

Interview No. 2 with Charles F. Rauch, Jr., Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy (Retired)

October 25, 1982, Monday

Place: Wakefield, Massachusetts

Subject: Service with Admiral Elmo Zumwalt

By: Paul Stilwell

Adm. R.: Well, as I was saying the acronym that was used for the program was ACTOV which I coined really because it did two things. What it really stood for was Accelerated Turnover to the Vietnamese. In a little bit more detail the accelerated turnover of U. S. Navy assets to the Vietnamese. But, the reason I picked the letters I did was because it sounded like "active" and the connotation we were trying to get across was that this was a very action oriented program and it had to move fast, therefore there was a lot of activity.

As it turned out a lot of people called it Act O V and it kind of lost that active sound. But, that was the term that was used for the whole Navy Vietnamization program. Then we had a lot of subsidiary programs, the intelligence turnover was ACTTOVENT, Communications was ACTOCOM, and ACTOLOG was for logistics, and so on and so forth.

The other thing that we did that you asked about strategy and that sort of thing. Most of that, I guess, was on-the-job training. Their officers were pretty good officers. Many of them had been to, many of their senior officers had a year at our war college. They had had other training, some of them with the French in France, but most of the younger officers had not.

They already had a pretty good strategic sense, and the new people that came along we sent through their naval academy which now was a two year program. We had advisors up there. So, they were getting some feel for strategy and tactics in that situation. Then, as I mentioned to you, we also sent some officers through our officer candidate school which was another big program that we developed.

Let me also mention another officer training program. This was another idea of Admiral Zumwalt and for obvious reasons got solid support by Commodore Chon. I don't know the entire motivation and I sure would not want to see it in print that there was a complete ulterior motive there, but Admiral Zumwalt did want to make good friends with Chon because he knew he could not pull this off without Chon's help. He was always looking at ways that he could help both him and his family. And, one of the things he seized upon was the possibility of sending Chon's number two son to the U. S. Naval Academy. The number one son had already gone to the equivalent of their military academy in Vietnam. The number two son was about ready to go off to college somewhere. Chon was extremely interested in that. The precedent we had was that there was some arrangement that during the Vietnam war years we could allow one person from any of the countries in Southeast Asia who were helping in the war effort to go to our Naval Academy, which

could have been Australia, or Korea, or anybody that was actually involved. Strangely enough the Vietnamese had been overlooked in that. So, we had the job, number one, of getting it possible for a Vietnamese person to compete, and number two, trying to make sure that Truc, which is his last name, which is the same as our Christian name, his given name, try to get Truc in. That was one of the things that I spend a little bit of time on, that Admiral Zumwalt spent a lot of personal time on. He worked through a friend of his that he'd known when he was in the Systems Analysis Division, Pat Parker who was at the time at the University of Rochester. Pat was in the Center for Naval Analysis and they worked very closely with the Systems Analysis Division at one time, but he was now working at the University of Rochester. So, we got Pat to help with this. He actually had Truc come over and live with him for a period of time while he was sort of upgrading his capability in speaking English. I think he may have taken a couple of refresher courses that Pat thought he might need. Anyway, through a lot of effort, working through the Under Secretary of the Navy and through Pat we finally got Truc into the Naval Academy. He graduated and he did very well. He was to have been an officer on one of the DE's that we had turned over to them. Therefore he got out of country quite easily because he was in that fleet that steamed to Subic.

I don't know about any of the other kids whether they got out at that particular time or not. I don't think they did.

Admiral Zumwalt tried every way when it was obvious what was going to happen to Saigon to get Chon go come out. He was working through the naval attache, he was working through the State Department. He had everybody going over there talking to Chon telling him to get on one of those planes and get out of there. Chon decided he did not want to do it. He had two elderly parents that were living in Vung Tau, and they were in their late 80's or maybe even early 90's. I met them both. In fact, I had spent the night down there once. They were very, very nice people, but they were in no condition to travel. Chon realized that, so he opted to stay over there. He also was not the chief of the Navy any longer. He had lost that job, again legitimately. He was replaced by Kang who was the person I referred to earlier that had not been in the Navy for a number of years, who had been mutineered against once before.

But, Kang came in and took over the Navy. Chon had had that job for about four years this time. He had had the job previously. But, at any rate, he decided to stay over there. To this day Admiral Zumwalt is going through all kinds of efforts to try to get him out of there. What they did was they sent him up to a retraining camp near Hanoi which is a term for a

prison camp, I guess. Mrs. Chon has been up a couple of times to visit him. Apparently he's in good health, but the family is absolutely poverty struck. They don't have anything. They are living in Saigon. I think now a couple of the boys are now over here with Truc. Truc's living in California as far as I know right now. Admiral Zumwalt keeps in touch with him and he generally sends me a copy of the correspondence with him. Anybody he can get to listen to him in the State Department, the latest letter I saw a copy of was the Attorney General. He makes the issue that it's a point of honor for the United States to try to get out anybody that's still over there that tried very hard to help the South Vietnamese cause and the cause that we were fighting to help them with. And, Chon is certainly one of those. I think, perhaps, now he may be ready to come back. I know his son Truc is trying to get him back too, the whole family because they just don't have anything over there right now.

Q: Would the North Vietnamese let him go?

Adm. R.: No. It would have to be some big negotiation with the United States. It's not going to be simple. It's going to have to be a negotiated type of thing. Admiral Zumwalt's view is we're not through with our responsibility until we taken some of these people, if there are any like Chon, and

he suspects there are, who really have done everything possible to fight on the side that we happened to be supporting, that we ought to try to get them out of there. Like I say it would be some sort of negotiation. Who knows what the quid pro quo would be, but we ought to at least be working on it.

This gets me into another area that I'd like to talk about and the relationship between those two. Are you in any degree familiar with the so-called managerial grid, the Blake and Mouton thing?

Q: No.

Adm. R.: It's a way of looking at management and leadership where on one dimension you have productivity and on another dimension you have concern for people. This is sort of a graphical way of talking about what various people's leadership styles are.

At one time I was trying to adopt this thing for the U. S. Navy. I learned that it was too prescriptive. It would not have worked. But, the idea of a graph intrigued me that you've got two dimensions of leadership. You've got the concern for getting the job done, and you've got the concern for the people who are working for you. You need to balance those two. You

know people who've been really strong in one direction or the other direction but the really good leader is the person that's pretty strong in both directions. Admiral Zumwalt is certainly as good an example as I know who really spends a lot of time making sure that the people who are working for him are aware of his concern for them. At the same time he expects them to do Herculean things.

He got a bum wrap in his CNO days because a lot of people only saw him looking at the concern for people's side and anyone that's worked for him knows that that's nowhere near the entire place that he puts his emphasis. It is going off in both directions.

Well, I was intrigued when I first heard of this thing because I said that you could also train people in a diplomatic situation along two dimensions too. One would be the concern for support for the U. S. point of view, and the other would be the concern for the host national person and his country you were working as a diplomat. And, here again, you really have to have those two dimensions because if you go all out in either one or the other you're really not a very good diplomat from the U. S. standpoint.

I have seen in my advisors in Vietnam both extremes. I've seen the people who everything was oriented towards the U. S. viewpoint and no consideration whatsoever for the Vietnamese culture or their point of view and the fact that they had to be involved in this. I have seen the other which

is just as disastrous where the person becomes a native Vietnamese and to the detriment of the U. S. position. They all of a sudden take the side of the, I don't want to say anti-U. S. person, but the non-U. S. person. They see the U. S. as the ugly American over there. And, that's just as detrimental. The person that I know of is the best example of a true diplomat that really, really acted with vigor in both directions is Admiral Zumwalt. He is number one on America and a strong supporter for this country and for what it stands for. He's a great statesman, but he had an uncanny ability of seeing things from the Vietnamese side, and understanding where they were coming from and trying to visualize what it would be like in their culture and so forth.

Now, I meant to tell you a little anecdote now that's got nothing to do with any of this, but it's the relationship between him and Chon. One night around 11:30 or something like that I got a call to go over and see him in his bedroom in his quarters. So, I got dressed and did so. He said, "Chic, I'm really worried for my friend Chon. I just got word from the U. S. side at MACV that there is quite likely going to be a coup tonight. It's not going to bother us, but it's really going to disrupt the hierarchy in the Vietnamese armed services, and I don't know whether Chon knows about that or not. And I can't sleep until I know that he is at least informed."

My immediate reaction was, the chances of you knowing something that's going on in this country that the Vietnamese don't know are pretty slim. That's one of the reasons it was so hard to fight that war because both sides knew what the other side was doing. I said, "However, what do you want me to do? I'll be happy to do it."

He said, "Would you drive over and see Chon and tell him what I've learned and ask him if there is any way we can help?"

So, I got in my car and I drove over, about a ten minute drive to the Vietnamese Navy, well he was not in the Vietnamese Navy headquarters. He had a little compound, it was relatively well guarded, sort of around the block from the Vietnamese Navy headquarters. The people knew me and so they let me go in. He was in his pajamas. As a matter of fact, I think, he was playing with the kids and he was getting ready to go to bed. So, I told him that I had something I needed to talk to him about confidentially. We went into a room and sat down and I told him. He got tears in his eyes. He said, "There isn't going to be any. I guess I know what caused the rumor, but there isn't going to be any coup. But, that Admiral Zumwalt would be that concerned and send you over here is just a very, very meaningful thing to me. Please tell him how much I appreciate his concern. But, tell him not to worry, go to sleep, there's not going to be any problem."

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So, I carried it back and tears came out on Admiral Zumwalt's eyes when I told him about this. They had a very close relationship. And, I give Admiral Zumwalt a lot of credit for that because Chon is a wonderful person, and he can get along with a lot of people, but Admiral Zumwalt was so sensitive to his needs and his concerns and to the need for them to get along really well. He really pulled it off. I doubt if there's anybody in Admiral Chon's eyes today that stands quite as tall as Admiral Zumwalt does. Maybe some of his own people, but certainly no U. S. person. That was really a very interesting thing to watch them work. And, as I said earlier, it was not a complete capitulation on either side, they both had their ways of doing things, but they always would come to a thing that would be the best for the Vietnamese and still help the cause that we believed in.

Q: To change the subject and go back to something you mentioned earlier. In the hardware you enumerated you had mentioned the Coast Guard 82 foot WPB's, did you have Coast Guard involvement in the NaVForV staff for that aspect of it?

Adm. R.: Yes, there was a Coast Guard contingent over there that, I guess, came under us operationally, but they still had a pipeline to the Coast Guard

hierarchy. These things we just made work. The Vietnamese war was one of the best examples that, I think, is recorded in history of different armed forces working together whether or not the legal lines of authority were there. We had a captain who worked in conjunction with ComNavForV and we just told him what we were doing and he developed the turn-over program for those 18 WPB's. It was a very effective one. The Coast Guard are very professional people. All we did was support them. They turned them over and they did a beautiful job with them.

We also had one Coast Guard officer that for sure did come under us that was one of the advisors to one of the four coastal zones. There were two or three incumbents in that job while we were there, all good, commander level, good solid officers.

So, they ran their own program, but all we had to do was say this is what we're going to do and they got permission to do it. Of course, we would go to the CNO and the CNO would go with the Coast Guard and work out the details back there. But the in-country part of it was done pretty much by the Coast Guard. Like I say, it was their own plan and we let them go with their own plan. It was a little different than ours, but we said, what the heck.

Q: It must have been pretty much in parallel?

Adm. R.: It was completely in parallel. Quite often we'd turn over a WPB and some little amphibious craft at the same time or something like that. But, it was their show and we left it that way. I think it was better that way. They did not have to buy into exactly the program that we came up with, but the spirit of the thing they did buy into and we expected them to. They did a beautiful job on it. A good question.

But, you know we had, the Rung Sat is a good example of that. We had a Navy commander down there with a Vietnamese Navy commander and they played that thing like an organ. They had U. S. Navy several contingents of it. They had minesweepers to deal with. Little, not minesweepers like you think of, but little small craft minesweepers. They had patrol craft. They had the armored vessels. They had Vietnamese Navy. They had Vietnamese Army. They had Navy air. They had Australian Army. They could even call in B-52 strikes from Guam. They played all this, the cooperation was unreal compared to the way we cooperated in the halls of the Pentagon when we're fighting over the budget. The Coast Guard just fit in perfectly. The Koreans did a fabulous job. Army officers who had been in Korea called them a bunch of guks that could not ever do anything were just flabbergasted with what a professional group of soldiers these people were. You know, there

is a lot of negative that came out of the Vietnamese war and I certainly understand that, but there were some unusual things, and this cooperation from one service to the other, from one country to the other was really phenomenal.

Q: Was there any Marine Corps involvement in NavForV staff?

Adm. R.: Yes, we had out Marine advisor to the Vietnamese Marines. But, the irony of all ironies was that here we were running an amphibious operation in the delta and the people we were lifting were the U. S. Army and Vietnamese Army, occasionally Vietnamese Marines, but never our own Marines. Our own Marines were up acting like Army people up in I Corps, up near the demilitarized zone. They started out that way and nobody ever saw fit to change it. So, we never had that marriage of the U. S. Marines with the U. S. Navy that we're built organizationally to handle. That's one of the strange things about the war. The Marines never acted like Marines, they always acted like army people, which I don't mean to say is all bad, but that's not the Marine's role. They don't go in and stay in a holding situation for years and years and years. They generally go in and take the beach and turn it over to somebody else and go on to another place. It never

happened. The politics of that you're going to have to get from Admiral Zumwalt. I don't know what the politics of that were. As an observer it was a very strange phenomenon because there were no two ways about it, we were engaged in an amphibious warfare that was built for the U. S. Navy working for the U. S. Marines.

