


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Box #5 9th Division G-3 ORLL'S

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# CONFIDENTIAL 9TH INF DIV



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enced, terminated, or continued during the reporting period. Operation TOAN THANG II terminated on 17 February and Operation TOAN THANG III was initiated on 18 February. Operation SPEEDY EXPRESS continued as part of Operation QUIET THANG.

(4) In addition to the above listed operations an element of the 9th Infantry Division, the 3d Squadron, 5th Cavalry, participated in combat operations in the I Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ). The squadron conducted mounted and dismounted patrols in areas as designated. Troop D remained at Dong Tam and participated in missions as assigned by division headquarters.

b. (C) Organization

(1) The 9th Infantry Division reorganized two brigade headquarters, seven infantry battalions, and two artillery battalions to a Riverine MTOE configuration during the period July 1968 - November 1968. During the initial period of the Mobile Riverine Force, excellent results were achieved--particularly during TET 1968. However, the VC progressively adapted their tactics to counteract riverine operations until in recent months success in pure riverine operations has been significantly reduced. At this time, of the seven infantry riverine battalions, only two are afloat.

(2) Experience conclusively indicates that riverine units cannot conduct extended land based operations without additional equipment and personnel. Conversely, standard units can conduct both riverine operations from afloat bases and land operations without significant problems. Because of the reduction in operational effectiveness it was considered essential to reorganize the riverine units.

(3) The 9th Infantry Division requested authority to reorganize one brigade headquarters, five infantry battalions, and one artillery battalion to standard artillery and light infantry MTOE. Although the reorganization has been approved by COMUSMACV, tabular authority has not been received as of this date. In the interim the following units are being provisionally reorganized:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>AGG</u>
HHC, 3d Bde	27	4	97	128
6th Bn, 31st Inf	43	2	875	920
3d Bn, 39th Inf	43	2	875	920
4th Bn, 39th Inf	43	2	875	920
3d Bn, 47th Inf	43	2	875	920

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>AGG</u>
5th Bn, 60th Inf	43	2	875	920
1st Bn, 11th Arty	44	3	479	526

(4) Additionally, Company E (LRP), 50th Infantry has been reorganized as Company E (Ranger), 75th Infantry, under the provisions of USARPAC GO 66, dated 27 January 1969. There were no changes to MTOE 07-157E, PAC 3/68. Strength authorization is as follows:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>AGG</u>
Co E (Ranger) 75th Inf	3	0	115	118

(5) Under the provisions of USARPAC GO 124, dated 13 February 1969, the following unit was organized to provide a fourth firing battery for the 2d Bn, 4th Arty.

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>AGG</u>
Btry D, 2d Bn, 4th Arty	8	0	107	115

(6) Under provisions of USARPAC GO 34 dated 16 January 1969, the following units were updated from the "E" series to "G" series MTOE 07-167G, PAC 1/68.

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>AGG</u>
43d Inf Plt (Scout Dog)	1	0	27	28
45th Inf Plt (Scout Dog)	1	0	27	28

(7) Under the provisions of USARPAC GO 43 dated 17 January 1969, the following unit was updated from the "E" series to "G" series MTOE 01-075G, PAC 1/68.

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>AGG</u>
9th Avn Bn (Inf Div)	47	58	318	423

(8) Under the provisions of USARPAC GO 93, dated 31 January 1969, the following unit was updated from the "E" series to the "G" series MTOE.

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>AGG</u>
3d Sqdn, 5th Cav	50	36	963	1049

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(3) A division claims disaster procedure was established. Under this program settlements of major losses of personal property due to enemy action were made, with immediate assistance given to individual soldiers who wished to file claims for their lost or damaged property.

(4) The Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 1969, became effective 1 January 1969. During this period the Staff Judge Advocate, by staff visits to all subordinate units, provided a smooth transition from the use of the old manual to the use of the new manual. In addition, supplies of the new manual were obtained and distributed in sufficient quantities to all units to enable them to continue the administration of military justice without undue interruption.

(5) The Chief, Military Affairs, Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, through utilization of the SJA Bulletin, individual counseling, and staff visits to various units materially contributed to the more expeditious processing of various administrative actions such as line of duty investigations, reports of survey, and investigations by boards of officers.

