

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY'S OFFICE
1964 - 1965

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During this period I was the Special Assistant and Administrative Aide in the office of the Secretary of the Navy. Mr. Nitze was the Naval Secretary and Captain Zumwalt was his Executive Assistant/Senior Aide. Special Counsel was Robby Robertson and Bill Thomson was the PAO. The Marine Aide was Colonel Ross Dyer.

Mr. Nitze and Captain Zumwalt came into the department after Mr. Korth (Secretary of the Navy) has departed. One of the first moves made was to create an environment that the Secretary and the CNO worked together and presented to Defense, a joint effort on major decisions. The CNO moved his office next to the Secretary's office with an adjoining door and passage way. The existence of the closeness became well known throughout the Defense Department and the Pentagon. The move was very effective and attained its goal of unity and agreement between the CNO and the Secretary.

One of Captain Zumwalt's first major undertakings was to get something moving toward a pay raise for the Navy. At first he was turned down by Mr. Nitze because of a lack of hard facts that justified a raise. Congressman Rivers had been working for a Military pay raise but was not making much headway on Capitol Hill. Zumwalt's plan was to justify that the Navy was a unique service that should be considered separately for a pay raise because of the critical need for skilled people. This was the first real move into the High Tech syndrome. After many briefings and volumes of paper generated out of Bupers at Zumwalt's direction, Mr. Nitze became convinced that the Navy did in fact have a High Tech specialized training gap and needed qualified skilled people now. Mr. Nitze went to Secretary of Defense, Mr. McNamara, and presented his case but was turned down because McNamara could not approve a separate pay raise for the Navy and not for the other services. However, he agreed to meet with Mr. Nitze once a week to discuss the problem. After several months, McNamara became convinced that the Navy was unique but he could not single out Navy for a pay raise over the other services. The effort was made to join with Congressman Rivers and add more teeth to a major pay bill for all Military. This was successful and the Military received their first major pay raise since the end of World War II.

As Executive Assistant, Captain Zumwalt recognized the requirement and need for a separate group of Naval Officers with the proper education and experience to review for the Secretary of the Navy all of the studies requested by the Secretary of Defense's "Whiz Kids". During this period the Secretary of Defense staff began laying study requirements that interfaced with the budget process. It was Captain Zumwalt's effort that established the first Office of Program Appraisal (OPA). Rear Admiral Draper Kaufman headed the office. OPA was organized to review all budget processing and study effort for the Secretary of the Navy. ~~In time they increased their capability to generate studies of the Navy.~~ In time they increased their capability to generate studies and recommendations for the Secretary on major study efforts. They reviewed all paper/studies/budget papers that were generated by OPNAV for the Secretary's signature to Defense. This period in the Navy Department and the Defense Department was the start ^{of} systems development, high technology growth and recruitment challenges, ~~of sophisticated weapons system, retention and recruiting problems, and obsolete Fleet~~ ^{of} ~~and the initial outbreak of hostility in the Pacific~~ ^{obsolescence} i.e. Laos.

The Nitze/Zumwalt management effort was directed to the Navy ^{put the} ~~on~~ the "cutting edge" of each of these critical areas.

Through the Secretary of the Navy's Office at the insistence of Zumwalt, bright and capable officers were detailed to important Defense Department and White House billets. The pay raise stemmed the tide of wishful people leaving the Navy and helped to improve enlistments. Pay was increased to support the high tech requirements. The Navy became more involved with sophisticated weapons systems development. The most significant contribution was Mr. Nitze's direct involvement and respected counsel in the Defense Department decision making process. Zumwalt's untiring effort and complete dedication ensuring that Mr. Nitze was well supported and prepared for his involvement in Defense matters helped make the whole process work.

This period was the beginning of Navy's positive participation in the decision making process in the Defense Department.

Q: So you're saying that Captain Zumwalt originated the concept of pro pay?

No, pro pay had been in effect prior to the period. There but Zumwalt in consequence

Admiral Nicholson: He originated the first major pay raise for all late Mr. McNamara ~~advised~~ Mr. ~~Nette~~ ~~that the Navy~~ military, which later supported the need for pro pay. *had a unique and critical pay problem.*

Q: There had been friction between the previous SecNav and CNO, which is why Admiral Anderson served only two years.* Was there a deliberate attempt to move over in the other direction to avoid that?

*Admiral George W. Anderson, Jr., served as Chief of Naval Operations from 1 August 1961 to 1 August 1963.

Admiral Nicholson: When Nitze/Zumwalt came into the Secretariat, they made sure there was not going to be an environment of indecision or friction between them. It was a very good working team. You have to give credit to those three executive assistants--Miller, Kidd, and Zumwalt—who were very powerful captains, very competent captains, and hard-chargers. But they did pull together, even though the three of them were different types of personalities. They didn't always agree initially, but when they finally ironed it out, the final line was one position. *Zumwalt set the tone of this among the three.*

I think one of the things in Admiral Zumwalt's tour as executive assistant to Mr. Nitze is that up until then, the Defense Department was known as "Whiz Kids' haven"--Enthoven, ~~McNamara~~, etc.* The Navy before that was not heavy on the systems analysis ^{*intelligent*} ~~studies~~ ^{*environment was seen*} that were coming ~~from~~ DoD. The Navy, really in OpNav, didn't know how ^{*to*}

*Alain Enthoven was Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Analysis from 1961 to 1965. "Whiz Kids" was a nickname for relatively young men, such as Enthoven, working for Secretary McNamara.

cope with them, because they had little experience in the field.* When Zumwalt came in, he started the concept of the Office of Program Appraisal, OPA. Admiral Draper Kauffman was the first director of it.** It was Zumwalt's concept that this group would be made up of top-notch officers, brought in to review and generate studies to answer the questions that Enthoven's Whiz Kids asked. This opened up many new concepts. For one, it brought the Secretary of the Navy up to speed on what was being asked of him down in Defense. When Mr. Nitze went to DoD, he had the answers to most of the questions the Whiz Kids posed. OPA also generated new ideas and studies to stay ahead of DoD. This ^{encouraged} ~~started~~ the Navy ^{to place} ~~putting~~ qualified officers in Defense ^{Department} positions. Before, we would send people to Defense with no military/political background, and they were ineffective there. ~~We were way behind in that.~~ The Army always had qualified, experienced people in certain positions in DoD. I think a good example of that was in Joe Califano's office. Joe Califano was first the special counsel to Deputy Secretary of Defense Vance.*** In his office was a young, hard-charging officer who had been a professional in the military/political bureaucracy for most of his career--a guy by the name of Lieutenant Colonel Al Haig.**** We didn't have a Navy representative in the Califano office. So Admiral Zumwalt screened

*OpNavy--the large, extended staff of the Chief of Naval Operations.

