

Rg 472 270/30/9/4  
9th Infantry  
2nd Brigade S-3

**CONFIDENTIAL** Command Report

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS, 2ND BRIGADE, 9TH INFANTRY DIVISION  
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96372

AVDE-47MH-A

30 July 1968

SUBJECT: Combat Operations - After Action Report

THRU: Commanding General  
Headquarters  
9th Infantry Division  
APO U.S. Forces 96370.

TO: Commander  
United States Military Assistance Command Vietnam  
ATTN: MACJ343  
APO U.S. Forces 96222

1. NAME OF OPERATION: OPERATION TOAN THANG.

2. DATES OF OPERATION:

Phase I : 162050 thru 182030 May 1968

Phase II: 270510 June thru 051500 July 1968

3. LOCATION: LONG AN and HAU HGHIA Provinces, RVN, Map References:  
1:50,000, sheet Nr. 6229 I thru IV and 6330 II and III.

4. COMMAND AND CONTROL HEADQUARTERS:

Headquarters Mobile Riverine Force

2nd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division

Task Force 117

5. REPORTING OFFICERS:

a. Captain R. S. Salzer, Commodore CTF 117.

b. Colonel B. A. David, CO, 2nd Bde, 9th Inf Div.  
(Commanding Officer until 28 May 1968)

c. Colonel Robert E. Archer, CO, 2nd Bde, 9th Inf Div.

d. LTC William F. Lackman, CO, 3-47th Infantry.

e. LTC Lawrence E. Bryan, CO, 4-47th Infantry.

f. LTC John G. Hill, CO, 3-60th Infantry.  
(Commanding Officer until 11 June 1968)

g. LTC George E. Marine, CO, 3-60th Infantry.

h. LTC W. E. Rawlinson, CO, 3-34th Artillery.

6. TASK ORGANIZATION: See Inclosure #1.

7. SUPPORTING FORCES:

a. U.S. Navy: Naval support throughout the operation was provided by Task Force 117. Support included mutual coordination and preparation of operational plans and orders; Administrative and logistical

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requirements were effectively fulfilled. Operational support include escort and riverine deployment of combat units, employment of direct and indirect Naval fires. Employment of riverine survey and underwater demolition teams. Tactical operations included employment of assault support boats in eagle float tactics. All operational support provided assisted the Brigade in its response to intelligence targets and subsequently to defeat the enemy.

b. U.S. Air Force: The 7th U.S. Air Force supported tactical operations, employing pre-planned and immediate airstrikes. Principal targets were troops in the open, beaching sites, landing zones, bunkers and other fortified fighting positions. Airstrikes were effectively employed and no significant problems were encountered, targets were properly marked and identified.

c. Army Aviation: Army aviation assets were provided through 9th Infantry Division. Maximum utilization was made of air cavalry units when the enemy evaded ground forces. Helicopters were employed extensively in aerial reconnaissance, people sniffer missions, and to saturate the AO with infantry elements in search of the enemy. When contact was established, light fire teams and assault helicopter companies contributed decisively toward the enemy's destruction.

d. Artillery: Artillery fires, employed independently or with airstrikes and gunships, were effectively employed to destroy the enemy and block his withdrawal from areas of contact. Response to all fire missions were quick and efficient. Artillery fires were employed extensively to suppress hostile fire against attacking forces and to eliminate sniper activity.

## 8. INTELLIGENCE:

a. General. Enemy activity in Saigon (during Phase I) was characterized by sporadic contacts in the eighth precinct (south of the DOI Canal) and in the Sixth precinct (west of the PHU THO race track). The predominant enemy threat to the Naval assault support boats was considered to be along the CHO GAO Canal/SONG TRA/SONG VAM CO, which was the route of entry to the AO. Previously, several underwater mining incidents occurred along the CHO GAO. The enemy's presence along the waterways continued, and his activities included tax collection and bunker construction. Within the AO, the enemy's presence along waterways was estimated to be at squad level. However, VC and NVA units were infiltrating and exfiltrating SAIGON. The enemy forces included an artillery regimental command post, resupply and staging personnel, and a VC Command Headquarters.

b. The enemy forces within the AO during Phase II of the operation consisted of VC/NVA forces massing to attack SAIGON. Considerable intelligence reports of enemy movement and activities along established LOCs and MSRs indicated an attack against SAIGON was imminent.