(6) Initial studies and preparations were made for the implementation of the Military Justice Act of 1968. While this act does not become effective until 1 August 1969, a great deal of prior planning and coordination, training, and instruction are necessary due to major changes in military justice which will be effected by the new act. The SJA in conjunction with commanders, executive officers, and adjutants of divisional units, prepared a basic plan of implementation, made requisitions for new personnel, and trained court reporters and legal clerks as needed.

d. (C) Intelligence

(1) Discussion

(a) General: This reporting period includes three distinct phases of enemy activity. The first phase was a continuation of a period of increased infiltration and build-up which began January 1969. This phase was terminated on 22 February with the initiation of widespread offensive activity known as the Post-Tet Offensive. There were continuing high points of enemy activity until the end of March. This is generally accepted as the date of the close of the enemy's Winter-Campaign which began in early December 1968. The third phase, which has extended from the beginning of April to the present, could be classified as a near stand-down. During this period of decreased contact, agent and PW/Hoi Chanh reports have indicated that the enemy has entered a period of re-evaluation and self-critique for his failure to achieve established goals. Indications have been received that the enemy is planning now for another offensive. Since the initiation of discussions in Paris, the enemy has continually geared his activity toward operations having the most political impact such as capturing US servicemen, attacking weaker Vietnamese outposts, con-

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ducting acts of terrorism, and interdicting communication routes. During the first stage of the Winter-Spring Campaign in Long An, it was obvious that the enemy was attempting to lay the ground work for another attack on Saigon, and other population centers within the province. Their main objectives were to tie down US forces and to disrupt successful pacification efforts. The principal Communist goal within Dinh Tuong and Kien Hoa Provinces was to inflict maximum losses on US forces. Some specifically stated objectives were to attack My Tho, Cai Lay, Cai Be, Ben Tre, and Mo Cay cities and to interdict the "People's Road" (Highway 4). Captured enemy documents stated the enemy's overall objectives within the division TAOI were "to annihilate 60 per cent of the enemy troops and destroy 50 per cent of the enemy outposts, to liberate half of the district seats and province capitals and destroy the remaining half so that we can eventually control them all." An NLFSVN message, dated 29 January 1969, urged a strong Winter-Spring Campaign in order to strengthen the VC bargaining position at the Paris Peace Talks. Intelligence indicated that the Viet Cong considered a major military effort essential in order to support his peace delegation in Paris.

(b) Long An Province: Activity remained relatively moderate during the first two weeks of February with isolated attacks by fire comprising the enemy's main effort. However, indications continued to be received reflecting a major enemy buildup. On 1 and 2 February 1969, the 2d Battalion, 60th Infantry, made contact with a new infiltration group, the 4010, north of Thu Thua. The contact resulted in 55 NVA killed, four PWs captured and two Hoi Chanh. The prisoners stated that they had been sent to SR-III to reinforce units for the coming offensive. Enemy activity continued to increase and there appeared to be little question that the enemy was planning a show of force following his self-imposed, though often violated Tet Truce. On the night of 14 - 15 February, the enemy attacked Binh Phuoc with 107mm rockets, mortars, RPGs, automatic weapons, and small arms fire which resulted in two US KIA, 22 US WIA, and 9 VC KIA. On 19 February a Hoi Chanh rallied to Military Advisory Team Number 69. He reported that he was the political officer for the 6th Battalion of SR-II and stated that the general offensive would begin on 22 February at 2200H. As predicted, a surge of activity in the form of intense mortar and rocket attacks on military installations and population centers throughout South Vietnam on the night of 22 - 23 February marked the start of the final phase of the Winter-Spring Campaign. The most significant attack within the province on that evening was the attack on Tan An City in which 22 107mm rockets were fired into the city. On 24 February a Hoi Chanh from the 1st Long An Battalion stated that his unit's mission was to move into Saigon and attack the "Y" Bridge. On the following day, 25 February, elements of 2-47 Infantry and 6-31 Infantry engaged an estimated VC company approximately five kms SW of Thu Thua resulting in 31 VC KIA. The following week activity decreased, but reports continued to indicate that the 2d Long An Battalion would move against Saigon during this offensive period. On