**Rear Admiral Draper K. Kauffman, USN. Admiral Kauffman's Naval Institute oral history discusses his tour as director of OPA.

***Joseph A. Califano, Jr., was general counsel when Cyrus R. Vance was Secretary of the Army. When Vance became Deputy Secretary of Defense in 1964, Califano moved with him and became Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of Defense.

****Lieutenant Colonel Alexander M. Haig, Jr., AUS, later became White House chief of staff, a four-star general as NATO commander in Europe; and Secretary of State in the Reagan Administration.

Admiral Nicholson: He brought in highly qualified officers and civilians to work. Their job first started off in reviewing the many studies that came up from Defense. As I remember, one of the studies was a carryover from the study on "Conventional War ~~at sea~~ in Southeast Asia," where the military and the civilians were at odds as to how (before Laos and before Vietnam) you would fight a conventional war in Southeast Asia. The civilians' view was to limit the scope of logistical support, and the military viewed it that a limited logistic support would be a problem and in certain scenarios, a disaster. OPA reviewed Defense studies and presented their analyses of those studies with comments and recommendations to the Secretary of the Navy, who would forward them to DoD as SecNav studies.

*One such individual was Commander Stansfield Turner, USN, who was assigned to the office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis), Alain Enthoven, in the early 1960s to review Navy force level requirements. XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXJANEXXAXXXWHENXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXWAS
Turner had a number of key jobs later when Admiral Zumwalt was CNO and eventually retired as a four-star admiral.


Q: So the OPA was more or less a response to the PPBS that McNamara had put in.

Admiral Nicholson: Yes and presidential memos. OpNav tried, but they were not staffed for it. OpNav would review the presidential memos for the CNO, and then they would be reviewed and studied by OPA for SecNav approval and endorsement.

*PPBS—Planning, Programming and Budgeting System. For more on the PPBS, see Commander Gordon G. Riggle, USN, "Looking to the Long Run," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, September 1980, pages 60-65.

Q: What was the relationship between OPA and the Director of Navy Program Planning, which was a three-star billet?*

Admiral Nicholson: OPA would work in mutual support with Program Planning, but OPA would have the last review prior to a subject being presented to SecNav. OPA would prepare the Secretary's input to DoD.



*OP-090 was the designation of the three-star Director of Navy Program Planning; under him was OP-90, the Director of the General Planning and Programming Division, a two-star admiral. Vice Admiral Ephraim P. Holmes, USN, served as OP-090 from July 1964 through June 1967.

Q: Did OPA take sort of a devil's advocate approach on Navy programs?

Admiral Nicholson: Yes.

Q: Do you recall any specific cases that you could use as examples?

Admiral Nicholson: They made contributions to pay and benefits studies and memos. They did analysis work on force levels, budget inputs, ^{and} weapon system deployments. There are far more studies done by OPA than I can recall at this time.

Q: Admiral Zumwalt has the reputation of being a systems analysis man. Is that something that grew out of his tenure with SecNav, or did he bring that to the job?

Admiral Nicholson: He just has a natural ability for it--a highly intelligent man. I don't know the definition of a systems analyst, but anything that Zumwalt wants to get involved in, he usually does pretty well in it. He is a highly intelligent man who can motivate others to work beyond their abilities and ^{enjoy} ~~like~~ doing it.

Q: What I'm driving at is that systems analysis is a specific discipline beyond sheer intelligence. I'm wondering if he brought that background to the job or developed it as part of the reorganization of the SecNav's office.

Admiral Nicholson: I think he brought it with him. He had a lot of duty in the bureau. In fact, as a commander he was an executive assistant to the Under Secretary for Manpower.* He's a guy that really came up and said, "You better get this hump legislation going; you're top-heavy in the Navy now at the higher ranks." He can speak to this better than I can, and I wasn't there at the time; I only got this from others. He was responsible, although a lot of people try to take credit for it; he was the commander with the pencil who came up to Noel Gayler, who was then EA to SecNav and said, "We're top-heavy in rank because of the spillover of World War II.** The only way to fix it is through legislation." A very controversial subject. It was successfully accomplished.

Q: He wrote an article about that in the Proceedings, and the ironic thing is that he, of all people, surmounted that hump.***

*In the late 1950s, Commander Zumwalt served as executive assistant and senior aide to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Personnel and Reserve Forces).

**Captain Noel A.M. Gayler, USN, was executive assistant to Secretary of the Navy Thomas S. Gates, Jr., from 1957 to 1959.

***Commander E.R. Zumwalt, Jr., USN, "Beyond the Hump," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, July 1959, pages 59-65. As explained in the article, a great number of officers were commissioned between 1942 and 1945 for wartime service, so that the number of officers in those four year groups would have normally been spread over 13 year groups. Unless an appreciable number of officers in the hump were retired early after being passed over, they would clog the system and keep deserving juniors from moving up. Zumwalt himself, commissioned in 1942, was part of the hump, but he obviously did not suffer early retirement because of that condition.

Q: What was the perception of Enthovenⁱⁿ within the Navy?

Admiral Nicholson: I think¹ he was looked upon as a very bright man who was a college professor and came to work in the Defense Department. His background was not in a military environment.

Q: A typical sort of reaction from senior officers was, "I can tell things from my 30 years' experience that your studies can't show." Was there any resentment from these senior officers toward the group of young outsiders?

Admiral Nicholson: Yes, there naturally was some opposition to the academic/analysis type of thinking. That's why the Navy assigned Stan Turner and other officers in Enthoven's office--in order to get a naval viewpoint.

Q: Was this in part an effort to educate the outsiders?

Admiral Nicholson: Yes, it was an effort to have a military input and thinking in the analysis environment.

(There are no pages 16 or 17 in this retyped version.)

first thing they did was try to change that. And, it was a very simple thing; they went to the CNO and asked him if he would move his office up next to Mr. Nitze's office. Before that, they were separated by a stairwell. And, so, it was a very smart move, because the CNO then moved in, and they had an adjoining door. Now, psychologically that told people in the E-ring that you never know when the Secretary and the CNO are talking. ^{*} It was very effective.

