

INTERVIEW WITH DAVE HALPERIN  
BY MR. ROBERT RICE

15 February 1975

H - I graduated in 1965 from Columbia; I spend a year at Harvard in their Master's program and then went to my first ship--my first naval assignment. I'd been commissioned when I finished college, but given a year's leave of absence. These were the years of 66 to 68 and one shipboard tour at those times were two years; so coming up at the end of my second year, it was pretty clear that I'd be sent to Vietnam. Most of the young junior officers in 1968 expected to be sent to Vietnam.

R - It was not a voluntary thing at that point?

H - I thought it would be interesting. The ship spent several deployments off the coast of Vietnam and I had been the boat group commander on an Amphibious Troop Transport; so in that capacity I had had occasion to lead waves of landing craft into beaches in Vietnam and it was the event of our time and it seemed like it would be an interesting assignment notwithstanding some general misgivings I think most people had about this war. So my detailer told me to expect orders to Vietnam and I didn't find that unreasonable or disagreeable and my captain on this ship knew about Zumwalt, who had at that time the reputation of being one of the brightest and the most imaginative young flag officers in the Navy. So he undertook to try and get me an assignment in Vietnam as the Admiral's aide and I'd done well enough in my ship work to where I was

(

screened by the aide's selection board and approved for a position as an aide, but the Zumwalt's aide slots had, at that point, been filled. So the detailer eventually called me and asked whether I would--how I would feel about orders as aide and flag secretary to the Deputy Commander of Naval Forces and that sounded fine. I didn't know what an aide was, it just sounded like it would be a pretty simple position and you'd get a pretty interesting overview of what was going on in this country and this war.

R - Who was that?

H - I arrived in country and relieved the fellow as aide to Rear Admiral Bill House, who was there for about 4 months as I recall and was himself relieved by Rear Admiral Bill Flanagan, and it was Flanagan whose aide I normally was through my tour in Vietnam.

In any event, shortly after I arrived in country, Zumwalt decided to expand the operations in the Mekong Delta; and give his Deputy some more clearly defined role and to divide the locust of command responsibility in Vietnam. He asked the Deputy to take up residency in Canto, which is the largest of the Mekong Delta cities and divide his time between Headquarters in Saigon and Canto. I went down with the Deputy and worked with the Army there. In that time I began to teach at some Vietnamese school and trying to learn the language and it was really quite interesting in the country and thought that after 6 months

of being an aide it was interesting, but it really wasn't much of a contribution and that I would try and do something else.

R - What does an aide do?

H - Fix plane tickets and makes sure that the cars are there, the planes are there and the messages are on the desk in the morning and that the directives get discharged and that the Headquarters is informed when decisions are made, that the dinner parties are arranged. It's a kind of a "jack of all trades" job. It's interesting and Flanagan has become a very close friend. He's a wonderful man and it was a very special opportunity to work closely with him and get to know him. One can see that it's a very valuable experience for junior officers whether in or out of the military. It is an opportunity in ones life to see how power is exercised and how the system works. In any event at the end of 6 months, I thought that it's been interesting, but surely--and that was a time in which there were plenty of gallant fellows who had been on boats, and out of a country who deserved that kind of a job for 6 months for their last 6 months in-country and I was interested in getting out. Zumwalt was devising, at that point, an operation which would put in place--he had a series of floating pontoons constructed in Cam Rahn Bay and taken down in the welldeck of an LST and then in a 24-hour period planted in the river in the southern most tip of Vietnam (which was an area

( (

of about 250 thousand acres that had been gradually taken over by the Vietcong and there's a large city down there-- Cam Ho--had been bombed by B-52's when the government gave up any effort to try and control it was so clearly under VC control and virtually abandon). As the war passed on this was very rich and fertile area and Zumwalt felt that it could be reclaimed for the government and resettled if the government would establish a presence, which would provide an umbrella of security and make a commitment to the region which would encourage people to come back and resettle. So I asked if I could go down to that operation because it seemed like a very interesting one. I have a picture of it in fact.

This was where we lived, where I lived the whole time we were down there which in time we began to rebuild the city. This is where the city had stood, and a base was constructed. It's an example to me of this fertility of the Admiral's imagination that he could conceive of this approach to developing an instant base.

R - And that being out there in the middle of the river made it fairly secure?

H - We had the machine guns all around it. Most of the people in Vietnam thought it was insanity and to tell that those were ammunition and fuel depots and anyone could throw a bomb down and blow the thing up and that was just crazy.

H - But we patrolled it and had nets out and those things and cleared the area around it and put patrols out and did those things that one could think of to secure it.

R - It's not quite as easy to ambush when something is out in the middle of the river as it is in the jungle?

H - Although the current was about 10 or 12 knots at its highest and one could certainly imagine just floating bombs down. And in fact shortly after I left, they had several swimmer attacks on the thing and killed people 50 yards distance. One fellow was crawling up on the side of one of these things with plastices strapped to himself, so it wasn't so invulnerable as people would like to believe. In any event, in that time down there I did a lot of things. My interest was in trying to get people to come back down, so I worked with various Vietnamese ministries to develop means of informing people in the Delta area. For the year and a half in Vietnam, I guess that was my billet, normally aide to the Deputy Commander. But I did three or four things in that year and it was a loose command structure, I mean this wasn't the Pentagon where you had a slot and that was it, I mean the war really militated against that kind of formality.

R - So basically the role you played there then was kind of --

H - Operations Officer of this operation, for a period of time I was the Psychological Warfare Officer, I was the Special Assistant to the Commander. Up until this point, I would say although in Saigon I sat at numberable dinner

H - parties at the end of the table, I had never had a meaningful discussion with Zumwalt. The aide, his Deputy was sort of out of the mainstream of the operations and although I knew Zumwalt, I had never had a meaningful conversation with him.

When I took this job down at SeaFloat, which is what it was called, it was an operation which the Admiral had very \_\_\_\_\_. In part it seemed to have grades of criticism from MACV about the wisdom and security and conceptual soundness of this operation and so he came down once every three or four weeks sometime bringing a three or four-star General, because it became known as one of Zumwalt's wild ideas and people were curious as to what the hell was going on down there. I would normally be the person that would brief people on this operation and I found out a great deal about the region and the kind of crops that grew there and I was starting to have the kilns rebuilt and pineapple crops put in and so I kept accurate statistics of the number of people coming down and where they came from and I would spend three or four hours a day with the people who were resettling the region and it was something that intrigued me; and I think that in the dialogue that developed during the course of the Admiral's visits, we came to get along. I think that that's really where we first had exchanges and talked and I got to know him in any event. About 4 or 5 months after I had been down there, one of the fellows who was

H - in command of one of the swift boats attached to SeaFloat was the Admiral's son, young Elmo, who I as the Operations Officer was the fellow who decided each day how the boats were to be deployed and used and developed to serve operations on which they would go, I got to know Elmo pretty well. I'm trying to think of how I move to the next job which was up on the Admiral's staff and I'm sure it was related to the fact--no, no, this place is right, but it's not quite in order. Any way, I'd been down there 5 or 6 months--6 months as the Admiral's aide, 6 months at SeaFloat, my year was up and I was scheduled to leave country.

