

Q: How old were you in Vietnam?

Admiral Nicholson: I was 45 years old.

Q: As far as planning, how far ahead did you plan when you were operating in Vietnam?

Admiral Nicholson: We had two major concepts. We planned on daily operation and reacted to the enemy. Then we planned our interdiction operation, short and long-term. We set up Giant Slingshot and Barrier Reef, then the Vinh Te Canal operation. The Swift boats patrolled the coasts and major rivers. We had operations in all the major rivers. There was considerable short and long planning for Vietnam which I was not fully involved with.

Q: Would you say that you generally had enough time to plan things?

I got the impression from Admiral Rectanus, there was not always all the staff planning there could have been.

Admiral Nicholson: It was kind of nice that way. You didn't have to go through a lot of opinions. No, we didn't have a lot of time for planning. Sometimes you can over-plan. But you couldn't do that on a big-scale operation. We weren't a big-scale operation. We weren't fighting frontal attacks. We could probe and then pull back. So a lot of our planning was done after we got started, and we'd improvise on it. If you can be flexible and make changes, that's better than going in with a plan and finding out it's too involved to change without excessive loss of life.

Q: Did you have what are known traditionally as contingency plans—if somebody does something, you will react so-and-so?

Admiral Nicholson: Yes.

Q: On aggressiveness of individual boat skippers and so forth, did you ever have the feeling that you were pushing them too hard? Or, on the other hand, holding them back?

Admiral Nicholson: We found incidents where our people in the field became fatigued. In those incidents they would stand down.

Q: Then how would you react? Scale down their operations?

Admiral Nicholson: Stand down some boats for repair and crew rest.

Q: You mentioned briefly the Coast Guard; now did they contribute some people to the NavForV staff? And how was that command relationship handled?

Admiral Nicholson: We had a Coast Guard commander on our staff. They remained under the opcon of the Coast Guard with close liaison on our staff. We used them quite a bit. They had Vietnamese on their WHECs and their smaller boats. We used them a lot in our interdiction on the coast, some in the rivers, and it worked very well. They would be under our opcon when doing operations.

Q: [✓]~~Now~~, at least in some instances they must have been under Navy opcon.

Admiral Nicholson: Yes. I do know that they had opcon of their forces. There were times when they worked with us under our opcon.

Q: This was the Coast Guard man in Saigon?

Admiral Nicholson: Yes. He'd pass the opcon to us.

Q: I presume that was blessed by Washington?

Admiral Nicholson: Yes.

Q: Looking back, are there any frustrations or disappointments—things that you had hoped to accomplish which you were not able to?

Admiral Nicholson: Yes. I always hoped to get more Vietnamese involved in operations. They got into it later, but I never felt I was very successful. I was too involved in getting this interdiction and Sea Float set up. I couldn't wait for the Vietnamese, or I wouldn't have gotten it done. I think the officer who relieved me probably did a better job, because things were in place, and then he could bring them in. I know in doing Sea Float, they were very reluctant to get down there. We could have done a lot in the Rung Sat with a destroyer up there and doing shore bombardment. We got a rocket ship in there once. I don't think we did a good job in the Rung Sat. We couldn't get that thing moving like we wanted. Rung Sat was sort of a stalemate. We got Australians and ARVN, but it wasn't continuous or very successful in cleaning out the area.*

*ARVN—Army of the Republic of Vietnam

Q: Did you make overtures to the Seventh Fleet?

Admiral Nicholson: Yes. We would request destroyer and rocket ships. We did get LSDs to transport the Sea Float ammi pontoon to Nam Cam.

Q: Could you have used a carrier down there?

Admiral Nicholson: No. We talked about it. We tried to get a carrier down there, but the targets were not large enough to warrant a carrier.

Q: Could they have given you more logistics support?

Admiral Nicholson: We got our logistics support mainly from the Army. Abrams was very good at that.

Q: The routine things a force needs are fuel, ammunition, and food. Where did you get those, for the most part?

Admiral Nicholson: We got them from the Army and Seventh Fleet. Our Navy support in Saigon, we had good support, because the Navy was supporting the Marines up in Danang. We would get support in Cam Ranh Bay from the Navy. The Seventh Fleet would come around and give logistics support there. Good logistics support there, and in Saigon. ~~I would say the routine stuff, yes, but~~ where I felt we didn't get adequate support was in special communications. For instance, people up in Slingshot would get in a fire fight in the river and we would send a casualty report by a slick helo back to base. We couldn't get the scrambled radios. We should have had our own helicopters. We had to bum helicopters

from the Army to take the admiral ~~out~~ or his staff. We had some Navy Sea Wolf helicopters. We didn't own our own communications. All our communications vans for the field we got from the Army.

