

Rg 472/270/30/8/3
Box # 2
97th Inf Div ORLL's

97 INF DIV
VOL I
ORLL
1 FEB 68
THRU
30 APR 68

By 15 MAR 2013 6/8/99
Authority NWD 873541
DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 927650
By TS NARA Date 5/25/99

Kg 492/270/35/26/6
Box II 6
19TH Military History Det

CONFIDENTIAL



OO SUMMER HUMMING
RE URGENT ID 139 141000

INT FCGG

23 APR 68

23 APR 2245

343

FROM GO 3RD BDE 9TH INF DIV TAN AN RVN
TO CG 9TH INF DIV BACCAT RVN
INFO/ CG 9TH INF FWD DONG YAN RVN
S-3 9TH INF DIV BACCAT RVN

17

CONFIDENTIAL 001 2403 BENGON 6803

SUBJECT: OPERATION TOAN THANG LONG ARVN

CONTACT YESTERDAY COMMENCED WITH SIGHTING OF 8 VC

IN A SUMMER D-3-3 CAV INSISTED 2 ROAT 30MM WHO

REVERED AGAINST THE VC. THE VC ALLOWED THEM TO AD

HOLD TO ENTER INTO THE HUNTER AREA BEFORE TAKING IT

OVER. INITIAL ESTIMATE APPEARED TO INDICATE A

SMALL-SIZED CONTACT. ENROLLED 10-12 IN THE CLOUD WHO

RECEIVED. IN MOVING TO WESTEN 400-500 METERS FROM

THE OBJECTIVE, THEY CAME UNDER HEAVY FIRE 100M. NO

ARMED AIR STRIKE WAS CALLED IN WHICH PREVENTED

THE USE OF APPROX 1000LBS OF 100MM AND 120MM

HEAVY WEAPONS IN ADDITION TO OTHER ADDITIONAL WEAPONS

CAUSED THE FIGHTING



200-6

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: NNO 927650
T 564

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 2 000511039 CONFIDENTIAL

THE NUMBER OF AUTOMATIC WEAPONS AND LENGTH OF TIME
POSITION INDICATED A POSSIBLE RE-INFORCED BATTALION.

BASED ON THIS CONTACT A MOBILE GUARD WAS ESTABLISHED AND
THE 4-3 INF AND 4-39 INF WERE ORDERED TO PROTECT A
2 CO FORCE BACK FOR DEFENSE. AS THE GUARD IS A SENSITIVE
LT TO THE REAR OF B/5-49 INF AND ADOPTED A ROUND TUBE
FLANK. 4-39 INF WAS INSERTED INTO A POSITION APPROPRIATE
TO THE SOUTH AND MOVE TO BLOCK FRIENDLY BATTALION
ROUTE TO THE SOUTH. A TOTAL OF 9 AUTOMATIC WEAPONS
(SPOKES) AND 1200 ROUNDS OF ARTILLERY WERE FIRED IN
ADDITION TO 3 GUNSHIPS TAKEN WHO WORKED FOR A 4 HOUR
PERIOD. GUNSHIPS OF THE CAV TROOP KILLED 100 ENEMY AND
THE BN PLT OF THE CAV TROOP KILLED AN ADDITIONAL 60 VC
(BC). THE LEAD SQUAD OF THE CAV TROOP 1ST PLATOON IN
THE BUNKER AREA CONSISTING OF 6 ENEMY ALL KILLED
PROBABLY IN THE INITIAL FEW SECONDS OF THE CONTACT.

THE SQUAD TO THE REAR WAS SUCCESSFULLY REINFORCED AT 0005
BY THE CAV TROOP AIRCRAFT, THIS SUSTAINED A WIA. IN
ADDITION 2 AIRCREW MEMBERS OF B/5-49 INF WERE KILLED AND
GUNSHIPS HIT BY SMALL ARMS ONLY ONE UNARMED SOVOLY

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

Authority ANQ 873541
By TJ NARA Date 6/8/99

TABLE OF CONTENTS (U)

9TH INF DIV ORLL

VOLUME I

	PARAGRAPH	PAGE
1. Section 1, Operations: Significant Activities.		
a. Introduction	a	1
b. Organization	b	3
c. Personnel and Administration	c	4
d. Intelligence	d	7
e. Operations	e	18
f. Training	f	36
g. Logistics	g	37
h. Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs	h	39
i. RF/PF Upgrading and ARVN Training	i	48
j. Engineer Support	j	51
k. Signal Support	k	51
l. Army Aviation	l	52
m. Chemical Operations	m	52
2. Section 2, Lessons Learned: Commanders' Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.		
a. Personnel	56	
b. Operations	57	
c. Training	66	
d. Intelligence	67	
e. Logistics	70	
f. Organization	72	
g. Other	74	
3. Section 3, Headquarters, Department of the Army Survey Information: Lessons Learned from Employment of Tactical Cover and Deception.	76	

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED WHEN
SEPARATED FROM CLASSIFIED
MATERIALDOWN GRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD CIR 5200.10

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NO 873541
By TJ NARA Date 6/8/99TABLE OF CONTENTS (CONT) (U)
9TH INF DIV ORLL

Inclosures

	Incl
1. 9th Infantry Division	1
a. Organization	
b. Task Organization and Locations	
2. Roster of Key Personnel	2
3. Tactical Area of Interest (TAOI)	3
4. Personnel and Administration Data	4
5. Enemy Unit Locations	5
6. Artillery Support	6
7. G-3 Air Operational Support Chart	7
8. Class V Supply	8
9. PSYOP Newsletter "THE DELTA BULLETIN"	9
10. RVNAF Support	10
a. Status of ARVN Refresher Training	
b. RF/PF Outpost Support Status	
c. IMPACT Support to RF/PF	
11. Base Operations	11
12. 1st Bde Operational Report-Lessons Learned (ORLL)	12
13. 2d Bde ORLL	13
14. 3d Bde ORLL	14
15. 3-5 Cav ORLL	15
16. DISCOM ORLL	16
17. 15th Engr Bn ORLL	17
18. 9th Sig Bn ORLL	18
19. 9th Avn Bn ORLL	19

VOLUME II

Combat Operation After Action Reports (COAAR)

20. COAAR Operation RILEY (1st Bde)	20
21. COAAR Operation CORONADO X (2d Bde)	21
22. COAAR Operation CORONADO XI (2d Bde)	22
23. COAAR Operation TRUONG CONG DINH (2d Bde)	23
24. COAAR Operation ENTERPRISE (3d Bde)	24
25. COAAR Operation QUYET THANG (3d Bde)	25
26. COAAR Operation WORTH (3-5 Cav)	26
27. COAAR's Operation KILO (3-5 Cav)	27
a. COAAR Operation KILO Phase I (3-5 Cav).	
b. COAAR Operation KILO Phase II (3-5 Cav).	
28. COAAR Operation CHARLTON (3-5 Cav)	28

DECLASSIFIED

Authority DDO 873541
By TJ NARA Date 6/8/99

AVDE-BCO

30 April 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968
(RCS/CSFOR-65 R-1)(U)

e. Operation TOAN THANG was implemented by brigade on 8 April 1968 to complete the destruction of company and battalion size VC/NVA forces that remained in the CMD area and to interdict and block those enemy supply lines and infiltration routes that led from Long An Province to the Saigon area. Recurring missions assigned to brigade units continued. The one company of 5-60 Inf under bde control was employed as Bde RRF nightly (co.-) with one platoon located on the Ben Luc Bridge to reinforce ARVN security elements. In addition the co conducted convoy escort missions on highway QL 4 and provided daily security for interdistrict road clearing teams. The one company from 2-60 Inf under bde control continued Tan Tru basecamp security and conducted local operations. The 3-39 Inf continued security of designated basecamps and conducted limited combat operations within the bde AO. The 2-3 Inf continued operations in Binh Chanh District from its two FS/PB's and intensified efforts to destroy VC/NVA forces and prevent enemy retraining and recruitment activities. The 4-39 Inf remained at Nha Be and continued the security mission at Cat Lai with one company while increasing interdiction operations along major waterways in the district. Operation TOAN THANG marked what appeared to be an attempt by the enemy to conduct a general buildup and reorganization of the forces that had moved into the CMD area after the Saigon attacks. The brigade reacted to this attempt with every resource available to it, including the use of TPS-25 ground surveillance radar and air cavalry troops in addition to techniques that had proven reliable during previous operations. The concentration of enemy forces was noticeable not only in CMD but also in Long An Province particularly in Tan Tru and Ben Luc Districts. Brigade units established contact frequently with sizeable enemy forces that displayed the same renewed offensive spirit so prevalent throughout the TET Offensive. Early in the operation the Bde CP (Fwd) moved to Nha Be to control a series of continuous combined offensive operations to locate and destroy VC/NVA forces and facilities in Nha Be and eastern Binh Chanh Districts. The scope of these operations included all of Nha Be District and that portion of Binh Chanh District east of the Can Giuoc River. Vietnamese forces that participated in the operations included the 1st Marine Task Force, 5th Ranger Group, and Nha Be RF/PF units. In addition the 46th Regt (ARVN) conducted operations in close coordination and cooperation to locate, destroy, and block enemy forces in Can Giuoc District with emphasis on the Long An - Gia Dinh Province boundary. The first day's operations, conducted by 2-3 and 4-39 with D/3-5 Cav screening forward of ground elements, produced no significant results. Operations continued on the following day with the 3-39 Inf added to the maneuver forces. The 4-39 Inf established contact with an unknown size enemy force which resulted in 6 VC KIA, 6 AK-47's captured, and 44 bunkers destroyed. The third day's operations produced insignificant results as units completed clearing assigned objectives and the bde tactical CP returned to Tan An the next morning. A team from the brigade remained in Nha Be to conduct a survey of RF/PF outposts and provide necessary support to accomplish upgrading.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NO 873541
By TJ NARA Date 6/8/99

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDE-BCO

30 April 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968
(RCS/CSFOR-65 R-1)(U)

The brigade began to experience heavier contacts with the resumption of intensified combat operations in Long An Province. On 13 April 1968, the 3-39 Inf with C/7-1 Cav supporting established contact with enemy forces in the Mouse Ears area of Tan Tru District (XS 6859) which resulted in seventeen VC KIA (BC). The objective area had been selected from sightings obtained by radar emplaced at the 2-60 Inf's combat base at Tan Tru. The 3-39 Inf established a Bn Field CP in the area and remained overnight. Operations conducted the following day, using D/3-5 Cav in areas where radar sightings were obtained, resulted in the destruction of a large bunker complex of over 200 one to two-man bunkers which were recently built. Operations based on the use of radar continued in the Nhut Ninh (XS 682594) and Thuan My (XS 713557) areas through 17 April 1968. The evaluation of operations with the TPS-25 radar conducted by the 3-39 Inf and D/3-5 Cav in support indicated that the concept is sound providing certain principles are followed regarding the size and location of friendly forces and the method of intercepting enemy forces on the move. The optimum size unit appears to be a company operating from a field base and establishing ambush locations along routes identified by the radar. On 18 April 1968, the remaining company of 2-60 Inf was placed OPCON to 1st Brigade completing the transfer of the Bn to 1st Brigade control. The 4-39 Inf occupied the combat base at Tan Tru. On 19 April 1968, 5-60 Inf (M)(-) returned to bde control with one company and the scout platoon remaining OPCON to 1st Brigade. Significant contacts in Long An Province continued to be established particularly on combined operations. The 2-3 Inf, reacting to contact established by ARVN north of Ben Luc, located a large bunker complex with over 500 bunkers, some reinforced with steel and concrete, and a partially completed bn size basecamp on 17 April 1968. On 20 April 1968, D/3-5 Cav, 3-39 Inf, and two RF companies from Rach Kien reacted to an intelligence report in the vicinity of My Le (XS 7566) and established contact with an enemy force later identified as the 315th LF Co. Seventeen enemy were killed by US elements and nine VC KIA's were credited to the RF companies. The Rach Kien District Chief died of wounds received during the action. The most significant contact of Operation TUAN THANG occurred on 22 April 1968 when D/3-5 Cav inserted its infantry element in northern Tan Tru District. The platoon was immediately engaged by an estimated three VC squads firing small arms, automatic weapons, and 12.7 machineguns. LFT's and fighter aircraft received heavy AW fire which resulted in one fighter hit but not downed, one helicopter forced to land at Tan An Airfield, and several helicopter crew members WIA. A tactical emergency was declared at 1830H when the size of the enemy force was placed at a battalion or larger. The 5th Bn, 60th Inf moved to the area of contact by organic APC's and elements of 2-3 Inf and 4-39 Inf conducted a night airmobile insertion into the area. Under a heavy smoke screen established by artillery, D/3-5 extracted its infantry platoon. The squad establishing initial contact sustained one-hundred per cent casualties (6 KIA). All units employed in the operation established

