

## The Projection of Soviet Power

### Working Definition

In military writing, 'power projection' traditionally denoted the use of naval firepower and tactical support for interventionary forces. Several changes in the international milieu have led to a broadening of the meaning of the term. In the first place, the breakup of the Western colonial empires and independence of the successor states has largely removed from the Western powers a long-existing international infrastructure of bases and other military assets under their control. Moreover, the growth of new norms as a result of the emergence of the third world has meant that 'gunboat diplomacy' and swift interventions, at least by the western powers, is roundly condemned and generally precluded. As a result, the powers have had to develop substantial networks of economic and military aid agreements, explicit and de facto alliances and the like for sustaining or developing their worldwide interests.

We will thus define power projection as the overall capability first of all to develop an infrastructure of influence--ranging from 'treaties of friendship' and cadre development in the Soviet catalogue, to an active alliance system in the American case. The prepositioning of forces and equipment, the development of a world-wide naval support system, the development of reconnaissance capabilities and command and control communications networks are part of such an infrastructure. Power projection at the second level denotes the capacity to inject appropriate instruments of influence and force over distances into rapidly changing violent (or potentially violent) situations, in order to protect or further develop the power's infrastructure. These tend to be small conflicts which may increase rapidly in scope (like the 1960 Congo crisis or the successive Middle East wars), and they tend to be in (though are not logically confined to) the third world. On a spectrum of weaponry and organization, these capabilities start at the opposite end from the strategic pole--that is, from the thermonuclear arsenal and central war plans; they are also a distance from (though they do in part overlap) the conventional forces and weaponry that sit astride the internationally recognized lines of division in Europe and Korea.

### Objectives of the essay.

During the past two years, Soviet capabilities to project power have manifestly increased, as witnessed in the Cuban-Soviet intervention in the Angolan civil war and the appearance of Cuban soldiers bearing Soviet arms from Aden to Vientiane. In the same period, America's allies lost their wars in Southeast Asia while the Defense Department closed down numerous military facilities throughout the globe. The contrasting trends in Soviet and American power projection resources and capabilities make a thorough examination of this subject pertinent and timely. In the first substantive section, we will briefly examine the background to Soviet power projectional capabilities, and then compare roughly the respective American and Soviet projectional capabilities in terms of forces, equipment,

and materiel.

As we have already noted, the ability to develop a network of alliances, whether explicit or de facto, is central to the ability to project power. Substantial changes have occurred in recent years in the American and Soviet alliance systems, which we examine in part II.

The milieu of the international system is changing rapidly, particularly in the third world. As we have argued, it is there that many of the targets of both Soviet opportunity and long range planning exist, given the endemic instability there. In section III we identify five trends conducing both toward violence and toward Soviet advantages.

Given these changes in capacity, alliance systems, third world milieu, what are the respective intentions of the superpowers? In Section IV we examine the change in 'will' in both America and the Soviet Union, and suggest some hypotheses about future Soviet actions.

What, if anything, is to be done on our part? In the concluding section we consider some options within the realm of possibility, given present political constraints.

### I. The Development of Soviet Capabilities

As a great strategic land mass, self-sufficient in its supply of energy resources and critical minerals, and without allies across the seas, the Soviet Union traditionally had little need to develop the means of projecting military power beyond the periphery of its client European states.

Though the military integration of Eastern Europe with the Soviet Union has been in the process of consolidation throughout the post-war years (as illustrated by the efficiency of the August 1968 military intervention into Czechoslovakia), the ability to project power beyond Eastern Europe is a more recent development. In the past few years Moscow's conception of the geographic extent of the area where its power and thus its influence can and should be effective has continued to widen.

The sale of arms to Egypt through Czechoslovakia in 1955 is a first stage. It coincides with the development of new categories into which Soviet theorists could fit the potentially "progressive" ex-colonial states.

The construction of a blue-water navy came next, and following closely behind came the bilateral agreements and more hardware for projecting influence and protecting friends abroad, in areas that hitherto had either been Western preserves or neutral areas in which there had been little Soviet presence.

The late 1950's and early 1960's are something of a watershed. We know from Soviet writings that they saw the American capability to project power to be a central part of its capacity to maintain an international system suitable to its interests. The American intervention in Lebanon

in 1958 is said to have had great impact on the Soviet leadership. At that time it did not have the capability to follow suit. True, it tried: in 1960 its airlift into Laos caused grave concern to the American leadership. But its intervention in the Congo in the same year, where it gave Patrice Lumumba some lorries and 16 Ilyushin transport planes for moving his troops, without however having provided logistical backup, was a total failure.

The Cuban missile crisis was clearly the event that motivated the Soviets to accelerate their power projection capability. After the 1962 Crisis the buildup increased in pace, as the Soviet Union built a network of interlocking base, overflight and mutual support arrangements and sharply accelerated the construction of instruments for projecting power, from large transport aircraft and ships to matériel for its growing naval infantry.

Between 1962 and 1975, for example, the Soviet ability to project a payload to a distance of three thousand miles increased by a factor of thirteen. The mobility and firepower of the seven airborne divisions was greatly increased. The Soviets began an extensive program to develop larger and more numerous transport planes: for example, the large Ilyushin 76 CANDIDS which can take off from short, unprepared airstrips and transport 40 tons of freight 3,100 miles in less than six hours, are being built at a rate of 18 a year. By 1980 they could easily have more than one hundred of them. The impressive growth of their merchant marine fleet by a factor of three since the early 60's is important also, given the integration of its alert frequencies into the Soviet military command and control system, and its broader military capabilities, all in such contrast to the American merchant marine. Instead of moving toward a containerized fleet, which requires sophisticated ports and is highly unsuitable for moving military matériel in a power projection mode, they are buying 'RoRo' ships--roll-on roll-off--many of which can be used in ports without special facilities and that can unload in relatively little time. Even their fishing fleet of well over 4,000 ships plays a part in the communications and intelligence areas. It is worth noting that, in straight comparison of our total tonnage the US is ahead, but if oil tankers are excepted, the Soviets are greater in both number and tonnage.

In 1967, following decisions made earlier that decade, the Soviets greatly enhanced their long-range aerial reconnaissance ability, with the introduction of the Tupolov 95 BEAR D. The staging privileges gained in Cuba, Somalia, Guinea, and, to a lesser extent, South Yemen, thereafter extended the Soviet range to critical areas beyond the Central Atlantic to which they were previously confined. This enabled the Soviets to monitor American and allied exercises and fleet movements in general, and to coordinate potential targets with missile launching systems, all with an accuracy theretofore denied them. Likewise with the Antonov 38 MAY ASV plane, which has operated from Somalia, Guinea and Cuba: in the case of the west coast of Africa, for example, the geologic structure of the area had made it an ideal location for American submarines with a strategic mission. Though this plane is not highly competent, Soviet patrols now have circumscribed Western freedom of movement with it.