## 9. MISSION:

a. Phase I: Mobile Riverine Force and elements assigned to operational control of 2nd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, attack at H-Hour, 17 May 1968, to locate, fix and destroy VC/NVA MF elements in AO SNAKEPIT, including an artillery regimental command post, resupply and staging areas and a VC command headquarters in zone.

b. Phase II: Mobile Riverine Force conducts airmobile, riverine, reconnaissance-in-force operations in BEN LUC, THU THUA, Districts, LONG AN Province and DUC HOA District, HAU NGHIA Province, to locate fix and destroy NVA/VC elements in zone. Coincidentally interdict enemy MSRs and LOCs, and locate enemy supply caches.

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**10. CONCEPT OF OPERATION:**

a. Phase I: The Brigade's concept of operation was to employ the 3-47th Infantry as the lead elements of a riverine convoy into the AO. The 3-47th Infantry would deploy from DONG TAM at 162300 May to AO AMAZON and move along the RACH VANG to the RACH XOM CAU to XS843660. The 4-47th Infantry would follow the 3-47th Infantry, but move to AO SAHARA and conduct eagle float operations. The 3-39th and 4-39th Infantry Battalion (-), OPCON to the Brigade, would be employed in airmobile assaults to exploit contacts developed by the Brigade's maneuver battalions.

b. Phase II: The scheme of maneuver involved employing the 3-60th Infantry by riverine movement to AO POPEYE to assault RED Beach #1 and subsequently attack northwest in zone. The battalion would also be employed in airmobile assaults throughout the AO. The 3-47th Infantry would deploy by riverine movement to assault GREEN Beaches and subsequently attack northwest in zone. Artillery support would be provided from two FSBs established in the vicinity of XS605763 and XS575845.

**11. EXECUTION:**

a. Phase I:

(1) As originally conceived, the operation commenced in accordance with OPORD 45-68. Commencing 162050 May, the 3-34th Artillery and river assault craft deployed to establish FSB FARLY at XS897618 to support the transit and employment of the maneuver battalions. After conducting eagle float operations along the NUI River, the 3-47th Infantry beached at 0755 hours, 17 May, in the vicinity of XS875691. The 4-47th Infantry beached 15 minutes later at XS880690, after conducting eagle float operations along the BA DANG River. Throughout the day B/7-1st Air Cavalry made aerial reconnaissance of the AO, and support ground force in their attacks.

(a) Initially, the 3-47th Infantry employed B and C Companies to sweep south after beaching, while A and E Companies remained embarked prepared to reinforce contacts if encountered. During its sweep Company B apprehended two detainees. At 0900 hours E Company, 3-47th Infantry was inserted in the vicinity of XS861679, and Company A inserted later at 0940 hours in the vicinity of XS862678. It was during its beaching, that Company A engaged one VC who was hiding in nipa palm near the landing site. The first significant contact of the battalion occurred when A/3-47th Infantry encountered VC snipers near the beach; one VC was killed and two U.S. WHA resulted. As the sniper engagement continued, it intensified; an estimated platoon size enemy force was employed in small groups to engaged the advancing forces. The battalion slowly maneuvered against the insurgent force. Artillery, airstrikes and B/7-1st Air Cav reinforced the infantry's attack. As of 1525 hours the engagement continued. Company A 3-47th Infantry had sustained three U.S. KHA and five WHA, Company B had one WHA. A POW was captured with his AK-47 and chicom revolver by Company A in the vicinity of XS863677. The enemy broke contact at 1940 hours, and the 3-47th Infantry searched the area from which it was engaged. 17 VC KIA were found in bunkers along the river in the vicinity of XS862675.

