

Interview No. 1 with Charles F. Rauch, Jr., Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy (Retired)

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Subject: Service with Admiral Elmo Zumwalt

By: Paul Stilwell

Q: Admiral, could you begin by giving somewhat of your background as a Naval officer before you reported to serve with Admiral Zumwalt?

Adm. R.: Surely, I was a standard division officer in surface ships and went to submarine school after I'd served in surface ships for two or three years. I spent a couple of tours in diesel submarines, taught at nuclear power school in the officer's course. And, then got into the nuclear program at the executive officer level. I was the Exec of the Swordfish in the Pacific, and then became commanding officer of the Skate for two years. I followed that with a command tour on the Blue Crew of the John Marshall which is one of the second set of five of the ballistic missile submarines.

When I completed that job, obviously, I had to go to Washington. The place that the Bureau in their wisdom chose to send me was the newly formed Systems Analysis Division in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. A young new admiral by the name of Zumwalt headed this up.

Q: Well, since you served with him even before he went to Vietnam, maybe we could begin with that tour. When chronologically was this?

Adm. R.: This was, actually he had asked for me, and I can back up and tell you why. When he set the Systems Analysis Division up it was done, I think,

by Paul Nitze who was the Secretary at the time. The Navy was late in getting such a thing set up. We were getting the short end of the stick, I think, in a lot of the force level arguments that were going on in the Joint Chiefs and in the Department of Defense simply because we didn't have a mechanism for doing any of our own studies.

So, Mr. Nitze wanted a Systems Analysis Division started because of his close association and high respect of Zumwalt, he was chosen as the person to set that up.

The Navy gave him something like seven, my figures may be wrong, but it's in that magnitude of people to start with. I think, maybe, there was a civilian involved and maybe seven Naval officers all of whom having operations research type backgrounds.

The first thing he did was come to the city, like he is one to do, and looked for some people to augment this outfit. What he was looking for was people that had operational backgrounds in a whole spectrum of Naval fields. I happened to be the one that got the nod as far as nuclear submarines, and specifically ballistic missile submarines were concerned. So, I spent most of my time in strategic offensive and defensive analysis.

He, I think, was extremely successful in that job. I'm sure he will talk to you about this at great length. But, he had a couple of strong points. One was that he knew all the people in the Systems Analysis Division quite well from his position as Executive Assistant to Mr. Nitze. He was his secretary. And, he knew the politics of systems analysis that was operating under MacNamara.

I would like to say it wasn't a political thing, but it turned out to be. I think the people who came in there originally really did do studies first and then make up their minds depending upon how the studies turned out. But, then as happens to anybody that's been in a job a long while many of the people started having their own opinions and then they would get studies to justify them.

So, you needed somebody in the Navy who could do a similar sort of thing. Admiral Zumwalt understood that perfectly. Consequently every major study he did had a steering group set up that would have the very people on the steering group that were going to approve the study from the Secretary of the Navy on through the various people in the Department of Defense. His modus operandi was that he would call a steering group together when they had completed their assumptions. If you could get an agreement on the assumptions you would go on to the next step of coming up with the methodology. Then he would get the steering group to agree on the methodology.

Well, if you agree on the assumptions and the methodology of a study, then when the conclusions come out there is no way that you can do a lot of arguing.

So, the conclusions would come out and sometimes, in most cases, I should say, they would be favorable for the Navy. And, he was very successful in that job.

It's in that job that I really got to know him. When he got ready to go to Vietnam, he called me up one day and asked if I would go out there.

At the time I was on crutches because I had cracked a bone in my ankle playing softball with my son. I slid in the wet grass and did that damage.

My basic background was submarining. I knew nothing about amphibious warfare. I scarcely knew where Vietnam was. I guess I knew we were in a war. But, I didn't know much about it at all. And, really, my background was more engineering than systems analysis. But, I'd learned a little bit about systems analysis in the year and a half that I'd been there.

Q: Could you cover some of the cases you worked on during that period in systems analysis?

Adm. R.: Yes. The first thing I did was I worked on a case where I was just one of his representatives on a larger study looking at the Polaris program.

Every so often people question having two crews for one submarine. Of course, you know it was set up so that you could maximize the amount of time that the hardware was on station and the obvious way of doing that was to run two crews.

As you know as the years went by personnel became a larger and larger percentage of the defense budget although it never reached, I don't think, fifty percent in the Navy since the Navy is so capital intensive. It came awfully close to it. People were always looking at ways of cutting back personnel. Those people in the Systems Analysis Division were always

wanting to go with one crew instead of two. Well, this meant that you simply couldn't have the ship out there as much in a year's time as you could with two crews.

So, they had a study. I don't know if they have done it since or not. We were about the third, I think, to look at this. We were trying to put it to bed forever, but I would never say that that was done.

That was the first major study that I was involved with.

The second one was one that I was a study coordinator on. It was a follow-on to a previous study looking at the defense that we might have against the projected Soviet ballistic missile submarine capability. I spent a lot of time on that. I can't say much about it because it's relatively classified I suspect even today some of the stuff we looked at would be considered classified.

Q: One of the programs about that time was the shipboard anti-ballistic missile defense. Was that one of the cases that you looked into?

Adm. R.: No. Although it was important to us, in fact, the use of some of the equipment that you're referring to would have been of interest to us in our total look at defense against a ballistic missile submarine. But, we did not look at that per se. We just sort of took what was on the drawing board and took the parameters from that and took a look at how that might be applied to this particular problem which is really a mighty problem I might add.

Q: Was Admiral Rickover given the opportunity to give an input on the studies that involved nuclear submarines?

Adm. R.: Yes, but not on the particular studies that I was involved in. He just didn't have all that much concern about it I don't think because those studies never became really big in the Department of Defense. It was a thing that had to be looked at, but it was not a thing that had a lot of appeal to it at the time. I suspect if you were to do it today it would have a lot more interest than it did then.

Quite often when you're looking at some projected threat you don't get really quite the enthusiasm that you do with some things that are a little bit more imminent.

He did get into several studies that went on while I was there. But, I was not involved in those studies.

Q: Which ones were those?

Adm. R.: Well, while I was there they also---no, I'm sorry, it was not while I was there in the Systems Analysis Division. I can't think of any right at the moment that went on while I was in the Systems Analysis Division.

The two big things that occurred, as I recall, was, number one, we had a group of people that were working on convincing Mr. MacNamara that we should not have a single bomber that was all things to all services. I

think that many of the aviators gave Admiral Zumwalt credit for shooting down the idea, Mr. MacNamara's, that you could buy one airframe and you could use that off carriers, off of land bases, fields and so forth.

The other thing that was very big was the efforts to get more escorts because we had gone many, many years, in fact, from the time that MacNamara came in, so the time we are talking about which is '67, '68 without ever purchasing any new escorts. It was really hurting the Navy.

Those were the big things that were being handled almost directly under the supervision of Admiral Zumwalt. And, with this political game that I mentioned before we had the very high powered steering committees and things like that.

The studies that I was involved in were not that sexy that we had that kind of involvement.

There is another one that I did have a little bit to do with. And, I just looked at the strategic implications of our having a little island in the Indian Ocean called Diego Garcia. As a matter of fact the name I gave to that study was SIDIEGO, Strategic Implications of Diego Garcia.

It was kind of interesting because this was one of those cases where the people in the Systems Analysis Division of the Office of the Secretary of Defense had already made up their mind. They didn't want it. They didn't want anything to do with it.

At that particular time Mr. Nitze had become the Secretary of Defense.

So, we put this thing together and all I did was put the strategic

portion of it in. Other people did the other parts of it, importance for fueling and importance to carrier task forces, that sort of thing.

I'll never forget the look on the faces of those systems analysis people when the decision was made in favor of our stuff instead of theirs.

It was just a really good case of the very thing I mentioned at the onset that they didn't have anything any better than we did to say not to do it. They had just gotten the feeling that it was not a good thing to do. And, I think that we've seen in recent years that it has been valuable to have that little base.

Q: It seems to me that some of the good training that Admiral Zumwalt got for being CNO had come during this period because that was an issue. You mentioned the escort question. That developed into the FFG program I presume.

Adm. R.: Yes, it did. He has said many times that traditionally people thought the best training for that job was to have a tour of CincPacFleet and maybe a tour in the Atlantic at the high level or something. But, he felt his training as Director of the Systems Analysis Division and the training he got previous to that when he first went to work for Mr. Nitze in national security.

Q: International Security Affairs, I think.

Adm. R.: Yes, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security. That his experience there, plus his experience in the Systems Analysis Division probably prepared him better for the job as the Chief of Naval Operations than some of the high level operational jobs that have been a traditional, and still are as it turns out, paths to CNO. And, I expect he's right. What he learned in those two jobs is how Washington works and that's really the CNO's job.

Q: In many cases he is the resource manager rather than an operational commander.

Adm. R.: Absolutely. In fact, you're not an operational commander at all except for your hat in the Joint Chiefs. I suspect that's one of the merits of this present discussion as to whether those two jobs might more properly be completely separated.

Q: Did you get into the question of aircraft carriers in these studies?

Adm. R.: They did, but I didn't. I was not involved in anything other than the ones I've mentioned.

I had this strategic offensive and defensive analysis job. In fact, the last six or eight months I was there I was the Director of that. This was not a thing that Admiral Zumwalt himself was putting a whole lot of time on. He's that way. If he gets somebody he thinks is handling something that

he does not have the time to put on it, and handling it in what he views as the right way and fairly competently he just lets you alone. He's a fabulous person to work for.

So, I did a lot of things where I did not have the daily association with him. He knew what I was doing. Occasionally would make briefings to him and I would always write status reports to him.

That was another thing that I learned about him in those early years. He was a great person to deal with as far as memo's were concerned.

From the time I knew him until today, and it's probably worse today than it was in those days, he's always been a very, very busy man. He's always taking on twice what a normal person would do in a week.

So, I was always working on some of these things that were not the things that would take his, a large portion of his time in a week. Quite often I'd go a couple of months where he knew what I was doing, and I was getting instructions from him, but it was all through memo's. The habit we got into was we would write a memo to him and tell him what we recommended and give him some other alternatives, and the pros and cons of all of them, and why we picked the one we did. We would just leave some blanks down at the bottom for him to say, "Go Ahead," or "Please See Me," or "No, I Don't Want To Do It."

If you got a check mark on the "Go", that was the same thing as his calling you in and saying, I want you to do thus and so. He would back you just as much with that little check mark as he would if it had been his idea and he had called you in and said, "O-kay, I want you to do this."

With that little check mark you had confidence you could go through the halls of the Pentagon and go ahead and push your thing through. That's the way I dealt with him for many years, as a matter of fact, because I was generally doing things that he simply did not have the time to devote a lot of effort of his own to them.

Q: Well, how much relationship did you have with Congress in this job?

Adm. R.: I had none in that particular job. I did later on, a little bit, but not in that job.

Q: One case that I looked into is the reactivation of the battleships during that period. First, there is the question of two cruisers which Admiral McDonald seemed to favor. Then Senator Russell was pushing very hard for a battleship to be brought out. So, the studies changed as to which would be the more effective.

Adm. R.: Well, that's, as I said earlier, that's the way the politics of systems analysis works. On the surface it looks like a great idea and it probably does keep you from doing ridiculous things. But, you can come up

with a study that will support, to a degree, your view. And, if you carry it through politically properly, I don't know what properly is, but using the Zumwalt method then you end up fairly successful.

Q: Were there cases where you had disagreements with the admiral and if so how would those be resolved?

Adm. R.: Not at this stage. And, I didn't have many disagreements ever. But, one of the things that occurred as I was with him longer was occasionally we would have disagreements on what you might call the mini-staffs. From the time he went to Vietnam on, I was always in a mini-staff type of situation. We would sometimes have disagreements among ourselves. I always took the position that we ought to try to resolve it ourselves because although I think he has a fabulous amount of assets, and I think in every respect of the word he's what you would consider a great man, one of the things he was not particularly good at was arbitrating fights within the people he had a lot of confidence in. He didn't like to do that. So, I always tried to see if we couldn't resolve those sorts of things ourselves.

