

CO

HEADQUARTERS  
1ST BATTALION (AIRBORNE) 8TH CAVALRY  
1ST CAVALRY DIVISION (AIRMOBILE)  
APO San Francisco, California 96490

AVCIG-CO

20 April 1966

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (MACV/RCS/J3/32)

TO: Commanding Officer  
1st Airborne Brigade  
1st Air Cavalry Division  
ATTN: S-3  
APO San Francisco, California 96490

1. NAME AND TYPE OPERATION:

- a. Name: MOSBY I
- b. Type: Reconnaissance in Force

2. DATE OF OPERATION: 110800 April - 171615 April 66.

3. LOCATION: Reference, Map, Vietnam, 1:50,000 Sheets 6452 I, II, 6552 III and IV.

4. COMMAND HEADQUARTERS: 1st Airborne Brigade

5. REPORTING OFFICER: Lt Col Levin B. Broughton

6. TASK ORGANIZATION:

A 1/8  
Sqd A/8th Engr

B 1/8 (OPCON 1st Bde) CIDG Co

Bn Control  
Pathfinder Tm  
RRU Tm

C 1/8  
Sqd A/8th Engr

D 1/8  
Plat (-) A/8th Engr

7. TAC Air and ARA were used initially in preparation of the LZ's, however for the remainder of the operation they were not used due to the requirement for secrecy. Air Cavalry was used sparingly so as not to give away friendly locations. Engineer support was used extensively to improve the LZ for the Battalion Base of Operation.

8. INTELLIGENCE: The purpose of the operation was to locate and destroy infiltrating enemy VC/NVA units. Intelligence reports revealed indications of VC/NVA regimental sized units infiltrating into RVN from Cambodia during that period. One weapons battalion was believed to be disposed along the border with the mission of guiding and securing infiltrating units.

On 11 April 1966 the battalion closed into the AO with negative enemy contact; however, LZ MAVERICK was saturated w/punji stakes. C Co reported a way station vic YA 685452 and several huts vic YA 687453.

At 0100 12 April 1966 A Co reported hearing two groups of an estimated 5 VC each vic YA 678398 moving from N to SE. Sighting of several huts by C Co and aerial scouts were made, but nothing significant was found.

13 April 1966 A Co found an excellent trail network, 100 prone shelters and 75 cooking sites vic YA 675405 (see trails overlay).

14 April 1966 at YA 660422, Co C reported finding a hospital and rest area with a water system, several huts w/hospital beds and other medical equipment. Hospital appeared to have been deserted within last 48 hours. The complex is still under construction and it is believed that the VC/NVA personnel will return and continue to improve the hospital (see trails overlay). The area is a good target for TAC Air to attack when aircraft are running out of staytime.

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (MACV/RCS/J3/32)

15 April 1966 C Co reported finding an estimated bn size VC/NVA encampment having over 150 foxholes, many cooking stoves, and small articles of clothing. The area appeared to have been occupied 7 to 10 days previously. At YA680335 A Co engaged 3 VC in black pajamas, who fled. 1 VC was estimated WIA, 1 AKA Chi Com assault rifle and 1 1936 Moss bolt action rifle were captured. A Co also found a company size rest area via YA680345 and reported other sightings of empty villages and of trails (See trails O/L).

16 April the Bn extracted from AO and returned to LZ OASIS with negative contact.

The weather during the operation was excellent with a general increase in afternoon and evening violent but short thunderstorms. Nevertheless airmobile operations were not hampered by weather conditions. Cover and concealment were excellent near the stream and river banks and in the low areas. Concealment was sparse on the low plateaus, but cover remained good. Water was readily available along the rivers and the larger streams, but for the most part water found in the streams was stagnant. Landing zones were fairly plentiful, especially near the rivers and along active large streams where the Montagnards have cut large areas of timber. Small shrubs and bushes must be removed from these LZ's to afford access by helicopters.