R - This would be like 1969.

H - That's right. And at some point I decided to extend for another 6 months and I went up and talked with Flanagan and I said I'd like to extend, but I'd like to do something different. At that point, Zumwalt had started on his staff in Saigon a Systems Analysis section of his planning staff.

R - Was that Chick Rauch?

H - Chick Rauch was part of it. There were about three different people that sort of melted together. A fellow named Henry, who was the plans officer; Chick Rauch who was the turn over Czar as it were; and there was a commander who was sort of the technical fellow who headed up as Systems Analysis shop that related to these other outfits. And since that had been Systems Analysis as

H - a discipline, that it sort of intrigued Zumwalt, so this was an effort to reproduce--I mean it looked to all of us in Vietnam like he was reproducing this fancy Washington apparatus in Saigon. It was very exciting to be a part of this military figure that was so clearly different than any other military figure that most of us had ever come in contact. He moved at about twice the speed of anybody else in every sense. So I thought maybe I could get assigned to this systems analysis shop.

R - Was he also different in the way he related to people?

H - I mean there's all kinds of differences. He's really sort of an anomalous military figure in the sense that if you watched him work in a normal command fashion, there are all kinds of curious things that you'd see in him. He's a man whose voice is very low, he never raises his voice. And when he's most serious and most determined and intent, he's almost inaudible. That's sort of as a superficial observation is certainly a departure from the conventional military figure. He's very controlled and in briefings I've watched him, I'd know when he was concerned about something because his jaw muscles were tight and that's about the only way you'd know and most people would never know. He would ask a question, if he would get a response that he wasn't satisfied with you would see his jaw muscles tighten and you'd know that something was going to change, although the briefing



H - officer wouldn't know. He's a very gentle, mild man, and he doesn't get angry. I mean he makes clear decisions about things, but you don't see manifestations of anger.

R - What astonishes me most about Zumwalt is that a guy like that got all the way to the top of the Navy. How the hell, there must have been somebody smart looking after him. I suppose it was Nitze.

H - Nitze was an early sponsor, but you see the thing about someone like that is that anybody that he worked for found him to be the most incredible achiever. You could give him any job and it will be done better than anyone has ever done it for you before. So that in a career, people on whose staff he'd work knew that he was not just somewhat more able young officer, that if you gave the job to him to do, he would do such a remarkable job that you would know that here was an officer with a difference. He's a brilliant mind, his passive for work is prodigious and he has this sort of imaginative quality in his approach to solving problems that I think is what distinguishes his performance over time. So in Vietnam, in the beginning in the Tank with MACV, with the others, the heavies--he was the only three star--and there was the head of the Air Force, the head of the Army and Abrams and their Deputies and in this crowd, I'm sure he came on in the beginning as a curious figure and I mean maybe they didn't know what to make of him and he's 10 years younger and very different and he would come on with these 6

H - dimensional viewgraph slides to illustrate some analyses of enemy tactics and it just took them -- what were these WWII Air Force flyboys who were forced into competent solid people, but you get a 4 dimensional viewgraph with three different axes demonstrating some ingenious analyses that the Admiral has put together containing three different recommendations on tactic and it takes them by surprise. But it was an exciting climate in which to work and one could tell in talking to PHD's from Harvard who work for General Brown that they worked very hard and they were able and they put together good analyses; but I don't think they ever felt that the General could understand them or was with them or they had the kind of a leader that made it exciting to work. Whereas the feeling around the staff at COMNAVFORV was very different. So I went to work on this System Analyses Shop after I took a trip around the world and came back for another 6 months. And the first job I got, which took two or three months, was to develop a plan--a time phase plan--for turning over all the air support responsibilities--the Vietnamese Navy operations--to the Vietnamese Air Force, which was an interesting project. It involved a lot of different variables and there were training schedules to work out and equipment turn over schedules to work out, had to figure out to what extent the operations were to be joined and then when the Vietnamese were to take over and there were different kinds of aircraft.

R - Where was this going to originate?

H - Mostly helicopters and fixed wing aircraft that flew out of bases in the Delta and Saigon. We had one squadron of Marines fixed wing aircraft and we had a lot of different helicopter detachments and since we were turning over far fewer helicopters to the Vietnamese Air Force than U.S. Forces used, the questions was whether the planes that we were turning over could be adapted to the kinds of missions that heretofore had been performed by helicopters. So there were a lot of crises like that to work on. And it was quite interesting, and it brought us at cross-purposes with the Air Force and the Army; and so it was an occasion where I was working with a team of people that was putting together a presentation containing a lot of fairly controversial points which the Admiral would eventually have to present and get approval both from MACV and Hawaii and Washington. So it was a great time to be working with him on sort of a cerebral way on a project and kind of an analyses where you were working as an advocate on a set of issues.

R - How's his diplomacy with the other Services?

H - He's the most effective person there is. People will always chaff about him, they resent his effectiveness; but he always prevails, because he is better prepared in every meeting he ever attends than anybody else present. And over time you prevail, if you've read more carefully, you're more imaginative in your analyses, your brighter

H - to start with, your more articulate -- and he's a master bureaucrate. He's a sort of person that has no -- he doesn't work on behalf of himself, but when there are issues at stake, he is a master bureaucrate and can marshal different kinds of constituencies to provide; identifies at the key juncture points in the decision making chain, bring pressure to bear. There is one other factor which I think explains his success which is that he is the most loyal person to those who work for him of anyone I have ever seen. He would spend, I think, 2 1/2 hours at the end of each day in Saigon on the phone in his bedroom with a list of people that he was taking care of. These were Lieutenants all over the Delta. These were enlisted people, these were chiefs, these were captains, these were people and it's a matter of just demanding that they be given whatever it was that they wanted-- whether they were getting out of the Navy and wanted a job with a construction company in Des Moines, he would figure out someone he knew in Des Moines and he would write letters and he would place calls and he would get the Secretary of the Navy to write and he does it not for 10 but for a thousand people. That's the kind of behavior that makes people love you and loyal to you to the end. So that as he's going through unlike someone like Haig or Kissinger (Kissinger more than Haig) who has no loyalty, who never enhances the careers of anyone--I mean there isn't any real loyalty that to be felt towards a man like that

H - because his relationships with the people that work for him are really rather cynical relationships, I think. And this kind of loyalty that is spread throughout the Government--all kinds of people that have worked for the Admiral at one time or another or in one capacity of another. When an issue came to a critical decision venture and he really felt that it was important, there would be Congressional aides that would be willing to get him appointments to brief people. He had this sort of legacy of support and loyalty and affection and admiration that comes into play when he is concerned about an issue and he is determined it needs to be heard.

