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Authority MW921673
By WBP NARA Date 1/19/04

Annex A (Task Organization) to Combat Operations After Action Report
LAMSON 719 (U)

XXIV Corps

HQ, XXIV Corps

108th Arty Gp

8th Bn, 4th Arty

2d Bn, 94th Arty

1st Bn, 39th Arty (-) (D+30)

1st Bn, 44th Arty AWSP (-)

45th Engr Gp (OPCON D-13 to D+23)

14th Engr Bn (CBT)

630th Engr Co (LW)

511th Engr Co (PB)

59th Engr Co (-) (LC)

27th Engr Bn (CBT) (-)

591st Engr Co (LE)

504th MP Bn (-)

300th MP Co (OPCON)

212th CAB

131st Surv Aerial Co

220th Recon Airplane Co

101st Abn Div (Ambl) (-)

101st Abn Div Arty (-)

2d Bn (Ambl) 11th Arty

2d Bn (Ambl) 319th Arty

4th Bn, 77th AFA (Ambl) (-)

Co B, 326th Engr Bn (Ambl)

1st Bde, 101st Abn Div (Ambl) (Res)

3d Bde, 101st Abn Div (Ambl) (D+30 to D+67)

1st Bn, 501st Abn Inf (D+25 to D+67)

2d Bn, 502d Abn Inf (OPCON 3d Bde, 101st Abn Div) (D+26 to D+67)

1st Bn, 506th Abn Inf (D+47 to D+67)

2d Bn, 327th Abn Inf (D+29 to D+48)

TF 326th (OPCON) (-) (D-1 to D+17)

Co A, 326th Engr Bn (Ambl) (+)

59th EOD Det (-)

101st Combat Aviation Group

101st Avn Bn (AH) (Ambl) (D-1 to D+67)

158th Avn Bn (AH) (Ambl) (D-1 to D+67)

159th Avn Bn (AH) (Ambl) (D-1 to D+67)

5th Trans Bn (D-1 to D+67)

14th Avn Bn (OPCON) (D+2 to D+63)

71st AHC (D+25 to D+59)

116th AHC (D+34 to D+36 & D+50 to D+53)

174th AHC (D+25 to D+67)

132d ASHC (D+25 to D+63)

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AFTER 12 YEARS: DOD DIR 5200.10

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223d Avn Bn HHC (OPCON) (D+2 to D+67)
48th AHC (D+2 to D+67)
173d AHC (D+2 to D+67)
282d AHC (D+34 to D+36 & D+50 to D+51)
235th AWC (D+28 to D+56)
238th AWC (D+2 to D+56)
D/227th AWC (D+28 to D+66)
179th ASHC (D+23 to D+66)
756th Med

2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Air Cav

C/7/17 Cav Sqdn (OPCON)

B/7/1 Cav Sqdn (OPCON)

67th Med Gp

237th Med Det

571st Med Det

34th Gen Spt Gp (-)

34th Avn Det (DS)

34th Co Spt Gp (AM&S)

58th Trans Bn

610th SG Trans Co

142d DS Trans Co

263d GS Avel Co

MHHS 463d, 1st MAW (OPCON D+1)

1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech) (Reinf) (OPCON 101st Abn Div (Ambl)
D+32 to D+67)

1st Bn, 11th Inf (Mech)

3d Bn, 187th Abn Inf, 101st Abn Div (OPCON D-1 to D+67)

1st Bn, 61st Inf (Mech) (OPCON 101st Abn Div (Ambl) D+26 to D+31
and D+57 to D+67) (11th Bde, 23d Div D+32
to D+56)

3d Sqdn, 5th Cav

1st Bn, 77th Armor

5th Bn, 4th Arty (DS)

1st Bn, 82d Arty (-) 23d Div (Atch) (DS) (D-1)

Co A, 4th Bn, 12th Armor

Co A, 7th Engr

Co P, 75th Ranger

298th Sig Co

Co B, 23d Med Bn, 23d Div (OPCON D+31 to D+48)

75th Support Bn

Trp F, 8th Cav (OPCON D+2 to D+67)

11th Bde, 23d Inf Div (OPCON 101st Abn Div (Ambl) D+32 to D+66)

1st Sqdn, 1st Cav (OPCON 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech) D-1 to D+56)
(OPCON 101st Abn Div (Ambl) D+67)

2d Bn, 1st Inf (D+21)

4th Bn, 3d Inf, 23d Inf Div (OPCON 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech)
D-1 to D+56)

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H Troop, 17th Cav
Co C, 26th Engr Bn
6th Bn, 11th Arty (-)
Btry C, 1st Bn, 82d Arty
Btry C, 6th Bn, 11th Arty
Btry A, 3d Bn, 82d Arty
11th Spt Bn (Prov)

HQ, USASUPCOM - DNG
26th GSQ
8th Trans Gp
39th Trans Bn
57th Trans Bn
Co C, 11th Motor Trans Bn (+)
2d Maint Bn
63d Maint Bn
FSA 26-1
FSA 26-2

I Corps
HQ, I Corps
I Corps Arty
64th Arty Bn
1st ALC I Corps
71st Med Gp
I Corps Sig Bn
1st MP Bn
111th Trans Co
116th Trans Co
118th Trans Co
1st Arm Bde
7th ACS
11th ACS
17th ACS
4th ACS (Prov) (OPCON) (D+40)
1st/3d Armored Cav
1st/8th Armored Cav

1st Abn Div (+) (OPCON)
1st Abn Div Arty (-)
44th FA Bn (Med)
1st Abn Med Bn
1st Abn Service Bn
1st Abn Signal Bn
1st Abn Bde
1st Abn Bn
8th Abn Bn
9th Abn Bn
1st Arty Bn

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2d Abn Bde
5th Abn Bn
7th Abn Bn
11th Abn Bn
2d Arty Bn
3d Abn Bde
2d Abn Bn
3d Abn Bn
6th Abn Bn
3d Arty Bn

1st Inf Div

1st Regt
1st Bn, 1st Inf Regt
2d Bn, 1st Inf Regt
3d Bn, 1st Inf Regt
4th Bn, 1st Inf Regt
2d Regt
1st Bn, 2d Inf Regt (OPCON 54th Regt D+53 to D+68)
2d Bn, 2d Inf Regt
3d Bn, 2d Inf Regt
4th Bn, 2d Inf Regt
5th Bn, 2d Inf Regt

3d Regt
1st Bn, 3d Inf Regt
2d Bn, 3d Inf Regt
3d Bn, 3d Inf Regt
4th Bn, 3d Inf Regt

54th Inf Regt
1st Bn, 54th Regt
2d Bn, 54th Regt
4th Bn, 54th Regt

10th Engr Gp

101st Engr Bn
Co A, 1st Engr Bn
Co B, 1st Engr Bn
Co C, 102d Engr Bn
118th Engr LC Co

1st Med Bn
1st Sig Bn
1st Log Bn

1st Inf Div Arty
48th Arty Bn (-)
B/11 (105)
B/48 (155)
C/10 (155)
11th Arty Bn (-)

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C/11 (105)
A/10 (155)
14th Arty Bn (-)
A/48
62d Arty Bn
A/62 (105)
14th Arty
B/14 (105)
C/48 (155)
1st Ranger Gp (+)
21st Rngr Bn
37th Rngr Bn
39th Rngr Bn
77th Rngr Border Defense Bn
3d Co 79th Rngr Border Defense Bn

Vietnamese Marine Division (D+1)

HQ Bn
Service Bn
Medical Bn
A Btry, 48th Arty Bn (-) (155)
147th Bde (D+1)
2d Inf Bn
4th Inf Bn
7th Inf Bn
2d Arty Bn
C Btry, 20th Arty Bn (155)
258th Bde
1st Inf Bn
3d Inf Bn
8th Inf Bn
3d Arty Bn
D Btry, 48th Arty Bn (-) (155)
369th Bde (D+32)
5th Inf Bn
6th Inf Bn
9th Inf Bn
1st Arty Bn
5th Inf Regt, 2d Inf Div
1st Bn, 5th Inf Regt
2d Bn, 5th Inf Regt

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Annex B (Personnel and Administration) to Comint Operations After Action Report LAMSON 719 (U)

1. (U) G1 support was limited to general administrative functions which consisted primarily of monitoring strength and casualty reports of US units, and morale and welfare activities. A G1 staff element consisting of one officer, was established at the corps forward CP for the purpose of supporting corps troops in the operational area and maintaining liaison with G1 at the corps main CP.

2. (C) Other Aspects:

a. Adjutant General Support. The AG mission was strictly that of supporting the forward CP administratively in internal procedures and functions. The following services were provided.

- (1) Classified Control.
- (2) Reproduction.
- (3) Clerical Assistance.
- (4) Control of Courier Items.
- (5) Message Processing.

To accomplish this, two Administrative Specialists and two Message Center Clerks were assigned to process messages and correspondence in the forward TOC and operate a distribution center in the Headquarters Commandant's forward area. The G3 Sergeant Major and the Headquarters Commandant provided assistance in supervising these operations.

b. Replacements. Replacement personnel for units involved in LAMSON 719 were obtained through normal administrative channels. There were a sufficient number of replacements from CONUS and units standing down to meet and exceed personnel losses. Units involved in LAMSON 719 were given priority for replacements.

c. Medical.

(1) US medical units and facilities which supported the operation responded in an exemplary manner. Evacuation of the sick and wounded was timely and well executed. Patient treatment provided was competent and truly professional in nature.

(2) Patient Evacuation. RVNAF patients in Laos were evacuated by US DUSTOFF helicopters, and in emergencies by gunships and cargo helicopters belonging to American units. RVNAF DUSTOFF aircraft conducted no

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Annex B (Personnel and Administration) to Combat Operations After Action Report LAMSON 719 (U)

operation into Laos. RVNAF patients picked up in Laos were evacuated by air to the RVNAF medical facility at Khe Sanh, operated by the 71st Medical Group. Patients were sorted, further stabilized, and rendered necessary emergency treatment before they were evacuated to the 71st Medical Group medical facility at Dong Ha. All evacuations to Dong Ha were conducted by US and VNAF helicopter assets. Company B, 75th Support Battalion, 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized) was operating at Khe Sanh to provide emergency care and treatment to US wounded personnel, and to provide back up support to the ARVN medical facility at Khe Sanh during mass casualty situations, or situations requiring special medical treatment that the ARVN was incapable of providing. RVNAF patients evacuated to Dong Ha were stabilized for evacuation to Hue, Da Nang, Saigon and other cities where a patient's unit was home-based. This evacuation of patients from Dong Ha was conducted by the 903d Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron, and was directed and supervised by the XXIV Corps Surgeon. Patient evacuation could have been conducted by the 903d Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron at the Khe Sanh airstrip. However, the ARVN medical facility was located approximately eight kilometers from the airstrip, and the roads were entirely unsuitable for ground patient evacuation from the Khe Sanh airstrip. The 18th Surgical Hospital at Quang Tri handled most US casualties resulting from the support of Operation LAMSON 719, and was prepared to provide assistance to the 71st Medical Group in mass casualty situations, and in the situations requiring specialized medical treatment that was unavailable from ARVN resources. The USS SANCTUARY was available periodically, to provide neurosurgery capabilities. The 95th Evacuation Hospital and the 85th Evacuation Hospital also made available specialized medical and surgical capabilities that were necessary for life-saving purposes. On 3 March 1971, the 571st and 237th Medical Detachments (RA) were made OPCON to the XXIV Corps, and were further placed OPCON to the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile). This OPCON procedure centralized control of DUSTOFF assets under the 101st Airborne Division. The 571st and 237th DUSTOFF units were responsible for evacuating ARVN casualties from Laos, and the 101st organic DUSTOFF aircraft provided DUSTOFF support to American units participating in LAMSON 719. Evacuation of patients was often overlapping by the DUSTOFF detachments, i.e... the closest helicopter to the pickup zone made the patient pickup, regardless of DUSTOFF unit or patient nationality.

(3) Treatment Facilities:

US

18th Surgical Hospital

RVNAF

71st Medical Group

B Med, 75th Support Bn

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US

USS Sanctuary

85th Evacuation Hospital

95th Evacuation Hospital

(4) Medical Statistics.

(a) Dustoff Evacuation:

Total missions 1,396

Total missions into Laos 296

Total patients evacuated

US 1,614

RVNAF 2,468

Total patients evacuated

from Laos 1,570

Bogus missions 68

(b) Fixed Wing Evacuation

Total missions 36

Total patients evacuated 3,039
(RNVAF)

Litter 661

Ambulatory 2,378

d. Chaplain Activities. The overall role of the Chaplain area coverage throughout the operation was excellent. Although the Chaplain sections were not geared for the increase in requirements generated by LAMSON 719, the religious program was met with outstanding success. The success of the cooperative Chaplain effort was due to commanders support and interest in seeking and assisting in providing this important aspect of morale and the Chaplain's efforts and willingness to meet the challenge.

e. Provost Marshal:

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(1) During the operation a forward CP of the 504th Military Police Battalion was established at the Quang Tri Combat Base in order to provide a coordination and control base for operations. The forward CP controlled the day-to-day conduct of the operation; coordinated escort and traffic control requirements along QL 1 through the city of Hue, Quang Tri, and Dong Ha Combat Base and traffic control of QL 9 from the Dong Ha Combat Base westward to Khe Sanh; gathered and prepared required data; disseminated new missions and information to subordinate units and the Corps staff; operated an MP communications facility; and provided physical security for the Corps TOG.

(2) The 300th MP Company was alerted and deployed from 18th Military Police Brigade resources at Long Binh. The unit was assigned missions specifically along QL 9.

(3) Two MP platoons were formed from existing resources from within the 16th Military Police Group's 97th MP Battalion and attached to the 504th MP Battalion. The purpose of these augmentations to existing units was in anticipation of commitments in conjunction with the mission, particularly with respect to convoy escort and security.

(4) Vehicle Density on QL 9.

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>EAST BOUND</u>	<u>WEST BOUND</u>
February	12,593	14,212
March	14,448	14,605
April (1-6 only)	4,356	3,981
TOTALS	31,397	32,798

(5) Convoys Escorted/Monitored: FEBRUARY MARCH APRIL

Total Convoys:	861	693	230
US	673	374	116
ARVN	188	319	114

Total Vehicles:

US	15,097	4,359	1,539
ARVN	9,581	9,252	4,025

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(6) Significant Discipline, Law and Order Activities:

<u>OFFENSE</u>	<u>CASES</u>
Aggravated assault	9
Murder or attempted murder (w/hand held explosives)	6
Murder/negligent homicide	2
Fatal traffic accidents	14
Non fatal traffic accidents	68
Possession of dangerous drugs	59
Possession of Marijuana	40
Narcotics confiscated:	
Heroin	987 vials
Marijuana	38 kilograms
Assorted pills	275 each
Bottled Obisitol	23 bottles

3. (C) Friendly Casualties

a. US

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>MIA</u>
23d Inf Div	47	256	7
101st Abn Div (AMBL)	68	261	17
1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (MECH)	55	431	3
XXIV Corps Arty	9	76	0
USASUPCOM	8	40	0
45th Eng Gp	6	11	0
504th MP Bn	3	15	0
223d Avn Bn	19	59	11

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b. RVNAF

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>MIA</u>
1st Inf Div	537	1,607	537
1st Armd Bde	54	364	0
1st Ranger Gp	93	435	27
I Corps Troops	55	314	24
Abn Div	455	1,992	0
VNMC Div	355	770	63

4. (U) Awards and Decorations.

a. CG, XXIV Corps has approved awards for valor or heroism and forwarded recommendations for 743 US personnel for individual ARVN awards and 34 US units for ARVN unit awards. In addition 103 ARVN personnel were recommended for US awards.

b. US Awards.

b. US Awards.	<u>XXIV CORPS</u>	<u>101st Abn Div (Ambl)</u>	<u>1/5 (Mech)</u>	<u>23d Inf</u>
Silver Star	8	34	15	26
Distinguished Flying Cross	3	142	25	50
Bronze Star/Valor	18	43	113	30
Army Commendation Medal/Valor	6	36	95	37
TOTAL	35	255	248	143

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Appendix 1 to (G1 Advisors Report of ARVN G1 Activities) to Annex B (Personnel and Administration) to Combat Operation After Action Report LAMSON 719. (U)

1. (C) Planning Phase: a. On 18 January 1971 the I Corps G1 and G1 Advisor became involved in the Planning of LAMSON 719 and began formulating plans for moving the I Corps forward CP to Dong Ha. An advance party was moved to Dong Ha to lay out the CP area and develop detail plans to move and establish a forward Headquarters at Dong Ha Combat Base. Planning was orderly and the CP area was well organized. The headquarters forward element moved by road to Dong Ha on the night of 29 January 1971 closing in the CP area at 0300 hours, 30 January 1971. The move was orderly and convoy discipline was outstanding. The G1, I Corps was convoy commander for the move.

b. Concurrently with the planning and preparation for the move the following actions were accomplished:

- (a) Plans for establishment of a 500 man POW Camp
- (b) Dong Ha CP security.
- (c) Review of the status of personnel undergoing training in training centers and earmarking graduates for allocation to combat units.
- (d) Publication of personnel reporting and strength accounting procedures. Daily reports similar to US Personnel Daily Summary were developed.
- (e) Re-allocating personnel as replacements for Lam Son tactical units.

c. No provisions or estimates were made for refugees as the operations plan did not envision evacuation of non-combatants from Laos.

2. (C) Execution: a. Adequacy of Plans. Planning in the G1 area of interest was conducted in an orderly and logical manner. From the standpoint of adequacy there were some shortcomings. Due to the Marine and Airborne Divisions being OPCON to I Corps rather than attached, obtaining information and personnel data from these units was often difficult and untimely. Both units operated independent replacement systems, neither of which were responsive to I Corps. The lack of data and responsiveness hampered forecasting and reporting of personnel data, planning for replacements, evacuation of casualties, and optimum use of personnel assets.

b. The overall efforts of the G1 were adequate. The basic problems in the G1 area stemmed from the fact that I Corps had not previously operated as a Corps, and had not been confronted by the day to day quick reaction decisions that are required to support a corps level operation. In the waning days of the operation the G1 areas were running smoothly and the G1 was aggressive and sought speedy solutions to problems.

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3. (C) Other Aspects. a. Maintenance of Morale. The morale of Lam Son 719 forces was generally high. Vietnamese Chaplains were active throughout the operational area. Delegations from the National Assembly and Provinces visited the operational area to express gratitude and appreciation to RVNAF forces participating in the operations. Morale programs were set up in the rear and rest areas.

b. Replacements. Replacements provided during the operation were obtained from the training centers (draftees) and ex-military prisoners that were restored to duty. Providing replacements to combat units was a constant problem and was relentlessly pursued by the G1 throughout the operation.

c. Medical. The surgeon is under the staff supervision of the G4. During the operation the lightly wounded in many instances, were evacuated to the rear. This problem caused a significant drain on manpower. Action was taken to change this procedure and to return lightly wounded personnel to duty. RVNAF medical support is covered in more detail in paragraph 2c(2), Annex B.

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Annex C (Intelligence) to Combat Operations After Action Report LAMSON 719 (U)

1. (U) Topography

a. The terrain of Quang Tri Province may be generally divided into two belts, north and south of the Song Thach (Song Quang Tri). Both belts have significant river valleys. In the north they are the Cam Lo and the Ben Hai. In the south they are the Song Thach, Da Krong and the Xe Pon.

b. Both belts can be subdivided into three general regions: the lowlands east of QL 1 with elevations under 10 meters; the Piedmont Region west of QL 1 with elevations up to 300 meters; and a portion of the Annamite Mountain Chain between the Piedmont Region and the Laotian border. The Piedmont Region is more extensive in the northern belts, extending for a distance of 15-20 kilometers, as compared with 10 kilometers in the south. Similarly, the highest elevations are greater in the north than in the south, 1,600 meters as opposed to 1,000.

c. The type of vegetation in Quang Tri (P) may be generally related to the three regions of the province: the Coastal Plains are generally inundated, and are covered by rice paddies. Vegetation in the Piedmont varies from sparse in the west to medium in the foothills of the mountains. The mountainous areas are generally covered by double and triple canopied forests with very dense undergrowth.

d. The primary ground LOC in the province is the National Highway QL 1. A secondary ground LOC is QL 9, which runs from a junction with QL 1 (in the vicinity of Dong Ha) west to the Laotian border. From Dong Ha to FSB Vandegrift (YD0049) QL 9 is a two lane, all weather, hard surfaced road, occasionally subject to enemy harassment. West of FSB Vandegrift, QL 9 becomes a two lane, fair weather, dirt surface road which is always subject to enemy interdiction and has many destroyed bridges.

e. The Cua Viet is a major water LOC, providing Dong Ha and Quang Tri cities a water link with the sea through its tributaries. Due to its proximity to the DMZ, the river is continually the target of enemy mining attempts.

f. The terrain of Laos in the area of operation LAMSON 719 is characterized by three prominent terrain features, all of which are parallel to Highway 9. The first of these is the Xe Pon River. The Xe Pon is the primary drainage feature in this area and runs between and generally parallel to the high escarpment to its south and Highway 9 to its north. The Xe Pon River runs almost the length of Highway 9 to Tchepone where it meets the Xe Bang Hiang River, a primary north-south drainage feature in the area.

g. The second prominent terrain feature in this area is the Co Roc highland adjacent to the RVN/Laos border and just south of

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Highway 9, vicinity XD 7432. Two pieces of high ground provide excellent observation and fields of fire from the Co Roc area into the valley through which Highway 9 extends. The vegetation in the Co Roc area consists primarily of bamboo and brushwood, offering adequate cover and concealment.

h. The third significant terrain feature in this area is the high escarpment between XD 5036 and XD 3141. This ridgeline extends westward into Laos parallel to highway 9 and the Xe Pon River, overlooking all of the ground to the north, and is covered by very thick brushwood and dense, closed canopy. Much of the area has been subjected to a farming technique known as slash and burn, which has destroyed much of the undergrowth and cleared some areas, but dense vegetation still covers much of the land.

i. The terrain north of Highway 9, is very hilly, well drained and heavily vegetated, restricting access almost entirely to infantry. This land form holds true throughout most of the area, but the vegetation becomes very thick and triple canopied west of the Xe Bang Hiang River. Around Tchepone the terrain is of lower elevation and is open canopied and much more accessible to armored vehicle traffic.

j. Highway 9, from Khe Sanh to Tchepone, is a one lane, dirt, seasonal thoroughfare. For this reason, and because it is overlooked by the high escarpment to the south, it is easily interdicted if the high ground is held. It is not easily bypassed due to the river to the south and the hilly terrain to the north.

2. (U) Weather summary for LAMSON 719.

a. Availability of data:

There were no weather observers in Laos for operation LAMSON 719; therefore, all daily weather summaries for the LAMSON area were based on pilot reports recorded at the Tan Son Nhut weather central, weather analysis charts that were saved by local weather forecasters, and the forecaster's own information on restrictions of visibility near operational activity. Official weather observations were available for the Khe Sanh area from 8 February 1971 to 29 March 1971.

b. Weather during LAMSON 719.

(1) On a few days, the weather was bad enough to affect operations in the LAMSON operational area by delaying take off times for FAC pilots and delaying air shipment of supplies to Khe Sanh and Lang Vei. Weather conditions in this region presented difficulties and hazards during the operation. On many days early morning fog obscured most of the terrain and prevented launch from Khe Sanh until almost noon. Mid-day offered the best over-all conditions

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for flight. Generally the skies were clear and visibility was reasonable, giving aviators excellent conditions for missions. However, as mid-afternoon approached, cumulus build-up would restrict air-space; and the haze from fires and dust would limit visibility, creating instrument flight conditions wholly unsuitable to operational missions. The weather in Quang Tri (P) during the operational period was influenced by the end of the Northeast Monsoon period and the start of the transition period to the Southwest Monsoon. The Northeast Monsoon, which was the dominant weather factor in February, is the result of a northeasterly flow of cool, moist air from the sea, and brings considerable lowland cloudiness, light rain and drizzle to the province. In March, the Northeast Monsoon begins to weaken, causing an improvement of the weather in the province. The weather in March is characterized by two to three day periods of good weather, interspersed with periods of low ceilings and low visibility.

(2) Aviation weather standards: During Operation LAMSON 719, ceilings of 1,000 feet above ground level (AGL) were used as a standard for effective operation of Army aircraft while ceilings of 3,000 feet AGL were used as a criterion for employment of Air Force tactical air support.

(3) The following table illustrates the percent of time ceilings in the coastal plains and western Quang Tri/western Laos portions of the AO met minimum aviation standards.

AREAS	% OF TIME CEILING MET MINIMUM STANDARDS	
	1000 + FT AGL	3000 + FT AGL
Coastal Plains		
0800 - 1800 hours	80%	54%
1200 - 1800 hours	91%	69%
Western Quang Tri (Khe Sanh) and Eastern Laos		
0800 - 1800 hours	33%	25%
1200 - 1800 hours	64%	45%

These figures are significant because the majority of the support aircraft for LAMSON 719 were based in the coastal plains, and daily were required to cross the Annamite Mountain Chain, stage at Khe Sanh, and operate in eastern Laos. In general, it could be stated that a ceiling above 2,500 feet in the coastal lowlands resulted in ceilings above 1,000 feet in the operational area.

3. (S) Enemy situation in the operational area prior to 30 January 1971.

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(1) General

(a) In northern Military Region 1 (NMR 1) the enemy had shown intentions of increasing the tempo and scope of his operations. During the latter part of 1970, he had initiated a campaign of attacks by fire, limited ground attacks and sapper attacks to inflict maximum casualties and damage to allied personnel and installations. These attacks were directed against fire support bases (FSB), isolated outposts and lucrative, high value installations. In conjunction with this activity, agent reports indicated that the enemy in and north of the DMZ was conducting resupply activities and preparing for a campaign to be launched against the northern two provinces of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) toward the end of January. Additional agent reports indicated that the NVA would launch a major campaign during the spring and summer of 1971 in an attempt to control the lowlands of Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces. The attacks being conducted during the latter part of 1970 and during January 1971 were believed to be designed to wear down allied forces, determine weak points in allied defenses, and demonstrate an appearance of strength in preparation for future large scale attacks. During December 1970 and January 1971 the 84th Artillery Regiment, supported by other R-5 front elements, concentrated on attacking by fire the FSBs south of the DMZ, thereby permitting greater freedom of movement for the 27th and 246th Infantry Regiments as well as the 33d Sapper Battalion and 126th Naval Sapper Regiment. Intelligence indicated that the 27th Regiment had formed a 4th Battalion and was preparing for increased activity south of the central DMZ while elements of the 246th Regiment were concentrating on road building activities in an area south of the western DMZ. Elements of the 33d Sapper Battalion moved south of the central DMZ to conduct activities near and around Cam Lo and Route 9. Water mining incidents in the Cua Viet River reflected continued activity by elements of the 126th Naval Sapper Regiment. The 270th Regiment remained committed to the defense of the Vinh Linh Special Zone north of the DMZ. Agent reports on elements of the 164th Artillery Regiment indicated that the Regiment was continuing its training and coastal defense missions. Evidence of 164th Regiment participation in attacks south of the DMZ was practically non-existent, further supporting agent reports concerning 164th missions.

(b) In Thua Thien Province intelligence indicated that Military Region Tri Thien Hue (MRTTH) elements were also preparing for future activities. Elements of the 7th Front were actively engaged in attempting to infiltrate the coastal lowlands. Prisoner and Hoi Chanh statements and other intelligence revealed that the 7th Front proposed to establish a ~~favorable~~ political climate, procure food locally and establish bases and caches for future operations. The infiltration of the lowlands was accompanied by attempts to interdict QL 1 and the Hue to Da Nang railroad, the major lines of communication (LOC), and attacks by fire (ABF) on isolated outposts and installations.

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such as Camp Evans (101st Airborne) and the city of Hue (1st ARVN Division Headquarters). Concurrently, the enemy began to open Route 616 in the Vietnamese Salient and by 1 January 1971, Route 616 was open and sustaining moderate to heavy truck traffic. Additionally the enemy had begun construction of a new road, an offshoot of Route 616 which bisected the northern portion of the Laotian Salient and reentered RVN in the vicinity of the Da Krong River Valley. This road was part of the enemy's plan to expedite the flow of supplies and develop a major infiltration route for personnel into Base Area 129 where enemy forces would stage, resupply and prepare for future attacks against the heavily populated coastal lowlands of Thua Thien (P). Further to the south elements of the 324B Division were engaged in resupply and refitting activities following the Ripcord/O'Reilly campaigns. Agent reports indicated that the 29th Regiment was heavily committed to road building activities in eastern Base Area 611 and in the Tiger Mountain area. Sensor activations also revealed considerable activity in this area. Elements of the 803d and 812th Regiments continued to refit and train and protect caches in the western portion of Thua Thien Province, while elements of the 4th and 5th Regiments remained forward near the Piedmont in southern Thua Thien Province. During January 1971, agents began to report an increased state of alertness on the part of the enemy forces north of the DMZ. Additional agent reports indicated that the enemy was reinforcing B-5 Front elements in preparation for defense against a suspected attack on the two southern provinces of North Vietnam. Aerial photography supported these indications by revealing field artillery pieces just north of the Ben Hai River in the central DMZ area. Aerial Photography also revealed that the area north of the central DMZ had become extremely active during early January.

(2) Enemy Forces.

(a) Strength

Enemy strength in Northern MR 1 was estimated to be 25,100. Enemy strength in the B-5 Front area of responsibility (approximately 20 kilometers north of the DMZ, south to the Cua Viet River and Route 9) was estimated to be 14,800. In the MRTTH area (south from Route 9, and the Cua Viet River to the Thua Thien/Quang Nam Province) enemy strength was estimated to be 10,300.

(b) Composition

(1) Enemy forces operating in the DMZ/NMR 1 area consisted of 27 infantry battalions, 12 artillery and rocket battalions, eight sapper battalions, and the equivalent of eight other combat and service support battalions. A total of nine infantry battalions, two sapper battalions, six artillery battalions and four other combat and service support battalions were located in the B-5 Front area. Enemy composition in the MRTTH area consisted of 18 infantry battalions, six sapper

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battalions, six artillery and rocket battalions and the equivalent of four additional combat and service support battalions.

(2) Major enemy units identified as operating in the B-5 Front area included the 207th, 27th and 246th Infantry Regiments, the 31st LI Group; the 33d Sapper Battalion; the 126th Naval Sapper Regiment (a battalion equivalent) and the 84th and 164th Artillery Regiments. In the MRTTH area major enemy units included the 7th Front (a regimental equivalent); the 812th, 803d and 29th Infantry Regiments of the 324B Division; the 4th, 5th and 6th Infantry Regiments and the 675th Field Artillery Regiment.

(c) Reinforcement capability.

Reported enemy disposition was such that it was estimated that the enemy would reinforce his elements in the DMZ area with only one regiment or about 2,000 men from NVN.

b. Southern Laos.

(1) General

(a) The change of governments in Phnom Penh in 1969 and the resulting loss of the Cambodian port of Sihanoukville, which was being used to supply NVA/VC troops in Cambodia and in RVN MR III and IV, forced North Vietnam to switch to a total reliance on the LOC in the Laotian panhandle.

(b) During the latter part of 1970 the enemy had greatly expanded his rear service area adjacent to the border of Quang Tri Province (see Appendix 4 for a comparison of build up). He had reactivated his traditional logistics system in the eastern portion of the Laotian panhandle and had expanded this network to the west sufficiently to increase the flow of supplies to forces in Cambodia and diffuse the US air interdiction effort. The enemy was attempting to gain military superiority in the southern portion of NVA MR III and IV (Appendix 3) in Laos and to protect traditional and expanded LOC. As of 1 January 1970, enemy activity to extend Route 1036 to the south had been discouraged by heavy US bombing along the Laotian/NVN border. Route 1039, however, had been completed through the Ban Raving Pass where it connected with Routes 913 and 92A to offer the enemy another route into the Tchepone area. Route 1032A was sustaining vehicle traffic into the western DMZ where supplies were unloaded into the Houay Nam Xe/Xe Bang Hiang River and floated west and south where they were then picked up along Routes 913 and 92A. On the east-west infiltration routes within the region, only very light foot traffic was evident. Immediately to the south, the enemy prepared to cross the Xe Pon River and move into the Republic of Vietnam on Route 616. This east-west route was first noted being used on 1 January 1970. However, the

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principle direction of movement was out of this region to the south along Routes 9G, 92G, and 914 into Base Area 611 (Appendix 4). By January 1971, Route 1032A had been connected with Route 1032B providing the NVA with an effective entry gate from NVN into Laos (Appendix 4). In spite of the heavy bombing in the western DMZ, sensors indicated that as many as one out of every four trucks exiting NVN was using this entry gate. Analysis of aerial photography also indicated numerous alternate bypass routes in this area which ensured a steady, uninterrupted flow of supplies, in spite of interdictory efforts by the US Air Force. Widening of Route 925 to within four kilometers of the border was also noted, indicating the possibility of the development of a major east-west infiltration route into the Khe Sanh area of western Quang Tri. Enemy vehicles were entering the Republic of Vietnam on Route 616 and heavy input further south through Base Area 611 was also noted (Appendix 4). Thus, inspite of intensive air interdiction, the enemy had expanded his storage areas, transshipment points, truck parks, POL pipelines and by pass roads. Most of these concentrations appeared in Base Areas 604 and 611, and the enemy moved an increasing number of anti-aircraft units into these areas and the road systems serving them. This was accompanied by a build up of enemy combat troops in Base Area 604 along the main north-south supply routes. The supposed mission of these troops was to provide security of the vital supply links during the Lactian dry season. Enemy activity in NVA MR III appeared to be directed toward the improvement of LOC and the movement and storage of supplies. The enemy had not initiated any significant offensive operations. Friendly guerrilla efforts had met little opposition; however, these friendly elements did not pose a major threat to enemy units located in Base Areas 604 and 611.