The two gentlemen, ^{who} Admiral McDonald, ^{was} then CNO, and Mr. Nitze then really started to work as a team. And, I would contribute the biggest part of that to ~~Admiral, then~~ Captain Zumwalt, Bud Zumwalt. He sensed this, and he was very sensitive to it. He pulled together both the CNO's office and the VCNO's office by working with the administrative aides. At that time, I was a young officer standing back and looking at all this. It was very interesting to watch, because there were three ^{what we} ~~we~~ called ~~them~~ EA's or executive assistants. ^{Captain} ~~Admiral~~ Jerry Miller was the Executive Assistant to the VCNO; ~~And, Captain Kidd, Captain Miller, and Captain Kidd~~ was the Executive Assistant to the CNO, Admiral McDonald; and Captain Zumwalt ^{was} the Executive Assistant to Mr. Nitze. These three captains, ^{all} three of them were top-running

*The five corridors which go all the way around the Pentagon building are lettered A through E. The E-ring is the outer one with a view to the outside of the building, so E-ring offices are considered the most desirable. Generally, the highest-ranking officers and civilians have the E-ring spots.

**Captain Gerald E. Miller, USN, was EA to Admiral Horacio Rivero, USN, Vice Chief of Naval Operations; Captain Isaac C. Kidd, Jr., USN, was executive assistant to Admiral David L. McDonald, USN, Chief of Naval Operations.

^{in the Navy.}
~~ranked~~ Captains. All three of them wanted to be an Admiral, and they wanted to make it today. But, nevertheless, the three of them worked together. And, I would say those three were probably three of the ~~most~~ most powerful Captains in the whole Pentagon. And, the guy that pulled them together was ~~But~~ Zumwalt.

Q: Do you think that Captain Zumwalt was the prime mover in getting the offices moved together?

Adm. N.: Oh, yes. ~~There is~~ ^{he was} no doubt about it. It was his idea, I'm positive. Because Mr. Nitze didn't know how the Navy worked. He was really a civilian, and Captain Zumwalt had been in the Pentagon and been in BuPers, and he knew before he came up there how ~~we were~~ ^{he was} going to run it. * ^{No doubt about it.} He ran the show. No-body got in to see Mr. Nitze that Captain Zumwalt didn't know about and Mr. Nitze was fully briefed. And, I think that was one of the biggest moves.

~~And~~ then one of the big tasks that Captain Zumwalt took on shortly after he got there was ^{it was} ~~he was~~ personnel oriented, and he instigated getting Mr. Nitze to get a study board called; ~~it~~ finally named ~~it~~ the Alford Board.

*BuPers--the Bureau of Naval Personnel, in which Zumwalt had had several tours of duty previously.

Rear Admiral Alford was in charge of it.* But, it was Captain Zumwalt that planted the seed, really drew up the concept, and I would say practically wrote the report. ~~However it was a study,~~ I mean he got the information from Alford ~~for the committee,~~ ^{the thing} but he helped put it together. The bottom line of the study came out; it showed that the Navy enlisted ranks and officer ranks required more skilled technicians than any other branch of the services.

Now, if you go back in time to 1964 and '65, the Defense Department was still thinking about the merger that Eisenhower started where you merge all the military services together ^{and} to make a statement like that at that time was pretty dramatic. ^{traumatic.} And, everybody says, "well, ^{we'll} ~~he'll~~ never sell that." But, they did prove in this study that it was required. Anybody in the Navy knew it was. ^{But who were} People not in the Navy said, "Oh, hogwash. You're just trying to get something for the Navy." ^{study} But, anyway the Alford Board was completed, and then the next thing to follow was ^{that} shortly after that ^H the military had not had a pay raise for a number of years. Congressman ~~Rivers~~, Mendel Rivers was working very hard on ^{that} the Hill to get a pay raise across the board for the military. ^{**} That was at the time when ~~one of~~ a lot of our enlisted men were on what we now refer to as food stamps or on welfare, ^{and} working two jobs. The pay was very low, particularly for the enlisted and lower officer ranks.

*Rear Admiral John M. Alford, USN.

**Representative L. Mendel Rivers (Democrat--South Carolina).

Mendel Rivers was not having very much success selling it ⁱⁿ Congress, nor could he get McNamara to defend it.*

Admiral Zumwalt took on the task of convincing, working with Mr. Nitze, that the Navy needed a special pay. Mr. Nitze said, "well, now I can't sell that." So, he worked with him for several months and finally showed him the facts which he'd gotten from the Alford Board ^{and} BuPers, and finally convinced Mr. Nitze that, by golly, the Navy does have a problem; they need skilled technicians to run this Navy. And the ^{and more} more sophisticated weapons that came in, the more that need existed. I think the unique thing about it all was, I remember this was in 1964 and '65, and Admiral Zumwalt saw that at that time. Very few people did. I can remember people just ^{never wanted to} literally talk about it; people would just turn on deaf ears. He realized that in the next ^{10, 15} ~~ten, fifteen~~ years we better get ^{it} ~~them~~. Lots of vision.

After he'd convinced Mr. Nitze that there was a need for this, then Nitze took it down to McNamara. Well, McNamara reacted the same way that Nitze did: "Paul, there's no way I can sell this, a separate pay bill."

So, Mr. Nitze was so convinced that he said, ^{*All right,} "Well, let me come back and talk to you ^{later}."

Well, it finally got to a point where McNamara says, ^{*All right,} "I'll meet with you every Friday about this pay raise."

*Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense from 1961 to 1968.

Well, every Friday we put together books of facts that we would collect. We practically dedicated our whole staff to it. Zumwalt would ^{pull} ~~put~~ it together and brief Mr. Nitze. Mr. Nitze would take it down to McNamara every Friday afternoon. This meeting went on for three months. I may be wrong there, but for two or three months. Finally, ^{he} convinced McNamara that the Navy did have a problem, but he couldn't sell ^{his} ~~us~~ special favors. ^{pay raise.}

^{So} ~~then~~ he ^{got in} ~~with~~ Rivera's pay bill, and that's how we got that pay raise. Instead of a special Navy pay, they did get an across-the-board pay ^{raise.} ~~From~~ that we got pro pay ^{started.} ~~And~~, that was the real seed that showed ^{and} to this day, I think everybody recognizes that people on Navy ships need ^{or} ~~and~~ require special talents.

^{Admiral}
Q: So, you're saying that Zumwalt originated the concept of pro pay?