Despite the rapid growth of the Soviet projectional capability, there remains an overall American lead in every area and theatre. Gross Soviet military capabilities immediately applicable to most of these do not remotely equal the gross capabilities the United States could potentially bring to bear. Thus at the present time, the United States could theoretically move a division more quickly even to the Persian Gulf, than could the Soviets--unless one assumed that the Soviets had full access to Turkish or Iranian airspace (which they have had only sporadically in the past). They remain deficient, moreover, in naval infantry: they have only 12,000 men, compared to our three full marine divisions.

To be sure, we should not expect Moscow to develop forces for power projection that are a mirror-image of our own, given the difference in American and Soviet requirements. Static comparisons are thus of little utility unless they indicate goals and will as well, which we consider further on.

A reconsideration of the American advantage turns problems up in three areas. The first lies at our own 'cutting edge'. A cutting edge of power projection will inevitable be Special Forces and whatever other units are trained to undertake unconventional warfare activities, along with all the other related activities that can be used to probe adversaries or mount special operations where time is of the essence or where circumstances preclude a major intervention.

Thus there have been budgetary cutbacks in the Special Forces greater than for the army as a whole--though the total cost of unconventional warfare capabilities for all services is only about a tenth of one per cent of the defense budget. The promotional structure of the army, in a reaction to the Vietnamese war, is such that there is less incentive to involve oneself in such an area. Moreover, budgetary constraints and the growing threat in Europe, have driven military and congressional attention further away from contingencies outside the NATO context, with consequent effect on force structure, training, matériel acquisition, and so forth. It is worth recalling how cost-effective unconventional operations can be: the world war II British raids behind the Italian-German lines in Libya destroyed more planes and matériel than did the RAF bombardments. And the Israeli raid on Entebbe was one of the most impressive and cost-effective military operations of all times.

The extent to which restrictions have now been imposed on clandestine American collections and operations abroad, following the furor over the role of the CIA, must also be considered a significant shift in the relative ability of the two superpowers to project their influence at the lower end of the force spectrum. The decline of American security assistance programs is another area where our power projectional capabilities are decreasing, at the same time as Soviet capabilities increase. The access of Military Assistance Program officers, Special Forces Mobile Training Teams and the like to third world armed forces was always a major dimension of our power projectional capability, particularly in geographically critical countries like Zaire, Ethiopia, or South Korea.

The second point is that, for all that the Russians have a gross inferiority to American capabilities in the projection of power, the trend is moving in the other direction, and moving very rapidly in some respects (as for example with amphibious ships of several classes). The increased Russian transport capacity is rapidly making the current net comparisons of the ability to project power into the Persian Gulf obsolescent. In ten years the naval-infantry assault forces have been doubled. Moreover, the proximity of the most important potential theatres of conflict to the Soviet Union (Europe and the Persian Gulf) makes ships equal to ours in size unnecessary in many cases--and raises the question of just what the mission the new Kiev class carriers is.

Thirdly, Soviet doctrine as it seems to have developed, suggests that their inferiority is not wholly disadvantageous. Less emphasis is placed on gross capabilities; more on reaching the area of conflict first. This is particularly pertinent if the United States has the capability to project greater power into the particular arena. For the first power on the scene can establish a presence, possibly a legitimacy, which can then be dislodged only with the use of an untoward amount of force. This effectively deters the second power from intervening. Essentially this is what happened in Angola. The Soviets moreover work through surrogates, for reasons which we examine below. They also can interpose their fleet successfully, as they did during the Lebanese crisis, to make an American intervention prohibitively expensive.

To conclude, we see that American power projectional capabilities remain larger than those of the Soviet Union, an advantage increasingly vitiated by self-imposed restrictions, and by the Soviet build-up in critical areas. Finally, the Soviet Union seems capable of making a virtue of necessity, in developing doctrine suitable to its smaller capacity. Thus its willingness to increase the risk factor in its interventions is suggested by the Angolan operation. The speed with which the General Staff apparently organized the air lift, following on the declining fortunes of its MPLA allies, leads us to hypothesize that the Soviet Union will move swiftly to take advantage of situations where the United States is disinclined to intervene openly and where it has a reliable local ally. Moreover, the Soviet Union will continue to build up its essential projectional capability through the development of, for example, more and better LPD ships, more large transport aircraft, and, as we see in the next section, will continue to develop the de facto alliance structures essential to power projection in the late 20th century.

## II

### The Shift in Alliance Patterns

The advent of nuclear weapons and the change in the balance of forces has brought significant changes both in the balance of alliance systems worldwide and in their pattern. In this section we look at the evolution of alliance functions, then examine the erosion of the American system, the development of a quite different Soviet system, with new patterns of alliance use developing.

Projecting power through allies. Throughout the nineteenth century and midway through the twentieth, the purpose of alliances was as much to aggregate power as to project it. With the advent of the nuclear era with its new hierarchy of superpowers and relatively less powerful allies, the smaller partners could at best add only a trivial amount of military force to its ally's arsenal at the strategic level. The projection function (that is, the smaller power's willingness to lend facilities or to supply manpower to or in the interest of its greater ally) then assumes a relatively greater role in the contribution the smaller power could make to the alliance. To take the extreme case, Cuba, by allowing Moscow to develop military bases so close by the United States, by herself standing in for Moscow as the center of communist activity in the Western hemisphere, and by intervening in third world conflicts where Moscow's presence might be self-defeating, advances Soviet interests by many orders of magnitude beyond what her own actual military force adds arithmetically to Soviet capabilities worldwide. The same proposition holds true for the sort of close relationships that stop short of formal alliance: an increasingly important category in a world where three fourths of the states consider themselves non-aligned.