Q: Could you have done more with more boats, more people?

Admiral Nicholson: Yes. More PBRs and Swifts. We used to trade things.

Q: What about the quality of the officers and men you got?

Admiral Nicholson: They were screened pretty well. Most of them were volunteers who wanted to come out there, in our immediate staff. In the boats ^{there} they were

good people. Oh, once in a while you'd get somebody who didn't work out.

Q: Captain Kerr expressed disappointment on that point. He said that when Admiral Zumwalt got out there, Vietnam service was not viewed as career-enhancing for Navy junior officers.

Admiral Nicholson: Yes, that's true. You couldn't find a submariner out there. We were volunteers, but they were good people. Yet I didn't find any Polaris boat skippers out there, or Polaris XO's. I had officers tell me they would never fight in that war, because it wasn't their war. Well, my viewpoint on that was different. You're not going to pick where you go. If you're a professional, you go where the war is, and that is your war. If you're a professional, you¹ better get in it. I volunteered to go, but I must admit that I had reason to volunteer. I'd really made up my mind that I should get into it before it was over.

Q: You mentioned Captain Salzer. What about the other two task force commanders, Art Price and Roy Hoffman?

Admiral Nicholson: Very good. Worked well together and supported Zumwalt and his operations.

Q: What can you say about the quality of the officers on the NavForV staff as opposed to the mini-staff, the rest of them?

Admiral Nicholson: Well, Bob Powers was exceptional and as I understand is still performing well.

Q: We had a rep on the West Coast interview him.

Admiral Nicholson: He was on the logistics staff, and he's a top notch man. He's been nothing but top notch through^{out} his career. There were some who did not want to be there, so we eventually got rid of them. Then we brought our own people. Zumwalt brought them.

Q: You had a morale problem.

Admiral Nicholson: Yes, we had a morale problem when we first went out there. I hadn't thought about that, but now thinking back we had a morale problem. We had people that didn't want to change, didn't want to go on the offensive. They either got with it, or eventually we eased them out. I don't have the same bad feeling about Vietnam that some may have. I felt it was a war and that, I may not agree with its concept, ~~but~~ as a professional I should be in it.

Q: Well, it came time to leave. You described this as a fun tour. Did you have some kind of withdrawal pangs as you got away from it?

Admiral Nicholson: Yes! I was with Zumwalt in a helicopter and he asked me if I wanted to extend my tour for six months. I was about halfway through my tour, and I said, "You know, admiral, I've enjoyed this tour. You know I like working for you. I'll stay under two conditions; one, you've got to get me a wife just like the one I've got, because she's going to leave me if I don't get back. And two, I'd like to skip captain and go right to vice admiral. If you can guarantee me

those things, I'll stay."

He said, "I understand."

Q: Well, do you have any wrap-up thoughts?

Admiral Nicholson: Yes, we'd better wrap this thing up. Let's shift over. That's the end of that one. Shall we shift to the CNO?

Q: Yes.

Admiral Nicholson: When I returned from Vietnam after one year in-country, I was ordered to command the Destroyer Development Group in Newport, Rhode Island. ¹²¹ I left my family there when I went to Vietnam.

Shortly after Admiral Zumwalt became CNO, he asked me to be the squadron commander of a destroyer squadron organized along the structure of my Dealey squadron. He had heard me talk about the Dealey squadron and its performance. His purpose was first to challenge the Bureau of Personnel to man all destroyers with young high-quality lieutenant commanders and other high-quality subordinates. He really was taking the first step to upgrade the surface Navy and attach high caliber officers and enlisted to the surface Navy. The squadron was formed in spite of some of the Bureau of Personnel people. We named it the Mod Squad.* It was a well screened group of people and on balance it performed as you would expect and desire.

*The 'Mod Squad' nickname was taken from a popular television show of the period on the exploits of young Los Angeles policemen.

There are no pp. 103 and 104 in this retyped version.

Q: But it was an exceptional group you had, since you cited how many made flag.