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11 March 1969, approximately 2 kms north of Binh Phuoc, A/2-47 Inf contacted an unidentified VC force and killed 20. On 24 February, C/5-60 Inf apprehended 22 detainees, 10 of whom were classified PW. Three of the PWs were believed to be from the 2d Long An Battalion, one from the Dong Phu Battalion, one from the 901 Sapper Battalion and one from a 220 Battalion. The number of prisoners from different units indicated the importance still attached to the area by the enemy. During the first two weeks of March, the enemy continued to suffer heavy losses while awaiting orders from COSVN to start the final "Peak or Pulse" of activity. These losses the VC could ill afford. High ranking members of the main and local force battalions were beginning to rally to the side of the government, a sure sign of deterioration of VC morale. A key member of the SR-III Rear Services Organization (Moui Hung) was killed during this period. Large caches were uncovered, some containing new weapons and supplies which further hampered the VC effort. There were indications that his goals remained the same as before, to make a show of force. Infiltration of replacements and supplies continued. On 18 - 19 March, 13 kms north of VC Island, elements of the 3d Brigade contacted an unknown size unit attempting to move along the Bo Bo Canal into Long An. Following this contact, 41 VC bodies littered the battlefield. On 16 and 18 March, PWs were captured from the K-5 and K-4 Battalions, 1st NVA Regiment, confirming the location of all three battalions of that unit in Long An. On 25 March, approximately 7 kms southwest of Can Duoc, 3d Brigade contacted VC elements of the 514B Battalion with results of 22 VC KIA and 1 PW captured. On 3 April, 5 kms south of Ben Luc, the 2d Battalion, 50th ARVN Regiment made contact with the K-5 Battalion of the 1st NVA Regiment. This contact resulted in 36 VC KIA. Weapons captured included two RPGs, one RPG-2 RL, one 12.7 AMG, and four AK-47s. Although activity within Long An greatly decreased within the third period of the quarter, the enemy gave ground reluctantly. On 8 April, the 2-47 Infantry Battalion contacted the K4 Battalion, killing 47 VC/NVA. Prisoners of War captured during this period continued to report that several SR-III and NVA units were located within the Gia Dinh and Long An border area, however, major units were reported widely dispersed and attempting to avoid contact. Between 1 and 18 April, 17 107mm rockets were captured. The enemy fired another 18 on US and ARVN positions. On 14 April, the enemy initiated overt offensive action against allied forces when the K4 Battalion, 1st NVA Regiment attacked the 4th Battalion, 50th ARVN Regiment, killing 18 ARVN and wounding 22 ARVN and 20 civilians. There were subsequent attacks with the K5 and K6 Battalions on the 18th and 26th of April respectively, however, enemy initiated activity decreased noticeably. As the reporting period drew to a close, intelligence continued to be received which indicated that increased activity has been scheduled for the period between April and mid-July. Any increased activity allegedly depends on the Paris Peace Talks.

(e) Dinh Tuong Province: Enemy activity decreased slightly in Dinh Tuong during the first week of February. Scattered contacts throughout the

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province during that week failed to locate major enemy units, however, documents captured approximately 10 kms NW of Cai Lay on 10 February provided information of planned attacks on Cai Be and Cai Lay District Towns, the 514C Battalion being the major unit mentioned. An "Official Message" from the VC My Tho Center, dated 10 February, directed all forces in Dinh Tuong to be prepared to attack My Tho and US base camps in Dinh Tuong as follows: (1) To mortar My Tho and American bases on 15 and 16 February; (2) To attack Cai Lay on 21 February and other district towns on or after that date; and (3) to destroy and kill all GVN and Americans. The VC self-imposed truce started on 15-16 February. On 20-21 February Dong Tam had three separate attacks by fire with only light friendly casualties. Then on 22-23 February enemy offensive attacks by fire erupted throughout the province and Division TAOI with Dong Tam and My Tho receiving 84 and 100 rounds of mortar fire respectively. According to a Hoi Chanh and a PW from the 267B Battalion, elements of the Dong Thap I and II Regiments, which were to participate in an attack on My Tho that night, had their plans disrupted by friendly operations. Another PW reported that the 550 Battalion had crossed the My Tho River into Dinh Tuong and joined with the 514A and the 263 Battalions for that attack. The preemptive operations conducted by the 9th Infantry Division and the 7th ARVN Division north and northwest of My Tho are believed to have thwarted the enemy attacks. Even as these plans were set aside, however, the enemy continued to resupply and regroup for further offensive operations. On 6 March north of Cai Lay contact developed with the 4th Company of the 514C Battalion and 43 of the enemy were killed. The 1st Brigade continued to press the enemy and several contacts developed which resulted in significant enemy casualties. On 11-12 March 1969, 1st Brigade contacted elements of the 261B Battalion near Thanh Phu Village. Originally this contact was believed to have resulted in 57 VC KIA, but according to a prisoner of war captured by elements of the 7th ARVN Division in April, the battalion (with a strength of 200) suffered 100 KIA and 20 WIA and another 20 deserted or were missing. In addition, most of the unit's heavy weapons were lost. The unit reportedly withdrew into Kien Phong Province at this time to regroup and recruit new members. Another large contact occurred on 16 March when 32 VC were killed 6 kms west of Cai Lay. The 4th Battalion, 39th Infantry pounded the 261A mercilessly on 23-24 March. A sweep of the battle area revealed over 140 enemy bodies. On 31 March, 11 kms east of the Wagon Wheel, the 1st Brigade contacted scattered VC elements and killed 34 of the enemy. Throughout this period intelligence reports were received which indicated that the enemy was entering a period of increased activity and a reorganization and re-evaluation phase. As the month of March drew to a close, it became less likely that the enemy could initiate a final "high point" to close out his campaign. Likewise, it appeared unlikely that a coming "large scale" Summer Offensive would develop. More credible were Agent Reports which indicated a resumption of "Post May 68" evasive tactics (referred to as the "Tuc Decision") coupled with an attempt to inflict maximum casualties on US personnel and damage the GVN's cause as much as possible. On 9 April 1969, contact was made with the Kien Tuong 504 Battalion seven kms northwest of My Phuoc Tay which resulted