I think I backed off too early once. I'll tell you about that later on. But, I can't really think of any time I had any big disagreements with

him. Well, there were some things, I guess, that were a matter of emphasis. There were some things that he had his pet ideas that when you looked at it, if you thought it wasn't too good you had to tell him that. But, he didn't like just a negative answer on something. Generally he had an idea for a particular purpose, something that was going to solve a problem. If you just simply said it can't be done, he didn't keep you around too long. But, if you said I see what you're trying to do, I've looked into the thing and it looks like this is a better way to accomplish that, that was never a problem what-so-ever. He was a wonderful person to work for in that regard. If you could show him the wisdom of going in another direction to accomplish what he was trying to accomplish, he was quick to go along with that. What he could not abide was the nay sayers, these people who would say no to every idea that he had and he has had some real wild ideas. He is just an idea generator. It's very important that he have somebody around him who's willing to tell him, I know what you're trying to do, but that's not going to be as effective as going this other way. He will go along with that person. I think sometimes in his life he's not had those people and, I think, it has hurt him a little bit. I think of his political campaign. I don't know who those folks were, but I don't think his advice was as good as it could have been.

Q: As he's gained some problem from the junior senator from Virginia on his trying to be on the Disarmament Advisory Committee.

Adm. R.: That's one I'm not familiar with.

Q: Well, Senator Warner is objecting to Admiral Zumwalt being on this committee because he's a journalist, and he says he would have classified access that journalists wouldn't have, and by the same token he might be able to exploit it. But, I think the real reason goes back to their disagreements when he was in the Navy.

Adm. R.: John Warner is just trying to find reasons to disagree, I think.

Q: Who were some of the other people that he brought into systems analysis at your level?

Adm. R.: One of the ones that I can think of right off hand was a friend of mine, Max Morris who was Commandant of Midshipmen, and from that job made admiral. And, got heavily involved, and maybe still is, I've kind of lost

track of Max, but very heavily involved in the Law of the Sea work. The three mile limit versus twelve, two hundred, whatever it is. In fact, he's been one of the key people on that I think.

Q: Yes, he has.

Adm. R.: For decades really. And, that pretty much started in those days.

There was some other people that we saw later on. Burt Shepherd came into the Systems Analysis Division right after he got back from Vietnam where he was a hero as an aviator over there. He had an air wing that was flying off the America, I think. Burt was later his executive assistant when he became CNO. A very important person to Admiral Zumwalt. He came to us in the Systems Analysis Division.

It seems to me Bill Smedberg was in the Systems Analysis Division while I was there. Then I later saw him in the planning shop in what we used to call the Bureau of Naval Personnel.

Another person that had a very important job was Al Whittle who later became Chief of Naval Material.

As a matter of fact, Max Morris and Al Whittle and another older captain whose name slips me right now, took a look at possible reorganization of

OpNav. Admiral Clarey was the Vice Chief at the time and he wanted to look at that possibility.

We came up with a wild matrix type of an organization which put the hardware specialists sort of in one branch of the matrix and the warfare specialists sort of in the other dimension. This never flew, of course, because nobody likes a matrix type of organization although they have it. They just don't want to admit that they have it.

But, I think, it focused the admiral's attention at the time on what he had in OpNav, and I think maybe having gone through that drill helped him get some ideas that you may have seen crop up later on when he became CNO. The idea that you have three parallel strong warfare specialities, the 02, the 03, and the 05 that's there right now, the underseas warfare, and the surface warfare, and the air warfare was referred to in a way although we didn't really say it in those words in that study that we did.

Q: How much relationship was there between systems analysis and the Director of Program Planning?

Adm. R.: Well, there was quite a lot. And, as a matter of fact, that's 090. I don't know what the numbers are now. That's the job that Admiral

Clarey had. So, Admiral Zumwalt worked for Admiral Clarey in that capacity before Admiral Clarey later became VCNO.

Oh, he was down there all the time. This was a very, very close relationship between Op-96 and his boss which was O90.

Q: Since they're both in a planning business it would seem very logical.

Adm. R.: Well if 96 worked the way it's set up to work, what 96 is, the Systems Analysis Division, is a tool for the O90 to use in selling its program. Of course, the other relationship you have is with the planners that are working down at the Joint Chiefs' level. You're working to help support the Navy's budget, but you're also working, well, you're working to help support the Navy's budget through the Navy side which is the O90 side and through the Joint side which was in those days the O6. My numbers may not be right any longer.

Q: I don't know the numbers that well myself.

Adm. R.: Oh, o-kay. I'll refrain from using them then.

Q: Do you think that one of the reasons you were picked to go into systems analysis was that you had had both an SSN and an SSBN command? That, I think, is an unusual combination isn't it?

Adm. R.: No, not in those days. In those days most people who had an SSBN had to have an SSN first. Today that's probably unusual. It wasn't in those days. I think that you had to have the SSBN to take that job. I think that what he was looking for was somebody that had some familiarity with the strategic warfare side. When I say strategic warfare I'm really talking about deterrence, strikes, and that sort of thing. I'm not talking about the strategy that goes into any warfare. It's sort of a term that we have used to separate out the nuclear exchange from conventional warfare. So, he was really looking for somebody that had some sort of background in that area. I think that's one of the reasons. I suspect one of the other reasons is I had a fairly good background in postgraduate school. I had a master's degree in mechanical engineering which was very heavily math oriented, of course. And, I did relatively well there. I suspect the combination of the two was more than anything else why I got the job.

Q: Captain Kerr alluded to this when I talked to him. He said that you were

really very much a numbers man coming into your relationship with Admiral Zumwalt. Then you evolved more into things that couldn't be quantified as much.

Adm. R.: That's accurate I think.

Q: Well, I take it you weren't hand picked for the systems analysis job on your personal relationship with the admiral.

Adm. R.: He had never heard of me. He was looking at records which he is very good at. In fact, one time in Vietnam, I think it was, he told me that he spent about 30% of his time trying to get the right people in the right jobs around him. And, having seen a lot of his activity in that regard I think that might be accurate. It may be a little high. But, he felt that was very important and he put a lot of time into that. I suspect he was looking through records and he saw a skipper coming off about the right time who had a math background. I suspect that was one of the reasons that I ended up there. But, you're right that was the luck of the draw as far as I'm concerned.

Subsequent times I think it was based on the relationship we had in the previous job.

Q: Well, he did have some BuPers experience, so he knew how to work that system.

Adm. R.: Very definitely, very definitely. Well, as I told you I was the last person in the world that should have gone to Vietnam if you looked at what my qualifications were and my physical capabilities at the time. As a matter of fact, by the time I went through all that counterinsurgency training that you get at the amphibious base before you go over there, I think the first day that I was no longer limping was the day I flew to Vietnam. I just recovered in time from that leg injury.

Q: Did you go through the simulated POW training?

Adm. R.: No. There were a couple of us that were able to skip that just because of the time pressure involved.

Q: Captain Kerr said that and the admiral went through it out in the Philippines and they learned how to survive in the wilderness and so forth.

Adm. R.: That's right. The admiral left a little bit before I did and

Howard went with him. Howard was coming at the time, I guess, from Tufts, from Fletcher School.

Q: Yes.

Adm. R.: I still had some things to do, to get relieved, and to go through the school and all that sort of thing. So, I got to Vietnam about ten days after they arrived out there. In fact, I got there the night before he relieved as Commander of the Naval Forces.

Q: So, I think, this is about the beginning of October 1968?

Adm. R.: It was. I got there the 29th of September or the 30th and he relieved the next day. I think it was the 30th of September he relieved.

Q: I think either that or the first.

Adm. R.: Anyway, it was in that time frame and he left me with a few little odd jobs. I was sort of his man in Washington for things having to do with Vietnam for about ten days there. He wanted me to see if I could get some

more money to support an improved systems analysis group over there in Vietnam. In fact, ostensibly that's what I was going over there for.

When he called me up and said, "They have a little group over there of systems analysts over there and I want to beef that up, so I want you to go along with me."

I said, "You know I don't know that much about systems analysis."

He said, "Oh, yes you do. I know exactly what you know and I want you to go."

So, I said, "I'll let you know in twenty-four hours."

And, I finally decided that's where the action was, so it probably was a thing that I would be interested in doing. As I'll tell you later my job turned out to be quite a bit different. But, what I was ostensibly going over there for was to beef up this systems analysis staff that was over there on the staff of the Commander of the Naval Forces, ComNavForV.

He needed some more money for that. I think it was \$50,000 which is not a whole lot of money in OpNav. But, I was going around from admiral to admiral begging and I didn't have his background any more. In fact, once somebody is gone they bury the body really fast and they get on with the next regime. He was getting a lot of funds and there were a lot of people that, I wouldn't say that he had necessarily alienated, but they were

glad to see him go 'cause maybe they were going to have a little bit more say in where the money went. The last thing they were going to do was give me \$50,000 to give to him over there in the war.

Then we were trying to hire a few people to come out there to help us out. So, I was liaison with some of those people and so forth.

Q: Did you wind up getting the money?

Adm. R.: No, I never did get the money. No, I was not very good at that anyway, but the cards were stacked against us that particular time. That was no problem anyway. We managed.

Q: Was there somebody that you relieved on Admiral Veth's staff?

Adm. R.: I was a numerical relief for somebody and I forget the person's name.

Q: Was he in the---

Adm. R.: He was in systems analysis, yes.

What I became was a special assistant out there. But, that's not what I went out there for.

We had another person, a commander at the time come out with us, Commander Leo Parent, who was very good in systems analysis. He knew a lot more about the technical side of systems analysis than I did. I had enough math background that I was a little bit cocky and I knew that I could handle the job. But, I was not the technician that some of the people out there who worked for me were. As it turned out Commander Parent, well, he helped me in a lot of areas, but he really ran the systems analysis part of the job. I spent most of my time on what later became known as the Vietmanization.

Q: I got the impression from Captain Kerr that the title was not nearly so important as fitting people into functional roles.

Adm. R.: Yes. Titles never were important to him. That's right. In fact, you could do anything with your organization so long as you got the job done. The people that actually did things, his confidants he had could be anywhere in the organization.

Q: And conversely if somebody wasn't fitting in he would be frozen out essentially?

Adm. R.: Oh, yes. Yes, that's right. Somebody could be very high in the organization and if he was one of these, "No we can't do this," type of people he would stay there in the organization, but he just would not be listened to.

Q: Well, he mentioned specifically, Captain Kerr did, the chief of staff. He was essentially by-passed until Captain Tidd got in.

Adm. R.: That's right. That's right. I'll tell you later about Captain Tidd and how he got the job.

Q: Well, why not now?

Adm. R.: Chronologically it comes a little bit later.

Q: Well, then, maybe, you want to pick it up when you did get over there and got to plunging into the problems.

Adm. R.: The night before he relieved I had an opportunity to talk with him for maybe a half hour or something like that. And, he told me that he had

gone through Vietnam on a ten day inspection tour which you would do before relieving. And, that he had sort of picked three areas that he was going to work on. One was since the Navy had a little bit of territory called the Rung Sat which was that mangrove swamp area between the ocean and Saigon through which the major channel, shipping channel to Saigon winds, he wanted to see if we couldn't do a little better job of controlling that because there was an awful lot of harassment of ships coming up that channel. And, every time somebody got rockets shot at them the Vietnamese Navy got in trouble because they were supposed to be handling the Rung Sat. As you know there were IV Corps that were divided up amongst the generals in the army. But, the Navy owned one little piece of territory that was this little swamp area. So, he wanted to do a better job of that.

The second thing he wanted to do was look at operations and see if he couldn't get the Navy a little bit more involved than they had been. They had been pretty much a police force that was just simply stopping the sampans and out on the open ocean trowlers and inspecting them for counterband. He wanted to get a little bit more involved in that.

The third thing he wanted to do was see if we couldn't turn over our things to the Vietnamese. He had gotten the idea that that was the only honorable way out. He wanted me to look into some of the aspects of that.

Now, see this was already awkward because there was already a person who already existed who would normally have had that job, a person who was a very competent naval officer by the name of Arbo, Captain Arbo. He was the senior naval advisor at the time. The only problem with Captain Arbo is that he had been there for about eight months. The only advantage I had over him is I knew nothing about the Vietnamese, I knew nothing about the Vietnamese Navy, I knew nothing about the war, so I was really fresh and I hadn't had any bad experiences or good experiences. So, I could sit down and do something on paper and go talk with a few people and see if it was feasible and then adjust and so forth. It would have been very difficult for him to do that because he had been so involved over about the last eight months or something like that.

Q: Did this make him reluctant to embark on a turnover program?