So that takes us up to about the last two months, and at that point--he had known me down in this river operation. We got along quite well and we worked together on this turn over plan for the Air Force responsibilities and Elmo and I got along well and gradually we got to know each other much better and he asked in the end two things:

(1) I was about to get out of the Navy and go to Law School at that point and he asked whether (I guess that question came later. The first question was whether I would take some general position with him and he gave me free reign to wander around the country visiting Naval Operations in Vietnam which were being turned over to the Vietnamese as a trouble-shooter which was a very interesting assignment. And I did this with his son and the two of us would go take a helicopter and we'd go up to Bien Thu or to \_\_\_\_\_

H - and the Cambodian border and we'd spend three or four days and we'd drive boats, talk to people, we reviewed records and gather statistics and come to some conclusion about problems in operations, about tactical problems and come back to Saigon and write reports and frame recommendations in. That was very exciting because it really gave one free reign to use ones imagination. So in that capacity the Admiral and I developed I think a way of working together which involved me going to study some problem or some issue and be off by myself and just fuss with it. I talked to people, gather statistics and then come back to him and brief him with some discrete recommendations that he could implement leaving it somewhat unclear as to the source of the recommendation; because it is a tricky general problem to take a younger person and have him sort of taking soundings at a low level in sort of an ambiguous way and use that as a source of directing fairly senior career people to make changes in their operations. Towards the end this mode of operation became very tricky and very frequently unpleasant to go out to an operation and be greeted by some Commander who felt he had a Zumwalt spy arriving to spend a week and what the hell kind of an approach is this to take to anything. This pattern of operating developed and it revealed all kinds of things that badly needed correction, curious things that were going on, op-tactical disasters, turn-over problems of some magnitude that had been relatively

H - concealed and covered up or obscured by the Commanders who for one reason or another didn't want to highlight all kinds of problems. So it is an effective tool, but it comes at some cost of demoralizing the senior people who feel that their trust is being questioned somehow or their authority or whatever.

R - Well, it also turns up some senior people who ought to be somewhere else.

H - Yes, that's true. About that point, Zumwalt was named CNO and I was going to get out of the Navy that June and he asked if I would come back with him to Washington with the understanding that he would let me out of active duty within a day or two of being asked, that I could stay as long as I wanted or as short as I wanted; but he would like me to come and be with him in the first few months of his tenure at least. Although the notion was fairly nebulous as to what I would do, he thought it would be useful to try and operate in somewhat of a similiar way as I had done in Vietnam; but instead he changed the structure a bit and his notion was that I would work for a week for a time with different constituencies within the Navy sounding them and trying to program for different notions of things that they thought should be corrected in the Navy and we would meet with the Admiral briefly. They would have a chance to, after having flushed things out and framed problems and developed some recommendations to deal with them, then they would meet with the Admiral

H - and maybe the Secretary of the Navy and have a chance to present their views to him directly.

R - This notion arose before he ever left Vietnam?

H - Yes.

R- And this turned out to be the Retention Board?

H - Yes, this turned out to be the Retention Study Group that we did. I think that he had in mind in Vietnam--I mean that was such an exciting time, it had been this incredible promotion and he's given all of a sudden the opportunity-- he has the whole Navy in scope. He wanted to make changes quickly and he was spending half his day running the Navy in Saigon and the other half he had teams of people working on all kinds of projects-- things that he wanted to do in the first day and the first month and the first six months--

R- And he had Bagley there.

H - Yes, he had Bagley fly back, he had a man, now Admiral Bigley who has gone to head the Middle East Force, who came back, he put Admiral Tidd full time working out things and it was really exciting. He began soliciting all kinds of officers throughout the Navy for ideas and views, and put people on task. It's like, I'm sure, every President who comes to office feels in the first six months of his tenure. It is such an exciting period--all the wrongs are going to be corrected. That's the sort of enthusiasm that ebbs in time--

R - Before you've met Kissinger and Rickover and Stennis--

H - But one hopes that every four years that someone will



H - come that brings to bear exactly those kind of feelings because--surely that's the infusion that you need.

So he had in mind that this technique that seemed to be working in Vietnam is a means of identifying problems and issues would work in the context of trying to sound younger people, since he viewed as one of the critical problems in piecing this naval retention. He felt that the most direct way is to find out what are the sort of things that are making people leave the Navy and what kinds of changes could be made that would make the difference and leave them to stay in.

R - He was fussed about the all volunteer Navy and all volunteer everything?

H - Yes. He gave me carte blanche to develop some sort of format that we could work within under that general guidance.

R - Was the implication of what you said that the first idea was for you to be going around the fleet or?

H - We did a little of that, but that seemed fairly less practical than calling people back.

R - Do you want to describe briefly the system you got for assembling the boards, because that's kind of a critical point, isn't it?

H - Yes. The Navy is comprised of lots of different kinds of communities and they represent pretty definable groups--aviators, submariners, surface officers, junior officers versus senior officers, women, blacks.

(

R - What I meant was how did you make sure that the groups didn't get stacked?

H - That was one problem. I think the second Z-Gram was an announcement that the Admiral intended to convene this series of retention study groups. As I recall, the way we assembled the groups was to, we wrote guidelines that we thought would militate against any effort to stack the group and then we would frequently add a couple of maverick people or people that we thought were imaginative and that were not hand picked by command to represent a command point of view. As I recall, the message that went out requested that the group include half the people who were staying in and half who had clearly decided to get out. So by insisting that you get people who had already decided to get out of the Navy--

R - You have that many reasons for leaving.

H - That's right and there was a lot of chafing about that. I began to find, I mean it was a problem that didn't seem real, because once the people came back, they had so many bitches and griviences on their mind that it was clear that this couldn't possibly have been a group that was selected for \_\_\_\_\_ --I mean you take anybody in the Navy who has spend any amount of time and they've got ideas about if they were CNO what the hell they would do; and they're not about to be muzzled by any Commanding Officer when they have the ear of the Chief of Staff of the Navy. So it didn't turn out

H - that this was in any way a --

R - If it turned out, in other words, if the Commanders of the various commands didn't have any idea who had a command point of view and who didn't.

H - That's right. Everybody had all kinds of ideas about what he should do. I'm sure there were records to shape these groups, but if you're running a group every third week or every second week--

R - Of course if you just put one rabble-rouser in the group, that's all you'd need to stir everybody else up.