9. MISSION: 1/8 Cavalry executed air assault operations into assigned AO along the Cambodian Border to locate infiltration routes, interdict enemy movement and destroy enemy forces and installations.
10. CONCEPT OF OPERATION: Beginning 110800 April A 1/8th Cav conducted air assault in to LZ MAVERICK (YA684417) followed by C 1/8 into LZ SILVER (YA703455). Companies then moved overland to establish combat bases, locate infiltration routes and to establish ambush sites along these routes.
11. EXECUTION: Commencing 110800 April 66, 1/8 Cav executed an air assault into LZ MAVERICK (YA684417) with A 1/8 preceded by TAC Air. Negative enemy contact was made; however the VC had saturated the LZ with Punji Stakes. The Battalion minus C 1/8 closed into LZ MAVERICK at 0935 hours. At 1008 hours C 1/8 air assaulted into LZ SILVER (YA703455) preceded again by TAC Air. Negative enemy contact was made and the company immediately moved overland to assigned AO. Upon D 1/8 securing LZ MAVERICK A 1/8 moved overland to assigned AO. Both A 1/8 and C 1/8 established separate platoon size ambushes in assigned AO's for the night following extensive patrolling during the day. Negative enemy contact was made during the first day and night.

Commencing 120800 the attached CIDG Co air assaulted into LZ SADDLE (YA730466) preceded by TAC Air and ARA. Negative enemy contact was made and the company moved overland into assigned AO to establish a base of operations and ambush site. A 1/8 and C 1/8 continued patrolling within their assigned AO's until 16 April when the Battalion was air lifted back to OASIS.

On 13 April at approximately 1330 hours the attached CIDG Co was detached and air lifted back to Duc Co.

On 15 April at approximately 1615 hours A 1/8 observed 3 VC via (YA680-335) and took them under fire. This was the only enemy contact throughout the entire operation.

Commencing 161000 the Battalion began its extraction back to OASIS (YA123282) with A 1/8 from PZ CHICO (YA683326), C 1/8 from PZ LANCER (YA665415) and the Battalion (-) from LZ MAVERICK. The Battalion closed OASIS at 1430 hours.

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (MACV/RCS/J3/32)

Commencing 171030 hours 1/8 began movement back to Camp Radcliff by ground convoy and C-130. The Battalion closed at 1615 hours minus B 1/8 which remained at QASIS under OPCON 1st Bde. B 1/8 first elements arrived at Camp Radcliff 181130 hours and all elements had closed by 1428 hours.

#### 12. RESULTS:

- a. Enemy KIA-0; EST KIA-0, EST WIA-1, VCC-0, VCS-0, Wpns-2.
- b. Friendly Forces-KIA-0, WIA-6.
- c. Rice Destroyed-1 $\frac{1}{2}$  Tons
- d. US Equipment destroyed during operation-None

#### 13. ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS:

- a. Logistical and service support was excellent.
- b. During this operation companies conducted clandestine operations which precluded daily aerial resupply. Companies carried four (4) days supply and were resupplied on the 4th day. This type operation points up our urgent need for light weight rations. A 4 day supply of C-rations is 25 pounds as opposed to less than 10 pounds for the Long Range Patrol Ration.
- c. Adequate vehicular transportation and its prompt arrival in the area of the supported unit remain a problem for convoy movements. For the movement to An Khe two (2) 2 $\frac{1}{2}$  ton trucks, to be loaded with mess equipment arrived 20 minutes prior to scheduled departure. This late arrival delayed the departure of the convoy for 40 minutes. The availability of vehicles and the timely arrival of vehicles has been the biggest problem in the coordination and execution of convoy movement of a platoon or division (-).
- d. The proximity of the base to the operational area during this operation simplified resupply by allowing timely resupply. Resupply could be effected directly from base to companies rapidly and without a second handling in the forward area.

#### 14. COMMANDERS ANALYSIS:

- a. Operation was a success in that it afforded additional training for personnel of this unit even though no enemy contact was made.
- b. TAC Air and Artillery was effective except in a few cases where preplanned TAC Air was late arriving at the objective which caused delays in some of the air assaults.
- c. Air Cavalry was effectively used on a mission type basis.
- d. Pathfinders were often used to the maximum in controlling air-traffic in conjunction of artillery firing, where again they were a vital part in the success of the operation.
- e. During this exercise it was proven that units can operate up to four days without resupply which certainly enhance such operations as ambushes and patrols.