Adm. R.: Yes. Well, they already had one. There was a turnover program in existence. The difference was it was not nearly to the extent that Admiral Zumwalt envisioned, nor was the time frame anyways close to the very accelerated time frame that he was talking about. So, you know, they had put a lot of effort into putting this thing going and it was an orderly

thing. They knew, in quotes, knew about what the Vietnamese could take. So, there was a certain amount of reluctance like anybody would have if somebody came and said your plan is all wet, we're going to work on a much different plan.

So, you know, we had our differences and I was going over his head quite frequently. But, in his defense if the roles had been reversed I'm not going to say I wouldn't have been closer to the way he worked out. I'd like to think I would have, but I may well have been just very similar to the way he was in resisting some of the things that we were doing.

At any rate Admiral Zumwalt told me, he said, the thing I'd like for you to work on is this business of turning over our stuff to the Vietnamese. And, he had some very definite ideas on some things that we could do. One of his pets was a program that he felt would be very important to help the Vietnamese learn English because he figured that we just weren't going to be able to turn these things over if we couldn't at least communicate with the people we were dealing with. So, he had an idea of sending a lot of folks back to the United States to, maybe, go to their last year of high school living with a family in the United States. And, I'm talking about large numbers. Then when they came back after a year over there speaking native English they would know English and they would be able to converse

and we would be more effective in terms of turning things over. This was an idea of his that he had gotten and it's typical of his solutions to things. He looks a lot more broadly than most people look, and certainly that was a thing that nobody had ever tried and something that he thought would be very successful.

As it turned out that particular thing didn't turn out to be the thing that the Vietnamese Navy was too much interested in. And, if they weren't interested in it he was smart enough to know that it wasn't going to go.

Q: I would think a problem with that would be getting the people back in to fight the war after they had seen a taste of California for example.

Adm. R.: Well, that would be a big problem. But, he figured that it was a really good way to teach English and he's absolutely right. I think probably an ulterior motive was that it might also get some of the folks in the United States a little bit of an association with some intelligent Vietnamese people. Everybody we dealt with was primarily an intelligent person. And, he knew that going over there and he knew that if a large portion of the country had some sort of first hand experience that that might be very important in their attitudes. Well, it never turned out. I

think we had one person as a test case stay with his sister or something like that for a little period of time. I don't really know. But, it was not a thing that the Vietnamese Navy wanted to do. In fact, when I first presented that it was my first association with a Vietnamese naval officer. I forget his name now---Son. When I got all through he went up to the blackboard, he drew a picture of a little boat sinking in the stern and he said, "What you've just done," he said, "here we are sinking in the stern and you are trying to hold our bow up." That was his way of saying we're got other problems that are more serious than the ones that you're trying to fix, let me tell you about some of the things that we've got.

So eventually we got Admiral Zumwalt to back off of that. But, it was something he felt very strongly about because he saw this as a solution to a serious problem. At any rate that's how he got started in the thing. He knew that we wanted to teach them English. I did not know that. I was an idealist that thought if you were in somebody else's country that you spoke their language. Now, I hasten to tell you that I was there a year and a half and I never did learn more than about ten words of Vietnamese which I regret to this day. But, I didn't have to. I could do my job without it and so there was no motivation for me to learn it. But ideally it seemed to me that was the way to go and I explored that a little bit.

.. I talked to a lot of people and pretty soon I was convinced that I was wrong

and, indeed, Admiral Zumwalt was right that the solution was to teach them English. The strongest backer of that idea was Admiral Chon the Chief of Naval Operations or the Navy Chief of Staff of the Vietnamese Navy.

Q: What convinced you that you were wrong?

Adm. R.: Well, Chon's argument was, and Chon was a wonderful person. He saw everything in very simple terms. If you gave him the problem, he could break it down to very simple dimensions and the solution seemed almost elementary. He simply viewed the Navy as an international service unlike the other two services in the country, and therefore the Navy ought to be able to speak an international language, and the most prevalent international language at the time was English. So, he wanted everybody in his Navy to speak English. It was just as simple as that.

Some of the things I learned when I looked into it was that Vietnamese is an agrarian language. They don't really have any technical terms and we would have to invent a lot of terms just to go ahead and teach in Vietnamese. This was a very compelling argument. Somebody told me and I've never checked this to know whether it's true or not that the original language of the Swedish Air Force was English for somewhat the same reason. Like I say I have no idea of the validity of that statement, but I was told that.

Adm. R.: Whether or not it's true I could understand why it might be true. Certainly in Vietnam it would have been a disaster to go the other way. It took us a long time to teach people to speak Vietnamese, a year of absolute Army language school type of training, and then we only had them over there for a year under the ground rules that we were fighting that war. So, it was not a very cost effective thing to do. The other thing was they still didn't have the technical language and we would have had to invent things. And, if we invented something different than somebody else invented it could have been a real nightmare. So, from a practical standpoint as far as I was concerned, once I looked into it, it looked like we just simply had to teach them English.

The other thing is that we were recruiting primarily in the cities because we wanted people who had some technical schooling, and if you do that what you are doing is picking up people who ever since 1954 had been studying English in the high school. So, they may not have spoken English well, but they didn't have to learn the grammar and the vocabulary because they knew all that. It was just that they were not familiar with oral English. They were very familiar with written English. A large portion of the Vietnamese that we were bringing into the Navy were.

Well, and contrast that with how many U. S. folks have any smattering

whatsoever in Vietnamese. It was zero you know.

So, it did turn out to be the best way to go, but I didn't know that at first. I had to spin my wheels a couple of days learning that first. Then we tried other ways to do it besides sending folks back to the United States and I think it worked out fairly successfully. But, that's a good example of something that he comes over with a solution for. And, he felt very strongly about it, very strongly because it was a different idea and the kind of thing he liked to do. And, it was a good solution if the Vietnamese had thought it was a good solution, also if we had been able to get the people back and gotten enough people in the United States to go along with it and that sort of thing.

But, when I come back to him and say this is not something that the Vietnamese have any interest in, then he, in his very good relationship with Chon, explores it some more and learns the same thing and he gets off of that kick and we go on to other things.

Q: What did you wind up doing as an alternative?

Adm. R.: Well, the---let me get to that question later on. Let me get the chronology straight here.

There is a very important story here that goes on over the next couple of weeks, the next three or four weeks. He had asked Captain Arbo to come up with a plan for the turnover of our things because Captain Arbo was the right person to do that. And, it was never a very ambitious plan for the reasons that I mentioned earlier and I understand that.

I was taking up most of my time looking into this English language thing. Finally after I was there about two weeks he said, "You have to take this thing over. I want a plan to turn our assets over to the Vietnamese. I am convinced that it's the only way we can get out of this war. We've been spending a lot of money over here. We haven't built any escorts, we haven't helped our deep water Navy at all during all this time that we're pouring all this money into this operation. We've got to get out of it and there is only one way we're every going to get out of it, and that's let them stand on their own two feet and run the thing themselves. So, that's one of the things I want to do. And, I want an ambitious plan for doing that."

Well, I took that charge, so to speak, talked to my people, and we worked about 38 straight hours, straight through, and I mean straight hours, and came up with a plan for turning over our things to the Vietnamese. Not only did I work with my people in the Systems Analysis Division, and Leo Parent gave me some good ideas on that incidentally, but I was also

working with some of the folks that were at the time naval advisors that were on Captain Arbo's staff. I was looking to see what his plans were and I was just compressing the time frame. And, we came up with a scheme whereby as far as the PBR's were in particular concerned, and the PBR's were the little fiberglass boats with pump jet engines are fabulous. They have a fifty caliber on it. They really could move. They were maneuverable. We had about 250 of those. And, Admiral Zumwalt wanted to turn all of these things over to the Vietnamese. There is no way we were going to be able to train people fast enough to do that without getting them to learn a little bit of English, just enough to get by. Not enough that they could go see a play in English and understand the play, but something that was very occupationally oriented.

So, our scheme was, we'll train a person and we'll put one person in the crew and as soon as that person feels comfortable in there we'll take a U. S. person out and we'll run with that mixed crew for awhile. They we will do it again, and again until the Vietnamese take over. This was a thing obviously that appealed to Admiral Zumwalt because it is the kind of innovative thing that he would like to do. He was strongly behind that.

And, we came up with a time plan of when all these things could be turned over and we made it in the form of a presentation. He was supposed to make a presentation to General Abrams. He was scheduled to do it some-

where near the end of October. You've got to recognize that we've only been there since the beginning of October. I don't know how much of this Howard told you, but this was one of the highlights in my life was watching this operation. Anyway, Leo and I put this thing together. I had the thing color coded and everything everything else. We had this neat presentation. We met with the admiral a couple of times. He liked it. He made some comments. We'd go back to the drawing board and fix a few things that he wanted fixed. Then he took the things that we had made into slides, and then he just simply wrote notes on each page, and what he was going to do was make the presentation himself. And, he was going to do it directly from this stack of copies of the slides that he had. We practiced it two or three times.

In the meantime General Abrams is called back to see President Johnson.

Did Howard give you all this?

Q: Yes, but I'd like to hear your version.

Adm. R.: What I didn't know is whether Howard was at that briefing or not. I guess he was. It will be interesting to hear the two because we were on one side of the screen and Howard was probably out front where the players

were. Leo and I were back there flipping the slides.

So, anyway General Abrams comes back and later we found out that Lyndon Johnson had told him that he wanted to get out of that place as fast as he could. He wanted to turn things over to the Vietnamese, and he wanted to do it at a faster rate than they had ever talked about before. Oh, he had such things as a letter in his pocket from the President saying that Lincoln had his Grant and I have my Abrams and all this sort of thing.

Anyway, so what was supposed to be a very standard briefing, a sort of a standard update of how people were doing vis-a-vis their counterparts in the Vietnamese armed services turned out to be an opportunity for General Abrams to let people know what he heard back from the President.

So, anyway, since you always go by seniority, and many times in my life I've gained from this, the Army always goes first. And the Army went first. They started going through their program. I don't think they were too much aware of the degree to which General Abrams had bought off on the President's idea that we've got to turn this stuff over fast. I'm sure he told them when you give this briefing, now I want to hear a little bit about your turnover plans.

Well, the presenter was a major or colonel or something and he kept being interrupted. And, finally from where we were listening from behind

the screen all of a sudden we hear this (sound of a fist thudding on a desk) hand come down on the table. We could hear ice trays jumping and there was complete silence. And, the general really started chewing these people out. I've never heard a grown man talk to other grown men like General Abrams was talking to his generals. They didn't understand. They didn't have enough imagination. They didn't have anyways near the enthusiasm or the innovativeness that he was talking about and so forth. And, he gave them a certain period of time to get their act together and come back.

I happened to be out on the outside when the chief of staff to General Abrams came up to Admiral Zumwalt and said, "Bud, in view of what happened maybe you just want to delay yours and come back at the same time the Army's going to get their act together and come back."

And, Admiral Zumwalt kind of smiled and said, "No, I'll go ahead and I'll go on anyway." Cause he knew he had it. And, that's typical of Admiral Zumwalt. He's generally three or four weeks, months, years ahead of everybody else. He had on his own decided that this was the way to go before he ever came over there. And, the other thing he has is the courage of his convictions. So, he was pressing on with this idea.

So, he came back to Leo and me and he said, "We're going on ahead with this thing. Hang on because I'm going to go over the first fifteen

minutes of it, which as you know, is mostly history very, very fast and get right to the point that I know General Abrams is interested in, namely the speed with which we're going to turn these things over."

And, so it was exactly that. We'd practiced it at one pace and for that first ten minutes or so Leo and I could hardly keep up with what he was doing. But, then he calmed down and we went at maybe even more of a deliberate pace actually in the last half of it which presented the actual turnover program. He got all done and there was just absolute complete silence.

After about a minute one by one a general would start saying, well it's a little ambitious, but we've got this problem and that problem. After about three of those (sound of a fist hitting the table),"I like it," General Abrams comes down again. "I think it's exactly what I'm looking for. We're going to do it."

Well, this was something like a Thursday or a Friday and Admiral Zumwalt said we will have all the documents on your desk by Monday, general for you to sign.