A great power's ability to project power through its allies or close friends is a function of its relative power position in the alliance, in the world system, and of its standing in the world system more generally. When a great power is seen to be strong, or when it is clearly in the ascendance, it can work through allies, summon them into coalition, and use them as surrogates. This minimizes its own risks, spreads the costs of fighting the enemy, and optimizes war-fighting potential by buttressing and supplying the ally best able to wage a particular conflict. There are no pure cases, always a mixture of motives on the part of ally and great power: but the United States could, for example, "fight communism" in Indochina through the French between 1949 and 1954. Washington could buttress Middle Eastern regimes--unsuccessfully in the event--by supporting an Iraqi and British-concocted alliance: and could muster the assistance of most of its allies in the Korean war. As long as the American position was strong and there was hope in the situation, Washington could persuade allies to fight in the Vietnamese war; as hope dwindled and the American position became more uncertain, it became increasingly difficult to keep allies in the fight.

In great crises it was possible to obtain cooperation even from non-aligned states; India sent 'humanitarian' assistance to the United Nations forces in Korea, which was of symbolic significance. Throughout

the first stage of the 1960 Congo crisis, the American stance drew wide support from the non-aligned. Washington coordinated its policy advantageously with such radical regimes as Ghana's in a fortuitous overlap of interests. It supplied the planes with which Ghana dispatched nearly its entire army to the Congo in hopes of stabilizing the deteriorating position there. In 1962, just prior to the Missile Crisis, it was possible for President Kennedy to persuade the most radical marxist leader in Africa--Sékou Touré--not to extend strategic staging facilities to the Soviets.

The systemic effect of alliance erosion. In the 1970's all that changed. SEATO died as an organization in 1975 when the North Vietnamese army marched into Saigon. The Rio pact ceased to have any operational characteristics. Canada grew more truculent in its attitude toward the United States as its internal problems mounted. In Europe, though there was a growing realization of how serious the Western position was, little was done to remedy the situation. The rundown of British defense forces gravely weakens Allied Forces North: Norway has become even more vulnerable and the Soviet Union has underlined Norwegian vulnerability by testing missiles in the Barents Sea. In the 1973 war, Portugal was the only NATO ally to give assistance in our resupply to Israel. The fact that Europe's dependence on Arab oil put them on a cleft stick, making it difficult to do otherwise, only underlines the change in the Western security position. Turkey and Greece sharply and adversely redefined their relationship to both NATO and the US. Though from 1974 the Italian Communist party conceded a role for Italy in NATO should it come to power, it called for a total reexamination of the Atlantic pact. It remains hostile to much of the NATO doctrine that gives a semblance of stability to the European balance--particularly with regard to "first use" of nuclear weapons.

The only strengthening of the American alliance system that has occurred in the 1970's comes from Australia, thanks to the return of the Country Party to power. The new Australian leader is deeply concerned by the projection of Soviet power into the South Seas and other areas that bear on Australian security.

Consider also our military infrastructures abroad. In the past decade, from Sangley in the Philippines, to Cam Ranh Bay in South Viet-Nam, and to Wheelus in Libya, the United States has closed bases for reasons ranging from "managerial efficiency"--because facilities could be duplicated or consolidated elsewhere--to surrender. The loss of no single base has been crucial, but every closure has removed an inter-connecting link from an international system, the whole of which is greater than the sum of its parts. The function of inter-connection is indeed often more important than the ostensible primary function of the base itself--which means that, in most cases, the argument that the presence of a base exacerbates bi-lateral relations is seldom a sufficient reason for closing the base.

Consider the closure of the bases in Thailand. These had been maintained after the American withdrawal from Viet-Nam, primarily in order to have the ability to enforce the ceasefire agreement. Less well appreciated was the Pentagon's desire to sustain an American position

far enough West for the projection of American power into the Middle East, in case the more logical Eastern approach was closed. Almost wholly as a result of a badly orchestrated American position at the negotiating level and a collapse of will at the top, the Ford administration gave in to the not very strong Thai demands to withdraw, even from the highly important intelligence collection facility at Ramusun. Most of the facilities could be duplicated in the great base complex in the Philippines, though not the forward position.

Not surprisingly, the Philippine posture has stiffened in the renegotiations over base rights there, for the bases have become more of a liability as the Philippines becomes more isolated as an ally. It is easy to envisage a sharp change in Philippine willingness to sustain so close a working relationship with the United States in the near future.

The problem is not just base closure. Where we have maintained bases, our allies and friends have imposed a growing collection of restrictions on their use: what sort of weaponry can be stored, what sort of platforms can operate out, and for what purposes. Some officers have argued that these restrictions have done as much damage to our international network as have our base closures and losses.

Yet another dimension of base closure and alliance erosion has to do with momentum. When great powers have a declining purpose, declining function, and perceived declining need, then it is possible to justify the closure of any facility with the rhetorical question of what purpose the bases could possibly serve. This in fact was asked by American officials after the closure of the Thai bases, despite their advocacy of the American position prior to the collapse of negotiations. Decline feeds on itself. The reverse is true for a rising power.

In relationships with unallied third world states, American relations have, with a small number of highly important exceptions, eroded even more rapidly than with allies. As third world leaderships look for foreign scapegoats, in the face of their intractable problems at home, the United States becomes more and more a whipping boy. This is despite the anomaly that American local economic interests are generally much more substantial than those of the Soviet Union, for example in Nigeria. Relations with some really important third world states, like India, seem unsusceptible of substantial improvement.

Only in Egypt has there been a reversal. The ebb and flow of Egyptian relations with the Soviet Union over the past two decades suggests caution in predicting that the present situation is immutable, however-- something underlined by the riots in January 1977.

In Saudi Arabia and Iran, the United States has sustained close relationships of vast political importance, even if of no long term help in holding down oil prices. Iran for its part has bought almost a billion dollars worth of Soviet weaponry (and is currently negotiating for more, as a signal to the American congress). It also appears increasingly susceptible to Soviet pressure. In the summer of 1976 the Soviet ambassador in Teheran, according to numerous Iranian sources, attempted to press the Shah into a downgrading of his relations with the United States and,

in general, attempted to intimidate him. Iranians claim that the Russian was unsuccessful, and that the Shah pointed to Soviet arms in Iraq, and the Soviet Union's own vastly greater force nearby, as the source of friction between Teheran and Moscow. But the record suggests that the Russian made his point. Not long after, Iran returned a Soviet pilot who had attempted to defect in Teheran. More significant, for some time the Soviets had been attempting to expand their military overflight privileges across Iran. For a time the Soviets succeeded by claiming that these were civilian aircraft. The Iranians, who knew otherwise, finally called the bluff of the Soviets, and the practice stopped. But in the autumn of 1976 the Iranians once again turned a blind eye to Soviet overflights, and the Soviets were able to project their power in the Western Indian Ocean at a new level of sophistication. They introduced Il-38 ASW patrols, like those operating out of Cuba and Guinea, to Somalia.