No, pro pay never in effect. Later, Zumwalt's effort
Adm. N.: ~~Oh, yes, absolutely.~~ And, he led the assault on it.
on the pay study, expanded the pro pay program.

Q: There had been friction between the previous SecNav and CNO ^{**} which is why Admiral Anderson served only two years. Was there a deliberate attempt ⁱⁿ to move over the other direction to avoid that?

*Pro pay--short for proficiency pay, ~~which was~~ given to individuals, such as technicians, ~~who had~~ special skills required by the Navy.

**Admiral George W. Anderson, Jr., served as Chief of Naval Operations from August 1961 to August 1963.

Adm. N.: Exactly, that's what caused it. It was very obvious. And that was very damaging to the Navy. As I said, when there's friction between SecNav and the CNO, and I'm not privy to that, ~~but I don't know that~~ it was pretty obvious, and that when it got down to Defense, why, McNamara would make the decision: "If you ~~you~~ guys can't agree, I'll make the decision." I'm not saying that's what caused Anderson to leave, and I'm not privy to even discuss that, because I don't know. All I know is what I read in the papers, but there was friction, and Zumwalt and Nitze made sure their first day up there they were not going to have that kind of situation. And, they did not. It was a very good working team. You have to give credit to those three executive assistants, Miller, and Kidd, and Zumwalt, who were very powerful captains, very competent captains, and hard-chargers, but they did pull together, even though the three of them were different types of personalities. ^{ies,} They didn't always agree, but when they finally ironed it out, the final line was they agreed. It was all settled.

I think one of the things in Admiral Zumwalt's tour as Executive Assistant to Mr. Nitze, ^{is} that ~~it followed~~, up until then, the Defense Department, as you remember, was, sort of, ~~at~~ the Whiz Kids, Enthoven, McNamara, and those people. ^{on these} The Navy before that was sort of out in the cold in the studies that were coming down from DoD. ^{**} The Navy, really in OpNav, didn't know how

*Alain Enthoven was Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Analysis from 1961 to 1965. "Whiz Kids" was a nickname for relatively young men
 **DoD--Department of Defense. such as Enthoven on the staff of the Department of Defense.

to handle ^{them,} it because they weren't geared to do this. * When Zumwalt came in, he started what they called the Office of Program Appraisal, OPA. Admiral Drapper Kauffman was the first director of it. ** It was Zumwalt's concept that this group ^{would} be top-notch ~~captains,~~ ^{that} brought in to review and generate studies to answer the questions ~~in the Enthoven's~~ ^{that} Whiz Kids studies. ^d This opened up many new concepts. For one, it got the Secretary of the Navy up to speed on what was being asked of him down in Defense. So, when Mr. Nitze went down, he had the answers to those questions the Whiz Kids set up in studies. They also generated new ideas and concepts. This, I think, then also started the Navy to ~~start~~ putting more top-notch officers down in Defense. Before, ^{we} would send people down just as a normal tour, and they would get lost down there. We were way behind ^{in that.} The Army always had their people down there. I think a good example of that was ⁱⁿ Joe Califano's office. Joe Califano was ^{first} Special Counsel to Assistant Secretary of Defense Vance, and then he moved over to be special assistant of some sort to McNamara. ^{***} In his office was a young, hard-charging officer who had been a professional in this business for most of his career, a guy by the name of Al Haig, Lieutenant Colonel Al Haig. ^{****} We didn't even have a Navy rep down there in that office. So, Admiral Zumwalt said we'd better get one down there. We looked ^{and} screened

*OpNav--the large, extended staff of the Chief of Naval Operations.

**Rear Admiral Draper L. Kauffman, USN. Kauffman's Naval Institute oral history discusses his tour as director of OPA. R.

***Joseph A. Califano, Jr. was general counsel when Cyrus Vance was Secretary of the Army. When Vance became Deputy Secretary of Defense in 1964, Califano moved with him and became Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of Defense.

****Alexander Haig later became White House chief of staff, a four-star general as NATO commander in Europe; and Secretary of State.

Lieutenant Colonel Alexander M. Haig, Jr., AUS,

and sent a top-notch ~~commander~~ down there.

It was very interesting how that worked. Of course, Lieutenant Colonel Haig was very popular then, a very competent officer, ^{and} a very professional ^{men} ~~one~~ ~~man~~. This was the start of more competent, top-notch Navy in Defense, and, also over in the White House. Admiral Zumwalt directed that. He saw that was the need. He did this even when he was CNO. The idea was to get people ^H not the ~~captains~~ and the ~~Admirals~~ ^H but to get the people on the deck ^{plates}, on the working level who picked up the pencil and started the thing before it became policy and ^{you} ~~we~~ couldn't turn it around. It was a very important item.

Q: Well, what do you ^{remember} ~~know~~ about the job that Admiral Kauffman did in getting the OPA started?

Adm. N.: Well, he brought in top-notch ~~captains~~, in to work. Their job first started off in reviewing so many of these studies that came up from Enthoven. As I remember, one of the studies ^{which} ~~was~~ a carryover was, "The ^{the} Conventional War At Sea In Southeast Asia," where the military and ^A civilians were at odds as to how ~~you'd fight~~ (before Laos and before Vietnam) ~~how~~ you would fight a conventional war in Southeast Asia. The civilians said, "well,

you know, you don't need all that. "And the military says, well, to win the war you need this and this, just to make it very simple. But there was a split there.

OPA was the type of organization to go in and look at that and say, well, here's ^{give it} exactly sort of a scientific look, if you will, and help to resolve some of those problems before they became policy.)

~~I don't recall, and~~ there were a lot of big studies. I should remember them, but I don't. ^{that was done} Key studies that were done there and that was one of ~~them~~ before OPA started, but I think there was a follow-on of it that went on. Oh, they got into everything. They looked at everything. Extra hazardous duty pay for flight ^{deck people;} ~~pay~~ OPA would look at that. The main function was to look at the budget, the line items of the budget, ^{that was a big job, keep abreast} That was a big job, keep Mr. Nitze ^{compare that with} briefed of the budgets, and then prepare memos from Defense and the President. They reviewed those.