Q: Well, by the time you got there things were so well entrenched.

Adm. R.: Yes. There's no way he could have changed that. But, how it got built up that way would be an interesting thing to get him to comment on.

Q: Well, your tour in Vietnam came to a close just about the same time as his didn't it?

Adm. R.: Yes. He got there about ten days before I did and I left about ten days before he did, or 15 days, something like that. I left on the 30th of April in 1970. I'm not sure when he left, something like the 10th or 15th, something like that, of May, maybe a little later because he was coming back to be CNO and the change of command was going to be right, like it always is, the 30th of June or 1st of July sort of thing.

Q: Was there surprise that he had been picked for CNO?

Adm. R.: Well, he had made a couple of trips back to Washington and I knew what he had gone back for. He did not tell a lot of people what he had gone back there for. One was for him to meet with some people while they were still trying to decide, the Secretary of Defense primarily. The second time he came back it was for the announcement and he knew that's why he was going back. He was gone to some place, it sticks in my mind he was staying with John Warner who was at the time the Under Secretary. But, he was somewhere and this you'll have to find out from him, hidden really until the day of the announcement because they didn't want anyone politicking that was going to change that. There was a big struggle for the job. Jack McCain was certainly a person, who was CincPac at the time and he came out on several occasions. He was certainly hoping to get the job and was a consideration. You had Ike Kidd who was lobbying for the job at the time. And, you even had Stan Turner who was a rather young admiral. I don't know whether he was lobbying for himself or not, but, well, no,---

Q: I think he was still a captain.

Adm. R.: He was. I'm four years ahead of myself. He was still a captain. Stan was with the Secretary at the time, right, it was the next go around that he lobbied.

Primarily it was Ike Kidd and Admiral McCain that were lobbying for themselves. I think there is no question about the fact that Chic Clairty thought that he was in a good position to move up. I guess they were mostly concerned about Kidd or McCain who had their little pockets of support that might upset things if it got blown up, if it got out of the bag too soon, so he was sort of hidden away somewhere and then they made the announcement. Then he came back and, of course, we had heard about it before he got back. It was quite a happy time all through Vietnam when we all realized where he was going.

Q: When you wound up that tour what were your greatest satisfactions and your greatest disappointments?

Adm. R.: Mine personally? Well, there was a lot of satisfaction because we'd see a lot of development in the Vietnamese Navy just in that year and a half over there. We could see that they were going to continue to make a very fine Navy. So, the satisfactions were easy to come by. The disappoint-

ments probably were in some of the things that we tried to pull off that really weren't going as well as we thought that they should be going.

We had done a lot of, and really in retrospect it was none of our business and we should have known they weren't going to pay any attention to us anyway, but a lot of lobbying with the Vietnamese Joint Command to allow more flag rank jobs for some of these Vietnamese naval officers. You only had this one star rank. We kept calling him commodore, but they would have called him admiral, and that was it. So, when he was in with the other members of the armed services he was always the junior member and he should have been a higher ranking person. He finally did get two stars, but never any more than that. And, they finally did after we had left allow a couple of one stars. So, we were able to, later on, get the task force commanders to have one star, and the fleet commander, the person who had all of the ocean capable ships. We thought that should have been done a lot earlier. I was a little disappointed we weren't able to pull that off. But, now we're talking about something that's very cultural and it's very much owned by the Vietnamese hierarchy, a prerogative of theirs how they are going to structure their rank in the various services. Our showing that they were the, as far as personnel were concerned, on their way to being the 9th largest Navy in the world, and that Thailand had about 20 or 30 admirals and

they had a far smaller organization than the Vietnamese Navy. You know, all this was going on deaf ears, they could care less, they knew what they wanted to do. It was a very political thing. It's one of the things that the Vietnamese Navy hierarchy was concerned about and we tried to help them, but we were never very successful in that.

There were a couple of other things. We didn't think that Chon's word got out as well sometimes as it should have. We didn't think their communications was quite as good as it could have been. The shipyard could have done better we felt. They didn't have the civilian resources to do as good a job at that as we thought they ought to have.

The disappointments were in things that still were undone when we left. As a matter of fact, I wrote a letter about two or three months---in November of 1969 I wrote a letter to Admiral Chon and the whole world really, everybody that had anything to do with implementing this both on the U. S. side and the Vietnamese side, outlining what I thought were 20 areas that needed improvement. The key ones were increased officer and petty officer strength. This was something that we had to convince General Abrams of so he could convince their general staff. The rank structure that I just talked about in some degree. The shipyard that I already mentioned. Increasing the standard of living. We had made great strides there, but a lot still had to be done.

The final thing which was more of a tactical sort of thing than the kind of thing that I was able to have much influence over, and the biggest concern we had, I think, really from a tactical standpoint when we left was the lack of air support. We had our helicopters and we had out observation planes, I forget the name of them now you know this was 15 or 16 years ago.

Q: Not quite that far.

Adm. R.: OV-10's I think they were.

Q: I think you're right.

Adm. R.: Low fuselage, slow observation planes.

Q: The Bronco I think it was called.

Adm. R.: It was the Bronco, right.

Those were extremely important to us in all of our river activity. Then we had the patrol aircraft, the PB-3's that were doing the Marketime patrols along the coast. They weren't going to get any patrol aircraft from us.

They weren't going to get any Bronco's. They weren't going to get our helicopters because it was politically infeasible to convince anybody in the Vietnamese armed services that the Navy needed its own air arm. So, theoretically they had to depend on the Vietnamese Air Force and they just simply didn't have that much interest in Navy support. Consequently one of the things we did is we got some radars in and turned over some radars to them that you could put on the islands that would help in a little way to take the place of the PB patrol. But, we knew that was not going to ever take the place of that daily series of patrols by our Navy patrol aircraft. Whether or not we would ever get their Air Force to do that we were not sure. They weren't getting those kinds of planes. Then the air support in a tactical situation on the rivers, we weren't sure whether we would be able to pull that off. So, we were leaving the Vietnamese Navy with a lot of hardware, but we didn't have the air cover that we enjoyed ourselves and that's a significant difference. We explored all kinds of ways of trying to help them with that other than relying on their Air Force. But, the bottom line was that they were going to have to rely on their Air Force for air cover. And, we didn't have that much control over how good their Air Force was, how good it was in support operations with their Navy and that sort of thing.

So, these are the kinds of things that were problem areas that we saw

as we left and my biggest disappointment was just simply that we hadn't made any more headway in some of those areas. I think that we did probably about as well as you could have expected as far as getting the U. S. people committed to the Act Off program. By the time we left I don't know if there was anybody that didn't believe in it just simply because we had people over there by now who had been working on it for several months and had become a very big part of it. Other than leaving the country with some friendships that you knew you weren't going to be able to follow up on very much I didn't have very many disappointments other than the ones I've mentioned.

Q: Was there any sense at all that this was an ultimately doomed venture?

Adm. R.: No, not when we left at all. The only way it could have been doomed was if our country would not have continued to provide some logistics support because, simply, they could not continue on their own. They could do all of the maintenance, they could do anything that we could do. They were carrying out operations. I'm talking about the Navy now. They were carrying out operations some which exceeded the kinds of things that we were doing. They got involved in one area of the U Minh forest in the IV Corps there---all this is covered in one of my letters. They got involved in an

operation in there and stayed a lot longer out in the middle of the operation than we normally did. So, they were operating. They were maintaining. It looked like, from our perspective, if the other services were doing as well as the Navy was and we could just simply keep the spare parts going over there, it looked like it was not doomed, it looked like that there was a possibility of success. I think the worry was that the U. S. people would simply not support even continuing to send supplies and once that happened then it was doomed. Once we realized that the country was no more going to support anything, then it was a doomed operation.

Q: So, you left on an upbeat note really?

Adm. R.: Yes. You'll get that from one of my letters. I wrote one letter as I was leaving and at the end of it I said, "I believe the above summary gives,"---well I also talked about, well here, "To show what has happened as a result of the very close cooperation on the point of these two great men over the past one and a half years the following statistics have been compiled to show the changes between 30 September 1968 and 31 March 1970. The personnel strength has doubled. The Vietnamese school graduates per month have increased by a factor of 7. English language graduates per month

have increased by a factor of over 30. By the end of June total Vietnamese craft will have doubled. Trainees are all on board or in training to effect this. Total engagements with the enemy have grown by a factor of 13. During this time that there has been a doubling of the personnel and assets. I believe the above summary gives a hint to the effectiveness of the two leaders, Zumwalt and Chon, as well as to all the hard driving personnel of both of the navies dedicated to seeing the emergence of a strong Vietnamese Navy as soon as possible. I leave feeling that in view of the strengths listed above there is cause for optimism." And, I did.

Q: Now, is there anything else that you want to say in regard to Vietnam and France? Your in-country tour?

Adm. R.: There was one other thing that I did which Admiral Zumwalt supported me on it and then he turned around and did a similiar thing. Just before I left I wrote a letter to the top 35 officers in the Vietnamese Navy telling them what I thought their strengths and weaknesses were. If you'd like I'll leave you a copy of that.

Q: Please.

Adm. R.: Then I wrote a letter for him to sign to Chon saying I'm about ready to go and I've got some concerns. They're pretty much the ones I've already outlined, the air support, whether or not people throughout the Navy were listening to him as much as we would like to have seen and things like that.

I'll give you a copy of those, of all those things. But, there's no point in giving you this 20 problem thing, it's just too voluminous. I think if I give you these three letters, the letter that I wrote, or a sample of the letter that I sent to all 35 of the top officers in the Vietnamese Navy, and the letter that he sent to Chon, this will give you a pretty good feel for how we viewed the situation when it got time to, for us to leave.

Q: You mentioned the Sea Float program earlier. What was the impact of it on the overall war effort?

Adm. R.: I spend a little time talking about that because as you pointed out earlier outside of the recording session, then Captain Roy Huffman had made some incursions into the Bo Day river and, I think, Cho Lon is the other river. Two rivers come together and separate the tip of the Ca Mau

peninsula and the rest of the delta. He had come in there with a couple of PCF's and had caused a little bit of damage. We really didn't realize the significance of this until a week or so later he tried to get in there and he found that the Viet Cong, who we now learned were using that tip of the peninsula as sort of a staging area, they had hospitals and armories and everything else in those mangrove swamp areas, which as you well know you can't see a thing from the air. What tipped us off to how important it was to them was they had telephone pole size V's or X's really all the way across the river in two or three places. Then they had other telephone pole size logs laid across those things to create a barrier to anybody going through those rivers like he had done with some of those swift boats. Well, that got our interest up and so Admiral Zumwalt decided that if that's so important to them then we'll go down there and blow that out. So, he had another operation, I believe the title of it was Silver Mace where he used some of the special forces, some of the SEALs and they took an operation down there and blew all those things out. But, now it becomes obvious to us that this is a very important area and that they are using it as a staging area which intelligence confirmed. Another thing that we were aware of is that Chon was very much interested in that area because it was a place that had quite a thriving fishing community and the other industry in that community was a

charcoal industry. They used a lot of that timber down there and they had a lot of ovens and they were making charcoal that they were selling throughout Vietnam. And, that community completely disappeared in the 1968 Tet offensive. The people just went elsewhere. So, Chon was interested in some sort of presence down there that would help bring the people back, and we were all interested in doing something about the staging area that they were using that tip of the peninsula for. So, Admiral Zumwalt decided he would just simply anchor about, I think we started with nine, eventually we used 11 ammunition pontoons in the middle of the river. And we set up an afloat base there. We'd pull them down there and anchor them there and put four or five butler huts on them, three or four of which were very heavily protected with sand on the roofs. We had sandbags along the sides. It was well armed with 50 caliber machine guns and mortars and that sort of thing. And, two of the pontoons, as I recall, had fuel. We could land a helicopter on one of them. The thing was supplied by ships coming down from Saigon in the Vietnamese Navy.

As it turned out, we operated several river craft from that afloat base. It was never attacked which surprised a lot of people. It was pretty strong and could defend itself, but nobody ever tested it. The amazing thing is that just without anybody saying anything the town started growing back. And,

before we left there were 6, 7, 8000 people in that community that had come back and built huts out of materials available down there and had restored the community. We made a lot of patrols from Sea Float and were able to uncover some strongholds in that swamp area. It was so important that eventually we put a base down there and then got rid of the afloat base. This required a tremendous amount of movement of sand down there because you're talking about building a base in a swamp. So, we had to do a lot of fill. This was another place where Admiral Zumwalt showed his perseverance because one source of sand after another that was close to the area seemed to disappear and we investigated it. So, we were moving sand down there by barge from long distances, from up above Saigon. But, he was steadfast in his resolve to build that base. When we left, it was well underway. We have pictures of it sent to us by people a couple of years later and it was a very active base down there.

Q: Another thing you mentioned when we weren't recording was that the plans and policy changes sometimes came about very much on an ad hoc basis rather than from planning.

Adm. R.: Yes, I mentioned when we planned the SEALORDS, which was a time in

October or November of 1968 when Admiral Zumwalt got a group of people up spearheaded really by Captain Bob Salzer, who at that time was commander of a task force, what 113 I believe.