H - That's right. So the problem in that kind of group is not sort of getting people to say what concerns them, but trying to figure out some creative solutions to what you're going to do about it. And that really was the catalytic --

R - When those groups got together, was there any kind of a pattern that repeated itself over and over with different groups? For example, did it start out everybody --

H - People don't know each other in the beginning when they come together. They're told to check into the Holiday Inn over in Arlington and to be a group such and such at the Center for Naval Analysis at 9 o'clock on Monday and so they'd show up and everybody sort of look at each other. Then we'd sit down and I would begin--

R - Were you the warm-up man?

H - In the beginning I was the only person that was there. They'd come and I'd tell them where the coffee was and we'd sit down around the table. At the beginning we tried to

- H - keep it at 10 or 12. In the beginning it was small and more manageable. I felt as sort of the first point that I should make them understand somehow that this man was not an ordinary man and this was a rather special opportunity to have some real impact on the way the Navy was.
- R - Did you any previous experience in whatever those terrible things they called group dynamics?
- H - I'd been a teacher for six months in classroom and tutored kids.
- R - So mostly you just made this up as you went along?
- H - Yes, it was not very structured in the beginning, but working with the Admiral, I knew how he worked and I knew what it was that we had to do if anything was going to be made to happen which is to say that if you go to the Admiral, you say, these people are terribly concerned about uniforms they just think that the uniform (\* \* \*) and they're just bitching and moaning, the Admiral is going to appreciate the problem but he's got 8 minutes to give you and you've spent 7 of them describing graphically how upset they are; but if you come to him and in three minutes say, they feel very concerned about the uniform but what they would like to do right now, they'd like to do away with the top hat, they would like a board comprised of the following people make recommendations in six months, they'd like to have a new man in charge they like and give him some discrete things and he can say "do it, set up the board, get a Master Chief of the Navy, do away with the hat

- H - give me some cost". You've got to transfer the grivience to something that can be made to happen, because the Admiral, if anything, his fault of training is that he moves so quickly when he can figure out something to do to change, to address, to deal with the problem that he wants to act and not to understand and analyze. The problem was to take these all kinds of extraneous griviences and distill them down and figure out what do you do if, you know, you're concerned that you don't get a chance to command a ship until your 35 years old and that's 12 years after you've joined--well you can talk about how upsetting it is or you can figure out what could he do. And you could say, well he could take one destroyer squadron in each coast, which contains 4 ships apiece, that's 8 ships and give those to Lieutenants to command. Change those from LCDR to Lt commands. And you could take all the PG's and make those LT commands and then you could reduce the command tour from 24 to 18 months. And you figure all that out and it provides 37 command opportunities which gives the top 7% a shot at it. So that if you can take the concern about lack of command and figure out how you could approach so that you could give them some discrete so they would express these things we'd toss different solutions --
- R - Did they play a big part in devising such solutions? Were you able to get a lot of this out of them?

( (

H - Yes, but the idea was to get them into the way of thinking, I mean to make them understand that they had 42 minutes with the Admiral and they could either tell him how bad it was or they could give him 143 recommendations which they could see happen. One could do it by giving them examples of the way the Admiral behaved in Vietnam, by trying to make them think in terms of creative solutions to the problems that they feel; and by about the third day, they were coming up instead of shooting problems, they were shooting--how about if you took, how many destroyer squadrons are there? Couldn't you take this --

R - But it was necessary to give them three days to get it off their stomach.

H - That's right. They wanted to talk about uniforms--you know they would have talked about uniforms forever. Everybody has his notes on "why the hell do you have a brass buckle, why in the hell do you do this, why do that". There are a lot of bitches, the first thing was haircuts. This was before he said "alright, we'll longer hair and sideburns if you want them" but in the beginning, the first day these guys are going nuts.

R - Why? Can you explain why haircuts were that important?

H - I don't know. They've never been very important to me, they're not very important to the Admiral either. The Admiral doesn't know what he's wearing much less what his hair looks like; but they were clearly important to somebody and that was the point.

R - Did you ever figure out what the importance was?

H - The fellows said all kinds of things: you couldn't get a date; it earmarked you as a Navy person in any city that you appeared in and these fellows wanted bell-bottom trousers and pink shirts, long hair, and be able to get a date and go kick around the town a little bit. And if they have hair that is a 1/4 inch long and they can't have civilian clothes on board ships and they're in Nice and they got to go buy civilian clothes and hide it in the bottom of their locker, they felt like jerks. I don't have an answer. Those are the kind of things that they said, but clearly in these times people spend more time looking in the mirror, they comb their hair more, they care about it more. Why that is, God only knows, but it was the case.

R - It also made them feel as if they were there for real, allow them to bitch awhile.

H - That's right. If you cut it off too soon and said listen if you really want to use your time effectively, what you'll be doing is we'll divide up; but you really couldn't do that. They've come there as much to ventilate as they had to frame and I saw my job as making sure that there was some constructive consequence of their having been called together.

R - What is that, a week?

H - A week. So we'd go two days of bitching, two days -- and I'd be sort of trying to extract and to get them to come up with some recommendations that wer doable, things that

H - could be changed.

R - Did everyone of these get to see "Z" then?

H - We would all meet on Friday--normally Mrs. "Z" would have lunch or drinks for them up at the house and they'd go up and that would be sort of kicks. And the way we did these presentations would be that the night before I would work up a bunch of view-graphs which would flash the recommendations on the screen. Then we had it that people who felt most strongly about particulars would speak; but we rehearsed the thing. It was a performance. We had 42 minutes and I knew the Admiral's time sensitivity and I know what I want to happen. 67 minutes or so, but a limited amount of time and they had a lot of things they wanted to say and I wanted to make sure that several things happened -- normally an hour. So we'd have these 8752 recommendations and I'd stand up there and say, "Seaman Jones felt very strongly about uniforms, Admiral" and then he would jump to his feet and he'd say, "Admiral, we have about 4 different concerns and we think that if you'd set up a new uniform board and it contained two enlisted men and if you'd send three people out in the fleet" and he'd get it out. We would work on it for about 4 or 5 hours. We'd get the slides together and we'd sit down and it would be a late night and we'd go over it and we'd time ourselves and it was fun.

R - Sounds like great fun. Did the Admiral enjoy it?

H - Yes, because the Admiral was being given things that he



H - could do. He would go back and normally I would go up, maybe Saturday morning, and he'd sit and say, "okay, do this, we'll do this, get a directive out on this, give this to Chick Rauch". I felt I had to operate in a somewhat discrete way , because the Admiral always had some young people on his staff--I mean in every command he has some Lieutenant that he gives great responsibility to and it's always tricky because, particularly when it's a four star Admiral and he has all these two and three star Admirals competing for his time much less Captains and Commanders. In a sense, in the way that I was able to shape recommendations and sometimes it clearly was the case that there were feelings and I would think and there wouldn't be any suggestions so I would think of something that could be framed as a recommendation that could be made to happen that would deal with this problem. So that it was a position with substantial leverage in a certain sense. And so we would go up and there would be 87 recommendations he'd go down and in eleven minutes he could say, "alright we'll try pilot program, two on the West Coast and two in the East Coast; we'll let one APA, one destroyer and one PG try having civilian clothes on board, get a directive out that says that; we have eight black people in the Naval Academy now, I want 108 by next year's class and make sure that a letter goes out to the Commandant" and so forth. So he would go down and we would make these things happen.