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in 31 VC killed. This was the last contact with a major unit in Dinh Tuong during the reporting period. One of the most significant developments of this period was the reorganization and realignment of enemy forces. Documents and PWs confirmed the reassignment of the 267B Battalion to the Dong Thap II Regiment. Although the exact date of this organization is not known, it probably took place early in February 1969 in preparation for the Post Tet Offensive (PWs have also reported that the 5140 Provincial Battalion has been upgraded and made part of the Dong Thap I Regiment; however, there is no corroborating evidence at this time). Equally significant as to enemy intentions was the consolidation of MR-II artillery units under the Binh Duc Artillery Unit and the formation of a Binh Duc front in the Dong Tam area. A similar consolidation was effected by the organization of the 341 MF Sapper Battalion of MR-II with the 332X, 334X, and 338X Sapper Companies forming subordinate elements. The lack of contacts with major units and the significantly decreased activity further confirmed reports that this phase of the offensive was one of a near stand down. Enemy forces remained generally dispersed in company size or smaller units attempting to avoid contact.

(d) Kien Hoa Province: As the first phase of the reporting period began, reports were received from Kien Hoa that civilian laborers were being forced to assist the VC units in their pre-offensive movement of supplies. Reports indicated that the 516, 560, and 550 Battalions and the 550 LF Company would be used in an attack on Ben Tre City. Me Cay was also reported to be a major target of the VC. On 11 February, a 120 - 200 man unit of an NVA Battalion was reported four kms southwest of Dong Tam. A report was received which indicated that the VC were massing for an attack scheduled to begin before Tet and last until 29 February. On 20 February 1969, elements of 3-47 Infantry operating in northwestern Gieng Trem District contacted an unidentified enemy force of unknown size. Contact continued for five hours resulting in 9 US KIA, 10 US WHA, and 90 VC KIA. It was later determined that the contact had been with the main body of the 516 Battalion. Interrogation of PWs revealed that the 516 Battalion, on contacting US forces, had been completely surprised in its movement toward Ben Tre for the offensive which was to begin 22-23 February. The 580 LF Company which had come into the area to support the 516th withdrew into its own area of operations (Binh Dai District) because, as a PW later stated, the 516 Battalion fled to the west along the Ba Lai River and another moved to the southwest in an attempt to avoid the 2d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division. Reports continued to be received, however, that the enemy, with a new front organization of the 1st Battle Group, was continuing plans for the final phase of the Winter-Spring Offensive. Intelligence reports continued throughout March to indicate the presence of several new units in Kien Hoa Province. The C66 Artillery Company was one new unit mentioned. In this area enemy contact was at an all-time low; however sporadic contacts continued throughout the area. Prisoners of War, almost all of whom were local guerrillas, indicated that a major attack upon Ben Tre was imminent; however, this attack failed to materialize.

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In Kien Hoa, as the second phase ended and the third began, terrorism again became the major enemy tactic. Ben Tre City experienced several acts of terrorism during late March and early April. A bomb planted on a bicycle was discovered by an ARVN sergeant near the fence which protected the helipad and C/1-84 Artillery Headquarters. As the bicycle was thrown into a nearby ditch it exploded, injuring a small child. Later, near the lake in front of the Second Brigade Command Post, another bicycle loaded with C-4 was found. On 21 March, the 2d Brigade contacted a VC element north of Ben Tre along the Ba Lai River which resulted in 40 VC KIA. It is believed that the unit contacted was the 516 Battalion. On 22 and 24 March 2d Brigade elements contacted VC elements which resulted in 40 and 17 VC KIA respectively. No unit was identified. As the second phase ended on 31 March, 3-47 Infantry killed 27 VC in sporadic contacts northeast of Ben Tre near the Ba Lai River. On 9 April 1969, a command detonated 750 pound bomb mine exploded only minutes after US elements passed over it on Route 175 in Truc Giang District. No one was injured. Reports indicated that the enemy would avoid contact while continuing his harassment against US and GVN forces. After 1 April 1969, there were no major units contacted. During the week of 14 April intelligence reports were received placing the 516 Battalion in Giong Trom District with the mission to harass small outposts and disrupt US river traffic. On 25 April, RF elements moving along a road in Ham Long District were ambushed by an estimated 300 VC. Results of the contact were as follows: 1 US Advisor KIA, 25 RF KIA, 55 RF WIA. Friendly losses were one 60mm mortar, 6 radios, and 37 individual weapons. Enemy losses were 14 VC KIA and one machine gun captured. The enemy continued to choose the place, the time, and the conditions of battle.