Admiral Nicholson: That's right. They were screened, and that's what Zumwalt was trying to do with the whole destroyer force, have a tighter and better screening of its officers. The Mod Squad was selected the same way, and they outperformed all the other destroyers in operational readiness.

When we deployed to the Med, the Sixth Fleet Commander Ike Kidd officially said, "This is the best destroyer squadron we've had during my tour over here."* The ships had high retention rates, which was also one of Admiral Zumwalt's objectives for the Mod Squad. Young people, motivated properly and made to feel that they are contributing to a positive goal, will produce well and at the same time create that same positive attitude in those around them.

*Vice Admiral Isaac D. Kidd, Jr., USN, Commander Sixth Fleet.

Q: Do you think you were helped or hurt by the fact that this trial got so much publicity?

Admiral Nicholson: It probably did not help. The mistake that was made was my mistake. I named it the Mod Squad. I should never have done that. If I ^(a)dd it to do over again, I would have kept a low profile. I generated some of that publicity. I think, in looking back, I'd do it differently. But you know, on the other side, I knew what Admiral Zumwalt was trying to do, and I knew he was going to try to do it before he left CNO's office. So we couldn't go around and let this thing sit and watch it for four years. I wasn't sure it was going to last more than a year, because there was so much opposition. The bureau was fighting it all the time. I think those were the two ~~things~~ that were wrong, and I take responsibility for the high profile.

The Mod Squad was number one squadron in DesLant, the type commander in operational exercises, and stood near the top in retention. ~~I can't remember where.~~ ^{at} The point I want to make is why Zumwalt did the Mod Squad. A lot of people have misconceptions about it. For the record, it was to improve the quality of the surface Navy and to screen people for command closely. By doing that, you will get good retention rates, both enlisted and officers, and upgrade the quality of the surface Navy.

Q: Well part of it was to put the best people in the jobs, and I would think that was the objective all along. How was the screening different than before?

^{Typically,}
Admiral Nicholson: ¹The Bureau would screen some people who had never been on a destroyer and make them commanding officers. Some of them didn't have to go up through the various departments of a destroyer. Some aide in Washington would get a job to be a commanding officer of a destroyer, never having been an executive officer. Zumwalt wasn't telling them how to do the screening process, he would just get them to try to screen better and improve the quality.

Q: One of the problems that was supposed to have been ameliorated by having the surface forces as a type command is that you no longer get the idea that replenishment ships and amphibs are second-class citizens. Did this enter into it at all--that you were creating an elite in the destroyer force?

Admiral Nicholson: Well, you know, at that time I think the destroyer force needed something elite. We were getting pretty well beaten down. The top notch people in the enlisted and officers went first to the submarines, then to the carriers, and what was left went to the destroyers. You can look at the records in the Bureau and see that.

Q: Yes, but the amphibs and the service force were even below destroyers.

Admiral Nicholson: That's right, ^{and} they were. Sure, it created an elite force. You know, the aviators were fighting for their elite force. The submariners were fighting for theirs. And the amphibs were below that. But Zumwalt had Mod Squads in other than destroyers. He was taking the first step in upgrading all surface forces.

Q: Don't you think that's a problem and you should try to get some good people there, too?

Q: Was there anything unusual about the operations that you were involved in?

Admiral Nicholson: No. It was regular carrier operations. We deployed in the Sixth Fleet. We didn't get any special operations. The only thing we had to do differently was to change all seven skippers, all within 30 days. So we deployed with new skippers and other officers throughout the squadron. New execs and new operations officers. We had people who hadn't worked together. We had a month to shake down, and then

Admiral Nicholson: Well, that's the point of the whole thing. There weren't enough good people in the whole Navy to man all the billets. Eventually they did do something about that. They eventually started detailing our top notch people to amphibs and service forces. The Mod Squad created the concept. They transferred front runners from destroyers to amphibs as split tours to improve the quality of all surface forces.

Q: Was there any aspect of this program that somehow you tried to create more good people, instead of identifying the few good ones there were?

Admiral Nicholson: If your program is designed to have top quality surface to the top, you most likely will not miss many good ones.

An upward mobility program works to improve quality within and attract quality from outside. Recruiting for an elite Navy is far easier than recruiting for a mediocre Navy.