Q: I think 116 was the Gamewarden and 115 was Market Time.

Adm. R.: Then it's 117 is what it was that he had. Anyway, there was a definite set of plans to try to get back on some of the canals and tributaries on the Mekong that were pretty much in Viet Cong control. However, some things just sort of happened. For example, as part of that plan later on we used swift boats, but the genesis, I think, were just some initiatives on Captain Roy Hoffman's part where he just sort of went into some of those places that he could get a swift boat into. It turned out to be a successful sort of thing. So, this was just sort of adopted by the bigger plan.

Admiral Zumwalt talks in presentations about Vietnam as how he sees the afloat craft, the armor craft as being sort of the battleship on the rivers, and the little PBR's as the escorts. I believe he calls the swift boats the cruisers. And, he sees this as a metaphor for the riverine type of warfare that he came up with. The point I was making was a large portion of that was by design and another portion of it was by design after he saw something

that was really very successful.

Q: You were then wrapping up your tour in Vietnam. Did you express a preference for duty after that?

Adm. R.: Yes. I was, I'd already been accepted at the National War College which has always---take it that you need to get punched, and it's a year where you can be in a nice atmosphere with other people and talk about strategy and tactics and politics. So, it was a thing that I was looking forward to. I was also offered a job that would have been the project officer for what has now become the Trident submarine because I still had some loyalty to the submarine force. Right in the midst of trying to make the decision on whether to go to the War College or whether to take the project officer job Admiral Zumwalt got word that he was going to be Chief of Naval Operations. So, he asked me to come back to him on his staff when he became Chief of Naval Operations. One of the jobs he was kicking around was the possibility of my being his executive assistant. Here again I would have been the wrong person for that job because it was a very routine type of follow-up type of job, a thing that Emmet Tidd would have been brilliant in. But the politics were such that I couldn't anyway because the ground rules

Could not
understand
Bert's last
name.

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unwritten, of course, are that if you have a non-aviator as CNO you generally have an aviator as executive assistant to them. The vice chief is generally an aviator. They try to keep that surface-aviator thing pretty constant throughout. So, politically I couldn't have gotten it anyway. But, that didn't deter him. He still asked me if I would come back then as a special assistant as both he and I realized that the executive assistant job was not really in the cards.

Q: Was this the job that Bert got?

Adm. R.: Yes, and Bert did a good job in there, I think. He's the person that should have had it.

He also nominated me to be the executive assistant to the Secretary, Mr. Chafee. And, I earlier on mentioned that Mr. Chafee told me that he thought the word Vietnamization was coined after that briefing of Mel Laird's in Don Tam. It was during the interview that he mentioned that to me. That was also not in the cards. Here again, I'm not an executive assistant type. Again, I was very flattered that I was nominated. I think Admiral Zumwalt did that with good intentions. The thing that was against that politically was, by now I had a reputation of being very close to

Admiral Zumwalt. I had worked for him for a year and a half when he was the Systems Analysis Division Director, and now I've worked with him for a year and a half in Vietnam. Generally there is this concern about the separation between the military and civilian side and it's sort of frowned on that the CNO ends up with one of his boys in the Secretary's office. So, I don't think that that ever politically had a chance anyway. But, it's just as well because as I've said that's not the kind of thing that I would be good at anyway.

What I ended up being was a special assistant in some non-defined or ill-defined areas. I was a member of the mini-staff which he continued to have when he was Chief of Naval Operations. I looked at such things as being the liaison with the Commander of the Naval Forces in Vietnam. Most of the dealings that the CNO had Bob Salzer and Jim Wilson went through me during the time that I was in that position, who incidently were the successors to Admiral Zumwalt.

Q: Also Admiral King for a little while.

Adm. R.: And, at first it was Admiral Jerry King. Then, I think, Bob relieved him did he not?

Q: I believe he did.

Adm. R.: And, I think Jim Wilson relieved Bob. Yes, it was Jerry King.

And, I was working on that. I helped him prepare a couple of briefings and there's a little anecdote here that I'm not sure Admiral Zumwalt remembers too much of. Well, he may as a matter of fact, but it was kind of an interesting thing to me.

I think we intended that I might also work in some sort of liaison capacity with the submarine people and Admiral Rickover, but that never flew because Admiral Rickover absolutely was not going to have any in-between person. He wanted to deal directly with the CNO so that he made it very clear that that's the way his job was written and that he didn't need any in-between people. So, I was out of that completely. I did not turn out to be a person that had any influence on Admiral Zumwalt or even advised him or anything else as far as submarines are concerned purely because Admiral Rickover made sure that I didn't simply because he didn't want anybody doing that. If anybody was going to it was going to be him or a person designated by him and I was a person designated by Admiral Zumwalt and not by him.

Q: In his book, On Watch, though he suggests you had something of that role.

Adm. R.: Well, what he did was ask me to go see Admiral Rickover and before he had his first meeting with Admiral Rickover as the CNO he wanted me to go over there and talk to him about it, about this relationship and how he was going to work it and that sort of thing, which I did. It was such a distasteful thing with Admiral Rickover, the whole thought of it that he right there sensed that we might be setting up something that he organizationally was not going to have anything to do with. He gave me a bad time when I was over there. Probably I didn't choose my words as well as I should have in talking about my purpose for being there. But, I think, it sort of was o-kay that I did talk to him first and gave Admiral Zumwalt some idea of what his reaction was to any sort of an in-between type person because that meant that the admiral dealt pretty much with him directly.

Q: Did Admiral Rickover sort of disown you at that point?

Adm. R.: Yes. He disowned me, I think, then, but to an even greater extent later on when I got involved in the people side of it. It's just something that he's never worried that much about. I don't mean to do him a disservice to say he's not concerned about his people because he is, but that's way down on his priority.

Q: Did you then, in effect, sort of burn your bridges as far as the submarine part of your career?

Adm. R.: Oh, yes. There was no chance that I was ever going to be a commander of a submarine group or anything like that. Oh, there's no question about that.

Q: Or be involved in a development program either?

Adm. R.: Not on the submarine side. Oh, yes, I burnt that bridge. There is no question about that.

I don't know how much Admiral Rickover knows of the name Rauch. I don't know whether he even remembers who I am, but I think that there was a period there where he saw me as too much associated with Admiral Zumwalt. Maybe he had some other reasons. He saw me taking on some of these personnel issues. I just don't think he was a big supporter of some of the things I was doing. Consequently there is no doubt in my mind that had I ever asked, which I didn't, but if I ever had somehow or other magically I would not have been able to get any of those submarine development type jobs. You're right, there is no question about that.

Q: As someone who has observed both of those officers closely what could you say about the relationship with each other?

Adm. R.: Well, I think it started out with a mutual respect. One of the mistakes I made when I was talking to Admiral Rickover in those early days was I said some positive things about Admiral Zumwalt. I said, he's got a lot of support, a lot of civilian support, which is true, especially people who I think consider themselves intellectuals identify with Admiral Zumwalt quite well. So, all the whiz kids, all the systems analysis people, many of the people in the Secretary of Defense's office, many of the people on the civilian side of the Navy, people in Congress had a great deal of respect and still do for Admiral Zumwalt. So, I made this comment that this CNO probably as much as anybody we've had there for a long time would be able to get along fairly well with the civilians. This set him into orbit because, I think, he saw me saying that he'd be able to compete with him in Congress, and, of course, Admiral Rickover's stronghold was the backing he's always gotten from Congress. I tried to explain what I meant, but that was the kiss of death for me to make such a statement. And, of course, he was in the process of eating me up and trying to do away with me anyway and that sort of set him off. I never after that tried to get involved because I

didn't want to make matters worse. I just simply drew back entirely from any relationship with Admiral Rickover. I did not enjoy the position between Zumwalt and Rickover that I did between Zumwalt and Chon in Vietnam. I think at one time there may have been a hope, and I don't know whether it's true or not, but there may have been a hope that that might have been able to be the case, but it simply could not have worked. Rickover wouldn't play that kind of game.

Q: Do you think anybody could have fulfilled that role?

Adm. R.: No. No. Oh, maybe somebody that is a Rickover backed person, somebody that spent two or three years in his office could. In some respects Admiral Shear filled that role. Admiral Shear was OP-31 at the time which was the submarine development in OP-03. And, Admiral Shear, I think, to some degree filled that liaison type role, but by and large they talked directly.

Q: Wasn't Kinnaird McKee one of the few people that had the confidence of both?

Adm. R.: Yes, probably McKee. Shear did too. Admiral Shear was, I think, respected by Admiral Zumwalt. He was highly respected by Admiral Rickover and still is. Admiral Shear and I occasionally disagreed, but by and large he and I had a good relationship too. But, I think maybe Admiral Shear or later on Ken McKee kind of filled that role. But, it would be hard for anyone to really fill the role like I had filled between Chon and Zumwalt in Vietnam. Admiral Rickover is just not going to do it that way. I have a lot of respect for Admiral Rickover. Well, this is not about Admiral Rickover, so I won't waste time on that. He's been very important to the Navy, but there were some key differences between Admiral Zumwalt and Admiral Rickover. And, other than the personality thing, which could have been dealt with, there were some key philosophical differences. The biggest was the conflict between the so-called hi-low mix which you read about in "On Watch." Admiral Rickover's position that we needed to go first class on anything that we built. You know what the conflict is, Admiral Zumwalt didn't think we could get the quantity of ships in particular that we needed if we built everything nuclear power. And, Admiral Rickover's position was there is no sense in building something unless you make it nuclear power. I don't know whether he still feels that way or not. That last testimony he gave before Congress was kind of _____ was kind of interesting, but he

was a very strong advocate of that. Of course, Congress, I think, it was in '72 or '73 had some sort of a ground rule that they passed that all combat ships from now on would be nuclear powered. Well, there is no way that the country can support that, so they got off of that kick within a year or two. But, there was that slight period of time there where that was exactly the case.

Admiral Rickover's power was still growing even through the Zumwalt years. I think there were people who understood Admiral Zumwalt's hi-low mix philosophy, but there were still the supporters of Admiral Rickover. So, this made for a little bit of difficulty in getting some of our things through because here we were showing a fight within our own ranks.

I think that maybe Admiral Rickover did us the greatest amount of disservice in that particular area, but I can't in any way even in spite of that take away what he has done for the Navy in the development of nuclear power in the Navy.

The personalities were such that it's not a thing that you have expected to last too long, but if they didn't have so many philosophical differences it could have. Both of them could have seen the advantage that having the other one on their side had. I think that support from Admiral Rickover in all the force levels would have helped in things that Zumwalt was trying to

get across, and, I think, Zumwalt could have helped Admiral Rickover although he may not admit it, but I think he could have. But, it just didn't turn out that way because of the difference in philosophy.

Q: I got the impression that Admiral Zumwalt was willing to go halfway to compromise but Rickover wouldn't come his half?

Adm. R.: Well, that may be true, that may be true. Rickover may have told you the same statement.

Q: I haven't talked to him.

Adm. R.: You'll probably have a difficult time ever doing it.

Q: I imagine that's true. Did you get into any hardware areas yourself in your special assistant role?

Adm. R.: No, I really didn't. When he had to make a presentation to the President around August, and he relieved the first of June, I was involved a little bit as special assistant in putting together the presentation for

him to make to the President. I was involved more as a leg-man than as an idea person. He had Charlie DiBona and Dave Kassing who were involved in the Center for Naval Analysis working on some things that he should be saying with a lot of his own ideas thrown in. I was sort of the glue that was going to put all these pieces together with a lot of direction I might add. This was not a thing that I had a whole lot of my own creative involvement in. But, it was a thing that I alluded to earlier. It was kind of funny, we put together finally a very short thing, maybe as many as five or six pages total of what would normally have been slides in any other setting, but he was going to meet with all the other chiefs of staff and the Secretary of Defense with an annual meeting that they had with the President. Sort of a state of the service type of meeting. This was Nixon of course. So, he wanted these things put together in a book. We put them together, which talked about the four missions of the Navy. Since then we have had various multiplications of that, but essentially they're the same thing, projection mission, keeping the sea lanes open, the strategic mission, and so forth. Then he drew, as we discussed earlier, from his experience in systems analysis and made some comments on the competency he had on being able to win in a sea confrontation under various scenarios. He was saying at that time something over 50% but it was diminishing fast. So, we put

this thing together and he wanted it sort of fancy. So, I looked around in OpNav to see what we could do in the time frame we were in and we laminated all these things and we got some sort of binder, hard binder, we put this spiral binding on the thing. You know, you punch about 20 different rectangular punches and they will take spiral binders.

Q: Yes.

Adm. R.: We put this thing together and we had one for everyone that was going to be over there. And, I took it down to him. We were always changing things right up to the bitter end, you know, to try to improve the situation. So, I finally took it down to him sort of like about an hour before he had to go over. And, he has all these things and he's leafing through it and on the very back page we had something about CinCPac and there was a typo on there that came out "pact." Well, he didn't mind giving one of these things to everybody else, but he wasn't about to give something with a typo in it to the President. So, he said, "You've got to get this changed." Well, if we'd not gone to the trouble of having these things laminated and all of that trouble it would have been a very easy thing to do. I had to get it retyped. I had to go tear this thing apart. I had to go to another

part in OpNav and get the thing repunched and the spirals put back in and all that malarkey.