(b) The 4-47th Infantry conducted its eagle float and beaching operations without incident, and at 1300 hours it had moved to the vicinity of XS867737. Shortly thereafter, it made contact with small groups of VC snipers. Company B received three WHA from the initial engagement and five WHAs later. One VC tiger scout was KHA when a grenade was tossed into B Company's position. Company E sustained three WHA while moving to the vicinity of XS871636. The contact terminated at 1600 hours and a search of the area was made. B/4-47th Infantry accounted for two VC KIAs, and three additional VC

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KIAs were located in the vicinity of XS871736.

(c) The 3-39th Infantry (-) employed its Company A in an airmobile assault, at 1030 hours to the vicinity of XS820630 to exploit a contact of the 7-1st Air Cavalry. Thirty guerrillas were alleged to be operating in the vicinity of XS817629. C/3-39th Infantry was airlifted to the vicinity of XS813632 to complement Company A's maneuver. Company A captured three VC and three AK-47s, and killed five VC in the vicinity of XS815636. At 1545 hours the enemy's fire diminished to sporadic sniper fire, and terminated at 1600 hours. The two companies continued its movement without further incident. Company C established night defensive position in the vicinity of XS831633.

(d) The 4-39th Infantry (-) made no significant engagements during the day. C/4-39th was airlifted in the northern portion of the AO to an LZ in the vicinity of XS893737; while B/4-39th Infantry remained at NHA BE in an RRF posture. During the day 18 airstrikes were employed in support of the infantry battalions. Seven VC KIAs were contributed to the total killed as a result of airstrikes. At the end of the day, 41 VC were KIA, five POW captured, 11 weapons were captured, and 107 bunkers were destroyed. Friendly casualties were five U.S. KHA, one VN KHA, and 21 U.S. WHA.

(2) The operation continued on the morning of 18 May, after the units' night resupply kits were extracted. The 3-47th and 4-47th Infantry continued eagle float operations, as the 3-39th Infantry (-) searched its area of previous contact. Throughout the day contact was limited to sporadic engagements of B-40 rocket, small arms and automatic weapons fire. No contact could be established with a unit size force; the enemy continued to employ his forces in small (two to three men) groups.

(a) The 3-47th Infantry eagle floated southwest along the NUI RIVER and subsequently beached its elements at 0930 hours in the vicinity of XS842657 to search the area. Several bunkers were destroyed, and supplies and ammunition were captured. At approximately 1400 hours all elements were extracted by ATC and proceeded in the eagle float operation. Until 1550 hours, no engagements were made. It was at that time A/3-47th Infantry encountered sniper fire while searching in the vicinity of XS893660. Shortly thereafter, B and E Companies were engaged with B-40 rocket and small arms fire. Company A was employed in a blocking position in the vicinity of XS893665, while C and E Companies swept towards the blocking position. The battalion continued its operation until late in the evening. It was later extracted and return to the MRB.

(b) The 4-47th Infantry eagle floated north and west along the BA DANG River and beached in the vicinity of XS865737. The battalion conducted a thorough search of the area, and found 18 VC bodies, two B-40 rocket launchers and several grenades. The VC KIAs were the result of artillery and airstrikes employed in the area. At 1325 hours, B/3-47th Infantry was engaged with B-40 rocket and small arms fire. With the support of artillery, the company suppressed the enemy fires. The battalion embarked ATCs to continue its eagle float operation. In the near-time airstrikes, artillery and gunships engaged suspected VC positions in the vicinity of XS904725 where the rocket fire originated. At 1640 hours, B and E Companies were inserted in the vicinity of XS906724 to search and clear the area. Company E found four chicom carbines, and one 57mm recoilless rifle round. The company also engaged a small group of VC (five to six) running in the area; one VC KIA resulted. Co B was also engaged with small arms and automatic weapons fire; the company established contact and obtained five VC KIA. As the contact continued Company E maneuvered in support of Company B. Together they attacked an enemy bunker position in the vicinity of XS905727. When the contact ceased the two companies swept the area and reported 10 VC KIA, and several

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items of equipment captured. The 7-1st Air Cav accounted for ten additional VC KIAs in support of the battalion's contact. The air cav troops continued to engage small group of fleeing VC, and by 1900 hours reported nine VC KIAs. The battalion (-) backloaded on ATCs and returned to the MRB.