Q: So, this is more or less a response to the ^{PPBS.} ~~PPBS~~ that McNamara had put in. *

Adm. N.: That's right, exactly. ^{memos.} Presidential ~~levels~~. The only way to do it; ~~was~~ OpNav was trying to do it, and they just couldn't, because they had other ^{the} things to do. But, here was a group of dedicated people who would take ^{the} Presi-

*Planning, Programming and Budgeting System. For more on the PPBS, see Commander Gordon G. Riggle, USN, "Looking to the Long Run," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, September 1980, pages 60-65.

dential memos and write the response for Mr. Nitze.

Q: What was the relationship between OPA and the Director ^{of} Program Planning, which was three-star ^a billet?

Adm. N.: Well, Program Planning, I forget, I think that was Admiral ~~Hall~~ ^{Holmes,} if I'm not mistaken.* I might be wrong about that. They looked after the Navy's side, and they would bring their programs up, and OPA would look at them ^{really} with the eyes of the Secretary. ~~I believe~~ [^] that's what it was. They didn't do the work for 90 or ~~or~~ 090, but they would review it and send it back ^{to them} ~~to them~~. Before [^] it would come up and be sort of rubber-stamped and sent down to Defense, and then we'd have to defend it. Whereas OPA would then go to the various agencies ^{and say} "I'm not so sure this is right," and they would know what to expect from Defense. Under Drapper Kauffman and other officers ^{too who headed it, it was} ~~still~~ ^{still} very effective.

Q: Did OPA take sort of a devil's advocate approach on the ^{Navy} programs?

Adm. C.: Oh, yes. "Send it back, this will never sell!" ^{that's right} and a lot of times, you know, OpNav would turn around and say ^{wait} "wait a minute, that's not right." So, it was very good. I think it was a good sounding board for all Navy studies,

*Vice Admiral Ephraim P. Holmes, USN, Director of Navy Program Planning from July 1964 through June 1967.

**OP-090 was the three-star Director of Navy Program Planning; under him was OP-90, the Director of the General Planning and Programming Division, a two-star admiral.

and because of that, Navy studies that went down to Defense at that time were much better than they were before.

Q: Do you recall any specific cases ^{that you could} ~~to~~ use as examples?

Adm. N.: Well, as I've been talking, I've been trying to think of them. Well, OPA did a lot in that pay bill, in the pay study. I don't think OPA got off and running during the shipyard study. I don't think they had ^{an} input to that. They may have. Admiral Fluckey headed that.* There was a study to look at closure, what shipyards should be closed and which ones shouldn't be. I don't think OPA was in being ~~then~~ at that time. I should remember the studies. Maybe I'll think of them as I go along.

Q: Admiral ^{Zumwalt} ~~Zumwalt~~ has the reputation of being a systems analysis man. Is that something that grew out of his tenure with SecNav, or did he bring that to the job?

Adm. N.: He just has a natural---highly intelligent man. You know, he's not only a good systems ^{analyst} ~~analyst~~, but anything that he wants to get involved in, he usually does pretty well in. I think he's just intelligent.

*Rear Admiral Eugene B. Fluckey, USN, who in March 1964 was assigned temporary duty as Task Force Director of the Shipyards Appraisal Group.

Q: Well, I'm sort of driving at ^{what} ~~that~~ ^{is that that} ~~That~~ is a specific discipline, ^{beyond} ~~the~~ ^{sheer} ~~arm chair~~ intelligence, ^{and} and I'm wondering if he brought that background to the job or he developed as part of that reorganization.

Q: Well, I think he brought it with him. He had a lot of duty in the bureau. In fact, I believe as a ~~Commander~~ working as an executive assistant to the Under Secretary of Naval Personnel, and he's the guy that really came up and said, "you better get this ^{hump} ~~hunk~~ of legislation going; you're top-heavy in the Navy now. He can speak that better than I can, and I wasn't there at the time, but I only got this through other people. But, I think that kind of thinking. He was responsible although a lot of people try to take credit for it, he was the ~~Commander~~ with the pencil that came up to Noel Gayler who was then EA to SecNav and said, ^{"we're} ~~you're~~ top-heavy in rank because of the spill over of World War II, and you've got to get rid of them. The only way to get rid of them is to legislate them out. Well, very controversial.

Q: He wrote an article about that in the Proceedings, and the ironic thing is he of all people surmounted that hump.

*In the late 1950s, Commander Zumwalt served as executive assistant and senior aide to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Personnel and Reserve Forces).

**Captain Noel A.M. Gayler, USN, was executive assistant to Secretary of the Navy Thomas S. Gates.

***Commander E.R. Zumwalt, Jr., USN, "Beyond the Hump," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, July 1959, pages 59-65. As explained in the article, a great number of officers were commissioned between 1942 and 1945 for wartime service, so that the number of officers in those four year groups would have normally been spread over 13 year groups. Unless an appreciable number of officers in the hump were retired early after being passed over, they would clog the system and keep deserving juniors from moving up. Zumwalt himself, commissioned in 1942, was part of the hump, but he obviously did not suffer early retirement because of that condition.

moving

Adm. N.: Yes, right! That's right! I wish I could remember some of those studies.

One of the key officers that was put down there, when I talked about the Navy getting top notch officers down in Defense, was Stansfield Turner.* Bud did that, got Stan Turner down there working with Enthoven and his star crew. A very competent man.

Q: What was the perception of Enthoven within the Navy?

Adm. N.: Well, I think he was looked as a very bright man who was a professor in the colleges within the United States and came to work in the Defense Department, and really did not have a military mind, but he was a systems analyst and you can't win wars, I think Southeast Asia is a good example of it. It was a war that was thought would be over in 30 days by the systems analysts and the military said there's no way."

Q: A typical sort of reaction from senior officers was "I can tell things from my 30 years experience that your studies can't show." So, was there sort of resentment of this group of outsiders?

*Commander Stansfield Turner, USN, was assigned to the office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis), Alain Enthoven, in the early 1960s to review Navy force level requirements. He had a number of key jobs when Admiral Zumwalt was CNO and eventually retired as a four-star admiral.

Adm. N.: ^{Oh, sure.} Oh, yes. That's why we put military down there. That's why Stan Turner went down there. ^a ~~A~~ military man, ^{a highly intelligent man.} ~~with high intelligence.~~

Q: Was this ⁱⁿ part of an effort to educate the outsiders?

