Foreign Affairs. Those present were the seven members of the party which greeted us at the airport plus T'ang Wen-Sheng (Nancy Tang) Deputy Director, American and Oceanian Affairs Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Mr. (General) T Chai Chang-weng, Department of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defense.

After a few moments of amenities, Mr. K'O made the comment to me that the PLA had always been grateful to the American Armed Forces for arming the PLA in 1945/6 by giving modern arms to Chiang Kai Shek whose forces promptly turned them over to the PLA. I did not respond. Mr. Tchai Chen stated that he had been a negotiator at Pan Mun Jon, opposite Admiral Turner Joy. Jocularly, he pounded the table to show how he had behaved. After a laugh, I commented that Admiral Joy had been a good negotiator. Mr. Tchai disagreed saying he had been too mild. Mr. K'O then said he was on the staff serving the effort at joint government between Chang Kai Shek and Mao in 1945-6. He commented that he had known General Marshall. I said that I had too and that I had great respect for him. Mr. K'O said that he liked Pat Hurley better and that General Marshall had missed the opportunity to work out a peaceful solution.

Mr. Tchai then intervened to ask why it was that the US had backed such a string of bad leaders like Chang Kai Shek, his son, Bo Dai, Diem, Ky, Thieu, Sygman Rhee, Park, etc. He added that he thought the American military particularly foolish to have believed that air and sea power could have stopped Chinese forces in Korea (where he obviously had a military role).

*Peoples
Liberation
Army*

I concluded that the conversation by this time had demonstrated that Chinese knew me well and were consciously roughing me up.

I responded that with regard to SEA I had been of the school that counseled against getting involved because I had judged that our strategic interests were not at stake, that once we had gone in we erred in not going all out, at once, against the North, that when we finally did so we forced a truce that would have worked except for the political impotence caused by Watergate, and that they would be well advised not to be misled by the unique circumstances of this historical incident.

With regard to Korea, I said that I personally had no difficulty in singling out Kim Il Sung as worse than any of the leaders that the US had supported, that I considered him a "mad dog on a leash," the leash being the restraining influence of PRC leaders, and that with regard to US forces in Korea, I well recalled that after slowing the initial momentum of PRC forces, the US forces had worked well enough together to drive the PRC north up the peninsula and force them to negotiate a truce.

Mr. Tchai flushed and said that if the conversation continued in such vein, the dinner would have to come to an immediate end. However, he then ameliorated his tone and commented that there were obvious ideological differences between us. Mr. K'0 intervened to comment that Mr. Tchai was a military man used to speaking bluntly.

I stated that obviously when their government invited me to visit PRC, my ideological positions were known, that Mr. Tchai and I had major differences of view, that I was willing to discuss areas of mutual interest, but that obviously they did not expect me, as a military man, to accept passively their earlier comments.

We all laughed and the tensions passed. Madame Kang had appeared markedly upset by Mr. Tchai's aggressiveness. Nancy Tang appeared to support Mr. Tchai's initiative.

The "historical" exchanges continued at a lower level of intensity throughout dinner. Nancy Tang commented acerbically at one point that the US had even bombed PRC during the SEA war. I said that the bombing had been accidental. Mr. Tchai said "we can only know what we observe as facts--the facts are we were bombed." I said, "I am in possession of the fact that the bombings were accidental."

As the dinner ended, Mr. Tchai had begun to give his view that the US could never have brought North Vietnam to its knees through any military force. Before I could respond, Mr. K'O stood up to read the prepared, pre-translated long toast. It consisted of an attack on the Soviet Union, detente, and the "gang of 4" ending with a toast to PRC-US friendship and a word of praise to me. I responded that I thought Mr. K'O was a man of delicate timing, that I was very much aware of Mao's advice, "Enemy advances, we retreat; enemy retreats, we advance," that my adversary of the evening, Mr. Tchai, had been in the process of advancing just as the toast began, that thanks to Mr. K'O's delicate timing, the world would never know whether in response to Mr. Tchai, I would have taken Mao's advice. After the laugh, I spoke of the need to make detente work as a process of mutual forbearance, of the role of US-PRC cooperation in bringing this about, and toasted a future in which our progress could be mutually advantageous.

The dinner promptly adjourned. On our departure, Mr. Tchai went to some length to make amends for his earlier comments and to suggest that two military men could respect one another and work together despite conflicting ideologies.

IV. The Background Questioning

On 30 June we visited the Great Wall and the Ming tombs. On 1 July we visited the Palace Museum and a Peoples Commune. The trips were used by Mr. Ni, Mr. Fan, Mrs. Ho, and Mr. Be to rotate among the three cars as escorts talking to me and my wife in one car, two daughters in a second, and my sister in a third. Detailed questions were carefully interspersed with discussions of scenic objects and pastoral scenes. I was questioned about the work of the Committee on the Present Danger, how it was organized, the degree of its effectiveness, the amount of liaison with the Administration, Senator Jackson, Senator Moynihan. They were interested in the extent of my relationship with Cy Vance, Zbigniew Brzezynski, Joe Sisco, Scoop Jackson, Pat Moynihan. They asked my political plans for 1978. They were quite interested in Harold Brown. Questions to the family sought to elicit more background on them and to crosscheck what I had said about my relationships to key figures. They were diligent in learning about my business and public service affiliations. These kinds of probings continued throughout the trip with regard to SALT, military balance, naval balance, etc.