It is thus fair to say that, in the third world in general, the United States is on the defensive, rather than defending; it is seldom able to elicit support on issues of import to it. Adverse votes in the U.N., nationalizations of American business, and indifference to the American democratic idea seem characteristic of third world relations with the United States.

The new Soviet alliance system. Moscow's situation is moving in the opposite direction. Explicit alignment with the Soviet Union--even by military treaty--does not exclude a third world state from membership in the non-aligned movement as now constituted. At the most recent conference in Sri Lanka in August 1976, North Korea and Viet-Nam were admitted to membership; the independence of Puerto Rico was demanded and there was the usual litany of anti-American slogans.

Consider also the Eastern European satellites: they may be as reluctant allies as ever, but the Soviets have integrated their own logistical and transport system with those of the satellites, and increased their control of the military base network. This has gone far in recent years to offset the possible reluctance of these states to support the Soviet Union in a war. The Soviets have recently undertaken the revision and expansion of their European allies' treaty relations so as to commit them to assist Moscow anywhere in time of war--not just in Europe.

The satellites are, for their part, further intertwined in alliance and quasi-alliance relationships with such third world friends as Angola and Iraq, or clients of Moscow like Cuba. The area of explicit communist control, by regimes hostile to the United States and bound to the Soviet Union by de facto alliance relationships, has increased with Cuba, Viet-Nam, and Laos deeply intertwined, in varying degrees, in the Soviet system.

The Soviets have created what I would call an incipient international alliance system. Starting from the primary alliance system in Europe, they have constructed low-capability alliance systems in the Middle East and South Asia by signing treaties of friendship, by training forces, and granting increasing amounts of economic and military aid. They have enlarged the amount of prepositioned matériel in such states as Iraq and Syria for use in a middle eastern war. Their friends, like Libya, have used such

arsenals to resupply mutual friends--as Libya recently resupplied Algeria and Uganda, presumably with Soviet acquiescence. In Somalia the Soviets have greatly extended their direct lines of force projection: they have constructed a deep-water nuclear submarine facility and a two mile long runway for reconnaissance and ASW planes. It is, by every reasonable definition, a Soviet base, with extensive implications for the security of the Western lines of communication from the Persian Gulf to Europe. From the Cape Verde islands to Tonga the Soviets have investigated the possibility of building long runways and harbor facilities.

Patterns. Increasingly a pattern suggests itself, as the Soviet Union nourishes friends through the increasingly important stages of close diplomatic relations, economic then military aid, friendship treaties, then strategic access for the Soviet navy, and ultimately the capability to threaten Western interests directly.

In the Angolan conflict one sees the working of the new Soviet proto-alliance system. Overflight and staging rights granted by Algeria, Mali, Guinea and Congo Brazzaville made the Soviet supply and resupply efficient and fast. Operating out of Conakry and Point Noire, a five-ship Soviet naval group could stand as symbol of Soviet aid and protection. At the Cuban end, a similar if smaller network operated, with Guyana acting as a principal staging post. Africans may have cooperated with Moscow primarily because of South Africa's intervention in Angola: Soviet benefits have been no less for that. Angola and the Soviet Union have subsequently signed a Treaty of Friendship including obligations of mutual support that go beyond the customary provisions.

What the Soviets have been seeking is multiple options for precisely such operations. Right now the Soviets are building up their ties with Mali far beyond the needs of the bi-lateral relationship. The objective clearly is to provide a hedge against a defection from the system by near-by Guinea, whose need of the Soviets has lessened recently. A proto-ally, like Egypt, can in fact defect, at great cost to Moscow, but benefits will have been garnered during the period of friendship (in the Egyptian case enormous benefits off and on for two decades). Other friends will be there to take its place (in this case Libya, whose side the Soviets have taken in its recent conflict with Egypt). Likewise, as the Soviet Union's relations with Syria deteriorate, those with Iraq warm up, after a two year chill. The Soviets, to be sure, have suffered serious reverses in the Middle East, and are now at a position well below their highpoint--but one still far higher than is in the American interest or than it had been a decade ago.

What explains the overall record of Soviet gains in the third world? American policy in Viet-Nam, towards Israel or the white regimes in South Africa may be important: but those were not sufficient to cause the changes we have seen. The Soviets, despite their own bumbling diplomacy, have the third world adherence to various colorations of Marxism-Leninism also working for them. A surprising proportion of the influential leaders within the third world, who have given it what unity it has and built what organized movements that have met regularly, have been radical socialists, Marxist-Leninists. It is the ideology of "scientific socialism" of Sékou Touré, Samora Machel, or Augustino Neto, the Marxist rhetoric

of the Ba'athists and of numerous other Arab regimes, and the derived radicalism elsewhere, that gives to the Soviet Union many important opportunities for building its alliance system in the third world.\* Such ideology is usually self-serving and impure by Moscow's standards, fashioned largely to provide a convenient justification for the harsh personal rule and economic centralism that suits third world leaders, but does not affect the result--a perceived overlap of interests with the Soviet Union.

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\* Senator Moynihan's brilliant argument, published in Commentary in March, 1975, traces third world radicalism to Fabian influences. Fabian influence, however, has been on the decline for a generation and has slipped badly in recent years. The argument is thus increasingly unconvincing.

### III

#### The Deteriorating Milieu

There has been a general increase in conflict in recent years in the third world. This of itself would elicit superpower attention as one or the other's interests or ambitions got involved. But it coincides with the considerable increase in Soviet activity in this part of the world, raising the question of who will benefit, and how much. We will identify two basic trends in the third world, resource scarcity and resurgent ethnicity and 'tribalism', that seem to be increasing conflict, and will look at three sorts of conflict that appear to be on the increase partly as a result of these basic trends: traditional state-to-state warfare, intractable regional conflicts like that in Southern Africa and in the Middle East, and terrorism.

Conflict in the third world, to be sure, is hardly new. Indeed the notion of a 'third world' begins with India's independence, which was followed by probably the bloodiest struggle yet in the post war third world history. Yet in all, in the fifties and up to the latter part of the so-called development decade of the sixties, there was relative peace. The enthusiasms of independence, which came in 1960 for so many states, and without bloodshed to most, muffled or eclipsed the underlying ethnic conflicts in many places. Fairly substantial development aid funds helped bring relatively rapid growth, which helped further to smother unrest. A feeling of momentum attended third progress as more states became independent, and as institutions like UNCTAD were created to serve as mouthpieces for them. African states in particular discovered that the UN was a useful forum for venting their frustrations. There was at least the appearance of momentum in the Organization of African Unity and in the non-aligned movement.