R - This just wasn't you, was it?

H - No, it was the group effort of a week and it was some discrete recommendations, but he wanted these things to happen.

R - But when you got into the directive phase and all the rest of it there were other of his assistants involved.

H - That's right. Then normally what I would do, Admiral Tidd was there and I'd go over it, we'd sit down and I'd say, "this was the guidance" and I'd leave these list of things and then out would come these green stripes that would drive people nuts.

R - But it would be coming out of Tidd not out of Halperin right?

H - Right, or out of his special assistant, the Admiral has them. He can figure out a way to get anything done that would work right, and in some things the best way to do it was this, some things he would make notes of and say, "I will call Admiral so and so because that's the best way to do it."

R - You and Tidd got along alright?

H - Fine. Many people didn't because they felt Tidd was the guy where all these green stripes were -- flooding out on the streets from Tidd's office and they'd say, "Jesus Christ, who's running the Navy." But Tidd had done exactly the same function in Vietnam and it was a system that he had developed really in Vietnam and then transposed to the CNO's job. I still the world of Tidd and I see him

H - whenever I'm in Washington.

R - He seems to me as a very effective guy.

H - Right. He's not as creative, he's pretty solid, he's not sort of unorthodox; but he works harder than anybody and he knows exactly what the Admiral wants and he makes it happen.

R - And of course Bill Norman was in on it.

H - That's right. This I'm describing at the beginning. It wasn't very long after Bill Antle, who is now at Columbus, Indiana took over the retention study. I left when I went to Kissinger and Bill was running the thing, and for most of the time we were at these things we were co-chairing them together and then the wives began. One group said why can't our come and the Admiral is always apt to say do it. The next group would have wives, the word gets out and now we have the wives. I guess for half or two thirds of them would have the wives there and the Admiral felt that if they were coming they ought to have their opportunity as well.

R - Do you think they contributed a lot?

H - Well, they did in the beginning and I think certainly must be true that when a fellow is reaching a decision about whether he's going to stay in or get out, his wife's view is one of the critical factors. The problem that we had with the wives is that their range of concerns were much more limited than their husbands, and so that in about the third group it was really a struggle to focus on issues

(

H - that had not been covered before and of course, each group that would come what we would have them do to start with is read over the recommendations of the past groups and I would make every effort to try and get them to try and focus on new issues, but we began to run out of new issues. But they all wanted to have their say. The lines in the commissary upset every Navy wife that's ever been. I mean it's all very well that the last group discussed it and raised it with the Admiral; but they have some story that they just couldn't wait to tell the Admiral which is part of the reason in having them come. It became a little tedious to be chairing a group that was repeating the kind of recommendations that you've heard forever.

R - But this was a community relation effort as well as --

H - And as time passed, the recommendations got fewer because these groups had gone over a lot of ground. And at this time, then there was, Bill Antle and I really did it together for most of the time and Bill Norman really never-- he reported in and never had a direct connection with these series of retention study groups, he was a much more general purpose Special Assistant to the Admiral and he was always someone that we could go to to get things done as he had day to day access and if we were having problems getting this recommendation implemented or that one, he could always take care of it. He took on the development of all kinds.

R - Didn't he do the Black retention group?

H - You're right. He did that and then took those recommendations and stayed with him and made sure they happen, and then turned them over to Tidd; but he was there to take those and develop them into a much more fleshed out program which would move the Navy forward into this century.

R - That was the hardest one, I think.

H - Yes, that was one that really, but it was also the most -- the sessions were just incredibly poignant. I remember one incident I think with the Black Officers. The Admiral would normally be accompanied by half a dozen flag officers and maybe the Secretary of the Under Secretary of the Navy would come; so this was a room full of people and were heavies -- maybe more on 5 officers, I don't know. The Chief of Naval Personnel would come and his two Deputies and all kinds of people as time passed wanted to get in because the truth of the matter is that every Admiral also had his very strong views on what the Navy uniform should look like and all the little things. I mean everyone who has gone through 25 years in the Navy has things in his mind where if he were Chief of Staff of the Navy, what he would do about the fringe on the back of -- I mean so that they got to be very heated sessions because the young fellows would come in and they were getting their chance to tell the Admiral and even Rear Admirals weren't getting a chance to tell the Admiral-- That is one of the reasons why towards the end we had Captains and Commanders because --

(

R - What retention would a Rear Admiral have?

H - That's right and that was the excuse. But it was precisely the middle ranks of the Navy that, as time passed, with the Admiral felt disenfranchised. He felt that he'd given great attention to the young people and he'd written off the middle because they were not a retention problem or for whatever reason. But in itself this Black Officers--

R - Middle grade officers or junior?

H - These were I would say up to LCDR, Ensigns to LCDR.

It showed all the people in the room how easy it is to be insensitive to the most enormous problems of minorities-- Black people specifically--in just all kinds of ways. Some Black sailor described the fact that the reasons so often you saw Black men with their faces broken out is because for the most part didn't need to shave nearly so much or so early as -- when they got to boot camp and everybody had to shave whether they need it or not because it was programmed for the morning, their face would get cut and break out, but from then on they had to shave but this was really a special problem that many people didn't need to shave and the reason that you had so many infected faces was because -- and that may or may not be true, I don't know-- but it was a strongly felt view, and it came up. It was an example of the kind of issue that goes unnoticed. So in any event, the wife of

H - a Black LCDR, just a powerful girl, warm person, made the point about how difficult it is to find decent housing even in Navy towns where the Navy has the kind of leverage that it should be able to put it in by that kind of discrimination. She reported that when her husband had been sent down to the University of Texas as a Lieutenant and a ROTC instructor, a member of the faculty, the only place that they had been able to find a place to live was in a couple of rooms over a Greyhound bus station. So with that this Rear Admiral, with a very Souther tone of voice, said, "Wait just a minute, that just couldn't be right." And he went on and on about how he had been--he had really looked after the Black fellows that worked for him and he knew for a fact that this just wasn't true; and then he said, "and I had this one boy that worked for me and he recently came to Charleston and he had some problems and we went into town and we got him a place to live and it just wasn't a problem. I don't know what you're talking about." Ester Fisher said, "Excuse me Admiral, how old was this boy?" and he said, "Oh, I would say 32, 33." She said, "I see." And he went on and then he stopped. And I think only the Admiral understood the point. It was sort of a confusing question and it had come from nowhere; but it illustrated the kind of exchanges that occurred in that room in those sessions. They were very powerful. It alerted the Admiral to what I think he felt was going to be his greatest challenge in the personnel field to bring some meaningful integration and to respond to the