So, he said, "I have got to go down to the secretary's office right now," the Secretary of Defense. "And all the chiefs are going to go in two cars as a group over to the White House. It's my impression we'll be coming in the Southwest gate. So, you take my car, my driver and when you get this thing done, you get over there as fast as you can and as we go through the gate you can hand it to me."

That's exactly what we did. I got there and about three minutes before they did and I just stood right outside of the gate and when they came in he simply rolled the window down and reached out and grabbed this thing out of my hand, rolled the window up and went in as though nothing in the world had ever happened. I heard later that it was a very well received presentation. He made many points with the President and so forth.

Q: How to be calm under pressure.

Adm. R.: Very interesting. But, that's the last that I really had anything to do with even looking at big picture stuff like strategy or looking at the hardware mix we should have or anything like that. He asked me to be involved

when Stan Turner started, I think Project 60 is what he called it. He wanted in 60 days to make a statement, from the time he took over of what in his, on his watch he was going to do, what kind of hardware changes, what kind of developments, and so forth. He had Stan working a little bit with Worth Bagley, but I believe Stan was in charge of the thing. And, I was supposed to have helped a little bit too. He didn't exactly know how, he just said we're doing this thing that you ought to get involved in. Other than to give him a few things on personnel I really did not even get involved in that very much. I just all of a sudden got very, very busy and I shifted really towards the personnel side of things. What was causing me to be so busy was that I ended up being the mini-staff coordinator of the Z-grams.

The genesis of the Z-grams was that he wanted to make some personnel changes and he knew they were going to be unpopular on the part of many people in the hierarchy and he did not really think he could pass everything down through the chain of command and see it about five levels below him in exactly the way he had intended it to go from the beginning. There are a lot of general messages that go out from OpNav. You can never tell who the author of them is, who's behind it. They are just OpNav, or NavOp number so-and-so. All of a sudden there started to be this kind of a thing, you know, who really believes in this. This is really way out. Did Admiral

so-and-so really say that? So, there is this questioning of NavOp's all of a sudden that I didn't really know existed until I got there and could see what was going on. He was aware of this and he felt that if it were obvious that the CNO personally was behind some of these things that they would carry a little bit more weight than just the standard NavOp. So, you had NavOp so-and-so and it started out with a Z-number, Z-1, Z-3, Z-4, 5, 6, 7, 8.

Q: How did you get picked for this specific role?

Adm. R.: Well, you put your finger on it before because of the orientation that I had gotten into in Vietnam of, it was really a personnel type of orientation. The personal response program, the training development, that kind of thing. I think he saw me as special assistant in some of those personnel areas. He and I talked about management and about good leaders and bad leaders and this sort of thing at various times, at breakfast and stuff like that, and how we might be able to impact that somehow or other. I think he knew that was my orientation and I thought a lot like he did in areas of leadership and management. So, my guess is he needed somebody on his staff and I was the logical person. The other people were too involved in other things.

Well, this all of a sudden took a lot of my involvement and so, I really didn't get involved in the hardware thing as much as I would have otherwise, the Project-60. We had a lot of people that one way or another you could say were on the mini-staff one of whom was Dave Bagley. Dave when we first got over there and the admiral took over as CNO, he had some Rear Admirals' job.

*I do not believe I
have this correct.*

Q: He was CruDes select commander. ←

Adm. R.: Well, but he had been, but he was then in a joint job on the Joint Chiefs, and yet he talked to Dave a lot because they had been friends since prep school and had played games with each other, a lot of friendly rivalry and all this sort of thing. So, he had a lot of confidence in Dave. The other person that shared an office with me, or I shared with him, I guess, would be the person who later became JAGG, "Robbie" Robinson, who was Horace B. I think was his name. He was general counsel to Mr. Nitze when Admiral Zumwalt was the executive assistant. They had developed a very close friendship from that. He had a lot of confidence in Robbie's counsel in legal matters as well as other matters. So did I. Robbie is a sharp person. He's got a good bit of common sense. So, Robbie got a look

a look at all the Z-grams that were written. I did. Dave Bagley did. Two or three other people did. And, so what sort of evolved was I would collect the comments from all these people and then I would collate them and send them to the admiral with my version of what I thought the Z-gram ought to look like, and what some of the other alternative versions were and who wanted it this way and that way and why I'd chosen what I did. Generally he would take it from me and do one more thing with it. He would get a response from the vice chief on the thing and then he would generally send it out. But, that started taking an awful lot of my time. I wrote some of them, but I didn't write all that many. I probably wrote, maybe, six of them or something like that out of what were 150 maybe. Oh, I guess not that many.

Q: More than 100.

Adm. R.: It was over 100, but it wasn't 150.

Q: The vice chief, was it Admiral Cousins at that point?

Adm. R.: It started out being, Admiral Cleary still was at the beginning.

Q: Well, he left fairly soon because he was a submariner and he went to CincPacFleet.

Adm. R.: That's right, but he was there in some of the early ones.

Q: I see.

Adm. R.: And, then it was Cousins after that. The bulk of them came out either under Cleary or Cousins. I guess, perhaps, the bulk of them maybe under Cousins. Cleary had a lot to do with some of the early ones. Cleary was behind this idea because a lot of these things he'd tried to do anyway. I think if he'd become CNO you would have seen some of them. You wouldn't have seen quite the imagination that you got in these, but you would have seen some of them. But, he would make some mature type of comment and we would change some things as did Ralph Cousins later on when he became the vice chief. Oh, such a thing, the Mickey Mouse thing that was talked about in, "On Watch." And, I'll come back to that later. He just simply wasn't going to let that go out the title being "Mickey Mouse Elimination." It's the sort of thing that Admiral Zumwalt had been talking about before he was ever CNO. He wanted to get rid of all this "Mickey Mouse," and he wanted

the Z-gram that was that. By the time we got it ready to go, it took us a little while, in fact it went probably later than he would have liked. The last person to change it was Cousins. He talked us into a better title. I think it was better.

I'm going to spend some time later on if you'll remind me on the "Mickey Mouse" Z-gram.

Q: I wonder where the ideas for these came from?

Adm. R.: That's what I was going to tell you now.

Q: Alright. fine.

Adm. R.: One of the things that we did in Vietnam towards the end is at my request, really, because one of the problems that I saw was a lack of communications security in the Vietnamese Navy. One of my solutions for that was to get a couple of sharp young lieutenants and have them go from base to base and see what they could learn just being near the base, just what they could pick up, and then tell the base commander and see if there wasn't some way of stopping some of that leakage that was occurring. I had

the impression that we were tipping our hands an awful lot, especially on the Vietnamese side, but probably outside too. But, I was only looking at the Vietnamese side.

I talked the admiral into letting me bring his son, Elmo, in to work on this. And, also Dave Helperin who had originally come over there as an aide to Admiral Flanagan, who was the Vice ComNav IV B, Deputy Commandant IV B. These were two bright young people. They both later became lawyers and are doing fine as far as I know. In fact, Dave Helperin was aide to, administrative assistant to secretary, well he wasn't secretary at the time, Mr. Kissinger.

Q: He got in a flap with him over wire tapping.

Adm. R.: Oh, yes. We had a series of people in that job incidentally. That's how sharp Dave was, and Elmo is just as sharp too. He's a sharp naval officer.

They did a lot more than what I expected out of them. They would bring back reports on a lot more than just communications security. They would tell me all kinds of things that we needed to beef up and this sort of thing. I say me, to the boss.

Dave Helprin, in a way, became then a member of the mini-staff. What he was asked to do was to try to find out from the young officers and some of the enlisted people how they thought things were going, what were some of the problems. What evolved is that we actually had these groups that came back to Washington. I've forgotten the name of them. Anyway, who would meet in Washington for about a week and then they would make a presentation to Mr. Chafee and to Admiral Zumwalt. What they saw were improvements that could be made in their particular area. We started out with just a group of junior officers.

In here somewhere Jack Davey in trying to build the image of the CNO, and he was the mini-staff person as far as Chinfo is concerned. He was the advisor directed, direct advisor to Admiral Zumwalt as far as his personal PR was concerned.

Jack Davey had set up a series of interviews that he would give, or panels really that he would sit with. Then he was going to do videotapes of these things and then spread them throughout the Navy so the rest of the Navy could see these. I think we finally did seven or eight of these kinds of things.

One of the early ones was getting a group of young officers together out at BuPers and just a give and take between the admiral and a panel of

five or six officers. One of those officers was black, Steve Wilkins, who was a lieutenant. He raised some questions that none of us had ever thought about before. That was the plight of non-white males in the Navy in any position, and particularly in the officer position.

So, one of the things that we wanted to do then was have another group of people come in for one of these weeks sessions and this time they were going to be all black officers and we were going to get some feel for some of the things that we ought to do to improve their lot. Well, that was a very traumatic thing for a lot of us. In the mean time he had decided to get some sort of a minority officer in as an advisor to him on these sorts of matters because he became aware, being questioned by Steve, that these were things that he'd just simply not thought about before. I think it's fair to say that. He might tell you differently. My guess is that here is an area that he just simply had not spent a lot of time thinking about. It was a dimension that whose time had come obviously and here we were way behind times.

So, he got Bill Norman, who you've probably heard of, who is a very capable and competent and confident naval officer with a political science background who has become an advisor to Admiral Zumwalt every since. I don't know how much they see each other today, but they have had a very close

association. And, Bill got there about the same week that we had this study group in. He spent some time with them. Anyway they gave a presentation which really was a Damascus road experience for some people in the room. Not as many people as it would have been nice if it had of been. But, I think it's fair to say that Admiral Zumwalt got an insight in that meeting that he'd never had before. These people were saying, look we can't even get cosmetics in the exchanges. We have a special problem in getting our hair fixed. There's nobody at the bases to fix our wives' hair. All kinds of things.

During that time where we were talking about the stewards and all that sort of thing, Admiral Beshany, who was at that time, he had three stars, and I forget what his job was. I'll never forget this, nor will Admiral Zumwalt. He spoke up and said, "Well, I don't understand all this problem. The boys that work for me have always seemed to like the job. We've always had them as part of the family and they have always wanted to stay with me as I've gone from one place to the other. I don't understand all this problem."

The wife of one of the officers that was there got up and said, "Admiral how old were these boys."

And, he said, "Oh, I don't know, 25, 29, 35 something like that."

Well, you could have heard a pin drop. That's all that was needed to be said, you know? Then this same women got up later on and made some comment on where she had to live at one of the places until they could get some sort of an arrangement. They had to live upstairs over a garage or something like that. She got tears in her eyes. Well, this touched Admiral Zumwalt very much. So he decided right then and there that one of the things that he was going to do is turn this thing around. And, I think if you were to ask him today to list, well the same thing you asked me, what are some of the things you are pleased with and some of the things you are not, I think one of the things he would number is one of the things that he is glad he took on is the issue of trying to bring about a little bit of affirmative action in an outfit that all of a sudden we realized inadvertently or otherwise, the facts are it was a very racist organization. And, none of us had ever thought of that in those terms before. This is the thing that we never even given consideration to. But, when you looked at the history, and you looked at what was going on, it was almost devastating to realize what had been done to this group of people. So, he spent a tremendous amount of personal effort supporting Bill Norman's, supporting my programs to help turn this thing around.

Another group of people that came in, then we'll get back to that later

on, but another group of people who came in were some, we started having warfare people, all young aviators, then all young submariners, and all young surface people, and that sort of thing. We got some of the key enlisted skills in, and some of the ratings that we were having trouble retaining people. So, these study groups, retention study groups was, I think, what we called them. How can we do a better job of retaining them? They provided a lot of insights that later led to Z-grams. It's a long answer to that short question, but it's an important concept that you bring people in from the outside, and to tell you what are some of the things that really have been going on a long time that's kind of "Mickey Mouse," and really could be improved if you put your mind to it.

Somewhere in all this the CO's started getting their noses out of joint and upper middle officers. So, one group we had in was a bunch of commanding officers. We had a group come down from the Naval War College which would automatically take care of that outfit. They talked about some things.

So, the source of the Z-grams were ideas that would come from any of us. Sometimes they were originated in OpNav, I'm sorry, in the BuPers now that this mechanism existed. Quite a number of them came out of these retention study groups. And, another source of them was whenever Admiral

Zumwalt went anywhere on a tour he started this practice of getting a group of people back on the fantail, sitting down with the chiefs, meeting with the junior officers, meeting with the department heads, and he always had somebody with him like Howard (Kerr) or Emmitt Tidd or somebody who was writing down all the questions. And, if he couldn't answer the question then we would try to find out a little bit more about it and see if something of a bigger nature had to be developed. So, a Z-gram could easily come from something that was raised during one of these sessions.

Q: Did he had a backlog of these when he came to be CNO of things that he had wanted to do?

Adm. R.: Yes, I'd say, maybe, five or six. One of the major ones was this idea of a junior squadron where you could have somebody a whole rank junior from the normal being the commanding officer of the ship. The squadron commander would be a whole rank junior. The department heads would and so forth, because he thought if you got some people in this category it could probably be a really good squadron. You'd have a lot of young Turks that were really charging and going to do a good job. And, there were a lot of these people in the Navy that were ready to take on these responsibilities.