Resource scarcity. In the early 1970's, a new factor to the conflict potential of the third world, resource scarcity and resource competition. It is too soon after the great oil-price rises of 1973-74 for the evidence to be conclusive: but there are scattered indications that the tighter economic conditions which have accompanied the oil price rise among energy-deficient developing countries have stimulated conflict--as indeed one would expect. The Indian government attributed the growing internal conflict, which provided the occasion for the creation of Mrs. Gandhi's new order, to scarcities--of oil-based fertilizers, food, and fuels. The argument is self-serving but has considerable merit. The Indian case is not unique: the earlier oil-price rises in 1970-71 were centrally involved in the Philippine power struggle that led to Ferdinand Marcos's martial law regime.

The other side of the coin is inter-state conflict--and here Philippine-Vietnamese-Chinese disputes in the South China Sea, the Moroccan-Algerian conflict in the phosphate-rich Spanish Sahara, or the Indian-Bangla Desh water conflict come to mind. It will be surprising if some of these potential conflicts do not in due course lead to war--as seems most likely in the Magreb, where the Algerians have well-armed the Polisario Front, and where the Moroccan army is primed to defend its new acquisition.

Is there a great power beneficiary? The Moroccan case might look favorable to the West: but the richer Algerians can rather cheaply tie down a sufficient Moroccan force to foment instability in the kingdom, in which case the Soviet Union, whose arms are involved, would benefit.

Conflict is seldom helpful to the status-quo power, which hitherto the United States has been. The Soviet Union, being much less dependent on external sources of oil and minerals and the stability of the international political and economic system, can prospect amidst instability with increased chances of success. The extent to which the Soviet Union was willing to encourage the Middle Eastern states to war in 1973 has been a sober lesson. It would appear that the Soviets will encourage third world states to use economic leverage against the west wherever they would also benefit, and will exploit competition for scarce resources to their own ends.

Resurgent ethnicity and communalism. With the exception of Somalia, Lesotho, Botswana and a few others, the new states are not homogeneous nations, and increasingly it looks as if the ethnic groups within are, if anything, in the process of consolidating their nationhood through the consciousness-raising effects of 'political development.' Communalism, "tribalism", regionalism, all appear to be on the rise throughout the third world—from Malaysia to Ethiopia, or from Chad to Iraq. In most cases unity has been preserved, for example in Sudan, but in others, for example Pakistan, it has not. In every case there has been a high price. The Nigerian civil war, which began in 1967, was won by the Federal Military Government very expensively, partly as a result of the Soviet arms supplied them, something Moscow, unlike Washington, was not inhibited from doing by domestic pressure groups. Despite substantial American economic involvement in Nigeria, that government has become steadily more hostile to the U.S., at the same time that its own stability once more comes into question.

Traditional conflicts. Prior to the 1970's there was a general third world tendency, which had begun with Nehru, to assume that these new states had brought to the international system a new morality which precluded the resort to force in their affairs. It was a notion which proceeded from the lack of arms in most cases. By the 1970's the arsenals of these states were increasingly well stocked and the leaders could resort to the traditional means of resolving disputes. The recent dispute between Uganda and Kenya comes to mind, as does the Tanzanian-sponsored refugee attack on Uganda in 1973. The massive Libyan-sponsored coup in the Sudan in the summer of 1976 and the third sub-continental war, in 1971, which led to the creation of Bangla Desh, are further cases. The Syrian intervention in Lebanon, Iran's assistance in Dhofar, and the Indonesian seizure of Timor in 1975 also illustrate the point.

In general there appears to be a new permissiveness toward the use of force in the third world. This derives from a number of factors. There is the perceived American unwillingness to assert itself in the third world, following on the withdrawal of British, French, and Portuguese forces from Asia and Africa. There is the growing arms supply, and most importantly there is the frustration on the part of the new leaders who are unable to deliver on their extravagant promises at home and seek diversions in external conflict.

Moreover, the demands of modernity and the failings of the political leaderships following independence or following the accession of a new, purportedly more vigorous leadership to power, have resulted in numerous coups and great instability, which has generally favored the revolutionary great power. Ethiopia, the prime example, disintegrates daily at the present time. Less well known is the extent of Soviet involvement--from the daily and lengthy Amharic broadcasts to more clandestine meddling.

In all of these cases American interests are involved, and in very few conflicts of recent years has the United States been the beneficiary--which is not surprising since America was the principal organizer of the international system, and even, for a time, its principal military defender. With the erosion of that system American interests were bound to suffer.

Regional conflicts. The instability of Southern Africa, like that of the Middle East, can in part be seen as a unique and contained problem. Like the Middle East, it is likely to affect and be affected by the international system as a whole, however. As in the Middle East, though to a lesser degree, the United States has historic links with the local pariahs--in this case the white regimes, on which fact the Soviet Union has played with great success in recent years. American policy is now in a difficult position. It must hope for the miracle of agreement on an American-sponsored "breakthrough" if the growth of the same sort of radical-Marxist governments in Zimbabwe and Namibia that have come to power in Angola and Mozambique is to be avoided.

It is often argued that the two former Portuguese colonies have found themselves perfectly capable of accommodating to reality in the region--and working with South Africa, as Mozambique does. Zimbabwe and Namibia could presumably follow suit. But working with Pretoria is hardly Mozambique's preference, and once South Africa looks vulnerable, it would be prudent to anticipate that the Mozambique regime's truculent Marxist-Leninist ideology will have increasing relevance to policy.

A Soviet-assisted radicalization of Southern Africa, which in part has already occurred, will have serious consequences for the West. The sixteen fold increase in the flow of oil to Europe and America around the Cape of Good Hope during the past ten years vastly increases the significance of the political orientation of those who control that region. It would be dangerous indeed for the Southern Africa SLOC to be controlled by regimes unsolicitous of Western security interests, as there are no bases available to the West capable of protecting the lines anywhere along the Eastern littoral of Africa.