So, we stayed up through the night over that weekend also and I don't think we got there Monday morning, but we indeed got it there Monday. We got this whole plan so if the general had wanted to he could have signed his

name about fifteen times and that would have set the whole thing in operation right then and there. We had messages to CincPacFleet and messages to CNO and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and directives to various people to do various things, directives to us to carry the thing out. It was all completed staff work. Well, the Army doesn't work quite that way. He had to give it to his staff and it took probably, it was on into the fifteenth or twentieth of November before we had enough approval that we were actually operating the thing legally. That did not stop us from going ahead as though we had approval.

But, that was an exciting period because he knew exactly what to do. Lyndon Johnson knew exactly what to do. And, two great minds sort of came together there. Many of the things that we did were picked up by the other services eventually.

I'm not sure that many people in the country knew Lyndon Johnson wanted to get out because it was so near the end of his tour and he was a lame duck president at that time. But, the whole idea of turning things over to the Vietnamese was really his.

Now, I'm going to jump ahead just a little bit. In February Mel Lard came out there who was Secretary of Defense on a fact finding tour. And, Howard I'm sure told you about this.

Q: We haven't gotten that far in his narrative yet.

Adm. R.: Oh, you haven't?

Q: We just covered 1968 with him.

Adm. R.: My gosh. Well, you need to have him tell you this because he'll know a little bit more of the details of how it was set up. But, in February Mr. Laird came out there and there was a whole schedule of briefings laid out for him, and ComNavForV had no time at all which was typical because the ComUSMACV staff put everything together and they were very Army oriented. And, they didn't have Admiral Zumwalt doing anything.

Well, he had a good friend who had the 9th Infantry Division in the delta. I can't think of his name, Julian somebody. Howard will know that name. Anyway, he got this general to give him ten or fifteen minutes of his time down there for a briefing. He and this general were very, very good friends. I don't know if they had ever known each other before, but the general had a great respect for what Admiral Zumwalt was doing on the operational side because he was helping get his forces moved around and he knew Admiral Zumwalt was trying to get into the war and get beyond just a

police action sort of thing.

So, the general said that he could have, I think, fifteen or twenty minutes of the time that was allotted to him for a briefing down there. I guess it was Dong Tam where we were in the delta. It was at the 9th Infantry headquarters.

I think Howard and Lou Glenn, who was the admiral's aide, he was added as the admiral's official aide. Howard was sort of a special assistant. He really had two aides, Howard and Lou worked pretty much together. I guess Howard acted sort of like an executive assistant in the mini-staff over there. I think Howard knew where the people that helped with the briefing down there, but I was down there.

We put together a condensed version of what we'd given to General Abrams and we added to that some things that we were doing already because we'd got off and we were running and had things to show that were in operation. I'll tell you what one or two of those were.

He was very well received by the Secretary of Defense. And, Mr. Chafee told me later, many years later, I guess it was a year and a half later when I'd come back to the United States, that the word Vietnamization was really coined after listening to Admiral Zumwalt's presentation down there in the delta. I don't know whether that's true or not, but that's

what Mr. Chafee told me and that Mr. Laird had been very impressed with the speed with which the Navy had moved off in the direction in which General Abrams was trying now to lead us.

So, then this thing became a big issue in the Nixon administration, this idea of Vietnamization.

You should ask Howard about that because this was a very important thing. I'm sure he'll be telling you anyway. He would be able to fill in the details on that. It was very important.

What had we done? Well, I'm going back now to your question on how did we teach them English. I don't know how we decided to do it, but it was primarily my people. We'd gotten together with some outfit that was over in Vietnam. I didn't really know much about them. They were two men who came in and talked to us a little bit and convinced us that they were reasonable consultants in the area of education and training. So, we asked them to put together what we called a boat school. And, what we wanted was primarily to train the Vietnamese English, but we wanted to do it only to give them the English that they would need to be a crew person in the first the PBR and then we later included some of the other kinds of boats that we were turning over.

We actually had a mock-up of a PBR in the building where we were running

this school.

I did almost everything through the contractor. I also found a young Lieutenant who was a Naval Academy graduate who had been an advisor or else he was a division officer. I think he was a division officer on some USPBR's. He had come to talk to me about the problems of the PBR's and that sort of thing. So, I asked him how he would like to come to Saigon and be the officer in charge of this boat school. He was a sort of a can-do kind of a guy.

Q: Who was that? Do you remember his name?

Adm. R.: No, I can't think of it right now. I don't even have it written down. I can find it for you eventually I guess.

This Lieutenant was kind of interesting because he'd come in and give me all kinds of problems on all sorts of things that had to be taken care of. He didn't know how they were going to get it done. Generally I just simply listened to him and say, "Yes, those are really significant problems and I'd like to have you tell me tomorrow how we're going to work them out. I'll support you however you want, but I need to know how to support you, so, you're going to have to tell me what you're going to do."

He would go hang his head and he'd leave the office and the next day

he would come back with the solutions to the problems.

We had him working with this consultant group and they sat up a boat school. They rented for us, and we put this into their contract, an old hotel in Saigon, oh, probably ten blocks I guess from where the naval headquarters were. It was empty, and they took it over and it was the boat school for training the Vietnamese.

We had a couple of problems with this. Number one is I didn't have a contract with these people yet. I didn't even know how to get contracts. Fortunately Leo Parent was the supply officer. He was a systems analysts, but his original background was supply officer. We kept working through the Army and the people who in Saigon were supposed to take care of contracts. We were having all kinds of difficulty. Number one, we were already working with these people and we hadn't gone out on bids and that sort of thing. But, we didn't have time to go through all that malarkey. We needed to get busy tomorrow and we did. These people were willing to go ahead with us. They somehow or other had confidence that somehow we would eventually pay them.

So, they got some folks together in the area, English speaking people, or bilingual people, and they put together a very good program. I think it was about three months that we had these people there. By the end they knew

enough English that they could get by and they could field strip all of the guns. In fact, we would have demonstrations at the graduation ceremonies. I remember, this was their idea. One of the demonstrations was a couple of people blindfolded would field strip a fifty caliber machine gun. Somebody else would do a rifle and this sort of thing. They turned out to get a little bit of English, enough to get by. Like I said we're talking about oral English now. Many of them knew written English. We did not go in for a lot of frills. We just taught them all the phraseology necessary to do their job and then enough just for day-to-day type of eating and working togetherness sort of thing.

One of the problems that we had other than the contract problem was that there was some GS-11 over there who was supposed to be the granddaddy in the world for reverse English training, or for English training for foreign people. He was from the Army Language Institute, or the Defense Language Institute which is located at Lackland Air Force Base down near San Antonio. He heard that we were teaching English and he came in one day and tried to shoot our program down because it hadn't gone through the Department of Defense and specifically through him, and we couldn't do this and all this sort of thing.

That was an interesting time because I learned something about Admiral Zumwalt that I hadn't really known before. The guy wanted to see the Admiral,

and so we brought him in and he talked to us about what we couldn't do and what we were doing wrong and all this sort of thing. And, the admiral was really polite, and he was really nice to the person. When the guy left he called a couple of us back in and it was obvious that he disliked this person's attitude and this person's blinders that he had on and empire building and all this sort of thing as much as we did, but I did not get that at all from listening to the discussion with him. That's one of his strong capabilities. He can be sitting and listening to somebody that would cause me in his position to boil. I would probably lose it. But, he never does. He's just very, very patient. He's got complete control. Later on he takes the necessary action or he'll indicate that this is a person he doesn't ever again want to see or do business with, or if he does he will not give him the time of day or something like that. But, at the time you'd never know that.

Q: How did he overcome this obstacle?

Adm. R.: I don't know. Oh, oh, this guy? Oh, we just bypassed him. We had so much clout with General Abrams we could do almost anything we wanted because we were showing results. General Abrams, you know, he was like, he was a General Grant. He didn't care how you got the job done. He wanted to

see the job done. That was somebody else's problem to worry about coming around later and paying and worrying about whether you're doing this to the department or not.

Q: Well, with his support you could do a great many things.

Adm. R.: Oh, yes. This was zero problem. We had to give periodic briefings to General Abrams. The next time we did it which was within a month of the time that we'd told him what we were going to do, we showed him a picture of the building. We said this is the boat school, it's in operation, we've had our first class there for two weeks. This is what we're doing. Well, you know, that says it all, you don't have to convince him that we were wrong by not going through some GS-11 in getting this thing set up.

Well, it also became obvious to me that we still weren't going to train people fast enough through the boat school. So, we were supported, and I went to all the meetings that this guy ran where we were to sit down and decide how we were going to in the tri-service situation train people to speak English. All the services now had this requirement. Well, they always had all had it, but now they all knew they needed to go at a faster rate. They had some little fly-by-night school and a couple little broken down buildings out near the Vietnamese headquarters, general staff headquarters.

And, General Abrams when he saw our big building that said this is the boat school he turned to his people and said, "Why can't we do that? Why don't we get a hotel and put in our language school for all the other services?" And, they did. And, we supported that. We sent probably another 600 to that school who were going into other things. But, the people who were going into our boats for the crews for the turnover went through our boat school. That thing went on for probably about three years. I don't know how long the tri-service school went. It may have gone for several more years after that.

But, these two ways were the ways we primarily got the English training across to the Vietnamese. And, it worked pretty well.

Q: You mentioned Captain Arbo's resistance to this speeded up transition plan. What was the reaction of the Vietnamese?

Adm. R.: That's a good question. I think that when we put that presentation together and, I believe it was slightly before we presented the thing to General Abrams, Chon was called over and we gave him the essence of what it was we were going to do. And, Chon thought it was great because he was strongly behind taking on as much as he could take. I think it's fair to say that, maybe, Admiral Zumwalt and Commodore Chon and maybe myself since

I didn't know any better, and I suspect you could have probably found a handful of U. S. and Vietnamese people somewhere are probably the only people who thought it would work. There was a lot of concern about it in his Navy that we got talking to some of his officers. And, of course, a lot of people in our Navy who had already come to the conclusion that we were moving way too fast and should not do this. But, Chon never had any doubt but what he could do it. He was absolutely supportive to the letter from the very beginning. Of course, this wouldn't have gone if he hadn't of been.

Chon had his difficulties too because there were some political factions in the Vietnamese Navy. To his credit he confronted them openly. But, he had captains working for him, and in fact, his one person who was chief of staff to him for a long time was loyal to another faction.

The Vietnamese Navy had a fairly rocky background and the only person who had ever been head of it and left normally at the end of a tour was Chon. He left to go to the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. When he came back, I think, he became head of the RF's and PF's, regional forces and popular forces. They had a bunch of little patrol groups. I think he was the head of that organization. Then President Thieu got him to come back in as CNO.

There was another admiral who was out of the Navy, but he still wore the rank of an admiral and he worked for one of the other ministers, Admiral Kang. He had some very loyal supporters. Kang had been the object of a mutiny and he had been ousted from the job when he left the job as CNO. Well, they didn't call it CNO. They humored us by calling it CNO, but the Vietnamese translation was Chief of Staff for the Navy. He had been Chief of Staff for the Navy and then had been ousted by a mutiny. But, he still had some loyal followers. So, Chon had those people that were quite often against him just in general. I think some of them also accused him of being a puppet of Admiral Zumwalt. Nothing could be further from the truth. The two of them would go into a closed door meeting and out would come some new idea that the Vietnamese Navy was going to march off on, and, I think, many of the people that were not particularly loyal to him often thought he was a puppet of Admiral Z's. I happen to know differently. Chon had no quams whatsoever about saying that may work in your country, but it won't work over here. Chon was smart too. He always had an alternative that would get the same goal that Admiral Zumwalt was trying to get. That's why they got along so beautifully. He'd say, however if you do this we could probably pull it off. Now, there were some things he just didn't go along with. Admiral Zumwalt wanted to get women in Vietnam more associated and more active. Chon just didn't want anything to do with it.

Zumwalt's position on that was simply he was looking for any kind of resource he could get and he saw this as maybe an untapped resource. But, it's something that Chon--oh, he had women in the service, but they were involved in ceremonies and clerical type things and stuff like that. That's as far as he wanted to go with it, and so that's the way they kept it.

But, I don't think he was really a puppet of Admiral Zumwalt, yet these are the kind of problems that Chon had. Nevertheless there were a large number of people that kept coming onboard and kept thinking that, well, maybe they can do this. The interesting thing is that after about four or five months in this procedure that I was relating to you on turning the PBR's over Commander Son came up one day and said, "I think we can turn these things over faster."