- H - problems and the issues that were raised by an integrated Navy.
- R - Of course, I think in a funny kind of way his zeal in pursuing that end and in a way saved his neck as CNO because it got all kinds of people who generally are not on the side of the military on \_\_\_\_\_.
- H - That's right.
- R - They couldn't fire him, the two or three times they felt they wanted to they just couldn't.
- H - I think that's probably right, but it illustrates his sort of schizoid views on things. It's a very conservative and traditionalist point of view on defense and foreign policy coupled with a very enlightened and sensitive perception about social issues. But again he's a curious man. He has a kind of definite manner and to meet him, you might not think this was someone who cared much about people because he has such a neutral -- I mean he isn't openly demonstrative frequently, he's not -- he has this neutral even way; and if you go along not knowing whether he cares or whether, just what his degree of human involvement is, so that knowing how courageous he's prepared to be and how much he does on behalf of other people in this sort of anonymous way is a little out of what seems to be this sort of public character.
- R - Do you want to move on -- talk a little about the long trip home from Vietnam?
- H - We had this plane and we had about 15 or 20 people pile on and it was just a great trip.



R - It was a Navy plane? Used that for the whole trip?

H - Yes, it was a Navy plane and as I recall we went to Okinawa, stopped in Singapore, back to Europe, we were in Naples and we were in SHAPE Headquarters and London. This was normally for him to be briefed on what general defenses used as well as just to get home. It was a trip in which he was -- I mean we were writing green stripes in the raw all the way. He had so many ideas and things he wanted to do. He wanted to push ahead on this weapons program and begin a process of negotiation with Rickover on various issues and he had these personnel policies that he wanted to do and he had personnel changes that he wanted to make and he had some promotion policy changes that he couldn't wait to get started and he was shaping up his staff enroute. One is never with him when he isn't moving a 100 miles an hour. And if you can keep the pace, it's just tremendously exciting. There is nobody who's more fun to be on board with, but the other phenomena is that he works for such a team and on such a fast track that if you feel that you're not on that team and you're not with him on that track, you can feel terribly left out. I think that in every headquarters that he's ever been at there been people that have been on his team--the mini-staff--whatever and it's been tremendously exciting for them; but then there's been the mainstream of his staff that feel somehow that he operates on a faster track with a special team of people and that he is inaccessible and they feel very frustrated.

R - It's the CNO that has an enormous elaborate machinery --

H - That's right, he might have 2000 officers on his staff and lots of Admirals and Captains and people who are just making their careers--

R - Deputy Chiefs, a half a dozen or so of them, aren't there?

H - That's right. So that one could feel the exhilaration recognizing at the same time that it was at the expense of the morale of many career people who wanted access and --

R - What was his purpose on this trip home when he made the fleet visits? What did he do?

H - In the personnel field, he felt this was his first opportunity to make himself accessible and sort of announce his willingness to entertain any kind of change. He must have had a half a dozen ship visits on this trip back and he would go and assemble the crew and he'd speak to them and indicate that --

R - Where?

H - Normally on the flight deck of a Carrier or he'd gather the officer together in the wardroom; he get the enlisted people back on the hanger deck -- any place that seemed large enough, the mess decks, from time to time he'd get up on a table. He would announce that as a matter of first priority, he wanted to do something about retention. He realized that there were going to be a lot of changes to be made, but that he was ready to make them and open to their suggestions. And with that he'd say, "What are your views, what are the kind of changes that you would recommend I make." One would

H - be around and he would start firing and he'd say, and I mean this kind of process the Admiral has to turn the grivience into a change. And someone would say, "Goddam, why are we deployed three months at a time" and the Admiral recognizes the problem but the person isn't giving him any recommendation.

R - He was able to get the guys to open up though?

H - Sure. I mean it isn't very hard when you're an Admiral and you stand up and say, "Ready to hear your views and prepared to make changes and what should I do?" That's an invitation that few Navy men can resist. I think that in the beginning people were a little hesitant and their officers were standing around. But he would press and press and then finally the blood would come and then the hands wouldn't come down. In the beginning the people were feeling him out and trying to figure out what kind of a man is this and how do they know if he's any different from any other man. I'm sure plenty of officers have stood up and made speeches. It's only as time passed that he began to get--the fleet I think began to appreciate that this was really a splendid man and that if they could get his ear, they could get a change made. Which is a problem. It's a liability as well as an asset, but in the beginning there wasn't an understanding of what this man was until the Z-Grams began to come. And I think one of the reasons he felt he had to take this sort of approach was to create a sense of change dynasticism. If it meant placing himself in this sort of vanguard position and having a cult developed, I never think that's something

H - that he would choose to do; but it seemed that if he was going to create a sense of change and reform, that he had to be that everyone had to feel it. And so a message that went to every message board in every command in the Navy and 500,000 people could read it saying, "I'm directing as of next Monday that all enlisted men be prepared to be allowed to have civilian clothes onboard ship and that haircut standards are as follows and will be effective and I will ensure" -- I mean if it took that kind of grand gesture, I think he felt that he had to do it and to do it early on to let people know that he was serious about this business.

R - Well, it did take that kind of grand gesture, didn't it? You just couldn't trust the channels to do it, could you?

H - That's right. And the retention study groups became, as time passed, a check on whether or not the programs were being---

R - Did you hear back from those guys when they got back to the fleet?

H - All kinds of letters and they'd call and say, "Listen, the Commanding Officer--they'd put the thing on the board--and he'd said that if anyone who cares to wear their hair, they can stay on the ship." So the reports would filter back and Admiral Bagley would call them.

R - Who did they write to, you?

H - Well, they'd write to all kinds of people, but a lot of them wrote to me. But you wouldn't even have to do that. The next group would come in and say, "The Z-Gram came out a month ago, but on our ship we haven't felt it." And the

H - Admiral would say, "Well, what's your ship." And heads would roll and change would be made and people knew that he was not going to be had.

R - Was he a "heads will roll" kind of a fellow?

H - He never says it, but he does do it.

R - He fires people?

H - He does fire people. He fired someone in Vietnam and in 24 hours he had him out of country. I've never seen him do that so fast, but it was a fairly senior officer who just wasn't do a competent job. He'd made some serious errors of judgment, it was clear he wasn't working very hard. The Admiral felt he had to have nothing but first rate people who are in those critical staff jobs and he had him out of country just like that. He doesn't do it very often and for the most part his approach is if he has someone who is disappointing him in the way that they're working, he gets them a promotion--not a promotion, but he'd find them a good job if they've worked hard for him and sort of been loyal and sort of cared and tried to do well and just haven't really performed very well, the Admiral will take care of them like he will take care of any of the people that have performed brilliantly, maybe not quite to the same degree; but his approach is not to be brutal with people. He just doesn't do it. There are jobs and there are low pressure jobs and high pressure jobs. There are proliferal jobs and there are central jobs and there are graceful ways of doing things and he's always gentle and delicate to the extent that he can.