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NO 873541
By TJ NARA Date 6/8/99

AVDE-BCO

30 April 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968
(RCS/CSFOR-65 R-1)(U)

heavy contact with the enemy and follow-up operations the next day indicated the enemy had engaged brigade units from will-constructed "L"-shaped bunkers. On 25 April 1968, D/3-5 Cav again established heavy contact while supporting 2-3 Inf in Binh Chanh District west of the Can Giuoc River (XS 7779). After insertion the infantry platoon was met with heavy AW and SA fire from a bunker complex approximately 300 meters long. The unit was reinforced by 2-3 Inf and contact was broken resulting in six WIA and two KIA from D/3-5 Cav and six WIA and two DOW from 2-3 Inf. The 6th Bn, 31st Inf was placed OPCON to the bde on 27 April 1968 and was assigned a temporary AO in the vicinity of Binh Chanh. The unit will be employed as a RRF in the CMD or Long An AO's and will conduct maximum interdiction operations. The Long An - CMD boundary area continued to produce significant contacts and on 27 April 1968 the 2-3 Inf engaged a reinforced platoon vic XS 783745 which had opened up on them at a distance of 10-15 meters from a bunker complex shaped like a wagon wheel. The area was sealed off with two companies and an armored cav plt and the contact resulted in fourteen VC KIA, four RPG-2 launchers, one RPD-56 MG, four AK-47's and one US carbine captured. Five US KIA and none WIA were sustained by the 2-3 Inf with the majority taken in the initial stages of contact. Operation TOAN THANG has underscored the enemy's change in tactics most forcibly demonstrated by his selection of bunker sites forward of tree lines to avoid friendly supporting fires and his reluctance to establish contact with friendly units until they have entered his position and can be fired upon from three sides. Brigade units are rapidly adjusting to these techniques as the operations continue. Results to date are indicated below:

(1) Enemy personnel losses:

VC KIA (BC) - 116
POW - 5

(2) Enemy equipment losses:

Small Arms - 28
Crew-served Weapons - 8
Mines/Booby Traps - 14
Rice - $3\frac{1}{2}$ tons
Sampans - 69
Bunkers - 1058
Grenades - 364
81/82mm mortar rounds - 35
75mm recoilless rifle rounds - 0
60mm mortar rounds - 16
Small Arms rounds - 1095
Medical Supplies - 7 lbs
Documents - 10 lbs

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NO 873541
By TJ NARA Date 6/8/99

From 3/5 Cav Report by LTC [REDACTED] (Part 1 of 1)

AVDE-CT

5 May 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 Apr 68
(RCS/CSFOR-65) (UIC-WDF2AA) (U)

OBSERVATION: The logistical requirements of an armored cavalry squadron are unique in an infantry division, and the type of infantry division found in Viet Nam (e.g. 101st Abn Div, 1st and 3d Mar Divs, 1st ACD) does not have the necessary equipment or demand histories for parts to fully support such an organization.

EVALUATION: Transfer of the 3-5 Cav to ICTZ has resulted in a degradation of the unit's combat capability through a rising deadline rate. Tanks and armored personnel carriers are foreign to the 1st ACD and the 101st Abn Div, and the Marine divisions have no APC's. Therefore the organization of the support elements of these units has not been readily adaptable to higher echelon services on armored cavalry vehicles, and replacement parts were practically non-existent upon the 3-5 Cavalry's arrival in ICTZ. The conclusion is that, while a cavalry squadron possesses great tactical mobility while in the shadow of its rather extensive logistical umbrella, a restriction is placed upon all capabilities of the squadron when it moves too far from its logistical base.

RECOMMENDATION: For such moves in the future, commensurate maintenance support must accompany the unit. This means that an appropriate maintenance element, complete with a reserve of parts on the authorized stockage list, must be placed in direct support of and move with the unit.


f. (C) Organization:

Detachment of Air Cavalry Troop

OBSERVATION: The detachment of the Air Cavalry Troop (Troop D) from this squadron has resulted in a decrease in the ground capabilities of the squadron.

EVALUATION: Due to the fluid and wide ranging nature of cavalry operations, the role of the air cavalry troop in the armored cavalry squadron cannot be satisfactorily fulfilled by miscellaneous helicopters temporarily in support of the squadron. The problems in command and control have been solved by the attachment of 4 OH-23's, but the squadron has experienced difficulty in finding the enemy, fixing him with light, air-mobile forces, and blocking or screening avenues of egress with aerial fires until the combat power of the bulk of the squadron can be brought into play through ground mobility. Conversely, this ground mobility is also vital to the operations of the air troop, particularly the aero-rifle platoon. This element should not be employed outside the capability of forces in the area to react to heavy contact, and the squadron provides more of that capability on an hour-to-hour basis than other type units. The conclusion is that the squadron is the unit most able to utilize the capabilities of the air cavalry troop while at the same time protecting the troop's vulnerabilities.

RECOMMENDATION: That the air cavalry troop of this squadron not be detached in the future.


HUGH J. HARTLEY
LTC USA Armor
Commanding

Inclosures:

- 1 - Organizational Structure
- 2 - Roster of Key Personnel

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NO 873541
By TJ NARA Date 6/8/99

AVDE-CT

5 May 68

SUBJECT: Inclosure 1 (Organizational Structure) to Para 2. Organization
to 3-5 Cavalry Operational Report - Lessons Learned.

1 - 17 Feb 68

3-5 Cavalry

Headquarters and Headquarters Troop (HHT)

Troop A

Troop B

Troop C

Troop D (Air Cavalry Troop)

18 Feb - 17 Mar 68

3-5 Cavalry

HHT

Troop A(-)

Troop B

Troop C

Co C, 2d Bn, 34th Armor(-)

Section(-) Light Scout Team (LST), Troop D

18 Mar - 30 Apr 68

3-5 Cavalry

Troop B

Troop C

Co C, 2d Bn, 34th Armor(-)

Section(-), LST, Troop D

HHT

Organizational Structure (DRAFT)

Inclosure 1

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 873541
RV TJ NARA Date 6/8/99

AVDE-MH

12 May 68

SUBJEC: Operational Report of 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

(b) In all provinces of the division's TAOI, the enemy is capable of mounting multi-battalion attacks against targets of his choosing. There has been an increase in the total number of VC battalions operating in the TAOI, and the identification of two new units in Bien Hoa Province significantly increases the capability to conduct special type operations. These units are the K-34 NVA Artillery Battalion and the 4th NVA Sapper Battalion. In addition, intelligence indicates the formation of a sapper battalion in Sub-Region E-2. The enemy's most significant vulnerability lies in the fact that to attack the targets which he has chosen as objectives, he must mass his forces, increasing his vulnerability to allied firepower. Based upon an analysis of all recent intelligence, the enemy's most probable course of action is a renewal of his offensive, striking fewer, more carefully selected and reconnoited targets than during his Tet Campaign.

e. (C) Operations.

(1) There were a total of twelve major operations either completed or in process by the 9th Inf Div during the period 1 Feb - 30 Apr 68. Highlights included counter operations to the VC Tet Offensive and the termination of Operations KITTYHAWK and ENTERPRISE after more than one year of continuous combat resulting in tremendous strides in the pacification program. Operations during the period 30 Jan - 10 Feb 68 resulted in some of the heaviest combat experienced by the division since its arrival in Vietnam. Units were deployed with minimum advance warning and demonstrated their flexibility to operate in many different areas and types of terrain to include encounters with the enemy in built-up areas in the major cities within the division TAOI.

(2) At the end of the previous reporting period, the VC/NVA forces had just commenced their Tet attacks with multi-battalion size forces attacking major US/FWMAF/GVN installations and province and district capitals within the III and IV Corps Tactical Zones (CTZ). During the period of 31 Jan - 10 Feb 68, the cities of Bien Hoa, Saigon, Long Binh, My Tho, Ben Tre, Tan An, Vinh Long, and Xuan Loo were subjected to major enemy attacks. In each city elements of the 9th Inf Div, in coordination with GVN forces, met the VC/NVA attacks head on and drove the enemy out of the cities by the 10th of Feb. Elements of all three brigades saw action in the Mekong Delta where the 9th Inf Div is the only sizeable US combat force.

(3) After 10 Feb enemy tactics included small unit actions and increased stand-off mortar attacks on US installations, major cities and

12 May 68
1st Ending

AVDE-MH

12 May 68

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

s capable
oosing.
ns opera-
Bien Hoa
ocial type
and the 4th
e formation
gnificant
ch he has
vulnerabil-
t intelli-
l of his of-
ted targets

completed
Apr 68.
and the
than one
the pacifi-
68 resulted
ce its
warning and
reas and
-up areas

NVA forces
forces
strict
uring the
Long Binh,
d to major
oordination
enemy out
des saw
izeable US

s and in-
ties and

villages. The VC also increased attacks by fire and ground assaults on division fire support/patrol bases (FS/PB). On 25 Feb elements of the 263d MF Bn launched a heavy mortar and ground attack against FS/PB Jager (vic XS 3549) located 3km west of Long Dinh along Highway QL 4 in Dinh Tuong Province. On 9 Mar the VC initiated a heavy mortar attack on FSB Malloran, a floating artillery base of the Mobile Riverine Force (MRF) which was positioned east of My Tho (XS 5740) along the north bank of the My Tho River. This marked the first time that the VC achieved success in attacking this type of FSB.

(4) From 10-29 Feb the 9th Inf Div continued to react to the presence of enemy forces south of Saigon and in the immediate areas around provincial and district capitals.

(5) Beginning 1 Mar the division developed plans for major reconnaissance in force (RIF) operations designed to locate, destroy, and fragment VC main force battalions and their supporting units while continuing to maintain, secure and open major lines of communications - principally Highway QL 4 - within the division TAOI.

(a) On 7 Mar, the 1st and 2d Bdes began Operation TRUONG CONG DINH in coordination with 7th Inf Div (ARVN) principally in Dinh Tuong Province to drive enemy forces away from My Tho and to eliminate enemy interdiction of Highway QL 4 in the provinces. On 17 Mar the 1st Bde commenced Operation DUONG CUA DAN (PEOPLE'S ROAD) to protect and upgrade Highway QL 4 between Cai Lay and the junction of Highways QL 4 and LTL 6A northwest of My Tho and to conduct RIF operations in coordination with 7th Inf Div (ARVN) and RF/PF forces on either side of Highway QL 4. The 2d Bde continued TRUONG CONG DINH, expanding operations into Go Cong and Kien Hoa Provinces. In both these successful operations, emphasis has been placed on combined operations with ARVN and RF/PF units. At the end of the quarter, the 2d Bde Vietnamese Marine Corps (VNMC) joined the 2d Bde in riverine operations.

(b) From 11 Mar - 7 Apr the 3d Bde participated in Operation QUYET THANG in Long An and Gia Dinh Provinces south of Saigon in cooperation with Capital Military District (CMD), 5th Ranger Gp, 25th Inf Div (ARVN) and provincial and district forces to locate and destroy VC/NVA forces threatening Saigon from the south and southwest and to secure major lines of communication. Here again, coordinated operations with Vietnamese forces were stressed.

(c) On 8 Apr the 9th Inf Div commenced participation in Operation TOAN THANG with the 3d Bde in Long An and Gia Dinh Provinces, Task Force

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDE-MH

12 May 68

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1). (U)

AVDE-SUBJE

Forsyth and the Royal Thai Army Volunteer Regiment in Long Thanh and Nhon Trach Districts, Bien Hoa Province, and western Xuan Loc District, Long Khanh Province. These operations are conducted in coordination with 25th and 18th Inf Divisions (ARVN) and RF/PF forces. The purpose of the operations is to locate and destroy the VC/NVA units in the vicinity of Saigon/Bien Hoa and to keep them fragmented, so they cannot mass for renewed attacks on these major strategic population centers. The operation had been effective to the end of the reporting period in that the anticipated renewed VC/NVA offensive had not materialized by 30 Apr 68.