(2) Enemy

(a) Strength

(1) The enemy strength in NVA MR III and IV was estimated to be 64,000 consisting of about 54,000 NVA and 10,000 Pathet Lao troops. In MR III the enemy strength was estimated to be 42,000 consisting of 5,000 NVA in combat battalions, 32,000 troops assigned to the 559th Transportation Group and 5,000 Pathet Lao. In MR IV, enemy strength was estimated to be approximately 22,000 including about 7,000 NVA personnel assigned to combat battalions, about 10,000 in elements of the 559th Transportation Group, and 4,000 Pathet Lao.

(2) Enemy strength in northern Laos was estimated to be approximately 33,000 consisting of 16,000 NVA and 17,000 Pathet Lao. Information suggested that NVA and Pathet Lao units located in northern Laos would continue operations in northern Laos and probably not move to the LAMSON 719 AO.

(b) Composition

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Intelligence indicated that in MR III major enemy units consisted of the following: 13 NVA and 20 Pathet Lao battalions, 10 Binh Trams, one Front Headquarters and nine regimental or larger headquarters. In MR IV the enemy force was believed to be organized into approximately 17 NVA and 21 Pathet Lao battalions, six Binh Trams and four regimental or higher headquarters. Agent reports, Hoi Chanh and prisoners indicated enemy units located in the LAMSON 719 area of operation included all or major elements of the 48th Regiment, 320th Division; 24B Regiment, 304th Division; 141st Regiment; the 3d NVA Regiment and the 1st VC Regiment, 2d NVA Division; and elements of the 675B Artillery Regiment. In addition to these combat forces, each Binh Tram had an organic transportation, engineer, and AAA capability and at least one infantry company. All Binh Tram personnel were believed to have received some infantry training. These factors, combined with the considerable command and signal capabilities normally present in a Binh Tram, made it a potentially significant fighting force. Binh Trams in the area of operation included Binh Trams 32, 33, and 34. Although not identified, up to three additional Binh Trams were believed to be located in the area of operation. To provide security against air attack, approximately 20 anti-aircraft artillery battalions had been assigned to these Binh Trams. Each air defense battalion contained two to five companies. Not all companies were believed to have weapons, as some had been organized into transport companies, maintenance companies, and ammunition supply companies. Weapons companies had two to six weapons of mixed caliber. Up to 200 medium caliber (23mm, 37mm, 57mm, and 100mm) weapons were estimated to be employed in the area of interest.

(c) Reinforcement capability.

Agent reports and prisoner and Hoi Chanh statements indicated that enemy disposition in North Vietnam, Laos and the Republic of Vietnam would permit the enemy to reinforce his combat, transportation, and rear service personnel in LAMSON 719 area of operation with up to seven regiments by D+21. Available for reinforcement within one week were four regiments: two from the 304th Division and two from 320th Division. Available for reinforcement within two weeks was one additional regiment from the 304th Division. Available for reinforcement within three weeks were two additional regiments of the 308th Division. In addition, the enemy was expected to be able to reinforce with one battalion from the 164th Artillery Regiment within two weeks and block or defend with two other regiments from the south (Appendix 5 for enemy disposition prior to operation LAMSON 719).

c. Capabilities and conclusions.

(1) Capabilities

(a) To defend in the DMZ/NMR 1 area with available forces.

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(b) To attack across the DMZ with up to four regimental equivalents to cut the major LOC and to seize key population centers in NMR 1.

(c) To reinforce enemy forces located in and north of the DMZ with one additional regiment.

(d) To withdraw forces providing security for logistics facilities and LOC in Laos.

(e) To defend logistic facilities and LOC in Laos with available forces.

(f) To reinforce defending forces in Laos with up to seven regiments by D+21.

(2) Conclusion

The enemy had become concerned about the possibility that Allied forces were planning an invasion of NVN. Indications were that the enemy was assuming a defensive posture north of the DMZ and, therefore, probably would not launch a massive effort into NMR 1. However, the enemy indicated that he would continue his attacks by fire on Allied FSB's and would probably make a determined effort to interdict the major LOC and harass Allied rear areas. In Laos, enemy forces were actively engaged in supporting a massive effort to move supplies into and out of the Lao-Tian panhandle. As NVA forces operating in Cambodia were depending upon this extensive logistic and LOC network in Laos, it was estimated that the enemy would choose to defend his logistics base in Laos and would reinforce defending forces with enemy units located in NVN and possibly with forces from MRTTH.

4. (S) Enemy reaction to Operation LAMSON 719.

a. Phase I (30 January - 8 February 1971)

North of the DMZ, agent reports indicated the enemy's increased concern about the possibility of an Allied thrust into or north of the DMZ. One report indicated an unidentified coastal defense rocket battalion had moved to the eastern DMZ to engage naval patrol vessels. Another report alluded to a high level B-5 front meeting to discuss reactions to any Allied intrusion of the north. A series of agent reports alluded to a newly formed 3d NVA Division which reportedly was being deployed to the eastern DMZ to reinforce enemy units in that area. This reported newly formed enemy unit could possibly have been a task force composed of 27th Regiment, 270th Regiment, and 31st Group elements or an infiltration group parceled out as reinforcements. Sensor activations indicated continued resupply activity in the DMZ. Units from the 84th Artillery

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Regiment resumed strikes on allied bases following the TET cease fire. These 82mm and 120mm mortar and 122mm rocket attacks on FSB Fuller, FSB Vandegrift, FSB Elliot and troop positions on 6 February 1971 were the beginning of the enemy's response to Phase I, Operation LAMSON 719. Water mining activity being conducted by elements of the 126th Naval Sapper Regiment appeared on the upswing after a short lull. In the west, enemy resistance had been extremely light. allied operations by 6 February 1971 had completely shut off the flow of enemy supplies into western Quang Tri Province. At this stage the enemy had presented only a token reaction to Operation LAMSON 719. The enemy's suspicion of a possible allied attack to the north and his defenses in that area were probably major factors in limiting his initial reaction to Phase I of Operation LAMSON 719.

b. Phase II (8 February - 6 March 1971)

(1) North of the DMZ, agents continued to report enemy concern over expected allied thrusts to the north. An agent reported an unidentified regiment of the 308th Division was dispersed above the central DMZ to defend against a possible allied attack. Four additional agents reported a new 3d Division in the eastern DMZ. Below the eastern DMZ the number of ABF on allied positions and fire support bases increased. This action was attributed to elements of the 31st Group and the 270th and 84th Regiments and was believed to be an attempt to limit the activities of forces supporting allied operations in western Quang Tri Province. The attacks by fire varied in intensity and duration. RF and PF units reported receiving ABF consisting of 60mm and 82mm mortar rounds, while ARVN and US forces and installations were being struck with 82mm and 120mm mortars and 122mm and 140mm rockets. These ABF on FSB Fuller, Camp Carroll and FSB Vandegrift resulted in little or no damage to the FSB's and installations; and only light casualties were sustained by allied forces. Civilian casualties from attacks on La Vang CB and Dong Ha city were 13 wounded.

(2) South of the eastern DMZ, the 126th Naval Sapper Regiment increased activity near the end of February, sinking one ship and damaging another in the Cua Viet River on 24 February. On 27 February, an explosive charge was attached to a barge and detonated, damaging the barge. The discovery of four Soviet made ground-to-sea rockets on 3 March indicated the enemy's increased interest in disrupting allied shipping along the Cua Viet River, where supplies could be easily transported in support of the LAMSON 719 operation.

(3) South of the central DMZ, agent reports, sensor activations, PW statements, and VR revealed a build-up of enemy forces west of FSB Fuller, and Route 9. These enemy units were identified as being the 3d Battalion, 27th Regiment, and elements of the 84th Artillery Regiment. The missions of these forces were to conduct ABF against FSB's Fuller, Vandegrift, Elliot and Ca Lu; to fix allied forces

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on these FSB's; to tie down allied forces operating in the area and to disrupt the flow of supplies to and from Khe Sanh. A Hoi Chanh stated that six companies of the 15th Engineer Battalion, B-5 Front, were deployed between Cam Lo and Khe Sanh with the mission of interdicting Route 9. During this phase, attacks by fire increased as did attacks on convoys traveling on Route 9.

(4) A sharp increase in enemy activity was detected in western Quang Tri Province. Sensors along Route 608 and near the western DMZ indicated increased movement. The 37th ARVN Rangers contacted an enemy battalion at XD670477. The 3d Squadron, 5th Cavalry engaged two enemy companies at XD7674, another company at XD795508; and ground observers reported sightings of large size enemy forces (probably the 88th Regiment/308th Division) northwest of Khe Sanh. Another agent report indicated that the 246th Regiment, B5 Front was located in the vicinity of XD641596. Information derived from PW and agents, indicated that these forces were planning attacks on Khe Sanh.

(5) North of the western DMZ, NVA SAM units increased activity against allied aircraft. On 2 March the enemy launched an SA-2 Missile at a Mohawk flying at 3,700 feet. The pilot reported the missile came from a line along XD8159-XD6981. Three probable SA-2 Missiles were fired at an O2 flying over XD671680 on 3 March. Aerial photography revealed empty fan song antenna trailers at XD675869 and a missile transporter at XD864952. In addition, an F4 reported receiving a weak fan song radar signal while flying over XD6054, to the south of the operations area.

(6) The K34 Rocket Artillery Battalion and other 7th Front elements increased activity in southern Quang Tri by stepping up attacks by fire and terrorist incidents in the lowlands. Quang Tri and La Vang Combat Bases received 122mm rockets on 24 and 25 February, respectively. This increased activity was believed to be an attempt to divert attention from, and to stop the flow of supplies to Khe Sanh.

(7) On 8 February ARVN forces crossed the Laotian/Vietnamese border to launch the second phase of Operation LAMSON 719. Initial enemy resistance was light; however, the density of enemy AA assets deployed throughout the rear services system was soon reflected by intense AA fire. The AA weapons included 12.7mm, 14.5mm, 37mm, 57mm and some 100mm guns. Numerous aircraft received intense AA fire as the enemy had deployed guns along key supply routes and storage areas. Aircraft flying along Route 9 and 1032 received heavy 37mm AA fire from well emplaced positions.

(8) During the initial ARVN thrust, observers reported major enemy efforts to move material south, out of the AO. Efforts by the enemy to relocate AA weapons to the western Tchepone area were also reported. As ARVN forces moved near the border, the enemy

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also revealed his conventional artillery capability by launching heavy artillery attacks. These artillery attacks, along with mortar and rocket attacks on fixed ARVN positions and FSB's continued sporadically. The artillery weapons include confirmed 122mm field guns and 105mm howitzers and possible 82mm and 120mm field guns. During the initial drive on Route 9 and during the air assaults north and south of Route 9, ARVN forces initiated numerous small contacts and uncovered sizeable storage facilities along all major routes. Captured equipment included trucks, POL, communications equipment, and various types of AA and individual weapons and ammunition. Also, a captured document established one segment of the POL pipeline from Vietnam to Base Area 611 as running along XD4739, XD5038, XD5233, XD5231 and XD4928. Allied airstrikes destroyed other segments of the pipeline north of Base Area 604. Major enemy units defending the area just west of the border during the initial phase were the 1st VC Regiment, 2d NVA Division; 24B Regiment, 304th Division; and elements of the 675B Artillery Regiment. A PW from the 14th AA Battalion, 2d NVA Division stated the 2d Division consisted of the 1st VC Regiment and 3d and 141st Regiments. During February, the division moved east from Tchepone to support other NVA units attempting to halt the ARVN drive into Laos. An agent reported the location of the 24B Regiment as along the Xe Samon River between XD619562 and XD647552 on 6 February. Additionally, rear service units put up strong, but isolated, resistance while withdrawing to the west and north. Tentatively identified as being in this immediate vicinity was a K20 unit (possibly the 20th Sapper Battalion) and other 304th Division support elements.

(9) On 12 February, enemy resistance began to stiffen, particularly around Ban Dong and Route 1032B. This probably coincided with the arrival of substantial enemy reinforcements from North Vietnam. The entire 308th Division was identified as being among these reinforcements. From 10 to 14 February ARVN and US units intercepted large enemy formations attempting to move east toward Khe Sanh. On the 10th, 21st Rangers contacted 88th Regiment elements near Route 1032B. On the 11th, 37th Rangers reported engaging one battalion in the vicinity of XD670477. Visual reconnaissance revealed continued infiltration of 88th Regiment elements on Route 608. ARVN forces overran a 308th CP at XD646403 on 18 February indicating that the entire 308th Division was being deployed near the Laos/Quang Tri (P) border area.

(10) Two prisoners disclosed on 11 February that the 64th Regiment, 320th Division had arrived in Laos on 4 February and had begun operating in the Ban Dong area. On 14 February a PW from the 64th Regiment stated that the 7th Battalion with 450 men and the 9th Battalion were in the area. He also disclosed that an unidentified NVA tank unit with 15 PT76 amphibious tanks was located at XD5446. The 64th Regiment and the tank unit were probably operating as a task organization as ARVN elements contacted enemy

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armor at XD517473 on 10 February. Tanks were also sighted or destroyed at a number of other locations. On 9 February air cavalry elements sighted two enemy tanks at XD492494 and 21st Ranger elements reported three tanks and vehicles towing artillery pieces at XD 592504.

(11) Further south, documents captured at XD725257 on 8 February identified the 4th Anti-aircraft and 75th Engineer Battalion of Binh Tram 41. The documents also contained a defense plan that indicated Binh Tram forces and a supporting infantry regiment would defend in place, then withdraw to the junction of routes 92C and 926. This infantry regiment was believed to be the 141st Regiment, 2d NVA Division.

(12) VR indicated the enemy continued to move material via western and southern routes and revealed evidence of new road construction in some areas. Indications that the enemy would continue to reinforce were supported by agents who reported that NVA forces in MRTTH were organizing Laos liberation battalions to assist in the Laotian fighting. Two other reports also indicated that elements of 324B Division were moving west to defend the salient area and Route 616.

(13) By 20 February 1971, NVA resistance to LAMSON 719 had increased to the point where enemy forces were able to consolidate and organize counter attacks against the ARVN. The first major battle of the operation began on 18 February 1971. Elements of the 102d Regiment/308th Division supported by a heavy volume of NVA ground and anti-aircraft artillery, rocket and mortar fire, attacked the 39th Ranger Battalion at XD605512. During the contact the enemy fired small arms and automatic weapons from all directions into the Ranger position, employed accurate mortar and recoilless rifle fire, and then attacked from the east into the weakest segment of the perimeter. The enemy was reported to be using new individual weapons and wearing new uniforms. The enemy did not carry packs, only weapons, ammunition and grenades. No signals or noisemaking devices were employed prior to assaults, but flashlights were observed at night. This attack resulted in heavy losses for the 102d Regiment as two battalions of the 102d were rendered combat ineffective.

(14) The NVA initiated their first coordinated armor-infantry attacks of the war in Laos when they assaulted elements of the 3d ARVN Airborne Brigade at FSB 31. On 24 February 1971 the enemy employed armor and infantry in wave assaults until they overran the FSB. Subsequent combat in the area resulted in the enemy losing at least 27 PT76 light amphibious tanks and an undetermined number of T54 medium tanks. A PW revealed that the 24B Regiment and the 36th Regiment/308th Division were the infantry forces involved in the FSB 31 attacks and that elements of the 36th Regiment were to attack ARVN Airborne units in the Ban Dong area. The PW information was substantiated by friendly sightings of enemy armor throughout the area

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 east of Route 92B and north and south of Route 9.

(15) In an attack on 27 February 1971 enemy forces brought main tank gunfire on FSB 30. However, this time armor was used only in a support-by-fire role. Following the launching of several counter-attacks by the enemy, enemy anti-aircraft units moved east to block allied air assaults. Simultaneously, enemy transportation units began moving supplies southward. During this period enemy anti-aircraft fire took a heavy toll of allied helicopters.

(16) Msg Quyen, a rallier from the 24B Regiment/304th Division, provided detailed information on a headquarters designated as 70B Corps. According to MSG Quyen, 70B Corps, organized in October 1970, commanded the 304th, 308th and 320th Division, artillery regiments, and armored regiment and numerous support elements, including anti-aircraft artillery. The 70B Corps was originally organized to operate in RVN, but was diverted to oppose the LAMSON operation. Msg Quyen related that 24B Regiment, with advance elements from the 9th and 66th Regiments, had infiltrated to an area just west of the Quang Tri border by 9 February 1971. He further related that at least one tank battalion of the Corps' tank regiment had infiltrated into Laos by early February 1971.

(17) On the southern flank of the operation, enemy support units and what was probably 324B Division elements continued to exert heavy pressure on the ARVN 3d Regiment. Heavy artillery and tactical air relieved the pressure on the 3d Regiment, allowing them to regroup and to reinforce.

(18) Along the Quang Tri border, 1st Ranger Group elements made contact with the 88th Regiment/308th Division on 3 and 4 March 1971. This contact also revealed that the 88th Regiment's main objective continued to be Khe Sanh. The 1st ARVN Airborne Division was also heavily engaged in early March 1971. On one occasion the enemy shelled the 2d Battalion/1st Airborne Division position with 1,000 rounds of mortar and artillery and then attacked with at least a battalion. The ARVN sustained very light casualties while inflicting heavy casualties on the attacking force. A PW stated that the attacking unit was the 25th Sapper Battalion, subordinate to 70B Corps.

c. Phase III (6 - 15 March 1971)

(1) Elements of the 84th Artillery Regiment continued to shell friendly outposts below the DMZ. On 6 March, a 19 round rocket attack was conducted against the Khe Sanh airstrip by probable elements of the 84th Artillery Regiment. The 33d Sapper Battalion and the 14th Engineer Battalion remained active as several convoys were ambushed along Route 9. To the west, heavy sensor readings indicated increased activity as enemy units continued to infiltrate south from the DMZ. This correlated with agent reports identifying 27th Regiment elements moving to positions south of Route 9 where they would become

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Annex C (Intelligence) to Combat Operations After Action Report LAMSON 719 (U)

tactically active.

(2) In the southern Quang Tri lowlands, enemy activity increased as probable K34 Rocket Artillery Battalion elements conducted attacks by fire on Quang Tri and La Vang Combat Bases. Several agent reports indicated 7th Front elements would assist local force units in attacking bridges and supply convoys along QL 1. Intelligence indicated that 808th and 814th Battalions were to attack the Mai Linh Subsector Headquarters and ARVN installations in the La Vang area.

(3) Enemy activity in the Khe Sanh area increased sharply as Khe Sanh received heavy attacks by fire. These attacks were attributed to 675th Regiment Conventional Artillery units located in the mountainous region west of the base. A probable 84th Regiment team struck Forward Support Area 1 with rockets early on the morning of 8 March 1971.

(4) South of Khe Sanh, interrogation of a Hoi Chanh, who rallied on 16 March 1971, confirmed earlier indications that 812th Regiment units had deployed in the Quang Tri Salient. He stated the 5th Battalion was located at YD815299 and heard that the 6th Battalion was operating near the Co Roc area. An agent reported that the Huu Municipal unit had received a directive from MRTTH outlining the unit's duties in support of the Laos operation. The unit was to conduct harassing attacks around and near military installations, and VC cadre were to tell the populace that the ARVN was being annihilated in Laos.

(5) Local VC units within Thua Thien (P) apparently adopted this theme as the 160th PF platoon discovered leaflets at YD911115 stating that some ARVN units had joined the North Vietnamese. Possibly related, on 15 March 1971 an estimated VC platoon entered a hamlet at YD558315 and distributed leaflets urging the people to join the VC. They also kidnapped eight males between the ages of 13-17. With the decrease in assistance from NVA units, local VC elements appeared to be employing forced recruitment more frequently as a means of supplementing their forces and appeared to be making an effort to develop unrest among the populace in an attempt to force ARVN to return to the RVN to provide security.

(6) To the west the ARVN incursions into the immediate Tchepone area appeared to catch the enemy off balance. Visual reconnaissance throughout the LAMSON area indicated increased movement of enemy ground units and field and anti-aircraft artillery. Air Force sensors indicated heavy enemy truck traffic, especially through the western DMZ entry gate. After taking stock of the general situation, the enemy began preparations for immediate counter activity and initiated resupply of his hard pressed units. PW interrogations disclosed that elements of the 24B Regiment were engaged along Route 92B and in the area between Base Area 604 and the Quang Tri (P) border.

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(7) North of Route 9, 24B Regiment forces were probably responsible for the convoy ambush at XD660380, the mortar attack on the 11th Airborne Battalion at XD 650390, and the downing of a helicopter at XD652382. In the vicinity of XD5643, a PW reported that he observed troops from the 1st VC Regiment. He believed these forces were to take part in coordinated attacks against Aloui with tanks, rockets and field artillery. A PW from the 24B Regiment captured on 4 March 1971 indicated that the 4th Battalion, 24B Regiment deployed south into Laos in September 1970 and that its current mission was the interdiction of Route 9 between Lao Bao and Ban Dong. One of the prisoners located an NVA armor unit in the vicinity of XD635368, where airstrikes destroyed enemy tanks on 1 March 1971.

(8) Interrogation of a PW from the 1st Battalion, 36th Regiment captured at XD534436 on 4 March 1971 provided unit locations as of 1 March 1971 for several 308th Division subordinate units. He stated that the 1st Battalion, 36th Regiment was located in the vicinity of XD5749, the 2d Battalion at XD5649, the 3d Battalion at XD5450 and the Regimental Headquarters at XD570498. The PW further stated that the division's 6th Anti-aircraft Battalion, recently attached to the 36th Regiment, was based at XD585495 on 1 March 1971. He also claimed that the 36th had a subordinate 5th Sapper Battalion which was targeting the Aloui area. The source depicted the 308th Division AO as extending from the western corner of the DMZ to Aloui. Its primary mission was to open the 1032/92B road system to supply traffic. The PW also stated the 102d Regiment was assigned the northern portion of the AO, the 36th the middle, and the 88th the Lao Bao area. He said the 36th Regiment deployed south with 1,600 men but only 1,000 were left. The 1st Battalion and the 5th and 6th Support Battalions were caught in a 25 February 1971 Arc Light strike at XD6362, resulting in 200 killed or wounded. In addition, the 2d and 3d Battalions sustained 300 casualties in the ground assault on FSB 31.

(9) ARVN units discovered a destroyed 122mm howitzer and two multi-tube 122mm rocket launchers south of FSB Liz on 10 March 1971, indicating that the early March 1971 shelling of Aloui and FSB Lo Lo were conducted from this location. A readout of 7 March 1971 aerial photography revealed two probable camouflaged 100mm anti-aircraft guns near Route 1032B at XD5958. This supported indications that the enemy was increasing the size as well as density of his anti-aircraft effort in the western DMZ infiltration routes. Documents recovered from enemy bodies on 11 March 1971 near FSB Delta identified the 141st NVA Regiment.

(10) The enemy increased his use of conventional artillery during the period, with extensive attacks on ARVN fire bases using 82, 122 and 130mm guns. He also engaged in counter-battery activities against US artillery units along the Quang Tri border. Enemy field artillery had been forced to increase its mobility to avoid destruction by allied tactical air and helicopter gunship strikes. However, RVNAF

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Annex C (Intelligence) to Combat Operations After Action Report LAMSON 719 (U)

artillery in static hilltop positions offered a tempting target for enemy mortar and rocket teams, as well as conventional gun batteries. Elements of the 675B Field Artillery Regiment concentrated on attacking these positions.

(11) A PW captured on 14 March 1971 southwest of FSB 30 indicated he was a member of the 5th Battalion, 88th NVA Regiment. His capture in this area indicated the westward movement of the regiment from its normal positions along the Quang Tri (P) border and indicated that its future commitment would be against ARVN forces in the Aloui area.

(12) Enemy units throughout the operational area showed signs of preparations for increased pressure on ARVN as they prepared to withdraw from the Tchepone area. Allied supply helicopters experienced heavy anti-aircraft fire near ARVN bases, and there were frequent sightings of enemy armor. Airstrikes destroyed two tanks near FSB Hercules (XD 497348) on 14 March 1971 and six others north of the Xe Pon River and FSB Liz on 15 March 1971. South of the Xe Pon River, 1st ARVN Regiment units engaged in heavy contact from 14 through 17 March 1971 with probable elements of 141st and 1st VC Regiments of the 2d NVA Division. ARVN units reported over 1,600 enemy casualties in these contacts and it was believed that two enemy regiments were probably rendered combat ineffective.

d. Phase IV (16 March - 9 April 1971)

(1) As ARVN forces began this redeployment phase, the enemy became increasingly willing to expend personnel and equipment in order to inflict maximum casualties. For example, the 1st ARVN Regiment was in constant contact from 14 to 17 March with probable elements of the 2d NVA Division at FSB Lo Lo, resulting in over 1,300 enemy killed, compared to 116 friendly killed and 272 wounded. Again, on 18 and 19 March 1971, elements of the 1st ARVN Airborne Brigade were in heavy contact, resulting in 560 enemy killed. ARVN forces had 26 killed and 86 wounded. The NVA apparently felt that their increased losses were worth the political and psychological gains.

(2) The 2d NVA Division, despite heavy losses in the south, applied all available troops on ARVN forces defending southwest of Aloui. At 2300H on 19 March 1971, four battalions of the 2d ARVN Regiment received coordinated ground attacks from the 1st VC Regiment, the 141st Regiment, the subordinate units of the 2d NVA Division and HT 33.

(3) The 4th Battalion of the 1st ARVN Regiment was in heavy contact at mid-day of 17 March, and in intermittent contact throughout that night. The enemy used loudspeakers calling for ARVN soldiers to surrender during the night. A search of the enemy KIA indicated that they were from the 64th Regiment, 320th NVA Division.

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Annex C (Intelligence) to Combat Operations After Action Report LAMSON 719 (U)

(4) When the 4th Battalion moved to a new helicopter pickup zone on 18 March, they met with large, well-coordinated forces. The pickup zones were subjected to intense AA fire, as rear service units employed more weapons.

(5) At Aloui, the enemy was expected to launch an armor attack against ARVN forces; however, ARVN forces deployed eastward before the assault could occur. Tac Air, however, destroyed four enemy tanks near Aloui on 19 March 1971.

(6) Along Route 9, between Aloui and Ta Bat, enemy units launched an all out effort to prevent the withdrawal from the base. They conducted coordinated ground attacks on ARVN convoys, supported by mortars, rockets, and artillery from the 675B Artillery Regiment.

(7) Activity increased south of FSB Delta with numerous attacks by fire, including 130mm field artillery. The intensity of enemy actions indicated the reinforcement of 324B Division elements already there. Statements of a 16 March 1971 Hoi Chanh and captured documents indicated 812th Regiment employment in the Co Roc area to harass allied positions. Prisoners identified both the 29th and 803d Regiments of the 324B Division as the force attacking the Vietnamese Marine Corps elements at FSB Delta.

(8) While the 2d NVA Division attacked from the west, elements of both the 308th and the 324B Division attempted to block the ARVN withdrawal into Quang Tri (P). As the major units approached the Laos/Vietnam border, aerial observers detected a large element of enemy armor closing rapidly on the rear of the ARVN column. Allied air destroyed a large segment of this armor force. Apparently, the NVA planned to block ARVN movement, then attack the rear with tanks.

(9) When the allied units redeployed into RVN, the enemy relied on attacks by fire, and economy of force tactics such as sapper assaults and ambushes to further pressure allied forces and cause casualties. Khe Sanh received rocket or artillery fire almost daily, probably from the 675B Regiment in the Co Roc highlands. Small unit ambushes employed around Khe Sanh to harass the allied forces were probably conducted by elements of the 812th Regiment of the 324B Division. Elements of the 25th, 31st, 33d and 19th Sapper Battalions probably conducted the sapper attacks on Khe Sanh and Vandegrift during late March and early April. Enemy attempts at psychological warfare became apparent on 29 March 1971, when ARVN stragglers returned to Khe Sanh with notes the NVA had placed on US bodies. The notes urged ARVN soldiers to "Chieu Hoi".

(10) The NVA conducted no major attacks after all ARVN units had closed to the Khe Sanh area on 24 March 1971.

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(11) The major enemy formations, both in Laos and MR 1 have been seriously hurt by ground fighting and incessant air and artillery bombardment. These units are understrength and have lost heavily in terms of experienced leaders and equipment. It is expected that these units will require four to six months to refit and retrain. Intelligence reveals the enemy has been forced to utilize combat troops as well as rear service personnel in a massive effort to repair the damage done to roads, storage areas, and transshipment points. It is estimated that the enemy will not be able to rebuild his logistics system and his tactical units for a major offensive before late September 1971. As this time frame puts him into the northeast monsoon period, any major offensive may be forestalled until the spring of 1972.

APPENDICES

1. Sensors
2. Enemy Identified in Combat
3. NVA MR III & IV
4. Route Structure Adjacent to MR 1
5. Location of VC/NVA Units
6. Enemy Tactics
7. The Xe Banghian Water Transportation System

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Appendix 1 (Sensor) to Annex C (Intelligence) to Combat Operation
After Action Report LAMSON 719 (U)

1. (S) Security requirements dictated a close hold on planning for sensor equipment to support LAMSON 719. Planning for sensor use was initiated immediately upon release of close hold. ARVN planning included use of only PSID sets. Sensor teams were not included in LAMSON 719. During the Dewey Canyon II phase, a total of 41 ADSID strings were implanted by Marine OV-10A aircraft in support of Khe Sanh and Route 9 security.

2. (S) In accordance with the provided planning guidance, 19 Laos strings were readout by Dart 1. Information from those strings was passed through XXIV Corps FWD to I Corps FWD. These strings and extracts from infiltration surveillance center reports provided valuable information on enemy truck and personnel movements in and around the area of operations. The ARVN commander was notified through advisors of the availability of F-4 sensor implant capability, and subsequently two route monitor strings were requested and implanted. Completeness of Task Force Alpha route structure coverage made further implants in the initial stages of LAMSON 719 unnecessary.

3. (S) In accordance with other guidance, the use of stay-behind strings was emphasized through advisor channels. Because ARVN units did not have implant teams in Laos, commanders were reluctant to attempt sensor implant. Persistent requests led to approval of the stay-behind string concept. Approval came during the withdrawal phase of LAMSON 719. Sensor implant was not accomplished because required equipment was misdirected to 101st Airborne Division (Ambl).

4. (S) During the final withdrawal from Laos and Khe Sanh, 10 strings were programmed for Air Force implant and monitor to increase scrutiny for the withdrawing troops. Subsequently, eight strings were implanted by F-4s. Redeployment of RVNAF to the RVN made implant of the remaining two strings unnecessary.

5. (S) Sensors detected 5,232 targets of which 694 were attacked. Artillery attacked 677 targets, expending 3,339 rounds. Mortars were used to attack 14 targets and radio firing devices were used against three targets. There was no reported BDA of these strikes as a majority of targets were attacked at night or in inclement weather, and most air observers were not available for adjustment and BDA. Local Air Force records of strikes during LAMSON 719 do not reflect the source of target acquisition, precluding attribution of Air Force strikes to any particular targeting agency.

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Appendix 2 (Enemy Identified in Combat) to Annex C (Intelligence) to
 Combat Operations After Action Report LAMSON 719 (U)

UNITS IDENTIFIED IN CONTACT

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>IDENTIFIED BY</u>
BT 41	Document
308th HQ	PW/Doc
36th Regt	PW
88th Regt	PW/Doc
102d Regt	PW/HC
64th Regt	PW
304th Div	PW
66th Regt	PW
24B Regt	PW/HC/Doc
2d Div	PW
141st Regt	Doc/PW
1st VC Regt	PW
BT 31	PW
70B Corps HQ	PW/HC
25th Sapper Bn	PW/Doc
675B Arty Regt	Probable
164th Regt	Probable
324B Div	Probable
29th Regt	PW
812th Regt	Doc
803d Regt	PW

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
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APP 3 (NVA MR III AND IV) TO ANNEX C (INTELLIGENCE) TO COMBAT OPERATION
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Downgraded at 3 year intervals: Declassified after 12 years

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
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Figure APP 4
Route Structure Adjacent to Northern MR 1.