R - But in this, I'll ask him about this, of course, it might



H - And you can say and you can announce that every instruction to the Flag Selection Board will preclude the promotion to flag rank of anyone with a demonstrated insensitivity to the aspirations of minority groups.

R - This did get done, didn't it?

H - It did get done, but -- and it was new. But as these problems began to come up, the Admiral could think of 150 ways to deal with the thing and many of them were subtle and many of them were gradual and to some degree you have to fire a few. But really to be effective that kind of changes ---

R - Then I'd suppose what you'd also do when you institute something like that is that your next flag selection board is a carefully chosen flag selection board.

H - Of course. It's the most important thing that I'm sure he regards he did was to shape the selection of flag officers. He assembled flag selection boards whose judgment he trusted, he would give them guidance that they couldn't overrule; he would set people up that he thought were really Rhodes scholar--captains--and would put them in jobs that would compel their promotion and in time, he got the age dropped 10 years and he got the most versatile and interesting group of flag officers I think the Navy ever had.

R - That really hasn't occurred to me to go into it --

H - He's done more in that area, I think, and he regards that as of critical importance.

R - This will remind me to get into that more than I have so far.

H - I guess the point is it became a means of monitoring the degree to which various programs were in fact being implemented.

R - From your point of view or from what you know of his point of view what do you think of as the substantively rather than PR wise the most significant of the personnel initiatives? We all know that from the point of view of dramatizing the issue, the haircut --

H - Well, I would say that there are a number of things of worth that leave a mark. I think the fact that the Navy will be an integrated Navy in the future and I think he set that in motion in a way that it can't be reversed type because that's not an insignificant contribution. I think he has gone a long way to making careers in the Navy possible which don't follow orthodox patterns. He made a lot of internal changes that are not all that meaningful to an outsider; but which make it possible for Chinese linguist to have to be at sea rarely, to work in his field and to become a rear admiral, in a way that I think was never possible before. There were certain things one had to do, certain kinds of ships on which one had to serve and in certain capacities. There were only a certain number of prestigious Washington and staff jobs and that you got a certain predictable sort of person with an occasional exception that would go through 20 years of those kind of jobs and bring to bear a certain predictable kind of capability. But the system didn't seem to allow for people that were great system analyst that really were interested in figuring out ways of



H - making weapon systems cost effective.

R - There are specialties aren't they?

H - There are specialties, but for example the Admiral made Project Managers of weapon systems, the equivalent of a carrier command. Normally an aviator just couldn't be an Admiral if he didn't take command of a carrier. So that the result was that you had the second tier people who were running these weapon systems. Which is just crazy when you think about the importance of taking a major new weapons program and running it from its inception to fruition. He forced people who were the top 1%, who were Rhodes scholars, who wanted to take command of a carrier because it's what the traditional Navy assumed the best people would do and there they would be running HARPOON.

R - The theory of that is that the theory has always been though that you'd be a better project manager of HARPOON if you have had a command at sea and you know what the problems are using the weapon.

H - I'm sure that's true and these people don't come without sea experience who go to these positions; but I'm trying to suggest examples of ways in which the system was stretched and reshaped to permit people who had particular skills to follow some more unorthodox paths.

R - How about the family problem, did anything really happen to alleviate that much?

H - I think probably the biggest move in that direction was the

H - Admiral's determination to homeport ships overseas which has such a clear effect on family time together, which has come under a great deal of criticism but that was one. That's the kind of problem that if you really work at it you can increase family time 20% if your the most ingenious at deployment schedules and so forth; and so that I think he squeezed the system to get the 20% and did it by rescheduling and certain different refueling processing.

R- But 20% is the best you could do?

H - That probably is the best and to make quantative and greater change you have to put ships abroad, which he did.

R - You mean you can get 20% by tempo adjustment and so forth?

H - That's my guess. He said, "I'll charter a flight to send people over to Naples and --

R - But he did cut down sea time for all those special ratings too? I suppose that's important.

H - That's right. There are so many hundreds of things that changed some 10%, some a 100% all of which taken together represent the best and most imaginative approach to running this Navy that anyone could be expected to take. I find it hard to believe that anyone can do it as well. There will be in time someone who does it as well, but you're lucky when you come across someone who is that good, I think.

R - Besides there's been some large wave of innovations has been made that the problem begins to get to administering them, you can't continue to swamp the organization of changes year after year after year.

H - That's right and I think that he felt that by the end of the first two years he'd essentially made what sort of major changes he was to make and the rest was to be to consolidate and to see that the system responded.

R - Were you in on the beginning of -- have you got a version of how "Z-Grams" happened to be and of where and when and who said what to who kind of thing?

H - My recollection would be I guess that on this trip back, Z indicated that he thought he would like to communicate by some form of direct message.

R - Is this something that he put up for discussion?

H - I don't think so. I seem to remember that on the plane he said, "I want to be ready to go on ALNAV message that said the following things on the day he took over." So on the first day, I guess, and he had us drafting something that would go out as an ALNAV, and there has always been a message-- there's been a category of message that go to all commands and all ships and just happened that he wanted to make sure that on some key announcements that they would be disseminated by message and in this ALNAV form. Then another early one was announcing that he was going to convene a series of retention study groups to deal with certain kind of issues. I think he chose it as a logical, I mean I don't think he thought of it as something that was going to be known as -- it was just an ALNAV message, but he wanted to be heard Navywide on this. And then when these recommendations began to come in, I thought it was very important that at the

- H - beginning when he got some recommendations that people who went back to their ships could see in a week's time that something had happened. But he said, "We're going to have to set up a pilot program, one on each coast---" and give a sense of responsiveness to issues that were brought to his attention.
- R - This is, you're now talking civilian clothes on board, right? That was a very early one, wasn't it?
- H - I guess it was, I lost track of the sequence of them; but that was in the works a long time. And on a lot of the personnel ones, in the beginning, I would try and draft these things. And I would draft roughes or there were a lot of people that were drafting these things. The way in which they happen, whether it was Tidd's shop or whether it was his special assistant or the executive assistant or whatever, somehow the things would get moved and it wasn't all that orderly.
- R - Who was his special assistant then, Shepard?
- H - Shepard was his executive assistant, right.
- R - Well, that's some of the funniest ratings I've done in a long time was with all -- when all the CINC's wrote back about the draft of Z-58.
- H - I did a lot of work on that thing and the thing got toned down substantially from its initial form, I think.
- R - (?)
- H - It was still pretty tough. He won't be had on the tough issues.

R - Well, Cousins changed it from Mickey Mouse to something else.

H - Demeaning Regulations.