Q: I'm interested in the viewpoint of a commodore of a squadron like this. You get all these top notch, handpicked COs, very aggressive, presumably competitive. How about the competition among themselves?

Admiral Nicholson: Keen--but that's good. Competition within an organization is healthy if it's monitored properly and directed to benefit the squadron as a unit. That's one of the tasks of a squadron commander and an admiral.

deployed to the Sixth Fleet for normal Sixth Fleet operations.

Q: Captain Kerr said when he commanded one of those ships that he was confronted with the race problem pretty quickly. How much of that did you see at your level?

Admiral Nicholson: During that period of time the nation and the military were experiencing problems that had racial overtones. Most of them were exaggerated or were small disciplinary problems blown up into major racial problems. Consequently, all levels of command at that time were touched or involved by what the nation was experiencing. The media helped to keep the fire going, too.

There are no pp. 112 and 113 in this retyped version.

Admiral Nicholson: The Soviets at that time made their first venture into the Western Med with a sizable naval force. They were testing our reactions, but more importantly, they were telling all that the Med was not a U.S. sea but a sea for Soviets and anyone else. They were feeding back to us our line "freedom of the seas."

Q: Was there any harassment or any incidents at sea?

Admiral Nicholson: No, nothing.

Q: What was your flagship for that squadron?

Admiral Nicholson: Josephus Daniels.

Q: This was the biggest one in that group.

Admiral Nicholson: Yes. Any more on the Mod Squad?

Q: Not unless you have more.

Admiral Nicholson: We made the point.

I had returned from a Sixth Fleet deployment and received word that the CNO wanted me to be transferred to Washington for a new assignment. I later learned from Admiral Zumwalt that he wanted me to head the home-porting project.

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The CNO was having some difficulty meeting all the deploying requirements of the ^{is the US Navy's fleet} Fleet. Fuel expenditure, long separation of families due to long deployments, and the wearing down of ships and equipment. The environment in the White House and Congress in the 1970s was to cut back the military harshly. The admiral wanted to find some relief, so he started the homeporting of ships and crews overseas. The plan was to put a squadron of destroyers in Greece, followed by a carrier, a submarine tender in La Madalena, Sicily, carrier and one group in Japan, and a squadron of destroyers in Guam. All of these came about except the carrier in Greece and the destroyer squadron in Guam. The Greece project was difficult and later terminated because of the shakey Greek government. The sub tender in La Madalena, Sicily, and carrier in ^{Yokosuka} Japan are still in place.

Homeporting did just what the CNO said it would do. Some of those opposing the project later admitted that it was a good concept. The Guam project did not make it for political reasons. It required housing ^{new} construction for the deployed squadron, so I believe Congress refused to fund it. Hindsight would indicate that it would be very prudent to have a Guam homeporting in place now with an operating repair facility.

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Q: Would you have had to build an air station for the carrier squadrons in Greece?

Admiral Nicholson: The plan was that we would use the Air Force base. Our logistics support would have to come out of Naples into Greece.

Q: Whom did you primarily deal with in this job?

Admiral Nicholson: I reported to the deputy CNOs for logistics, 04 and 05, BuPers 01, Plans and Policy 06, and the CNO*. It was a touchy job because every step of the way we had to convince or force the program. Most of the 05 people didn't want to do it. But the concept was right. It did cut down on transit time. People debated whether they would see their families enough. ⁴¹It must be working or they'd have the Midway back here now and the submarine tender too.

Q: Did you get over before Congress? Did you testify on this program?

Admiral Nicholson: The admiral did. The Rosenthal Committee (Foreign Relations) called Zumwalt up on the Greece project. There was opposition from some people—Rosenthal—on the Foreign Relations Committee because of the shakey Greek government. It was a logical concern. Admiral Zumwalt won the day during testimony. He did his homework well and actually struck a major victory for the congressional go-ahead for all homeporting.

 { *OP-06—Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Plans and Policy);
OP-04—DCNO (Logistics); OP-05—DCNO (Air).

There are no pp. 121-124 in this retyped version.

Q: You said earlier you would talk about Z-grams when we got to that point in the discussion. What do you have to say about Z-grams?

Admiral Nicholson: The idea of Z-grams? All of them?

Q: Not only the idea, but you were on the receiving end of them.