30 January 1971


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TO AFTER ACTION REPORT
LAM SON 719



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
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


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APP 5 (LOCATION OF NVA/VC UNITS) TO ANNEX C (INTELLIGENCE) COMBAT OPERATION
AFTER ACTION REPORT LAM SON 719




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
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AFTER ACTION REPORT LAM SON 719



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
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
APP 5 (LOCATION OF NVA/VC UNITS) TO ANNEX C (INTELLIGENCE) COMBAT
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APP 5 (LOCATION OF NVA/VC UNITS) TO ANNEX C (INTELLIGENCE) COMBAT OPERATION
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Appendix 6 (Enemy Tactics) to Annex C (Intelligence) to Combat After Action Report LAMSON 719 (U)

1. (C) ENEMY AIR DEFENSE. The NVA skillfully deployed throughout the LAMSON 719 operational area an extensive, sophisticated, well-integrated, highly mobile air defense system. Large numbers of anti-aircraft weapons of several calibers were strategically positioned, well-camouflaged, and effectively dug-in. There was evidence that some anti-aircraft weapons were radar-controlled. Whenever the opportunity presented itself, the NVA employed its entire family of anti-aircraft, artillery, and infantry weapons against aircraft in the air and helicopters on the ground. The enemy quickly massed his anti-aircraft weapons around friendly troop positions and known or suspected GVN Forces landing or pick up zones.

An effective technique used by the NVA was the employment throughout the operation area of ten to twelve man combat teams armed with small arms, at least one 12.7mm machine gun, at least one 82mm mortar, and one or two RPG rocket launchers. Positioned on or near critical terrain, located in bunkers and trenches, and well-supplied with ammunition, these combat teams attacked by fire allied aircraft and GVN ground forces operating within their assigned areas. The teams were capable of placing 12.7mm machine gun and 82mm mortar fire on virtually every friendly position, landing zone, and pick up zone in the LAMSON 719 operational area.

The NVA infantry and AA gunners frequently moved in as close as possible to friendly forces who were occupying positions and securing landing and pick up zones. NVA forces sometimes closed within 20 or 30 meters of friendly units manning perimeters and positions. This "hugging" often afforded the NVA protection from friendly artillery, tactical air, and armed helicopter strikes which friendly forces were reluctant to bring in too close to themselves. Thus, the NVA was able to direct a heavy volume of short-range small arms, AA, and RPG rocket fire against helicopters flying in and out of the friendly position.

NVA forces registered mortar, artillery, and rocket fires on most landing and pick up zones in the area, particularly those on the ground. Consequently, nearly every landing and pick up zone came under indirect fire attack soon after any allied airmobile operation began.

2. (C) STRONG POINTS. Throughout the operation area, enemy strong points were situated on prominent terrain. These strong points were made up of one or more crew-served weapons or one or more mortar teams, plus one or more teams armed with various small arms, often including RPG. The AA and AA weapons were situated in the same general area, so as to open fire to attract the ground and draw it into range of the RPG teams which could then open fire.

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Appendix 1 (Enemy Tactics) to Annex C (Intelligence to Combat After Action Report LAFSON 117-41)

1. (C) DRAFTING FIRE ATTACKS AGAINST SUPPORT BASES. A basic technique utilized by the NVA to defend against the establishment of fire support bases on prominent terrain features was to place 82mm mortars at an approximate range of 3,000 meters around the hill and AA weapons covering logistics, helicopter and supply routes into it. Using this technique one 82mm could be in range to cover several possible fire base sites. Once fire support bases were established in Laos, the NVA forces would establish a mortar belt around these and subject the FSB to indirect fire attacks during resupply missions. Mortars, long range artillery and rockets were used extensively to keep the fire base under pressure and to soften it up for a planned future ground attack. The NVA made effective use of their artillery pieces during the operation. They were able to bring accurate fire on fire support bases from well camouflaged positions. The enemy's effective use of artillery and the problems encountered in locating weapons positions indicate that their artillery units were well trained. The enemy also rapidly maneuvered AAA to positions to isolate the fire bases by bringing maximum fire to bear on allied serial resupply aircraft. In addition to the AAA, all available firepower was directed at all aircraft to include high performance aircraft.

2. (S) NVA INFANTRY AND LINE PLATOON, EMPLOYED AGAINST ARMOR VEHICLES. In addition to displaying excellent judgment in the selection of assault targets, which considered well-enclosed lateral movement, the NVA infantry was well organized to meet the ARVN armor threat. Automatic weapons and mortars were employed against ARVN infantry accompanying armor vehicles to disperse and pin them down, while B-40 teams moved on tanks in armor vehicles. The ARVN reportedly moved to well camouflaged positions to engage the ARVN armor and did not maneuver until it was necessary. It is believed ARVN believed it was of the opinion that the NVA armor could not penetrate their positions. However, the enemy employed armor effectively in the assault on fire support bases 31 and 30, and subsequently on all ARVN armor units redeployed toward the Quang Tri area. During this maneuver, it is reported that enemy tank commanders were able to effectively use AAA fire on low flying aircraft and shot down over 200 aircraft. During the assault on FSB 31, the enemy employed tank-infantry teams supported by heavy volumes of mortar, rocket and artillery fire. These tank-infantry teams are believed to have led the assaults accompanied by infantry by advancing on tanks. During attacks on FSB 30 enemy tanks were reportedly utilized in a support-by-fire only role as NVA infantry maintained the assault. A heavy volume of artillery, mortar and rocket fire was used to defeat the GVN positions in support of the assault.

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Appendix 7 (The Xe Banghian Water Transportation System) to Annex C (Intelligence) to Combat After Action Report LAMSON 719 (U)

1. (C) INTRODUCTION

Some of the effects of Lam Son 719 on the enemy's supply systems may never be known; but one result of the operation coming to light now at the beginning of the monsoon is the apparent loss to the enemy of the use of the Xe Banghian water transportation system, also known as Waterway 7-J. To better understand this loss and its military significance, this report will review the use of the waterway. This history is based on intelligence derived from the interpretation of aerial photography, sensors, interrogation of POW's and recent information gathered from a Hoi Chanh who rallied during Lam Son 719. For maps of the area of this report refer to Tab A and B.

2. (C) GEOGRAPHY AND HYDROGRAPHY OF W.7J

Two river systems divide the Demilitarized Zone between North Vietnam and South Vietnam. Both begin in the Western DMZ. One stream, the Rao Thanh flows eastward, eventually becoming the Song Ben Hai which empties into the Gulf of Tonkin. The other stream, the subject of this report, the Houei Nam Se flows westward, becoming the Xe Banghian approximately twelve kilometers west of the Laos-RVN border. The Houei Nam Se/Xe Banghian flows westward for 30 kilometers and then turns southward into Base Area 604. Near the center of Base Area (BA) 604, in the vicinity of Tchepone, it is joined by two other rivers, the Xe Pon and the Xe Namkok. The Xe Banghian continues its trek south of Tchepone for 52 kilometers to the confluence of the Xe Lanong. At this point its course changes, and it flows westward to the Thailand border, where it changes course and flows southward, eventually draining into the Mekong. At high water the Xe Banghian is navigable throughout its length to small sampans. During low water, the enemy's use of the river is limited to local movement in and around Tchepone as there are numerous sandbars, rapids, and rock out-crops north and south of this area which limit the use of the river.

3. (C) DEVELOPMENT OF THE WATERWAY

Along with the northern portion of the Xe Banghian, the Houei Nam Se had been considered not navigable during periods of low water. On 11 January 1969, however, photography revealed that improvements had been accomplished on the portion of the channel of the Houei Nam Se lying within the Western DMZ and on an unnamed stream which flows from the north into the Houei Nam Se (vic XD 683684). While the improved channel did not appear suitable for travel by watercraft, items resembling PCL drums were observed floating downstream on both of the streams. Also at the time, a friendly guerrilla team reported that the enemy was moving rice by watercraft from a point seven kilometers west (XD 551695) of the stated improvements to a point approximately 16 kilometers farther west (XD 390640), indicating the enemy had developed a combined free-flow/watercraft method of moving supplies. Shipments were averaging about 25

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tons per week; though, at the time, the feeder route at the eastern end, Route 1032A, had only recently been improved to accommodate vehicles, while the apparent collector route on the western end, Route 92A/913, was motorable only for four kilometers north of its junction with Route 9G. By January 1970, one year later, the enemy developed this transportation system into a combined road and waterway logistical route. Route 1032A was motorable and sustaining heavy vehicle traffic on the eastern end, while Route 913/92A on the other end was carrying vehicle traffic coming south out of the Ban Raving Pass on the recently created Routes 1038 and 1039. The Houei Nam Se/Xe Banghiang provided the natural connector between two overland routes and had become the major supply corridor from the Western DMZ to BA 604.

4. (C) THE FOUR STEPS

Basically there are four steps in the movement of supplies through this system: 1) movement of supplies through North Vietnam to the Houei Nam Se/Xe Banghiang; 2) the unloading of the supplies into the river; 3) collection at various points at the western end of the river; and 4) storage of the supplies in Base Area 604 or movement farther south by vehicle. While the specific location of each of these activities has changed during the two-year operation of the waterway, the four basic steps are helpful in understanding the system.

Step 1: Supplies are first trucked south through North Vietnam on Route 103/1032A. This route is not only more direct than 1039 or 1038 to the west but is also safe from harassment by the air. In fact, when unable to continue south on Route 92A/913 from 1038 or 1039 because of interdictions, the NVA have resorted to dumping supplies into the water where 1038 and 1039 parallel the Xe Banghiang. Also, during the beginning of Lam Son 719, the NVA extended Route 1036, which parallels 1032A, to the river. This provided them with yet another access route to the water. The rallier cited at the beginning of this report believes Binh Tram (Military Station) 27 located in the Hill 700 area has the responsibility of maintaining the Xe Banghiang system between Hill 700 and the Xe Pon River. For this task BT 27 has approximately 400 people engaged in the operation of the system between these two points. Hill 700 on NVA captured maps is the equivalent of what we hold as Hill 663 (XD 676716) and is located just to the west of the unnamed stream which flows into the Houei Nam Se and which also serves as the roadbed of Route 1032A. According to the source, only two to five minutes are required to prepare a bag of rice or food stuffs for insertion into the river system. Supplies are unmarked, but contents are indicated by the size of the bag or type of container. All 55-gallon drums contain gasoline. Rice is normally shipped in 50 kg bags, salt in 30 kg bags, and sugar in 25 kg bags. In addition to fuel and food, some medical supplies are also shipped. No weapons or ammunition are shipped by the free-floating method. The contents and weights of items shipped through this system have been verified by PW interrogations and friendly guerrilla units who have

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intercepted parcels as they floated downstream. Also, pilots striking the 55-gallon drums with 20mm cannon fire have reported explosions and oil slicks which would again verify that the barrels contain POL.

Step 2: Step 2 originally occurred when the level of the water was high enough to receive the supplies as they were pushed off the beds of the trucks. This point was several kilometers north of where the unnamed tributary of the Houei Nam Se and the Houei Nam Se join. By May 1970, this original transshipment point was supplemented by a second point farther west on the Laos-RVN border, near the 1032 fording point across the Houei Nam Se. When vehicles began using this ford, the transshipment point was again moved to the west, approximately one kilometer. Once unloaded into the water, supplies are normally dammed up by a barrier across the stream or river which is then broken so that the supplies float on the released water to the Xe Banghiang. This regrouping and then releasing may also occur ~~further~~ downstream if needed. Dams, according to the rallier, are usually broken at 1630 hours and then the supplies float freely until they reach the transshipment points. To facilitate the movement of supplies on the river once in the water, an extensive network of channeling devices was constructed. Some of these water floatation devices were made of bamboo poles. The rallier described their use and construction: In areas where supplies are likely to collect or get stuck, bamboo poles are driven into the river bank and then bamboo logs are tied to the poles with rope. The rope has enough slack to allow for variations in water level. Floating supplies bump into the smooth bamboo logs and are diverted from the bank area into the main channel. The bamboo channeling logs are about the diameter of a man's thigh (approx 12 cm). Other channel devices noted on aerial photography have consisted of walls of POL drums and rocks. Their net effect is to channel the supplies into the swiftest part of the current. When the watershed becomes depleted during the dry season, their construction necessarily becomes more elaborate in order to create an effective chute for funneling supplies quickly through the system. According to the rallier, total time through the system from Hill 700 to the junction of the Xe Banghiang and the Xe Pon (XD 303467) is approximately four days.

Step 3: As previously mentioned, initially the third stage occurred only ten km west of the RVN-Laos border where supplies were picked up by pirogues and transported farther west via these watercraft. Within a year, thirty-two channeling devices were constructed along the water routes from XD 678692 to XD 404649, extending use of the river some 15 kilometers to the west where supplies were corralled into several transshipment points on the east and west banks of the Xe Banghiang. The supplies were initially collected by two strings of bamboo poles lashed together at XD 404654, where they were gathered on the west bank of the river. From this point the supplies were portered 200 meters west to 92A, where they were either stored temporarily in limestone caves in the area or placed on trucks for further shipment south. A second collection point was also located in the area, only slightly downstream at XD 404649.

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Supplies missing the first collection point were probably picked up at this location. Several pirogues were also located downstream to snatch those containers that escaped both collection points. Later in 1970, when the high level of the water allowed the unhindered movement of supplies over the rapids to the south of these pick-up points, new transshipment points farther south were created adding another 16 kilometers to the water route. The major transshipment point was located east of the Route 913 ford (vic XD 351510). The other point at XD 318481, farther to the south, lies only three kilometers north of the junction of the Xe Banghian and the Xe Ron and is probably the one talked about by the rallier when he states the only transshipment point he knows of at the end of the river is the one located at the confluence of these two waterways. This statement would indicate the rallier's knowledge of the system is recent as this last location is relatively new to the system.

Step 4: Once in Base Area 604, the supplies are either stored in the numerous natural caves inherent to the Karst topography along the river or are transported on Routes 913 and 9G farther south to other base areas.

5. (C) RELATIONSHIP OF THE WATERWAY TO THE ADJACENT ROUTE STRUCTURE

The significance of the water route is better understood by seeing it in relationship to the adjacent road system as the enemy uses the river and roads to complement one another. During the wet season, when the overland routes are bogged down with mud, the rain is turned into an asset as it swells the river and allows supplies to float farther south and faster through the system. During the dry season, when the water level of the river recedes to a point where supplies cannot float freely, the adjacent roads are hardpacked and can sustain heavy traffic. The interchangeability of the two systems is clearly evident in the fact that for the last two years, the NVA have reopened the segment of Route 92A parallel to the Xe Banghian just in time to correspond with the beginning of the dry season and limited use of the waterway. There are other advantages to this novel transportation system: while the roads in Laos are safe only at night, the river is a day and night mover. Trucks are vulnerable to US gunships, while supplies floating in the water are difficult to hit. The rallier indicated that all factors including air activity, snagging on rocks, water leakage and minor stealing accounted for a loss of only 30% of the supplies that were shipped through the system. The accuracy of the percent figure--which seems high to us--is apparently based on the fact that, according to the source, a store-keeper at Hill 700 records the number and type of bags or drums that are dumped into the river and another storekeeper at the end transshipment point records the number and type of supplies that are received.

6. (C) VOLUME

The volume of supplies moved on this relatively low risk system is as significant as its integral relationship with the route structure.

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For example, on a typical photographic mission covering the entire length of the river during last year's monsoon, 490 plastic water-tight bags of supplies and nine 55-gallon drums were counted floating in the water. Based on earlier estimates of weight, the total tonnage in the water during this one photographic mission alone was over 50 tons. On other photo missions, the ratio of dry supplies to fuel is reversed with two to three hundred 55-gallon drums noted floating along the river, representing over 15,000 gallons of fuel. Air Force tonnage totals for W-7J indicated some 290 tons per week were being shipped on this transportation system during its peak use last year. This estimate is based largely on the number of trucks noted on Route 1032A multiplied by their known maximum load capacity. The rallier indicated that during the rainy season, supplies are dumped into the river system almost every day, the average per day being about 200 tons of supplies. The rallier also indicated that the POL pipeline is preferred over the waterway as a means of shipping fuel because once in operation it far exceeded the capacity of the river system. While the rallier's estimate of the tonnage shipped on the waterway appears high when compared to Air Force tonnage totals or to the amount noted on aerial photography and while he plays up the success of the pipeline, all estimates of volume of traffic on the waterway system are higher than the 165 tons per week credited to the NVA pipeline through the area--and that system is known to be limited to fuel. Also, other individuals interrogated on the pipeline indicated that it was only in use a couple of hours a day and was often interdicted. On 29 April, for instance, the pipeline was reportedly interdicted five different times.

7. (C) SUMMARY

The river system provides the enemy with a steady means of moving supplies from North Vietnam to the Tchepone storage areas where the supplies can be distributed into the Laotian infiltration network or the gasoline can be used to fuel vehicles. When compared with the night shuttle runs made on alternate land routes and even when compared with the POL pipeline, W-7J was effective and its continued use could have been anticipated for 1971. Evidence prior to Lam Son 719 indicated enemy intentions to continue use of the waterway as the channeling devices were being improved in anticipation of the upcoming dry season and Route 92A was again being re-opened for use. Significantly, comparative photography flown during November in the vicinity of XD 599667 showed new channeling guides in the eastern end of the waterway. The enemy had been neglecting inputting into the system on 1032 in favor of Routes 1038 or 1039 farther west. This activity indicated enemy intentions to renew the use of the entire waterway. Indeed, the western end of the system was in use up to and during the initial phase of Lam Son 719.

8. (C) EFFECT OF LAM SON 719 ON W-7J

Lam Son 719 has changed the enemy's intentions for use of this waterway, at least apparently--and significantly--for the summer monsoon. The

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time frame of Lam Son 719 coincided with the normal period of channeling improvement and the area of the operation encompassed the western transhipment area of the Xe Bangiang. Consequently, existing flotation devices fell into disrepair and no new ones were built. Aerial photography shows only ten of the approximately sixty-seven channeling devices serviceable prior to Lam Son 719 to be serviceable at this time. Transshipment and collection points were also damaged or destroyed and presumably a number of personnel engaged in the maintenance of the waterway were killed during the course of the operation. The rallier has indicated that destruction of the channeling devices is the most effective way to close down the system. Also, heavy bombing by the Air Force has cratered the bed of the Xe Bangiang and the Houei Nam Se to such a degree that the main channel in some places has been dispersed to the extent that more work than usual will be needed to create an effective flow for floating supplies downstream. Thus, at the beginning of the monsoon, the enemy has been deprived of his traditional wet season means of movement from southern North Vietnam into Base Area 604.

The construction of the POL pipeline and the use of the waterway were created initially in support of the roads extending out of southern North Vietnam into Base Area 604; mainly to move fuel to storage areas for vehicles traveling the Laotian route structure. The limited cargo capacity of one truck (approximately 16x55-gallon drums) and the acute need for resupply, would indicate that the enemy will attempt to open one or both systems as soon as possible. But as far as the waterway is concerned, use of the Xe Bangiang during the next month, and hopefully the next three months, is unlikely as repair and access via the neighboring roads will be extremely difficult once the rains begin. As a result of this, one probable course of action the enemy may take will be to temporarily forget about resupplying his depleted stockpiles within Base Area 604 and concentrate instead on moving what is left within the system as far south through the Laotian route structure as possible or to the areas requiring highest priority. Besides providing BDA of enemy vehicles noted on the Laotian route structure, recent aerial photography over this area has shown that the cargo on most of the destroyed vehicles invariably to be POL, again indicating the fuel shortage currently encountered by the enemy in Laos.

9. (C) CONCLUSION

In summary, three facts become paramount when assessing the effect of Lam Son 719 on this strategic waterway and the enemy's implementation of it. First, existing flotation devices were destroyed and the river itself was dispersed due to the cratering of intense bombing. Secondly, the time frame of Lam Son 719 coincided with the enemy's normal period of channeling improvement and he was not able to provide the maintenance necessary to sustain the system. Lastly, because the waterway was not functional during Lam Son 719, the enemy found himself using and depleting existing stockpiles of supplies. This inability, then, to move supplies on the Xe Bangiang waterway leaves the enemy faced with four

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
alternatives: 1) expose more of his trucks on the roads in Laos; 2) limit cargo mainly to fuel; 3) face the wet season with a supply shortage; and 4) begin the next dry period of movement with no built up reserves in the Laotian base areas.

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Annex D (Logistics) to Combat Operations After Action Report LAMSON 719

1. (C) Supply

a. Planning Phase: (17 January to 30 January 1971)

(1) Several problem areas were identified and explored during the planning phase. The most significant of these was equipment shortages in all commands. Many items required, but not available in MR 1 were of sufficient importance to preclude the success of the overall operation. These items were identified (without regard to equipment authorization), the list consolidated and forwarded to USARV under the code "GWS". The most critical items on this list are included at Appendix 1. These "GWS" supplies received command attention at all levels, were located and shipped from other MR's within country, from other points in USARPAC and from CONUS. The items arrived utilizing a combination of all modes of transportation. The "GWS" project, terminated on 11 February, with success, and the operation was not held up because of equipment shortages.

(2) Difficulty was encountered in establishing an effective reporting system to monitor the logistical effort. One reason for this was the secrecy surrounding the entire planning phase. Personnel who were to become involved in the day to day work of making the daily resupply a reality, were not briefed for the most part until the week of the operation. In some cases, responsible individuals were not briefed until the operation began. This deficiency in planning, which may have been compensated for by the prevention of security leaks, hampered accurate logistical reporting. This made it difficult in the early stages of the operation for commanders and their staffs to make sound and timely decisions.

(3) Logistical support for the 12th Signal Group was over-looked during the planning phase. The greatest effect of this oversight was the delay encountered in obtaining the mission essential communications equipment required for the success of the operation. Their requirements were added to the "GWS" list and the unit did receive satisfactory support, although belatedly.

b. Build-up Phase: (30 January to 16 March 1971)

(1) The biggest problem encountered in the supply area during the initial phase of the operation was the many difficulties experienced involving the storage and distribution of bulk POL.

(1) On 30 January 1971, there were only five days supply of JP4 on hand

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GP-4

Downgraded at 3 year
intervals Declassified
after 12 years

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at Quang Tri. Sufficient stocks were available at Tan My to be delivered via pipeline; however, these stocks were not immediately available where needed.

(b) In addition to initial shortages within the 26th GSG of 1,200 gallon and 5,000 gallon tankers, there were also an acute shortage of 10,000 gallon storage bladders and helicopter refuel systems. A request to III MAF produced sufficient complete refuel systems; however, these were found to be unserviceable. On 1 February, serviceable assets arrived at Da Nang from CONUS based on the initial "GWS" list. These were ultimately installed at Vandegrift and Khe Sanh.

(c) The initial shortage of 1,200 gallon tankers was critical since this was the most efficient way to haul bulk fuel along the narrow winding road from Vandegrift to Khe Sanh. The engineer effort on the road was still continuing and the almost constant rain made the passage of the road extremely difficult, even for 1,200 gallon tankers. The delay in completion of the airfield aggravated an already difficult distribution problem (Khe Sanh airfield was scheduled to receive 21 X C130 bladder birds of 4,000 gallons of JP4 each day beginning 5 February. This was not realized until the airfield opened on 18 February). To aid in overcoming the shortage of 1,200 gallon tankers, CH54 and CH47 aircraft were used to hook JP-4 from Vandegrift to Khe Sanh. This method is inefficient due to the large quantities of JP4 consumed and the difficulty in moving filled containers from point to point for exchange into collapsible tanks, but was entirely necessary. This operation was also somewhat hampered by the shortage of 500 gallon collapsible containers, and the ability of 26th GSG to fill required numbers of containers.

(d) The 5,000 gallon tanker assets were used to provide JP4 distribution between Quang Tri and Vandegrift (FSA-1) with movement to FSA-2 by 1,200 gallon tanker. The shortage of these assets was aggravated by the ambush of a JP4 convoy on QL 9 on the night of 7 February. In this action, one US soldier was killed, eight US injured and six 5,000 gallon tankers either totally destroyed or rendered unserviceable.

(e) On 8 February, approximately 100,000 gallons of JP4 were moved to the tank using a combination of helicopter airlifts, 5,000 gallon and 1,200 gallon tankers and 500 collapsible containers mounted on five-ton trucks. By that time, 100,000 gallons per day were being consumed, and no headway was being made in the attempt to build up stocks.

(f) On 11 February, 26th GSG received delivery of 31 X 1,200 gallon tankers and 10 X 5,000 gallon tankers which relieved the CH54's and CH47's for other missions. During the period 13-15 February, helicopter airlift moved 275 tons of airfield matting to Khe Sanh from Vandegrift. This accelerated the completion of the airfield, and with arrival of the first

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C130 bladder bird on 18 February, the distribution of JP4 ceased to be a limiting factor. With the improved condition of QL 9 from Vandegrift to Khe Sanh, 5,000 gallon tankers were dispatched from Quang Tri (BSA) to Khe Sanh.

(2) The basic plan required SUPCOM agencies to supply I Corps elements from FSA-2 for a ten day period or until I ALC had built up adequate stocks to assume the support mission. The delay in completion of the airfield, the poor condition of QL 9 for the first two weeks of the operation, resulting from constant rain, and the initial inability of 26th GSG to move planned tonnage forward resulted in a failure to support I Corps from US sources as planned. This situation resulted in CG, I Corps requesting that emergency moves be taken to build up adequate stocks for the support of his units. A misunderstanding existed as to what constituted adequate stocks, since amounts constituting days of supply for ARVN were far higher than US allowances. These differences were resolved through close liaison and coordination between XXIV Corps and I Corps commanders and staffs.

(a) As a further consequence of the slow build-up of Class V, some units were initially required to draw from FSA-1, Vandegrift and transport forward to the Khe Sanh area using organic transportation. Class V stocks at Khe Sanh eventually reached planned stockage after the airfield became operational, the daily tonnage moved by the 26th GSG increased, and a three day surge using rotary wing aircraft was employed.

(b) As a result of an enemy action, about 700 tons of ammunition were lost from ASP 101 (Quang Tri) at 0415, 18 February. The lost stocks were quickly reconstituted and had no appreciable effect on the operation.

(c) The resupply of ARVN forces in Laos required increasing effort as the scope of operation broadened. Appendix 2 lists chronologically the tonnage delivered.

(d) Initially all air items for rigging ARVN loads were provided by the 101st Airborne Division (Ambl) Discom to the appropriate ARVN units. Later some items were provided to I ALC (FWD) at Khe Sanh which in turn controlled issues to individual units. The 101st Airborne Division (Ambl) provided all pathfinder functions at unit PZ and technical assistance in rigging to unit requiring it. The preparation of loads and outloading required close and continuous supervision and coordination by 101st personnel.

(e) Summary of build-up of stockage at FSA-1 and FSA-2 is shown at Appendix 3. Consumption figures are at Appendix 4.

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c. Withdrawal Phase: (16 March to 9 April 1971)

(1) Logistical planning for the withdrawal phase was complicated by the lack of a detailed tactical plan. The troop withdrawals were contingent upon the speed with which 26th GSG could retrograde stocks and equipment, primarily from Khe Sanh. However, the stock levels at Khe Sanh Could not be computed by line item without the detailed tactical plan which should have provided troop movement schedules. This failure in logistical planning was compensated for through liaison visits to FSA's and supported units, maintenance of a continuous logistical estimate, and by ordering necessary readjustments on a daily basis.

(2) Through the efforts described above, supplies were withdrawn and retrograded successfully without loss of combat effectiveness of the supported units. However, there was some wasted effort involved in the delivery of unneeded supplies and the retrograde of critically needed items.

(3) Retrograde of major end items began from Khe Sanh on 25 March. During the planning for this retrograde there was considerable disagreement between USASUPCOM DNG and supported units as to retrograde responsibilities and turn-in locations. Based on a XXIV Corps decision that was agreed upon by all parties concerned, using units transported their retrograde end items to Khe Sanh. Here they were given turn-in credit by the 178th Light Equipment Maintenance Company. The 63d Maintenance Battalion then assumed responsibility for back-haul to Dong Ha or Quang Tri. Retrograde of heavy equipment was complicated by a shortage in all units of recovery equipment. This phase of retrograde was accomplished only through unit cooperation and an outstanding effort by the 26th GSG. Total figures for retrograde from FSA-1 and FSA-2 are provided at Appendix 5.

(4) During the final draw down of stocks at Khe Sanh, ARVN and US stocks were cross leveled to the maximum extent possible. This conserved transportation by eliminating unnecessary movement, both delivery and back-haul. An example of this was the transfer of 10,000 complete rounds of 155mm HE ammunition from I AIC to 26th GSG just prior to the closing of FSA-2.

d. Total of ARVN supplies expended and major equipment lost in Operation LAMSON 719 at Appendix 6. Additional information on ARVN Logistical Activity see Appendix 10

2. (c) Maintenance

a. Build-up Phase: Several critical problems emerged during this phase of the operation.

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(1) Units did not know the location of their maintenance support. Nondivisional units and forward elements of the 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry experienced this problem.

(2) Deadline reporting was neither accurate nor timely. Some units were exempted from providing data for the USARV Weekly Command Deadline Report. Other units were unable to provide an accurate and timely input for the Artillery and Tracked Vehicle Daily Deadline Report. This lack of accurate deadline reporting became critical in the area of setting priorities for resupply of critical major assemblies and repair parts. The lack of this information on a command wide basis prevented timely actions and generated problem areas which could have been easily avoided.

(3) Repair parts procedures were almost completely ignored by the units. During a maintenance evaluation conducted during the end of March, and the first part of April, it was found that repair parts records had not been maintained during the previous two months.

(4) TAMMS: The records vital to this system were not maintained during the operations.

(5) Although the Preventive Maintenance Programs of most of the units were seriously neglected, their organizational and direct support operations performed adequately.

(6) The plan for providing DS support to the 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry was not completely satisfactory. The repair parts area was weak. Repair parts were being received at Chu Lai instead of the operational area. No arrangements were made initially to have these parts shipped on a regular basis to the Quang Tri area. The concept of a contact team to support a units works well as long as it is for a short period of time and the team has the resources of the parent unit readily available.

(7) The supply of repair parts remained critical throughout the operation. A concerted effort by all logistical units was required to keep adequate stocks available.

(8) A low operational readiness rate was experienced throughout the operation for the M107 gun (175mm). Part of the problem resulted from extremely high rates of fire and frequent moves. Inadequate repair parts plagued both organizational and direct support maintenance activities. USARV support was required to provide minimum essential parts. Maintenance and readiness improved after 26th CSG elements were reinforced to the point where a contact team from the DSU was provided each Heavy Artillery battalion. The M110 SP Howitzer (8 inch) did not experience the problems incurred with

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the M107. A chart showing the operational readiness of XXIV Corps Artillery M107/M110 weapons for the period March and April is attached at Appendix 7.

b. Withdrawal Phase: One of the most serious and overlooked areas during the phase was the retrograde and backhaul of equipment. A letter of instruction covering retrograde operations was published by Support Command on 11 March. It should have been a part of the original plan. As a result of this, confusion resulted as to turn-in points and responsibility for retrograde. As already pointed out, amplification of responsibilities were published by XXIV Corps and Support Command.

3 (C). Transportation

a. Tactical Airlift

(1) Planning Phase: Due to the strict security measures involved in this operation it was extremely difficult to provide the information requested on the various methods, means and capabilities of tactical airlift. However, as the planning situation became less dynamic and actual requirements were firmed, the tactical airlift logistical support area of the operation solidified.

(2) Build-up Phase: The overwhelming preponderance of combat essential airlift requests were not planned for, nor expected, and thus deprived the common service airlift user of any aircraft for almost two weeks, resulting in an almost complete shutdown of in-country transportation that was not associated with this operation. This problem was partially alleviated by ten additional C130 aircraft from out-of-country resources. Tactical airlift was requested to process, land and deliver into Khe Sanh, 500 tons of cargo per day with the capability to increase to 800 tons per day. This requirement was not excessive and the 500 tons was easily met. On one occasion 1,100 tons of cargo were delivered to Khe Sanh. A total of 2,734 sorties were flown and 28,332.8 tons of cargo were delivered in response to this operation.

(3) Withdrawal Phase: The retrograde phase of this operation was of minor significance to tactical airlift, flying a total of 75 sorties while backhauling 923 tons. The role of tactical airlift was efficient, timely and responsive throughout the entire operation.