(6) Operations commencing, continuing and terminating during the period 1 Feb to 30 Apr 68 are summarized as follows:

(a) Operation CORONADO X (18 Jan 68 - 13 Feb 68). The purpose of this operation was to locate, fix and destroy the 263d MF Bn, 514 LF Bn, and Cai Be District Forces. On 31 Jan the MRF, consisting of 2d Bde Hqs, 3-47 Inf, and 3-60 Inf, became OPCON to the Senior Advisor IV CTZ and moved from their pre-Tet positions in western Dinh Tuong Province to the vicinity of My Tho in response to multi-battalion VC attacks on that provincial capital city. On 1 Feb the two US battalions attacked north into the city from the My Tho river. They engaged in battle with the 261, 263, and 265 VC battalions which had occupied the city. The MRF and elements of the 7th Inf Div (ARVN) continued the battle on 2 Feb and by mid-day had driven most of the VC from the city. The MRF accounted for 116 VC KIA (BC) while 7th Inf Div (ARVN) reported 408 VC KIA. On 4 Feb the MRF moved to the vicinity of Vinh Long, provincial capital city, where during the period 5 - 8 Feb they engaged the 306th, 308th MF Bns and D587 LF Bn which were attempting to seize the city. Results of this battle of Vinh Long were 138 VC KIA, 4 POW versus 5 US KIA and 92 WHA (18 of which were USN). On 11 Feb the 2d Bde returned to the vicinity of Dong Tam and conducted operations in the vicinity of Cai Lay on Highway QL 4. Elements of 2-39 Inf and 5-60 Inf (M) became OPCON to the 2d Bde for this two day operation. Results for 11 - 12 Feb were 2-39th and 5-60th 51 VC KIA and 2d Bde 33 VC KIA. This operation terminated on 13 Feb 68. (See Inclosure 13, 2d Bde ORLL and Inclosure 21, Combat Operations After Action Report, CORONADO X.)

(b) Operation CORONADO XI (13 Feb - 6 Mar 68). This operation was initiated in coordination and cooperation with the 9th Inf and 21st Inf Divisions (ARVN) to locate and destroy the 303, 306, and 309 MF Bns and Tay Do Bns I and II, in the vicinity of Can Tho, Phong Dinh Province, to relieve the pressure on the city which holds the headquarters of IV CTZ. The MRF remained OPCON to the Senior Advisor IV CTZ. On 14 Feb the MRF

12 May 68
Period Ending

hanh and Nhon
rict, Long
ion with 25th
of the
vicinity of
mass for re-
The operation
t the antici-
r 68.

uring the

purpose of
, 514 LF Bn,
2d Bde Hqs,
CTZ and
ince to the
on that pro-
d north into
the 261,
MRF and
Feb and by
ounted for

On 4 Feb
l city,
th MF Bns
lts of this
d 92 WHA
vicinity of
on Highway
the 2d Bde
9th and
ated on 13
bat Opera-

ration was
d 21st Inf
MF Bns and
rovince, to
of IV CTZ.
eb the MRF

AVDE-MH

12 May 68
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending
30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

Bns, 3-47 Inf and 3-60 Inf, made beach landings and conducted sweeps north along the Kinh Truong Tien Canal, south of Can Tho. ARVN elements of the 9th and 21st Divisions conducted operations north of the city sweeping to the southwest. A/3-47 Inf found a sizable ammo cache in the morning including, in part, 460 B-40 rounds, 200 pounds of explosives, 89 120mm mortar rounds, plus 500 pounds of medical supplies. Sporadic contact was established and continued in varying degrees of intensity through 20 Feb. Results for this period were MRF: 14 US KHA and 73 WHA (evac), VC: 82 KIA. On 22 Feb, in response to new intelligence, the MRF and GVN forces initiated a riverine/airmobile attack in Phong Hiep District, Phong Dinh Province and Thuan Hoa District, Ba Xuyen Province to locate the VC III MF Headquarters. This riverine movement appeared to have caught the VC by surprise when B and C/3-47 Inf beached along the Kinh Lai Hien Canal, vicinity WS 8481. The enemy were in bunkers along the canal, but the fighting ports were oriented towards the open rice paddys and away from the canal in anticipation of airmobile attacks. The VC became confused and ran into the open fields away from the MRF forces where they were easy prey to artillery, gunships, and infantry fires. The VC lost 60 KIA in this engagement against negative US casualties. This operation in Phong Dinh and Ba Xuyen Provinces marks the deepest penetration of US Forces into the Mekong Delta to date. On 24 Feb the MRF conducted a waterborne cordon, search and clear operation on the island of Cu Lao May (vic XS 0109) Hoa Binh District, Vinh Binh Province which netted over 450 detainees. During the operation, the 3-47 Inf and 3-60 Inf conducted MEDCAP and DENTCAP operations at the detainee collection points. There was no enemy contact in this one-day operation. On 25 Feb the MRF returned to the vicinity of Can Tho in expectation of renewed VC attacks by the 303, 306, and 309 MF Bns. On 26 Feb, elements of 3-47 Inf and 3-60 Inf became heavily engaged approximately seven km northwest of Can Tho. B/3-60 Inf airmobiled into a hot LZ, with significant damage to helicopters and many wounded. Other elements of the MRF moved to support B Company. The contact with the VC in entrenched positions lasted throughout the day until about 2200 hours. A sweep of the battle area revealed 22 VC KIA. US losses were 14 KHA and 51 WHA. During the night the VC continued harassing the MRF Bns with probing attacks and sniper fire. On 27 Feb the area was swept again with an additional 40 VC KIA discovered from the previous day's contact. B, C, and E/3-60 Inf found ammo caches including 5 crew served (C/S) weapons, 16 small arms (SA), over 15,000 rounds of SA ammo, 161 RR rounds, 193 artillery/mortar rounds, plus other items. Results of the two day operation were: 85 VC KIA, 22 US KHA, and 83 US WHA. On 1 Mar the MRF and three ARVN Ranger battalions conducted RIF operations approximately five km southwest of Can Tho along the Rau Ram and Cai Son canals. Heavy contact developed

Page 21 of 21

66/8/9 75 NARA D626 6/8/9
175380NN AUTHORITY
UCC123456789

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NNO 873541
By TJ NARA Date 6/8/99

AVDE-MH

12 May 68

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending
30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

AVDE-M
SUBJEC

in the afternoon and continued into the night, and scattered contact occurred the following day. As a result of the engagement, the enemy suffered 63 KIA while the MRF sustained 6 KHA and 37 WHA. The operation terminated on 6 Mar 68. (See Inclosure 13, 2d Bde ORLL and Inclosure 22, Combat Operations After Action Report on CORONADO XI.)

(c) Operation TRUONG CONG DINH (7 Mar - to date): On 7 Mar the 9th Inf Div initiated Operation TRUONG CONG DINH in coordination and cooperation with 7th Inf Div (ARVN) and elements of the 1st and 2d Bdes, 9th Inf Div, and TF 117. The purpose of this operation was to locate, fix and destroy enemy forces located in Dinh Tuong Province and to relieve enemy pressure on Highway QL 4 and the city of My Tho. In the initial stage of the operation, elements of the 1st Bde, 2-39 Inf and 2-60 Inf, conducted airmobile assaults into an area near the village of Binh Phouc, 14 km northeast of My Tho, and then conducted reconnaissance in force operations north and northeast in zone. The 5-60 Inf (M) conducted diversionary reconnaissance in force operations west along Highway QL 4 and then returned to resume road security for the complete length of QL 4 within the AO. 2d Bde elements, 4-47 Inf and 3-60 Inf, conducted airmobile and beach landings 12 km and nine km east of My Tho while the 7th Inf Div (ARVN) operated in the area generally north of My Tho and east of Highway QL 4 with three infantry battalions, a ranger battalion, a cavalry squadron, and several regional force companies. During this phase only light contact was established with the enemy; however, action was characterized by many sightings and destruction of enemy bunker complexes. MRF forces commenced airmobile assaults six km northeast of My Tho. At 1845 hours on 7 Mar, B/4-47 Inf landed in an LZ and was engaged with heavy SA and AW fire from bunker positions along the rice paddy dikes south of the LZ. The heavy fire resulted in five downed helicopters. Fighting continued until 2400 hours when the VC broke contact. At 0300 hours 9 Mar FSB HALORAN, located 10 km southeast of My Tho along the northern bank of the Cua Tieu River, received heavy mortar and RPG fire for approximately three quarters of an hour. Two light fire teams (LFT) supported the action. Results of the enemy attack were two artillery barges destroyed, four M-102 howitzers destroyed, one US killed and six US wounded with unknown enemy losses. The 7 - 9 Mar engagements resulted in 15 US KIA and 100 WHA while the enemy sustained 53 KIA, 9 detainees and 9 SA's, 2 AW's, and many other items of equipment captured. Numerous bunker complexes were also destroyed. On 10 Mar the area of operation shifted to the southern area of central Dinh Tuong Province in Long Dinh and Cai Lay Districts to locate and destroy VC elements and to relieve enemy pressure along Highway QL 4. Elements of the 1st and 2nd Bdes operated in this general vicinity from 10 - 16 Mar with extensive day and

12 May 68
d Ending

4VDE-MH

12 May 68

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

ntact occurred
ffered 63
minated on
at Operations

r the
n and
2d Bdes,
locate,
to re-
i the
if and
llage of
naissance
(M) con-
ig Highway
length
conducted
ile the
no and
ttaison,
g this
:, action
iker com-
st of My
engaged
daddy dikes
ters.

At 0300
g the north-
re for
LFT)
illery
and six
resulted
ainees and
erous
ration
ong Dinh
believe
Bdes
a day and

night patrolling along Highway QL 4 as well as reconnaissance in force and strike operations into suspected VC locations; also, extensive upgrading of Highway QL 4 by engineer work parties was initiated. Moderate to heavy contact was established during this period, and many bunkers were destroyed and items of equipment captured. On 162400 Mar 68 the 1st Bde terminated participation in this operation and commenced operation DUONG CUA DAN (PEOPLE'S ROAD). Elements of the 2d Bde continued operation TRUONG CONG DINH in the Cai Lay, Rach Ba Rai, Cai Be Districts, and central Dinh Tuong Province. On 17 Mar, 5 km northeast of Cai Lay, Task Force Sabre (Trp C/3-17 Air Cav Squadron; D/3-5 Cav Squadron; and E/3-47 Inf) conducted aerial reconnaissance and eagle flights into AO Hatchet north of Highway QL 4. At 1530 hours elements of Company E came under heavy SA, AW and .50 caliber MG fire. Light fire teams (LFT) and artillery supported until the VC broke contact at 1920 hours. Results of this engagement netted 22 enemy KIA while friendly forces sustained 2 KHA. On 4 Apr 68 the 2nd Bde commenced RIF operations in Truc Giang and Giong Thom Districts, Kien Hoa Province. An assault craft, transporting 3-47 Inf, received B-40 rockets, .50 Cal MG and AW fire from the south bank of the Song Ba Lai as the boats proceeded toward pre-selected landing beaches. Infantrymen of the 3-47 Inf assaulted the river bank under covering fire of naval assault craft. The enemy, reluctant to yield to the infantry attack, stubbornly held their position. The 3-47 Inf suffered moderate casualties during the fierce battle, 17 KHA and 67 WHA; wounded were rescued by navy assault craft while the remainder of the company remained under heavy fire. The 4-47 Inf, several times during the afternoon, came under heavy fire as they advanced toward the enemy positions. Contact broke prior to darkness. C/7-1 Air Cav, flying aerial recon, had numerous contacts, accounting for 16 VC KIA. On 5 Apr the operation continued with the 3-47 Inf sweeping the battle area with no contact; however, 24 VC graves with flags were uncovered. Throughout 6 and 7 Apr sporadic contacts were made with the enemy as elements of the 2d Bde continued sweeping the area. Results of the four day operation: 39 US KHA, 166 WHA with enemy losses at 85 KIA and assorted equipment captured. During operations on 12 Apr, elements of the 2d Bde found and caused destruction of 366 enemy bunkers. On 15 Apr 68 the Mobile Riverine Base (MRB) received 57mm and 75mm fire. The USS Benewah received three hits, and the Tom Green received eight, both with minor damage. A specially configured LCM-6 tanker was also hit, set on fire, and eventually sank. The suspected area of hostile fire was searched with negative results. Another operation conducted by the 3-47 and 4-47 Inf on 17 Apr netted the battalions 78 enemy killed. On 20 Apr, the 2d Bn VNMC joined in Operation TRUONG CONG DINH in coordination and cooperation with 2d Bde. The 2d Bn VNMC, although shore based, conducted riverine operations as a third battalion with the MRF. On 23 Apr the MRF

Page 23

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

12 May 68
riod Ending

12 May 68
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending
30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

operations dealt the enemy severe losses in personnel and equipment. Many civic action projects were completed, and the revolutionary development program was raised to a high level. (See Inclosure 14, 3d Bde ORLL, and Inclosure 24, Combat Operations After Action Report, ENTERPRISE)

(h) Operation QUYET THAN (11 Mar 68 - 7 Apr 68): This operation was conducted in close coordination and cooperation with the Capital Military District (CMD), 5th Ranger Group, 25th Inf Div (ARVN), and province and District chiefs. The purpose of the operation was to conduct consolidation operations to destroy the enemy, his infrastructure, installations, supply caches, LOCs and conduct pacification and revolutionary development throughout Long An Province and specified areas of Gia Dinh Province. Task organization for the conduct of this operation consisted of the 3d Bde with 3-39 Inf, 4-39 Inf, A/2-60 Inf, C/5-60 Inf (M), and 2-3 Inf (199 LIB) OPCON to 3d Bde. In the initial stage of the operation, elements of the 3-39 Inf conducted airmobile assaults and reconnaissance in force operations within the AO. Elements of 4-39 Inf and 2-3 Inf continued extensive day and night operations along the many canals in Binh Chanh and Nha Be Districts of Gia Dinh Province to deny the enemy use of the waterways as infiltration routes in and out of the Saigon area. There were no significant contacts with the enemy; however, by conducting extensive airmobile assaults and footmobile patrols and ambushes, small enemy elements were engaged with significant results. In a period of only two weeks, the enemy sustained over 120 killed, and a large amount of equipment was captured. On 7 Apr the 2-3 Inf conducted waterborne and airmobile assaults and RIF operations destroying 46 enemy bunkers. The operation was successful in preventing the enemy from moving personnel, equipment and supplies near the Saigon area. Additionally the operations conducted kept the enemy off balance and prevented him from grouping his forces for a coordinated attack against the capital city from the south. On 8 Apr Operation QUYET THAN ended. (See Inclosure 14, 3d Brigade ORLL, and Inclosure 25, Combat Operations After Action Report, QUYET THAN.)