Admiral Nicholson: I think on the Z-grams as a whole, on the receiving end of it, [✓] had Zumwalt

been supported by some key senior officers in the Navy, then most of those Z-grams would have obtained the objectives he wanted. I don't agree that sailors should be running around downtown Norfolk in dungarees. Zumwalt didn't want it either, but the on-scene commanders could have prevented it and handled it and other Z-grams better than they were handled. The support by some senior officers including some flag officers on the implementation of the Z-grams was terrible. Some of them refused to enforce them and some let the meaning of the Z-gram be misinterpreted. In general, the Z-grams were never intended to undermine the tradition or discipline of the Navy. They were designed to create a new spirit of involvement, but not to tear down the chain of command. That was misunderstood or exaggerated by some senior officers. Not all Z-grams were effective and Admiral Zumwalt will be the first to admit it. He changed many of those that missed their mark. The Z-grams didn't ruin the Navy as some people would have you believe.

Q: I'm interested in how your skippers reacted in implementing them.

Admiral Nicholson: Well the one we had trouble with was the concept of "let them decide what uniforms to wear." I don't know what Zumwalt's thinking was, but I think the idea was that he wanted people, like we did in Vietnam, to feel they were part of the Navy and contributed to it. Treat ~~you~~^{them} like a mature individual. I think that one probably went a little too far in that young kids like to be told what to do. It's like the father that doesn't tell or discipline his son. We had trouble with that, but it could have been directed better than it was by some senior officers at sea.

Q: Did your skippers in that squadron prosper the way the ones in the Dealey squadron did?

Admiral Nicholson: Yes, the Mod Squad was younger. Three have made commodore.

I think to sum up, Admiral Zumwalt as CNO didn't get enough credit for his shipbuilding work. If he hadn't pushed new construction, we wouldn't have the lift we have right now, or some carriers, or the Trident submarine, or the Los Angeles submarine. He believed the amphibious force should have a faster vehicle of attack and assault. He's a numbers man. If you're going to go to war, be sure you have the number of ships, weapons, and people you need to win. The wars the U.S. has won were won by greater numbers of forces. If you think you can win it by being smarter and building a better mousetrap, the other guy is going to build one bigger. If I had my

choice, I'd like to have lots of carriers, ^{not the big, sophisticated} ones, if I'm going to war. If I'm going to wave the flag, maybe the small number of sophisticated forces will work.

That's about it. I think that in my association with Admiral Zumwalt, he was a CNO that has predicted what's happening now. If the environment in Congress had been what it is now, he might have gotten ~~1/2~~ what the Navy might get in the 90s. He told Congress we had old ships, and we'd better get a shipbuilding program going. He wanted more than he got. He said by 1985 we're going to be in trouble. Well, we are. And they called him a hawk. I think at the end of his tour he was pretty adamant about the state of the Navy and the entire military. I think the biggest thing was this shipbuilding program. Some of the Z-grams were implemented and interpreted wrong.

Q: I can't ask you to answer this next one from an objective viewpoint since you were so involved, but one of the criticisms of his regime was that there got to be a good deal of inbreeding—people like you, one tour after another involved with him. So that sort of shut off the outside ideas that might have provided

a freshness to it that didn't come.

Admiral Nicholson: Well, let's see. The CNO right now and Tom Hayward before him, they picked their own people. Burke had his select group. I don't think he was any different than anybody else. Most of the big flag jobs are submariners. Is that inbreeding? The Superintendent of the Naval Academy is going to be a submariner. Most of the key flag billets are held by submariners. It's their day in court.

Q: So you're saying it's just the normal way of doing business?

Admiral Nicholson: CNOs pick their people because they don't have time to train all new people. Tom Hayward picked his people. Jim Watkins picks his people. They have four years to do it. They can't bring in all new people with nice records and say, "He would be good in that job, but I don't know him." There is no way he can survive. So he has to assign his people to the key billets. I don't call it inbreeding. You pick people you know can do what you want to do, so you don't have to spend time training them during the first two years of a four year term.

Q: That's true, but don't you run the risk of getting people you know are philosophically attuned to what you're thinking, and maybe you don't get outside ideas that you need?

Admiral Nicholson: You pick people who are objective, and you don't pick them if they aren't. Zumwalt got accused of having yes-men around. Well I wasn't a yes-man. A lot of times I didn't agree with him, and I'd tell him, and then we'd iron it out. Either he would change or I would change. Sometimes, he would say, "This is what I want you to do." And you either did it or you quit. No, I don't agree with that.