Howard Kerr is a good example. When we first started the idea and we finally got it to the implementation stage we almost had to force them to put Howard in as one of the commanding officers. His name did not appear on the list when it came over. We kept coming up, this was one of my jobs, come up with reasons why we could get Howard one of these ships. I don't even remember now how I did it, but finally I used some sort of criteria which pulled Howard out. Well, he turned out to be one of the best ones in the whole crowd. He's had a very fine naval career ever since. But, this was a thing that did not set well at all. It was against anything that we'd ever done in the Navy. It was almost too avant-garde. It was a thing where there was almost, let me put it another way, it was a thing where there was the most solid resistance to what he wanted to do, but he felt so strongly about it he said, "Well, on this one I'm just going to dictate this is the way we're going to do it." And, he did. It went fine. It disappeared later on because there just was not enough, there were not enough people that wanted to spend that much energy to make the thing continue to work. So, it didn't go. But, the squadron was a very good squadron. Nicholson was the squadron commander. You heard his name before. He was the operations guy on the mini-staff in Vietnam. Everything went fine. The only problem was is it was just going against the whole fiber of what the officer

corps in the Navy is built on. That was one of the things that people really objected to except for the people involved. They thought it was great.

The other one that he really came in there with his mind made up on was the "Mickey Mouse" thing. He wanted to do away with ridiculous instructions that were sort of an achronisms. The best example of that is, you may remember when you had this thing that on a weekend if you went on liberty you had to stay within a 100 mile radius if it was a two day. I don't have the numbers right, but the concept is correct, 300 miles if it was a three day weekend or something like that. With air transportation and reasonable air fares that's a ridiculous thing to have. It didn't belong in the Navy in the 1970's. So, he wanted to look at all these things and so that was another one that he came in with his mind made up for that he was going to take care of.

There may have been others, but these are the two that hit me right now as things that he had long since decided he was going to do.

Q: One of the principle criticisms I've heard in implementing this whole program was what you mentioned the bypassing of the middle level seniority people because he wanted to get the word directly to the working level, but creating resentment in between. Might it not have been better to try the

chain of command first and then go his way if the chain of command didn't work?

Adm. R.: I don't know the answer to that, but I want to tell you something that I tried. Incidentally, Bert Shepard was against the Z concept. I remember when we were all talking about it, he didn't think it was a good idea. Davie thought it was a great idea, the PR guy. That was another thing, I think, that the admiral had pretty well made up his mind on. I think he could have been shaken loose from it, but that would have been a very difficult thing to do. I think he was pretty much convinced that putting a Z-number on these things was fairly important.

To answer your question, I think, in retrospect we could have done it a little bit differently. If you look in the, "On Watch," a little chapter in there on the "Mickey Mouse" Z-gram, he's got a whole coverage in it. I had quite a file on it which I gave him and he got pretty much from that file. We put a lot of effort into that. Ironically the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Navy was the one that drafted it along with, I think, Dave Halperin had a little bit of hand in it too. But, the ideas were pretty much from the Master Chief who you generally think of as a fairly conservative person. This was Delbert Black. And, so, it's not one

of those things that a bunch of left wing people like Rauch and Zumwalt thought up out of the, or went to some young kids and thought up. It was a thing that came from the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Navy. This is not well known.

The other thing that we did with that, knowing that it was controversial, when we got it all put together we sent it around to each one of the fleet commanders. The CinCLantFleet, CincPacFleet, I think we even sent one to CincUSNavEur. We got their comments. We collated and incorporated their comments on the thing. Then, I wanted to do one more thing, and this is one of my failures in not standing up for my rights within the mini-staff, I wanted to write a confidential message to the commanding officers that was going to send forth the entire "Mickey Mouse" Z-gram about four or five days before they got the thing in the clear so that they could have gotten their ducks in line, and they could have implemented it as their program. Dave Bagley shot me down on that. He said it was unnecessary, but he would buy off on sending a confidential message to them saying of this nature is going to come. I should not have bought off on that in retrospect, but at the time I did. We sent this message out confidential saying we're got this Z-gram that's on the way, I know you'll support it and all this sort of thing. The day it got there was a holiday. I don't recall which holiday it was.

The following day we sent the Z-gram because Admiral Zumwalt was getting pretty impatient to get this thing out since it's one of the things he wanted to do early on. We're now even into the Cousins VCNO tour. So, what the commanding officers got by the time they broke that other message probably they got the Z-gram, maybe, even before since they came, since nobody did much during the holiday. Probably by the time they got to work they got the Z-gram before they got the confidential message saying it was coming. I can't help but believe if we'd done this the other way it would have softened it a little bit. There still would have been the people that would have been very much against it, but at least they could have gotten their own ideas together. And, so it could have looked like they were involved in at least showing how it was going to work in their particular command. But, it didn't. The sailors knew at the same time they did essentially. I think one of the beard things was in there. The thing I mentioned about the doing away with any limits on liberty. I think doing away with the liberty cards was in there. I believe that's come back, but that was in there. There were about ten items. I think we may have gotten rid of one of them after we heard from all of the four star admirals. I think we went with the nine that were left. I think it's probably spelled out in, On Watch, the whole body of the thing. But that's a good example

of where, in my estimation, we would have done a little better giving the CO's a little bit of a headstart on the thing, and we didn't. It just didn't come out that way.

Q: Did you get any resentful feedback from the CO's and unit commanders?

Adm. R.: Well, what you got was for those people who resented it a throwing up of their hands and saying, screw it, if that's the way he wants to run it I'm not going to pay any attention to it.

You see every Z-gram that was written, I won't say every one, but all those that made changes that looked like a difference in the standards always had a bottom paragraph in it saying that I know all this represents a change in the standards, it does not represent a lowering of the standards, and I know that the commanding officer's, and the chief petty officers will, as they always have done, make sure that the standards are maintained. All those words were always there, but nobody read those. The young people didn't.

Also, in this "Mickey Mouse" Z-gram was the allowing you to wear dungees to and from work. So, you didn't have to come to work in one kind of uniform and change, and then work, and then change again and go home.

all you were going to do is go directly from your home to the ship and work and then go back home again, you could do that in dungerees. Well, the interpretation was, going from work to their place of business. So, we picked on the people in dungerees in the Chicago airport. And, their response was, "I'm on my way to work. I just happen to have been home for the holiday. I'm flying back to go to work." That should not have ever occurred. If anybody had ever paid attention to the last paragraph in the Z-gram.

But, what happened was those people who resented it, and I'm not suggesting that this was a majority, but it was a very vocal minority. That's not true. Oh, yes, it's true. What they did was they just simply did not go along with the whole idea, and so they said, "Screw it. If that's what he wants to do, well we won't check, you know. If they want to wear dungerees sure, I'm not going to pay attention to whether they are neat or not." So, you had a few commanding officers that were doing that kind of thing, and the chiefs said, to heck with this noise. So, you had people that could get to the Chicago airport. This was never, ever the intention. It was never the intention to make a bunch of sloppy people out of the thing. It was a case of where all of a sudden people could no longer see where the limits really were, and so they just tested it and it got way out of hand.

Well, once you started having people in dungarees in the Chicago airport, then you got this feedback by the retired community that said, what in the world is my favorite organization gone to, you know, got all these people running around looking like a bunch of tramps and they say they are in the Navy. So, you got this big groundswell led pretty much by ex-CNO George Anderson to try and do whatever they could against Admiral Zumwalt.

Q: Didn't he also lead some of the protests against the loosening up on racial restrictions?

Adm. R.: Yes. It was a little more subtle, but he did, yes.

I suspect that retired group had a lot to do with the committee that Eddie Hebert, Congressman Hebert, put together to look into the Navy once we had a couple of the race riots. You recognize that we were the third service for this to occur. The Army had already had theirs a couple of years ahead. That the Air Force had had a big blowout out at Travis Air Force Base. Our time was coming up, our turn in the barrel. It's remarkable it didn't start with us because we really had the most racist organization when you start to look at the history of the Navy with respect to black and white officers. But, it did happen to us. Whether or not it was a racial

thing I don't know. I guess it was.

You were talking about being tired when you were out on Market Time. Where the first one occurred was on Kitty Hawk. They had been out there for 11 months and they had gone into Olongapo, into Subic, and the little fracas that occurred in Olongapo. That continued when they got back aboard ship. That finally ended up into the riot that they had aboard the Kitty Hawk.

Ten years before the same thing could have happened, except it probably would have been between the snipes and the deck hands, you know. You always had that fight. Or it may have been between a destroyer and another destroyer, or something like that. The people were tired and there were a lot of frictions there, but this manifested itself along racial lines. Then we had a whole series of them. We had sort of a, some sort of resistance in the Hassayampa, an oiler that was in port. Then we had that fiasco on the Constellation back on North Island off the West Coast. As a result of those, Chairman Hebert of the House Armed Services Committee decided to investigate the Navy and ostensibly Admiral Zumwalt.

One of the problems Hebert had is he is a strong Zumwalt supporter because he believed in all the hardware things that Admiral Zumwalt was over there arguing for, but he did not like all this equality of races sort of

thing that Admiral Zumwalt was over there trying to do. This made it very difficult for Admiral Zumwalt because he had to maintain Hebert's support for the hardware and do it somehow or other and still do this thing that he had developed a very strong personal commitment to. It was a fine line to tread that few of us would have been able to successfully do. Somehow or other he was able to do it.

Q: How much support did he call on you in that effort?

Adm. R.: Not too much really. He probably got more support from Bill Norman, the black officer that was a minority advisor than he did from me as far as things to try. But, obviously Bill couldn't go over there and talk to Mr. Hebert. That was never going to go anywhere. The admiral did it all himself. He maintained that relationship in a way that most men couldn't do. He did not ever compromise from his resolve to increase the quality of life of non-white officers. Well, all officers, but particularly the non-white officers in the Navy. And, yet he continued to have the support of Hebert and his people as far as the hardware programs were concerned. It was a very difficult time.

Now, Bill and I went over and talked to the staff, the permanent staff

who were going to be working with three congressional members on this investigation before it ever started. As soon as Bill and I came back we could have written down their findings because we knew what they were going to find. They told us, and then they went out to San Diego and interviewed a lot of people and they wrote down essentially what they told us that they were going to find. There was a breakdown in the fiber of the discipline of the Navy because of all this permissiveness Admiral Zumwalt had allowed and that's what caused the race riots. And, it's just ridiculous.

Q: Sounds like systems analysis.

Adm. R.: It is. Yes, it's ridiculous to say that there was this permissiveness which caused the race riots because it didn't have any thing to do with it. Nevertheless, somehow or other he got through all that. He calls that his thermidor. I never knew what the word thermidor was until I read his book. But, he was put to the test and he was not too sure a couple of times there, I guess, how it was going to turn out. He came through it o-kay. So, we survived all that. I'm kind of rambling right now. Would you like to go back and get more chronologic?

Q: I don't know what the sequence might be. I'm wondering if this made it tough for you in your operation to keep pushing forward when you're getting, for whatever reasons, race riots that people can attribute to the so called permissiveness?

Adm. R.: Well, let me back up and talk now about what my position evolved to be. As I said I started out as a special assistant to him. I think he and I both knew that what I was going to get involved in more and more were some of the kinds of things that we did in Vietnam. There were several things going on. One, is that the Army and the Air Force had had their race riots and we knew it was just a matter of time. He had also gotten this new awareness about the plight of the minorities in the Navy. We only had something like four tenths of one percent of the officer corps were black. And, so we never paid any attention to that. The jobs they had been given were all jobs that you could not ever get much of a career because the jobs weren't any good. There are two things that determine where you are going to do. One, is how well you do. And, two is what tickets you get punched. So, there were just a lot of things. And enlisted people there were about 4% or 5% of the Navy that were black. Another group that was filipino and I don't know how much that was. We all of a sudden realized this, far below

the percentages of any of the other services. Then we started looking at some of the practices we had gone through and it was really ridiculous. We'd made a lot of headway too, but we hadn't even come close to where we ought to be.

In 1942 I was told that they had a different recruit training center for the stewards that were coming in than they did for anybody else. Their pay rate was different. Their uniforms were different. It was a plantation model if you had ever seen one. It didn't matter what the academic background was, or the capability, or the experience of this person coming in, if the person was black or Filipino they were stewards. Well, you know, we changed that. We started letting some of these people into other rates and that sort of thing. But, a lot of the other stuff we didn't change. So, we knew we had problems that we needed to deal with.

It was shortly after we got back that we learned that the Navy people in Vietnam were getting these real pure viles of heroin. It was something like 95% pure in these real nice little plain plastic vials. It had been going on apparently while we were still over there, but nobody had ever told us about it. In fact, I'm pretty sure that most Navy people really hadn't become involved in it by the time we left. And, it was just starting in the Army. So, all of a sudden we heard about this. People were

snorting the stuff and it was so pure that they were real high on that, and to maintain it when they got back in the states where they were getting the 15% stuff they had to shoot it up. So, all of a sudden we were bringing back people who had the potential for making heroin addicts out of themselves. We had this problem all of a sudden to deal with.

Of course, I always thought that we had a management problem, that we had a lot of officers in the Navy that really were really only working on that production side of the two dimensions I was talking about and really could do a better job at looking for the concern for people side. But, I want you to know that never did he or I or anybody ever want to do anything to take away from the concern for performance. It was only to add another dimension along with---so, these things were growing as problems as you well know, in the early '70's. Fathers and sons couldn't even talk to each let along a 40 year old chief talking to a 17 year old Seaman Apprentice. So, we had to do something. I recommended to him that we set up a project managership in BuPers very similiar to the project managers we had over in the Material Command. As you know we had the special projects that developed the Polaris program. Then later on the special projects for the development of all kinds of different pieces of hardware. We needed something similiar to that to take a look at these growing human resource

problems. He went along with that. By January of 1971 Dave Bagley had gone over there to be PersP, which among other things was going to be the Navy Ombudsman, which really was a thing that grew out of that extra chief of staff job that we had in Vietnam.