Adm. N.: It was an effort to ^a insure that the stuff that Enthoven and his people were putting out was accurate and feasible militarily, and to educate ⁺ Enthoven, yes. And, the Navy spent a lot of time educating him. I think he would admit ~~it~~ that he wasn't educated in the roles and missions of the Navy. We took him on an aircraft carrier and got him educated. I think by the time he was there for a year or two he kind of got the picture ^{and did} a lot better, but, you know, you can still when you pull ^{it} him away and put it on a piece of paper ~~it's~~ it's like a briefing, it sounds like a great briefing, but we lost the battle. I always ^{talk about} ~~thought~~ the war in Vietnam was a great operation, but the patient died.

You want to leave that subject, ^s or are there some more questions on that?

Q: You mean on the SecNav period?

Adm. N.: No, no, just the Enthoven/defense thing.

This is covered elsewhere.

~~I was involved in Zumwalt's OPA and setting up OPA and also his~~
~~real insight as to how it worked.~~ He knew all the inner workings of
 OpNav and all the inner workings of BuPers. A lot of people that go ^{into}
 to these EA jobs don't know that. He was unique at that time. He was one
 of the few that really knew it. Now, ~~Admiral Kidd did~~ Captain Kidd and
 Captain Miller, the other two EAs, ^{and} they did too. They had similar back-
 grounds. But, I think of the three of them, Bud Zumwalt had a more sensitive
 awareness of the inner workings of OpNav than either one of those two. ^{I think} They
 kind of respected him for that. They envied him. At times, you know, there
 was a lot of competition in there, but I think when it got down to real
 tough issues they looked to Bud. Because of that, Mr. Nitze then became a
 key factor in decisions down at Defense. And, this is my opinion. I think
 eventually he became Secretary of Defense because of his contributions as
 Secretary of the Navy. He became the Assistant Secretary of Defense. And,
 our SecNav before that did not play a role down in Defense. It wasn't his
 fault; he wasn't properly briefed and wasn't brought in to it. So, if you're
 not contributing they cut you out.

^{Okay,}
 I've talked about the three captains. ~~Okay,~~ I would say before, just
 before ^{Zumwalt} ~~Zumwalt~~ and Mr. Nitze came up, and this is a pass-on also, at the
 time of Mr. North and Admiral Anderson were in the jobs we had the big

~~TFX~~
effects, ~~TF~~/F-111B controversy.* When Admiral Zumwalt and Mr. Nitze came up, they took steps right away to put that to bed and not make it a big thing that it was. I think they really resolved it.

Q: What sort of steps?

out of my area
KN
Adm. N.: Well, I think the key was they convinced McNamara ^{that} "hey, you can't build one plane for the Air Force, and the key word in those days was commonality. And McNamara and the Whiz Kids thought you could build one plane for everybody. Well, you just couldn't do that, because you take a plane off of an aircraft carrier, it can't be as heavy as one that takes off of land. That's basically what it was. And, they convinced the DoD people that you couldn't do it and therefore got the Navy out of it. But, I think what really, at that time, and I think they still played it, although I'm ahead of my time now, but Admiral Zumwalt can verify this when he listens to this tape. But when Admiral Zumwalt, Captain Zumwalt then, became Admiral and he went to sea and came back as ^{OP-96,} ~~Op-96~~, if there is anybody that should get credit for the F-14, he's the guy ⁱⁿ ~~and~~ ^{Op-96} with Charlie DiBona who wrote the numbers up and got the Navy out of the TFX/F-111B project and put them in the F-14, and showed that it was cost-effective that we have the F-14. **

*TFX was the original designation for a tactical fighter that was supposed to serve the needs of both the Navy and Air Force. F-111B was the eventual designation for the Navy version, but it did not go into production because of unfavorable evaluations of its suitability for use on board aircraft carriers.

*From August 1966 to August 1968, Rear Admiral Zumwalt was Director of the Systems Analysis Division (OP-96), Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. Charles J. DiBona worked in OP-96 as a civilian analyst.

You know they talk about naming the F-14 after the tomcat and all that, but the guy that really got the thing saved and alive was Admiral Zumwalt. People don't say that.

Q: Well, ^DVCNO for Air was pushing pretty strongly, too.*

Adm. N.: Yes, but ^{Zumwalt}~~Zumwalt~~, when they were hanging by their fingernails down in Defense and they were going to cram F-111B down the Navy's throat, it was Zumwalt and Dibona in the back room that showed them in a systems analysis briefing the numbers that this F-14 ^Hand OpNav supplied the numbers, sure ^H but they put it together and showed them that the F-14 would be more cost-effective. And, everybody contributed on it. ^DI'm sure.

Q: Do you have any other cases on hardware that Zumwalt got involved in during that period?

Adm. N.: Yes. In general, if you look at history of the McNamara time, McNamara, to my knowledge, did not, nor did Eisenhower build a Navy ship, a combatant ship. There was no ship building program. Why, I don't know. With Mr. Nitze and Captain Zumwalt, they started the groundwork that showed us that we've got to start building this Navy shipbuilding program. And, Admiral

*Vice Admiral Thomas F. Connolly, USN, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Air), testified before Congress on the unsuitability of the Navy version of the F-111 and thus had an important role in getting it scuttled.

Q: Can you discuss any cases concerning hardware in which Captain Zumwalt got involved during this period?

Admiral Nicholson: You may wish to verify this with Admiral Zumwalt, but to the best of my knowledge, Nitze/Zumwalt began a dialogue in DoD and laid shipbuilding criteria to begin work to rebuild¹ our aging Navy. When Zumwalt was the director of ops analysis as a rear admiral, he was responsible for the study that proved the F-111 was not suitable for the Navy and that the F-14 was a proper substitute.* You may want to verify that.

The USS Carl Vinson, I believe, was approved in Zumwalt's CNO tour, and so were some amphibious lift ships. I'm sure the Oliver Hazard Perry class was approved during his tour. He and Nitze worked hard in DoD and on Capitol Hill to get legislation moving on bloc obsolescence of the ships in the fleet.**

*The F-111 was an aircraft which Secretary of Defense McNamara intended to serve the needs of both the Navy and AirForce. The Navy version did not prove to be suitable for carrier use, and its Phoenix weapon system was transplanted to the successful F-14 fighter.

**Bloc obsolescence of the many Navy ships built during World War II was a parallel, in a sense, to the hump situation for naval officers. Large numbers of them came to the end of their useful service lives about the same time and so had to be replaced.

Q: One ship that didn't get off the ground in that era was the FDL, which was sort of the equivalent of what we now have for the Rapid Deployment Force, floating warehouses?* What were the ramifications of that in the SecNav's office?