(c) The 3-39th Infantry conducted a search of its area of previous contact employing Company C in the vicinity of XS832633. At 0930 hours Company C located 12 VC who were previously killed by artillery fire, and one RPG-2 rocket launcher in the vicinity of XS832633. Company C continued reconnaissance-in-force operations, and at 1020 hours located five VC KIA previously killed by airstrikes in the vicinity of XS342634. At 1340 hours Company A commenced airmobile operations from RACH KIEN, and at 1400 hours had completed its insertion in the vicinity of XS838640. The only contact of the day, occurred at 1435 hours when Company A engaged three VC with weapons moving west from the vicinity of XS893662. The battalion continued its search in the AO, and was later extracted by air to RACH KIEN at 1755 hours. The 3-39th Infantry was released from OPCON of the 2nd Brigade at 1800 hours. After extraction of its night kits, the 4-39th Infantry conducted a block and sweep operation in the northern portion of the AO. Company C was extracted from its night defensive positions and reinserted in the vicinity of XS883752 at 0853 hours. The company established an east to west blocking position oriented to the north. Company B subsequently made an airmobile extraction from NHA BE, at 0905 hours, and was inserted in the vicinity of XS879765. B/4-39th Infantry initiated reconnaissance-in-force operations to the south and west, moving towards the blocking positions established by Company C. The battalion (-) was extracted from the AO and returned to NHA BE at 1730 hours. The 4-39th Infantry was released from OPCON of the 2nd Brigade at 1800 hours.

(d) Throughout the day, assault craft of River Division 91 supported the 4-47th Infantry, and was ambushed while beaching the unit at 1320 hours. The boats encountered B-40 rocket and automatic weapon fire from both banks of the KINH LO. Fourteen Navy men and one infantry man were WHA, although the enemy fires were quickly suppressed. In a later engagement the river assault craft reported three VC KIA and captured one AK-47. Nine airstrikes were employed during the day resulting in 24 VC KIA and 42 bunkers destroyed.

(3) Results of the two day operation were: five U.S. KHA, one VN Tiger Scout KHA, 37 U.S. WHA, and six U.S. WNHA. Enemy losses consisted of 126 VC KIA, five POWs, 61 detainees, one 57mm recoilless rifle, three B-40 rocket launchers, one RPG-2 rocket launcher, ten AK-47s, six chicom carbines, one .38 cal pistol, one 9mm chicom pistol, 11 B-40 rounds, one RPG-2 rounds, 500 AK-47 rounds and six AK-47 magazines captured. In addition, 180 bunkers were destroyed.

## b. Phase II:

(1) On 27 June, the Mobile Riverine Force initiated offensive operations in support of Operation TOAN THANG - Phase II. The operation began at 0510 hours, when the 3-34th Artillery and river assault craft deployed to establish FSB WAGON WHEEL in the vicinity of XS903687. The 3-47th Infantry and 3-60th Infantry were employed into the AO, conducting beach assaults; after which, the two battalions attacked southwest and northeast respectively, employing eagle float techniques. The 3-47th Infantry initially employed B and E Companies in beach assaults in the vicinity of XS866680 and XS870681, while Company C remained afloat as the battalion RRF. C/3-47th Infantry subsequently beached at XS861681 and commenced to sweep through the area; one engagement occurred at 0915 hours. The company engaged one VC in the vicinity of XS867680; upon examining the VC KIA, it was assumed that he was an officer. The VC wore a helmet and web gear and carried a 9mm pistol. Continuing its sweep operations C/3-47th Infantry observed a group of six to seven individuals running in the area; the group was dressed in green uniforms. Artillery was employed

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against the group, which was evading the company's advance; results of the engagement were undetermined. Continuing its operations, the company moved to a PZ located in the vicinity of XS3568, where it found a chicom handweapon (pistol). The battalion employed Company C in an airmobile assault at 1352 hours to exploit intelligence reports of enemy activity in the vicinity of XS840645. A search of that area revealed only booby traps and no evidence of recent enemy activity. The 3-47th Infantry continued its employment of B and E Companies in eagle float and reconnaissance-in-force operations until 1830 hours; at which time, it established night defensive positions and employed ambush patrols.