(4) Tactical Airlift Recapitulation (See Appendix 8).

b. Highway Transportation

(1) Planning Phase: The movement planning process for LAMSON 719 was accomplished from 17 January until D-Day, 30 January 1971, during this phase of the operation, the movement program, which included forecasts of

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transportation capability, were made available to the command. The movement program for troop units was planned and distributed for coordination. During this planning phase the following basic transportation steps were taken: determination of requirements, analysis of capabilities, and selection and allocation of modes. A total of seven LST's were determined necessary to move elements of the 23d Infantry Division from Chu Lai to Tan My. Most units road marched from their home station to the Quang Tri area on QL 1, arriving on 29 and 30 January. During this phase, procedures for control of traffic on QL 9 were published and distributed. The plan called for a Joint Highway Traffic Center to be established at the I Corps TOC at Dong Ha. It was envisioned that the following control personnel could be contacted at this locations: Military Police Representatives of US and ARVN, liaison representatives from Support Command, and Movement Control personnel from XXIV Corps and I Corps.

(2) Build-up Phase.

(a) The MSR (QL 9) between Khe Sanh and Vandegrift was identified as a potential problem area. This 28 kilometer stretch of dirt road was in poor condition, and was limited to one-way traffic in places, and its capability to stand up under heavy traffic was questionable. It was not thought to be passable to 5,000 gallon fuel tanks or 12 ton trailers (stake and platform). This road proved the biggest obstacle to resupply FSA-2.

(b) The road capacity could not by itself achieve the computed daily requirement of 1,250 tons (US Forces only). Consequently, the importance of the airfield at Khe Sanh was identified. The capacity of this airfield, upon completion, was estimated to be 40 sorties per day, with a surge capability of 60 sorties. This equated at $12\frac{1}{2}$ tons/sortie to 500 ton/day, with a higher surge capability. Taken together, resupply by a combination of road and air would provide an excess, required for the build-up of stocks. FSA-2 at Khe Sanh, it was estimated, would reach its stockage objective of three days within 15 days.

(c) Due to communication difficulty, the units desiring convoy clearances had to notify XXIV Corps Headquarters rather than the Joint Highway Traffic Center as was first planned. Traffic regulating points were established at Vandegrift and Khe Sanh and placed under direct control of the ACofS, G4, XXIV Corps.

(d) A total of 400 trucks, 200 US and 200 ARVN, were required daily in order to reach the tonnage objective at Khe Sanh. ARVN consistently surpassed this figure while the US Forces did not meet the goal until early March. Road conditions however, did not limit the tonnage delivered.

(e) In March also, a "free flow" system of traffic was established.

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Annex D (Logistics) to Combat Operation After Action Report LAMSON 719

Certain hours were designated for traffic flowing east and west. This system increased the flow of QL 9 traffic significantly.

(3) Withdrawal Phase.

(a) Withdrawal presented no particular difficulty for transportation with the exception of retrograde of major and items and this was due to the shortage of retrieving vehicles.

(b) Vehicle traffic monitored on QL 9 during LAMSON 719 consisted of 1,163 US convoys totaling 20,995 vehicles and 621 ARVN convoys totaling 22,858 vehicles.

(4) Cumulative equipment combat lost to US units is at Appendix 9.

10 Appendices
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67 WRP NARA Date 1/19/69

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Appendix 1 (Critical Items) to Annex D (Logistics) to Combat Operations
After Action Report LAMSON 719

MOST CRITICAL ITEMS OF "GWS" LIST

1. 10,000 gallon collapsible tanks.
2. 500 gallon collapsible drums.
3. 350 GPM pumps with filter separators.
4. 12 point aircraft refuel systems.
5. Tractor, D4.
6. Tractor, D7.
7. Tractor, airmobile.
8. AVLB's.
9. 1,200 gallon fuel tankers.
10. RT forklifts (6,000 # and 10,000 #).
11. 5,000 gallon semi-trailers.
12. Airfield matting (M-8, AM-2, and MX-19) and related items.
13. Air items (sling, cargo nets, etc).

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GP-4
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intervals Declassified
after 12 years

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 67 WBD NARA Date 1/19/69

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Appendix 2 (ARVN Log Air Support) to Annex D (Logistics) to Combat Operations
 After Action Report LAMSON 719

ARVN LOG AIR SUPPORT

Total Tons Delivered

Feb 18	511.0 tons	Mar 10	11.0
19	332.5	11	--
20	585.6	12	565.0
21	363.5	13	362.0
22	425.0	14	343.0
23	295.0	15	205.0
24	317.0	16	162.0
25	209.5	17	292.0
26	325.0	18	277.0
27	240.0	19	280.0
Mar 1	415.0	20	283.0
2	346.0	21	445.0
3	304.0	22	203.0
4	255.0	23	304.0
5	541.0	24	75.0
6	324.0	25	30.0
7	498.0	26	3.0
8	582.0	27	36.0
9	363.0	28	6.0

TOTAL: 11,378.1 tons

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GP-4
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Appendix 3 (Stockage Build Up) to Annex D to Combat Operations After Action Report LAMSON 719 (U)

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF EVENTS

DATE	FSA 1 (days of supply)			FSA 2 (days of supply)			XXIV Corps (Fwd) Operational
	Class I	Class III	Class V	Class I	Class III	Class V	
30 Jan							
31 Jan							FSA 1 Opened
1 Feb	3	2	½	0	0	0	
6 Feb	3	2	1	3	Minimal	Minimal	FSA 2 Opened
11 Feb							31X1200 Gal Tnks and 10X500 Gal Tnks rec by 26th GSG
18 Feb	5	3	2	2½ (2 (Excp JP4))	1		Fire at ASP 101 Dest 700 tons of ammo
23 Feb	5	4	2	3	2	2	Began issue of 1 meal of "A" Rations per day
25 Mar	28	7	8	8	4	4	Began Retrograde
28 Mar	24	5	7	5	3	4	1300 8" Complete rounds dest at FSA 1 by hostile rocket fire
30 Mar	15	3	4	2	1	3	
1 Apr	2	3	3	0	0	0	FSA 2 Closed. All matting removed from Ham Nghi
3 Apr	1	1	2	0	0	0	
4 Apr	0	0	0	0	0	0	FSA 1 Closed

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GROUP 4
 Downgraded at 3 year
 Intervals; declassified
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 67 WSP NKA D-13 1/97

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 67 WSD NASA Date 1/1962

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Appendix 4 (Average Daily Consumption) to Annex D (Logistics) to Combat Operations After Action Report LAMSON 719

AVERAGE DAILY CONSUMPTION FIGURES
 (29 January - 6 March)

Class I 3,164 rations (C-Rations) (1 Ration = 3 meals)

Class III (Includes ARVN)

MO 27,592 gallons

DF 44,910 gallons

AV 2,322 gallons

JP4 120,885 gallons

Class V

<u>DODIC</u>	<u>ITEM</u>	<u>DAILY USAGE</u>
A071	.56 ball	80,000
A131	7.62 ball and tracer	80,000
A165	7.62 ball and tracer	85,000
A475	.45 ball	3,000
A583	.50 ball and tracer	36,000
A653	20mm	4,300
B470	40mm HE	2,000
B534	40mm	1,200
B568	40mm HE	5,200
C226	82mm ILI	200
C256	82mm HE	700
C262	90mm Cannister	1
C266	90mm HE (G)	1
C275	90mm Beehive (G)	35

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 Authority MUD921673
 By WBD NARA Date 1/1960

Appendix 4 (Average Daily Consumption) to Annex D (Logistics) to Combat Operations After Action Report

<u>DODIC</u>	<u>ITEM</u>	<u>DAILY USAGE</u>
C276	81mm Smoke	130
C280	90mm HE-T (G)	35
C294	90mm Heat (G)	5
C445	105mm HE	500
C449	105mm ILL	40
C454	105mm WP	10
C705	4.2" HE	250
C706	4.2" ILL	50
C708	4.2" WP	20
D110	Additive Jackets	400
D361	175mm Prop CH	625
D381	152mm Heat	20
D505	155mm ILL	80
D540	155mm Prop Ch (G)	550
D541	155mm Prop Ch (W)	1,350
D544	155mm HE	1,700
D550	155mm WP	100
D572	175mm HE	625
D592	152mm HE	35
D675	8" Prop Ch (G)	135
D676	8" Prop Ch (W)	260
D680	8" HE	350

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67 WSP NARA Date 1/19/09

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Appendix 4 (Average Daily Consumption) to Annex D (Logistics) to Combat Operations After Action Report

<u>DODIC</u>	<u>ITEM</u>	<u>DAILY USAGE</u>
D681	8" FL Reducer	175
G881	Frag Grenade	980
H459	2.75" Flech	375
H487	2.75" Heat	30
H490	2.75" 10#WHD	1,010
H519	2.75" WP	80
H534	2.75" 17#WHD	500
H555	LAW, 66mm	40
K143	Claymore with ACC	200
K145	Claymore w/o	100
L312	SIG, ILL, WAP	555
L495	Trip Flare	660
N311	Fuse (175mm)	625
N335	Fuse (other)	2,985

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 67 WBD NARA Date 1/19/69

Appendix 5 (Retrograde) to Annex D (Logistics) to Combat Operations After Action Report LAMSON 719

RETROGRADE

	<u>FROM FSA-2</u>	<u>FROM FSA-1</u>
Class I	85 tons	120 tons
Class II and IV	435 tons	1,510 tons
Class III	67,500 gallons	71,500 gallons
Class V	1,390 tons	1,300 tons

NUMBER OF MAJOR END ITEMS

M48A3	5	4
M113 (all)	21	3
M551	9	1
VTR (all)	2	1
M110	4	-
M107	1	-
M109	1	-
M548	-	-

AIRFIELD MATTING

MZ19	462	-
AM2	160	-
M8	21	-

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GP-4
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 67 WBD NARA Date 1/19/02

Appendix 6 (Total ARVN Supplies expended and major items of equipment lost) to Annex D (Logistics) to Combat Operations After Action Report LAMSON 719

Class	Items	Measured Unit	Quantity of Expenditure or loss
I	C-Rations		
	Ration A	ea	1,044,917
	Ration B	ea	1,276,657
	Ration RD	ea	34,181
II	M113	ea	87
	M41	ea	54
	155mm Howitzer	ea	26
	105mm Howitzer	ea	70
	D4 (Bulldozer)	ea	16
	D6 (Bulldozer)	ea	4
	D7 (Bulldozer)	ea	11
	Dump Truck	ea	17
	Truck, transport, 5T	ea	6
	Truck, 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ T	ea	139
	Truck, $\frac{1}{4}$ T	ea	49
III	Gasoline	tons	1,440
	Diesel Fuel	tons	1,758
IV	Sand bag	ea	3,439,100
	Concertina	rolls	512,060
	Barbed Wire, 50kg	rolls	5,092
	Iron Stakes, 0m80	ea	12,204
	Iron Stakes, 1m80	ea	37,467
	Iron Stakes, 2m40	ea	76,178
	PSP	ea	10,743
	Lumber, all, various sizes	ea	959
	Metal, sheet	ea	8,775
	Metal, corrugated iron sheet	ea	1,323
V	Shell 8"	ea	19,532
	175mm round	ea	26,981
	155mm round	ea	72,974
	105mm round	ea	260,635
	106mm round	ea	4,840
	76mm round	ea	11,806
	57mm round	ea	3,640
	81 & 60mm round	ea	121,585
	Anti-tank mines	ea	3,434
	Rocket 3.5, 275mm	ea	18,921

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GP-4
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87 WBD NARA Date 1/19/00

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Appendix 6 (Total ARVN Supplies expended and major items of equipment lost) to Annex D (Logistics) to Combat Operations After Action Report LAMSON 719

Class	Items	Measured Unit	Quantity of Expenditure or loss
V (Cont)	TNT and Compound C4	tons	11
	Grenade & Signal	tons	685
	Anti-personnel & ILL mines	tons	70
	Ammo (indv wpns)	tons	775

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
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OPERATIONAL READINESS

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Appendix 7 (ML07/ML10 Operation Readiness) to Annex D to Combat Operations

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Appendix 8 (Tactical Airlift) to Annex D (Logistics) to Combat Operations
After Action Report LAMSON 719

TACTICAL AIRLIFT

1. (C) The following is a resume of the tactical airlift (C130) in support of LAMSON 719.
 - a. Quang Tri had 314 sorties which discharged 1,865 passengers and 2,569 short tons of cargo.
 - b. Dong Ha had 39 sorties which discharged 1,000 passengers and 278 short tons of cargo.
 - c. Khe Sanh had 771 sorties which discharged 3,594 passengers and 9,064 short tons of cargo.
 - d. There were 216 sorties into all other MR 1 (Da Nang, Phu Bai etc.) which discharged 4,363 passengers and 1,529 short tons of cargo.
2. The last six days of the reporting period were devoted primarily to retrograde in the Khe Sanh/Da Nang operations. The majority of the cargo retrograded was the matting which had been used in the assault strip and adjacent taxi ways. During this phase, 75 sorties moved 190 passengers and 923 short tons of cargo.

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Appendix 9 (Combat Losses) to Annex D (Logistics) to Combat Operations
 After Action Report LIMSON 719

(C) The following items were reported as combat losses sustained in Operation LIMSON 719 during the period 29 January 1971 through 5 April 1971. Reports were compiled from information copies received at this headquarters of messages dispatched from the units involved to Commanding Officer, ICCV.

<u>ITEMS</u>	<u>1/5th</u>	<u>23d</u>	<u>101st</u>	<u>Corps Arty</u>	<u>Total</u>
Small arms, indiv wpn	96	104	131	32	363
Small arms, crew served wpr.	35	12	1	20	98
Vehicles, truck 5 ton	0	11	0	5	16
Vehicles, 2½ ton	1	1	0	9	11
Vehicles, other & trailers	3	1	11	25	40
Carrier, Mortar M125 & XM106	1	2	0	0	3
Recovery vehicles 578, XM806 & M88	4	0	0	0	4
Carrier Cargo M548	0	1	0	5	6
Gun, 175mm How & 8"	0	0	0	4	4
Command vehicles M551	15	10	0	0	25
Tank, Combat M48A3	17	0	0	0	17
Carrier, Personnel	22	15	0	0	37
Command post, light tracked	0	0	0	1	1
Radios, (all)	32	9	15	5	61
Night vision devices	2	3	0	0	5
Generators, (all)	2	0	4	7	13

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By WBD NARA Date 1/19/04[REDACTED]
Appendix 10 (ARVN Logistical Activity) to Annex D (Logistics) to Combat Operations After Action Report LAMSON 719

1. (C) Planning for Operation LAMSON 719 was begun by G-4 I Corps on 8 January. The initial planning strength of troops to be supported was placed at 33,000. I Corps planned to have I AIC stock seven days of all classes of supply at Khe Sanh and three days of supplies at Dong Ha. Planning covered these items; classes of supply, maintenance, potable water, administrative move of units, graves registration, supply distribution, and retrograde of repairables. In the administrative deployment phase ARVN was to receive total support from I AIC at Dong Ha. When tactical units deployed (Phase III) to the operations area the 26th Spt Gp, FSA-2, at Khe Sanh was to pick up total supply support of all classes except ARVN peculiar items; these included parts for M41A1 and M113, 76mm ammunition and 60mm Mortar ammunition for all ARVN forces, and this support would continue for the first ten days of Phase II. This was to allow I AIC ten days to reach their stockage objective at Khe Sanh. This planning was based on QL 9 being able to handle up to 1250 vehicles daily with no road interdiction by the enemy. The airfield at Khe Sanh must be completed 3 February and able to handle 40 C130 sorties daily. Additionally, the US agreed to totally support at Khe Sanh for duration of the operation for all ARVN Class III requirements. After the first ten days of Phase II I AIC was to pick up total supply support for ARVN.

2. (C) Capabilities of I Corps and I AIC logistics units were considered adequate to support the operation except in the following areas:

- (a) Replacement of heavy combat losses of major items of equipment: To be provided by CIC and MACV.
- (b) Heavy lift helicopters for logistics resupply to units without ground LOC: To be provided by 101st Abn Div (Ambl).
- (c) Air items needed to rig supplies for lift: To be provided by 101st Abn Div (Ambl).
- (d) Certain items of equipment and supplies not available through ARVN channels.
- (e) Engineer support in improving and maintaining QL 9, construction of a temporary airfield at Khe Sanh by 3 February, and repairing permanent airfield at Khe Sanh by 10 February: To be provided by US engineer units.

3. (C) Logisitcs planning considered adequate in all aspects except:

- (a) Medical; battlefield evacuation by dust off, AERO-evac by fixed wing. The medical advisor was not briefed on the operation until it actually began. By the time ARVN forces were deployed the medical aspects were adequately covered. The US was to provide all dust off and AREO-evac.

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CONTENTS

Appendix 10 (ARVN Logistical Activity) to Annex D (Logistics) to Combat Operations After Action Report LAMSON 719

(b) Graves Registration; the natural aversion of ARVN to handle KIA's and a prohibition against dust-off evacuating KIA's created some problems. As planned, units evac'd KIA's by whatever means available to GR collecting point at Vandegrift/Quang Tri evac'd by road to Dong Ha/Quang Tri and VNAF evac'd from Dong Ha/Quang Tri.

(c) ASR's: XXIV Corps established an ASR for US units of 50 RPTPD of 105mm and 60 RPTPD of 155mm. I Corps established an ASR of 150 RPTPD for 105mm and 100 RPTPD for 155mm. XXIV Corps agreed to support ARVN at the US ASR, ARVN expected to receive support of stockage levels established at the ARVN ASR rate. This unresolved difference was a point of contention when considering stockage levels and evaluating the adequacy of US support.

(d) Air delivery; no initial planning was made for using this emergency mode of resupply. This was corrected as the operation progressed and adequate plans were developed and disseminated.

4. (C) As planned, a Joint-Movement Control Center was established at the ITOC (FWD) to provide movement planning for all traffic on QL 9 between Vandegrift and Khe Sanh. Initially, communications was a problem but with installation of field phones and access to radios this ceased to be a problem. The Joint-Movement Control Center functioned very well.

5. (C) It was initially planned for I Corps air items to be provided by the 101st Abn Div at time of lift out. I Corps' list of air items needed (various nets and slings) was incorporated with the list of the 101st needs and all these assets were issued to the 101st Abn Div. I Corps assigned and attached units were advised that their requirements for air items would be met by the 101st and they were instructed not to bring slings and nets to the operational area. This one source of supply proved infeasible as the logistics lift requirements increased resulting in delays in lift out, delays in rigging, and slow retrograde of net and sling assets from forward units. On 1 March the XXIV Corps G-4 issued a supply of slings and nets to the I AIC. I Corps G-4 allocated these among major units and the problem experienced previously disappeared.

6. (C) The I AIC GR Collecting Point, provided with a refrigerator van, was planned for, and initially located at Vandegrift. Units were responsible for evacuating their KIA's to that point, the I AIC assumed the responsibility for further evacuation. This proved impossible as almost all KIA evacuation from the battlefield was accomplished by helicopter direct to the 71st Field Hospital Morgue at Dong Ha or to Quang Tri bypassing the GR Collecting Point at Vandegrift. On 8 March the 71st Field Hospital was given the mission of receiving and evacuating KIA's. The refrigerator van was relocated from Vandegrift to Dong Ha. This changed procedure resulted in a more efficient, timely evacuation process.

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APPENDIX 10

Appendix 10 (ARVN Logistical Activity) to Annex D (Logistics) to Combat Operations After Action Report LAMSON 719

7. (C) As planned, I ALC totally supported ARVN troops during Phase I. The 26th Group was to pick up support for ARVN units at the beginning of Phase II and support for ten days, then I ALC was to take over support for remainder of the operation. Due to poor weather, poor roads and limited road net and completion of the Khe Sanh airfield ten days late (14 February) the 26th Spt Gp could not give total support to ARVN forces. I ALC began providing support in conjunction with 26th Group, on 8 February and continued through Phase II. I ALC resources were used in support during the period planned for buildup to seven day stockage objective so that on 18 February I ALC had only three days stock at Khe Sanh. To overcome this low stockage level 26th Spt Gp agreed to continue hauling supplies for I ALC until seven days stockage objective was reached. The only impact on the operation was a prolonged joint US-ARVN logistics effort in movement of supplies forward. The operation was in no way adversely affected except that stockage objective was reached later than planned.

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Annex E (Civil Military Operations (CMO) to Combat Operations After Action Report LAMSON 719. (U)

1. (C) XXIV Corps established a G-5 Section at XXIV Corps Forward in Quang Tri Province on 6 February 1971, and in conjunction with the G-5 Section at Corps HQ, conducted civil-military operations (CMO) and supported ARVN CMO actions in Quang Tri (P) for LAMSON 719. US/RVNAF forces integrated PSYOP and civil affairs into all tactical operations. PSYOP supported tactical operations by leaflet dissemination, air, ground and water-borne loudspeaker broadcasts, and face-to-face communications. Annex J to XXIV Corps OPORD LAMSON 719 coordinated the entire MR 1 PSYOP effort for this operation. I Corps PSYOP Guidance, dated 3 March 1971 coordinated the entire MR 1 GVN PSYOP effort for this operation and established themes for combined PSYOP exploitation.

2. (C) The Vietnamese Information Service (VIS) conducted PSYOP through the media of radio, TV, newspapers, posters, handbills, and use of teams and cadre to conduct face-to-face propaganda during rallies. Through the combined coordination of XXIV Corps Forward, the Psychological Advisor of Quang Tri (P), and the S-5, 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech), two US audio-visual teams (HE) from Detachment 2, 7th PSYOP Battalion were attached to Province to provide news of the RVNAF accomplishments during LAMSON 719 to the local populace until 8 March 1971 at which time the PSYOP Detachment had one HE team inactivated. The 110th VNAF Squadron flew aerial PSYOP support throughout MR 1, and disseminated leaflets in Laos. Flight "A" 9th SOS provided aerial PSYOP support throughout MR 1, and C-130 aircraft from the 7th USAF conducted massive leaflet drops both strategic and tactical in support of this operation. The 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech) because of their routine association with the Quang Tri (P) Chieu Hoi Center remained as the primary point of contact for US exploitation of Hoi Chanh throughout the entire operation. They interviewed Hoi Chanh and prepared necessary media for PSYOP exploitation. Corps effected coordination with Province Social Welfare to determine procedures for processing and providing for out-of-country refugees. The 10th POLWAR Battalion and the 7th PSYOP Battalion produced printed media as directed by the MR 1 CPOC and provided HB and HE teams to the US and ARVN tactical units. The 7th PSYOP Group provided required off-shore printing support for massive aerial leaflet drops. The Corps Forward G-5 conducted daily meetings with I Corps POLWAR personnel and US PSYOP and Civil Affairs (CA) personnel to support and assist CMO. Corps was also requested by MACV J3-11 to effect coordination with US and I Corps information officers to obtain photos of enemy caches to provide JUSPAO. Corps coordinated refugee actions with I Corps POLWAR and G-2 personnel. The ARVN G-2 handling of refugees is discussed later in this report.

3. (C) To facilitate presentation of specific CMO actions in support of LAMSON 719, the remainder of this report discusses PSYOP, and CA activities. Hoi Chanh information, and out-of-country refugees are covered in Appendices 1 & 2 respectively.

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GROUP 4

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Annex E (CMO) to Combat Operations After Action Report LAMSON 719

a. PSYOP. US and ARVN personnel employed aerial and surface PSYOP assets to exploit significant vulnerabilities of NVA units following US or ARVN troop contact, artillery, tactical air or B-52 strikes. PSYOP themes employed were demoralization, desertion, Chieu Hoi, and special messages prepared for LAMSON 719 by President Thieu and LTG Lam (Appendices 3, 4 and 5). Units used appropriate leaflets and tapes in the MR 1 CPOC catalog and requested leaflets to exploit Hoi Chanh using photos of the Hoi Chanh and an appeal written in the rallier's hand. The nature of the operation did not allow Flight "A" of the 9th SOS to extensively use "Earlyword" to encourage rallying of NVA soldiers. The 110th VNAF Squadron and elements of 7th USAF dropped President Thieu's May 70 and February 71 messages over strategic targets in Laos. Corps G-5 coordinated with MACV J3-11 on a regular basis to obtain Frantic Goat and Trail campaign massive leaflet drops to exploit the psychological advantage created by the Arc Light, tactical air, artillery and ground tactical actions. The use of 7th USAF aircraft in a strategic PSYOP role ensured saturation of the Laotian target area with a sufficient number of leaflets to reach most of the NVA units operating there, and reduce the amount of exposure of VNAF small aircraft which carry only a small fraction of the leaflets in a C-130 load. Saigon provided I Corps with a VNAF C-47 on a once per week basis for leaflet drops during March 71. Other 7th USAF targets for leaflet drops in LAMSON 719 are at Appendix 6. 7th USAF C-130 aircraft dropped 121.4 million leaflets. Flight "A", 9th SOS USAF and the 110th VNAF Squadron and unit organic aircraft dropped a total of 35.7 million leaflets in support of this operation, and conducted in excess of 119 aerial and broadcast hours. The 9th SOS dropped 13 million leaflets (494 leaflet missions) and broadcast 48½ hours (179 aerial broadcast missions). Broadcast themes closely paralleled the leaflet themes mentioned previously. Units used leaflets and tapes in MR 1 CPOC stock, however, it was necessary to develop eight additional leaflets and six additional tapes. Tapes and leaflets used for this operation are at Appendices 3, 4 and 5. Aerial broadcasts concentrated on operations aimed at preventing interdiction along QL 9 from Cam Lo west to Lang Vei, and along QL 1 from Da Nang to Quang Tri, Headquarters XXIV Corps Forward, 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech), 101st Airborne Division (Ambl), and 23d Infantry Division employed organic aircraft assets, tactical situations permitting. PSYOP personnel established aerial targets to coincide with the tactical situation and intelligence information received in the various unit tactical operations centers (TOC). The 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech) S-5 section exploited a total of 5 ralliers. A complete discussion of ralliers is contained in Appendix 1. Ground broadcast teams with the US brigades and the 10th POLWAR Battalion concentrated their efforts along QL 9 between Cam Lo and Ca Lu. The US Navy utilized an HB team for several missions along the Cua Viet River in an effort to reduce the number of infiltrations and minings along the waterway in Quang Tri (P). US forces also employed these teams in conjunction with VIP and MEDCAP missions. On 3 March 71, the 101st

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Airborne Division (Ambl), assumed control of all US tactical elements operating in Quang Tri (P). The XXIV Corps G-5, 101st Airborne Division (Ambl), 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech) and 11th Brigade, 23d Infantry Division CA and PSYOP Officers established procedures for PSYOP requesting, operating and reporting at a meeting conducted on 6 March 71. The 101st Airborne Division (Ambl) maintained centralized control of all US PSYOP administration. The individual units who were OPCON to the 101st Airborne Division (Ambl) selected their own targets within their assigned tactical AOs, and submitted them to the 101st Airborne Division (Ambl). This procedure of consolidating all requests and passing them both electronically and telephonically to MR 1 CPOC greatly reduced the amount of traffic between the operating units and the CPOC. In addition to increasing the efficiency of the requesting procedure, PSYOP personnel saved numerous man-hours trying to pass information to Da Nang over limited telephone system connecting the areas. By the 8th March 1971, the PSYOP assets in support of LAMSON 719 and other tactical operations in Quang Tri (P) were three HB teams and one HE team for the US units. The use of HB teams for VIP missions was restricted mainly to populated coastal lowlands. Very early in the operation the rapport between the US and the Vietnamese was reflected in the following incident. On or about 25 March 71, the 11th Brigade was conducting a VIP mission in Gio Linh (D). As the team's vehicle came over a rise in the road, the occupants noticed a banana tree planted in the middle of the road. They dismounted from the vehicle to inspect the road. About 15 meters on the other side of the tree, they found a mine emplaced in the middle of the road. The local Vietnamese had planted the tree to serve as a warning to vehicles on the highway. The success of munitions collection under the VIP program is attributed in part to the techniques employed. The PSYOP personnel of the 11th Brigade left sums of money and C-rations with their brigade MP highway check points through their AO in Quang Tri (P). The HB team told the local people that they could turn in munitions at any time to the MPs at the check points and receive rewards. This system provided around the clock turn-in points which assisted in protecting the identity of the participants. Previous HB team methods involved broadcasts requesting the local people to bring their found munitions up to the vehicle as it passed through their area. A summary of munitions turned in under the VIP is at Appendix 7. The 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech) HE team was attached to the Province to support the VIS. Each day the team would work a different district with the VIS cadre, bringing the people in the districts news of the LAMSON Operation, and the effects of the Vietnamese accomplishments upon local VC/NVA activities. A total of 88½ presentation hours were made to a total of 13,212 people. TV and radio spots on the news in Hue and Quang Tri City added to the popular coverage, as did various posters which were specially developed.

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Annex E (CMO) to Combat Operations After Action Report LAMSON 719

Weather, artillery firing, helicopter traffic and tactical air strikes throughout the AO during the LAMSON Operation markedly reduced the employment of the 9th SOS PSYOP aircraft in Quang Tri (P). The tactical requirement for helicopters reduced their availability for PSYOP missions. Units overcame this reduction in PSYOP capability in a number of ways. Courier aircraft, travelling throughout Quang Tri (P) often carried boxes of leaflets for dissemination over targets along the route. The 11th Brigade fired six 105mm propaganda leaflets rounds to get coverage in targets along the DMZ. In addition, they co-ordinated with their battalion S-3s to have DMZ patrols disseminate leaflets by hand along the bunker lines and complexes belonging to the enemy. These patrols from two battalions disseminated 205,000 leaflets in support of this operation. During the latter part of the week of 21 March 71, ARVN tactical PSYOP in the area of operations was reduced, and the emphasis shifted to POLWAR programs to welcome home ARVN troops from the front and provide them with entertainment. ARVN political indoctrination teams resume activities with I Corps subordinate units. To accomplish this mission, I Corps used the combined assets of four HE teams, two cultural drama teams, and a political indoctrination platoon. A summary of US CMO support for LAMSON 719 broken down by monthly statistics is at Appendix 9. It is intended that a monthly summary will provide a clearer picture of the XXIV Corps PSYOP activities. The I Corps & MR 1 after action report on this operation is at Appendix 10 to provide a complete picture of all ARVN CMO accomplishments and operations conducted in support of LAMSON 719.

b. Civil Affairs (CA)

(1) The XXIV Corps OPORD provided guidance for US units if the occasion arose to persuade out-of-country refugees to return to their homes in Laos. Those persons refusing to return for fear of their lives would be transferred to ARVN for movement to I Corps Forward at Dong Ha Combat Base. The I Corps OPORD stated that there would be no refugees, as a result, out-of-country personnel were identified as low intelligence value sources. The CG I Corps assigned the staff responsibility for out-of-country personnel to the I Corps G2, because of their intelligence classification. The I Corps commander asked his G5 to provide clothing, blankets and comfort items since the weather in Quang Tri (P) was still cold when the initial 23 out-of-country personnel came in. GVN did not request US assistance to support the refugees, however, coordination was effected with Province through the 29th Civil Affairs Company and the S5, 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech), should the Vietnamese require US assistance. COMUSMACV guidance for out-of-country personnel expanded the above procedures to include the provisions of Annex E (Military Participation in Refugee Program) to Combined Campaign Plan, 1971 AB 146. The GVN

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Ministry of Social Welfare authorized Province welfare authorities to provide temporary relief payments and commodities at the same rates as allowed for Vietnamese refugees in temporary status. The decision for disposition of out-of-country personnel remained with the ARVN and the GVN. Intelligence reported a total of 1500 people living throughout the Laotian area of operations, and that the NVA was moving indigenous personnel to the west. This action precluded the mass movement of many refugees and displaced persons into South Vietnam. A total of 38 out-of-country personnel ~~were~~ reported during the conduct of the operation. A discussion of out-of-country personnel actions is contained in Appendix 2.

(2) Although the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech) was OPCON to the 101st Airborne Division (Abn) early in the LAMSON operation, the brigade maintained all of its civil affairs programs. The 11th Brigade, 23d Infantry Division was the unit which accomplished the majority of civic action programs in the area of VIP and MEDCAP during the operation because they were assigned an AO in the populated lowland districts of Gio Linh, Cam Lo and Hai Lang. Through establishment of a good rapport with the district S5 personnel, the brigade was able to accomplish five MEDCAPs for some 800 people during the period 13 March 71 - 28 March 71. On the 28th of March 71, Corps changed the AO of the 11th Brigade, and as a result, the 11th Brigade terminated CMO operations in the districts mentioned above.

4. (C) XXIV Corps and I Corps accomplished all of the missions and tasks as delineated in their respective operations orders. All PSYOP and CA activities were met with success. The US and GVN will have to observe and measure the effectiveness of the PSYOP effort to include the enemy to rally to the GVN under the Chieu Hoi program during the period following LAMSON 719 and future US/ARVN operations.