(1) Operation RILEY (3 Jul 67 - 7 Apr 68): Operation RILEY continued from the last reporting period. The purpose of this operation was to affect internal defense and revolutionary development activity in support of Bien Hoa Province. Major objectives were to provide security for Camp Martin Cox (Bearcat) base camp, provide ready reaction forces for RF/PF outposts and conduct strike operations against VC main forces in the AO. Operation RILEY was controlled by the 1st Bde during the period 1 Feb through 10 Feb, at which time the 1st Bde HQ moved to Dong Tam. The RILEY mission was then assumed by TF Forsyth. On 31 Jan in response to the VC Tet Offensive, elements of the 2-47 Inf (M) and 4-39

BY 75 NRA Date 6/8/99
Authority NNO 873541

AVDE-MH 12 May 68
 SUBJECT: Operational Report of 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS-CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

Inf moved to Long Binh post for perimeter security. At 1005H C/4-39 Inf conducted a motor march to a location east of Highway QL 15 and approximately five km north of Long Binh perimeter where the company established a blocking position. At 0930H A/2-47 Inf (M) and the 4.2" mortar section moved to Hoi Nai Village two km north of Long Binh, and working closely with one company 2-3 Inf, they made contact with an estimated VC battalion. These two companies received small arms, automatic weapons and RPG fire and returned fire with organic weapons while LFTs and artillery supported. Heavy contact continued throughout the day until the VC broke contact at 1800H withdrawing to the north. At 0700H C/2-47 Inf (M) moved to vicinity of III Corps HQ and established contact and received RPG fire. Fire was returned with small arms, automatic weapons and LAW. At 1100H B/4-39 Inf conducted an airmobile assault in an LZ near Widow's Village (located northwest of II FFORCEV HQ) and became OPCON to 2-47 Inf (M). The Scout Plat 2-47 Inf (M) became OPCON to B/4-39 Inf, and jointly, they made contact with an estimated VC battalion in the village. Conducting a joint mech/infantry house to house sweep, they maintained heavy contact until 1700H at which time the dug-in VC withdrew. During these multiple contacts the enemy sustained a severe loss in personnel and equipment. Final results of this engagement were: US losses--4 KIA, 23 WHA; Enemy losses--213 KIA, 32 PW, 25 WIA, 10 LMG, 19 AK 47, 4 carbines, and 3 .50 cal MG captured. Operations continued the next day in the Long Binh area and additional items of equipment were captured which included 8 AK 47, 3 LMG, 9 9mm pistols, 9 rifles, 1 82mm mortars and 1 .50 cal MG mounted on wheels. On 10 Feb elements of 1st Bde were released from the RILEY mission and moved to the Dong Tam area for future operations. TF Forsyth continued the RILEY mission with 2-47 Inf (M). During the remainder of this reporting period, 2-47 Inf (M) conducted extensive local day and night patrolling, provided security for 46th and 15th Engr work parties, conducted roadrunner patrols and established ambush patrols. On 4 Apr TF 123, consisting of three companies of the RTAVR, conducted airmobile assaults and reconnaissance in coordination with 18th Inf Div (ARVN) and 1-11 ACR. No contacts with the enemy were made during the operation. On 7 Apr Operation RILEY terminated. Operation RILEY accounted for 472 VC KIA, 41 POW and 2 Hoi Chanh, 72 C/S weapons and 152 SA. US losses were 64 KHA and 315 WHA (226 evac). (See Inclosure 12, 1st Bde ORLL and Inclosure 20, Combat Operations After Action Report, RILEY.)

(j) Operation NARASUAN (20 Oct 67 - 7 Apr 68): Operation NARASUAN was continued from the last reporting period by the RTAVR. The purpose of this operation was to conduct combat operations, PSYOP and revolutionary development support in the Nhon Trach District to reduce VC/NVA influence and to enhance the long range pacification effort in Bien Hoa

AVDE-MH
 SUBJECT:

Province
 lutionar
 itary op
 local co
 force op
 and clea
 tributed
 ducted t
 the 18th
 was limi
 RTAVR ma
 withdraw
 using ai
 LOC from
 the amou
 NARASUAN
 KIA, 5 P
 KHA and

(k)
 17 Mar 6
 and coor
 operatio
 4, to pr
 grade th
 ways QL
 els of V
 A0. Pre
 highway
 been sig
 grated a
 light op
 vices su
 lights,
 observat
 forces n
 Engr Bns
 with ARV
 and brid
 conducte
 spotted
 engaged
 Inf in se

12 May 68
Period Ending

12 May 68
AVDE-MH
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending
30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

Province. During this reporting period the RTAVR supported the RVN Revolutionary Development (RD) Program through civic action projects and military operations that contributed to village and hamlet security. Numerous local combat and ambush patrols, waterborne patrols, and reconnaissance in force operations in the Nhon Trach District, in addition to the roadrunner and clearing operations along Highway QL 15 in Long Thanh District, contributed significantly to the overall pacification effort. The RTAVR conducted these operations in coordination and cooperation with elements of the 18th Inf Div (ARVN). Throughout most of this period, enemy contact was limited to infrequent squad/platoon size encounters. On occasion the RTAVR made contact with company size enemy forces, but the VC elected to withdraw immediately or not become heavily engaged. Waterborne operations using airboats along small canals blocked the most probable southern VC LOC from west of Bearcat into Thu Duc District and successfully reduced the amount of supplies and equipment moving through the area. Operation NARASUAN terminated on 7 Apr 68. VC losses during the operation were 158 KIA, 5 POW, 30 C/S weapons and 106 SA. Friendly losses were: RTAVR: 28 KIA and 99 WIA (75 evac); US losses: 9 WIA (evac).

(k) Operation DUONG CUA DAN (PEOPLE'S ROAD). (17 Mar 68 to date): On 17 Mar 68 the 9th Inf Div initiated Operation DUONG CUA DAN in cooperation and coordination with the 7th Inf Div (ARVN). The mission is to conduct operations in Dinh Tuong Province to prevent VC interdiction of Highway QL 4, to provide security to allied military and civilian traffic, and to upgrade the surface and make repairs from Cai Lay to the junction of Highways QL 4 and LTL 6A. The operation emphasizes coordination with all levels of Vietnamese military and civil governmental organizations within the AO. Present planning calls for the local RF/PF elements to assume the highway security mission on or about 1 Jul 68. To date the operation has been significant in the increased participation by RF/PF units in integrated ambush patrols and the commitment of company sized units to daylight operations. Maximum utilization has been made of surveillance devices such as starlight scopes, seismic intrusion devices, radar, searchlights, infrared equipment, scout dogs, tracker dog teams, and night observation devices. Extensive sweeping operations were employed by those forces not conducting night activities. Elements of the 15th Engr and 86th Engr Bns made extensive repairs and upgraded the highway in coordination with ARVN engineers, as well as, performing daily mine clearing operations and bridge repairs. On 2 Apr 68 C/2-39 Inf inserted in vic XS 310522 and conducted recon in force operations to the east. LFT's from the 128th AHC spotted a VC force in the open at 1207H in the vicinity of XS 318519 and engaged them. C Company followed up with an assault, and at 1418H A/2-39 Inf inserted to reinforce vic XS 330523. Results were 12 VC KIA (BC) and

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDE-MH SUBJECT: 12 May 68
 SUBJECT: Operational Report of 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending
 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1). (U)

94 detainees. On 8 Apr 68 C/2-60 Inf located a large weapons' cache. At 0955H B/2-60 Inf vic XS 365545 found a US carbine, 34 cratering charges, and one case of blasting caps. At 1000H C/2-60 Inf found 1 120mm mortar with bipod and no baseplate, 60 57mm RR rounds, 40 RPG rounds, 50 grenades, 14 7.62 SA rounds, 1 82mm mortar round, 600 pounds of TNT, 50 bangalore torpedoes, 28 fuse devices, and 72 mines. At 1730H vic XS 320433 C/2-39 Inf found 1 .38 cal pistol, 7 57mm RR rounds, and 24 pounds of C4 explosives. On 11 Apr 68 A/2-39 Inf at 0815H vic XS 310510 policed up 20 detainees from a large group of people. By 0930H A, B, and E/2-39 Inf had detained some 90 detainees in the same general area. At 1417H Co A/2-39 Inf was airlifted in response to a call for assistance from a CIDG company vic XS 196557. The CIDG unit had been ambushed, resulting in one KIA and two WIA. C/2-39 Inf assaulted into an LZ vic XS 200546 at 1420H in support of the CIDG. Companies B and C reinforced later in the day around 1600H after A/2-39 Inf received AW fire in the vicinity of XS 200546. Sweeping through the area with the CIDG unit on the right flank, the units came under heavy SA, AW and 82mm mortar fire. Company B engaged 18 to 20 VC in khaki shirts and trousers and some dressed in short black or grey trousers, none wearing hats. The 2-39th Inf reported 19 VC KIA (BC), and supporting gunships had 6 VC KIA. On 29 Apr 68, A and B/2-60 Inf established heavy contact with an estimated VC Bn vic XS 233573. Artillery, TAC Air, LFT's, Spooky, and a CS drop were employed in support. Results of the action were 6 US KIA and 6 US WIA (evac). VC losses were 4 KIA (BC). Contact was broken at 2345H. The following day A/2-39 Inf and B/2-39 Inf conducted recon in force operations in the vicinity of the previous day's contacts by 2-60 Inf. At 1300H C Company discovered a weapons' cache vic XS 265568 containing 23 AK-47's, 1 60mm mortar, 36 empty AK-47 magazines, 90 60mm mortar rounds, 3 five pound cans of grease, 6 25 pound CHICOM claymore mines, and 21 electrical blasting caps. A Company located a cache at 1325H vic XS 269568. The cache contained 1 cal .30 Browning MG, 1 RPG launcher, 200 bangalore torpedoes, 10 SK rifles, 500 feet of electrical cord, 3 cans of fuse, 39 RPG-7 charges, 25 RPG-7 rounds, 55 fragmentation grenades, and 13 concussion grenades. Also, A and B/2-60 Inf returned to the area of contact and recovered 13 VC KIA (BC), 5 AK-47's, 1 magazine with an unknown amount of ammo, an AK-47 cleaning kit, 1 CHICOM grenade, and 10 pounds of medical supplies. Materially contributing to the success of the operation to date has been the willingness of the local population to come forward and volunteer information on the enemy compared to past experience in the same area. A deliberate campaign has been directed towards instilling in the local population the importance of keeping the road open and its relation to the economy of the Delta area. In many cases the people have assisted in actual repairs showing their growing concern over the impact on their

Page 32

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDE-MH
SUBJECT:

general risked by
9th Inf 1
yards fr
make it 1
as well as
the battl
ly appro
man was 1

(1) particip
the area oper
the 5th V also the
Army Volu (M) and t with the
Hoa Provi 3d Bde wi Chanh Dis in Long A with the
All 9th I national the 3d Bd (AN/TPS-2 and the " Saigon.
ed to squ significa pating in resulting the Air C ern Tan T Platoon (with an e and fight damage to 1830H. E while ele mobile in

12 May 68
Period Ending

AVDE-MH

12 May 68

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending
30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

as' cache. At
ring charges,
120mm mortar
is, 50 gre-
f TNT, 50
OH vic XS
and 24 pounds
310510 policed
B, and E/2-39
. At 1417H Co
ce from a CIDG
sulting in one
0546 at 1420H
in the day
ity of XS
• right flank,
mpany B engaged
n short black
ed 19 VC KIA
A and B/2-60
S 233573.
yed in support.
C losses were
y A/2-39 Inf
icity of the
scovered a
mortar, 36
cans of grease,
g caps. A
contained 1
s, 10 SK ri-
charges, 25
grenades.
recovered 13
f ammo, an AK-
supplies.
date has been
volunteer in
ame area. A
the local
relation to the
assisted in ac-
on their

general well being and prosperity. Of note in this vein were the dangers risked by an elderly couple living in close proximity to the highway. A 9th Inf Div company was engaged in a fierce firefight several hundred yards from their home. An infantryman was badly wounded yet managed to make it to their home. The couple took him in and hid him, assisting him as well as they could and risking their lives by doing so. Later after the battle was over and an element was searching the vicinity, they openly approached the element commander and led him to their house where the man was hid.