During the day, the 3-60th Infantry was employed conducting eagle float and airmobile operations. The battalion conducted eagle float operations from XS895758 to XS887030, and reconned in force without any significant engagements. At 1100 hours E/3-60th Infantry was employed in an airmobile assault to exploit an intelligence target in the vicinity of XS925740. Subsequently C/3-60th Infantry was also employed by airmobile assault to the vicinity of XS903710. The battalion continued its operation without incident until 1815 hours; at which time it established night defensive positions in the vicinity of XS873728, XS883730 and XS913702. Throughout the day, D/3-5th Cav provided aerial reconnaissance and gunships support to the maneuver battalions. Another VC KIA was killed by the air cav troop when it engaged a small group fleeing in the vicinity of XS854692; one 9mm pistol was captured after the engagement. PSYOPS activities were conducted in conjunction with "People Sniffer" missions flown during the day. Five airstrikes were also employed in support of the day's operation; twelve bunkers were destroyed.

(2) After a quiet and uneventful night, the MRF continued operations at dawn on 28 June. At 0340 hours, the 3-47th Infantry embarked ATCs in the vicinity of its night defensive location and deployed to conduct beach assaults. E/3-47th Infantry beached at XS708625 and commenced its sweep operations. B/3-47th Infantry deployed to establish a PZ in the vicinity of FSB YUMA. The company beached at XS699599 and prepared for airmobile operations. C/3-47th Infantry beached in the vicinity of XS683585 and attacked northwest. At 1025 hours, B/3-47th Infantry was airlifted to XS692642 and attacked southwest. In the meantime, the 3-60th Infantry had embarked ATCs and made beach assaults employing Company E at XS689661, and Company A at XS652661. C/3-60th Infantry was airlifted from XS913702 to an LZ located at XS645636. Throughout the day, both infantry battalions were employed in extensive airmobile and riverine roles. Multiple insertions were made to seek out the enemy. "People Sniffer" mission conducted throughout the AO indicated high readings of human activity in the areas of XS712620, XS718654, XS710643 and XS722650 earlier in the day. However, both the ground forces and D/3-5th Air Cav were unable to locate and engage the enemy. The 3-47th Infantry continued its operations until 1820 hours, and established night defensive positions at XS700618, XS688598 and XS694618. The 3-60th Infantry established night defensive positions in the vicinity of XS656659, XS734566, XS650623 and XS669637. Throughout the day, the 3-34th Artillery supported the ground forces from FSB YUMA located at XS702606. D/3-5th Air Cav continued its support conducting aerial reconnaissance and providing light fire teams. Two airstrikes were employed resulting in five bunkers destroyed and ten structures damaged.

(3) At 0625 hours the operation continued with the 3-47th Infantry moving to FSB YUMA in the vicinity of XS702606 for extraction. At 0715 hours, the battalion (-) backloaded ATC and returned to the MRB without incident. The 3-60th Infantry employed C and E Companies in an airmobile assault to the vicinity of XS697598, where they backloaded ATCs at 0825 hours and returned to the MRB. A and B Company's backloaded ATCs in the vicinity of their night defensive position at 0748 hours and 0905 hours respectively, and returned to the MRB.

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The 3-34th Artillery (-) departed FSB YUMA, and moved to XS898615; the battalion (-) was LRF at 1600 hours.