#### 15. COMMANDERS RECOMMENDATIONS:

- a. That more emphasis be placed on intelligence to maximize the chances of closing with and destroying the enemy. Indigenous units, e.g. USSF CIDG, should be pumped for latest intelligence.
- b. That more ambush type operations be employed. Units conducting the ambushes should work in a given area for a mission of three days without resupply before moving to a new area.

AVCIC-CO

20 April 1966

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (MACV/RCS/J3/32)

- c. That action be taken to make the Long Range Patrol Rations available in sufficient quantities to feed all committed infantry elements during operations of this nature. Rations could be either the US Ration or indigenous ration, which according to USSF personnel is a good ration.



LEVIN B. BROUGHTON  
Lt Col, Infantry  
Commanding

**INTEL O/L TO MOSBY I**

- CROSSING SITES INTO CAMBODIA
- SMALL TRAIL 10 WIDE
- 2 MAJOR TRAIL 2'-3' WIDE RECENTLY USED
- MAJOR TRAILS THAT HAVE BEEN USED RECENTLY 2'-3' WIDE
- VERY OLD TRAIL OVERGROWN W/THICKETS & BUSHES APPEARS NOT TO HAVE BEEN USED FOR YEARS.
- Possible CROSSING SITE SANDY BEACH
- TRAIL 2-3' WIDE WELL WORN - NOT USED RECENTLY 131430 APR 66
- TRAIL FACES OUT
- Lake BOTTOM w/ LARGE ANTI-HELIBORNE STAKES, STAKES PULLED UP AND DESTROYED - 13, 14 Apr 66
- HOSPITAL REST AREA
- FRESH WATER SPRING
- STAKES IN BEACH FOR TIE UP OF BOATS
- EN SIZE ASSEMBLY AREA
- TRAILS 2-4' WIDE RECENTLY USED
- ENCAMPMENT DESTROYED BY AIR STRIKE - OPEN FIELD TREE CUTS THRU OUT BY SAWS
- RECENTLY USED TRAIL 2-4' WIDE, 50-75 COOKING SITES, OVER 100 PRUNG TYPE SHELTERS 3 TO 4 OLD HUTS NOT RECENTLY USED
- TRAIL 18" WIDE OLD HUTS ALONG TRAIL WAY, NOT RECENTLY USED
- TRAIL 2'-4' WIDE RECENTLY USED
- ANIMAL CROSSING POINT
- 2 NEW HUTS
- TRAIL 18" WIDE NOT RECENTLY USED
- AREA FOR APPROX 7 SMALL LE'S 2-4 ACFT CAP
- 4 SMALL VILLAGES NOT RECENTLY OCCUPIED
- TWO ROCK FOOT TRAILS ACROSS RIVER TO ISLAND
- 11 MH
- 1 NEW HUT
- LZ CHICO 4 ACFT
- TRAIL 2-4' WIDE RECENTLY USED

TAC AIR-ARTY-ARA SUMMARY

11 April 66

TAC AIR: 0733-0757 YA680416  
0840-0851 YA680396  
0950-1000 YA703456

ARTY: 24 rds

ARA: None

12 April 66

TAC AIR: 0744-0753 YA711452

ARTY: 65 rds YA711452

ARA: 96 rkts

13 April 66 - 15 April 66

None

16 April 66

TAC AIR: None

ARTY: None

ARA: 84 rkts


TOTALS

TAC AIR: 4 Strikes  
11 Sorties


ARTY: 89 Rounds

ARA: 180 Rockets


D-DAY



D+1



D+2



Handwritten diagrams illustrating the RCN (PM) and RCN (AM) algorithms.

The top diagram shows the RCN (PM) algorithm. A '#' symbol is connected by an arrow to a circle labeled 'RCN (AM)', which then points to 'LZ MAVERICK'.

The bottom diagram shows the RCN (AM) algorithm. A '#' symbol is connected by an arrow to a circle labeled 'RCN (PM)', which then points to 'LZ MAVERICK'.

The middle diagram shows a sequence of steps: '# 2-6 3-6' followed by arrows pointing to '# 1-6', '# 2-6', and '# 3-6'.

The bottom diagram shows a sequence of steps: '# 3-6' followed by arrows pointing to '# 1-6' and '# 2-6'.

Inclosure # 4, to Combat Operations After Action Report, dtd 20 April 66