(1) Operation TOAN THANG (8 Apr 68 to date): The 9th Inf Div participates in this operation which includes all US/FWMAF/GVN units in the area surrounding Saigon as a follow up to Operation QUYET THANG. The operation is aimed at the location and destruction of VC/NVA elements of the 5th VC Div and VC Sub-Regions 2, 3, and 4 in the division TAOI and also the interdiction of VC/NVA LOC into the Saigon area. The Royal Thai Army Volunteer Regiment (RTAVR) and Task Force Forsyth with the 2-47 Inf (M) and the 6-31 Inf conducted operations in coordination and cooperation with the 18th Inf Div (ARVN) in Nhon Trach and Long Thanh Districts, Bien Hoa Province and western Xuan Loc District, Long Khanh Province. The 3d Bde with the 4-39 Inf and 2-3 Inf (199th LIB) in the Nha Be and Binh Chanh Districts, Gia Dinh Province and with the 3-39 Inf and 5-60 Inf (M) in Long An Province conducted operations in coordination and cooperation with the 25th Inf Div (ARVN) and other ARVN, Ranger, and Marine elements. All 9th Inf Div elements worked closely with local RF/PF units and the national police. Significant tactical techniques employed, especially by the 3d Bde forces, have been the extensive use of artillery radars (AN/TPS-25) to detect large scale enemy movements to identify enemy LOC, and the "Aquabush" or night ambush patrols on water LOC leading into Saigon. Throughout most of this operation, enemy contact has been limited to squad or platoon size encounters. From 8 - 20 Apr there were no significant contacts established by elements of the 9th Inf Div participating in this operation; only sporadic and light contact was established resulting in 5 US KIA, 28 WIA and 71 VC/NVA KIA. On 22 Apr D/3-5 Cav, the Air Cav Troop, conducted aerial recon and airmobile assaults in northern Tan Tru District, vic XS 604704. D Troop inserted its Aero Rifle Platoon (ARP) in the afternoon which became immediately heavily engaged with an estimated enemy battalion and sustained heavy casualties. LFT's and fighters supporting the contact received heavy AW fire resulting in damage to several helicopters. A tactical emergency was declared at 1830H. Elements of the 5-60 Inf (M) moved by APC to support the contact, while elements of 2-3 Inf, 3-39 Inf, and 4-39 Inf conducted night airmobile insertions into the area. All units were engaged in heavy contact.

AVDE-MH 12 May 68
 SUBJECT: Operational Report of 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending
 30 April 1968, RCS-CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

In the early morning hours of 23 Apr, the ARP was extracted under a heavy smoke screen created by artillery. The squad establishing initial contact suffered 100% killed (6 KHA) after it had advanced to within 30 meters of the enemy bunkers before receiving fire. D/3-5 Cav was credited with 35 enemy KIA. The enemy dead were found wearing blue uniforms and steel helmets indicating NVA troops. On 24 Apr TF Tower with the 2-47 Inf (M) and 6-31 Inf in coordination with the 1st ATF conducted a spoiling attack aimed at a reported NVA artillery battalion in the Hot Dinh area of Bien Hoa and Long Khanh Provinces. This operation continued with negligible contact until 26 Apr. On 27 Apr the 6-31 Inf became OPCON to the 3d Bde to act as a mobile reaction force in southern Gia Dinh and northern Long An Provinces. On 30 Apr 3-11 ACR and B/7-1 Air Cav became OPCON to 3d Bde to increase the protection of the southern flank of Saigon in Gia Dinh and Long An Provinces in anticipation of renewed VC/NVA attacks. The measure of success of Operation TOAN THANG is that up to the end of the quarter, the enemy had not been able to renew his offensive attacks against Saigon despite rumors and intelligence reports that such attacks had been planned. Results for 9th Inf Div units for the quarter were: 183 VC/NVA KIA, 4 POW, 11 C/S weapons and 42 SA captured; 25 US KHA, 97 US WHA (49 evac), 1 MHA and RTAVR 1 WHA. (See Inclosure 12, 3d Bde ORLL.)

(7) Combat Support Activities.

(a) Artillery Support.

1 Several firing batteries and battalions of artillery with the 9th Inf Div were required to operate both in the rugged jungle terrain of the Bien Hoa Province and in the rice-paddies of the Mekong Delta. Timely and continuous fire support was provided to divisional elements, Army of the Republic of Vietnam units, and Regional Force/Popular Force Outposts. Twelve firing batteries from II Field Forces Vietnam Artillery were used at various times throughout the quarter to supplement the fires of 9th Div Arty units, primarily because of the large Tactical Area of Responsibility of this division.

2 Artillery with 9th Inf Div fired a total of 313,660 105 rounds, 87,402 155 rounds, and 8,953 8 inch rounds during this quarter in support of division operations. These figures do not reflect support from adjacent firing elements as figures were not obtainable for those fires. A chart reflecting a breakdown of rounds fired by artillery with the division is attached as Inclosure 6. Reference also 9th Inf Div Artillery Operation Report-Lessons Learned for the period 1 Feb - 30 Apr 68 which

12 May 68
Period Ending

AVDE-MH

12 May 68

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending
30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

under a
hing initial
o within 30
v was cred-
lue uniforms
with the
conducted a
in the Hot
ion continued
f became OPCON
Gia Dinh and
r Cav became
lank of
renewed VC/
is that up
new his of-
ce reports
units for
42 SA cap-
(See In-

is being forwarded under separate cover.

(b) Helicopter Gunship Support. The 9th Aviation Battalion gunships flew 2,929 sorties. Missions included escort for VIP flights, aerial displacement of artillery by cargo helicopters, medical evacuations, river and road convoys, countermortar/rocket standby and suppressive fire support for units in contact. These light fire teams (LFT's) accounted for 33 VC KBA (BC); destroyed 182 structures and damaged 74 others; destroyed 163 sampans and damaged 58 others. D/3-5 Cav, under operational control of the 1st Bde, supported long range patrol (LRP) insertions/ extractions and provided nightly counter-mortar/rocket standby at Tan An and Dong Tam base camps. C/7-1st Air Cav provided support principally for 1st and 2d Bde operations in Dinh Tuong Province throughout much of the quarter.

(c) Tactical Air Support.

1. Normal air support was received from fighter aircraft. The Combat Sky Spot was proven very effective against enemy base camps. The sky spot is a radar controlled fighter and these missions are flown during the hours of darkness.

2. A summary of tactical air support for the quarter is given in Inclosure 7.

(d) Strategic Air Support.

1. This air support during the quarter consisted of two strikes. On 2700H Feb 68 a mission was flown resulting in 3 AK 47s, 1 five pound bag of rice, 1 pound of medical supplies, 1 NVA uniform, 1 OD uniform, 500 piasters, and 1 song book captured. The second mission was flown on 2900H Feb 68 and 25 bunkers destroyed.

2. Strategic Air Support was limited due to the higher priorities in I and II CTZ areas during this period.

(e) Naval Fire Support. There has been no Naval fire support rendered except that given to the 2d Bde as part of the Mobile Riverine Force.

(f) Chemical Support.

1. E63 Personnel Detector: This quarter the Division Chemical Section flew a total of 38 hours covering 23 missions using the E63 Manpack

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDE-MH

12 May 68

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending
30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)AVDE-MH
SUBJECT:

Personnel Detector (People Sniffer). This represents a decrease of approximately 55% from the previous quarter. The primary reason for this decrease has been the non-availability of aircraft to the section. Results were reported to the G2 for inclusion in their compilation of intelligence indications.

2 Riot Control Agents: Bulk CS was dropped from CH-47's contaminating VC base camps, lines of communication and infiltration routes. Over 26,500 pounds of bulk CS were dropped (325 drums). This represents a 40% decrease in the amount of CS used this quarter from last quarter. A total of 54 E158's were employed this quarter. This is an increase of 22% over last quarter. Last quarter there were 41 E158's employed. There would have been an even greater use of the E158 except for the non-availability of the munition. Since this is an experimental item, the production rate has been low.

3 Defoliation: There were no defoliation missions flown by the 9th Inf Div Chemical Section this quarter; however, 7th Air Force has been carrying on defoliation missions in the Rung Sat.

f. (U) Training.

(1) During the reporting period, division training consisted of the following:

- (a) Replacement Training.
- (b) NCO Leadership Training.
- (c) Battalion Refresher Training.

(2) Replacement Training consists of five and one half days of intensive orientation designed to prepare the individual for combat in Vietnam. The Reliable Academy, a provisional organization formed by the 9th Inf Div, conducted all replacement training. The following table shows the number of personnel trained during the report period:

<u>Month</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>EM</u>
Feb	75	1218
Mar	70	1807

CONFIDENTIAL

12 May 68
Period Ending

cause of
ason for this
ction. Re-
ition of in-

s contamination-
routes. Over
presents a 40%
ter. A
increase of
ployed. There
the non-avail-
a, the pro-

wn by the 9th
e has been

sisted of the

days of in-
combat in
formed by the
wing table
iod:

EM

18

07

12 May 68

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending
30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

	Apr	70	1103
	6-31st Inf	54	727

(3) In addition to receiving the normal replacement training, company grade officers and non-commissioned officers received an additional three day orientation keyed specifically to the situation in Vietnam. The latest equipment in use in Vietnam is demonstrated when practical, and the capabilities and limitations of support elements are discussed. One hundred forty-seven officers and 637 NCO's attended this course.

(4) The 14 day NCO Leadership Course is designed to raise the proficiency level of small unit leaders within the division by presenting instruction in the principles of leadership and instruction and practical exercises in the skills required of junior leaders. The course is aimed at the specialist and junior NCO who have not had the benefit of prior formal leadership training and who will probably be required to assume a leadership position during combat. During the past three months, 660 personnel have completed the NCO Leadership Course.

(5) Battalion refresher training is conducted by the maneuver battalion on a schedule of one day training per company per week. This flexible scheduling allows timely instruction and also permits each maneuver battalion to complete its refresher training each month.

(6) The 9th Inf. Div. continued during this reporting period to qualify personnel in specific MOS's by sending them to courses being conducted for this purpose by support units.

g. (C) Logistics. During the quarterly period ending 30 Apr 68, logistical activities continued in support of the 9th Inf Div and its operations. There were several significant problems in providing re-supply of all classes of supplies during the initial phase of the VC Tet Offensive. During this phase of the Tet Offensive, all classes of supply furnished to 9th Inf Div base camps at Camp Martin Cox, Tan An, and Dong Tam were reduced because of intense combat operations in the Saigon area, where the 506th General Depot is located, and the interdiction of main supply routes that lead to 9th Inf base camps. To alleviate the shortages of Class I, II, & IV, the 9th Inf Div provided its own logistical convoys with tactical security to make scheduled pick-ups at the 506th General Depot and deliver these supplies to Camp Martin Cox, Tan An, and Dong Tam. During the period 31 Jan 68 - 10 Feb 68, perishables normally received from Saigon were not available. Meal Combat Individual Rations

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NO 873541
By TJ NARA Date 6/8/99DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
3D BRIGADE, 9TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96373

AVDE-BOO

11 August 1968

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (MACV/RCS/J3/32) (U)

THRU: Command Channels

TO: Commander
U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
ATTN: J343
APO 96243

1. Name or Identity and/or Type of Operation: Combat operation to defend southern approaches to Saigon-CMD area and defend key installations in southern Saigon-CMD area.
2. Dates of Operation: 6 May - 13 May 1968.
3. Location: Gia Dinh Province, Nha Be and Binh Chanh Districts.
4. Control or Command Headquarters: Headquarters, 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division in coordination with CG, CMD.
5. Reporting Officer: Colonel George C. Benson, Commanding Officer, 3d Bde, 9th Inf Div; Lieutenant Colonel Joseph H. Schmalhorst, Commanding Officer, 6th Battalion, 31st Infantry; Lieutenant Colonel Anthony P. DeLuca, Commanding Officer, 3d Battalion, 39th Infantry; Lieutenant Colonel Robert L. Adcock, Commanding Officer, 4th Battalion, 39th Infantry; Lieutenant Colonel John B. Tower, Commanding Officer, 2d Battalion, 47th Infantry; Lieutenant Colonel Eric F. Antila, Commanding Officer, 5th Battalion (Mechanized), 60th Infantry.
6. Task Organization:

a. U.S. Forces:

- (1) 6-31 Inf
- 3-39 Inf
- 4-39 Inf
- 2-47 Inf (eff 09 May 68)
- 5-60 Inf (M) (-)

REFRAGED AT 3 YEAR
INTERVALS REFRAGED
UNCLASSIFIED AFTER
12 YEARS.