Admiral Nicholson: I believe that was started with the second director of OPA, Tom Davies, who relieved Draper Kauffman.** FDL The/concept, as I remember, was to position the logistical support forces in various combat areas to support deployed forces. It was not approved at that time. It was felt that ammunition and other equipment, if positioned in other countries, posed a problem for security reasons. The main thing was that it was considered by some as being hawkish—that we wanted to build bases all over the world. I think that's why it failed.

*The FDL was to be a forward-deployed logistics ship, but the version proposed in the 1960s was unable to obtain congressional support and thus was not built.

**Rear Admiral Thomas D. Davies, USN.

Q: Captain Zumwalt came to Secretary Nitze's attention for his strategic thinking, and that's when he first brought ^{Zumwalt} him in with International Security Affairs. What strategic manifestations did you see from Zumwalt during that period?

Admiral Nicholson: Captain Zumwalt as Mr. Nitze's executive assistant was exceptionally effective in developing concepts and strategy long before the requirement was recognized. He wrote a speech for Nitze on the subject of Antisubmarine Warfare which really was the groundwork and organization for a new 3-star billet in the Navy. It was developed to pull together all ASW hardware and operating procedures under one department. The admiral was later known as the ASW ^{CZAR} CZAR, Vice Admiral Martell.*

Zumwalt was very effective at keeping Nitze briefed on concepts not quite conceived or developed in DoD but later proven to be of major interest to the Navy. He was always working to get shipbuilding programs started in DoD in the 1963-64 period.

*Vice Admiral Charles B. Martell, USN

There are no pp. 22, 23, and 24 in this retyped version.

Zumwalt carried us on when he became CNO and I'll talk about that later on.

I would say that Nitze and Bud Zumwalt, and when I put the two of them together, ~~you know~~ Mr. Nitze is a very brilliant man, and the two of them together were a perfect team. Probably the best team we ever had down there, and they worked very closely together, initially down in Defense to get the shipbuilding program started which takes a long time just to get them to think about it.

Q: Well, two of the types of ships that started kicking out in the ~~Mid-~~ ^{mid-Sixties} ~~in~~ ^{Sixties} and the end of the '60's were the amphib on the one hand and destroyer-escorts on the other. Were they involved in both of these programs?

Adm. N.: Yes. The amphib lift that you see right now was started at that time and carried on throughout Zumwalt's CNO tour. The groundwork was started at that time. ~~The amphibious lift.~~ I think they had at that time what they called a Seahawk program which was finally cancelled. Another one was started and then we ended up with the Spruance-class destroyer. That all evolved through different phases and different people take credit for it. But, I would say in general that they started the shipbuilding program ~~and~~ ^{that} we know

~~It~~ today at that time.

Q: One ship that didn't get off the ground in that area was the FDL³ which was sort of the equivalent of what we now have ~~as~~^{for} the rapid deployment force, floating warehouses. What were the ramifications of that in the SecNav's office?

Adm. N.: I believe that was started with the second director of OPA, and he was a ~~Captain~~^{Draper} that relieved Drapper Kauffman. The concept, as I remember³, ~~it~~^{the} FDL was [^] they wanted to position the stuff in the various combat areas³ rather than a fast movement that we have now. They wanted to position it³ and it got shot down in Congress. Some of the reasons were, well, if we put all that ammunition over in these countries, who's going to say they won't seize it? [^] who's going to say it won't be obsolete?" The main thing was it's a hawkish thing that we want to build bases all over the world. I think that's why it failed. They started it.

~~Where are we at? Pro pay, pay raise, flight hazardous duty. I wish I could remember all the studies that OPA sent down. I know that they would look at all the shipbuilding programs. I'm ready to leave that if you don't have any other questions.~~

*The FDL was to be a forward-deployed logistics ship, but the version proposed in the 1960s was unable to obtain congressional support and thus was not built.

Q: I ~~have several more. One is that~~ Captain Zumwalt came to Secretary Nitze's attention ~~sort of~~ for his strategic thinking, and that's when he first brought him in with international security affairs. What strategic manifestations did you see from Zumwalt during that period?

Adm. N.: Here is my understanding of how Nitze found Zumwalt. Are you interested in that?

Q: Sure.

Adm. N.: *letter discussed by Zumwalt,*
Captain Zumwalt was over at the ~~Naval~~ ^{National} War College and he had written a paper, and the paper was The Accession of the Power of the Soviet Union. He tracked, gave opinions about how they Soviets arrived at the top man. Generally, ~~what~~ it was that they would pick several, and they would keep dying off, and they would keep eating each other up, and they would finally pick the guy that makes it. ~~Well Khrushchev made it.~~ It was more detailed than that. This study, when Mr. Nitze came over to the National War College to make a speech, ~~the, I guess he was a general, but anyway,~~ ~~the~~ director of the National War College said, you know, we have a young bright Navy Captain who wrote his paper on the accession ~~of~~ ^{to} power in the Soviet Union."

Becker *covered* *NT*

I ~~think that was the title, written by Captain Zumwalt.~~ So, he introduced him to Bud₃ and then nothing happened. Well, ~~then~~ Mr. Nitze then, I guess, at the time was in ISA₃ and he brought Zumwalt over to some job.* Well, a guy like Captain Zumwalt, you throw him into the Defense Department and say "find a job for yourself," he'll find ^{it, and it may be} ~~maybe~~ your job. He just boomed in that place. I think at that time ^{one} ~~he~~ does have very unique quality, I think he understood and liked the international flavor more than anything. He liked working with the State Department. He loved to have them walk a tight rope. I think he found this in his National War College₅ and I think that he became ^H ~~all~~ of ~~all~~ the CNO's that I knew. I didn't know any of them as well as he did, but he had an good understanding of international politics, the State Department, the White House, and he ^{liked} ~~loved~~ it, and he studied it. And Nitze recognized this. So, when ^{they tapped} ~~they tapped~~ Mr. Nitze ~~to come up and be SecNav,~~ ^{to come up and be SecNav,} I'm sure at that time that Nitze walked up to SecNav, Zumwalt came up there with him. ~~I think then, let me go back.~~ When Mr. Nitze was ISA₃ I believe that was the time that they had the missile crisis₃ and I think that's when he really found out about Zumwalt. Mr. McNamara would have to go to the White House, and they were down to the nitty-gritty part of this negotiation about the missile crisis₃ ^{all} ~~take~~ them out of Cuba or you're going to get it₃ and that stuff₃ and I'm getting this sort of second ^{be} ~~hand~~, but my understanding of it is that the Whiz Kids were great when they were writing memos that were

*Before he became Secretary of the Navy, Paul Nitze was Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs).