Terrorism. In 1967 after the Israeli victory in the Middle East, terrorist groups proliferated throughout that region. This is the last of the major changes in the third world which have increased conflict, and which have tended to benefit the Soviet Union. Palestinian terrorists not only learned from each other: via television, dissident groups from Pretoria to Belfast emulated and copied them. It did not take long for the Soviets to see its interests in this situation, given the intimate American connection to Israel. The Soviets were responsible for training and arming substantial numbers of the Palestinians with devastating effect, and they often put them through party schools, probably with less effect. The Chinese saw

such techniques as an inexpensive way of competing with the Soviets and began the same game, arming "national liberation movements" in South Yemen, for example, as a way of forcing the Soviets to make more expensive outlays to revolutionary governments. Even the otherwise conservative Kuwaitis have been drawn into the net by harboring terrorists with important Soviet connections, and who are otherwise only welcome in Libya.

What can one hypothesize for third world trends in the future? Except for the oil exporters, third world states are finding that they are fighting a losing battle to modernize their countries. The easy gains of the 1960's are being negated by population growth and internal instability in the 1970's. Terrorism may decrease in the unlikely event that the Middle East and Southern African conflicts are 'settled' in ways favorable to American interests. But the techniques of the terrorists will meantime have been exported worldwide. One hopeful possibility lies in increasingly adept Saudi diplomacy. This could soon result in a Soviet reverse in Aden, and the Saudi lodestone could eventually prove irresistible across the Red Sea to Somalia. But hopes must be distinguished from trends, which are now all toward more instability, of which the Soviet Union will, more often than not, be the beneficiary.

IV

Intentions

The Soviets continue to prophesize that communism is the wave of all the world's future, which is largely rhetorical in actual usage. What can be said in practice of Soviet moves and plans for the projection of its power, with relevance for today's problems? Clearly there is no evidence of a 'master plan' unfolding on a preordained timetable. On the other hand, can one dismiss Soviet strategy merely as being a response to circumstance when 'targets of opportunity' appear? That too is an extreme view. The Soviets began cultivating relations with Somalia in 1962 and built up its armed forces and waited for their opportunity. It came in 1969 with a coup d'etat which brought a regime to power favorable to its own view of the world--or at least willing to go along with Soviet desires. We know enough about Soviet decision-making, an orderly process and highly bureaucratized, to reject the pure and unanalytical thesis of 'opportunism.' What would be of interest would be to measure the degree of opportunism--as all states to some degree are opportunistic.

Soviet policy has been and will obviously remain a mix: to project power throughout the world so as to be able in the first instance to prevent American interventions, secondly to protect and develop Soviet interests according to the opportunities available, and ultimately, one assumes, to threaten Western interests directly. The careful choosing of its friends for their geographic location--particularly near the Persian Gulf--bears out this hypothesis on Soviet strategy.

The growth of the Soviet willingness to project power can be charted by a look at the use of 'gunboat diplomacy' in the last decade. In 1969 Soviet ships positioned themselves aside the harbor of Accra to intimidate the regime, which had seized a Russian trawler for fishing in illegal (and possibly troubled) waters. Russian ships positioned themselves near Mogadisciu, the capital of Somalia, and along the Libyan coast, in the early 1970's, to intimidate opponents of the regime in the former instance, and to intimidate the regime in the latter. In the autumn of 1976, by which time Libya's relations with Moscow had vastly improved, Soviet ships stayed in the Gulf of Solum, on the Egyptian-Libyan border, beyond the time of the Egyptian deadline for the withdrawal of all foreign vessels, with the obvious purpose of deterring the Egyptians from responding to clandestine Libyan attacks on Egypt and its friends in the region. On a different plane, the recent increases in Soviet military aid abroad (a rough doubling of commitments in 1976), also confirms a willingness to step up the pace in projecting power abroad.

At a much higher level is the most chilling example of all. If one follows Admiral Zumwalt's interpretation of the 1973 October war, the Soviet alerting of their airborne divisions, and actual preparation for intervention, was an effective way of compelling the United States to behave in a prescribed manner: in this case to force Washington to make Israel withdraw from its position surrounding the third Egyptian army. The effect of this episode has yet to sink into the American consciousness.

The other dimension of Soviet projectional intentions which transcends speculation is its relation to American intentions and will; indeed this may be the most potent variable in the Soviet calculus. The United States has, after all, been the posseser, the 'international policeman,' the super power par excellence, with the greatest international infrastructure of all time: American willingness to vacate its positions of leadership in the parts of the globe where it played an important role can thus be seen as a critical dimension of the Soviet calculus.

There are several aspects of the American position. First of all, the American will to act internationally and overtly is plainly at a post-war low right now. Polls in 1975 indicated a widespread American disinclination to aid even traditional allies were they to be invaded, though as is often pointed out they would probably change rapidly if such an attack in fact took place. But it is perceptions that matter: such an attack might not take place if the polls had not suggested an unwillingness to react. Moreover, as Kenneth Waltz has pointed out, public opinion often follows government policy and perceptions of priorities--if perhaps with some lag. If the government saw a threat, public opinion would presently get in line.

It is, secondly, important to note that the US has changed the definition of the competition between the US and the USSR, because of how we on our side determine whether a given issue or territory is vital or important to us. It has been widely considered on our side that détente ended the cold war, and in many circles it was assumed that this meant an end to conflict between superpowers in the third world. But following this the Soviets encouraged the Arab state to attack Israel in 1973, they increased the supply of arms to the North Vietnamese in 1974-75 as we wound our support down, and they intervened with the Cubans decisively in Angola on the side of a minority Marxist faction.

Nor have we on our side had any conceit for countering the Soviet version of 'detente' and their willingness to aid 'national liberation movements'--that is, the factions on their side in civil conflict. We accept that competition by the Soviet Union with us for the loyalties of third world and allied states, must continue, and that the position is to be asymmetrical. That is to say we do not consider that it would be prudent or legitimate for us to support, even verbally, independence for the Baltic states, much less for the peoples of Soviet and central Asia, so much further along the path of nation-formation than almost any of the former European colonies were at independence: the notion that we should is generally viewed with horror by the American foreign policy elite. \*

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\* Indeed, in a series of briefings by the American Secretary of State and his Counselor, in late 1975 and early 1976, the doctrine was officially promulgated that, for the admirable purpose of preventing nuclear war, we, the Americans, should assist the Soviets in developing "organic" ties between Moscow and its satellites in Eastern Europe. Although the so-called Sonnenfeldt Doctrine was widely discussed, and was officially repudiated by the president, the full measure of it was not really taken. Instead of standing for liberty in those states, the United States was to assist the Soviet Union in developing the sort of ties for Eastern Europe that would ease the tension between them and Moscow, so as to lower the risk of nuclear war: which, it was argued, could start from an uprising of an Eastern European regime

The pendulum has swung so far that no less than an American cabinet member has praised the Cubans for their role in 'stabilizing' the Angolan civil war.