Incl 8

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

DEG 1000
AUG 22 1961 NND 87354

ARMED FORCES
PARTMENT OF THE ARMY
DEPT. OF THE ARMY
9TH INFANTRY DIVISION
IN FRANCISCO 6/8/99
By TJ NARA Date 6/8/99

(2) Brigade Control:

B Trp, 7-1 Cav (7-13 May 68)
D Trp, 3-5 Cav (8-13 May 68)
HHC, 3d Bde, 9th Inf Div
2-4 Arty (-) DS
Btry B, 7-8 Arty (8 in and 175mm) FS Reinforcing
Btry C, 1-84 Arty (155mm) Reinforcing
Btry B (-), 1-84 Arty (155mm) Reinforcing
3d Plt, 9th MP Co (Spt)
3d Plt, Co C, 9th Sig Bn (Spt)
Co D, 709th Maint (Spt)
Co C, 15th Engr Bn (DS)
Co C, 9th Med Bn (Spt)
Tm, 9th MI Det (Spt)
3d Plt, 335 RRC (Spt)
Sec, 4th MA Plt, 2d CA Co (Spt)
AV Fld Tm, 246th PSYOPS Co (Spt)
2d Plt, C Btry, 5-2 Arty (DS)
2d Plt, H Btry, 29th Arty (DS)

b. Vietnamese Forces operating in close coordination and cooperation with 3d Brigade units:

30th River Assault Group (RAG) (ARVN) paraded this with the remaining RF/PP Forces, Gia Dinh Province. Nha Be and Binh Chanh District Forces

Capital Military District Forces

7. Supporting Forces: ~~reinforcing a movement with more troops and supplies~~

II Field Forces Aviation Units (2nd Battalion, 1st Log Co., 1st Inf. Bn., 1st Inf. Regt., 1st Inf. Div., 5th USAF, 1st Log Cmd.)

8. Intelligence: Enemy situation prior to the May (2d) Offensive:
Reporting Period: 1 April to 11 May 1968

During this period all enemy activity in sub-region 3 indicated massive efforts to resupply, train and provide recruits to all VC/NVA units suffering from the heavy losses sustained during the TET Offensive. At the same time, the enemy continued harrassment of Allied and ARVN installations throughout the TAOI concentrating on attack by fire and avoiding contact except where their base areas were challenged. It was obvious during this period that the enemy's rebuilding efforts were pointed towards a second offensive in the Saigon area.

Major battalion-sized elements in our AO became increasingly difficult to engage. For apparent security purposes, traditional enemy unit base areas were abandoned with only token RF representation, movement patterns seemed erratic as the enemy attempts to cover their subsequent movement into attack positions south of Saigon. In addition, indication was received that some IF and MF company-size

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 9TH INFANTRY

elements, normally operating separately, were uniting in a effort to bolster the attack strength of the larger LF units. LF elements in the 3d Bde's immediate area of interest around US installations, began coordinating attacks in order to cover the maneuver of the Saigon attack forces. Increasing VC command emphasis was placed on terrorist activities, interdiction of lines of communications, sabotage of Route 4 and attacks by fire on all strategic points in sub-regions 3. Interdiction along Route 4 was especially heavy between Tan An and Binh Chanh. Specially formed sapper elements initiated more frequent route-severing attempts along secondary roads leading to and from all US subordinate installations. Attacks by fire increased on ARVN, RF/PF OP's and throughout sub-region 3. In an attempt to hamper reinforcement efforts by Allied and ARVN units, combined LF elements put ever increasing pressure on the Tan An and Ben Luc bridges. At various times both locations came under rocket, mortar, ground and probing attacks. During this reporting period, especially in the last two weeks of April, pressure was exerted on all major Allied and ARVN installations in Can Duoc, Can Gio, and Nha Be Districts as a diversion to the maneuvering of the attack elements in positions south of Saigon.

The bulk of the offensive from the south was to be borne by the 3d Independent, 506th LF, and Phu Loi LI battalions with the aid of supporting elements from the 5th Nha Be Bn.

The enemy's overall plan for the attack in the southern region has the 2d Ind, 506th Phu Loi LB and supporting elements from the 5th Nha Be attacking and occupying the 7th, 8th, and 9th Precincts along Saigon's southern extremities. The D-16 LF and the 268's Bn with supporting rear elements were to provide diversion by attacking from the southwest into the Cholon-Phu Lam area.

9. **Missions:** We can't be evangelized on a bus.

- a. Deploy the 3d Bde south of Saigon to deny VC/NVA forces access to the city. Plan a put over increasing pressure on the city, and with a timely and violent attack.
- b. Defend key installations south of Saigon.
- c. Be prepared to reinforce US and ARVN units in Saigon-Cholon area.

10. Concept of Operations:

a. The general concept of operations was to move four maneuver battalions by airlift and vehicle to positions along suspected routes of infiltration into the southern Saigon-CMD area.

b. Conduct extensive combat operations in Binh Chanh and Nha Be Districts to locate and destroy VC/NVA units staging to attack the Saigon-CMD area.

13 Execution:

a. 6 May 1968: The disposition of forces in Gia Dinh Province on 6 May was the 4-39 Inf at Nha Be (XS 916823) and the 6-31 Inf at FS/PB Smoke (XS 78976). Because of the buildup of intelligence, the 5-60 Inf (M) was moved from Binh Phouc (XS 615550) to XS 815868 south of Saigon. At nightfall on the 6th, the complete disposition of units was: 6-31 Inf (Co's A and D).

BY 15 NARA Date 6/8/99
Authorization NWD 873541

THREE MONTHS OF THE ARMY
9TH INFANTRY DIVISION

at FS/PB Smoke; XS 789769; 4-39 Inf had Co B at Cat Lai (XS 956895), Co C at XS 880853, Co E and HHC at Nha Be (XS 916823), Co C/3-39 Inf (OPCON to 4-39) at Nha Be (XS 916823); the 5-60 Inf (M) had HHC and Co A at XS 815868, 2d Plt of Co A at XS 984878 (OPCON to 4-39 Inf), and Co C elements at XS 875868, XS 814875, and XS 853887.

b. 7 May 1968: The 6-31 Inf moved Co's B and C from Binh Chanh to FS/PB Smoke and conducted company-sized airmobile assaults and recon in force operations east of Binh Chanh. The operations had negative results and at nightfall the disposition of the battalion was HHC and Co C at FS/PB Smoke, Co A at XS 808865, Co B at XS 819866, Co C had one plt at the Ben Luc Bridge (XS 618748) and one plt OPCON to 5-60 Inf (XS 816874) and one plt at XS 775842.

The 3-39 Inf conducted local security patrols vic Rach Kien until the afternoon. Beginning at 1400H, the Bn Hqs and Co's A and B were airlifted to positions south of Saigon. The final disposition of the battalion was: HHC and Co B at XS 838869, Co A at XS 828868, Co C (OPCON to 4-39 Inf) at XS 886870. Co's A and B of 3-60 Inf became OPCON to 3-39 Inf to defend base-camps at An Nhut Tan (XS 665674), Rach Kien (XS 740669), and the French Fort XS 896616).

The 4-39 Inf conducted riverine and footmobile recon in force operations west and northwest of Nha Be with three companies. The operations had negative results and the disposition of the battalion at nightfall was: HHC, Co C and Co E at Nha Be (XS 916823); Co A at Tan Tru (XS 654623); Co B at Cat Lai (XS 956895); Co C/3-39 Inf (OPCON to 4-39 Inf) at XS 808870; and one plt of 5-60 Inf (M) (OPCON to 4-39 Inf) at 896873.

The 5-60 Inf (M) conducted recon in force operations with Co's A and C. The field CP of Co C/5-60 Inf (M) came under mortar attack at 0345H. The company received a total of 80 rounds of 82mm mortar fire. Fire was returned using organic weapons, arty and a light fire team. The CP received 8 to 10 rounds at 0515H. The same support was used for this contact. There were no casualties from either contact and the VC losses are unknown. The 3d Bde received a call at 0545H that an ARVN outpost at XS 827875 was under a ground attack from an estimated VC company. The 2d Plt of Co C departed its night location (XS 845835) to reinforce the outpost. At 0610H at XS 827875, the platoon established contact with an unknown size VC force. The platoon was joined by the rest of Co C at 0624H. The company remained in contact until 2000H when the enemy withdrew to the south. Co C was joined at 1030H by Co A/5-60 Inf (M) at XS 829876. The two units were supported by nine airstrikes and artillery all during the day. US casualties were: 2 KIA, 48 WHA (28 requiring dust-off). The VC losses were: 213 VC body count (A/5-60 - 80, C/5-60 - 35, B/7-1 Cav - 58, Arty - 10, and airstrikes - 30). Enemy equipment captured included: 19 AK-47's, 5 RPG-2 launchers, 1 RPD-56 machine-gun, 63 B-40 rockets, 3 B-41 rockets, and an unknown amount of loose small arms ammo. The final disposition of units was: HHC and Recon/2-47 Inf (OPCON 5-60 eff 071800H) at XS 845879, Co A(-) at XS 825872, Co C at XS 835876.

B Troop, 7-1 Cav supported the 5-60 Inf (M) (-) in its contacts between 0700H - 2000H.

9TH INFANTRY DIVISION
FRANCISCO 9622

c. 8 May 1968: The 6-31 Inf conducted local security patrols around their night location with negative results. The disposition of the unit at nightfall was: HHC, Co's A, D, and E at FS/FM Smoke (XS 789769). Co C conducted three-platoon-sized ambushes vic XS 815775, XS 815823 and XS 615755.

The 3-39 Inf conducted recon in force operations with Co A (reinforced by Recon/2-47 Inf) and Co B. Co A established contact with an unknown size VC force at XS 834875 at 1200H. The company received RPG, AW and SA fire and reacted with gunships, TAC Air, arty and organic weapons. Co A was reinforced by Recon/2-47 Inf at 1245H. The contact continued at the same coordinates throughout the day breaking at 2000H. The casualties for Co A for the day were 3 WHA. A total of 10 VC were killed by Co A. Co B established contact with an unknown VC force at XS 834878 at 1445H. Co B was supported by helicopter gunships, TAC Air, arty and organic weapons. The contact continued until 2000H at the same coordinates. Total casualties for Co B were: 4 KHA and 4 WHA. The VC losses were 37 killed by Co B and 20 killed by supporting gunships. Rcn/2-47 Inf sustained 7 WHA and one track damaged by a RPG-2 round while supporting Co A. The disposition of the battalion at nightfall was: HHC and Recon at XS 845884; Co A at XS 839881; Co B at XR 884882; Rcn/2-47 Inf (OPCON to 3-39 Inf) at XS 845885.

The 4-39 Inf reacted to contact initiated by D Troop, 3-5 Cav. At 1040H, 2/A/5-60 Inf departed its night location and linked up with an ARVN plt at XS 852783. Both units established contact with an unknown size VC force immediately. Co C departed Nha Be in trucks and airboats to reinforce the contact arriving in the area at 1245H. The units in contact received RFG, AW and SA fire. The units were supported by helicopter gunships from D Trp, 3-5 Cav, TAC Air, arty and organic weapons. The contact continued at the same coordinates until 1930 H when the VC broke contact and withdrew to the southwest. Total casualties for US units for the day were 12 WIA. The VC losses were 42 VC BZ. The disposition of the battalion at nightfall was: HHC, Co E and Co C/3-39 at Nha Be (XS 917823); Co B at Cat Lai (XS 958897); Co G at XS 861800 and 2/A/5-60 Inf at XS 896873.

The 5-60 Inf (M)(-) conducted extensive patrols in the area of the contact on 7 May and around its night location and acted as a RRF for the 3-39 Inf and 4-39 Inf. The daylight patrols had negative results and the disposition of units at nightfall was: HHC and Co C(-) at XS 802870; Co A at XS 810868; Co B/6-31 (OPCON to 5-60) at XS 802866, XS 795865, and XS 788868.