*I was not
what else is better
covered by*

pretty general, but when it got down to the point to tell Mr. Kennedy ^{what} are you going to do now? the missiles are coming the Whiz Kids failed him; they backed out. Zumwalt, Navy Captain ^{took} said "take a strong point." He ^{said} says "you've got to tell him ^{him} if he doesn't move them we're going in." And he convinced and wrote the memo for Mr. Nitze to take to McNamara. He couldn't find any support for it from the Whiz Kids. And Nitze, who is a pretty tough negotiator, took it to McNamara, it's my understanding. Bud wrote it. They took it over to the White House and sold it. That's when his star really came on. And in my whole association with Admiral Zumwalt, and when you're at war with somebody and people are getting shot and dying, getting killed, although he was a good administrator, his best was when he was under pressure in a crisis. When everybody else was fading, man, he came out a calm, cool, collected guy. People who worked for him knew that. You kind of had the feeling he was like, whether he was at sea, in Vietnam, or in the office, he gave you your head, you could do whatever you wanted to, and you knew that he was smart enough to get you out ^{of it} before you went to jail. It's like the skipper who knows how to handle a ship; if you let the JO take it in, that JO knows that that guy sitting in the chair is going to get me out before I run ^{it} aground. And, that's about the way he ran his ^{show} ship. He had people who worked for him close. You always worked over your head, and you worked

*JOs--junior officers.

~~worked~~ beyond your capabilities. He had average people ~~H~~ and I consider myself average ~~H~~ average people working over their heads and really didn't know themselves until they worked with him. He had ideas, and if you ~~were~~ an idea guy ^s he would take your ideas and add ^{on} to them. You always felt like you ~~were~~ running the show, and that's how he got the group of us ~~so~~ dedicated to him.

Q: What are some examples of ideas ^{like} that during the period you were in that office? ~~like that?~~

Adm. N.: In that office? Well, the pay raise. That was miraculous, ~~And~~ he sold it. At that time ^s when you were going to tell the Army and the Air Force and the Marine Corps that the Navy needed special pay, I don't know what you guys need, but the Navy needs special pay and then prove it and win it, he ~~thought~~ ^{fought} a lot ~~about it~~ ^{of battles}. ~~This~~ I think ^s pulling together, getting the navy blue-suiters and the purple-suiters together and the Navy Department ~~civilians~~ ^{*}. If you remember ^s when he came into it ~~before his time~~ ^{under} with Korth and Anderson there was a big reorganization study that was ~~just not~~ very, ~~well~~ was pretty detrimental to the Navy. Then Nitze and Zumwalt came in and they squashed that ^{quick}. I've forgotten the details of that, but it was ~~not~~ ^{not} very popular ^s of very good. He brought the military and civilians together

*Purple-suiters is a slang term referring to officers who work in joint-service jobs, such as being members of the Joint Staff which serves the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

^{they}
 better than ~~it~~ ever had before. I think, the battle of the TFX, the
 squashing of that, the extra hazardous duty pay, he was very personnel-
 oriented in that job as the EA to SecNav. You know, you're kind of ~~removed~~
^{when you're in}
 from that in the OpNav area. You kind of let the BuPers take care of ~~that~~.
 He knew how BuPers worked. Anything that came up ^{with} ~~from~~ personnel he was in
 it. I think of all the things at that time, he visualized the growth of
 the Soviet Union ~~at that time~~. He was always blowing that bugle. "The
 Soviet Union ~~was~~ building up its naval forces, and we'd better get on with
 ours. And, he was responsible for getting the shipbuilding program started.
 I can tell more about that when I get to the Vietnam section.

Q: Vietnam was just heating up during this period when he was with the
 Secretary. Was Captain Zumwalt involved any in formulation of the Navy's
 strategy for that?

Adm. N.: ^{Oh, very} ~~Not very~~ much. In fact, we were kind of forced into it. Mr.
 McNamara liked to call the shots in Washington. At that time, DoD didn't
^{opcon}
 have a good ~~OpCon~~ center, so he'd come up and use the Navy's ^{opcon center} ~~OpCon~~ because
^{they} ~~he~~ had the ships ^{plotted} ~~planned~~ and he liked to move the ships around. Because
 of that, Admiral Zumwalt and Mr. Nitze got into that quite a bit, the Laos
 part of it.

*Opcon--operational control. The center described contained
 plots of the positions of the Navy's ships and command and control
 facilities.

An interesting incident I recall regarding Mr. McNamara, Secretary of Defense, during the early stages of the LAOS involvement. The Secretary of Defense during this period for some reason liked the Navy OPCON center because of the world map graphics and communications. During a briefing it was briefed that a Navy aircraft had fired an air to air missile on a land base gun emplacement. Secretary of Defense asked the question, "why did they fire an air to air missile at a land target?" No one could come up with a satisfactory response so the Secretary of Defense told them to call the OPcenter in South East Asia and ask the question. The OPCON center in South East Asia was one of the carriers. The reply came back from the Pilot "I fired it because that was the only bullet I had left to fire."

~~I think one interesting story. I remember being in the ^{opcon} center, when one of our pilots ^{over} Laos had fired an air-to-air missile, a Sparrow, on a gun emplacement. ^{when} ~~And~~ that was briefed ~~there~~ and Mr. McNamara said, "Well, why in the world would he ever fire an air-to-air missile on a gun emplacement? That's a stupid thing to do. Ask him!" ~~The Pilot.~~~~

So, they went back to Southeast Asia and asked the pilot, ~~and I happen to know the pilot,~~ and the word came back, "Because that was the only bullet I had to fire."

He was in a lot of that strategy. The particulars, I've forgotten a lot of details and specific things we did.

Q: Did there seem to be jealousies on the part of other officers of ^{Zumwalt's} his relative age and seniority that he had his hand on so many power levers?

~~Mr. yes.~~ ^{envy.} ~~most of the navy.~~
Adm. N.: Most of that was in the big people worked with him. The little guys bitched, ~~about it.~~ That happened too, when he was CNO. ~~I think the most disgraceful thing, when I got to that area, when he was CNO he came out with what they called the 4 grams. You want to talk about that now? It's going to be out of sequence.~~

Q: ~~Well, why don't we just put it in sequence when we get to it.~~