It is also interesting to note the terms of the debate on power projection that has gone on since the Angolan intervention. In foreign policy community discussion, it is common to hear the (self-answering) argument that it is inappropriate to discuss the projection of Soviet power, given the right the Soviets have, surely equal to our own, to acquire the bases or develop the friendships that the sustenance of a great world power position requires. The ample American precedent for Soviet action is often cited, and the fact that the Soviets have not actively intervened in civil wars (as we did in Viet-Nam) is noted.

The next line in the chain of reasoning in such discussions is that the Soviets in projecting their power further and further afield will overstretch themselves and suffer the same fate that we did in Viet-Nam. This is an argument which merits brief consideration. The Soviets have made innumerable mistakes, particularly at the level of personal diplomacy. The refusal of a Soviet base commander to grant personal access to President Sadat to a Soviet base on Egyptian soil may be the extreme example, but there are other cases from Ghana to Indonesia.

Counting on Soviet mistakes is a misjudgement, for it fails to take into account the already demonstrated Soviet capacity for learning from both American mistakes in the development of its alliance system and from their own mistakes in their early bursts of enthusiastic involvement in the third world. The Soviets have been shrewd in minimizing the apparent size of the military forces they station abroad, relying as much as possible on merchant marine and fishing fleet capabilities for transport and intelligence functions, and simply by denying the existence, or the import, of the sort of military infrastructure which they have built up in Somalia and elsewhere. They moreover rely wherever possible on 'floating bases' to minimize the negative repercussions of shore visits by sailors, replenishing from supply ships rather than from land facilities, as they did in Alexandria and more recently off Latakia, Syria. They thus admit to no foreign bases, which is clever, given the credibility that tends to accompany growing and self-confident power. Moreover, the Soviet executive is not constrained in its actions, like its American counterpart, by domestic pressures--certainly not to the same degree. The Soviets, where they have failed, can fall back, try again, persist, and ultimately hope to succeed.

A second thesis is that 'pluralism' has so afflicted the camp of international communism as to render its threat to the Western-organized system nearly meaningless (as if the Soviets ever intended to place their

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against Moscow. All this was because Moscow is so little skilled in the art of implanting "organic" roots. Imagining the converse of the doctrine for Moscow (for example, if Moscow proposed to assist Washington in making the role of its international corporations more acceptable in Latin America) gives one the full measure of the asymmetries inherent in Soviet-American views of their bilateral relationship.

Strategic Rocket Forces in the hands of Poles, or Cubans, for that matter.) Pluralism characterizes international communism, but it does not characterize the Soviet strategic threat or the core of the conventional threat to Western military forces of political institutions.

With respect to the projection of Soviet power, 'pluralism', in the Communist world, is not intrinsically disadvantageous to them; in projecting power the superpower does not require an identity of interests or ideological concerns with its ally or third-world friend. If interests overlap because both countries have the same enemy or the same regional objectives, or if the third world state is sufficiently dependent (like Cuba), or enthusiastic enough about its Marxism-Leninism to permit the installation of a forward base (like Guinea), or to grant port and staging and military aircraft landing and take-off privileges (like Iraq), then Soviet interests are well-served, other things being equal. The allies in Eastern Europe, moreover, play their role at the non-strategic level in helping the Soviet Union cement ties within, and they bring support to, the proto-alliance systems. In most radical third world states there are many functions allotted to the East Germans, Czechs, Poles or Hungarians--as well as hard chores left to the Cubans--in the division of labor within the camp of "peace and freedom".

What seems evident is that the Soviets will for the short term walk very cautiously so as not to disturb the highly favorable position that obtains today: they are on the 'right' side of the conflict looming in Southern Africa, third world sympathies increasingly lie in their favor, and the majority view in the American foreign policy community is that Soviet advantages are to be discounted, particularly with respect to the Southern African theatre. The Soviets were clever enough in manipulating American opinion, in the short term, during the Angolan intervention (e.g. holding out olive branches to be grasped by the American leadership) to make one hypothesis irresistible: the Soviets know how to lead American governmental opinion, but they also know that popular and congressional opinion can whip back suddenly, as happened when the Cuban-Soviet fait accompli was finally noted in Washington.

It seems likely that the Soviets will thus not disturb the favorable situation for at least another two years, except of course through aid to the insurgents in Southern Africa, and through further development and consolidation of their infrastructures of influence worldwide. Thus they will press for extended facilities in Iraq, and in West Africa, and they will continue to press Mme Gandhi for an opening of Indian ports and repair facilities. They will probably make a quiet breakthrough--already well prepared--in Turkey (the recipient of the largest amount of Soviet aid last year), which will eventually lead to a fundamental change in the balance of power in the Mediterranean.

It would be folly to expect this situation to be self-correcting: the Soviets are much less likely than in the past to awaken latent anti-Soviet feelings in the United States through a fit of bad manners. Indeed the opposite seems true. In recent statements in the Soviet press, the Soviets have eschewed mention of their commitment of support to wars of liberation in the third world. In the absence of evidence of doctrinal debate, one assumes this is for the benefit of the new administration in Washington, many of whose members have seized this as a basis for a new level of trust in the Russians.

American Responses

As we have argued herein, the Western international system, and American interests in particular, from trade-investments to ties with fellow democratic governments, have undergone very basic attacks in recent years, owing to a partly fortuitous alignment of Communist, Communist-supplied, and radical states on a broad range of issues and conflict in the third world. The problem, however, should not be exaggerated, for as was also suggested, American capacities remain large enough for the moment to defend our interests.

The problem arises from the facts outlined in the preceding section: American 'will' being so low. Will is a question of consensus in the first instance, and it is worth noting that this is the first time in at least several generations when a fundamental divergence of interests and view could emerge between the professional soldiers and diplomats on the one hand and the political leadership on the other. What must therefore be sought are short-term and low-level moves which can be undertaken by those so disposed, with some chance of general consensus, without a further decline ensuing in the American will to protect its allies and interests.

At the diplomatic end of the foreign policy spectrum, the United States can ironically now use non-alignment to its advantage. In the 1950's and 1960's when most third world states were in one sense or the other tied to the West, it was Soviet strategy to stress the benefit of nonalignment as a first step in detaching these states from the Western security system. Their success was great, but it is not too late for us to play the same card, now that the balance of nonalignment has tipped the other way.