Appendices

- 1 - Hoi Chanh Information
- 2 - Out-of-Country Personnel
- 3 - Tapes Developed
- 4 - Leaflets Developed
- 5 - Vietnamese Developed Leaflets
- 6 - C-130 Leaflet Targets
- 7 - VIP Munitions
- 8 - 7th PSYOP Battalion Ralliers Guide
- 9 - Monthly Summary Report
- 10 - I Corps & MR 1 Advisors Report

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Appendix 1 (Hoi Chanh Information) to Annex E (Civil Military Operations) to Combat Operations After Action Report, LAMSON 719

(C) The following is a summary of personnel who rallied (Hoi Chanh) during the period 8 February 71 and 7 April 71, to include PSYOP exploitation. Corps used the 7th PSYOP Battalion Rallier's Guide, Appendix 8 for production of Hoi Chanh media.

1. Nguyen Mac, age 32, D-10 of K15 Battalion, rallied from Hung Hoa District Headquarters night of 10 February 71. His area of operations was QL 9 from the Rockpile (XD9757) east to Cam Chinh Village (YD1253). He rallied because he was cold, hungry, and had no previous opportunity to escape from the NVA. He was previously an RF, captured by the NVA in 1967. This Hoi Chanh led elements of 4/2 Battalion, 1st Division to 27 individual weapons, three crew served weapons, mixed ammunition, food, thirty bunkers, mess facilities, and observation tower and three VC supply personnel. 4/2 Battalion, 1st Division and 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech) exploited this Hoi Chanh on numerous occasions by aerial broadcast and leaflet drop. Leaflet is at Appendix 4.

2. Nguyen Duy Hung, Corporal, age 32, 1st Company, K-15 Engineer Battalion, B-5 Front, rallied to 1st Division 171300 February 71. His area of operations was in the vicinity of Khe Sanh (XD8030). He was an NVA mine layer. He rallied because of his unit's hardship. He claimed his cadre spoke lies, and there was no freedom in the North. Rallier provided current plans of Companies within his battalion for the attack of selected US/ARVN units in Quang Tri (P), and interdiction of QL 9. 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech) exploited this Hoi Chanh by aerial broadcast and leaflet drop. Leaflet is at Appendix 4.

3. Nugyen Trong Quyen, Master Sergeant, age 31, Leader of Platoon 3, Company 25, 24B Regiment, 304th Division, 70B Corps. His area of operations was QL 9 GVN/Laos border. His unit's mission was to break the operations of ARVN crossing into Laos. This rallier provided the following vulnerabilities on his unit: US air strikes destroyed 800 tons of rice, unknown amounts of gas, canned food, medicine and ammunition. He further mentioned that his unit was confused and feared B52 raids. He stated his regiment faced annihilation and would have to retreat if they did not receive division assistance. The rallier further stated that sappers were given drugs to excite them and make them frantically enthusiastic before combat. Extensive PSYOP exploitation was accomplished by I Corps personnel and GVN agencies in Saigon. Leaflet is at Appendix 4.

4. Le Vinh Thong, age 37, former school teacher, Vinh Ling School, was received by 1st Division at Doc Mieu Post Gio Linh (D) on 19 February 71. Thong was one of fifteen agents specially trained to become Hoi Chanh, and following their rallying, each was to organize and recruit for the VCI within their assigned cell area. Thong rallied because he saw the military forces and thought South Vietnam would be

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GROUP 4

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Appendix 1 (Hoi Chanh Information) to Annex E (CMO) to Combat Operations After Action Report LAMSON 719

victorious in the war. I Corps exploited this Hoi Chanh through the press and TV interviews.

5. Nguyen Van Nuoi, age 38, and Autonomous Section Chief of C-9 Local Force Unit, whose mission is to spread Communist propaganda to the people, rallied to the PF in Hung Hoa (D) on 17 March 71. His area of operations was Cam Chinh (XD1253). Of special PSYOP significance is the fact that he rallied with a leaflet in his possession of Nguyen Mac, the Hoi Chanh described in 1. Nuoi stated that he thought that Mac was dead until he saw the leaflet. The leaflet induced him to rally with his family. The 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech) exploited this Hoi Chanh by preparing a leaflet of him and Mac. A tape was made for aerial broadcast. Leaflet developed is at Appendix 4.

6. Ngo Van Sam, age 27, 3d Platoon, 2d Company, 5th Infantry Battalion, 2d Regiment, 324B Division, rallied to 9/369 VN Marine Brigade on 16 March 71 in the vicinity XD8335. Individual was originally an engineer soldier, but was changed to the infantry. He stated that he had been a part of the LAMSON 719 operation for six days. He had several leaflets in his pockets. He claimed that the NVA soldiers were using the leaflets for cigarette papers, which is evident that they were being picked up by the enemy. Corps exploited this Hoi Chanh for PSYOP. Rallier stated that the mission of his battalion was to interdict the ARVN and keep them from moving back into SVN from Laos. He further stated many more wanted to Chieu Hoi but were waiting for the opportunity to do so. Some were afraid that the ARVN might kill them in their attempt. He provided the names of many personalities in his organization through the level of division. Corps conducted an intensified program for aerial PSYOP to demoralize the remaining members of the rallier's unit. Special rally instructions were broadcasted using Vietnamese interpreters.

7. Vu Dinh Quynh, NVA PFC, DOB August 1949, rallied on 21 March 71 to the 178th Maintenance Battalion, 5th Infantry Division (Mech), in the vicinity of XD8541. He had been a sapper with 4th Company, 19th Battalion, 320 Division, which had the mission of maintaining visual contact with US/ARVN units and possibly to attack forces of Hill 903 vicinity (XD7548) on an unknown date in the future. He was separated from his platoon during a US contact, Quynh was afraid to be killed, and since he had previously thought of becoming a Hoi Chanh, he decided to rally. He had a Chieu Hoi leaflet on his person when he rallied. Quynh also brought in an AK-47 and a white parachute flare. He was reluctant to prepare a tape or leaflet for PSYOP exploitation because he feared for the safety of his family in North Vietnam.

8. On 16 March 71, fifteen Laotians and Bru came into the ARVN who were operating in the vicinity of Ban Tra in Laos. There were five

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Appendix 1 (Hoi Chanh Information) to Annex E (CMO) to Combat Operations After Action Report LAMSON 719

men, six women and four children. Personnel were forced to work for the VC and the NVA as slave type transportation labor. They reported that B52s bombed near their village killing four VC. They reported that they were afraid of the enemy cadre and escaped during the bombing confusion. GVN classified the male personnel as Hoi Chanh several days later.

9. During the week of 21 March 71, 81 reported Laotians and Bru turned themselves in to the 1st Division at Khe Sanh. On 26 March 71, nine males and eighteen dependents were transported to the Quang Tri Chieu Hoi Center, where the males received Hoi Chanh status. GVN transported the balance of the people to the Chieu Hoi Center on 29 March 71. All of this group of individuals were forced labor for enemy transportation units. The 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech) is developing a special leaflet for distribution to the Bru population of Quang Tri (P). The front side of the leaflet will feature a group of the Bru mentioned above, the reverse side a picture story showing the way the VC/NVA take Bru out of their villages and turn them into forced laborers for the enemy cause. The text will contain a minimum of writing because of the high illiteracy rate among the target audience.

10. The following is a list of the names of Montagnard Hoi Chanh discussed above with all of the data that is available on them from the Quang Tri (P) Chieu Hoi Center.

a. A Lang, age 31 rallied to the ARVN at Dong Ta Con, Laos on 16 February 71. He was a laborer for the VC/NVA for three years. His work area was old Hung Hua (D) and bordering Laos. He was responsible for bringing in eight weapons.

b. A Pua, age 38 rallied to the ARVN at Dang Ta Con, Laos on 16 February 71. He was a VC/NVA laborer for three years. His work area was old Hung Hoa (D) and bordering Laos.

c. A Cung, age 25 rallied to the ARVN at Da Ta Con, Laos on 16 February 71. He was a VC/NVA laborer for three years in old Hung Hoa and neighboring Laos.

d. A Chat, age 40 rallied to the ARVN at Da Ta Con, Laos on 16 February 71. He was a VC/NVA laborer for three years in old Hung Hoa (D) and neighboring Laos.

e. A Lang, age 18 rallied to the ARVN at Da Ta Con, Laos on 16 February 71. He was a VC/NVA laborer for three years in old Hung Hoa (D) and neighboring Laos.

f. Bun, age 30 rallied to the ARVN on 14 March 71 at Kieng Luong, Laos. He was a military guerrilla with the VC for three years. His

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area of operations was Kieng Luong (V) in Tchepone (D). He lead the ARVN to 18 weapons. His reasons for rallying were hunger and fear of the LAMSON operations. He had a Safe Conduct Pass (893C) in his possession when he rallied.

g. Puon, age 29 rallied to the ARVN on 14 March 71 in Kieng Luong (V) Laos, which was his area of operations. He was a military guerilla with the VC/NVA for three years. He rallied because he was hungry and afraid of the military operations. He was partially responsible for the 18 weapons which were mentioned above.

h. Cha-Kho, age 51 rallied to the ARVN on 19 March 71 at Lao Bao. His area of operations was Xa Rang, Laos.

i. Ta Nho, age 41 rallied to the ARVN at Khe Sanh on 23 March 71.

j. A-Nhon, age 41 rallied to the ARVN at Khe Sanh on 23 March 71.

k. Ai, B/d:Pa Nhut, age 51 rallied to the ARVN at Khe Sanh on 23 March 71.

l. Phim, age 25 rallied to the ARVN at Khe Sanh on 23 March 71.

m. Ai, B/d Pa-Mo, age 51 rallied to the ARVN at Khe Sanh on 23 March 71.

n. A Che, age 46 rallied to the ARVN at Khe Sanh on 23 March 71.

o. Ac Lo, age 29 rallied to ARVN on 23 March 71 at Khe Sanh.

p. Pong, age 51 rallied to the ARVN on 23 March 71 at Khe Sanh.

q. Lu Vung, age 41 rallied to the ARVN on 23 March 71 at Khe Sanh.

11. Nguyen Tat Dung, NVA Pvt, DOB 1952, rallied on 21 March 71 to the ARVN 8th Airborne Battalion in the vicinity of XD6537. He was a member of the 9th Squadron, 3d Platoon, 2d Company, 7th Battalion, Capital Regiment (102d), 308th Division. His company was setting up an ambush site south of QL 9 near his point of rally, when he heared the ARVN tanks on the road. The Hoi Chanh left his company area and crawled toward the road where he turned himself in. Minutes later his actions were discovered by his parent company, and the enemy and the ARVN unit exchanged fire as the ARVN armor continued to proceed down the road. The mission of the NVA unit was to ambush the ARVN armored element of QL 9. Dung stated that his organization's morale was low. The veteran soldiers were tired and afraid which demoralized replacements and contributed to the Hoi Chanh's rallying. Dung was with his outfit for one month prior to his rallying.

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12. Pham Hong Chin, NVA PFC, was captured on 2 April 71, by the D/3-5 Cavalry in the vicinity of XD7249. His status was changed to Hoi Chanh on 3 April 71. He was a combat soldier with the 8th Squad, 3d platoon, 5th Company, 88th Regiment, 308th Division. His mission at the time of capture was to pickup KIA and WIA from battle area XD7249. The mission of his company was to attack the Dang A Hai by artillery and then ground attack. Sixty NVA were in the attacking force.

13. Lo Dang Sanh, NVA Cpl/assistant Squad Leader, DOB 6 March 48, was captured on 12 March 71 by the ARVN in vicinity of XD4837. His status was changed to Hoi Chanh in early April 71. His principle duty was a pipe fitter on the NVA gasoline pipeline in Laos. His organization was the 5th Squad, 1st Company, 968 Battalion, 592 Engineer Regiment, 559 Transportation Group. His mission at the time of capture was securing the pipeline.

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Appendix 2 (Out-of-Country personnel) to Annex E (Civil Military Operations) to Combat Operations After Action Report LAMSON 719

1.(C) On 12 February 71, five refugees, four male and one female crossed into Vietnam from Laos and requested assistance from the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech). They represented a village of 117 in the vicinity of Bon Coum in Laos. They requested asylum for their entire village. The personnel were placed into ARVN channels at Dong Ha, following US interviews by military intelligence personnel to determine possible value for intelligence or PSYOP exploitation. Neither the US or the ARVN exploited these personnel for PSYOP. All persons refused to return to Laos for fear of death from the NVA.

2.(C) On 14 February 71, refugees, seven men, six women, and five children crossed from Laos into Vietnam and requested assistance from S-5, 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech). Personnel were immediately placed into ARVN channels for possible intelligence and PSYOP exploitation. These out-of-country personnel were billeted at Dong Ha Combat Base CIC. The Province Chief was prepared to enact a plan to provide for resettlement of the refugees. The plan was in three stages. Stage I, personnel would be kept in a temporary status for two days. They would be welcomed by a small receiving committee comprised of a National Police representative, an intelligence representative and a social welfare representative. In addition to the Province providing blankets, rice and canvas for shelters, personnel would receive a partial welfare payment of 20\$VN per day. Stage II, personnel are placed in minority group housing for 2 months, Province continues to provide welfare payments. Stage III, personnel are resettled in and around Mai Loc for a trial period of 6 months. During this time they receive full welfare payments. The Quang Tri (P) Community Defense and Local Development Plan for 1971 supports the above plan.

3.(C) On 26 February, it was reported that 500 refugees were building a village near FSB Delta (Vis XD6430). There was no indication that these refugees posed any problem to ARVN operations in that area. On 7 February 71, forty refugees, eleven men, fourteen women and fifteen children, came into 17th Armored Cavalry in the vicinity of FSB Aloui (XD5438). There was no indication that these refugees posed any tactical or civil affairs type of problem to the ARVN. A final report dated 31 March prepared by Air Force Field Exploitation Team A in Quang Tri City listed the names of thirty-eight out-of-country personnel, along with their dates of birth, and the date that they were received by ARVN.

GROUP 4

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Appendix 3 (Tapes Developed) to Annex E (Civil Military Operations) to
Combat Operations After Action Report, LAMSON 719

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Appendix 1 (Tactical Air Support) to Annex F (Air Support) to Combat Operation after Action Report, LAMSON 719.

1. (C) Concept of Operations. Tactical Air Support for LAMSON 719 was provided through the Air Force Tactical Air Control System (TACS), through a forward Direct Air Support Center (DASC VICTOR) established and collocated with the XXIV Corps Forward OP at Quang Tri. Tac Air support for Phase I was requested through the currently established Tac Air Request System; Tac Air support for Phase II, III and IV was submitted through DASC-VICTOR direct to 7th Air Force Operations Fighter Division (Frag Shop). Tactical Air Control Parties (TACP's) with each ARVN Division Command Post (CP) and Forward Air Controllers (FACs), continued supporting assigned ground units. A detachment from the 23d Tactical Air Support Squadron (TASS), from Nakhon Phanom Royal Thailand Air Base (RTAB), Thailand, known as Hammer Operations, deployed to and operated from the Quang Tri Army Air Field (AAF) to provide FAC support in Phase II, III and IV for the out country (Laos) effort. 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech) TACP, Barky Operations, continued to provide FAC support to the 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech) for the in-country effort.

2. (C) Force Composition:

a. DASC-VICTOR was formed at the 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech) TACP adjacent to XXIV Corps Forward Tactical Operations Center (CTOC) and was primarily concerned with Tac Air support in Phases II, III, and IV. 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech) TACP communication equipment remained in place with additional communication lines and equipment installed at each of the TACP's and 7th Air Force Command Center. The DASC were formed using existing DASC personnel resources augmented by personnel from other 7th Air Force units.

b. English speaking Vietnamese military personnel were assigned to HAMMER Operations and flew with USAF FACs as interpreters between the Vietnamese ground commanders and the US airborne FACs.

c. 7th Air Force Airborne Command and Control Center (AFCCC) provided controller positions dedicated to:

- (1) Accepting and directing fraged preplanned Tac Air sorties to a predetermined rendezvous point for HAMMER FAC control.
- (2) Supporting any additional air support requests from HAMMER FACs by:
 - (a) Diverting available Tac Air.
 - (b) Requesting immediate air strikes.

d. The USMC Air Support Radar Team (ASRT) installation at Quang Tri was relocated to Khe Sanh to provide extended radar control coverage over the LAMSON 719 area of operations during periods of darkness and adverse weather.

3. (C) Results and Statistical Data

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GROUP 4
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 After 12 years

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Appendix 1 (Tactical Air Support) to Annex F (Air Support) to Combat Operations After Action Report IAMSON 719.

a. Phase I.

(1) In country:

(a) Tactical Air Strikes:	
Close Air Support	155
Combat Sky Spots	29
(b) Bomb Damage Assessment:	
Killed by Air	2
Secondary Explosions	15
Secondary Fires	4
Structures Destroyed	8
Bunkers Destroyed	128

(2) Out of Country: Not applicable during Phase I.

b. Phase II.

(1) In Country:

(a) Tactical Air Strikes:	
Close Air Support	721
Combat Sky Spots	127
(b) Bomb Damage Assessment:	
Killed by Air	5
Secondary Explosions	44
Secondary Fires	59
Structures Destroyed	13
Bunkers Destroyed	333

(2) Out of Country:

(a) Tactical Air Strikes:	
Close Air Support	2691
Combat Sky Spots	69
(b) Bomb Damage Assessment:	
Killed by Air	1453
Secondary Explosions	682
Secondary Fires	233
Structures Destroyed	44
Bunkers Destroyed	90
Trucks Destroyed/Damaged	87/30
Tanks Destroyed/Damaged	38/9
12.7mm Destroyed/Damaged	44/10
14.5mm Destroyed/Damaged	1/0
23mm Destroyed/Damaged	11/1

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Appendix 1 (Tactical Air Support) to Annex F (Air Support) to Combat Operations After Action Report LAMSON 719.

37mm Destroyed/Damaged 23/3

c. Phase III.

(1) In Country:

(a) Tactical Air Strikes:	
Close Air Support	526
Combat Sky Spots	83
(b) Bomb Damage Assessment:	
Killed by Air	0
Secondary Explosions	21
Secondary Fires	20
Structures Destroyed	0
Bunkers Destroyed	152
Trucks Destroyed/Damaged	1/1

(2) Out of Country

(a) Close Air Support	1813
Combat Sky Spots	329
(b) Bomb Damage Assessment:	
Killed by Air	537
Secondary Explosions	2603
Secondary Fires	160
Structures Destroyed	14
Bunkers Destroyed	21
Trucks Destroyed/Damaged	50/25
Tanks Destroyed/Damaged	10/1
12.7mm Destroyed/Damaged	15/2
14.5mm Destroyed/Damaged	0
23mm Destroyed/Damaged	0
37mm Destroyed/Damaged	1/1

d. Phase IV.

(1) In country

(a) Tactical Air Strikes:	
Close Air Supports	763
Combat Sky Spots	159
(b) Bomb Damage Assessment:	
Killed by Air	56
Secondary Explosions	169
Secondary Fires	128
Structures Destroyed	17

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Bunkers Destroyed	306
12.7mm Destroyed/Damaged	2/1
 (2) Out of Country	
 (a) Tactical Air Strikes:	
Close Air Support	2600
Combat Sky Spots	219
 (b) Bomb Damage Assessment:	
Killed by Air	1113
Secondary Explosions	3409
Secondary Fires	386
Structures Destroyed	48
Bunkers Destroyed	254
Trucks Destroyed/Damaged	60/33
Tanks Destroyed/Damaged	11/6
12.7mm Destroyed/Damaged	18/0
14.5mm Destroyed/Damaged	0/0
23mm Destroyed/Damaged	10/1
37mm Destroyed/Damaged	39/5
57mm Destroyed	2
85mm Destroyed	1
Fire Controlled Radar Site Destroyed	1

e. Recapitulation

 (1) In Country	
 (a) Tactical Air Strikes:	
Close Air Support	2165
Combat Sky Spots	443
 (b) Bomb Damage Assessment:	
Tonnage	3592.3
Killed by Air	63
Secondary Explosions	249
Secondary Fires	211
Structures Destroyed	38
Bunkers Destroyed	919
Trucks Destroyed/Damaged	1/1
12.7MM Destroyed/Damaged	2/1
 (2) Out of Country:	
 (a) Tactical Air Strikes:	
Close Air Support	7104
Combat Sky Spots	617

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(b) Bomb Damage Assessment:

Tonnage	14435.1
Killed by Air	3103
Secondary Explosions	6694
Secondary Fires	779
Structures Destroyed	106
Bunkers Destroyed	365
Trucks Destroyed/Damaged	197/88
Tanks Destroyed/Damaged	59/16
12.7mm Destroyed/Damaged	77/12
14.5mm Destroyed/Damaged	1/0
23mm Destroyed/Damaged	21/2
37mm Destroyed/Damaged	63/9
57mm Destroyed	2
85mm Destroyed	1
Fire Controlled Radar Sites Destroyed	1

f. Commando Vaults: Twenty-five Commando Vaults (15,000 lbs bombs delivered by C-130 aircraft using heavy drop techniques) were employed in the out country operation. Two were employed for landing zone (LZ) preparation and four were employed for LZ construction. Nineteen were employed for various lucrative targets such as enemy truck parks, storage areas, enemy troop concentrations and base camps. Results, except for those used for LZ construction, were not available since no significant bomb damage assessment was received.

g. Gunships: There were a total of 80 AC119 (Stinger) and 47 AC130 (Spectre) gunships strikes employed, augmented when required by Candlestick (AC130) flareships. Gunships were utilized almost exclusively during the hours of darkness and were used mainly to interdict enemy vehicular traffic and to provide close air support at night for friendly base camps. With their high rate of fire power the gunships proved indispensable and highly effective, with a total of 50 to 60 enemy vehicles destroyed and rapid response to night troop-in-contact situations. Accurate detailed BDA for gunships was usually impossible because of the nighttime environment in which they operated.

h. Downed Aircraft: During the LAMSON 719 operation seven aircraft of various types were shot down by enemy ground fire. These included three F4's, one F100, one A7, one A1, and one O-2. Four pilots were killed; the remainder were rescued.

4. Problem Areas.

a. Vietnamese interpreters. Initially, the Vietnamese military personnel assigned as interpreters with HAMMER FAC's experienced some difficulty with airsickness which hampered air to ground communications. Interpreters were given Dramamine pills and FAC's were directed to attempt ground contact in English and use Vietnamese interpretation as a backup. By 12 February there remained only isolated instances of airsickness.

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Appendix 2 (ARC Light Operations) to Annex F (Air Support to Combat Operations After Action Report LAMSON 719).

1. (S) General.

a. Daily ARC Light Sorties were provided by Commander, 8th Air Force, Strategic Air Command. The ARC Light Force supports Southeast Asia operations with high altitude area saturation strikes against selected targets appropriate for heavy aerial bombardment. The objective of the ARC Light Forces were to:

- (1) Aid the defense of friendly forces under attack.
- (2) Interdict enemy lines of communication to include attacks on his stockpile, staging facilities and means of transportation.
- (3) Support friendly ground activities.
- (4) Apply maximum concentration against troops and weapons during enemy preparations to mount offensives. (i.e., spoiling operations)
- (5) Attack enemy fixed and semifixed facilities to include base camps, bivouac areas, caches, and command and control facilities.
- (6) Take full advantage of the psychological effect of heavy aerial bombardment to harass the enemy and destroy his will to fight.

b. Priority of strikes was given to support of the operation. From 24 February 1971 through the end of the operation, all thirteen strikes were normally scheduled in support of Operation LAMSON 719.

2. (S) Execution.

a. During operation LAMSON 719, six hundred and fifteen targets were struck by the ARC Light Force. Detailed breakdown for each phase of the operation is shown at Tab A.

b. Most ARC Light strikes were initially planned against targets based on hard intelligence. Targets selected and scheduled were often diverted to provide close support of troops in contact. Therefore, many strikes were used in a tactical close support role against enemy troop concentrations rather than against strategic type hard targets. A distinct disadvantage of using ARC Light strikes within three kilometers of friendly troops is the loss of target coverage when all aircraft are required to fly in trail formation due to safety waiver. Commanders were encouraged to plan targets so as to avoid having troops within the waiver distance to get maximum coverage and effects on each target.

c. ARC Light strikes were also used in preparation of Landing Zones in conjunction with other supporting fires. Normal sequence utilized

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After 12 years

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Appendix 2 (ARC Light Operations) to Annex F (Air Support to Combat Operations After Action Report LAMSON 719.

for landing Zone preparation was to initiate ARC Light strikes approximately twelve to fifteen hours prior to landing zone time with the last strike about three hours prior, at which time tactical air sorties were used continuously until time troops were inserted on landing zone.

d. The number of ARC Light strikes varied from two to twenty strikes employed during periods varying from ten hours to thirty six hours prior to insertion of troops on landing zone. Preparation starting time for ARC Light strikes ten to fifteen hours prior to insertion time appeared to be more effective than starting strikes twenty four or more hours before insertion of troops. The longer time and larger area gave enemy troops the opportunity to move back into area after strikes and at time of troop insertion landing zones would be hot.

3. (S) Results. Complete bomb damage assessment was accomplished on approximately ten percent of the targets struck. Secondary explosions were recorded by the ARC Light Force on four hundred and eight targets. The number of secondary explosions noted and the results obtained from exploitation of fifty five targets indicated that the strikes were very effective. Results are shown at Tab B.

4. (S) Problem Areas.

a. Target Requesting Procedures. Diverting of ARC Light targets became a major concern of all agencies involved in ARC Light Operations. The time phasing for strike request required that I Corps or the US Division requesting a strike, submit their requests to XXIV Corps approximately thirty six to sixty hours prior to desired strike time. This was necessary to allow for processing time and submission to MACV in time for daily target selection meeting held at 0730 hours each morning. Considering the fast moving situation, this time phasing was not responsive enough; therefore, many targets had to be diverted to place the strikes in close support of ground operations. A request was made to MACV to have them designate a schedule of available strike times and allow targets to be furnished approximately twelve to eighteen hours prior to desired strikes. This would have eliminated the problem associated with diverting from a previously planned target and insured that the work involved in planning the original strike would not be wasted. The request was not approved; therefore, targets had to be submitted for normal planning and diverting strikes onto critical targets was frequently required. In the planning phase for operations, particularly of this magnitude, procedures for requesting strikes should be reviewed and changed, if necessary, to be more responsive to the ARC Light support requirement.

b. Communications. A critical aspect of ARC Light operations was secure communications with nominating agencies and with higher headquarters. Message traffic from Quang Tri to MACV and out to the units in the field was slow. Flash messages were generally backlogged and it commonly took three to four

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hours for messages to reach MACV. A limited number of radios and only one secure telephone which were used by all staff members was available for use most of the time. The requirements of ARC Light operations and the need for the security of transmission should be given more consideration in the planning phase and provisions made to meet the requirements.

5. (S) Lessons Learned. ARC Light Operations and Targeting Personnel.

a. During operation LAMSON 719 contact with various US Units submitting ARC Light requests and the US Advisors to RVN Forces revealed that personnel assigned to ARC Light positions were not completely knowledgeable of the proper techniques and requirements of ARC Light Operations and Targeting.

b. Targets were received that were not properly oriented to get maximum coverage of intelligence available and in other cases those planning ARC Light operations were not aware of employment tactics or requirements.

c. Much of this was probably due to personnel turnover in key ARC Light operation positions and also could be attributed to lack of ARC Light activity in Military Region I for several months prior to this operation.

d. A recommendation is being made by this headquarters that MACV establish an orientation course on ARC Light operations and targeting for all personnel being assigned to US Units or to Advisor positions requiring knowledge of ARC Light procedures in performance of their duties.

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Tab A (Operations Summary) to Appendix 2 (ARC Light Operations) to Annex F (Air Support) to Combat Operations After Action Report LAMSON 719.

ARC LIGHT OPERATION SUMMARY - LAMSON 719

	PHASE I (Planning)	PHASE II (8 Feb - 5 Mar 71)	PHASE III (6 Mar - 15 Mar 71)	PHASE IV (16 Mar - 7 Apr 71)	TOTAL OF PHASE II, III AND IV (LAMSON 719)	
NOMINATED	I Corps	0	175	90	132	397
	U.S.	8	93	39	212	344
	TOTAL	8	268	129	344	741
SCHEDULED	I Corps	0	158	86	129	373
	U.S.	7	87	39	175	301
	TOTAL	7	245	125	304	674
DIVERTS	I Corps	0	93	86	153	332
	U.S.	0	16	0	16	32
	MACV	0	10	2	15	27
	TOTAL	0	119	88	184	391
ABORTS	0	9	6	17	32	
STRIKES	I Corps	0	189	97	135	421
	U.S.	7	37	20	137	194
	TOTAL	7	226	117	272	615
NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT	18	670	359	807	1836	
TONS OF BOMBS	456.75	14435.50	9261.75	22705.25	46402.50	

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Tab B (ARC Light BDA) to Appendix 2 (ARC Light Operations) to Annex F (Air Support) to Combat Operation After Action Report LAMSON 719.

ARC LIGHT BDA DURING OPERATION LAMSON 719 FROM 080001 FEB TO 072400 APR 1971.

1. (S) Of the six hundred and fifteen ARC Light strikes flown, results on two hundred and seven were unknown due to weather conditions, on the remaining four hundred and eight targets three thousand one hundred and fifty five secondary explosions two to fifteen times magnitude were recorded by the ARC Light Force.
2. (S) BDA of the fifty five targets that were exploited indicated the following.

KIA	2644
POW	3
WIA	12
INDIVIDUAL WEAPONS	1541
CREW SERVED WEAPONS	82
MORTARS	93
ROCKET LAUNCHERS	300
AAA	16 (INCLUDES 23MM, 37MM AND 57MM WEAPONS)
AA/AW	41 (INCLUDES 12.7MM WEAPONS)
TRUCKS	72
TRACKS	11 (INCLUDES ONE TANK)
ARTILLERY PIECES	13
AMMUNITION	993 TONS
FOOD	1101 TONS
STRUCTURES	890
BICYCLES	300
BUNKERS	176
FUEL	151,925 GALLONS
PLUS VARYING NUMBERS OF UNIFORMS, DOCUMENTS, PAPER, AND OTHER MISCELLANEOUS ITEMS.	

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Appendix 3 (Naval Air Support) to Annex F (Air Support) to Combat Operations After Action Report LAMSON 719

1. (S) Summary of Navy Participation in LAMSON 719 Operations.

a. The three carriers to TF 77 participated extensively in LAMSON 719 by providing 1872 strike sorties between the period 8 February and 6 April 1971. These operations were carried out coincident with other strike operations in Steel Tiger and North Vietnam. During this period a total of 8000 strike sorties were flown by aircraft from carriers Hancock, Kitty Hawk and Ranger, including 4497 sorties during March, a three year high.

b. Of the 1872 strike sorties flown in support of LAMSON 719 only 703 sorties received assessment of bomb damage (BDA). This was due to a variety of reasons including type target (such as troops under cover, bivouac areas and gun positions), dense foliage, smoke, dust and weather. There were also several occasions when HAMMER FACs, who controlled most Navy sorties, did not have time to assess damage between flights of strike aircraft.

c. Several flights were controlled by Khe Sanh ASRAT and none received BDA.

d. Many Navy flights were directed against high priority troops in contact (TIC) targets including enemy tanks firing within friendly firebase perimeters.

e. In the latter stages of the operation numerous Navy missions were directed against abandoned friendly vehicles, tanks and supplies.

2. (S) TF totals and individual performances of the three CVAs which participated in LAMSON 719 operations follows.

a. Total missions flown by TF 77 (8 February to 6 April 1971)

SORTIES FLOWN:	1872	BUNKERS DE/DAM	71/6
RNO SORTIES:	1169	STRUCT DES/DAM	12/0
TRKS DE/DAM	44/44	STACKS OF SUPP DEST	60
TANK DE/DAM	27/12	BOXES AMMO DEST	310
DOZERS DE/DAM	6/2	KBA	111
APC DE/DAM	1/0	PIPELINE CUT	1
SEC EXPLS	1850	POL BARR DEST	25
FIRES	266	BRIDGE DES	1
RC/RS	21/3	HELOS DES	2
FORD CUTS	5	GROUP 4	

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b. Missions flown from the Carrier Hancock.

	PHASE II 8 FEB - 6 MAR	PHASE III 7 MAR - 16 MAR	PHASE IV 17 MAR - 6 APR
SORTIES FLOWN	156	151	390
RNG SORTIES	138	105	231
BDA			
TRKS DES/DAM	0/0	2/4	16/19
TANKS DES/DAM	0/0	0/0	2/5
DOZERS DES/DAM	0/0	0/0	4/2
APC DES/DAM	0/0	1/1	0/0
RADAR DES/DAM	0/0	0/0	1/0
SEC EXPLS	3	28	540
FIRSES	9	15	57
RC/TS	0/0	0/0	10/0
FORD CUTS	0	0/0	2
GUNS DES/DAM	0/2	0/0	3/2
BUNKERS DES/DAM	4/1	0/0	23/2
STRUCT DES/DAM	0/0	0/0	4/0
STACKS OR SUPP DEST	0	0	33
BOXES AMMO DEST	0	0	10
KBA	0	0	22
PIPELINE CUT	0	0	1
POL BAR DEST	0	0	25

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c. Missions flown from the Carrier Kitty Hawk.