(e) Go Cong Province: Go Cong Province was relatively quiet at the beginning of the reporting period. Reports were received that the 263B Battalion and the 514B Battalion were operating with local forces, with the mission of attacking district capitals and ARVN outposts. On 22-23 February, Vinh Binh received 22 rounds of 82mm mortar fire. Mortar fire and small arms fire as well as automatic weapons fire were received by numerous PF outposts throughout the province on that night. Throughout the remainder of February and the first of March, reports continued to indicate Hoa Dong District as a principal target for the VC. On 21 March six rounds of 82mm mortar again fell on Vinh Binh. Countermortar was fired, killing five VC. Two PWs from the 514B Provincial Battalion were captured. They stated that the unit was understrength and had only 150 men. On 8 April 1969, a VC platoon attacked a Popular Forces outpost at Kom Houng Su (w) resulting in 9 PF killed, four wounded and two Vietnamese civilians killed. One of the dead civilians had been a village chief. On 13 April 1969, 2d Brigade inserted into the Coconut Grove in Hoa Dong District. In a series of contacts, US elements accounted for 12 VC KIA. Operations continued for two days in Hoa Dong District by elements of the 2d Brigade. The month closed without significant enemy offensive operations. The enemy continued to harass small outposts and use direct fire weapons against stronger positions.

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(f) Vinh Binh Province: Elements of the 9th Infantry Division entered base area 487 on 31 March. This operation was in response to intelligence which indicated that the 501 and 510 Battalions were refitting and resting for further operations. Contact which was sporadic and lacked firm identification continued through the next few days without decisive engagement. Operations continued intermittently through April with total estimated 130 body count. Intelligence reports continue to indicate that the 501 and 510 Battalions and several unidentified guerrilla units operate in Vinh Binh Province.

(2) Recapitulation

UNIT	LAST LOCATION	STRENGTH	COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS
9th VC Div			
271 Regt	NW of Angel's Wing	1200	MCE
272 Regt	Vic of Angel's Wing	1250	MCE
273 Regt	SW of Tay Ninh City	1300	CE
1st Ind Regt			
K4 Bn	W of Rach Kien City	320	CE
K5 Bn	Eastern Thu Thua	270	MCE
K6 Bn	Binh Phuoc (D)	310	CE
SR-II			
2642 Bn	Vic of Sugar Cane	275	MCE
6th Bn	N of Duc Hoa City	275	MCE
267 Bn	Southeast of Tra Cu City	225	MCE
308 Bn	Southern Pineapple	275	MCE
269 Bn	N of Tra Cu City	225	MCE
SR-III			
1st Bn (506)	NW of Rach Kien	250	MCE
2d Bn (508)	Long An-Gia Dinh Border	250	CE

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UNIT	LAST LOCATION	STRENGTH	COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS
<b>SR-III (cont)</b>			
Dong Phu Bn	Long An-Gia Dinh Border	300	CE
265 Bn	SE of Can Giuoc City	200	MCE
520 Bn	Southern Tan Tru	200	MCE
<b>DINH TUONG PROVINCE</b>			
1st Regt	Southern Base Area 470	200	MCE
261A Bn	Eastern Base Area 470	150	MCE
261B Bn	N of Cai Lay City	150	MCE
514C Bn (Poss)			
<b>2d Regt</b>			
263 Bn	N of My Tho City	300	CE
514A Bn	NE of My Tho City	200	MCE
267B Bn	NW of My Tho City	250	MCE
Binh Duc Arty Bn	Western Sam Giang and Ham Long (D)	350	CE
<b>GO CONG PROVINCE</b>			
514B Bn	Go Cong Tri Border Area	150	NCE
<b>KIEN HOA PROVINCE</b>			
516 Bn	Giong Trom (D)	250	MCE
518 Bn	Co sized elements in Kien Hoa	200	MCE
550 Bn	SE of Ben Tre City	200	MCE
560 Bn	Mo Cay (D)	175	MCE