It is important to realize that, despite the element of hypocrisy involved, third world leaders really do value aspects of nonalignment which we should take into consideration. Without apparent consciousness of the contradiction, most third world leaders are sincere in saying that they do not want entangling bases or to give strategic advantages to either superpower--meaning the Soviet Union. For example, India, despite its wholly biased non-alignment and anti-Americanism in rhetoric and in votes at the UN, has not as yet made genuinely strategic concessions to Moscow. However compromised India is in her declaratory policy, by the language of her 'Treaty of Friendship' with Moscow, and by the web of interrelationships involving the Soviet Union into which it has been drawn, a clear line of demarcation still exists. The Soviets have tried in numerous places to induce states to cross that line, but as yet only a handful have done so.

Enough remains of the standard of non-alignment for American diplomacy to make some headway, through perseverance and a clear notion of the issue. The problem is an important one, because thanks to radicalism in the third world and Soviet assiduousness in courting its leaders, a very large number of states is involved with the Soviets just short of that line of demarcation.

A clear lesson or current pertinence comes from West Africa. In 1958 when Guinea opted out of the French community, bringing about a punitive withdrawal by the French, Moscow moved in and almost made an ally, in the manner of Cuba, of the Marxist-Leninist regime which still is in power in

Conakry. An odd but warm friendship between Sekou Toure and President Kennedy, combined with Russian interference in the troubled domestic political scene, led to the ousting of the Russian ambassador and denial to Moscow of staging privileges during the Missile crisis, as we have already seen. Relations did not recover fully until a rag-tag Portuguese expedition nearly toppled the regime in 1970. The Soviets offered help, which was accepted, and back they came, this time with a small naval task force to protect Touré's government. In 1975, Conakry was a principal staging base for the Soviet Angolan operation.

In the summer of 1976, however, Touré once again became uneasy about his excessive identification with Moscow. His need for Soviet support had in the meantime declined, with the independence of Guinea Bissau and the departure of the Portuguese whom he feared. Thus the possibility existed that a demarche by the United States, based on an appeal to Touré's non-alignment, might have a similar result to that fifteen years ago. Were Touré to deny the Soviets the right to fly military reconnaissance and other flights out of Conakry, his non-alignment would be credible once again, and that extension of Soviet power along the Western sea lines of communication would be withdrawn.

Doubtless the Soviets would then find other willing capitals--and we would have to start all over again. But time would be gained. By the same token, whether the Soviets can overfly Iran, Turkey, or Pakistan en route to their base in Somalia has much to do with how long their ships, submarines, and planes operating out of Somalia can stay on station. Indeed, until the Iranians looked the other way in late 1976, when they flew their surveillance planes to Somalia, it was unclear whether the Soviets would in fact attempt surveillances of the Indian Ocean from a forward base.

There are other instances, where intelligent diplomacy might do much to convince radical regimes that there are advantages in working with us, and disadvantages in too close an involvement with the Soviet Union. Using the UN as a forum for calling third world leaders on their abuses of human liberties, as Senator Moynihan has suggested, is very useful tactically, however long it will be before third world countries actually improve in the area of civil liberties.

It is at the political-military level that the greatest remedy can be found. Measured signals of American readiness to stand by its friends and to defend its interests are needed, in order to have an immediate effect at a time of perceived American weakness. These can often be inconspicuous to all but the target country. This would reverse the image of a declining West, its economies in disarray, its allies and friends routed on the battlefield in Southeast Asia and Southern Africa. Our economic interests in the third world, so vastly greater than those of the Soviet Union, would be assets rather than hostages if United States diplomacy in the third world were undergirded by its military structures.

Two recent examples, where American decisiveness, in a low key, had an important effect, are suggestive of what American policy should be. The call of two of our frigates during the summer of 1976 in the port of Tunis had the effect of buttressing President Bourguiba's regime at a time when its leaders feared that their bellicose neighbor Colonel Quaddafi,

whose arsenals of Soviet weaponry are over-flowing, was planning to make good on his threats to attack them militarily.

Still less stable is the horn of Africa. In August 1976 Colonel Quaddafi attempted a coup on a large scale in the Sudan, further destabilizing the region. In those circumstances 'Field Marshal' Amin of Uganda, with his rather primitive radicalism and ample Soviet arms, might well have hoped to succeed in his threats to the security of neighboring Kenya, with its far less sophisticated weaponry. It was surely not reckless of the United States to despatch a destroyer to Mombasa and to use our P-4 Orions for surveillance in the area, as a means of reassuring Nairobi and deterring Kampala--though Kenya's defense was in every real sense in its own hands.

Those were chances of a minor sort which were not missed. It is more instructive to look at those that were missed. Angola is at the intersection of Soviet and American capabilities to project power, according to an unfinished DoD study. Yet in point of fact a minor task force from the Sixth Fleet could easily and readily have interposed itself between Luanda and the highly effective Soviet flotilla, so much greater was the naval power available at that time to the United States. The psychological effect alone would have been enormous; the military benefit perhaps, though not necessarily, decisive.

Numerous other chances have been missed to increase the psychological benefits in the third world from the projection of power. The Soviets gleaned enormous benefit from OKEAN 75; the United States has never undertaken so comprehensive an exercise, but those that it does undertake are complex and important. They should be better publicized.

It is to the threats to the fabric of an international system, identified in this essay, that we might well try to address our policy on the projection of power, in resisting Soviet inroads on the declining balance in the third world. The Soviets have their growing arsenal, and they have an ideology which has proved surprisingly useful despite its own rigidities, in easing their acceptance in the most influential third world capitals. They also have that important but hard to define factor, momentum, working in their favor.

Most of all they have a disinclination by the United States to compete. For the first time since the furthest reaches of the globe become subjectively involved in international politics, the United States does not have the relatively free hand that for so long characterized its opportunities. This happens at a time when, as I have tried to demonstrate in this essay, a variety of changes in the international milieu coincide fortuitously with growing Soviet capabilities.

Yet the United States has always thrived in the past on competition. There is no reason why it should not sustain its interests in the competition today, if only, instead of being defensive, it defended; if instead of surreptitious or covert intervention, it openly took a stand on the values which it will support, and backed them up with whatever was necessary. "Perseverance in good policies is the only avenue to success," as Dean Acheson advised, and this would certainly be true of US policy in the third world. American military and political assets, if they were used, and if no further rundown occurred, should be adequate to sustain Western interests throughout the world until the day, no doubt a long time off, when currently unstable third

world states have developed enough to value less authoritarian and radical traditions and their stake in a pluralistic world.

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