	PHASE II 8 FEB - 6 MAR	PHASE III 7 MAR - 16 MAR	PHASE IV 17 MAR - 6 APR
SORTIES FLOWN	284	204	246
RNG SORTIES	193	127	96
BDA			
TRKS DE/DAM	2/1	2/0	12/4
TANKS DE/DAM	0/4	0/0	*20/1
DOZERS DE/DAM	0/0	0/0	2/1
SEC EXPLS	40	105	1024
FIRES	15	25	55
RC/RS	0/0	7/3	4/0
FORD CUTS	0	3	0
GUNS DE/DAM	2/5	0/0	6/0
BUNKERS DE/DAM	0/0	0/0	23/0
STRUCT DE/DAM	0/0	0/0	0/0
STACKS OF SUPP DEST	0	0	27
KBA	0	40	49
BRIDGE DEST	0	1	0
HELO DEST	0	0	1

* 17 TANKS WERE FRIENDLY ABANDONED.

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d. Missions flown from the Carrier Ranger.

	PHASE II 8 FEB - 6 MAR	PHASE III 7 MAR - 16 MAR	PHASE IV 17 MAR - 6 APR
SORTIES FLOWN	288	124	29
RNG SORTIES	194	62	23
BDA			
TRKS DE/DAM	5/14	5/2	0/0
TANKS DE/DAM	5/2	0/0	0/0
SEC EXPLS	103	6	1
FIREs	32	56	2
GUNS DE/DAM	8/4	0/1	0/0
BUNKERS DE/DAM	17/1	2/2	0/0
STRUCT DE/DAM	8/0	0/0	0/0
BOXES AMMO DEST	300	0	0
HELO DEST	0	1	0

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Annex G (Artillery) to Combat Operations after action Report Lamson 719

1. (C) INTELLIGENCE.

a. Weather: The only adverse effect weather had on artillery operations was in the reduction in the number of air observer sorties. This resulted in fewer observed fire missions during the periods of bad weather. Inclement weather slowed resupply operations but did not seriously hamper overall artillery operations.

b. Terrain: The limited number of adequate lines of communication in the area of operations restricted heavy artillery fire support bases to those firing positions along QL 9 and similar roads in the vicinity of Khe Sanh. The one notable exception to this statement occurred when one 175mm gun battery occupied a fire support base in the vicinity of the ARVN Ranger Camp near the international border (XD6845).

c. Target Acquisition: The following target acquisition means were employed to counter enemy attacks by fire. Some of the problem areas are also highlighted:

(1) Aerial Observers: Artillery aerial observers in army aircraft and artillery air observers flying with USAF FAC's were used extensively throughout US and RVNAF AO's. During the latter phases of the operation, aircraft were maintained over suspected areas on a dedicated artillery watch. Although difficult to assess, it appears on the surface that the maintenance of an airborne watch does inhibit the enemy's use of indirect fire weapons. The aerial observers were hampered in their locating of hostile artillery by a very active enemy air defense, several periods of bad weather, and excellent use of cover and concealment by the enemy. They also found it extremely difficult to locate hostile artillery at night, because of the amount of friendly air and artillery impacting into the area. The preponderance of enemy artillery was fired during the daylight hours when our troops were at work and therefore exposed.

(2) AN/MPQ-4: The Q-4 counter mortar radar was employed throughout the US area of operation and did acquire targets. Its limited beam width of 445 mils, coupled with the short but intense duration of the spikes in the hostile mortar fire on US bases, limited

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artillery function.

(4) OV-1 Mohawk: In addition to other target acquisition means, during the later stages of the operation, the OV-1 Mohawk aircraft flew infrared missions nightly over suspected enemy artillery positions. Hot emissions received by the aircraft were sent directly to the 108th Arty Group for firing. Attempts were made to correlate the emissions with other intelligence data. There was insufficient time remaining in the operation for a fair evaluation of its ability to locate hostile artillery.

(5) TPS-25 radars were used primarily to support US operations. One TPS-25 was employed in the Khe Sanh area over likely avenues of approach. A second TPS-25 was scheduled for deployment to the area but maintenance problems precluded its employment.

(6) Sensors: Sensors were employed by US units in support of RVNAF operations. Kill zones were plotted on either end of the sensor strings within range of heavy artillery. The strings consisted of acoustic and seismographic sensors and were emplaced along avenues of approach, choke points, and enemy lines of communication. 131 sensor targets were engaged with 216 rounds of 8" ammunition and 527 rounds of 175mm ammunition. A total of 155 sensor activations were reported.

(7) Sound Detection Equipment: When the units at Lao Bao began to receive heavy attacks by fire, a sound detection team was requested from F Battery, 26th Artillery; however, the units at Lao Bao were withdrawn prior to the sound detection team becoming operational.

d. Enemy attacks by fire:

(1) During Operation Lamson 719 the enemy employed all calibers of artillery, rockets, and mortars to defend his base areas and apply maximum pressure to allied units and base camp areas.

(2) During the period 6 February through 2 April the enemy conducted over 448 attacks employing indirect fire weapons alone, or in conjunction with ground attacks. There were an average of six attacks by fire a day in February increasing in intensity and duration during March to an average of eleven attacks a day. Of particular note was the fact that the majority of these attacks were conducted during hours of daylight during periods of peak activity. Many of the attacks appear to have been conducted as observed fire missions. These attacks resulted in 160 Friendly KIA and 980 WIA. Of particular note was the enemy's extensive use of the 82mm mortar and the 122mm rocket. The four reports of the 152

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mm guns in March were from the ARVN Rangers and are suspect, as no confirming reports from other local units were received.

2. (C) MISSION.

XXIV Corps Artillery supports I Corps and XXIV Corps in the conduct of a combined ground and air operation into Base Area 604/611 to sever enemy LOC's and achieve maximum destruction of enemy forces and stock-piles.

3. (C) EXECUTION.

a. **Tactical Missions:** As the operation progressed, tactical missions assigned Corps Artillery units were changed accordingly.

(1) 30 Jan - 7 Feb

108th Arty Group: GSR 5/4 Arty
 2/94th Arty
 8/4 Arty

(2) 8 Feb - 27 Mar

108th Arty Group: GSR Arty with I Corps
 8/4 Arty
 2/94th Arty (+B/1/39 Arty)

(3) 28 Mar - 6 Apr

108th Arty Group: GSR 101st Abn Div Arty
 8/4 Arty: GSR 6/11 Arty
 2/94th Arty (+): GSR 5/4 Arty

b. **Fire Support Coordination:**

(1) Fire Support Coordination evolved into a highly complex task mainly because of the extensive use of air assets and because of the language difficulty inherent with supporting RVNAF units, which was compounded by the lack of US Advisors at maneuver unit level. RVNAF division headquarters remained in Vietnam, and US advisors at that level continued their normal functions except for accompanying their counterparts into Laos. Coordination with USAF and US Army Aviation elements was critical, centering around destruction/neutralization of enemy anti-aircraft positions, scheduling of preparation fires for Airmobile operations, and conducting a flak suppression program in conjunction with air resupply

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activities. Combined efforts were made at Corps level for the solution of the problems incurred, mainly between FSE, USAF DASC, and Corps Aviation. Efforts centered around the following areas:

- (a) Combining targeting information from all available sources to identify anti-aircraft threats, and allocating resources to neutralize the threats during airmobile operations.
- (b) Coordination of flight routes to insure flak suppression and/or preparation fires were planned along the routes and on adjacent, hostile terrain.
- (c) Coordination of LZ preparations in order that Tac Air, artillery, and aerial field artillery fires could be used extensively, lifting the preparation fires at the last possible moment prior to aircraft insertion.

(2) Coordination/liaison below Corps level was of equal importance throughout the operation. The coordination problem could not have been solved without the extensive reciprocal liaison that took place. This included, in addition to the traditional supporting (US) to supported (RVNAF), supported (RVNAF) to supporting (US). This facilitated the solving of all possible coordination difficulties inherent in the large zone of responsibility for artillery support and the forward disposition of RVNAF ground units, which extended beyond the range capability of heavy artillery. The latter situation created increased problems since English speaking advisors were not present with the ground elements in their forward positions. Liaison beyond normal concepts was important, not just from the standpoint of planning, requesting, and furnishing artillery support for ground elements, but to facilitate clearance of fires, to include clearance of counter battery/rocket/mortar targets for US Artillery and support units' self-defense. The extensive liaison concept also aided the full dissemination and exchange of target information, of all categories, between US and RVNAF units.

c. Fire Control Measures: The disposition of maneuver units, headquarters, and support elements caused the operation to take on the characteristics of a "conventional" situation, quite unlike normal RVN operations. In this context the use of an FSCL, NBL, and unit boundaries became critical. The No Bomb Line (NBL) is a measure used by the USAF to delineate areas of tac air responsibility between "in-country" and "out-of-country" resources. In LAMSON 719 the area inside the NBL was the responsibility of that portion of tac air allocated to the operation. All fire support elements relied on the Fire Support Coordination Line (FSCL), first as a safety measure when firing short of it (ground clearance required), and secondly as a basis for unrestrictive (within the limits of the ROE) engagement of targets beyond the FSCL. Again, the extensive use of

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liaison elements proved most useful in the full dissemination of the FSCL to all units.

d. Airspace Control:

(1) Plans were made for the establishment of two air corridors for the operation with the airstrip at Khe Sanh as the focal point. The first of these corridors (Hue-Khe Sanh) was designed to handle the traffic in and out of Khe Sanh. The second (Khe Sanh-Tchepone) would control traffic to the west. Only the Hue-Khe Sanh corridor was ever placed into effect. It existed as a restrictive fire plan, effective from 0700-2000 hours daily. Artillery could fire through it when VFR conditions existed and no aircraft were in the corridor. During times of reduced visibility, permission to fire through had to be secured from the Ground Control Approach (GCA). Artillery could be fired over or under the box at any time. The ground commander had the authority to close the corridor at anytime; thus, opening the airspace to artillery fire. Air warning advisories were not required inside the corridor during its hours of operation. During LAMSON 719 no flights were diverted due to artillery fire.

(2) One Artillery and Air Strike Warning Control Center (AASWCC) was already in existence when the operation commenced. Two additional AASWCCs were established as the operation progressed westward. Advisories were broadcast from these three stations to all aircraft, warning of danger areas and supplying information concerning routes around them. In addition, all artillery firing units posted air guards to watch for aircraft crossing the gun-target line.

e. Positioning. The primary consideration in the positioning of heavy artillery was that of placing firing elements as far forward as possible in order to take advantage of their full range capabilities. Even so, some maneuver elements in Laos eventually operated beyond the range of heavy artillery. Consideration was also given, but not fully exploited due to poor trafficability, to positioning laterally for maximum width of coverage. Another consideration involved in positioning of 8" howitzer batteries so as to be able to engage enemy artillery and mortar positions located by organic target acquisition means, and to take advantage of the accuracy of the 8" system in attacking enemy air-defense positions. During the course of LAMSON 719, Corps Artillery units participated in 91 tactical moves.

f. Ammunition:

(1) Expenditures varied from an average of 300 rounds per day (combined 8 inch and 175mm) in the early stages of the operation, to peak expenditures of 1000 - 1400 rounds of both calibers per day.

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(2) During the entire operation, 53% of the rounds fired by heavy artillery were in support of the RVNAF. However, during that period of Lamson 719 in which the RVNAF were operating in Laos, 58% of the heavy artillery expenditures were in their support.

(3) A detailed breakdown of heavy artillery ammunition expenditures is at Appendix 1.

(4) The distribution of heavy artillery rounds by target category and caliber is at Appendix 2.

4. (C) RESULTS.

a. Battle Damage Assessment: The assessment of damage or destruction from any one method of fire is extremely difficult as it is a common practice for B52 strikes, tac air, army air, and artillery to be employed in the same general area. BDA for heavy artillery is at Appendix 3. It is estimated that BDA was recorded on only 10 - 15% of the total rounds fired. The remainder were either unobserved or unreported.

b. Friendly Casualties: Personnel losses on the operation within XXIV Corps Artillery were 9 KIA, 76 WIA, 0 MIA.

c. Friendly Equipment Losses: Equipment losses of Corps Artillery units are at Appendix 4.

5. (C) ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS.

a. Supply:

(1) During Lamson 719, various methods of resupply were utilized. At the outset of the operation a provisional truck company was formed by utilizing the assets of XXIV Corps Artillery units. Troops and equipment were obtained from the battalions, consolidated and dispatched north to supplement existing transportation units. Midway through the operation, forward supply points (FSA-1 and FSA-2) were completely established and stocked. This cancelled the need for the provisional truck company and all assets were released to parent units. Repositioning of supplies aided units in handling resupply with organic transportation. When emergency resupply was required, it was coordinated with the 101st Airborne Division and air resupply was accomplished.

(2) Class V:

(a) Organic unit resupply of class V was not possible due to the

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quantity which had to be drawn each day. Class V resupply was adequate only when resources were stocked in forward positions. At the beginning of LAMSON 719, FSA-1 and FSA-2 had difficulty stocking the proper amounts of class V. Ammunition convys did not deliver complete rounds. Projectiles were delivered one day and the following day powder would be delivered.

(b) At various times, the Ammunition Supply Point reached a zero balance on critical items of ammunition. It is felt that this problem could have been avoided by the use of unit distribution, whereby the using unit submits its needs and ammunition is delivered directly to the using unit, not to a common supply point.

b. Maintenance:

(1) Maintenance of guns and vehicles proved to be one of the most challenging areas throughout the operation. The volume of firing done by the battalions, coupled with the frequency of moves for the firing batteries, required that most of the maintenance effort be directed toward the guns. As a result, wheel vehicle maintenance suffered. During the operation 175mm guns required 22 tube changes and the 8 inch howitzers required two tube changes. One tube change required a full day's work, most of the unit's maintenance personnel, and one-half of the direct support maintenance capability. This problem was further compounded by constant demands for elevating and traversing motors for the 175mm gun, items which require a considerable amount of time to replace. The 175mm gun chassis proved to be unsatisfactory on this operation. The constant firing of this weapon during the peak of the operation caused it to develop significant problems with the hydraulic system and the elevating and traversing mechanisms. The engine on the 175mm gun chassis proved to be unreliable on extended road marches or on road marches over rough, hilly roads. The recovery effort necessary after each road march placed another heavy burden on the maintenance program. The excessive down time of the 175mm gun is directly proportional to the number of rounds fired, as this causes additional wear and tear on the chassis and precludes adequate maintenance service. DSU Contact Teams were not sufficient to repair all deadlined weapons. Delays in repairing weapons occurred when contact teams were not available because of requirements elsewhere. The importance of keeping the guns operational detracted from other track and wheel vehicle maintenance. In addition, this problem was compounded by the non-availability of repair parts, especially parts for the 3/4-ton truck and the M548 Cargo Carrier.

(2) Vehicle recovery operations throughout the period indicated the need for a recovery vehicle, other than the M578 Vehicle Track Recovery (light) such as an M88 Tank Retriever. The M578 has the same carriage as the 175mm Gun and 8" howitzer, and consequently is not large enough

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to perform extensive recovery operations on these weapons.

c. Communications:

(1) Circuits:

(a) RTT: The XXIV Corps Command/Fire Radio Teletype Net provided a continuous flow of message traffic during the entire operation. A total of 1,926 messages were passed during the 66 days Headquarters, XXIV Corps Artillery was operational at Quang Tri Combat Base with only 11 hours of outage time.

(b) FM Secure: The FM Secure Net worked well within its range limitations. When the artillery units deployed to the Khe Sanh area, the distance from Corps Artillery Headquarters was approximately 56 kilometers. At that range the FM secure radio worked sporadically and was unreliable.

(c) Wire: The support provided XXIV Corps Arty by the signal support units was complicated by the maze of a large build-up in the Forward Area.

(2) Problem Areas:

(a) As in most field operations the greatest problem was in the laying of field wire and then keeping the circuits operational. Where the wire was laid by air, it was impossible to work on the lines once it went out. Wire lines placed along roadways were constantly cut and mangled by vehicles. Wires that were dug in or strung overhead were still subject to being broken.

(b) DSU maintenance of communications equipment was initially non-existent and although a limited repair facility was eventually moved to the Khe Sanh area, it could repair only a few of the items. DSU maintenance was accomplished by turning items in to either the 63d Maintenance Battalion at Quang Tri or the 2d Maintenance Battalion at Phu Bai.

(c) The inability of DSU Maintenance to provide timely repair or direct exchange items for radio teletypes impaired the full-time, record communications capability. Although not a new problem, the lack of RTT's at certain times hindered accomplishment of fire missions.

(3) Observations:

(a) Radio Teletype AN/GRC-142: The AN/GRC-142 proved to be a most valuable asset during the conduct of operation LAMSON 719. The main-

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tenance required to keep one set operational, however, is excessive.

(b) AN/GRC-46: The RT-524 proved to be a very reliable means of communication if used within its range limitations. When the KY-8 secure equipment is employed with the RT-524 and used within range limitations, this combination becomes a most usable asset to the commander.

(c) Maintenance: All communications equipment required an excessive amount of maintenance due to the conditions under which the units were deployed. The prime factor for excessive outage of C/E equipment was maintenance, operator and DS/GS. The lack of contact teams in the Forward Area required constant changing of equipment to keep it in operation. Further, complete lack of DS maintenance in the Forward Area compounded all problems.

6. COMMANDER'S ANALYSIS.

a. Tactics and Techniques:

(1) Throughout the operation it was found that both RVNAF and US units were unfamiliar with the characteristics, limitations, and capabilities of heavy artillery. Many times results were expected that far exceeded the heavy artillery's capabilities. For example, the 1st Airborne Division requested 2500 heavy artillery rounds be fired over an eight-hour period. These fires were to take the place of five cancelled B-52 Strikes (ARC Lights). With heavy artillery, if the weapons are not initially laid within traverse limits of the target, 8-15 minutes is required before the first round can be fired. Invariably, both U.S. and RVNAF units felt this time excessive; although it is appropriate, considering the capability of the weapons system. Another example of this lack of understanding of heavy artillery capabilities were the frequent requests for fire, specifying the number of rounds to be expended within a given period of time. On several occasions, the sustained rate of fire of the weapon would have had to have been exceeded in order to have accomplished the mission. Although priority of fires was established, it was difficult to convince both RVNAF and U.S. units that each was receiving a fair share of heavy artillery fires. Of all the RVNAF units supported, only the 1st Airborne Division was fairly familiar with the capabilities and limitations of heavy artillery.

(2) On nearly all occasions RVNAF commanders were reluctant to fire heavy artillery within established danger close criteria; i.e., 500 meters for the 175mm gun and 300 meters for the 8 inch howitzer. An average distance from friendly troops for fires throughout the operation was 1,500 meters. All RVNAF commanders exhibited more confidence in the 8 inch howitzer than in the 175mm gun.

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(3) It is felt that preparations were fired too far in advance of the planned combat assault. The standard procedure for an LZ preparation was a two-hour artillery preparation of the general area of the LZ, followed by two hours of tac air. Then, 20 minutes of artillery preparation of the LZ, itself, was followed by four minutes of AFA fire. During the initial phase of the operation, preparations were fired several times expending 300 to 500 rounds on each and the CA was cancelled due to weather. The majority of these preps were fired from 0500-0700 hours. On several occasions the CA was cancelled at 0700 hours, just after completion of the artillery portion of the prep. The RVNAF consistently scheduled CA's too early in the day, considering the usual weather limitations in the AO.

(4) To facilitate requests for fire, quick fire channels were established with adjacent units. This method of obtaining fire in the least amount of time fully justified the employment of additional personnel and equipment to operate the quick fire channels.

(5) U.S. liaison teams deployed with the RVNAF CP's in the RVN and the RVNAF liaison teams functioned well. Requests for fire were expedited and current information was constantly available.

(6) In underdeveloped and heavily jungled areas, engineer bulldozer support to provide fields of fire and level firing positions, and to prepare bunkers for ammunition, equipment, and personnel is mandatory. Engineer support during the first half of the operation was virtually nonexistent due to the priority given to the construction of the Khe Sanh airfield. When adequate engineer support was available, it was used to prepare positions prior to their occupation, enhancing the unit's ability to provide continuous fire support to the maneuver elements.

(7) The emplacement of heavy artillery in close proximity to international borders requires careful coordination to insure an effective screen of maneuver elements. This was not accomplished during Lamson 719 and led to a high incident rate of direct and indirect fire attacks on forward fire support bases. U.S. maneuver units were precluded from completely accomplishing this mission due to their not being permitted to cross the border into Laos, from where many of these attacks were directed.

(8) Lamson 719 reconfirmed the basic principles of field artillery tactics and techniques. Where these principles were followed, operations were well executed; where they were violated, confusion resulted. This points up the importance of stressing basic, proven procedures both in training and during operations.

b. Augmentation to Unit's TOE's:

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(1) Recognizing the maintenance requirements of heavy artillery battalions, ordnance contact teams are a necessity at the battalion level in operations involving high expenditures and frequent moves.

(2) The M-36 chronograph proved to be reliable. During the initial phases of the operation, registrations were difficult to conduct due to weather limitations, which prohibited air observation, and the limited number of ground OP's in Laos. Extensive use was made of the two M-36 chronographs assigned to the artillery group. It is strongly recommended that each heavy artillery battalion be authorized this piece of equipment. The cost would soon be recovered by ammunition savings which would accrue from the reduced requirement for registrations.

(3) Each battalion maintenance section should be authorized the M-88, tank recovery vehicle, in addition to the 5-ton wrecker and VTR. On many occasions during road marches, authorized recovery vehicles were unable to provide pulling power adequate to extract inoperative guns and tracks.

c. New Equipment Required:

(1) This operation again pointed out the urgent need for the development and production of a light-weight, highly mobile, long range, 6400-mil counter battery radar. The need for adequate, 6400 mil radar coverage was demonstrated by the fact that counter battery could be fired in response to only 102 of the 488 attacks by fire. The requirement for 6400 mil coverage which exists in this type combat environment is equally applicable to all intensities of warfare.

(2) Major mechanical problems encountered with the 175mm gun, M107, proved that the weapon should be mounted on a heavier chassis.

(3) The new family of computers (TACFIRE, TOS, and CS-3), still in the developmental stage, would have greatly assisted in this operation by providing accurate information far more rapidly than is possible using manual procedures.

d. Lessons Learned:

(1) The mutual exchange of liaison personnel such as was practiced in this operation out of necessity, due to the fact that U.S. personnel could not enter Laos, proved extremely advantageous and well worth the additional personnel required. It is felt that it will be equally advantageous in any future operations involving troops of two or more nations, regardless of any limitations imposed on the movement of U.S. troops.

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(2) The inability to register weapons as often as was required was a continual problem. Calibration of the weapons using the M-36 chronograph and frequent net messages were an effective solution to this problem. Adequate preparation must be made, however, to minimize the time spent out of action. Grids must be cleared for firing prior to the arrival of the calibration team. Following its arrival, one gun at a time must be called out of action until such time as the calibration of the unit is completed.

e. Recommendations:

- (1) That heavy artillery units be given high priority in the allocation of engineer bulldozer support during extended field operations.
- (2) That heavy artillery ammunition be delivered directly to the using unit rather than to a common supply point.
- (3) That an M88 Tank Retriever be added to the MTCE of heavy artillery battalions.
- (4) That the 175mm gun chassis be replaced by another chassis that can withstand extended road marches or road marches over rough terrain, and the shock of sustained firing.
- (5) That personnel at all levels receive training in the following areas:
 - (a) Rigging of all types of equipment for helicopter movement.
 - (b) Demolitions.
 - (c) Recovery Operations for tracked vehicles and heavy artillery pieces.
 - (d) Perimeter defense and security.
 - (e) Patrolling techniques and night ambush patrol around firebases.
 - (f) Field fortification construction.
 - (g) Field sanitation and hygiene.
 - (h) Direct fire procedures for heavy artillery.
 - (i) Proper procedures for crater analysis.

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Appendix 1 (Ammunition Expenditures) to Annex G (Artillery) to After Action Report LAMSON 719

Ammunition Expenditures

Missions / Rounds

1. (C) Total heavy artillery expenditures: 9319/53,087

a. Total 8" expenditures: 2373/16,392

b. Total 175mm expenditures: 6,946/36,695

2. (C) Expenditures by unit:

a. 8th Bn, 4th Arty

(1) 8": 782/6,595

(2) 175mm: 3,060/16,266

b. 2nd Bn, 94th Arty

(1) 8": 1,591/9,797

(2) 175mm: 3,127/16,361

c. B, 1st Bn, 39th Arty - 175mm: 759/4068

3. (C) Heavy artillery expenditures in support of US/RVNAF Forces.

a. 8th Bn, 4th Arty	<u>US Support</u>	<u>RVNAF Support</u>
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(1) 8"	622/5,230	160/1,365
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(2) 175mm:	1,752/8,356	1,308/7,910
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b. 2nd Bn, 94th Arty

(1) 8"	586/3,664	1,005/6,113
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(2) 175mm:	1045/6166	2,082/10,195
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c. B, 1st Bn, 39th Arty-175mm	295/1617	464/2451
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d. Total 8"	1208/8,934	1,165/7478
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e. Total 175mm:	3,092/16,139	3,854/20,556
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GROUP 4

1-0-1

Downgraded at 3 year
intervals; declassified
after 12 years

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Appendix 1 (Ammunition Expenditures) to Annex G (Artillery) to After Action Report LAMSON 719

f. Total heavy arty: 4,300/25,053 5,019/28,034

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Appendix 2 (Heavy Artillery Round Distribution) to Annex G (Artillery)
 to After Action Report LAMSON 719

DISTRIBUTION OF HEAVY ARTILLERY ROUNDS

TARGET CATEGORY AND CALIBER

1. (C) Percentage of total expenditures by caliber devoted to each target category.

<u>CATEGORY</u>	<u>8 inch</u>	<u>175mm</u>
1	13%	9%
2	24%	28.5%
3	5%	7%
4	41.5%	33%
5	10.5%	13%
6	4%	2%
7	-	.8%
8	-	1.3%
9	-	.9%
10	2%	4.5%

2. (C) Target Categories

1. Permanent Enemy Locations (Bnks, Huts, Ammo Dumps, Supply Areas).
2. Counter Arty. and Counter Mortar Fires.
3. Flak Suppression.
4. VC/NVA Locations (Sensor Activations, SEL, KEL, En Act, Per, URS).
5. Preps and Blocking Fires (Defensive Targets, Medivac).
6. Tanks.
7. Highway 1032.
8. Pipeline.

GROUP 4

2-0-1

Downgraded at 3 year
 intervals; declassified
 after 12 years

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Appendix 2 (Heavy Artillery Round Distribution) to Annex G (Artillery) to
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9. Cancelled Airstrikes.

10. Other (Road Nets, TOT's, Trucks, Downed Aircraft).

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Appendix 3 (BDA) to Annex G (Artillery) to after Action Report LAMSON 719

CORPS ARTILLERY

BDA

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Fighting Psns Destroyed	13
Bkrs and huts Damaged or Destroyed	86
Mtr Psns Silenced or Destroyed	6
Rkt Psns Silenced or Destroyed	1
Arty Psns Damaged or Destroyed	4
23mm Psns Silenced or Destroyed	3
51mm Psns Silenced or Destroyed	6
Number of Secondary Explosions	57
Number of KIA	1679
Number of Tanks Damaged or Destroyed	11
Number of Trucks Damaged or Destroyed	40
Number of Supply Areas Damaged or Destroyed	1

3-G-1

GROUP 4
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Appendix 4 (Equipment Losses) to Annex G (Artillery) to After Action Report LAMSON 719

CORPS ARTILLERY

EQUIPMENT LOSSES

1.(C) Destroyed by enemy:

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>AMOUNT</u>
Wheeled Vehicles	26
Tracked Vehicles	6
Trailers	13
Generators	7
Communications Equipment	
(a) Radio's	5
(b) Wire Dispenser	1
Small Arms	52
M-107, 175mm Gun	4

2.(C) Equipment Lost through accident:

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>AMOUNT</u>
Wheeled Vehicles	1
Small Arms	3
292 Antennas	2
M-110, 8" Howitzer	1

3.(C) Tubes destroyed by malfunction: M-107, 175mm Gun 2

4-G-1

GROUP 4

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Annex E (Aviation Support) to Combat Operations After Action Report, LAMSON 719.

1. (C) Control: The CG 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) was charged with the responsibility of control of all aviation elements employed in support of LAMSON 719. In arriving at the optimum organization to support the operation, several factors had to be considered.

a. A three division equivalent size force was to be supported with troop lifts and resupply to be primarily accomplished by helicopters.

b. Only those assets organic to the 101st Abn Div (Ambl) could support the operation from their home station and additional facilities at Quang Tri were extremely limited. This made it necessary for non-organic units to operate under field conditions.

c. There was a requirement to commit maximum aviation assets in support of LAMSON 719 and to maintain other mission requirements in the division's area of operations. The availability of other fully committed USARV units would eventually have heavy bearing on aircraft support capabilities.

d. Other factors such as heavy lift requirements, distance to be traveled, the area of operation and the enemy situation were large considerations in planning.

e. Four assault helicopter battalions with 12 companies and four aerial weapons companies, one assault support helicopter battalion with five medium (CH-47) companies, one heavy lift (CH-54) company and one Marine (CH-53) heavy lift squadron were provided to support troop and heavy lift requirements and controlled by the Commanding Officer, 101st Aviation Group. Two additional air cavalry troops were provided and placed CPCON to Commanding Officer, 2/17th Cavalry. Aerial Field Artillery was provided by 4th Battalion, 77th AFA.

2. (C) Mission Planning and Execution.

a. The air mission commander of his operations officer coordinated all aspects of each assault with supported units and participating aviation units. Control measures included the following:

- (1) Starting aircraft on ANC command.
- (2) Prescribed routes.
- (3) Established altitudes.
- (4) Rules of engagement.
- (5) Release points

H-1

GP-4

Downgraded at 3 year intervals; declassified after 12 years

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Annex H (Aviation Support) to Combat Operations After Action Report,
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- (6) Landing/takeoff direction.
- (7) Communications discipline.
- (8) Downed aircraft recovery procedures.

b. Approach routes could be changed by the air mission commander while the flight was enroute. Route changes were made due to enemy fires, weather or intelligence. Usually, alternate routes were selected beforehand. In each case the air mission commander made the decision to change routes but coordinated his route adjustment with the Airmobile Task Force commander to insure clearance from other friendly supporting fires. The normal formation used was a "close" trail formation with 30 second intervals. The formation was designated by the air mission commander. All troop lift helicopters normally operated between 4000 and 6000 feet above ground level (AGL).

3. (C) Employment: In the broad context US Army Aviation was employed to:

- a. Perform security and reconnaissance.
- b. Perform direct aerial fire support to ground units (Cav, ARA, Gunships).
- c. Airlift troops into and out of combat areas.
- d. Reposition reserve units by air.
- e. Perform aerial evacuation of casualties.
- f. Provide command and control aerial vehicles for ground commanders.
- g. Airlift supplies and material from rear bases to troops throughout the combat zone.
- h. Mark targets for strike by Tactical Air.
- i. Radar surveillance of roads and waterways leading into the objective areas.
- j. Infrared surveillance of likely enemy armor, artillery and vehicle positions.
- k. Aerial photography and imagery delivery.
- l. Route, area and point reconnaissance.
- m. Bomb damage assessment.

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Annex H (Aviation Support) to Combat Operations After Action Report, LAMSON 719.

- n. Convoy coverage.
- c. Artillery fire adjustment.
- p. Search and rescue for downed aircraft crew.

4. (C) Predominate Missions. Four types of missions predominate during LAMSON 719:

a. Resupply: Resupply missions flown by UH-1, CH-47, CH-53 and CH-54 helicopters accounted for the highest number of sorties by type mission. Resupply missions also accounted for a significant number of gunship sorties. All resupply missions in Laos required gun escort. None of the ARVN ground units were so located in Laos that unescorted resupply aircraft could operate in and out of their positions.

b. Fire support: Gunship sorties flown in support of ground units accounted for the second highest number of sorties by type mission. Gunships from USA, Cavalry and the aviation elements were in continuous demand throughout LAMSON 719 for the purpose of providing fire support in close proximity to friendly troops. NVA habitually pressed in or "bugged" friendly units in order to escape from the effects of B-52 strikes, Tac Air and Artillery. The gunship was an extremely effective weapon to counter this tactic, and consequently was in great demand throughout LAMSON 719.

c. Troop lift: The majority of troop movements into and out of Laos were by UH-1 aircraft; therefore, this type mission accounted for a high number of sorties.

d. Reconnaissance and surveillance: US Army fixed wing aircraft (O-1, OV-1, C and C models and O-5A) were employed in general support of XXIV Corps to meet reconnaissance, surveillance and imagery delivery requirements. The C2 Air, XXIV Corps, allocated sorties which were flown on a daily basis in support of operating units. The 2/17th Cavalry also contributed to the reconnaissance effort and their report is covered elsewhere in this annex.