R - Which actually is probably better.

H - I suppose.

R - Who named them Z-Grams?

H - I think it just got to be Z-Grams.

R - It just wasn't anybody in the front office that called them that?

H - I don't think so, I mean who knows. It's like how did Tidd's things get called "Green Stripes", it had a green border and they were floating all over the building and people were just decide themselves. Who said it first, how does it get it, who knows.

R - Have you any recollection of how soon after they started coming out they were generally called Z - Grams?

H - I just don't know.

R - Was he generally referred to as "Z" before he became CNO in conversation about him?

H - I don't know, I always called him "Z" and partly because when I was working with his son, the son didn't wear any name tag and was very self-conscious about being--and when we would talk about him, it just seemed--it was a way of sort of \_\_\_\_\_ his name. I still do that, when I talk to his son--talk about "Z", I don't know.

R - Well, other people refer to him that way.

H - You see, I don't know how it really caught. I guess people in Vietnam called him the "Big Z". I don't know how it begins.

R - But he had been called that before he became CNO?

H - I think so.

R - Do you have anything else on your mind especially about the personnel stuff? Can we move on to the famous Thanksgiving--the Army/Navy Game train ride?

H - It was just a period of great excitement, I mean it's the most fun thing that I've ever done.

R - You did that exclusively for your 4 or 5 months with him there?

H - That's right. That's really all I did. It was very loose in the beginning. He's always been sort of accessible to me--if I come up and have a two-page list of things that I'd like you to think about, I've always been able to do that--make suggestions and recommendations. I know him to the point where I can use 8 minutes and 8 minutes is frequently what you could get--tried to work with him in the car or whatever.

R - When you say that it was loose at the beginning, what was it that would support the end?

H - I guess the nature of the job was unstructured and I was a little unsure how this thing was to work or whether it was to be a useful role--it was a pretty unstructured job and I didn't have a title and I had an office over in CNA because that was the furthest away we could get from the Pentagon, and I was nominated special assistant to the Chief of Naval Personnel and I had a double "O" title, and that wasn't so great. It was sort of just jockeying to keep out of,

H - because for some reason it was sort of a tricky position and it was true that I always felt that I had kind of a -- I mean any time I felt like I wanted to talk to him, I would just go over.

R - It got more formal toward the end?

H - No. It was the structure of the job and the way it worked, it began to take shape. But it was the beginning that was probably the most fun.

R - You were over at CNA the whole time?

H - Yes. We tried I guess at BuPers, but that didn't work.

R - Too many people leaning over your shoulder.

H - Yes. The other special part of the job is that I could go see the Admiral, I had breakfast with him, or I could go call him and say "I want to do this, can I say that you said to do this?" That's the kind of access that everybody wants and Lieutenants aren't suppose to have that. I think that we mutually came to it--I mean I had never seriously considered staying in the Navy, but I think the Admiral acknowledged that there are enough people who felt ruffled about the way in which I worked for him over the year and a half that it might be tricky coming up as a career if I had decided to stay. So I think that it was in our common understanding that it wasn't something I was going to do, but recognizing that had I wanted to, it would be a little tricky. In any event, I guess this was November/December and we'd been running for about 4, 5, 6 months on this thing and the thing was tapering off. It was clear, as much had been done as was going to be

(

H - done and there were all kinds of new groups that wanted to come in--the Senior Chiefs and the LCDRs who were aviators-- I mean everybody wanted the chance to be heard and the thing was getting a little cut and dry. So we were all going up to this Army/Navy game. Kissinger was along and I was along and there must have been 50 other people, 3 or 4 cars. I think by tradition, each Chief of Staff and Service Secretary has a car--everybody piles in and goes up to the game and have a good time with parties on the way back down.

R - Was it fun, or was it make believe fun?

H - It was good fun. It was always real fun with the Admiral. It's contrived, accepted --I mean anytime you have a party in a carload of people who often know each other, there's really going to be fun. If you're with a group of people and it's a black tie affair, you don't know the other people sitting on your table and it's suppose to be a good time and you think, this isn't so great; but at that time it was sort of the team. The family was along, Tidd and everybody was there and it was good fun.

R - How did you happen to fall into conversation with Henry?

H - I don't remember. He was along and I guess I was talking to Nancy for a little while and he'd been her professor and I had to take this course--I can't really remember. I mean you're standing next to somebody and the train is jogging along, you had a drink in your hand and you chatted away and he turned to the Admiral at some point and he said, "Bud, I need a new assistant and perhaps you would be so kind to recommend someone." He's a very funny man and I



H - think he found it very agreeable to have deferential officers around him that staff people, because in the beginning I think he felt very insecure in this position of great leverage and the military people could be counted on to be excessively deferential and treat them in the same way that a private treats a general. When he came at the beginning, Haig was a Colonel and I mean, military people will do anything. You say, "I need that report by eight o'clock in the morning" and they'll work all night and won't say anything about it, and wouldn't mention that they stayed up all night, because it's what they've figured as always been in the cards. I mean it's no difference when they worked in MACV in Saigon or whatever and somebody else screams and has a tantrum and that's part of their job to say, "Yes sir, anything you want sir. I'll make sure that the State Department gets straighten out." So it's not the way-- and one interesting thing is that Kissinger just brought a professor down from Harvard because professors as he well knows are "prima donnas" and they don't take orders and they don't work all night. They don't take orders, he doesn't take orders. Colonels take orders. So anyway here's this Lieutenant, he just needs a Lieutenant that's got any-- which was then David Young, who has become a very good friend of mine, the Admiral knows that. He got caught as many people-- can be very critical on hindsight, but when you're a 34 year old boy and your'e getting your guidance from the Attorney General and the head of the CIA is supporting it

- H - and John Erhlichman is saying, "This is what the President wants, and get on with the plan" and you could say, "Well, I wouldn't do it if the Attorney General said this because he's the Attorney General" but your 34 years old and at the present you turn down the head of the CIA and you think there's some legitimate National Security issues at stake and the President is paranoid anyway--I mean I have no confidence that I in David's position would have behaved in any different way -- that is to do what could be done to find out what Ellsberg--I mean it's easy in retrospect to say, "But that's a clear case of what you don't do." I don't feel so \_\_\_\_\_ about it and I think that people who work in that building and have seen how just bizarre it is, don't feel sure that they would behave in any self-righteous way. I just think it's not so clear. And I think that if you had access to the recordings of Kennedy and the staff and when they were going after one thing or another, that there were plenty of people who were doing plenty of things that if exposed in this climate and it's sort of compared to the standard of the law, it would look pretty shakey. That's my view. Not that I think that Watergate hasn't been a good and healthy thing and that our standards have dropped to the point which certainly needed to be examined.
- R - One assumes the reason that this is a government of checks and balances and that the founding fathers realized that people in those positions would do those things if there