So, what Admiral Zumwalt did was to get Son permission to personally brief General Abrams. He had this thing all set up. He had already convinced Abrams that this was the right thing to do. But, he wanted Abrams to see a Vietnamese over there telling him we can do it even faster than what these turkeys are telling you. So, that guy put together a beautiful briefing and we just went over and listened. He gave the presentation and when it was over, you know, General Abrams played the role he usually does. He took a couple puffs on his cigar and so forth and finally said, "O-kay, it sounds good."

Q: What was the reaction of the sailors and junior officers, how enthusiastically did they take to it?

Adm. R.: Well, there's one thing about that war over there. It's like the four blind men describing the elephant you know. Everybody saw that war differently. Everybody saw the Vietnamese differently. It's very difficult to answer any objective question about anything in that war by yes or no, or they all did this or they all did that. This is another one of those cases. You had the entire spectrum. You had the people who were very supportive of the idea, who had gotten to know the Vietnamese, who knew they had all kinds of capabilities, and if they wanted to do it they could do it to the whole other end of the spectrum that called them a bunch of gooks that could never do anything. I think as time went on we got more and more people that realized that we were dealing with intelligent people.

By and large if there was a split that was discernable it would have been between the advisors and the U. S. side who really didn't have that much to do with the Vietnamese Navy. The advisors who worked with the people closely knew them and they knew they were capable of a lot of things. Some things they were capable we weren't capable of. They knew the rivers better than most of us did. They just were very capable people. The ones

that would have been most skeptical were the ones whose entire time over there was spent on the U. S. side because when we got over there you'd have the advisory group with people who had been sent over there as advisors were counterparts to various levels in the Vietnamese Navy. Then you had the U. S. action over there and the two had no relationship whatsoever.

Some of the things that we did to try to get everybody on the U. S. side to eventually think of themselves in terms of being an advisor. So, to answer your question, I think as more and more people became more and more familiar with the Vietnamese you had more and more realization that this was an intelligent group of people that could do almost anything they wanted to do. In fact, they could do anything they wanted to do given the resources. Their only limitation was the resources.

Q: I didn't phrase the question clearly enough. I was referring to the Vietnamese sailors and junior officers. How did they take to the accelerated turnover and the language training and so forth?

Adm. R.: Well, it's kind of hard to know how somebody really feels that's in a culture different from your own. But, it's my impression just by the

enthusiasm with which they went through that boat school, and we also got them later on back to, some officers, Newport to the OCS program. It's my impression that they were solidly behind this because they did respectable jobs when they took over their part in a boat and later on when they took over the whole boat. I suspect the thing never worked exactly as we planned where we had one person and then another person and then another person. The concept was the basis on which we built the thing, but I think, maybe, we'd get one or two and then we'd turn the whole boat over. It was one of those things that looked good on paper, but when you actually did it you would maybe take some shortcuts or have some modifications of the original plan. Nevertheless, they got involved in many things and did extremely well. One of the things that would tend to enhance enthusiasm was they were getting a lot better equipment than they had on their own. They had wooden junks and they had, as a matter of fact, it had not been too many years that those junks were not propelled by sail. They had some old French landing craft that had been left over from the old days when the French left. And, that's just about all they had to operate. They had had a few other landing craft that we had turned over to them in earlier years, amphibious ships, small amphibious ships. But, that was by and large it. Now, we're going to give them 250 of these neat fiberglass pumpjets, real fast. We're going to give them these fifty foot swift boats that we used

for the in-shore patrol. We had about 80 of those. We were going to give them 18 Coast Guard 82 footers called WPB's which were really nice boats. We were going to give them some old converted PB-1's which are airplane tenders which the Coast Guard had used as destroyer escorts. So, they stand to get some equipment that is really pretty exciting compared with what they had had to operate with before. So, anybody that had any enthusiasm for the service at all would have been quite pleased. This is not to say you don't have deserters in their Navy just as you have deserters in our Navy and you have people that were never interested in the military in the first place. But, those who understood what the situation was and that they had to be in the military and that they had chosen the Navy, I'd say, were by-and-large very enthusiastic about it. Otherwise we couldn't have pulled the thing off. They are the ones that made it work. I've got to impress that on you. It was Admiral Zumwalt's backing, Admiral Zumwalt's very excellent relationship with Chon, but ultimately the Vietnamese sailor and the Vietnamese officer had to make this thing work. And, it worked and it worked well.

One of the things that you want to get Admiral Zumwalt to get for you, I started to bring it and I forgot it to be honest with you, is a letter that he has from Captain Clay which is a letter that he received after the

fall of Vietnam. The letter explains how the Navy equipped themselves at the very end. Do you know the story?

Q: No.

Adm. R.: I'm jumping ahead now, but I think it's pertinent to the question you asked. The other services pretty much bolted near the end. The Air Force went off in different directions flying here and there and so forth. I don't know what happened to the Army. The Navy had a plan that they were going to fight their ships as long as there was a South Vietnam. Then in case the country fell, and it was kind of obvious the way it was collapsing into Saigon, they were going to carry out this contingency plan. And, they carried it out beautifully. The plan was to get every one of the ocean capable ships that was not actually in overhaul and they had a couple places to meet. Some in Saigon, some in Vung Tau. They were going to load up all of the heirarchy of the Navy and as many dependents as they possibly could get aboard the ships and they were going to steam at night down through the Rung Sat sound for those people in Saigon and out of Vung Tau and they were going to join up just off Vietnam, and they did that. They started, I think, with close to 30 ships. When they got clear of the coast, they

radioed the U. S. and the U. S. sent a couple of destroyers over to escort them. But, they steamed as a fleet to Subic Bay. Hauled down the Vietnamese flag, hauled up the U. S. flag, went in and officially turned all those ships back over to

Q: I didn't know that story.

Adm. : Well, nobody else does and it's too bad because it's in a very unhappy situation it's a little bit of brightness, you know.

Admiral Zumwalt is reluctant to talk about it because he thinks it's self-serving. But, if you ask him for the letter he's got to produce it, or if you can't get it I've got a copy of it. He sent a copy of it to me.

The night before they got in to Subic, Que sat down and wrote him a letter and he told him what they had planned to do and how they were carrying it out, and what they did do. In the letter is a plea for help to get some of the dependents settled and that sort of thing.

But, what I'm trying to say is that the Vietnamese Navy did a very creditable job with taking over what we gave them and they kept it up, and they would keep it up to this day so long as they had the resources to do it. They did an awful lot of evacuation as the country collapsed from the North down to Saigon. We got a lot of credit for it, but their ships did

a lot of work.

So, it made a lot of us feel a little bit better, you know, we didn't like the fact that, nobody liked to see what happened over there after you put so much effort and sacrifice into the thing. The Navy did as well as you could have possibly expected them to do. That couldn't have been done if there hadn't been some enthusiasm for this.

The thing, I think, surprised everybody is that they maintained their ships fairly well. Oh, you would have a crew that didn't and it would be a disaster. But, by-and-large they did a very good job.

Q: Captain Kerr was mentioning that a consultant came in to give U. S. officers sort of a lecture on cultural understanding of the interrelationships that would be involved in American's learning about Vietnamese ways. He said initially you were quite skeptical about this. What was your own reaction?

Adm. R.: Well, this is a big portion, I guess, of one of the things that my people were involved in. I was looking for any help I could get in the early days trying to figure out whether we should speak Vietnamese or if we should speak English. When we started talking about what we finally decided to do, namely help them speak English, or learn English this person

by the name of Humphrey, Bob Humphrey who was under a contract in Thailand found out about what we were doing and he came over and he got me aside and spent about, I guess, a morning with me. He asked me to tell him what we were proposing and I told him pretty much what our plan was. So, then he gave me a presentation which boils down to whether you speak the same language isn't the whole thing. That I've done some research that shows that sometimes you have more difficulties once you can understand each other than you do beforehand. So, he gave me a picture of how sometimes we inadvertently make mistakes in dealing with people of another culture, and sometimes how we just are kind of crude and we just don't look good at all. He urged us to get involved in some sort of a program that would help our people understand the culture a little bit better. I got him in to see Admiral Zumwalt for 45 minutes. I said, "I think we ought to do this."

It was obvious to Admiral Zumwalt we needed to do it. So, he backed this program that was not too well supported at first by some of our senior people.

This was one of those things where the admiral stuck his neck out on something and kind of forced his people into doing what they probably wouldn't have wanted to do.

There's a little bit of risk involved when you get into some intimate

type of discussions like this.

Anyway, the so called personal response program was born. That's what Howard was referring to.

We had a couple of Vietnamese women who were working in some sort of capacity for the U. S. that we used in this. We got a handful of young officers who were particularly sensitive to the culture and who understood what we were trying to do. It was headed up by a Navy chaplain who was over there. I'm not sure how I got him, Commander Fedgie. He was not the force chaplain. That's the reason I'm hesitating. But, anyway, I found out about Fedgie and we got him over there.

He had had some post-graduate training and knew a little bit about this kind of thing we were talking about. He knew Bob Humphrey. He knew the program. There was also another chaplain up in I Corps by the name of McGonagle who may by now have left, who had written some things about a similiar type of program, a personal response program.

So, we got Fedgie to put this thing together for us. It was a combination of Humphrey's stuff and some of his own stuff. We ended up giving seminars all over the country. We required everybody that was ever going to have any association whatsoever with the Vietnamese, officer or enlisted person, to eventually go through this personal response program. It really didn't take all that long.

Essentially what Fedgie did was he started out giving surveys and he used these women to help him with this. He would get a lot of Vietnamese in the area, civilians around as well as military people in a particular area, to write down what they liked about the Americans and what they didn't like about the Americans. Then he would give the survey to our people and ask them the same questions about the Vietnamese. Then in the seminars he would get people together and he would have done his homework and he would take some of the things that we did not like about the Vietnamese and explain why they did those things and try to put it into the perspective of that's o-kay in their culture. In our culture we might not like it, but in their culture it's o-kay. You know something as simple as, well, we take Sundays off and this is the middle of a war. Well, you know, when you explain they have been in this war for 30 years or if it's not this one it's another one that's a little bit easier to see than if you're over there for one year. That's the kind of thing that he would do.

The other thing he did he was armed with the results of his surveys on the U. S. side and not only did he ask people what they thought in a couple of different areas about the Vietnamese, but he asked, now that's your opinion, what do you think the group you're in thinks. What he was able to show clearly was that the image was far worse than what each person

as an individual thought. So, that's a real nice tool for turning people's views around, you know. You said that you don't have any problem at all, but you feel that the group is very much anti-Vietnamese and that's not true. They are only 35% that are and yet there are 70% of you which said the whole group is against these people.

So, these are the kinds of things the he used as entrees into a discussion of our culture vis-a-vis their culture and how to expect different things and how to get along.

Admiral Chon was so intrigued by this that at one time he was hoping that we could have a reverse sort of thing for them, but I don't think it ever flew. He just simply did not have the resources to pull it off. He had to put every person he could get into a boat somewhere. He just simply did not have the capability of doing it. But, I think he was intrigued by it. I know he was very thankful that we did it because without it we would have had more problems than we did.

Q: Do you have any other examples of the problems such as Sundays off that would illustrate this understanding gap?

Adm. R.: Well, there are a lot of little things that---one of the things that we learned is how important face saving is and some of the things that

will be done as a face saving gesture.

One of the interesting things we learned was whereas in our service a fairly weak commander can be held up by the rest of the people, you know. True a really good commander will have a better organization than one that's mediocre, but the one that's mediocre probably won't fail. In the Vietnamese situation the one that's mediocre quite likely will fail. The reason is the other people won't do anything to by-pass him or in any way show him up or anything like that. They don't look at it as making him look good, he's in this position and our culture doesn't say that we can go over his head or that we can do things without his permission and all this sort of thing. That's kind of hard for our people to understand I think.

There were a lot of little things that we learned about body language and things like that. Some of that you got before you went over there, but Fedgie reenforced that.

The specifics were not as important as the understanding that I'm talking about of this is another human being that's interested in maintaining his or her own life just like you are in maintaining yours. I think if you asked anybody that went through that today you probably couldn't even get them to tell you any more of the specifics that I can, even the people that ran it. But, the understanding, I think, was the important thing that you got out of it.