B Troop/7-1 Cav conducted screening missions south of Saigon from 0700H to 1830H. The unit killed 8 VC in isolated cases throughout the day. D Troop/3-5 Cav supported the 4-39 Inf from 0700H to 1930H and killed 25 VC in the area of contact (XS 852873). The 3d Bde losses for the day were: 4 KHA and 19 WMA. VC losses were 112 VC BA.

d. 9 May 1968: The 6-13 Inf conducted recon in force operations with C A and C. At 0819H FS/PB Smoke (XS 789769) received 15 rounds of 82mm mortar fire. The counter-mortar fires resulted in 1 VC KIA with negative friendly damage or casualties. The battalion conducted recon in force operations during the day with Co's A and C. The units were airlifted to vc XS 896874 with Co 1

By 75 NRA Date 6/8/95
Authority NNO873541

inserted first followed by Co C. From the LZ the units moved to the west with Co A in the lead. At 1500H both companies established contact with an estimated company-size force. The units used helicopter gunships, TAC Air, arty and organ weapons to support their contact which continued until 1900H. During the contact the two companies sustained 15 WHA and killed 26 VC. The final disposition of units at nightfall was: HHC, Co's D and E at FS/PB Smoke (XS 789769); Co A at XS 863874; Co B OPCON to 3-39 Inf; and Co C at XS 867874. The S-2 of 3-39 Inf flew a continuous VR south of Saigon during the night of 8-9 May 68. Using a starlight scope, he spotted several sampans and one group of 10 VC during the night. Using helicopter gunships and arty, he killed 6 VC vic XS 713710 and sank 3 sampans vic XS 846655. At 0225H the battalion field CP (XS 845886) began receiving a mortar attack. The camp received a total of 50 rounds of 82mm before the attack ceased at 0255H. At 0345H, they came under a mortar and ground attack by an estimated VC battalion. The attack continued until 0630H when the VC withdrew to the south and west. The contact was supported by helicopter gunships, USAF CH-47 Spooky Flare and gunships, arty and organic weapons. US casualties from the attack were 2 KHA and 67 WHA. Enemy losses were 4 VC KIA. During the day Co A conducted recon in force operations in the vic of the battalion base camp with negative results. Co B conducted recon in force southwest of the battalion base camp in pursuit of the attacking force. They received sniper fire three different times between 0700H and 1400H with no casualties. At 1430H vic XS 843878, Co B established contact with an unknown size VC force. The action continued until 1700H with the enemy fire fluctuating between heavy to sporadic. The action resulted in 12 VC body count and 1 US WHA. The 3-39 Inf received OPCON of B/6-31 Inf at 1400H to support the B/3-39 Inf contact. When the company approached the area of contact, they began receiving sporadic sniper fire. The company established a block to the southwest of the contact area. The sporadic sniper fire continued until 1700H and resulted in 9 US WHA. The action resulted in 10 VC KIA for Co B/6-31 Inf. Co 2-47 Inf (OPCON 3-39 Inf) conducted local patrols in the vic of the battalion basecamp (XS 845886). The patrols sustained 1 US WHA from sniper fire at 1500H vic XS 844855. The disposition of units at nightfall was: HHC, Co B, Rcn/3-39 Inf and Rcn/2-47 Inf at XS 845885; Co A at XS 842883; and Co C OPCON to 4-39 Inf.

The 4-39 Inf conducted recon in force operations with Co's C/4-39 Inf and C/3-39 Inf. The units moved from XS 860800 to the south of a village located at XS 853784. Prior to reaching the village at XS 857790, the units established contact with an estimated company. The action was supported by helicopter gunships, TAC Air, arty and organic weapons and resulted in 2 US WIA and 34 VC body count. The disposition of the battalion at nightfall was: HHC and Co's C and E at Nha Boi (XS 916822); Co B at XS 977853; and Co C/3-39 Inf at XS 842794.

The 5-60 Inf (M) conducted recon in force operations with Co's A and from XS 804868 towards the 3-39 Inf basecamp (XS 845886). At 1300H vc XS 833877, both companies established contact with an estimated VC company. The units killed 5 VC in the action which continued for one hour and sustained 9 US WIA. The disposition of the battalion at nightfall was: HHC and Co C at XS 810377; and Co A(-) at XS 797865.

The 2-47 Inf (M) became OPCON to the 3d Bde at 1130H and conducted

BY 75 NRA D219 6/8/1985
Authority NM0873541

MENT OF THE ARMY
9TH INFANTRY DIVISION
FRANCISCO 96373

recon in force operation vic XS 860880. At 1550H the battalion established contact with an estimated VC battalion. The action continued until 1830H when the VC withdrew to the south. The action was supported by helicopter gunships, TAC Air, arty and organic weapons and resulted in 61 VC body count, 7 AK-47's, 2 RPG-2 launchers and 2 RPD-56 machineguns captured. The unit sustained 18 US KHA and 36 US WHA. The battalion established a battalion field location at XS 872886 with all units co-located at this location.

Troop D/3-5 Cav supported contacts of 5-60 Inf, 3-39 Inf and 6-31 Inf during the day and killed 7 VC, sank 6 sampans, destroyed 28 structures and caused 8 secondary explosions.

Troop E/7-1 Cav supported the 2-47 Inf and 4-39 Inf contacts killing 30 VC and destroying 1 ea 122mm launcher vic XS 836852.

e. 10 May 1968: The 6-31 Inf conducted footmobile recon in force operations during the morning vic XS 860874 with Co's A and C. The operation had negative results. At 1440H Co A and C conducted airmobile assaults into an LZ XS 813835 reacting to the 5-60 Inf (M) contact. From the LZ, the units moved west to the woodline then southwest to XS 804827. Both companies established a block oriented to the east of the location. The block had negative results. The final disposition of the units at nightfall was: HHC, Co's B, D, and E at FS/PB Smoke (XS 789769); Co A at XS 794829, and Co C at XS 814822.

The 3-39 Inf conducted footmobile recon in force operations with Co's A and B vic XS 841882. At 0930H Co B departed its night location (XS 845885) and began moving to the northwest. At 1005H vic XS 841882 the company began receiving RPG and automatic weapons fire. The company reacted with helicopter gunships from Troop E/7-1 Cav, TAC Air and arty. At 1100H Co A departed its night location (XS 842880) to support the contact and entered into the engagement at 1255H. At 1300H Recon/3-39 Inf also reinforced the contact. The three units kept the enemy force contained in their bunkers and used arty and air strikes on the enemy while Troop D/3-5 Cav screened and provided gunship support. The contact continued until 1930H when Co's A and B swept the area of contact. The action resulted in 65 VC body count, 5 US KHA and 27 US WHA.

The 4-39 Inf conducted waterborne (airboats) screening operations, waterborne assaults and footmobile recon in force operations in northern Nha Be Districts (vic XS 865885). During the night (0040H, 0225H, and 0254H), Co C/3-39 Inf (OPCON to 4-39 Inf), in an ambush position vic XS 841790, engaged a total of 7 sampans heading north towards Saigon. The area of ambush was swept at first light and 8 VC bodies were found along with enough canned goods and rice to feed 100 men approximately 2 days. Co C/4-39 screened in the airboats between XS 865885 and XS 855882. At 1230H the company beached at XS 857849. While searching an airstrike area (XS 857849), the company found a total of 18 VC bodies killed by TAC Air, arty and small arms. The disposition of units at nightfall was: HHC and Co's C and E at Nha Be (XS 916822); Co B at XS 85880C and Co C/3-39 (OPCON 4-39 Inf) at XS 893802.

The 2-47 Inf (M) conducted mechanized recon in force operations

66/8/9 1968 BY 1535 145800Z NOV 1968
145800Z NOV 1968 AUTOMATION

MENT OF THE ARMY
TH INFANTRY DIVISION
MARCH 1944

with Co's A and C from X5 873884 to the west with negative results. The battalion established a LaVallion field location at X5 810372 with seven platoon-size ambushes in that general vicinity.

The 5-60 Inf (X) conducted mechanized recon in force operations with Co's A and C. The companies departed their night locations and moved south to reinforce an ARVN outpost which was under attack (XS 813825). At 1120H vic XS 813828, Co A established contact with an estimated VC company in heavily fortified bunkers. Co C moved to the east flank and two companies from the 6-31(A and C) were inserted on the west. All units battered the VC all day until 2000H when the contact was broken. Helicopter gunships from Troop D/3-5 Cav, TAC Air, arty and organic weapons supported the contact. The action resulted in 4 US KIA, 28 US WIA and 20 VC KIA and 3 VC POW's. The final disposition for the battalion was: HHC and Co C at XS 810863; Co A(-) at XS 815876; and 1/4/5-60 Inf at XS 820870.

Troop B/7-1 Cav supported the 3-39 Inf in its contact during the day. Totals for the action were 5 VC KIA.

Troop D/3-5 Cav supported the 5-60 Inf (M) and 6-31 Inf contact all through the day. Totals for the action were 11 VC KIA, 1 VC WIA, 16 Sarpanes destroyed, and 39 structures destroyed.

f. 11 May 1968: (The 6-31 Inf conducted airmobile and recon in force operations with Co's A and C. At first light the two units began sweepng the area of yesterday's contact (XS 814820). During the sweep (at XS 815823), Co A discovered 3 VC KIA, 2 RPG-2 launchers, 13 B-40 rockets, 3 AK-47's, 2 AK-47 bandoliers, 10 chicom grenades, 15 lbs of clothing and 1 lb of documents. The company also destroyed 12 bunkers in the same area. Co C in the same area found 3 B-40 rockets, 1 AK 50, 1 RPG-2 launcher, 1 SKS rifle, 1 9mm pistol, 1 AK-47, 1 AK-50, 1 chicom radio and some web gear. From this area Co C continued operations to the south. At 1515H vic XS 823797, the company engaged an estimated VC platoon. The contact was supported by Troop D/3-5 Cav and arty and broke at 1600H. The action resulted in 4 US WIA and the enemy casualties are unknown. The disposition of the battalion at nightfall was: HHC, Co's A and E at FS/PB Smoke (XS 789769); Co B at XS 845878; Co C at XS 808808; and Co D at XS 886770.

The 3-39 Inf conducted recon in force operations with Co's A and B initially. Co A conducted footmobile operations from XS 826864 to the northeast. At 1115H vic XS 836875, the company started receiving RPG, automatic weapons, and small arms fire from an estimated 60 VC. The company reacted with Troop D/3-5 Cav gunships, arty and TAC Air. Rcn/2-47 Inf (M) was positioned to the north of the contact in a blocking position. At 1200H, the platoon came under heavy automatic and small arms fire from the VC forces attempting to withdraw to the north. The two units pounded the enemy from both sides all during the day until the VC broke contact at 1830H. The units sustained 5 US WHA as a result of the action and killed 27 VC. Co B conducted recon in force operations from XS 843883 to the south. At 0930H vic XS 845879, the company established contact with an estimated reinforced VC company. Co B/6-31 Inf was placed OPCON to the 3-39 Inf and moved from XS 850880 west to the point of

ENT OF THE ARMY
7TH INFANTRY DIVISION
SAN FRANCISCO 96373

contact establishing contact and blocking from the east at 1100H. Co B/2-47 Inf (M) was placed OPCON to the 3-39 Inf at 0930H and began moving south to the point of contact at 1000H. At 1100H Co B/2-47 Inf established a block oriented north at XS 846880. At 1105H the unit began receiving SA fire. All of the units involved pounded the enemy with TAC Air and organic weapons until 2000H when the contact broke. The action resulted in 9 US WIA and 21 VC body count. The final disposition of the battalion was: HHC at XS 845884; Co A at XS 834876; Co B at XS 842882; and Co C at XS 847872.

The 4-39 Inf conducted airmobile and recon in force operations northeast of Nha Be. The operation had negative results and the disposition of the battalion at nightfall was: HHC, Co's B and E at Nha Be (XS 916844); and Co C at XS 886772).

The 2-47 Inf (M) conducted local patrols from the vicinity of its night locations with negative results. The disposition of units at nightfall was: HHC at XS 810872; Co B at XS 780841; and Co C at XS 854887.

The 5-60 Inf (M) conducted local patrols from its night locations south of Saigon with negative results. The disposition of units at nightfall was: HHC and Co A at XS 815877; and Co B at XS 817872.

Troop B/7-1 Cav supported the 3-39 Inf and 6-31 Inf contacts killing 6 VC & 1 CCR 1 person.

Troop D/3-5 Cav also supported both contacts with negative results.

6. 12 May 1968: The 6-31 Inf conducted airmobile assaults and footmobile recon in force operations in southern Binh Chanh District with negative results. The disposition of units at nightfall was: HHC, Co's A and E at FS/PB Smoke (XS 789769); Co B at XS 847876; Co C(-) at XS 847585; and D/6-31 Inf at XS 804775.