5. (C) Army Gunship Utilization. In the early stages of LAMSON 719 it became quite apparent that the role of the armed helicopter was vital to the successful accomplishment of the airmobile mission, whether combat assault, extraction, medevac escort, resupply or an aircrew recovery. Due to the amount of enemy antiaircraft fire throughout the area of operation, particularly around LZ's and PZ's, the number of gunships required to provide protection for the UH-1H lift aircraft increased significantly. Based on this need, the amount of gunships increased from the normal one light fire team (i.e. 2 gunships) covering up to twenty UH-1H's to approximately one light fire team for every five UH-1H's.

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This increase created a major control and allocation problem. Initially it was necessary to place one escort gun team leader in charge of all escort gunships under control of the cavalry commander for integration into the fire support effort. This tactic was first used in the assault of LZ Liz. As more gunship assets became available to the ground force commander, distinct areas of responsibility were assigned. Examples of this were gunship coverage along the flight routes with the mission of suppressing enemy fire, gunship coverage from LZ to LZ with primary responsibility to the LZ area. By dividing these responsibilities, the AIC had his assets in positions along the entire flight route without diverting his escort gunships from the lift aircraft. Armed helicopters possess the capability for detecting and immediately engaging battlefield targets of opportunity close to friendly troops on the ground unmatched by any other weapons system in the US Army inventory. Armed helicopters operating with the air cavalry, aerial field artillery and escorting troop lift, heavy lift and support aircraft literally covered the battle area with their ability to respond immediately and accurately with their fire against known and suspected enemy weapons and positions. Armed helicopters often operated under low ceilings and weather conditions that restricted or precluded use of Tactical Air in close support of ground units or airmobile operations. Armed helicopters, particularly those of the Air Cav, played a key role in acquiring targets, and then directing artillery fire and tactical air strikes against them, and conducting battle damage assessments.

6. (C) Air Cavalry Operations.

a. Mission: The 2/17th Cavalry was tasked to locate and destroy enemy aircraft weapons, to locate and report enemy concentrations, to provide reconnaissance and security for allied units participating in LAMSON 719, and for assistance in downed aircrew recovery in Laos.

b. Reconnaissance and target acquisition: The 2/17th Cavalry crossed the Laotian border on 8 Feb 71 in direct support of the ARVN I Corps in Laos, and in general support of XXIV Corps. The 2/17th Cavalry did not precede the ARVN forces across the border. However, once the ARVN had crossed the 2/17th Cav began working in front of these units at a distance of 8-15 Km. Emphasis was placed on areas where future troop insertions were to be made, and on locating, and destroying enemy aircraft weapons. Storage areas, personnel and equipment were also encountered and engaged. During the initial days of the operation, the 2/17th assets were primarily employed in deep reconnaissance and in security of downed aircraft and crews.

(1) ~~After~~ ~~the~~ ~~start~~ of the operation, the Cavalry reconnaissance effort became, at the insistence of Senior Advisors who were looking for fire support and not reconnaissance, primarily an operation of providing fire support to the allied units on the ground. This effort was less

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productive in terms of intelligence gathered and enemy personnel and equipment destroyed, and more costly in terms of cavalry losses, since the NVA used the tactic of nestling AA weapons as close as possible to friendly troops. This inhibited the use of tactical air to neutralize these weapons. Frequently it was difficult, if not impossible, to obtain fire clearance against the enemy's AA from ground units because of the risk of friendly fire incidents.

(2) An agreement was reached with the ARVN Corps Commander so that two cavalry troops each day would be in close support to ground forces and two would be used for deep reconnaissance. The amount of intelligence gathered by the 2/17th Cav began to increase significantly at that time. However, as the operation continued it became apparent that helicopter insertions, extractions and resupply missions could not be accomplished at minimum cost in terms of personnel and equipment without extensive air cavalry support of these operations. As a result the air cavalry emphasis was shifted from reconnaissance to security, and the intelligence gathering capability was reduced significantly.

c. Support of airmobile operations: Upon receiving the mission to support a combat assault or extraction, one to four air cavalry troops would be tasked to perform the cavalry portion of the operation. The routes in and out would be reconnoitered as well as primary and alternate touch down areas. Recommendations would be passed to the Air Mission ~~and~~ Airmobile Task Force Commander prior to the actual insertion/extraction. Once a lift began the cavalry would normally screen away from the landing zone. Cavalry aircraft were also prepared to protect and extract downed airmen in the vicinity of the landing zone if required.

7. (C) Effect of Terrain on Aviation Operations. The river valley such as the east-west oriented Xe Pon, became natural flight routes and orientation markers. The escarpment running generally east-west approximately two kilometers south of the Xe Pon river furnished a natural objective/staging area for the thrust toward Tchepone. The dense foliage and uneven terrain coupled with the increasing density, mobility and sophistication of the antiaircraft defenses of the NVA proved an increasing obstacle to US Army Aviation support of LAMSON 719. The terrain dictated detailed route planning, meticulous reconnaissance and the prior selection and strict adherence to approach and departure routes. Landing zones which were too small or non-existent, required LZ construction using air delivered ordnance. In addition, small LZ's dictated the employment of a tactical trail formation with aircraft at 30 second intervals. Single ship LZ's are the least advantageous since aircraft exposure is increased and time required to insert troops is maximized. The rugged terrain discouraged contour flight and widely varying elevations made nap-of-the-earth flying extremely difficult. The terrain provided effective concealment for enemy movement and antiaircraft defenses and created difficulty in target identification and engagement. In special situations, the air

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cavalry elements found it necessary to adjust reconnaissance tactics according to the terrain. Cavalry aircraft adopted tactics to avoid flying over steep valleys and high ground with sparse vegetation where the advantage of early detection and employment of multiple antiaircraft weapons lay with the enemy. In relatively flat terrain, the cavalry aircraft flew at lower altitudes to decrease exposure time and limit engagement by higher caliber antiaircraft weapons.

8. (C) Weather. From the stand point of helicopter operations, adverse weather had minimum effect on ground operations. During periods of weather below VFR minimums, the command decision to start operations was delayed until ceiling and visibility conditions improved. Helicopter operations were delayed due to adverse weather, but not cancelled. Concerning fixed wing operations, adverse weather conditions in the target areas considerably reduced the IR sensor and photo capability of the OV-1 aircraft and caused cancellation of approximately 1/7th of the requested O-1 sorties.

9. (C) Limitations Due to Density Altitude. As the operation progressed it became typical to undertake the majority of aviation missions in the late morning and afternoon. A combination of altitude at Khe Sanh (1170') and the heat, produced a definite limitation due to density altitude. Generally, no apparent problem was encountered with the medium/heavy lift aircraft. UH-1H helicopters experienced a reduction in aircraft load (ACL) and fuel load; however, the density altitude produced no great hindrance for the UH-1H as a troop carrier or when utilized in the resupply role. The most profound effect of increasing density altitude was evident in AH-1G/UH-1C attack helicopter performance. This problem was extremely apparent since gunship assets were the least available. To combat the density altitude problem, the gunships were required to reduce the fuel load and/or ordnance to the following:

	Normal		High DA Conditions	
	Fuel	Arm	Fuel	Arm
AH-1G	1200 lbs	100%	800-1000 lbs	60%
UH-1C	1100 lbs	100%	950 lbs	50%

10. (C) Airspace Management. Airspace was managed through a series of artillery and air strike warning control centers (AASWCC) which broadcast artillery advisories. Both Tac Air and Army Aviation elements could call these stations to determine where artillery was firing at any particular time. Artillery fire could be shut off at any time through the Artillery Liaison Officer at the DTOC; Tac Air could be controlled by means of the division TACP contacting the FAC (the ground commander could also contact the FAC for this purpose); and Army Air could be controlled through the ANC. In the final analysis, the ground commander could

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control all of these assets through the liaison and communications links at his disposal. In addition, several air corridors were established for the use of C-130 resupply ships. The corridors however, restricted fire plans for the artillery. They constituted boxes through which artillery could not fire except when VFR conditions made it obvious that no aircraft were in the corridor or when permission to fire was granted by GCA. However, artillery could fire over or under these boxes at any time, thus gaining greater flexibility in the attack of targets of opportunity. Only the Hue to Khe Sanh corridor was ever actually used; the others (Khe Sanh to Lao Bao and Lao Bao to Tchepone) were available on call. On several occasions specified areas were pre-cleared of all artillery fire for a 15-30 minute period in order that photo and IR missions could be flown.

11. (C) Aircraft Maintenance.

a. The original maintenance organization consisted of the 5th Trans Bn, 101st Abn Div supporting divisional aircraft and the 335th Trans Co (-) supporting non-divisional aircraft from Quang Tri. These units were augmented by 175 military and civilian personnel. The augmentation consisted of 150 mechanics and 25 supply personnel to be divided between the three direct support units, A Co and B Co, 5th Trans Bn and the 335th Trans Co (-). Backup DS and GS maintenance support was provided by the 58th Trans Bn, 34th GSG, at Da Nang. The integral Direct Support Service Activity (DSSA) of the 5th Trans Bn, plus the 25 man augmentation provided the tech supply support for all units, except the 1/5 Mech and D 3/5 Cav troops. These units received their supply support from the 142nd Trans Co, 58th Trans Bn, their normal supply source.

b. The introduction of 2 assault helicopter companies and 1 aerial weapons company and the increased operational requirement necessitated a further reinforcement of the original maintenance organization. A control element of the 34th GSG (Fwd) was introduced at this time to provide experienced, high-level maintenance personnel needed to control and coordinate the aviation logistics effort. This control element further reinforced the original maintenance organization with 208 military and civilian personnel, as needed. These reinforcements were introduced between the period 22 Feb and the first part of Mar to cover support units. The additional personnel consisted of avionics and armament specialists, sheet metal, honeycomb and engine repairmen, technical representatives, and mechanics formed into PMP teams. A 40 man direct support platoon from the 604th Trans Co was placed under the operational control of the 335th Trans Co for a period of 10 days. The platoon was then placed under the operational control of the 58th Trans Bn to provide additional backup direct support at Da Nang. The support provided was adequate to maintain USARV standard operational ready rates. The maintenance management system utilized enabled the controlling element to identify problem areas and shift resources and

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apply technical direction in maintenance and supply to the aviation units. By shifting maintenance resources into and out of MR-1 as needed, the control element maintained a ratio of DS/GS maintenance for aircraft of approximately 1.58 personnel per aircraft. This ratio is approximately the same as the rates maintained in the other military regions in RVN. Supply support was expedited by a liaison officer from Aviation Material Management Center (AMMC) who maintained direct contact with his headquarters. Critical items were expedited and prepositioned at the DSSA's as required.

12.(U) Aviation Safety: Accidents. Eleven occurred during LAMSON 719. This represents a rate of 29.0 losses per 100,000 flying hours. In view of the tactical situation, the rate is not excessive. The tactical situation involved maximum loads, evasive maneuvers and quick tactical decisions involving the evaluation of risk. When an aircraft went down, it was quickly surrounded by the enemy making it difficult for the recovery crews to evacuate crew members. As aircraft were recovered, they were examined and investigated as the tactical situation permitted in regard to location of the evacuated aircraft, availability of personnel, etc.

13 (C) Aviation Flying Hours: The increase in aircraft flying hours for the units involved in LAMSON 719 was accompanied by a corresponding increase in individual aviator flying hours. It was impossible to keep some aviators under the 30 day/140 hour limit established by USARV. The 140 hour limit was waived by USARV, but did not relieve the commanders of the responsibility of monitoring their aviators for fatigue.

14 (C) Anti-Aircraft Engagements.

a. Normal policy when encountering anti-aircraft weapons was to request TAC Air. The USAF has the firepower and suitable aircraft to engage AA weapons at a more acceptable risk level than does the Army with organic gunships.

b. Only when the Air Force was not available would Army aircraft engage AA weapons. AA weapons as large as 37mm were engaged; however, 23mm and larger were usually left alone, or marked for a FAC.

15 (C) Tank Engagements.

a. During LAMSON 719, PT 76 tanks were encountered. Engagement technique for the AH-1G was to initiate contact as far out as possible with 2.75 flechette rockets. This served to remove personnel from the vehicles and the immediate vicinity. As the gun run continued, a mixture of HE and WP rockets were used in an attempt to destroy the target. Normal disengagement was 1000 meters.

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b. When available the XM-35 20mm cannon was used. This weapon is extremely accurate and affords a standoff distance of 1200-2500 meters.

c. Initially HEAT rockets were not available. However, once they became available results were good. This rocket is capable of destroying armor, but direct hits are required. This dictated that engagements be made at ranges of 900-1000 meters from the target, thus exposing the gunship to the tanks 12.7mm and to supporting infantry in the area.

16. (c) Evaluation.

a. The hostile anti-aircraft environment and performance limitations of the UH-1C gunship negated the effectiveness of this ship in the LAMSON 719 area. The 235th Aerial Weapons Company and D/227th Cavalry were added to the task organization to compensate for the ineffectiveness of the 60 UH-1C aircraft assigned.

b. The demand for air cavalry exceeded the capability of assigned units and all cross border aircraft operations required gunship support utilizing the assets of one aerial weapons company daily. Further demands on gunship assets emanated from medical evacuation missions, UH-1 resupply, downed crew and aircraft recovery missions. The foregoing requirements were in addition to the continuing requirements to provide gunship escort for the many combat assaults that were conducted.

APPENDICES:

1. Aviation Summary
2. Aircraft Losses
3. Sortie Summary
4. Major Lifts
5. Task Organization
6. Density Altitude Summary

CONTINENTAL

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Appendix 1 (Aviation Summary) to Annex H (Aviation Support) to Combat Operations
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AVIATION SUMMARY LAMSON 719

30 Jan 71 - 7 Apr 71

<u>Aircraft Sorties by Type:</u>	<u>Total In-Country</u>	<u>Total Cut-of-Country</u>
Guns	17,159	17,014
Troop Lifts	37,681	13,098
Medevac	1,829	909
Air Cav	10,603	7,284
Logistical	51,342	7,523
TOTAL	118,614	45,828

GRAND TOTAL 164,442

<u>Aircraft Loss and Damage:</u>	<u>Non-Hostile Damage/Loss</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Hostile Damage/Loss</u>
	1	OH6A	25 9
		OH58	15 6
	1	UH1C	62 8
	2 1	UH1H	314 52
	1 2	AW1G	157 24
		CH47	26 3
	1	CH53	13 1
		CH54	2 0
TOTAL	74 5		614 103

<u>Casualties:</u>	<u>Non-Hostile</u>	<u>Hostile</u>
	10	KIA 55
	3	WIA 178
	4	MIA 34

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Appendix 2 (Aircraft Losses) to Annex H (Aviation Support) to Combat Operations
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Aircraft destroyed by type:

	<u>DATE</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TAIL #</u>	<u>COORDINATES</u>
JH-1H:	8 Feb	173d AHC	-580	XD 735252
	8 Feb	B/7/1	-063	XD 595309
	8 Feb	C/158	-307	XD 590368
	11 Feb	D/3/5	-791	XD 922540
	14 Feb	B/158	-439	XD 506470
	18 Feb	1/5	-248	XD 507453
	20 Feb	C/158	-493	XD 570503
	20 Feb	237th Med	-635	XD 242423
	23 Feb	173d AHC	-516	XD 552344
	26 Feb	48th AHC	-276	XD 650299
	3 Mar	48th AHC	-177	XD 431372
	3 Mar	71st AHC	-358	XD 431372
	3 Mar	71st AHC	-269	XD 588388
	3 Mar	174th AHC	-639	XD 431372
	3 Mar	A/101st	-189	XD 431372
	3 Mar	A/101st	-720	XD 538349
	3 Mar	B/158	-279	XD 600380
	4 Mar	48th AHC	-141	XD 355403
	4 Mar	B/158	-894	XD 315415
	4 Mar	C/158	-462	XD 346408
	5 Mar	C/158	-341	XD 348408
	5 Mar	174th AHC	-215	XD 630267
	8 Mar	A/101st	-350	XD 701403

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Appendix 2 (Aircraft Losses) to Annex H (Aviation Support) to Combat Operations
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Aircraft destroyed by type:

	<u>DATE</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TAIL #</u>	<u>COORDINATES</u>
OH-6A:	10 Feb 71	A/2/17	-483	XD 649295
	11 Feb	F/8	-416	XD 688416
	18 Feb	C/7/17	-528	XD 465415
	26 Feb	B/7/1	-630	XD 727214
	26 Feb	B/7/1	-054	XD 668319
	27 Feb	B/7/1	-256	XD 626258
	27 Feb	F/8	-190	XD 755355
	28 Mar	A/2/17	-642	XD 962238
	28 Mar	A/2/17	-298	XD 967238
OH-58:	11 Feb	D/3/5	-091	XD 922540
	23 Feb	D/3/5	-085	XD 644545
	7 Mar	1/5	-814	XD 652382
	17 Mar	1/5	-884	XD 778438
	24 Mar	D/3/5	-136	XD 665536
	24 Mar	D/3/5	-955	XD 668543
UH-1C:	20 Feb	48th AHC	-700	XD 595203
	23 Feb	173d AHC	-503	XD 552344
	5 Mar	71st AHC	-492	XD 502402
	5 Mar	71st AHC	-092	XD 640380
	6 Mar	238th AWC	-042	XD 491368
	11 Mar	48th AHC	-097	XD 496356
	19 Mar	48th AHC	-489	XD 585428
	23 Mar	238th AWC	-206	XD 8442

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Appendix 2 (Aircraft Losses) to Annex H (Aviation Support) to Combat Operations After Action Report, LAMSON 719.

Aircraft destroyed by type:

	<u>DATE</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TAIL #</u>	<u>COORDINATES</u>
UH-1H	10 Mar	174th AHC	-695	XD 632376
	10 Mar	A/158	-619	XD 490350
	11 Mar	173d AHC	-382	XD 520357
	11 Mar	48th AHC	-206	XD 677458
	11 Mar	1/5	-700	XD 677458
	11 Mar	173d AHC	-776	XD 498342
	16 Mar	48th AHC	-345	XD 480370
	18 Mar	173d AHC	-088	XD 642387
	18 Mar	D/3/5	-372	XD 581515
	18 Mar	C/158	-288	LZ 30
	18 Mar	282d AHC	-529	XD 330430
	18 Mar	C/158	-401	LZ 30
	18 Mar	498th Med	-249	XD 348402
	20 Mar	174th AHC	-654	XD 551348
	20 Mar	48th AHC	-238	XD 580340
	20 Mar	B/101	-185	XD 515352
	20 Mar	B/101	-492	XD 515352
	20 Mar	B/158	-505	XD 515352
	20 Mar	B/158	-718	XD 590387
	20 Mar	C/158	-389	XD 583389
	20 Mar	173d AHC	-643	XD 580420
	20 Mar	173d AHC	-130	XD 585435
	21 Mar	71st AHC	-826	XD 648301

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Appendix 2 (Aircraft Losses) to Annex H (Aviation Support) to Combat Operations
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Aircraft destroyed by type:

	<u>DATE</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TAIL #</u>	<u>COORDINATES</u>
UH-1H:	21 Mar	326th Med	-642	XD 705405
	22 Mar	176th AHC	-759	XD 666365
	22 Mar	HHT 2/17	-403	XD 840420
	24 Mar	D/3/5	-627	XD 665550
	24 Mar	71st AHC	-361	XD 798356
	27 Mar	71st AHC	-655	XD 673525
	28 Mar	48th AHC	-030	XD 725358
AH-1G:	5 Feb	D/3/5	-340	XD 7747
	9 Feb	101st	-106	XD 901433
	9 Feb	A/2/17	-102	XD 653283
	9 Feb	B/4/77th	-848	XD 566368
	9 Feb	A/4/77th	-059	XD 593369
	12 Feb	C/2/17	-089	XD 673482
	12 Feb	C/2/17	-755	XD 663492
	18 Feb	A/2/17	-698	XD 470348
	20 Feb	D/3/5	-579	XD 659494
	5 Mar	D/227th	-548	XD 491412
	5 Mar	235th AWC	-708	XD 518315
	5 Mar	235th AWC	-780	XD 518375
	5 Mar	D/158	-120	XD 795354
	6 Mar	C/7/7	-382	XD 527495
	6 Mar	4/77th	-153	XD 536391
	6 Mar	4/77th	-018	XD 536391

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 67 WBD NARA Date 1/19/68

Appendix 2 (Aircraft Losses) to Annex H (Aviation Support) to Combat Operations After Action Report, LAMSON 719.

Aircraft destroyed by type:

	<u>DATE</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TAIL #</u>	<u>COORDINATES</u>
AH-1G:	6 Mar	F/8	-071	XD 5937
	15 Mar	4/77	-377	XD 429373
	17 Mar	235th AWC	-780	XD 578315
	18 Mar	A/2/17	-743	XD 439405
	18 Mar	D/101	-077	XD 469392
	18 Mar	B/7/1	-464	XD 471381
	18 Mar	4/77	-073	XD 475361
	21 Mar	C/7/17	-019	XD 638356
	23 Mar	4/77	-641	XD 8442
	31 Mar	A/2/17	-056	XD 964236
CH-47:	15 Feb	C/159	-506	XD 399439
	27 Feb	152d ASHC	-449	XD 647392
	18 Mar	C/159	-502	XD 640380
CH-53:	18 Feb	HMM 263	-014	XD 4647
	27 Feb	HMM 263	-502	XD 691219

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Appendix 3 (Sortie Summary) to Annex H (Aviation Support) to Combat Operations
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<u>DATE</u>	<u>GUNS</u>	<u>TRP LIFT</u>	<u>MEDEVAC</u>	<u>AIR CAV</u>	<u>LOG*</u>	<u>SURV&RECON</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
30 Jan 71	374	1574	0	209	665	6	2828
31 Jan	160	334	3	218	723	7	1445
1 Feb	176	392	1	184	716	8	1477
2 Feb	116	626	0	152	476	6	1376
3 Feb	127	476	0	62	561	8	1234
4 Feb	659	1047	0	270	941	6	2923
5 Feb	192	365	2	150	587	6	1302
6 Feb	334	742	32	140	986	8	2242
7 Feb	128	516	12	72	570	6	1304
8 Feb	468	1460	34	164	610	5	2741
9 Feb	173	157	5	69	468	10	882
10 Feb	466	949	6	217	1016	26	2670
11 Feb	380	722	13	258	573	26	1972
12 Feb	866	779	21	584	923	26	3199
13 Feb	501	1011	32	410	1308	28	3290
14 Feb	335	784	31	547	1014	29	2730
15 Feb	822	888	16	524	1032	14	3296
16 Feb	524	642	17	372	751	14	2320
17 Feb	115	125	5	52	298	10	605
18 Feb	644	714	21	446	733	29	2587
19 Feb	602	954	12	497	792	27	2848
20 Feb	558	824	16	575	953	32	2958
21 Feb	687	471	39	538	1306	29	3070
22 Feb	589	506	25	549	1032	23	2725

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GROUP 4

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<u>DATE</u>	<u>GUNS</u>	<u>TRP LIFT</u>	<u>MEDEVAC</u>	<u>AIR CAV</u>	<u>LOG</u>	<u>SURV&RECON</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
23 Feb	562	802	15	426	914	20	2739
24 Feb	448	541	14	354	1099	19	2465
25 Feb	496	698	36	162	668	23	2186
27 Feb	756	650	66	466	1001	24	2963
28 Feb	668	697	66	414	1197	25	3067
1 Mar	533	871	86	331	1289	29	3139
2 Mar	489	1037	35	404	985	33	3283
3 Mar	787	709	59	404	703	31	2693
4 Mar	808	1489	39	346	799	21	3502
5 Mar	678	1663	51	390	1274	26	4082
6 Mar	790	1774	95	294	993	32	3969
7 Mar	655	553	67	226	1004	27	2532
8 Mar	528	653	44	208	913	33	2379
9 Mar	77	110	64	12	281	14	558
10 Mar	97	89	6	0	365	13	570
11 Mar	689	1048	58	23	1496	17	3331
12 Mar	895	929	33	258	905	26	3046
13 Mar	808	645	93	158	1204	28	2936
14 Mar	626	566	150	268	879	25	2514
15 Mar	542	372	80	202	638	7	1841
16 Mar	637	738	53	195	1028	12	2663
17 Mar	635	915	103	308	1245	26	3241
18 Mar	1236	1332	141	186	858	29	3782
19 Mar	686	723	91	242	922	29	2693

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<u>DATE</u>	<u>GUNS</u>	<u>TRP LIFT</u>	<u>MEDEVAC</u>	<u>AIR CAV</u>	<u>LOG</u>	<u>SURV&RECON</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
20 Mar	1388	1297	74	196	819	37	3811
21 Mar	788	1435	57	286	838	35	3439
22 Mar	713	380	62	169	789	18	1861
23 Mar	756	1026	69	170	1340	37	3398
24 Mar	703	1172	50	157	719	34	2835
25 Mar	324	548	63	236	689	32	1892
26 Mar	342	387	55	48	1125	31	1988
27 Mar	344	627	28	264	903	33	2199
28 Mar	231	606	80	421	791	35	2164
29 Mar	356	501	42	207	718	36	1860
30 Mar	261	327	11	145	943	32	1719
31 Mar	380	765	19	345	1058	32	2599
1 Apr	371	761	59	254	932	32	2209
2 Apr	309	590	50	226	635	26	1836
3 Apr	310	804	25	62	755	33	1980
4 Apr	279	638	21	111	747	34	1830
5 Apr	118	207	17	151	423	20	936
6 Apr	259	601	13	144	476	36	1529
7 Apr	243	672	5	143	426	33	1522

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 67 WBD NARA Date 1/19/09

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 Appendix 4 (Major Lifts) to Annex II (Aviation Support) to Combat Operations After Action Report LAMSON 719.

<u>DATE</u>	<u>GROUND UNIT SUPPORTED</u>	<u>NUMBER OF TROOPS LIFTED</u>
8 FEB 71	4th Bn, 3d Regt, 1st Inf Div	600
8 FEB 71	2d Bn, 3d Regt, 1st Inf Div	424
8 FEB 71	1st Bn, 3d Regt, 1st Inf Div	420
8 FEB 71	21st Ranger Bn	450
8 FEB 71	2d Abn Bn & Abn Div Hqs	706
8 FEB 71	3d Abn Bn & Abn Div Hqs	761
10 FEB 71	4th Bn, 1st Regt, 1st Inf Div	420
10 FEB 71	9th Abn Bn	603
10 FEB 71	1st & 3rd Bn, 1st Regt, 1st Inf Div 1st Regt CP 3d Ranger Bn	629
11 FEB 71	Arty Pers	310
12 FEB 71	2d Bn, 2d Regt & Regt	430
12 FEB 71	7th Bn, 117th VNMC Bde	590
13 FEB 71	6th Abn Bn	657
14 FEB 71	3d Regt CP, Arty Pers, & Rngr Hqs Pers	443
15 FEB 71	2d Bn, 3d Regt, 1st Inf Div	420
18 FEB 71	4th Bn, 3d Regt, 1st Inf Div	380
19 FEB 71	6th Abn Bn	400
20-21 FEB 71	Negative Air Moves	
22 FEB 71	Negative Air Moves	
23 FEB 71	3d Regt CP & 4th Bn, 3d Regt	622
24 FEB 71	Negative Air Moves	

GP-4
 4-H-1 Downgraded at 3 year intervals;
 declassified after 12 years

UNCLASSIFIED
 Authority MD921673
 By WBD NARA Date 1/19/04

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Appendix 4 (Major Lifts) to Annex II (Aviation Support) to Combat Operations After Actions Report LAMSON 719.

<u>DATE</u>	<u>GROUND UNIT SUPPORTED</u>	<u>NUMBER OF TROOPS LIFTED</u>
25 FEB 71	1st Bn, 3d Regt, 1st Inf Div	300
25 FEB 71	39th and 21st Ranger Dr's	412
26 FEB 71	3d Regt CP	160
26 FEB 71	3d Bn, 3d Regt, 1st Inf Div	406
26 FEB 71	5th Abn Bn	515
27 FEB	11th Abn Bn	210
27 FEB 71	21st Ranger Bn	130
28 FEB 71	21st Ranger Bn	70
1 MAR 71	9th Abn Bn	350
1 MAR 71	1st Bn, 3d Regt, 1st Inf Div	290
1 MAR 71	3d Bn, 3d Regt, 1st Inf Div	395
1 MAR 71	2d Bn, 3d Regt, 1st Inf Div	200
2 MAR 71	2d Bn, 3d Regt, 1st Inf Div	190
2 MAR 71	7th Bn, 147th VNMC Bde	631
3 MAR 71	3d Bn, 1st Regt, 1st Inf Div	537
4 MAR 71	4th Bn, 1st Regt, 1st Inf Div	613
4 MAR 71	3d Regt CP	160
4 MAR 71	2d Bn, 1st Regt, 1st Inf Div	474
4 MAR 71	4th Bn, 147th VNMC Bde	685
4 MAR 71	258th VNMC Bde	2085
5 MAR 71	2d Bn, 147th VNMC Bde	715
5 MAR 71	1st Bn, 258th VNMC Bde	700
5 MAR 71	3d Bn, 258th VNMC Bde	685

4-H-2

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 Authority: MD921673
 67 MRD NARA Date 1/19/68

Appendix 4 (Major Lifts) to Annex H (Aviation Support) to Combat Operations After Action Report LAMSON 719.

<u>DATE</u>	<u>GROUND UNIT SUPPORTED</u>	<u>NUMBER OF TROOPS LIFTED</u>
5 MAR 71	5th Bn, 2d Regt & Ranger Sq	539
5 MAR 71	4th Bn, 2d Regt & 1/62d Arty	595
6 MAR 71	3d Bn, 2d Regt, 1st Inf Div	405
6 MAR 71	2d Bn, 2d Regt, 1st Inf Div	405
6 MAR 71	1st Bn, 1st Regt, 1st Inf Div	437
6 MAR 71	8th Bn, 258th VNNC Bde	600
7 MAR 71	1st Bn, 1st Regt	600
10 MAR 71	2d Bn, 2d Regt, 1st Inf Div	390
11 MAR 71	5th Bn, 2d Regt, 1st Inf Div	450
12 MAR 71	3d & 2d Bn's, 2d Regt, 1st Inf Div	600
13 MAR 71	11th Abn Bn	260
13 MAR 71	3d Bn, 3d Regt, 1st Inf Div	395
14 MAR 71	1st Bn, 1st Regt	600
15 MAR 71	4th Bn, 3d Regt, & 31 Regt CP	456
16 MAR 71	3d Bn, 1st Regt, 1st Inf Div	231
18 MAR 71	1st Bn, 1st Regt, 1st Inf Div	279
18 MAR 71	2d Bn, 1st Regt, 1st Inf Div	370
18 MAR 71	4th Bn, 1st Regt, 1st Inf Div	88
18 MAR 71	5th Bn, 2d Regt, 1st Inf Div	350
19 MAR 71	Arty & 2d Bde Hqs	265
20 MAR 71	3d Bn, 2d Regt, 1st ARVN Div	580
20 MAR 71	Elements 2d & 7th Abn Bn's	642

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Authority MD92/673
By WBD NARA Date 1/19/04

COMMERCIALS

1.1.2. **Aviation capacity** (aviation capacity for both passengers and cargo), Declaration LDCON TIC, TMC Geneva (1).

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3.27-4
a. reviewed at 3 year intervals;
reclassified after 12 years.

CONFIDENTIAL

SEARCHED
SERIALIZED
AUTHORITY MWD92/673
BY WBD NARA DATE 1/13/04

63007-4
Lung cancer at 3 year intervals
and classified after 10 years.

REF ID: A6731673
 CLASSIFIED
 Authority MD921673
 By WBD NARA Date 1/19/04

[REDACTED]
 Appendix 6 (Density Altitude Summary) to Annex H (Aviation Support) to Combat Operations After Action Report, LAMSON 719.

DENSITY ALTITUDE FOR
 KHE SANH
 8 FEB THROUGH 25 MARCH

DATE	MAXIMUM DEENSITY ALTITUDE	MINIMUM DEENSITY ALTITUDE
8 Feb	2370	1570
9	2000	1420
10	3670	1890
11	3780	2390
12	3780	2370
13	3760	2290
14	3790	2360
15	2550	1760
16	3000	2530
17	2430	2160
18	3950	2670
19	3880	2300
20	4480	2500
21	3900	2160
22	3990	2540
23	3890	2720
24	3890	2890
25	4130	3000
26	4370	3060
27	4630	3000
28	4690	3000

6-H-1

GROUP-4

Downgraded at 2007-07-01
 Automatically declassified
 after 10 years.