The other thing that Fedgie talked a lot about was cultural shock. He explained it and he explained why people who were used to a certain cues, as he called it, that were very familiar felt pretty good and then they got in an atmosphere where those familiar happenings and cues as he said were not there, there was a certain insecure feeling. And, he says, don't feel bad if you're all up-tight. That's perfectly normal. You ought to try to fight it, try to get out of that insecure feeling. If you understand some of these things about what's happening to you and if you can understand the people you're dealing with a little bit better, you ought to be able to be more effective in your relationships.

We had some dramatic turn arounds as a result of that. Some people who before they went through these kinds of seminars were just very mean to the Vietnamese just flipped completely to where they were very understanding. Of course, the first few days of that were very hard for the Vietnamese because they weren't quite sure what had happened to this individual. They didn't know when he was going to explode. He was not the person that they knew. But, then they could deal with it when they realized that there had been some sort of change in the person. This didn't happen a lot, but when it did it was very dramatic because you would have somebody that was really on one extreme and go to the other. Sort of a Damascus road type of experience almost for some individuals.

I think the thing was very important. You can see why some of the senior officers might resist becoming involved in such a seminar where you're trying to discuss your feelings with the other people and have somebody question whether you are coming across in the right way and that sort of thing. There was a resistance to it, but that's where Admiral Zumwalt helped us considerably because he was just solidly behind it. Things like that you don't have to do much explaining to him for him to see the wisdom of doing something like that.

Now he himself was brilliant I thought, and that's another side of him that I had not seen. I'd seen a hard driving task master, a person who was extremely loyal down, but who also demanded one hell of a lot of the people that worked for him. I worked harder for him than I've ever worked for any man anywhere before or since. For one reason, because he demanded and for another reason because he was so supportive of you when you did it. A third reason is I generally believed in what he was doing. It was exciting because he was always doing exciting things.

Q: Do you think it's fair to say that you had a dramatic turn around yourself? Captain Kerr sort of suggested that you did.

Adm. R.: I'm not sure it was all that dramatic. All of a sudden I got

involved in the interrelationships aspects of things and before I had been mostly a technician I guess, a planner, that kind of thing. What changed was in the kinds of things I was planning. I still continued to be in the planning . I was not at the cutting edge. I was not the person that was out there doing the training. It appealed to me and I liked to be involved in it, but I was still pretty much an implementor and a planner and a designer and a developer and that kind of thing. Other people were doing the work. That's what I continued to do. It's just that instead of doing it from a technical sense I shifted over to some of these unquantifiable, as you say, types of things, the interrelationships types of things.

One of the reasons why it's not too surprising is because my own leadership style throughout I had always tried to, I think, be somewhat cognizant of the people that were working for me. I had always felt that there were people in the Navy who were not good leaders just because they didn't have that much respect for what their people's views and that kind of thing. So, although it actually was a change in the orientation of the things I was doing I don't really think there was a big change in me personally. I may be wrong, it's hard for somebody to know. I don't think there was that big a change really.

Q: Was this program a precursor to then that which is used in the Navy

during Admiral Zumwalt's CNO tenure on the race question?

Adm. R.: Well, very definitely. We learned a lot of things in Vietnam and we did a lot of things in Vietnam. We thought, you know, that this is really effective, why in the hell aren't we doing this in the U. S. Navy? So, there's no doubt about the fact that this was indeed a precursor to the whole PersP concept.

One of the things that one of my people did, or I did, it's amazing now I don't know what's my idea and what's their idea, is that we decided that we ought to have some sort of counterpart for every department in the Vietnamese organization. The Vietnamese in all their staffs were oriented entirely differently than we were. They had an N1, N2, N3, and N4. The 3 was operations just like it is in many of our staffs. The 4 was logistics just like it is in many of our staffs. The 1 was personnel just like it is in many of our staffs. And our 2 is generally intelligence, but they had that in operations. So, their remaining major department in their big staffs was political warfare position. That included all of those things that had to do with keeping your own people on your side. Interestingly enough the chief advisors to most of the political warfare department heads, the deputy chiefs of staff for political warfare were nationalist Chinese because they had learned the hard way of what happens if you don't

keep your people from becoming communists. So, they were in country not in large numbers, but they were all over Vietnam. Their job almost entirely was to be advisors to the deputy chiefs of staff for political warfare.

Now, the propaganda part of that is just a very, very small part of that, the discussion of communism and anti-communism. But, it had all the social welfare sorts of programs. It had anything that you could think of that would help keep the people loyal to your side.

So, we set up an additional deputy chief of staff in our organization. I think we called for the Vietnamese Navy relationships or something like that. We had a commander there, a very capable commander, who had come to Vietnam to be in an operational job but I talked him into taking this other job. He spent a lot of time with me in the future years, John Walker.

We really now had a counterpart to their political warfare deputy chiefs of staff. We had the usual advisors in their political welfare. We had dropped pamphlets. We had dropped food and all kinds of things like that. And, we had trained advisors in these areas. Well, they came under that particular part of our staff, but also the programs to help get more protein in their diet, to help build shelters, to do anything, you know, that would help the quality of life of the Vietnamese sailor, we had a counterpart to it.

Well, this was certainly the precursor of PersP in the United States Navy. We would have an Assistant Chief of Naval Personnel for personnel matters. We would have an ombudsman and that kind of thing. No question about it., and no question about the fact that some of the things we learned in the personal response program helped us get started into the race relations programs and the drug abuse and some of those things that we got involved in later on. You're absolutely right.

Q: Could you describe some of the working routine around the NavForV headquarters, say a day or a week? The hours, the recreation, the focus of interest, the working style, and Admiral Zumwalt's role in that.

Adm. R.: Howard is probably better at that than I am. Everything pretty much revolved around Admiral Zumwalt. His modus operandi was that he tried to spend half of every day in the field. He couldn't do that exactly because if he went to Danang, for example, that would take the whole day. By the time you flew up there and talked with all the people up there and got back, so he would generally go up there and spend the night or something like that. But, basically he tried to be in the field somewhere every day. Generally what would happen was the most active place from the night

before is where he would go the next day to see how things were and to give pep talks, to congratulate, to give condolences, and to find out what could be done to keep something from going haywire the next time, or if we did well what could be done to do even better in the future and that kind of thing. So, he was always out troubleshooting.

Howard and Lou went with him most of the time. If it had anything to do with the Vietnamese Navy, quite often I would go with him.

He's a very interesting guy. He was always working. He would work over meals. He always had a briefcase with him. He would be reading in the car, on the way out to the airport, or wherever it was we were going to get the transportation to wherever he was going. Basically there were three things, between the Army and Air Force they ran, I guess, the best transportation system I've ever seen. If you were going to a place that had no landing strip, you went by helicopter which the Army ran. If there was a mile of expanded metal type landing strip you could go in an Army utility plane which was a turbo prop two engine U-21. Or, if you were going long distances and if you were senior enough as Admiral Zumwalt was you could get an Air Force T-39 which is a small jet, a six or seven passenger jet. If you were a captain, which I was, you could get the U-21's or the helo's.. So, if you called up one day around noon time and laid out the places that you wanted to go and about how long you wanted to be

there the following day, around 5 o'clock they would call you back and tell you your flight number, when it was going to leave, what your exact itinerary was. So, you're out there and you do exactly that. That was even for a captain as far as U-21's and helo's were concerned. For an admiral he simply could go anywhere he wanted to anytime using exactly the same system, but with even a little bit more of the priorities than we got. Then, of course, he had the T-39 availability that the captain, and I'm not even sure a rear admiral could get. I think you had to be a three star person to get a T-39. So, consequently it was very easy for him to go. He always had his briefcase with him even in those damned helo's, and I say damn only, I loved them, but they were vibrating so much. You can't read his writing anyway. He always had to have somebody on his staff that could decipher what he wrote. He generally took some people around with him he kept with him forever just simply because they were the only people that could tell what he was writing. They would quite often just type out their translation of these hieroglyphics and append that on something that he was sending back to somebody. Well, you add a helicopter to that and it's virtually unreadable, but that did not deter him. He went through his paperwork no matter where he was. If he was in a U-21, a helicopter, a T-39, if he was just riding in a car it didn't matter. He was always working on his paperwork.

Q: Did he ever allow himself to relax?

Adm. R.: Occasionally. Well, his relaxation was running. The other thing that we did, I'm sure Howard told you about, we played volleyball every noon which was a fabulous thing. This was a very relaxing thing for all of us. We had houseboys, the Vietnamese who helped keep, I shouldn't call them boys, but that's what they were referred to over there, the folks that cleaned the house, that served the food, they were involved in the volleyball games. The U. S. stewards, all of us, Admiral Z. It didn't matter, anybody got in those things. When he was gone it was a very disappointing thing, because sometimes it would be hard to get a game up. But, we did that religiously every noon. It was a real relaxation. Besides it kept us in fairly good shape. The temperature was always between 80 and 95, but once you got used to it it wasn't bad at all. It was great fun.

In the evenings they would show movies in the house there that he was living in.

Let me back up on the living quarters. I guess Howard told you this too.

Q: We didn't really get into that too much.

Adm. R.: Well, it's not a big issue. When he first came over there, he had a house about four or five blocks from the office buildings of ComNav-ForV. There was a house adjacent to these office buildings. There was a wall between them, but it was adjacent to that wall, and the other part of the block that we were in the Vietnamese had given to the U. S. to use for the entire time that we were over there. That's where General Westmorland quartered when he was over there. When General Abrams took over from Westmorland he opted for a trailer right out there near the MACV headquarters. So, he didn't choose to live in that house, that big house. It was an old French mansion. Consequently it was just being used for VIPs whenever they came to town. It was really not a good use of this. We were not paying rent for this, but we were paying a pretty hefty for that house where Admiral Zumwalt lived. So, I don't know who initiated the move, but somehow or other he moved into that house. We just simply cut a doorway through that wall so that you just walked out the backdoor of the house and through a little courtyard and you were in the office complex.

There was a guesthouse that went with this and there was bedroom downstairs in the guesthouse and a couple of bedrooms upstairs, sort of maids quarters I guess. His deputy lived in the guesthouse downstairs. I lived in one of the rooms upstairs. I think the deputy's aide lived in the other room upstairs.

In the big house Admiral Zumwalt lived upstairs and so did his aide and Howard, or whoever had those jobs.

Then there were other places around that we later annexed also where some of the other members of the ministaff lived. It seems to me the chief of staff lived up there in the big house. This is all insignificant except that we were all members of the mess and we could carry out a lot of activity at breakfast and at lunch. And, indeed, I got him at lunch time. I didn't eat lunch at the time. We always had a period where, I think, there was ten or fifteen minutes, I forget whether it was before the volleyball game or after the volleyball game, where he had something to eat and generally I got him during that period of time. I would give him an update on what we were doing as far as the Vietnamization program was concerned.

The only other time that I could just get together with him just on a personal basis was occasionally at breakfast.

Now, another thing that we set up was a weekly breakfast with Commodore Chon. In fact, we had a thing that we called the Czar. It was Chon, Zumwalt, and Rauch. One week we would eat breakfast at Chon's home. The next week we would eat breakfast up at the headquarters house there in our mess. We always did business during that breakfast.

He had a lot of dinners in the evening that were semi-formal dinners where he would invite the deputy, Sam Burger, ambassador, or some of the generals from the staffs, from General Abrams' staff. Quite often we would have visiting dignitaries through. All you had to do was be a member of that mess for a year and you had the whole world parade through because everybody from the United States was coming over there telling us how to run things. Theoretically they were on a fact finding tour of some sort. You had representatives. You had senators. You had deputy secretaries of defense, of the Navy. You had admirals. You had generals. You had everybody passing through. So, it would be rare that you wouldn't have at least two dinners in the evening where somebody was being honored of some sort. Obviously a lot of business got taken care of at those things.

The way things were going once we got into a routine at something like 11:30 everyday we would meet and give him an official briefing, not just me, but my people or the Vietnamese, or somebody would give him a briefing on the turnover program. We did that for about a half hour. This was a regular thing.

Then I've talked about the lunch. I've talked about the breakfast.

Q: How good a volleyball player was Admiral Zumwalt?

Adm. R.: Well, he was very good. He's pretty athletic. Oh, there were probably a couple of people that were better than he was, but he certainly was, he could hold his own. If there was no volleyball game, he ran. It may be that he did that anyway. I've kind of forgot now. But, he also is a big hustler you know. He's the Willie Mays or the Pete Rose of the teams, you know.

Q: Very aggressive?