(4) Operations continued on 30 June with the MRF implementing Frag Order #4 to OPORD 55-68. The 3-34th Artillery (-) departed the MRB area at 0400 hours to establish FSB CHEYENE in the vicinity of XS6276. The battalion arrived at 0915 hours and was LRF at 1000 hours. A/3-34th Artillery deployed from Dong Tam and joined the battalion at FSB CHEYENE. The 3-47th Infantry and 3-60th Infantry were employed in beach assaults; after which, both battalions were employed in subsequent airmobile and riverine insertions. At approximately 0430 hours the 3-47th Infantry and 3-60th Infantry embarked ATCs and proceeded up the SONG VAM CO DONG to the AO commonly titled the "Eagle's Beak". B/3-60th Infantry beached and established PZ SALLY (XS586799) and prepared for an airmobile assault to vicinity of XS588835. A/3-60th Infantry beached at RED Beach #1 in the vicinity of XS612760, and Company E was inserted in the vicinity of XS575794. In the meantime, the 3-47th Infantry had beached on GREEN Beaches in the vicinity of XS5778, and was reconning-in-force northeast in zone. The 3-47th Infantry encountered no significant contacts during the day; however, at 1530 hours Company A sustained two U.S. KHA and two WHA from a 105mm round booby trap in the vicinity of XS592786. B/3-60th Infantry was airlifted to vicinity of XS588835 at 1115 hours, landing without incident. Shortly thereafter, one of the airlift helicopters was engaged and downed by hostile fire in the vicinity of XS525817; no casualties resulted and the helicopter was later extracted. C/3-60th Infantry conducted an airmobile assault from XS612760 to vicinity of XS517825 at 1316 hours. The battalion made a series of airmobile insertions throughout the day without incident until 1800 hours. As A/3-60th Inf last airlift was departing a PZ in the vicinity of XS543821, it received sporadic small arms fire resulting in one U.S. WHA. E/3-60th Infantry found one case of U.S. grenades in the vicinity of XS542827. The infantry battalions subsequently established night defensive positions and employed ambush patrols. The 3-47th Infantry was located in the vicinity of XS592790, XS593789, and XS585793. The 3-60th Infantry was located in the vicinity of XS559832, XS553891 and XS553812.

(5) Operations continued on 1 July, with the 3-60th Infantry commencing eagle float operations, moving north from its night defensive positions to the vicinity of XS547913 without any significant contact or engagements. Several booby traps were destroyed during the battalion's recon-in-force operation. The 3-60th Infantry (-) was extracted in the vicinity of XS547913 at 1815 hours, and returned to the MRB at 2350 hours. The 3-47th Infantry attacked northeast from its night defensive positions. At 0116 hours, Company C received small arms and M-79 fire resulting in four U.S. WHA. The remainder of the day was spent exploiting intelligence targets using airmobile and riverine tactics with no significant contact; however, at 0832 hours vicinity of XS594789, Company C had one U.S. KHA from a 105mm round, booby trap. At 1020 hours, in the vicinity of XS600785 Company C sustained one U.S. WHA from a booby trap. C (-) and E Company backloaded ATCs, at 1900 hours, in the vicinity of XS6276 and returned to the MRB. The remainder of the battalion embarked ATCs from the vicinity of XS899622 and XS906657, and returned to the MRB.

(6) The MRF concluded the five day operation at 2305 hours when the 3-34th Artillery deployed from FSB CHEYENNE to the vicinity of XS503753. As a result of the operation, NVA/VC infiltration activities were evidently reduced. The absence of enemy contact and enemy losses though small (four VC KIA, five weapons and assorted munitions) were indications of the enemy's desire to evade friendly forces. During the operation three U.S. KHA and eight WHA resulted.