The logical place for me to be was working for Dave Bagley. So, I set up this project managementship. Started out, I think he gave me permission to get six naval officers and three civilains or something like that.

I borrowed \$50,000 from a friend of mine that I had known in Vietnam that was in the Material Command. I think we paid it back to him later on, but I didn't have any money to start with because we didn't have it in the budget anywhere. That grew into what still is in the Navy today as the Human Resource Management Program. There is still an admiral who has that job.

I would hope that for many of those things that they will continue to be.

I was double hatted for, oh, probably another six months where I still maintained an office in the pentagon and was special assistant to Admiral Zumwalt. But, I was putting more and more time in also being the Director of this project managership, of being the project manager for, I think we

called it then Human Relations Development or something like that. We later called it Human Resources.

We started out with only the management leadership idea, the drug abuse because I thought they were related. I thought you would never eliminate drug abuse by good leadership, but you certainly could by poor leadership push people inadvertantly into a higher level of drug abuse. And, then the race relations thing I knew we had to take on. They were all somewhat related.

We hadn't gone too far in the drug area until we started hearing from some recovered alcoholics who had come out of the program that started sort of on a, with no resources whatsoever out of BuMed, and going on in Long Beach. Captain Zuzka, I think he had retired as a captain in the Medical Corps and had gotten interested in this and came back. BuMed gave him a building out there. It was an old Butler building. He tried various things. He had Dick Jewell who was a long time retired Navy commander who was a recovered alcoholic, who as a civilian came in to help him. The two of those guys tried all kinds of things. They started having some success. Some of the people knew about this. A person by the name of Jim Baxter who was a captain and who was a recovered alcoholic himself convinced us that we really ought to take this on in our little project also. So, that's how that

grew. Jim became the first director of the alcoholic rehabilitation program under me. All I did was get him the resources. They were the ones that ran the thing and was quite successful. This was one of the things that Admiral Zumwalt really supported and was very pleased with the results because we really were turning around some really key, really professional people and holding on to those folks instead of having to get rid of them because they were alcoholics.

The woman's rights thing grew up later. And, then we also had a cultural relations thing that was part of this group. It didn't fit so much in leadership, but many of the principles were the same and all the old personal response stuff that we did in Vietnam was applicable not only to Vietnam, but was applicable to our sailors at Roosevelt Roads who would never leave the gate because of the image of Puerto Ricans as New York City ghetto type Puerto Ricans. The same thing when we tried to put a squadron of destroyers in Greece. Well, what are we going to do to try to get these people to actually live on the economy? We had a number of successes in places like this and it's the sort of thing that we needed to do. So, that was another thing that was put under this project managership.

Admiral Zumwalt was very supportive of this whole program. I was less and less involved in being a special assistant to him. Many of the

Z-grams had already gotten written. As you know, the first 50 came out in the first several months and then they were fewer and fewer because, you know, there are only so many things you can do. And, in fact, if you look through them many of the Z-grams in the later numbers were the development of some of the Z-grams of ours in the Human Resource Management area. There was a special one for the alcoholic program. There were some others that really grew out of that.

I saw this as a way of institutionalizing a lot of the things that he was trying to do, and that we had to build something into the Navy that was going to last after he was relieved. Some of the Z-grams got made into OpNav instructions and BuPers instructions and things like that. But, we still needed some sort of organization to continue the drug program and the alcoholic program to see if we couldn't continue trying to upgrade the management/leadership capability and things like that.

So, he was very supportive of this idea. Oh, he gave us a squadron of destroyers to do some preliminary programs with and things like that. But, he was not personally as involved in these things other than doing whatever we wanted to do as far as giving support to it. He believed in them. It's just that now his time was so consumed in other things.

So, what we sort of evolved into was my relationship with him over, oh, after about six months over the next year, year and a half was that Bill Norman and I would meet him out at the Observatory at his home for breakfast maybe once a week, sometimes twice a week if we had a whole lot to talk to him about. We would go out there with things all prepared and ask his advice, tell him what we thought ought to be done, tell him where the problems were, where the successes were and this sort of thing. And, we'd ride to work with him and in that period of time between eating breakfast and the ride into the Pentagon, gee, generally you could get enough business accomplished to keep you going for another couple of weeks. I continued to do that even after I was working for Dave Bagley with Bagley knowing very well that I was doing it. Ever now and then he would say, when you see the admiral in the morning tell him such-and-such, although they had a very close relationship. He saw him personally a lot more than I did during working hours. But, we continued that for sometime, those breakfast meetings, which I think were very helpful.

Q: Would you touch a little more on the women and integrating them into the Navy as a whole?

Adm. R.: The women? He tried to get Robin Quigley who was the PersK, which was at that time the Assistant Chief of Naval Personnel for Women. I don't know what the title was, but it had something like that, to come up with some sort of a plan for integrating women into the Navy, and out of that would come a Z-gram.

Robin was a very fine naval officer who was chosen above some of the other women to come up into that job. But, for some reason or other she thought things were o-kay as they were and she didn't want to push it any further. I'm not sure what all of her reasons were other than she just didn't think it needed to go any further than it was. So, we talked to her a couple of times, and he talked to her a couple of times and told her what he wanted, and it just didn't come. So, he finally put together an ad hoc committee that I was chairman of. Bill Norman was on it and we had some of the key women on it, one of which was Bobbie Hazzard who was one of his appointments type of assistants, the other side of the room from Captain Shephard. And, a couple of other women who had good reputations in the Navy, and a couple of other men.

And, we sat down and we started looking at the whole situation. We looked at skills that could be opened. We'd go through the routine of, well, let's see could a woman do this, and we'd say, well, yes, I know

some woman who could. I also know some men that couldn't. So, we all of a sudden after going through about eight different skills said, this is ridiculous. There is no reason why any skill has to be closed to women. There may be no jobs aboard ship because in those days they could not go aboard any kind of ship, except a hospital ship. They could not go aboard combat aircraft. So, if there were particular skills that only were sea going skills you couldn't get very many women in them, but it's not to say you couldn't have them. Anyway, we went through this same sort of procedure, and we looked at everything that was not open. We looked at all the various officer corps. There were not very many supply officers. There were no chaplains. There were none or one or two civil engineers. We looked at other officer specialities such as public information, public affairs, data processing, all these things. And, what we found was a lot of places where there weren't any women, and we just simply wrote up a plan to open all these things up. We also looked at the Naval Academy. We also discussed such things as directives that needed to be changed to make them less sexist in nature and this sort of thing.

We put this together as a plan and sent it over to John Warner, who was Secretary of the Navy, through the CNO, and we also wrote up a Z-gram.

Now, Captain Quigley is on leave during all of this and she comes back

livid when she finds out about it. That was my fault, it was not Admiral Zumwalt's fault. I just purposely did not bring her in. However, we did have her deputy on the committee which made it kind of awkward for her.

Q: I bet.

Adm. R.: But, Robin and I had had a very good relationship, and yet she thought I was a traitor after that. And, I think now we're still good friends, but there was a period of time there when she really hated me.

At the other level, and you've got to talk to the admiral about this, I don't think he was too sanguine as to how enthusiastic the Secretary of the Navy would be about this Z-gram opening all these things to him. So, he deviated a little bit from his normal routine in sending out Z-grams. The very last thing he had done after he had gotten it from the VCNO and was all ready to release the thing was he carried it into the Secretary and he would talk about it and then he would release it. For some reason or other he decided this one he would let go without the Secretary's seeing it, and I've only got this 4th hand, but apparantly Mr. Warner who was over on the hill somewhere or somewhere in the city, and he was informed of the Z-gram after it had gone out by telephone to his car, and they read it to

him over the phone while he was in a car. The word is, that he wasn't too pleased about this. And, I think, if they had had differences before, this certainly didn't do anything to alleviate the differences.

Q: Well, Captain Quigley wrote for the Proceedings and her philosophical basis was, it's fine if some women want to go to sea and do these things, but then you lose the option for women who don't want to do that kind of thing.

Adm. R.: That's right. That's right. I think she was trying to protect that person who really did want to be a personnel officer. And, yet, I didn't see anything that we were doing that was going to interfere with any of those people. And, I don't know of any other officers, other than maybe a handful at the very top of the Navy, that were against what we did. In fact, some of them didn't think we went far enough. There were a couple of officers who were still fighting this battle for women long after we had broken down the walls. They were just that adamant about it. I understand her position, but I don't think that what we were doing was hurting it that much.

Now, ironically it was her idea, I think I'm right, that if you're

going to do this, you really don't have a position for Assistant Chief for Women. I think she wanted to do away with that. I'm pretty sure that came from her, through her deputy that was on the committee. So, that was in there too. We were going to do away with that job. She didn't have any trouble with that I'm almost positive of that.

There were some reasons why we needed to maintain a vestige of that and later on my deputy turned out to be Fran McKee, who was one of the members of this committee, and then when she made Captain and I needed a deputy she came in to be my deputy when I was Assistant Chief of Naval Personnel for Human Resource Management. And, as you know, she later became the first line admiral and held that position for about three or four years.

But, for awhile Fran did some of those things. I mean, she would talk at women's groups, and if somebody really wanted to talk to a woman about a particular problem, Fran was available to do that. But, she tried to keep it in the main stream. You know, you've got managers who have women who are working for them, and they've got to learn how to deal with the problems of the women they have working for them.

So, we were one of the first services to do away with this division. I don't think we were the first. I think, maybe, the Air Force already had. I'm not really sure on that point. The Army dragged their feet a long time

because that was who the general was in the Army was that person in that particular job. They didn't have any other position for a general for a woman. So, they fought it the longest.

But, I think Robin agreed with this that it was sort of an anachronism to have a thing kind of like that, assistant chief for women. That all the people in the bureau ought to be working for the women just like working for their men constituents.

Q: It's like you have a separate corps there?

Adm. R.: Yes. It had been a long time since we'd ever had a separate corps. Like you had the Women's Army Corps, the WAC's. Even they didn't---that was affection. There was no Women's Army Corps by now, just like it had been a long time since there had been any particular group of volunteers that had their own hierarchy like that in the Navy. So, it was probably a thing whose time had come that that thing disappeared. So, that was part of that Z-gram too.

Now, interestingly enough one of the things that we did not take on was women flyers. So, Mr. Warner got involved in that and he sort of pushed that. It was a kind of a thing that he could do to get into it himself.

But, when he got to the thing, whether he liked it or whether he didn't, he finally looked it over and he approved all but two things. One was the Naval Academy. When I say the thing this was not to the Z-gram, this was our long term program. He approved everything except the Naval Academy and the Chaplain Corps. Later on he reversed himself on the Chaplain Corps. And, then you know what happened to the Naval Academy? About a year later Congress threw it on a rider on some other little bill that opened up all three academies. So, the Navy never did buy that one as an initiative on the part of the Navy. But, everything else they did. He did reverse himself and allow us to open up the Chaplain Corps.

Q: Well, wasn't part of this just passed about, instituted about the same time the Equal Rights Admendment was passed?

Adm. R.: Yes, that's correct. As a matter of fact, I think, here's another time where Admiral Zumwalt had already been talking about doing something to improve the integration of women in the Navy even before the Equal Rights Admendment. Then when he saw it go through Congress as fast as it did he got even more concerned that we go ahead and get out ahead of this thing.

If we've got a program that we have control of, we're a lot better off than if somebody says you've got to go do this. And, so, oh, yes, that was one of the motivations that we saw the equal rights going through the states in about another five or six months. It became obvious, you know, in about five or six months that it was going to have a hard, hard sledding up above the figure of 30 states. But, we didn't know that at first. We thought we were doing something that was, whose time had come, something that the country was ready for and wanted. That was almost unanimous going through both houses of Congress.

Q: You've discussed these various grieved minorities that were being addressed, the women, the Blacks, drug and alcohol abusers and so forth, was there ever any thought given to giving a place in the Navy to homosexuals?

Adm. R.: I knew you were going to ask that. Several people came to me and asked me if I was also their champion, and if we had such a program. In fact, the same question you just asked. My position was, no there isn't and I will not take it on if there ever is, and the reason I won't is because that is such a tremendously emotional issue in the Navy that I don't want that to jeopardize these other programs. If I ever get identified also

with that crowd, as NOW did, the National Organization of Women did, and it hurt them, and listen, I don't have anything against homosexuals. I would like to go on record as saying that I understand, I think, I try to understand what their situation is, and I don't figure that's my business as long as it's not interfering in any way with the job that they're assigned to do. There has been a whole tradition in the service against homosexuality because of some thoughts that it could jeopardize people working together effectively, and especially in the Navy where you are forced into a situation where you have males having to work with each other over a large period of time, that this could be a thing that really would not work out too well. Having said that I'm open on this, let me say I really was very strong that I would not want to ever have brought that in because I know it would have damaged our capability to run some of these other programs that were extremely important to the Navy. The alcohol was one of the best in the country. A lot of people learned from it, and a lot of people in the Navy have benefited from it. The drug program was never so successful, but nobody else has ever come up with a successful drug program either. It was as good as anybody's. It's just a very, very difficult problem. Our equal opportunity program was going very well. A lot of people objected to it, but the noise had died down. The people who objected were not in the minority

and they weren't quite so vociferous. Our cross cultural program was going very well, and the subject never came up, but had it I would have very strongly recommended against our identifying with that crowd for this very reason. And, I'll give you an example of that. I will not tell you the name, but we had a case of an officer who allegedly had made proposals to another male while he was drunk. This got in his records somehow or other. It was a year later he was in the Navy. And, people looking through records happened to see this thing and they tried get him out of the Navy. I talked to several doctors, and they all convinced me that if the person were not drunk he would not necessarily have had these tendencies. That it was perfectly reasonable that a person under the influence could have made such a gesture that he would not under any circumstance ever do. There was nothing else in the person's record to indicate that under any other circumstances this had ever been done. So, I tried to save the guy and the Deputy Chief of Naval Personnel when we were discussing this and I was going to bat for the guy said, "Chick, if he could have stolen a car or something like that, but to have made a proposal to another man, I just can't buy that." So, right then and there I realized what the lay of the land was as far as trying to champion that particular cause, and I just didn't want to have anything to do with it for what it would do to the other programs.