Adm. R.: Oh, yes, yes. He hates to lose. He's just a real competitor in everything. In fact, I said to him once, I said, "You know, there is one place where we differ. I've always hated to get involved in fights that I know I'm going to lose. I just think I lose something by losing, and if I can see from the very beginning that it's a lost cause I won't get into it."

He said, "I don't see it that way. I think it's important to make the statement. Even if you lose you've made the statement."

You know, there are two different concepts. He's a very, very dedicated competitor in anything that he does. He's in there to win, period.

Q: Well, the third possibility is, maybe, something that looks bleak from

the outset can be turned around.

Adm. R.: Oh, yes. That's right. He doesn't see as often as many of us do, well it looks like this is a lost cause. He sees it as there is a way to win it. Yes, you're absolutely right. And, I don't mean to imply that I go in always thinking I'm going to lose, but some things if I think, you know, it's just overwhelming I tend to not get involved in it because I don't want to lose that much capital so to speak. But, he sees it differently and that's the way he is. That is the way he has always been.

Q: What kind of working hours did the staff observe?

Adm. R.: Well, we'd start, it seems to me, around 7:30 at Breakfast which is when you really started to work, and be in the offices at 8:00. Then we would work until noon. Quite often we wouldn't get back to work until about 2:00 in the afternoon. But, it's rare that you got finished in the evening before 6:00 or 7:00 and quite often continued to work in the evenings. There were many nights, as I told you earlier, that I just simply worked all night long.

There are a couple of other things that I'd like to volunteer to tell you about.

Q: Sure.

Adm. R.: And, I'm sort of out of chronology now. I can give you these three letters that I wrote that will give you some sort of chronology as far as the turnover is concerned. I think that they probably left the important things out. You know that there is a history. We had a historian on the staff and if anybody ever wanted to do a history of the U. S. naval involvement in Vietnam they could get their hands on this written history. There was some person whose sole purpose was every month to send in a history. So, that's another way to go. But, I'd like to talk a little bit of some more things about the staff and the relationship between Admiral Zumwalt and Commodore Chon.

I was in this mini-staff situation. We had Dick Nicholson who was on the mini-staff. He came over there the same time I did. We went through the week at counter insurgency training together. We didn't know each other and we didn't know we were both going into the mini-staff at the time, but we happened to be through the thing together.

I was given the job of honchoing the Vietnamization program and Dick was on the mini-staff taking care of operations. He had the same problem I did. You had a deputy chief of staff for operations over there. So, he

was in this awkward position of trying to work with that person, around that person, through that person, or whatever. Later he became the deputy chief of staff for operations. But, when we first got over there we were without a doubt a mini-staff that had the confidence of the admiral and it was awkward for the deputy chief's that were there. But, he almost had to have something like this to change as fast as he wanted to change because it would have been very difficult to get them who had six, eight, nine months over there to all of a sudden change that abruptly.

The chief of staff was going to leave in about six or seven months, something like that. He had arranged that the chief of staff that was sent him be given another job in the Navy. They just did not seem to work well together.

Q: This was Captain Orme?

Adm. R.: No. It was Rizzo who relieved Captain Orme.

What he had arranged with the bureau was that I would relieve as chief of staff and the reason he was trying to get me to be chief of staff is I'd only been a captain about a year. Most of the chiefs of staff over there were captains nearing their last tour. He wanted to force the bureau to bring really young people over there, and if I was going to

be the chief of staff, then every time they suggested somebody that he would have categorized as an old timer he would say, well that won't work because that guy's senior to Rauch, so you've got to get me a younger person than that. At least that was one of his motivations. There may have been others, but that was one of his motivations.

So, I was going to be the chief of staff. We had this other person that was nominated to come over by the name of Emmett Tidd who was going to relieve Paul Arbo as the senior naval advisor. Emmett Tidd was, perhaps, two years senior to me. He had a really good reputation as a go getter, as a doer.

There was a little bit of a controversy between Arbo's basic philosophy and mine. I wanted to get all the U. S. people a lot more intimately involved with the Vietnamese. In fact, if I'd had my way I would have had the whole U. S. staff down at Vietnamese Navy Headquarters, and we would not have had out separate little America up there in the center of the city.

Arbo felt strongly about his being down there himself, but he did not see having the other people down there. The non-advisors. He saw an advisory group, in fact that's the way it was set up, and a U. S. group and there was not a whole lot of relationship between the two.

I saw this almost as a combined effort, and indeed, you'll read some of those things in the letters that I'm going to leave with you, cases where

we actually had a dual command, where we had a CO who was U. S. and an XO who was Vietnamese. Eventually in those situations we'd turn them over. Probably this was illegal. Probably you couldn't do such a thing if everybody knew about it. I guess people did know about it, but they didn't bother to argue with it. We had no authority over the Vietnamese. They had no authority over us. So, if you had a CO and an XO it had to be a good working relationship to pull it off because if the CO told the XO to do something and the XO chose not to do it, he could not do it since you had no military authority over the other person. Nevertheless, we did this kind of thing. This is the sort of thing that I believed in and Arbo did not. I knew Arbo was doing an awful lot of writing to Tidd getting him prepared to come over there.

It occurred to me that a better arrangement would be for Tidd to be the chief of staff and for me to be the senior naval advisor. And, if that worked out very well I could now be in the spot that I should be in in the organization to do the things that I was doing instead of being a member of the mini-staff. But, because of the involvement of the U. S. now, more and more in what the Vietnamese were doing, and because of Admiral Zumwalt's desire to get this marriage I had also to have a job on the U.S. side. So, I got to thinking about this. He was over at Clark Air Force

Base one weekend to see Mouza (Mrs. Zumwalt) and the children. I guess you know they were at Clark and one month they would come over, or at least Mouza would and spend a couple of days with us there in the complex, and then the next month if he could get away he would go over there. Well, he was over there one time when I decided this is the way it ought to be, that I should not be the chief of staff. So, I wrote this different organization up that actually had me as senior naval advisor and double hatted as a co-chief of staff for Vietnamese Navy matters with Tidd who was going to be the chief of staff on the U. S. side.

I bummed a ride on the T-39 that was going over to pick him up and so I had the trip back to talk to him about this. I showed him my paper. He made some comments about prestige and all this sort of thing. And, I said, "Don't you worry about that. I'll take care of the prestige." I think this is a better way to go, and for a lot of reasons. I know the Vietnamese pretty well now. You know what philosophy we've had to fight and it's very possible this is going to come over here. Now, we can just bypass it completely by letting me go ahead and be the senior naval advisor and let this other person be the chief of staff."

He said, "O-kay. Let's do it that way."

So, as soon as Emmett got over there he presented it to Emmett. Well, Emmett didn't like any of this co-chief of staff malarkey and, I guess, I

can understand that. So, what we finally agreed to was that I would be the deputy chief of staff for anything that had to do with the Vietnamese, on the U. S. side, and then I would be the senior naval advisor. So, all the advisors in-country would work for me. Then eventually everybody in the country became advisors. But, Emmett and I had a good working relationship that way. He was the boss and it's probably best that he was because he was a good followup person. I don't think he was particularly creative, but he was extremely good as making sure that what we decided to do got done.

Q: Which is what a chief of staff should do.

Adm. R.: That's right. He was better than I would have been at times. I think, to be real honest, I think I'm more creative, but I don't think I'm the followup person that he is. I can get things done, but he's really good at that. That's his forte and it's why he ended up in the job that he went to when, two jobs really, that he went to when Admiral Zumwalt became CNO. He put him into a position where he followed up on everything that we decided to do. Nothing got dropped through the cracks which can easily be done in that headquarters. But, not with Emmett there. He had all kinds of paperwork involved. Every time there was an idea it got jotted down

and he had an elaborate way of following up on these things and so forth. He developed that in Vietnam and then he perfected it when he got into the job in our Navy. He's extremely good at that. There's no question in my mind that this was by far the best arrangement for the two of us, and I'm sure if you asked Admiral "Z" he'd say the same thing.

But, that's another example of how flexible he is. I mean, he's put a lot of time in getting the right people in the right place. He's been orchestrating this, and here's somebody coming along saying that you've got the cord wrong, you need to flip these two things around. And, you know, it didn't take him any time at all to see, yes, you're right, let's do it that way.

I've never worked for anybody who said, "Yes," as much as he did. If you give him an idea, the first reaction was, "Yes," instead of, "No."

Q: This was Admiral Zumwalt?

Adm. R.: Yes. You give most people your thoughts on some way out thing and they will say, they will start telling you all the reasons why it can't be done. He simply says give it a try, or write it up. And, in that process of getting it ready to present to him and showing him how it's going to work, quite often you change your mind, quite often you say, well, now

that I've thought about it more I don't think it's a good idea. But, he gets a lot of creativity that way that you wouldn't get any other way, and this is another example of that where he says, fine, let's do it. So, that's the way we ended up with this situation we had, and it worked very well, very well indeed.

We did get all the other people caught up in the Vietnamization. They resisted it, some of them at first, but then we started getting people about this time frame over there who had been chosen by him to come over. So, they were sort of team players. I'm trying to think of the name of one of them. But, a whole series of people, and of course, they saw immediately what he was trying to do, and they got right on board and they did it. They also understood the importance of working closely with the Vietnamese. So, the people that came over there worked both sides of the street quite well.

Q: Captain Kerr suggested that before Admiral Zumwalt went an in-country tour was not career enhancing for a Navy surface type.

Adm. R.: That's right.

Q: It picked up prestige and he was able to get better people.

Adm. R.: Yes, that's exactly right. It used to infuriate him because we would, just to give you some example, and I don't think this ever changed as much as he argued against it. We would quite often have people over there who had come over there to get their career well. They had a poor career. Maybe they had been a department head on a destroyer and through a personality clash, or whatever, knew they had a bad fitness report. So, they would come over to a combat area and try to make a name for themselves. And, some of them did. Some of them were brilliant, but they were just born combat naval officers. They would have complete 4.0 glowing records coming out of there and they would go back and they would not get selected for executive officer because they didn't pay any attention to what they did in Vietnam, they were only looking at what they did in previous tours on a destroyer. It used to infuriate him because he used to say the whole idea of a fitness report is to kind of somehow or other predict how this person is going to behave under combat conditions. Here's a person who has proved it, and yet we don't pay any attention to that, but we look at how he did under this artificial peace time situation. Nevertheless, he made a strong effort and he got the backing, I think, of Admiral Moorer on this, to make that a career enhancing tour, and although I don't think we ever turned around anybody that really had bombed before they got there, now we didn't get very many of those people, now we got people who had good

records coming over there in the first place. Yes, that's exactly true.

Q: How long did you stay in country?

Adm. R.: The answer to the question, a short answer is a year and a half.

The first Christmas we were there he had gotten the guest house or the commander's house, Howard knows this too, at Baguio in the Philippines, which is a resort area. And, just before he went on that, went over and he spent Christmas with Mouza and the two girls. I've forgot whether Jimmy came or not. It seems to me he might have. Howard was going along anyway, which he normally does; and he invited me to go over there with them. I found out later that one of the reasons he invited me was to discuss with me whether I might not want to stay in country for another six months. It was at that time he offered me the chief of staff job downstream as soon as all the other people left and all this kind of thing.

I told him I had to check some things out, but I thought I could do it. So, I finally did stay there six months beyond the one year tour.

That reminds me of another thing about Admiral Zumwalt. I told you earlier about how hard working he is. He also uses another quarter of his brain that you and I use for taking care of our personal things. When he's in a situation like he was over there where he's got a lot on his mind, he

can almost, I don't know whether he puts it out of his mind or not, but he can turn personal things over to an aide to do that I to this day could not do. You know, they can pay his bills, they can make arrangements to go to Baguio. They can take care to make sure that the cars have been taken care of, make sure that the dogs coming. You know, all these things that Howard probably told you about. Getting them moved over to Clark and over to Vietnam. He can just put those out of his mind and give them to somebody else to worry about. He can put his entire being into the problem at hand. So, he had to have somebody go with him like Howard. He'd go over there to enjoy himself, but somebody else takes care of all the little nitty-gritty where you're going to eat next, and who pays the bill, and all these arrangements that you have to make.

Whenever Howard's with him Howard is on the phone all the time making arrangements for the next trip for going somewhere else. You name it.

Q: One of the classic story is when he was CNO and he went out jogging and for whatever reason his aide didn't go with him and---

Adm. R.: He got lost. Oh, that's a wonderful story. He probably told you that.