(7) On 2 July the Brigade deployed the 3-60th Infantry to DING TUONG Province to become OPCON to the 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division. The 3-60th Infantry was subsequently employed to secure FSBs established in the vicinity of Route #4. The deployment was

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initiated at 1455 hours when A/3-60th Infantry deployed from the MRB to a PZ in the vicinity of XS897615. The company was then airlifted to FSB MOORE in the vicinity of XS2650. The remainder of the battalion deployed to the PZ, and was airlifted to the TAOR where it was employed on multiple LZs. B/3-60th Infantry was airlifted to FSB MOHAWK in the vicinity of XS2450, Company C to the vicinity of XS4049, and Company E to FSB LAMBERT in the vicinity of XS3249. The battalion was passed OPCON to the 3rd Brigade at 1830 hours. The 3-47th Infantry remained at the MRB and employed B Company in defense of the MRB and FSB. The 2/E/3-47th Infantry continued its task of securing a tanker (truck) in the vicinity of XS641767. The platoon was employed on 1 July to secure the tanker which fell through a bridge on 30 June. The 3-47th Infantry continued its preparation for operations and on 4 June commenced reconnaissance in force operations in GO CONG Province

(8) The Mobile Riverine Force continued offensive operations on 4 July, implementing OP FRAG 1 to OPORD 56-68. The objective of the operation was to conduct riverine and reconnaissance in force operations to locate and destroy the 514th VC Battalion and other enemy elements in HOA LOC, HOA, DONG, CHAU THANH Districts, GO CONG Province. The operation was initiated in conjunction with the MRFs subsequent redeployment to DONG TAM. At 0415 hours, the 3-34th Artillery and its escorting river assault craft deployed to establish FSB MAVERICK in the vicinity of XS825538. The battalion arrived at 0600 hours and was LRF at 0645 hours. Concurrent with the artillery battalion's departure, the 3-47th Infantry (-) proceeded to the AO to employ its elements in beach assaults; after which, the battalion would attack south and east in zone. A/3-47th Infantry beached in the vicinity of XS807502 at 0800 hours. B/3-47th Infantry beached shortly thereafter, in the vicinity of XS814505. Both companies moved south and southeast while reconning in force. E/3-47th Infantry initially remained embarked as the RRF, and at 1100 hours the company beach in the vicinity of XS780519 and moved south in zone. The battalion continued its operation without incident, destroying bunkers and policing up the areas containing enemy equipment and supplies. B/3-47th Infantry apprehended three detainees with weapons and found two additional weapons. The detainees were later determined to be VCs. Another VC was captured by Company E. The battalion continued its operation until 1840 hours; at which time it established night defensive positions employing Company A in the vicinity of XS797490, Company B in the vicinity of XS783523 and Company E in the vicinity of XS797492. D/3-5th Air Cavalry provided aerial reconnaissance and gunship support throughout the day. Neither the air cav troop or the battalion encountered any engagement during the operation.

(9) On 5 July, the MRF continued the operation with the 3-47th Infantry embarking ATCs in the vicinity of its night defensive positions and deploying to Dong Tam. The battalion completed the transit moving through the CHO GAO Canal, and arrived at 1500 hours. The 3-34th Artillery departed FSB MAVERICK at 0945 hours and transited the CHO GAO Canal to Dong Tam. The MRF departed the SOI RAP Anchorage at 0630 hours and deployed by way of the South China Sea and MY THO River to Dong Tam; the transit was completed at 1435 hours. The 3-60th was released from OPCON of the 3rd Brigade and returned to the MRB at 1702 hours.

## 12. RESULTS:

### a. Phase I:

(1) Enemy personnel casualties	KIA	POW	DET
Period 162050 thru 182030 May	126	5	61

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(2) Friendly personnel casualties:	KHA	WHA	WNHA
Period 162050 thru 182030 May	6	37	6

b. Phase II:

(1) Enemy personnel casualties:	KIA	POW	DET
Period 270510 Jun thru 012350 Jul	4	0	25
Period 040415 thru 051500 Jul	0	4	4
Total enemy casualties:	<u>4</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>29</u>

(2) Friendly personnel casualties:	KHA	WHA	WNHA
Period 270510 Jun thru 012350 Jul	3	8	4
Period 040415 thru 051500 Jul	0	0	0
Total friendly casualties:	<u>3</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>4</u>

13. ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS: None

14. SPECIAL TECHNIQUES: One new technique which was employed successfully was the JITTERBUG. The JITTERBUG Concept is a four-step procedure used to locate, fix, develop and finally destroy an enemy target. With absolutely no pre-reconnaissance, the Command and Control (C & C) aircraft of the maneuver element and an LFT enter an AO. Working as a team, they attempt to confirm intelligence target locations or locate new targets. When a target is located, five of the troop-lift aircraft (already loaded and airborne) are inserted to engage the target. If contact is made or enemy movement out of the area is detected, a second set of five lift ships is inserted to block enemy evasion tactics. As the situation develops, additional troop lifts of five or ten aircraft are inserted. By not committing the airmobile maneuver elements until a definite target has been located, troop strength is conserved and the flexibility to react to any enemy move is retained.

15. COMMANDER ANALYSIS: Throughout both phases of Operation TOAN THANG, the presence of the Mobile Riverine Force reduced the facility with which NVA/VC elements could infiltrate and exfiltrate the Capital Military District of Saigon. The Brigade's ability to move anywhere, aboard TF 117 ships, itself represents a continuing deterrent to enemy initiatives against cities and installations. The enemy must always consider the fact that the MRF has the capability to operate against his base areas, his routes of communications and his units whenever they may mass to launch attacks. The two phase operation stressed the significant of employing airmobile and riverine assets. Tactics during both phases of the operation substantiated the conclusion that riverine and airmobile means represent logical complements to one another. Assault helicopter companies were employed extensively to enhance the mobility of the Brigade, such that infantry elements were inserted as required within the AOs to locate, fix, and destroy the enemy. Airmobile assets are a must, and their availability and utilization can vastly influence the course of a tactical situation. Employment of air cavalry troops in support of Brigade operations has had predominant influence in obtaining the desired tactical flexibility during engagements. In addition, the organic firepower of the air cavalry troops contributed toward destroying the enemy.

16. RECOMMENDATIONS: None

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Inclosures:

1. Task Organization
2. Overlay to OPORD 45-68
3. Overlay to OPORD 55-68
4. Overlay to OPORD 56-68

*Dennis N. Workman*  
 DENNIS N. WORKMAN  
 1LT, Infantry  
 Adjutant

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TASK ORGANIZATION

1. OPORD 45-68 (Period 162050 thru 182030 May)

HEADQUARTERS, 2nd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division

- a. 3-47th Infantry Battalion
- b. 4-47th Infantry Battalion (-)
- c. 3-34th Artillery Battalion (-)
- d. 3-39th Infantry Battalion (-) OPCON
- e. 4-39th Infantry Battalion (-) OPCON
- f. B/7-1st Air Cavalry
- g. Assault Helicopter Company

2. OPORD 55-68 (Period 270510 Jun thru 012350 Jul)

HEADQUARTERS, 2nd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division

- a. 3-47th Infantry Battalion
- b. 3-60th Infantry Battalion
- c. 3-34th Artillery Battalion (-) DS
- d. D/3-5th Air Cavalry
- e. Assault Helicopter Company


3. Frag Order 1 to OPORD 56-68 (Period 040415 thru 051500 Jul)

HEADQUARTERS, 2nd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division

- a. 3-47th Infantry Battalion
- b. 3-34th Artillery Battalion (-)
- c. D/3-5th Air Cavalry

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
Operational Overlay  
to OPORD 45-68  
effective - 162050 May



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Operational Overlay  
to OPORD 45-68  
effective - 162050 May




Inclosure 2

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Authority WD 87354/1  
By JF NARA Date 6-3

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Operational Overlay  
to OPORD 45-68  
effective - 162050 May




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
Operational Overlay  
to OPORD 55-68



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Operational Overlay  
to OPORD 55-68



Inclosure 3

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
Operational Overlay  
Frag Order 1  
to OPGP 56-68



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Operational Overlay  
to OPORD 56-68



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