Q: The art of the possible.

Adm. R.: Again, yes, yes. I couldn't believe what I was hearing when this guy said that. There's no way I could convince him that we didn't have to kick the guy out of the Navy. And, he got kicked out of the Navy. I think he was a Lieutenant Commander. But, he had had a year's sobriety before we even heard of this, and with absolutely a flawless record. But, if he had stolen a car during that time the guy would have understood because he obviously would do that when he wasn't under the influence. So, it's a long answer to your question, but it's a very important question. It's the thing we never took on as an issue. And, fortunately both Admiral Zumwalt and I got in and out without ever having any time where it had to be addressed, you know, we didn't really have any big test case or anything like that.

Q: Drug abuse did have to be and I've heard, I think it was from Captain Kerr, that Admiral Zumwalt almost made a snap judgement in response to a question he got in a question and answer session with sailors and said, "We'll have a one time exemption program." Did that kind of situation create a problem for you in being able to staff something and implement it

in short notice?

Adm. R.: No, but it seems there was some push for an exemption program. The Department of Defense had a group of people who were looking at the drug problem. There was a lot of interest. Also, there was Congressional interest in giving people a second chance. If you had the alternative of kicking somebody out of the Navy once you found out that they had smoked a couple of marijuana cigarettes or hanging on to them and saying, o-kay if you will come in to me and tell me about it and say you won't ever do it again, and in fact don't, we'll go along with you. We'll let you stay in the Navy. The idea of this was that you could help a lot of people that had gotten themselves into this situation, but they were in a catch-22, they can't get help because if they do then they get kicked out of the Navy. And, so it was not quite as off the cuff as it might have sounded because the whole idea of such a thing was the thing that we'd kicked around to try to go along with what was being talked about.

Let me talk about the drug program a little bit. When this real pure heroin hit over there, as I told you earlier, a lot of young people started coming home and to maintain their highs they had to start shooting up, and this is a whole different dimension than just taking a wiff of the thing off

of your hand, you know. And, so a lot of mothers started writing the president and saying, get us out of Vietnam because I sent a perfectly fine son over there and he's come home as a heroin addict. There was more pressure on the president to get us out of Vietnam because of the heroin that hit the market over there. And, I think you could get this, incidently, for about \$2.78, really pure heroin. You'd get it from your maid, from the taxi driver, from anybody you saw at all. He all of a sudden started putting some of his people on working with the Defense Department to come up with some sort of way to combat this drug abuse. And, it was a thing that the president was just very concerned about because he did not, he was not ready to get out of Vietnam, and they were telling him to do it strictly because of drugs. So, he had a couple of his young people come over and have meetings with us in the Defense Department on how we were going to handle this.

Now, here's a case where I really took advantage of the fact that the Army has to go first. We had a Navy captain, the medical officer as a psychiatrist who later made admiral by the name of Brown, Earl Brown, knew a little bit of the mechanics of drug and alcohol rehabilitation. So, Earl would go with me to all these meetings. Now, I'm the special assistant at the time and just starting this other program. I also was the liaison

person with Vietnam. So, there would be a presentation to these representatives from the White House on what all the services are doing in this regard and that regard and so forth. So, the Army would get up first and what some things they said went over well and some things they said didn't. So, while the Army guy was talking I would be in a little huddle with Earl Brown and say, you know, let's do this, we ought to set up a center somewhere, and we could do this kind of thing. Earl would go along with it. And, so by the time it came to me I would get up and say, well, the Navy plans to do A, B, C, and E, and it would go over very well. Then I would go back to my office, call Vietnam, say set up a drug rehabilitation place at such-and-such, and get some people involved in this. Then I'd write a note to the Secretary of the Navy and the CNO recommending that we do all these things. Talk about expediting, it was one of the fastest moving things that there was, and it worked out pretty well that way. We got on top of the thing as well as anybody did. I would like to think that many of our programs were out ahead of the crowd, in this one we were at least up with them. It's such a knotty problem. I don't know the solution to it yet today. We did the best we could. We set up a center in San Diego. We finally set up one in Jacksonville. We had some successes. We had lots of failures. It's one of those things that's hard to deal with. The alcoholic

we could get to if we could convince him or her that he or she were alcoholic. And, within two weeks generally if they were you could. And, once they realized they were playing games with themselves and with other people, then they wanted help, and once they wanted help you had a really good chance of getting that person into a program that they were going to be able to sustain.

Now, we're not waiting until people become drug addicts and are starting to scream for help, or within two weeks realize they are an addict and want some help. We're now trying to rehabilitate people who aren't even addicted because we don't want people to be problem drinkers, but we allow them to drink. On the drug side we don't want people to even use this stuff. So, we're trying to rehabilitate somebody for something that he has not yet decided he wants to stop doing. So, that turned out to be a very difficult problem. We had as good a support from the Navy as you could get on this because they didn't know what to do. Most of these programs, people were looking for some guidance because these were things they hadn't thought about before. The racial issue? Most of us who were white never gave a thought about that before as even an issue. Drug abuse? We all knew what a person could and could not do if they had various amounts of martinis or beer, but we didn't have any idea what a person could or could not do who had smoked

two or three or five joints, who had sniffed a certain amount of heroin or something like that. So, all my peers were looking for some help, and so, whatever we gave them they tried to go along with.

Q: A number of these people programs you tried, the Z-grams initiative, could be taken as an implied rebuke of Admiral Moorer because things hadn't been done sooner. Did this create a problem in that he was still on active duty, and Admiral Zumwalt's boss?

Adm. R.: Well, it not only could, but in a way it did. But, you still had to go on and do it. But, he got a bum rap on some of these things because some of these things he had in place, he just wasn't putting the emphasis on.

The race climate was better in 1970 than it was in 1966, it was better than it was in '42. But, I'm talking about little steps when it really needed to have a big leap.

Admiral Zumwalt got all the flack from the beards and all he did was put in an official implementation, a policy statement that Admiral Moorer had put out a couple years before.

Well, it did cause some problems. And, this is one of the things that

only Admiral Zumwalt knows as well. But, I know that there was some friction there because the implication was clear that a lot of these things should have been done before. But, some of them got acute in the late '60's and in the early '70's. You really had to have somebody there who was very aware and very innovative to even deal with it. The standard Mark 1, Mod 0 naval officer wasn't ever going to do a good job with some of these problems. And, I don't mean to imply that that was what Admiral Moorer was, but he didn't have a whole lot of help and a lot of innovative people to try to deal with some of these things. And, they weren't as acute. You know, I used to have the same trouble over talking to Congressmen trying to fight for some of the people to continue in some of these programs. And, they would say, well, I don't see how you guys let this happen. When I was a captain in the Army, I never had anybody using drugs. Of course not, you know, this is 1970 that we were talking about. It would have been a perfectly good response for Admiral Moorer to say, it was really not that big of a problem until recently. So, I don't want to put him down that much. I think that this thing came to a head at a time where some action had to be taken. I would like to think that we had a few innovative ways of dealing with them, because I know the other services picked up from us on a lot of areas.

One of the reasons that our alcohol program was so successful is that we used recovered alcoholics to run it. The other services didn't trust recovered alcoholics, and so, they tried to run it with people who were standard line officers. Well, my gosh, a recovered alcoholic is so much more effective in that particular job that it's a mistake not to use them. They are wonderful people as a group. The other thing is the other services wouldn't force a person into treatment, and we did. If a recovered alcoholic and a doctor together diagnosed a person as being an alcoholic, we would order him to a treatment. And, like about one out of 1000 of those ever back-fired. Once the people had been there for a couple of weeks they realized they needed help and then it was nothing but improvement from then on. The other services dragged their feet on doing that. So, I think in a lot of areas we were out ahead. But, you're right, a lot of the things that we did, I think Admiral Zumwalt did come out looking like he was saying to the chairman that, you know, you didn't really do this, so now I've got to. But, a lot of things just came to a head in the late '60's and the 70's also.

Q: You were on the mini-staff, and then that was sort of institutionalized with PersP.

Adm. R.: Right. I later became PersP. I relieved Dave when Dave Bagley became the Chief of Naval Personnel and I relieved him as PersP. Right.

Q: Did he have any problem in that this was, in effect, going around the Chief of Naval Personnel rather than working through him?

Adm. R.: When Admiral Guinn was there as Chief of Naval Personnel he invited me, as soon as he found out I was going to be working for Admiral Bagley, he invited me to come over to all the briefings. He was very good. We worked very well with him. I did my best to go through Bagley and through the chain of command. I can't even tell you an example of a case where I just went completely around them.

Q: Did the Chief of Naval Personnel get a chop on Z-grams?

Adm. R.: Oh, yes. Oh, yes. He got a chop, but when I was on the mini-staff I always got them afterwards.

Now, once Admiral Bagley became Chief of Naval Personnel then, I think, he was probably the last person that saw them. We had gotten the bulk of them out by then. I think they went through him from then on.

Q: How did your role change when you moved into PersP?

Adm. R.: I had to take on a lot of things in addition to this project managership that I simply was not good at doing and still run that project. I had a person relieve me who looked pretty good, but had some health problems that I was unaware of. And, so, a couple of times he really just did not follow up on things. We later had to replace him, but in the process I realized he had had some heart problem that had caused some of the problems that we were dealing with. So, I spent a lot more time continuing to work as the project manager, or supporting those programs than I did in some of the other areas. I liked the idea of being the Navy's ombudsman, and there were a few things that we were able to deal with there that helped. But, what I also took on as PersP that Admiral Bagley was very good at and I just didn't have much background for at all was all the Navy's clubs and that whole activity of officer's clubs. We had a supply officer captain who worked for me who essentially ran it. And, finally it got so obvious that I really was not up to snuff on it that we finally split things up so he officially ran it. I've got to be careful how I say this, but the Deputy Chief of Navy Personnel, who was then Admiral Baldwin, and Admiral Baldwin, I think, was not a strong supporter of the way I was handling the clubs and

messes. That's putting it mildly. And, I think he was right because I was not giving it the attention that Bagley used to give it when he was PersP. I think the other things continued to go o-kay. But, I came into that knowing nothing about it. I simply did not have the time to all of a sudden learn that and still keep these other things that were very dynamic, very tenuous to keep them going. And, so, I ended up just in agreement when they said, why don't we make this guy a separate person that doesn't work for you anymore. I said, fine.

We're kind of getting a little away from Admiral Zumwalt in some of these things right now.

Q: Well, your part of it is important too, because you were acting on his behalf.

Adm. R.: Yes, all these programs, I think, are very dear to him and without him they could not have gotten off the ground. I think that they are important to the Navy today. It gives us a little bit of an organization to deal with the things that we're not used to dealing with. There are going to be other things, and I can't even tell you right at the moment what they are going to be, that are going to come up where we need to have

somebody sit off and take a look and give the operating force some advice on how we deal with this, that, and the other. If I'd been Admiral Hayward, I would have run my pride and professionalism program through that mechanism that we set up. It was a natural for them. He chose not to, but he could have. It would have fit in very well. It was exactly what we were trying to do in our leadership and management programs. Of course, they are using it for the big increased emphasis on combating drugs that Tom Hayward started and Admiral Watkins is continuing. The alcohol program is still going. The leadership and management program is going. We've tried to integrate programs that are being taught in various schools so that at least the left hand is saying somewhat the same thing that the right hand is. I think the mechanism is probably a valid one. I'm also the first person to say that it ought to be scrapped if it's not doing what it should be doing. But, I think, that through the programs we set up we were able to institutionalize what Admiral Zumwalt stood for, a little bit more dignity for every person in the Navy, a little bit more understanding, leadership style that never ever does anything to take away the concern for the performance, but adds that other dimension of the concern for the people, and that they are not incompatible. I think this whole concept which is so strongly Zumwaltian is being preserved through some of the things that we set in motion.

Let me tell you another thing about one of the problems that I see. You talked earlier about the difficulty in going over the heads of so many people and I've discussed how there was, maybe, an alternative that we could have used, but we didn't use. I'll take the blame for that. But, if there were anything that I would say about Admiral Zumwalt and the programs that is less than positive, I think that he was a little bit naive in one area and that is that many of the things that he did and allowed us to do in his name were done with the assumption of a whole lot of commanders out there that were all Zumwalts, that they wanted to get their next senior person off their backs so they could try some of these things, so they could let their people feel a little bit better about themselves, so they could let the junior officers have a lot more operating time and make a mistake every now and then, and continue to back them and ruin their career just because they bounced against a ship going alongside when a JG was trying to learn or something like that. I think the reality was there are not a whole lot of Zumwalts out there. So, some of the things that we did with the assumption that there were, I think, was probably wrong.