If you're a professional, you have some principle in yourself. If you don't, then you shouldn't be working at that level. They all pick their people. There isn't a CNO around who doesn't clean house when he comes in. Once in a while maybe he will get a yes-man, and that will hurt him.

Q: Do you think the fact that there have not been many four-star blackshoes in recent years is sort of a reaction to the Zumwalt years?

Admiral Nicholson: Everything that's bad they blame on Zumwalt. No, not at all. My reaction to that is, if you go back and read the book, Nimitz, the blackshoes, ran roughshod over the aviators and the submariners. After the war, the aviators were in the major jobs. Then the blackshoes were number two, and the blackshoes and the aviators ran roughshod over the submariners. Now it's the submariners' day in court. Zumwalt didn't create that. There may have been some reaction to getting rid of Zumwalt's people, but I would hope that our senior officers are bigger than that. I would prefer to believe it is not true.

Q: Well, again playing the devil's advocate, the charge from people such as that is that he went around them. He went over their heads and talked directly to the sailors and didn't go down through the chain.

Admiral Nicholson: No. He was accused of that. That wasn't his intention. His intention at that point was he ~~wanted~~^{tried} to get the people on the deck plates in the Navy to become a part of the Navy. There was no intention of usurping the chain of command, ^{that's} ~~that's~~ he was accused of it. After Vietnam, the morale was bad in the Navy. People were getting out. You make people feel like they are part of the team. Maybe in some cases it got out of hand and people capitalized on the fact that you're bypassing the skipper. I heard a couple of skippers

Interview with Rear Admiral Richard E. Nicholson, U.S. Navy (Retired)

Place: Admiral Nicholson's office, Virginia National Bank, Norfolk

Date: Wednesday, 8 June 1983

Subject: Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., U.S. Navy (Retired)

Interviewer: Paul Stillwell

Q: Admiral, would you begin please by describing how you got to the billet with the Secretary of the Navy and your first encounters with Admiral Zumwalt.

Admiral Nicholson: In 1963, I was the executive officer of the destroyer USS Beale, home-ported in Norfolk. During the first year of that tour, I received orders to report to the Secretary of the Navy for an interview. Shortly after the interview, I received orders to report to the Secretary of the Navy as his special assistant. At that time, 1963, Mr. Fred Korth was Secretary of the Navy. In November 1963, Mr. Nitze succeeded Mr. Korth as SecNav and appointed Captain Zumwalt to be his executive assistant and aide.* In six months, I was assigned as administrative aide. My first meeting with Captain Zumwalt was ~~this time.~~ *November 1963*

*Fred Korth was Secretary of the Navy from 4 January 1962 through 1 November 1963; his successor, Paul H. Nitze, was SecNav from 29 November 1963 through 30 June 1967.

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Admiral Nicholson:

~~Adm. N.~~ I was Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Navy in 1963. At that time, Mr. Fred Korth was Secretary of the Navy, and I was brought in as Special Assistant to him. When Mr. Korth left the office and a whole new staff came up, Mr. Nitze came in as Secretary of the Navy, and so my association at that time with Admiral Zumwalt and Mr. Nitze was '64 ^{to} and '65. ^{*} And I was in the office at the time. ^{sort of} So, the mini-staff included Mr. Paul Nitze, Secretary of the Navy; Admiral Zumwalt, Executive Assistant; I was the Administrative Aide; ~~and~~ Robbie Robertson was the Counsel; and Bill Thompson was the ^{**}Public Relations. I think when Mr. Nitze and then-Captain Zumwalt came in to SecNav's office, the first thing that was done was to create a togetherness between ~~the~~ the Secretary of the Navy and the CNO. In the past, there was some indication that there was a lot of disagreement, and when the Navy went down to the defense decision-making process, there were times when the SecNav and CNO didn't agree ^{naturally, when there is} and when they were in doubt about that, somebody else is going to make the decision. So, when Admiral Zumwalt ^{and} then Mr. Nitze came up, the

*Fred Korth was Secretary of the Navy from 4 January 1962 through 1 November 1963; his successor, Paul H. Nitze, was SecNav from 29 November 1963 through 30 June 1967. Captain Zumwalt served Secretary Nitze as his aide and executive assistant.

**Captain Horace B. Robertson, Jr., USN; Commander William Thompson, USN.