Q: No, we didn't get that far. But, I've read that several places.

Adm. R.: Well, he'll tell you about it. That's one of his favorite stories that he tells about himself. It's very true.

There was a time when we were moving on and we kept getting all these communiques from Admiral Moorer who was the CNO at the time wondering what the hell we were doing. He didn't quite understand some of the things and it became obvious that the boss had to go back and talk to him himself. So, he put together another presentation which we helped put together. That's one of the things I spent a lot of time on over there was making presentations for him.

So, Howard, Lou Glenn and I and the admiral were going to make a five day trip to Washington, D. C. You understand two of those days are going and coming. It was a real hectic four or five days. I'm not even sure it was a full five days. We were going to give this presentation in Cinc-PacFleet. So, we did, and he had all kinds of notes on yellow scrap paper that he used for his notes. We had the backup material, but he had all these notes that he was going to take. Anyway, we left there and we're getting near Washington and he's trying to check to make sure he has everything and he said, "Lou, I can't find my notes."

We all said, no we didn't know where they were. So, Lou gets this little gleam in his eye and he gets his briefcase out and he starts pulling out one crumbled up piece of paper after another and finally one of them happened to be his notes.

Well, see, Lou knew him well enough that you don't ever let him throw anything away. So, whenever he sees anything like that that goes in the wastepaper basket after the meeting is over he goes over and picks it up and puts it all in his briefcase. So, he had it. But, that's the kind of thing. He writes things, literally, on the backs of envelopes and whatever happens to be available at the time he makes notes to himself and then sometimes he loses them. He needs people ^{too}, I don't know how he is today, but during those years when he was so consumed with the problem at hand he needs people to go along. And, he is so good at allowing them to do that. It's something he simply doesn't worry about.

Q: How did he and Admiral Moorer get along together?

Adm. R.: See, I would not have known if they didn't get along. It looked to me like they were getting along pretty well. Obviously they had some differences. He used to say that he got sent out to Vietnam to get him out of the city, that he was given an extra stripe, or an extra star. He just

was getting too much power because whatever he wanted he had all this political way of going through these studies and carrying the day, you know. So, he, I think, felt that he was sort of put out to pasture. So, he went over there and did the best job that he knows how to do. You know, he always does wherever he goes. Whether it's a bad job or a good job he makes it a good job out of it. So, I think, he always knew that Admiral Moorer had sent him over there to get him out of the city. But, during those years, I think, Admiral Moorer could do nothing but respect the job he was doing. Everybody who came over would see Abrams, and Abrams would say, I've got this wonderful Navy person that's one of the best leaders I've got in the country. He's head and shoulders above some of my generals. He's in the war more than some of my generals. He's at the front of my generals in turning this stuff over to the Vietnamese. So, they would go listen to Abrams and they couldn't very well not respect the job that he was doing over there. I'm sure that's how he got nominated for CNO. Just one person after another came over there and they would sit down with Abrams and hear about this great combat officer that we had over there. So I can't answer your question. I know they had frictions later on, but whether or not they were there then, it's kind of hard for me to tell.

One of the mistakes I made in the early plans was that I had looked over the shoulders of Captain Arbo's people and I'd looked at the five year

plan and I had just borrowed from that, and as I told you earlier done some time compressing, but as far as the riverine craft were concerned, the armored craft, the landing craft that we had armored and we were using for the troop carriers, the assault crafts is the word I'm trying to use, I had us turning over more than we had in country. At one time the intention was to replace all of the Vietnamese PF and RF craft which were the old French landing craft that had been left over there, they were quite old, to replace those with U. S. armored craft. And, I guess, we were going to continue in a building program. We didn't have to build, but we had to modify to get these things ready to come over there. That's something that I had not caught. So, I had us turning over more than we actually owned. You know what the budget struggle every year is in OpNav. So, they were talking about 30 or 40 million dollars of devotion to these craft to build them so we could turn them over to the Vietnamese. Moorer just did not want to get us involved in this kind of thing, so we had to sort that out. I had to simply change the plan because I was wrong. It's kind of interesting what happened, but this was one of the initial differences and one of the initial reasons that the OpNav staff were a little bit concerned about what we were doing over there. They saw us committing them to a big building program and that really was not our intention. It was a pure out and out mistake on Rauch's part. So, when we finally explained this to

in fact, I had the job of telling Chon we couldn't do this. We had to cut back on the number of riverine craft we were going to turn over to him. His immediate response to that, and as I've said before, he puts every job or every decision into a very simple thing to decide. He said, "No problem, just let us keep the RF and PF patrol craft we already have."

We were going to replace those and so instead just give us what you have and we'll just keep those also, which we eventually did. That's another good example of the way Chon and Zumwalt got along.

I'd go back up to lunch and say, you know I was telling Chon about the fact I goofed and we simply didn't have the craft to turn over to him and he suggested this and I'll be honest with you, I can't think of any reason why we shouldn't let them do that. You know, Admiral Zumwalt immediately went along with it. So that's the way things worked. ~

Q: You called Admiral Zumwalt a combat officer. Did you get out into combat yourself to know what they were doing?

Adm. R.: I went places where he did, but I never was in a combat situation. He one night went out when he was in---we all advised him against it, but you know, something like this didn't make any difference what the advise was. He was up, you know what's happened I've forgotten names. It was up on the

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Cambodian border and that river comes in and joins in a canal that goes ... to the Mekong. Right along the Cambodian border up from --- he went up here to visit a base and he spent the night and he talked somebody into letting him go on a night patrol up in that river. His son almost got killed on that river later on, but he didn't. Anyway nothing happened. We thought it could have been a catastrophe if anything had happened. You know, he decided that was what he was going to do, so he did.

We spent the night once, and I guess he did on several occasions, I only went with him once, down at the operation SEAFLOAT. When you get into the operations it was a bunch of pontoons, 11 of them that we strapped together and put in a river down on Ca Mau peninsula. There were Viet Cong all around that place. That's the reason we were down there. We'd go down there and spend a night. As far as ever actually being in combat situations I never was and I don't think he was other than, he'd always go out to the areas that he learned were hot areas. Oh, sometimes in the helo you'd get involved in a fire fight, somewhere you'd have to bypass an area or something like that. You always had people throwing rockets into Saigon, but to say we were actually involved in combat I don't think we really were. However, he was a good combat strategist is what I was trying to say.

Q: You talked about the Vietnamization program in terms of hardware turnover. Was there also, in a sense, an operational intelligence strategic turnover?

Adm. R.: Oh, yes. As a matter of fact, everything that we did had all kinds of aspects to it, improving their intelligence capability. We had intelligence officers all through the provinces in Vietnam. There were Navy intelligence officers and we had U. S. Navy counterparts with those people. We had probably the biggest one was the turnover of the bases. Between them and us we had about 55 bases over there of one size or another, some of which we built from scratch just after Admiral Zumwalt got there. So, we had to turnover a supply system. We had to teach them---they already had a couple of keypunch machines over there and some sort of automatic data processing equipment. We spent a lot of time teaching them how to use that in inventory control and developing a good supply system. We had people helping them develop their shipyard, which was a good shipyard, but it could stand developing. We got very involved, I'm back to hardware again, in helping them come up with a scheme for replacing their wooden junks because the life of one of those junks was about five years. Nobody had come up with anything that would prevent the seaworms from just drilling through those junks. It just looked like somebody had gone through with a half inch drill.

On one of these tours somewhere Admiral Zumwalt ran across this Army Second Lieutenant who was doing some structural work with ferrocement. You hear about all this?

Q: No.

Adm. R.: Are you familiar with ferrocement?

Q: I know what it is, but not this specific program.

Adm. R.: Well, generally you, what you do if you're making some sorts of structures, this guy was making dome for houses. You have a small quarter inch piece of iron or steel that you can bend to whatever shape you want. You put up a lattice work of that and then you tie it all together with wires and you cover it with chicken wire. Then you impregnate the chicken wire with cement. The word ferro is simply from the wire and the metal. Instead of using gravel or something like that you simply have this network inside of iron, and you can make it quite thin. In fact, the idea was it is quite thin, about 3/8's inch.

So, we got this guy to stay in-country at the end of his tour and come to work for the Navy to do two things. One, teach the shipyard how to build

ferrocement boats because it looked like an ideal replacement for their junks, and two, to see if couldn't start building some dome houses because it looked like a cheap way to get housing for them. This was one of our political type warfare programs was to help, one of our jobs was to increase the quality of life for the Vietnamese sailor. We were trying to get them places to stay. One of our problems was in recruiting primarily in the big cities was the people were reluctant to go out in the boondocks and live by themselves and be there a long period of time. So, if they could take their families along maybe they wouldn't be so reluctant. But, there was no facility for that. So, one of the things we did was work very closely with the construction battalion units that were over there to build a lot of facilities. One of our ideas was these domed houses. So, we got this guy to build some at Ben Luch, which is at the base that we had developed to replace an LST that was on one of the two rivers that split and go on either side of the so called Parrot's Beak in Cambodia that comes in quite close to Saigon. That was not too successful. I've got a letter in my files from that guy when he left country saying that one of the reasons that the domed houses weren't too successful in his view was that the construction people in the Navy had never done it and they just would not go along with it. You know, it was not invented here, so they didn't support it too well. Whether or not their way was more practical than his I don't

know, but it was a clever idea. What he had was a small two story dwelling. His feeling was that the people that lived in them liked them fairly well.

However, the other thing that he got involved in was very, very successful. They built their first junk, and it's kind of interesting, they made a complete copy of the old junks. Well, the old junks, the backbone of the thing is a big huge keel that some artist in wood cutting has hewn out of a big huge log. It's like about a foot by maybe a foot and a half, something like that. It's solid wood. So, when they made the first ferrocement junk they duplicated that keel by making a one by one and a half foot big piece of concrete. They they attached the skin to that. It was exactly like a junk, but the freeboard on that junk was considerably less than what it was on a wooden junk. As a matter of fact it operated o-kay, but it was very obvious that you didn't need that big hunk of concrete, that just the skin itself would do the trick. Just very similiar to what we have with fiberglass boats today, you do not have a big heavy keel in there, it's just a very small one.

From that then they decided to design their own coastal, I've forgot what they called them. They quit calling them junks, coastal patrol craft or something like that. They designed them from the ground up to be a ferrocement boat. They started building some pretty nice things. They also made a ferrocement swift boat which is the fast 50 foot steel hulled boats

that we were using for the in-shore patrols along the coast. Later on when we went back when he was CNO, 1972 we went on a three day tour over there to see how things were going, they took us on a ride on their ferrocement swift boat which was kind of neat. But, neither the direct copies of the swift boat, or the junk made sense. However, this thing that they designed to be a ferrocement did, and they started making quite a few of these. The shipyard was quite good at that.

But, these are all kinds of things that we turned over.

The other thing that is note worthy, obviously, is the pigs and chickens program which also came under this political warfare group. Admiral Zumwalt was very concerned about the diet of the Vietnamese sailors. He just could not see how they could be strong fighting people with no more protein than they were getting. I am told that the shelf off of Vietnam is as rich in food fishes as there is any place in this world, yet they weren't using that at all. The Navy was not per se. So, we did such wide ranging things as helping them get involved in fishing in the Navy and bringing fish in for use by the families at the various bases. We imported some really good hogs from the Philippines. We built some pens a couple of places where we bred them and then we would give the offspring to the Vietnamese. We did the same thing with chickens. This was kind of fun in

that if you put the call out to 30,000 sailors and say we need somebody that has some sort of interest in raising hogs or in raising chickens you're bound to find some people who really are sharp at that and really turned on for the opportunity for doing that. And, we did. So, we had people that were working with the Vietnamese teaching them how to inoculate the young chickens, how to care for the pigs and the chickens. It came to be a relatively successful program. Looking at it a couple of years later most the chickens didn't make it, but the pigs did. They did a very, very good job with them. The idea was that they would grow the pigs, they would mate them and they would take the piglets, grow them to maturity, eat half of them, sell the other half, and get enough feed to keep the thing self sustaining. What we would do is get them started in a self sustaining operation. He tried to get a lot of help via some drives over in our country to support that. They were kind of modest, I think, Mouza did a lot of work in that once he became CNO.

We were working in a time where there was not that much enthusiasm in our country for anything that was Vietnamese.