Q: Herman Wouck has a classic in the Cain Mutiny that describes that, and he said, "The Navy is an organization designed by genesises to be executed

by idiots."

Adm. R.: Well, I wouldn't want to go that far, but there are not as many genesises out there or innovators out there as I think we were assuming when we started sending all these things out because we did not ever say exactly how you pull this off. We said, o-kay, such-and-such is no longer an issue. From now on we're going to do such-and-such. We had one Z-gram that was written over in BuPers by a guy that's now an admiral on using fifteen minutes, or something like that, as the maximum time that any person would have to wait in line for anything. It was a really good concept. Half your life is spent waiting for this, waiting for that, and that the base commanders were supposed to come up with ideas that would as a goal eliminate all this waiting in line. Well, you know, we didn't take every little idea and say, or every little eventuality and say, "Thou shalt do that, thou shalt do that." You had to have some people out there that took this as a goal and try to figure out a means of implementing the thing. I don't think we had as many out there as we thought we did.

Q: Well, Admiral Zumwalt became a hero in the eyes of very many enlisted people, particularly junior enlisted people. I wonder, he let his hair grow

probably longer than even the specifications that were relaxed. Did that set a bad example that might have led to some of the abuses you described?

Adm. R.: It could have. I never thought of it in those terms. My concept of the abuses are as follows; I think that sailors, and I shouldn't specify just sailors, but probably most of us are most comfortable when we know exactly the limits within which we're operating. We may want them stretched a little bit, and we may lobby to get them stretched a little bit, but so long as we know what the limits are we can operate in those limits. I think by a large number of middle people not paying attention to those last paragraphs, and in by thinking they had been bypassed and therefore, and maybe not understanding how to deal with this, maybe they felt we had pulled the pedestal out from under them. And, in a way we did with the liberty card situation. That used to be a strong tool. We pulled that away, you know.

I think, number one, we had a group of people who really were not leaders, but who were able to be very effective relying on those artificial pedestals that existed and simply did not know what to do when those pedestals were weakened. Then we had some people, as a result of that, who weren't sure where the boundaries were and just did bizarre things. I don't

think there's any problem at all in coming back later, and saying where the boundaries were. In fact, we did that. We rescinded the dungaree to and from work thing simply because we could not control it. That's my feeling, is that it wasn't so much his example by the way he looked or anything like that. I think the worst thing was the bypassing and the handful of people, and I don't know how big the handful is, it was not the majority, but it was a group of people who just simply threw their hands up and did not try to enforce anything that allowed this to go on. And, they would certainly argue in strong defense in doing what they did because they simply didn't know how to deal otherwise.

Q: Well, that might have been an approach that these guys have got so much power now that I clamp down on them at my own peril.

Adm. R.: That's right, that's right. The true leaders had no problem and there's some really fabulous ships that continued to do great things, even greater things, the people were really happy. We did turn around the declining re-enlistment rate. I'm sure you're very aware of what was happening. Steadily over, and this is the one thing that when you publicize it it doesn't look too good as far as Admiral Moorer is concerned, but steadily

over the last three or four years the first term enlistments had been going down, down, and down and had gotten below 10%. And, you know to stay in the Navy you've got to have something between 20 and 35%, if you have less than that you are cutting out that whole middle capability, and that's what we did. We had not enough second class and first class petty officers, and senior third class petty officers because the folks that would be that had all gotten out of the Navy. Consequently you had the chiefs having to deal with the 17 year old, and they couldn't deal with them anyway because they couldn't understand them. It was one of the biggest generation gaps we've ever had in our country. It occurred in the late 60's and the early 70's. It was not just the Navy, it was not just the military, it was the whole country. And, then this was exaggerated by the low re-enlistment rate, so you didn't have the buffer of the in-between people in between you. You had chiefs having to deal directly with 17 year olds with a complete different value system. So, the re-enlistment rate had to get turned around. In carriers in the Atlantic it was 3%. And, so, that is why Admiral Zumwalt was so adamant about getting on with doing something and it's why he wanted to make it very clear all the way down through the chain of command exactly what it was he was saying. And, it's why he listened to the retention study group people that came in because we wanted to retain those people

and we wanted to know what is it that's forcing you out. And, when we'd find some things then we'd try to write a Z-gram that might fight some of those things.

This was a difficult time for anybody. I don't know what caused it, whether it was the Z-grams or what, but the re-enlistment rate at that time turned and started going back up again. And, so, I don't know what other people would have done to turn that around. It had to get turned around.

Q: We'll never know what the cause was and what would have happened otherwise.

Adm. R.: We'll never know, that's right.

Q: One thing that created problems among the retired community was the abolition of the bell-bottom uniform, the traditional white hat. Was that part of your program?

Adm. R.: No. I happened to be in on some meetings that discussed that. One impetus for that was one of the retention study groups, the wives in particular were complaining about their 35 year old husbands were running

around like a bunch of kids in sailor suits, and here they were grown men with families. And, all kinds of comments were made about some of these stouter people walking up and down the street wearing bell-bottoms and those jumpers. So, what we did was we conducted a survey to see what the people in the Navy really felt about this. Now, the mistake that was made, if in fact you look back and call it a mistake, is how you interpreted that survey. You could have taken that survey, if I remember it correctly, and you could have supported about any stand that you wanted to make. Because of the bias that we had in thinking that there was a large amount of distaste for this, and all of us had known some of these senior people who really should never have continued to wear that particular uniform. We're one of the only navies in the world where that's true. Most every other Navy by the time you become a second class petty officer you shift to the basic chief type uniform.

There was another interesting bit of pressure that was put on that nobody every knows about, and that is we were constantly being pressured by the Defense Department because we were also the only service that had to have this big uniform allowance halfway through a person's career, because whether you would ever do it or not, or whether you believed in it or not, the facts of the matter are you could come in as a private in the Army and

you could wear the same uniform until you were a general. Now, you and I know that's not true, but the style of the uniform is the same, and so, theoretically you could tell the people as they get to the next rank, well you're not going to get a uniform allowance. But, you could not tell a chief petty officer that because all of a sudden now he has to have a whole complete new bag. So, there was this pressure along with the results of the survey. In retrospect, in my view, what we should have done is done it for the second class petty officers and that would have taken care of everything that was a problem that we heard about. I don't think you would have seen some of the abuses. I don't think you would have seen some of these kids wearing clothes that didn't fit and all this sort of thing that caused so much consternation. However, once the decision was made, and it was not made frivolously, you had these pressures plus the results of this survey which certainly did not indicate that we shouldn't do it. I don't say it was really overwhelming in favor of doing it, but it certainly would support it, we went ahead and we did it for everybody. I think, in retrospect, that was probably a mistake. But, I don't think most people know the pressures that existed at the time.

Now, once you've made that decision then the problem you get into is it costs you 30 or 40 million dollars to go back. So, we were in some

austere times there and, I think, there were probably some times when Admiral, I don't know, you'll have to ask him, but I suspect that Admiral Zumwalt and later Admiral Holloway may have been perfectly willing to go back as far as the first three or four pay grades were concerned, but every time they looked into it, because I did sit on the uniform board, and I know we quite often had that as an agenda item. We started looking at what it would cost us to go back, to just simply scrap all these things that we had, and the other period of time we were going to go through where there was no standardization, the phase in time, that it was just a very expensive thing, both psychologically and economically to do. Now, obviously Admiral Hayward decided he could get the money somewhere because it had become so important and I don't really dispute that decision at all. I wish we'd have never done although I am just eternally grateful that we did it for the upper pay grades because I think we should have.

You know, when I was commanding officer of the Skate I had a reactor technician who was a brilliant technician, he simply could not take a pencil and paper test, so he could never make chief. He was a neighbor of mine. He had six kids. He was a respected neighbor, a person in the community and that guy goes off with his kids wearing a uniform that we've gotten to associate with young people, you know, and sort of lackadaisical young

people at that. It just was a very distasteful thing, and all of us knew a person like him. So, the idea of trying to help that person was a very valid one. The mistake was probably going as deep. But, the pressures were to do it all. No halfway measure.

Q: As we get down near the end of the tape let me ask a question similar to the one on Vietnam. As you came to the end of the time when Admiral Zumwalt was the CNO what were the satisfactions, and the frustrations or disappointments?

Adm. R.: Well, that's a hard question for I don't remember many disappointments. A lot of the things were not going quite as well as I'd have liked to have seen them go. We still never got a good handle on the drug situation. I think, maybe, their clamp down that they're doing today is certainly going to do something. I hope it does because it's such a problem. There were several areas where, I just think, we never learned how to handle it. Of course, as I said earlier, I don't know anybody else that's handling it in the country. But, the drug problem was one of the big disappointments.

Probably the other disappointment is the lack of support of Congress for some of these programs. And, let me give you an example that, I think,

is really pretty bad. I've told you all the programs we had. There was a move in the Congress to get rid primarily of the race relations program in all the services, or at least cut back on them. I went over to see a particular congressman from Georgia who is on the House Appropriations Subcommittee for the Armed Services and was telling him that I had gotten word that they were going to try to cut back on what they'd termed counselors. It was a congressionally coined word. By counselors they really meant anybody that was a drug abuse counselor, that was an alcohol counselor, that was a race relations, whatever you wanted to call the person that was running seminars or doing anything in any of these areas. On the side of the Congress, let me say, I understand the pressure on them to, what they called, reduce or increase the tooth-to-tail ratio, you know. They wanted to tell their constituents that they were not doing anything to hurt the defense, but they were cutting the budget, and the only way they could see that they could do that was cut out everything except the hardware, or the obvious thing that's going to shoot the bullet. So, I know they had that pressure. Nevertheless, they were pushed pretty much by some particular congressmen, I think, with an eye towards cutting the race relations program. I could never approve it, but when I talked to this congressman from Georgia about this he said, well he had to go vote and I was left with his legislative

assistant for about 10 or 15 minutes, and he got me aside and said, "Admiral, now don't you thing a better way of dealing with these people is benign neglect? Don't you think that's a better way of handling some of these active programs that you're coming with."

Well, I didn't even dignify the guy's statement by even answering such a ridiculous thing. But, that's the mentality we were dealing with over there.

So, they decided that the way they were going to cut back on some of these things was that they would take at least a first cut would be to look at the ratio that all the services had of counselors in the various areas to the population in the service, and they would reduce them all to the lowest common denominator. In other words, if the Army had one person per 1000, and the Air Force had one counselor for 3000, they would make everybody go to one per 3000 if that was the biggest number. So, that would cause a reduction not paying any attention to the fact that different services have different problems in different areas and things like that.

Now, the Navy had 66 people who were working in these cross cultural programs. And, if I had time I'd tell you about some really good successes in these programs. When you looked to see what the other services had, they were zero, therefore the Navy got all 66 of their cross cultural people cut

at a time when people were kicking the U. S. out of their country because we can't understand their culture, and because we cannot get along with them. Instead of taking our 66 and getting rid of them, anybody that had any ounce of sense on what's going on in the world would have said, hey, you other services, why in the heck aren't you doing something like this too? And, they should have. That's the kind of thing we were dealing with.

I guess if I were to put in a nut shell my disappointments, it was to realize that that's the kind of leadership that we had in our country. Our hands were tied. We have in the services a board of directors that does not have any internal people on the board. So, we don't have anybody that really understands the particular activity that they are the board of directors of. The board of directors are the committees in Congress, and they are creating all of these things for us giving us the wherewithal to do what we need to do without intimately knowing what they're doing when they're taking and giving and so forth. And, if it's a small item like, you know, the money for 66 people, what's that, \$50,000 or \$70,000 or something like that? You can't ever get to anybody that will sit still for five minutes to listen to something as insignificant as \$70,000. So, if one congressman getting together with one staff member decides to cut this, that's it. You have no recourse for something that small, and yet it might be kernel of something that's

important. That's my biggest disappointment.

The satisfactions, the alcohol program. I think we've got some good leadership programs in. I think equal opportunity is not working as it ought to be, but it's better than it's been for a long, long time. I think the women are integrating relatively well.

Incidentally what I did was once we had those 66 taken away from us, we just cross-trained some other folks so we continued the program. And, some of those things worked out extremely well. Whether they still continue, I don't know or not. But, we did some really good things. In La Maddalena where we put a submarine tender. The home porting, from a family standpoint, worked out very well in Greece until politically we had to get out there. In Puerto Rico we got that place where people were going out into the community, local Lions Clubs and Rotary's were inviting our people for the first time ever to come to their meetings. There were just a lot of things like that. Coincident with that you got an improved relationship and the greater effectiveness in the ship facilities at Roosevelt Roads and things like that. So, I've got a lot to feel good about, but the things that I'm to this day adamant about were the lack of support for some of these things by narrow minded people in Congress, that Admiral Zumwalt simply could not waste any more capital on to fight. You know, I've already

talked about what a fine line he tread, and he could not waste his time going over there fighting for 66 people to worry about this. He just had to do other things. That's the kind of thing that bothered me the most.

Q: Well, Admiral, I thank you very much for your recollections in contributing this, this perspective to the store of knowledge about Admiral Zumwalt.

Adm. R.: It's my pleasure.