The 3-39 Inf and attached units had sporadic contact in the area of the 11 May 1968 contacts with groups of VC varying in size from a fire team to a platoon. The groups were spread and appeared to be the remnants of the units engaged 11 May. The battalion field CP received a total of 23 rounds of 75mm recoilless rifle fire from an unknown size VC force. There were no casualties and the counter-mortar fire produced unknown results. At 0830H vic XS 828874 Co A found 20 VC KIA, 20 B-40 rounds, 1 RPG-7 launcher, 8 AK-47's, 2 AK 50's, and some web gear. At 1050H vic XS 842882, Co B began receiving sniper fire from a nippapalm area. The company attacked the area, engaging and killing 5 VC and capturing 1 AK-47. The company continued to search in the area. At 1630H vic XS 841881, Co B engaged a VC platoon killing 15 VC. At 1440H Co B/2-47 (OPCON to 3-39 Inf) engaged an estimated squad killing 11 VC and capturing a small amount of small arms ammo. The contact for all units was sporadic all day. The totals for the days action were: 89 VC KIA, 8 AK-47's, 2 AK-50's, 1 RPG-7 launcher, 300 rds of AK-47 ammo, 150 US 1:500,000 maps of Saigon, 20 B-40 rds, and 5 RPG-7 rds. The disposition of the battalion was: HHC, Recon/3-39 Inf and Recon/2-47 Inf at XS 845884; Co A at XS 841876 to XS 891879; Co B at XS 846878; and Co C at XS 843873.

BY 75 NARA Date 6/8/99
Authority ANO 873541
Document ID 062648300112

1100H, Co B/2-47

The 4-39 Inf conducted airmobile assaults and footmobile recon in force operations with Co's B and C in western Nha Be District (XS 857849). At 1300H vic XS 857850, Co B discovered 3 VC killed by arty; 1 R-40 rd, 15 sunken sampans, 2 AK-47's and a small bag of AK ammo. The rest of the operation had negative results. The disposition of the battalion at nightfall was: HHC, Co's C and E at Nha Be (XS 916822); Co B at XS 869777.

The 2-47 Inf conducted mechanized recon in force operations vic XS 857886 with negative results. The disposition of the battalion at nightfall was: HHC at XS 875886; Co B at XS 843883; Co C at XS 854887; and Rcn Plat at XS 843873.

The 5-60 Inf (M) conducted local patrols with negative results. The disposition of the battalion was: HHC and Co C at XS 877872; Co B at XS 815876 and XS 896864.

Troop D/3-5 Cav and Troop B/7-1 Cav supported 3-39 contacts with D/3-5 Cav killing 1 VC.

h. 13 May 1968: The 6-31 Inf conducted airmobile assaults and footmobile recon in force operations with Co's A, C, and D in southern Binh Chanh District. At 1630H vic XS 799838, Co D found 1 VC KIA and two hand grenades booby traps. The company destroyed 13 bunkers in the area. At 1640 H the company had 1 US WMA from a booby trap. The battalion S-3, airborne over XS 814777, spotted 3 VC KIA floating in the river. All other operations had negative results. The disposition of the battalion at nightfall was: HHC, Co's A, C, and E at FS/PB Smoke (XS 789769); Co B OPCON to 3-39 Inf; Co D at XS 790835.

The 3-39 Inf conducted mop-up operations south of Saigon with Co's A (vic XS 845875, C (vic XS 846876), B/6-31 (vic XS 847878), B/3-39 and B/2-47 (vic XS 842880 and west). All body counts and equipment captured were a result of previous actions except for 1 VC KIA by B/6-31 Inf vic XS 849877 at 1345H, and 1 POW captured by B/2-47 vic XS 844882 at 1000h. The totals for the day were: Co A/3-39 - 16 VC KIA, Co B/3-39 - 14 VC KIA, B/6-31 - 15 VC KIA, Rcn/3-39 - 1 VC KIA, B/2-47 - POW captured. Equipment captured for the day was: 13 AK-47's, 2 AK-50's, 27 R-40 rockets, 3750-762 rds, 1 Cal 38 pistol, 1 Cal 45 pistol, 7 chicom grenades, 1 VC flag, 1 VC map with markings. Co A was moved from south of Saigon to Rach Kien in the afternoon. The disposition of units at nightfall was: HHC, B/3-39, B/6-31, and Rcn 3-39 vic XS 845882.

The 4-39 Inf conducted airmobile assaults and recon in force operations northwest of Nha Be with negative results. Two men from Co B were wounded by a grenade booby trap. The disposition of the battalion at nightfall was: HHC, Co's B, E, and C/4-39 at Nha Be (XS 916822); Co C/4-39 at XS 847786.

The 2-47 Inf (M) conducted local security patrols from the vic of their night locations. The disposition of units at nightfall was: HHC and Rcn Plt at XS 884393; Co B at XS 793803; and Co C at XS 846885.

The 5-60 Inf (M) conducted mechanized recon in force operations vic

XS 7578 with Co's B and C. At 1330H vic XS 750870, Co B established contact with an estimated VC platoon in a heavily bunkered area. Troop D/3-5 Cav, TAC Air, arty and organic weapons supported the contact. At 1600H Co B was joined from the west by Co C/5-60 Inf. The contact continued until 2000H and resulted in 6 US KIA, 8 US WIA and 30 VC KIA. Troop D/3-5 Cav also killed 15 VC while supporting the 5-60 Inf. The disposition of the unit at nightfall was: HHC and Co C at XS 710796; and Co B at XS 744773.

Troop D/3-5 Cav screened the Rde AO south of Saigon and supported the 5-60 Inf contact.

12. Results:

a. Friendly losses during the operation were:

- (1) US KIA: 43
- (2) US WIA: 253

b. Enemy losses during the operation were:

(1) Personnel:

- (a) VC KIA: 376
- (b) POW: 9

(2) Equipment Captured:

Small Arms 88

Crew Served Weapons 24

HE ammo 185 rounds

PRC-25 Radio 1

Small Arms Ammo 5300 rounds

Web gear 80 lbs (approx)

Clothes 25 lbs (approx)

Documents 12 lbs (approx)

(3) Equipment Destroyed:

Sampans 44

Bunkers 426

Artillery	23
120mm Rocket Launchers	2
Structures	295

c. **Tactical Air Support:** During the operation the 7th USAF supported the 3d Bde "Go Devils" with 37 preplanned and 52 immediate airstrikes. Approximately 90% of the airstrikes were followed by sweeps of the target area by ground troops.

13. Administrative Matters:

a. No significant problems were encountered in providing logistical support to the Bde units during the operation. The 4-39 Inf and 6-31 Inf were supplied by air and vehicle from their FS/PB's at Nha Be and FS/PB Smoke respectively. The 3-39 Inf, 2-47 Inf (M), and 5-60 Inf (M) were resupplied by air and from battalion forward trains locations in Saigon/Long Rinh by vehicles.

b. Communications throughout the operation were provided by FM and RTT. Both RTT and UHF were provided by the communications platoon, HHC, 3d Bde and 9th Sig Bn. The 3d Bde Forward Tactical Operations Center was provided with "hot lines" to the 9th Division at Bearcat, RVN and CM in Saigon.

c. Medical support was provided by 3d D, 9th Medical Bn located at Can Bot Airstrip, Tan An, RVN. No problem areas developed during the operation and dust offs were conducted in a highly efficient and professional manner.

d. The continued contact created some minor problems in the maintenance of equipment, but command emphasis on the performance of preventive maintenance at every available moment remedied the situation.

e. The problem of refugees was handled primarily by refugee centers established in Saigon by CM. personnel. All refugees collected were afforded transportation by the Bde to those centers.

14. Special Equipment and Techniques:

a. A technique used at night was the use of a UH-1D helicopter and/or O-1 Birddog type aircraft with observers aboard with light intensification devices to conduct visual reconnaissance of the waterways and LOC's south of Saigon. This denied the enemy the use of the waterways as LOC's.

b. Finding the enemy located in built-up or heavily-fortified areas necessitated the frequent use of tactical air support, artillery and helicopter gunships. In addition to killing the enemy, this allowed time for reorganization of units in contact to the most favorable attack position and pinned the enemy down long enough for reinforcements to arrive.

c. The technique of house-to-house fighting, first seen in the TET Offensive, once again had to be used to rout the enemy from positions in built-up areas.

12

BY 75 NARA DATES 6/8/87
Autonomy TH 873800
DECLASSIFIED

nc/

d. The Boston Whaler boats attached to the 4-39 Inf were used on two occasions to reinforce units in contact. After beaching troops, the boats were used to screen the waterways.

15. Commander's Analysis:

During the eight-day period, the 3d Bde was heavily engaged with the equivalent of six VC battalions attempting to infiltrate Saigon from the south. To counter the threat, highly mobile defensive positions composed of five (5) battalions were positioned across the southern side of the city. From company to battalion-size base area of the Bde conducted recon in force operations to the south neutralizing many VC/NVA forces before they could reach the defensive positions south of Saigon. Operations of this type were made possible through extensive use of Assault Helicopter Companies (AHC) and riverine operations. The battalions were able to rapidly adapt to either mode of transportation, and quickly switch from one to the other without loss of momentum or time. Operations were conducted over widely varying terrain ranging from rice paddies to built-up areas. To reduce the high casualty rate normally experienced when neutralizing an entrenched enemy in house-to-house fighting, tactical airstrikes were used extensively. The effectiveness of the 89 airstrikes delivered in support of Bde operations during the period is reflected in the final casualty ratio 20.3/1. Because of the heavy vegetation along the numerous waterways south of Saigon, a major problem facing friendly forces was locating the enemy both during his attempt to infiltrate and exfiltrate the city. Two of the most effective means of locating enemy troops was through the use of air cav troops, and aquabushes (ambushes along waterways). Aquabushes placed along the various waterways in the AO provided valuable information on enemy withdrawal routes and posed a constant threat to enemy movement conducted primarily during hours of reduced visibility. Air cav troops were most effective during daylight hours when they conducted aerial recon, and when the situation warranted, recon in force operations with their organic aerial scout platoon. The air cav troops recon large areas of terrain in short periods of time which made them ideal for our operations. Action conducted during this period clearly demonstrated the effectiveness of a flexible defense and aggressive pursuit of enemy forces.

16. Recommendations:

a. Operations in Binh Chanh, Nha Be and Capital Military Districts, should continue until that area is cleared of all VC units that participated in the 2d Offensive on Saigon. Future operations should be concentrated on infiltration routes for supplies and equipment into the Saigon area to prevent another build-up and attack on the city.

b. While a great deal of importance must be placed on the Saigon area, large scale operations must be conducted more frequently in Long An and other provinces. During the long period of time that the bulk of the Brigade's forces were in the Saigon area only limited operations and local security type operations could be conducted in other areas. Lack of brigade operations in Long An and elsewhere permitted the VC to construct new base areas and move additional elements and supplies into outlying provinces.

6/15 NARA D616 6/8/98
75 AUTHORITY NNN 735180NN
DECEMBER 1967

c. Increased importance must be placed on the security of bridges along Hwy 4. The highway is a vital link between the capital city of Saigon and the delta region and is the main artery for commercial as well as military traffic moving in and out of the Delta. It was clearly demonstrated during the 2d Offensive on Saigon that the highway and bridges must be trafficable at all times in order for forces in Long An and other provinces to rapidly react to VC activities in the Saigon area.

d. Continued emphasis must be placed on RF/PP outposts in the Saigon area and upgrading the effectiveness of these vital installations. US and RVN forces must continue to work in close coordination in order to insure that RF/PP outposts are provided with all necessary materials and weapons. A system to allow quicker reinforcement of RF/PP outposts by US and RVN forces must be developed in order to protect these positions from numerically superior forces. At present this is difficult to accomplish due to remote locations of outposts, communications and transportation problems.

e. Continued emphasis must be placed on the major VC infiltration and supply routes that lead through the Plain of Reeds into Long An Province and subsequently into Saigon. Night VR missions as well as SL'R and RED HAZE missions in the Plain of Reeds must be continued in conjunction with daylight missions.

f. Replacing of obsolete equipment currently being used by RVN forces must continue at as rapidly a rate as possible. In this regard, the issue of M-16 rifles to RVN units has not only increased the fire power and effectiveness of the ARVN soldiers, but has given increased confidence to their over-growing aggressive attitude.

g. Civic action programs should be given added emphasis and expanded. Projects should be conducted under the control of GVN and given all possible support by US. It must become more of a program of the Vietnamese for the Vietnamese.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

/s/Jerry L. Burt
/t/JERRY L. BURT
MAJ INF
Adjutant

A TRUE COPY

Daniel S. Costello
DANIEL S. COSTELLO
Major, Infantry
Adjutant, 3d Bde
9th Inf Div

66 75 NARA D216 6/8/91
1958 ONN AUGUST 1973 41