UNCLASSIFIED
Authority MD921673
By WSP NARA Date 1/19/01

Appendix 6 (Density Altitude Summary) to Annex H (Aviation Support) to Combat Operations After Action Report, LAMSON TIC

DATE	MAXIMUM DENSITY ALTITUDE	MINIMUM DENSITY ALTITUDE
1 Mar	4530	3040
2	4700	3120
3	4790	2870
4	3880	2550
5	3780	2730
6	3890	2700
7	3560	2100
8	3500	2600
9	2640	2020
10	2890	2060
11	3000	2040
12	2850	2250
13	2770	2060
14	2580	1780
15	2060	1690
16	2450	1620
17	3000	1950
18	3000	2210
19	2950	2300
20	3910	2400
21	4080	2450
22	3890	2340
23	2850	1730

6-H-2

UNCLASSIFIED
Authority MA0921673
67 WSP NARA Date 1/19/69

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Appendix 6 (Density Altitude Summary) to Annex H (Aviation Support) to Combat Operations After Action Report, LAMSON 719.

DATE	MAXIMUM DENSITY ALTITUDE	MINIMUM DENSITY ALTITUDE
24 Mar	2780	1610
25	2900	2250

6-H-3

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REF ID: A6714921673
CLASSIFIED
Authority: MD921673
S7 WBD NARA Date: 1/1969

Annex I (Chemical) to Combat Operations After Action Report LAMSON 719 (U)

1. (U) Mission: To provide staff assistance in Chemical Operations to the Commanding General and to provide staff supervision of direct support chemical operations of assigned and attached units participating in LAMSON 719.

2. (U) Concept of Operations: The Corps Chemical Officer, located with the XXIV Corps, ACofS, G3, Forward, maintained staff supervision over chemical operations conducted during LAMSON 719. The Chemical Officer of the 101st Airborne Division (Ambl) had direct supervision of the conduct of the direct and general support chemical operations. These operations were performed by assigned chemical units and chemical section personnel of the supporting units.

3. (C) Execution.

a. Two defoliation missions, consisting of four UH1H sorties were conducted on likely ambush sites along QL 9 in the vicinity of the Rockpile.

b. 3,000 pounds of CS2 was utilized in seeding operations of the permanent bunkers when Khe Sanh was closed.

c. 179 CH47 sorties of bulk flame drops were flown during the operation. 1,607X55 gallon drums of thickened fuel were dropped resulting in four NVA KIA, 27 secondary explosions and 10 bunkers destroyed.

4. (C) Administrative Matters. Due to numerous ambushes along QL 9 in the vicinity of the Rockpile, the 101st Airborne Division (Ambl) requested a special authorization for approval to conduct herbicide operations in that location. A meeting of Quang Tri Province officials, province advisors, ARVN and US forces personnel indicated that all parties readily agreed to the necessity of the herbicide operation. A project was prepared by the Corps Chemical Officer in accordance with applicable herbicide directives. The project was approved by province officials, the I Corps Commander and Commanding General, XXIV Corps as required by US and Vietnamese herbicide directives.

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR
INTERVALS; DECLASSIFIED
AFTER 12 YEARS: DOD DIR 5200.10

REF ID: A671673
 Authority: MVN921673
 67 WRP NARA Date: 1/19/00

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Annex J (DEPCORDS) to Combat Operations After Action Report LAMSON 719

1. (C) Concept of Operation.

a. Territorial Forces, to include Popular Forces (PF) and Popular Self Defense Force (PSDF), continued lowland security operations in normally deployed positions. Regional Force (RF) units were prepared and accepted expanded areas of operation made necessary by the tactical displacement of regular ARVN forces: This situation was especially applicable to Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces.

b. In Thua Thien Province, there was a considerable shifting of RF units to cover two AOs left by the 1st Regiment of the 1st Division. Additionally, RF units took over the security of FSB Los Banos from the 101st Airborne Division (Ambl). RF Companies were attached to both the 54th Regiment and the 101st Airborne Division (Ambl) for combined operations during this period.

c. In Quang Tri (P) RF/PF units increased their operations during this period and were displaced to cover key LOCs and installations previously covered by FWMAF. AOs previously covered by the 1st Division and the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech) were taken by RFs during the period. Also a portion of QL 9 was secured by RF troops during the period.

d. The following table summarizes the operational results of Territorial Forces actions during LAMSON 719.

<u>PROVINCE</u>	<u>EN KIA</u>	<u>EN WPNS CPT</u>
QUANG TRI	125	147
THUA THIEN	44	68

<u>PROVINCE</u>	<u>EN KIA</u>	<u>RATIO</u>	<u>EN WPNS CPT</u>	<u>RATIO</u>	<u>OPER</u>	<u>CONTACTS</u>
QUANG TRI	25	5:1	0	147:1	786	46
THUA THIEN	20	2:1	7	10:1	80	6

e. Generally speaking, Territorial Forces did not experience a significant increase in enemy activity during LAMSON 719. The main enemy interest centered around rice gathering in the northern provinces and infiltration and terrorist attacks in the southern provinces. In addition, an overall increase in propaganda activities was noted. It is apparent that despite a diminished FWMAF presence, and the need to displace Territorial Forces units to cover key areas left by departing

GROUP 4
 Downgraded at 3 year
 intervals; declassified
 after 12 years

J-1

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REF ID: A651242
- UNCLASSIFIED
Authority MWD921673
67 WWD NARA Date 1/19/20

COMMERCIAL CONSTRUCTION

Annex J (DEPCORDS) to Combat Operations After Action Report LAMSON 719

FWMAF and ARVN units, Territorial Forces suffered no major setback in security due solely to LAMSON 719. A significant result in Thus Thien (P) was the displacement of RF units south of QL 1. This move was planned as a part of the 1971 Pacification and Development Plan. As a result of this displacement, Territorial Forces desertion rates virtually doubled in comparison to the same period one year ago. These desertions specifically occurred in those units displaced for operational purposes. Although terrorism in March was at a record high, it does not follow that this was the result of inadequate lowland security. Undoubtedly the high level was keyed to operations in Laos, but the purpose appears to relate to enemy determination to hasten withdrawal of ARVN Forces from Laos.

2. (C) Advisor Analysis.

a. Absence of regular ARVN units from the lowland populated areas did not inhibit operations of Territorial Forces within the normal secure area and consolidation zone.

b. RF units were able to deploy into expanded areas of operation which resulted from the tactical displacement of regular ARVN units, and no undue difficulties arose from that expansion of the consolidation zone.

c. The enemy capability to increase his level of terrorist activity was obvious during Operation LAMSON 719. It is apparent this enemy reaction was intended to have impact upon ARVN forces, through public reaction, and discourage further forays by the ARVN and force regular units to return to lowland positions.

d. RF units demonstrated a reasonable flexibility for attachment to regular units for combined operations. No unusual command relationship problems arose because of the attachment, and Territorial Force units were responsive to regular unit requirements.

e. Because of the relatively extensive displacement of numerous RF units during LAMSON 719, individual desertions from units so displaced increased sharply. This is a matter which will require careful command attention in the future.

f. It appears that future combined operations involving RF and Regular ARVN units would be highly useful - as a means of improving ARVN/Territorial Forces coordination and cooperations. Periodic assumption of ARVN areas of operation by RF units is an effective means of expanding secure areas and consolidation zones through the simple device of demonstrating the capability of RF units to function effectively in those AOs while maintaining a satisfactory level of security.

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Authority MW921673
67 WRP NARA Date 1/19/69

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Annex J (DEPCORDS) to Combat Operations After Action Report LAMSON 719.

g. RF units in Quang Tri (P) clearly demonstrated the capability to undertake extensive static security missions in the clearing zone, after coordination with regular forces units, thus relieving those same regular forces units for offensive operations. Clearly this is an additional means by which coordination between RF and ARVN units can be enhanced.

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Annex K (Engineer) to Combat Operations After Action Report LAMSON 719

1. (U) General. The LAMSON 719 operation required a hastily planned, but meticulously executed engineer effort to insure rapid opening of a main supply route into Laos for ARVN use, and a logistics base capable of supporting ARVN and US operations.

2. (C) Intelligence.

a. Aerial photos and limited road reconnaissance files of QL 9 provided information during the planning phase of the operation. The road was heavily overgrown with vegetation and with security restrictions preventing ground reconnaissance, it was difficult to determine the work which would be required to upgrade the road and bridge sites. The photos did permit an analysis of the approximate number of crossings which would require either culvert or tactical bridge emplacement. Upon the initiation of the operation it was discovered that the road did have a fair to good residual rock base and in places the old asphalt pavement remained.

b. Prior to the withdrawal of troops from Khe Sanh a detailed route and bridge reconnaissance was conducted to include pictures of the bridges and bypasses. Copies of this reconnaissance are filed with the 45th Engineer Group and XXIV Corps Engineer Section. All of the tactical bridges installed during the operation were removed during the withdrawal phase.

c. Generally QL 9 from Ca Lu to the Laotian border is a good single lane fair weather road with a clay surface. Although none of the culvert bypasses were removed it is probable that they will be washed out during this year's monsoon season. The primary restriction on the road exists at XD 913403, the site of a major stream crossing. The road on both sides is cut along a rock cliff and turns sharply at the approaches to the tactical bridge site. The gap where the original bridge was is approximately 200 feet.

d. Basically the same meager intelligence was available for the Khe Sanh Airfield as was available for the roads. Again, the area had been overgrown with vegetation and it was difficult to determine the extent of rehabilitation which would be required to make the operational once again. The photos indicated that the runway had suffered extensive damage and that earth fill as well as panel replacement would be required. Elephant grass growing from holes in the matting and edges concealed the extent of damage in some areas. Based on these photos it was decided to construct a second strip to be used as an assault strip until the old strip could be repaired.

Group 4
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Annex E (Engineer) to Combat Operations After Action Report LAISON 719

e. The soil in the area is clay and proved to be the main construction problem of the operation. The optimum moisture content of the clay was too high and the light airmobile compaction equipment could not increase the density sufficiently, but when it was dry the dust became hazardous to the aircraft at the base. Due to the soil conditions, the assault runway could not be used as a dirt strip and had to be surfaced, delaying the planned time schedule.

f. During the operation, A Company, 7th Engineer Battalion, 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (MECH) constructed tank trails both north and south of QL 9 from Vandegrift to the Laotian border. This resulted in an effective, fair weather, tactical road network. One such trail (Red Devil Road) runs parallel to QL 9, originating north of Vandegrift on QL 9, at the Stockpile and terminating near the Laotian border. This trail was upgraded, with assistance from the 14th Engineer Battalion (C), to a fair weather road from Khe Sanh east to the origin, and was used during the withdrawal phase by tactical units located to the north. A map of roads and trails is included in Appendix 1.

g. At various times during the operation, water points were located at the following: XD995480, Y0014450, XD848384, and XD826405. The average total water production was 60,000 gallons per day.

h. A rock crusher was operated at Ca Lu (YD015460) for a period of eight days with rock being supplied from the Song Quang Tri (YD0245) and a quarry at YD008473.

i. Mines became a factor at two locations during the operation. Upon the arrival of ground troops at Khe Sanh it was quickly discovered that the perimeter minefields emplaced by the Marines in 1968 would be a serious problem. Each time the base was expanded, the area had to be swept and cleared. Many areas remain which are not cleared. A sketch map showing known locations of minefields at Khe Sanh is at Appendix 2. QL 9 from XD737364 to XD719369 was the only area where enemy mining was conducted. Incidents began on 5 March 1971 when a D7E from the 59th Engineer Company (1C) hit a mine at XD722368. This mine and all others detected or detonated were mines with pressure firing devices or command detonated. Of the mines detected it was estimated that their explosive content ... 35 pounds of plastic explosive and were of Chinese origin. A total of eight mines were found in this vicinity - normally by visual means. Numerous other mines were detonated by vehicles in that area.

3. (C) Mission. To coordinate timely engineer support to assigned and attached units of XXIV Corps in the construction of roads, airfields, forward support areas, and field fortifications.

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Annex K (Engineer) to Combat Operations After Action Report LAMSON 719

4. (C) Concept of Operation. The 45th Engineer Group (Const) with attached units opened QL 9 from Ca Lu to Laotian border as a two lane roadway with turnouts; constructed assault airfield and repaired existing airfield at Khe Sanh during Phase I; constructed minimum essential operational and logistical facilities at Ca Lu, Khe Sanh and Lao Bao during Phases I & II, maintained QL 9 and Khe Sanh airfield and provided general engineer support throughout Phases III and IV. Company A, 7th Engineer Battalion, 326th Engineer Battalion, and 26th Engineer Battalion provided direct engineer support to their parent units as required.

5. (C) Execution.

a. The planning phase of the operation opened on 12 January 1971. One of the first requirements was to determine the scope of work and time frames for the opening of QL 9, completion of repairs to the airstrip at Khe Sanh and construction of forward support areas. During these preliminary planning sessions it was determined that a second airstrip would be required at Khe Sanh. Interpretation of the photos indicated that 30 days would probably be required to repair the existing runway, but it was felt that an earth assault runway could be placed in four days, which would allow limited C130 traffic during the initial stages of the operation. QL 9 was divided in half between Ca Lu and the Laotian border and a special task force was developed to handle the opening of Khe Sanh. The 14th Engineer Battalion was responsible for the opening of QL 9 to Khe Sanh with the help of elements from the 326th Engineer Battalion and supported by bulldozers from a platoon of the 59th Engineer Company (IC). From Khe Sanh to the Laotian border the road was the responsibility of the 7th Engineer Battalion and the 59th Engineer Company (IC) (1 platoon).

b. Although the operation did not begin until 30 January 1971, the first engineer elements were already positioned at Vandegrift by 29 January 1971. On D-Day the 14th Engineer Battalion (14th Eng Bn) clearing dozers, moved along QL 9 from Ca Lu opening QL 9 installing bridges and culverts as they had planned. Twelve M4T6 fixed span frames had been constructed prior to D-Day at Quang Tri. As the Engineer Elements arrived at the bridge sites, CH47 and CH53 helicopters brought in these frames, dropped them into place; a second helicopter quickly followed with the balk required to complete the bridge. In similar fashion four 20 foot sections of 36 inch culverts were delivered to construct bypasses to existing or newly implaced tactical bridges. Traveling with the engineers were Armored Vehicle Launched Bridges (AVLB's) of the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (MECH). Dozers prepared the launching sites and abutments for the six AVLB's.

CONTINUATION

Annex K (Engineer) to Combat Operations After Action Report IANSON 719

placed during this assault phase. QL 9 was open for wheeled and tracked vehicle movement to Khe Sanh on D+1, 31 January 1971.

c. While the heavy engineer equipment was moving west from Ca Lu, TF 326, a reinforced company of the 326th Engineer Battalion with a platoon of the 27th Engineer Battalion attached was being airlifted by helicopters into Khe Sanh. A portion of the task force moved east on QL 9 while two other elements were airlifted into two sites on QL 9 where they emplaced one M4T6 bridge and prepared another site for an AVLB which would be launched when the 14th Engineer Battalion arrived at that point. The airmobile capability was instrumental in the rapid opening of the road. The bulk of the task force immediately began working on the preparation of the assault strip and repairing of the main strip. At 0130H on D+2, 1 February 1971, the heavy equipment from 27th Engineer Battalion, to include bulldozers which had walked from Ca Lu, moved onto the Khe Sanh airstrip. TF 326 then became OPCON to the 27th Engineer Battalion.

d. As work continued to improve QL 9 to Khe Sanh, the 27th Engineer Battalion and the land clearing dozers of the 59th Engineer Company (LC) continued to open the road toward the Laotian border. The road west of Khe Sanh was only a wagon track through thick vegetation and the road was impeded with hills, grading and culverts. QL 9, west of Khe Sanh to the border, was opened for wheel and track vehicles by D+5, 4 February 1971. The land clearing dozers continued to clear vegetation 50 meters from the sides of the road until they were within .5 kilometers of the Laotian border.

e. In order to logically support the operation, two forward support areas had to be developed. The first, FSA 26-1, at Vandegrift, was begun on D-Day by A Company, 14th Engineer Battalion, with improvement work continuing until the operation terminated. The second, FSA 26-2, at Khe Sanh, was begun on D+5, 4 February 1972. This was a joint engineer effort with the 27th Engineer Battalion supporting the US units and two companies of the 8th Engineer Group, ARVN supporting the ARVN IALC. At both sites, large areas were cleared for vehicle staging areas and off load points. Ammunition storage and POL bladder berms were constructed in both areas as well as bunker slots and internal roads. At FSA 26-1 it was necessary to construct a large cargo transfer point because during the early phases of the operation road restrictions made it impossible to move large S&P trucks between FSA 26-1 and Khe Sanh. Sapper attacks on the POL storage area at FSA 26-1 prompted construction of a perimeter lighting system and, required the land clearing of 450 acres of perimeter.

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f. Around the clock construction work allowed the earth assault strip to be completed by 1500H on D+5, 4 February 1971. At 1600H the first C-130 landed at the airfield testing the assault strip. Although the landing and take off was accomplish safely, six to eight inch deformations had been created by the wheels of the aircraft. The strip had to be recompacted employing heavier compaction equipment, peneprimed, and matted prior to use. The compaction equipment, primarily 35T rollers, was moved from Ca Lu, Phu Bai, and Chu Lai with the longest movement completed by D+8, 7 February 1971. Emergency request for matting was sent to USAECV, and placement of MX 19 matting on the assault strip was begun on D+13, 12 February 1971. A starting adapter allowed matting to be laid in two directions simultaneously, and the 3,232 foot runway was completed at D+16 with the first C-130 landing on the matted surface at 1545H. At this time only 10 percent of the AM2 main strip had been repaired. As soon as the assault strip was completed TF 326 returned to the control of the 326th Engineer Battalion (Mech). On completion of the assault strip, the 27th Engineer Battalion began to construct connecting taxiways and a 800 foot by 350 foot parking apron. As each area was shaped, compacted, and peneprimed, matting was laid. All taxiways between airstrips were completed by D+28. When the repairs to the main strip were completed on D+30, 1 March 1971, the airfield, less the 800 foot by 350 foot parking apron, was fully operational. As an interim measure the old parking ramp between the two runways was repaired and was used throughout the operation. The maximum number of C-130 sorties using this configuration was 79 in one day.

g. Beginning on D-Day, while QL-9 was being opened by the 45th Engineer Group, A Company, 7th Engineers of the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech) was cutting a new trail through the jungle and mountains. The unit moved off of QL-9 approximately six kilometers north of Vandegrift and proceeded along ridges and through the Punch-bowl generally southwest to Khe Sanh, completing the tank trail in ten days. In early March the road was continued from Khe Sanh to the Laotian Border approximately eight kilometers north of and parallel to QL-9. Prior to the withdrawal phase, A Company, 7th Engineers with elements of the 14th Engineer Battalion improved the section of road between Khe Sanh and Vandegrift by reducing steep grades so that it could accept five ton wheeled vehicles, and it was used for the withdrawal of units from the Khe Sanh area. Supplementing the construction of a road parallel to QL-9 from Vandegrift to the border, additional tactical tank trails were cut into the jungle and mountains by A Company, 7th Engineer Battalion. These trails were used by the armored cavalry and artillery units to screen the main supply line in the south, see Appendix 1.

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h. In addition to the construction of facilities for fixed wing aircraft at Khe Sanh, there was a large requirement for the parking, rearming and refueling of the helicopters used in this operation. Beginning on D-Day rearm and refuel pads were constructed at Vandegrift and pads at Khe Sanh were started when the first heavy equipment arrived on D+3. During the first phase of the operation the old (AM2) strip at Khe Sanh was used to park helicopters while the engineers attempted to repair the strip. This was tactically necessary, but caused a delay in the repair of the field. When the earthwork was completed on the airstrip, engineer equipment was committed to the construction of 220,000 square meters of helicopter parking areas in the Khe Sanh area. In addition, a refuel/rearm facility and 40,000 SM of helicopter parking area was constructed at Lang Vei and 30,000 SM area at Mai Loc. On D+27, 26 February 1971, a hazardous condition existing at the Khe Sanh rearm/refuel point was recognized. Starting at 2000H and working through the night, the 27th Engineer Battalion dozers constructed ten six foot berms approximately 10 meters long by first light the next morning, to protect the airfield facilities from accidentally fired rockets.

i. After the initial opening of QL-9 and while the work continued at Khe Sanh airfield, general engineer support was provided to XXIV Corps units by the 14th and 27th Engineer Battalions. The sweeping of roads for mines became a daily task, although in general there was little mining activity. Units received support in the preparation of defensive positions and artillery units in the positioning of their guns.

j. In view of the great number of fixed and rotary wing sorties at the rearm/refuel points and the reopening of the Khe Sanh airfield, it was necessary to station fire fighting equipment and personnel at the forward base. The request was sent out to USAECV on D+20 and on D+28 there were fire trucks with crews at Khe Sanh, Vandegrift, and Lang Vei. The crews remained on location until each of the bases closed, and at the end of the operation, as the base at Mai Loc became the forward rearm/refuel point, fire fighting equipment and men were moved into that area.

k. On D+38, 9 March 1971, a C-130 aircraft while landing on the assault strip at Khe Sanh lost the rear wheel off the right landing gear. The axle dropped down onto the airstrip and was dragged for a distance of 1,700 feet down the strip. The damage ranged from a light scratch to a deep gouge where the plane touched down. Inspection of the strip revealed that 395 panels were damaged and 240 panels were damaged to the point where replacement might be required. Although replacement panels had been requested for MX19 it was determined that

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there were none in country and were not immediately available. On the basis of this information it was decided to attempt the repairs with an epoxy cement. Several tests were conducted based on the manufacturers recommendation, and mixtures of sand and epoxy between 3:1 and 1:1 mix by volume provided the range of consistency necessary to obtain the desired patching results with the 3:1 mix used in the most severely damaged areas. Due to cold weather, the epoxy required about twice the normal curing time resulting in six days for the repair completion. The epoxy patching proved to be successful and withstood C-130 traffic throughout the operation.

1. In addition to the damaged caused by the C-130 landing gear, enemy shelling caused damage which required rapid repair. On 17 March 1971 the first artillery round hit the runway, and the shelling continued throughout the rest of the operation. The 27th Engineer Battalion had a repair crew ready at all times to remove damaged panels and replace them. The courageous efforts of these men working in the "bullseye" should not go unmentioned. As was done for other types of damage, AM2 was normally replaced by sliding out an entire lateral row of matting. Any damaged MX19 panel had to be removed and replacement panel substituted. Epoxy was used successfully to repair small fragment holes and tears. A sketch of the airfield portraying shelling incidents is contained in Appendix 3.

m. The airfield matting at Khe Sanh was too valuable both in dollars and as a contingency stockage material to be left in place after the operation. After evaluating the condition of the matting, the MX19 assault runway and connecting taxiways were given top priority for removal followed by the 300 by 350 foot parking apron. The old AM2 strip was to remain in place because of its age, patched condition and the requirement for one runway for retrograde of all classes of supplies and matting (see Appendix 4).

n. On D+54, 23 March 1971, work began removing a portion of the M8A1 (800 by 350 foot) parking apron since both airstrips were still required. At 1600H the same day it was decided that the assault runway was no longer needed and work was diverted from the parking apron. The 27th Engineer Battalion moved in additional personnel and began a 24 hour operation and by D+60, 31 March 1971, all AM2 and MX19 which had been emplaced during LAMSON 719 (except for repair of the old runway) had been removed. The M8A1 parking apron was not removed because of the tactical situation, the great amount of time required and limited salvage value of the mat. A total of 868 tons of matting were flown and truck hauled from Khe Sanh

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c. Maintenance and improvement of QL-9 was a continuous function of Companies B and D, 14th ECB during all phases of the operation. The bridge and approaches at XD 918403 remained as a bottleneck during most of the operation (see Intelligence paragraph, this Annex), and it was only through blasting that the approaches to the single lane AVLB could be improved to pass S&P trucks. By D+39, 10 March 1971, a second crossing site had been prepared and another AVLB was placed in an attempt to make the turning radius larger at the crossing. On D+40 a storm caused a partial washout of the abutments on the original bridge and traffic was diverted to the improved crossing from then on.

p. During the peak of the operation the road was carrying an average of 1,000 vehicles per day. In order to guarantee the continued serviceability of the route, river run gravel was placed on critical sections, usually near bridge bypasses. On D+39, 10 March 1971, a crusher was installed at Ca Lu which crushed 684 cubic meters of river run rock to be used for road improvement. The decision to install the crusher was based on a longer time duration of the operation, and was subsequently used only eight days. On D+3, an AVLB launcher crossed a M4T6 bridge at XD 918416 causing the bridge to collapse. An AVLB was placed across the gap and traffic was again able to pass. A second bridge collapsed and had to be replaced at XD 981531. On D+5 a M83 tank retriever towing a M48 tank crossed the 90 foot double single Bailey bridge at XD 982531, which had been posted as class 55, collapsing the bridge with the vehicles tangled in the debris. The bridge and vehicles were removed and another Bailey bridge installed in four days. As QL 9 west of Ca Lu was improved, some of the initially installed bridges were removed or replaced. The final count on tactical bridges installed was six M4T6 fixed spans (38 feet) and five AVLBs.

q. During the final phase of the operation 14th Engineer Battalion and A Company, 7th Engineer Battalion removed the tactical bridges from QL 9. On D+63, 3 April 1971, three of the M4T6 bridges and one AVLB, all of which had good bypasses, were removed and transported back to Quang Tri. On 7 April 1971, following the withdrawal of the final tactical units from Khe Sanh, all remaining tactical bridges west of Ca Lu were removed and retrograded. The final bridge, a Bailey, was removed by the 14th Engineer Battalion on 8 April 1971.

6. (C) Results. The accomplishments of all engineer units during LAMSON 719 were outstanding and the morale and spirit of the troops remained high even though they worked a minimum of 18 hours a day.

a. The airfield at Khe Sanh was constructed to higher standards than originally planned, causing some delay in completion. The necessity for helicopters to use the runways for parking areas during the

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early phases of the operation also slowed the completion. QL-9 opening was achieved as planned and maintenance and upgrade of the road proceeded to a slightly forward road than expected. Demand for support for helicopter landing sites far exceeded requirements determined during the planning phase. The construction caused previously planned tasks to slip due to the high priority of the helicopter operations. Support to separate brigades by divisional engineer units was always timely and professionally done.

b. A summary of construction statistics is presented in TAB E.

7. (C) Supply Matters.

a. When the rain stopped, the dust problem began. The requirement for peneprime overwhelmed the transportation assets available to support the operation. By D+6, 5 February 1971, the engineers were forced to commit Lowboys and five ton dumps, to assist in the movement of peneprime to Khe Sanh. In addition to the transportation of peneprime and matting needed to keep the engineer effort on schedule, the engineer trucks were occasionally tasked to move ammunition to forward artillery positions.

b. The engineers continued in their one permanently assigned mission to support Corps units with potable water. Purification units were located to supply Vandegrift and Khe Sanh bases during the entire operation. The average daily output was approximately 60,000 gallons per day.

8. (U) Special Equipment and Techniques.

a. The assault strip at Khe Sanh became damaged when a C-130 landed and lost a wheel. It appeared that the airstrip would be closed for one or two weeks. At the same time that this incident occurred, the old runway at Khe Sanh, which had been repaired and reopened, was undergoing additional repairs due to subgrade failure. Lack of success in removing damaged panels as rapidly on the AM2 strip, and the type of damage inflicted, prompted the idea of repair instead of replacement of the M-10 panels. Previous welding attempts were not satisfactory. Asphalt cement (AP3) was tried and found to be unsuitable. Epoxy seemed to be a solution. A call was placed to USAECV and within twenty four hours the first epoxy shipment arrived. Several tests were conducted according to manufacturers' recommendations and it was decided that three sand to one epoxy cement by volume yielded the desired results upon setting. For small holes 50 percent sand and 50 percent epoxy was used. A test was also conducted employ-

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ing pure epoxy cement, but the consistency was too fluid and proved unsatisfactory. Another problem developed during the repair operation. Since rain kept the airstrip wet and the manufacturer warned that water prevented a bond from being formed between the epoxy and matting, a method had to be developed to keep the damaged area dry prior to epoxy/sand application. The problem was solved by working under canvas and drying the mat with a torch.

b. After the repairs to the MX-9 strip were completed the strip was opened and in all cases the patching held and received all traffic until the strip was closed for removal and retrograde 18 days later. When the strip was removed several of the panels which had been patched were inspected and the epoxy/sand mixture showed no sign of damage.

9. (C) Comment

a. From 12 to 15 January 1971, the Commanding Officer, 45th Engineer Group (Const) was the only engineer involved in the initial planning of LAMSON 719. Through his personal reconnaissance, and study of available photos and data, initial work estimates were made, which on the opening of QL-9 proved to be excellent. The selection of culvert and bridge sites for preassembled material was instrumental in the rapid opening to wheeled traffic. The 45th Engineer Group was assigned and accomplished missions critical to the entire operation, which required throughout the operation, concentrated management of a large variety of equipment, personnel, and materials.

b. The problem of stockage and issue of airfield matting must be solved. Except for constant contact between the XXIV Corps Engineer section, the US Army Engineer Command, and the USAF 834th Air Division the proper amounts of matting would never have arrived. It is important that the responsible supply agency establish proper stockage for matting and limit its issue to bona fide airfield projects. Much of the matting shipped to Khe Sanh was used for bunkers and structures which should have been constructed of timber materials.

c. The 45th Engineer Group was OPCON to XXIV Corps for 24 days, then reverted to control of the 18th Engineer Brigade. Had the group remained in the OPCON status for the entire operation, the command relationships for the group commander would have been simpler. As it was, he had to answer to two headquarters and at times was required to divert his attention from one mission to another. In any future operations of this magnitude, the supporting units should be OPCON to the Corps or controlling headquarters.

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d. The construction of the assault runway was a mission critical to the large logistics requirements of LAMSON 719. The strip was constructed in five days on relatively level terrain. The subgrade material was clay with a high water content. Cone penetrometer and CBR tests were taken during construction. Measured soil strength values varied somewhat in cut and fill sections, but indicated that the fields ability to accept C-130 traffic would at best be marginal. The first landing confirmed the test indications. The immediate reaction was to recompact with heavier rollers and place matting. This was a fortunate move because the field actually developed into much more than an assault strip as the AM2 strip took much longer to repair (30 days) than anticipated. Any similar tactical operation, which places great importance on the immediate opening of an assault field should emphasize the need for early evaluation of soil properties. Testing should be done immediately and engineering evaluations made to determine maximum soil densities and strength, type compaction methods and equipment required, and of course, whether or not existing soil conditions will permit construction as originally conceived.

e. Rapid repair of aluminum matting panels needs renewed interest by R&D agencies. The methods shown in TM 5-337 and other technical manuals rely on saw cutting a damaged panel in order to remove it from the airfield. This method proved unsuccessful, or at least too slow, for a variety of reasons. Special blades required were not in the supply system and not available despite special efforts of procurement. Cutting with welders and jackhammers was also used, but proved slow and occasionally damaged adjacent matting panels. On an AM2 strip it is possible and most practical, to slide out an entire two foot section perpendicular to the runway until the damaged panel is off the runway, and new panels slid into the damaged section. A front loader proved to be excellent for pushing the panels through the runway. The suggested pattern for laying MX19 matting does not allow this procedure, and requires either individual panel removal and replacement or removal and relaying of a large portion of the field. The question of panel design which incorporates a simple method of individual panel removal must be addressed.

f. For repair of holes in matting, epoxy cement was found to be an excellent material. Although no scientific data can be provided, use of epoxy in the construction industry for similar repair, and the excellent behavior of the epoxy patches under actual dynamic loading conditions, would indicate success of this method. More investigation should proceed by R&D agencies to test other, perhaps better, materials such as joint compounds, plastics, asphalts, etc. It should be noted that aluminum welding with inert gas attachment to arc welder proved unsatisfactory. Either the lack of experienced welders or improper

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7. Khe Sanh Airfield
8. ARVN Engineer Effort


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APPENDIX 1 (Roads and Trails) to Annex K (Engineering) to Combat Operations
After Action Report LAMSON 719

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
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67 WBD NARA Date 1/1966

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APPENDIX 2 (Suspected or Known Minefields) to Annex K (Engineer) to Combat Operations After Action Report LAMSON 719


LEGEND	
ROADS	
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KNOWN MINE	
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CLEARED MINE	████████
SUSPECTED
MINE FIELDS	████████



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Appendix 3 (Airfield Shelling Incidents) to Annex K (Engineer) to
Combat Operations After Action Report LAMSON 719.





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Appendix 4 (Airfield Matting) to Annex K (Engineer) to Combat
Operations After Action Report LAMSON 719

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SCALE: 1" = 500'

SUBSCRIPT CODE

- 1 - PREVIOUSLY EXISTING (NOTE 1)
- 2 - NEW CONSTRUCTION

DATA

- A - 60'x3600' RUNWAY (NOTE 2)
- B - 60'x325' ASSAULT STRIP
- C - 150'x150' TURN AROUND
- D - 60'x200' OVERRUN
- E - 150'x330' PARK APRON (NOTE 3)
- F - 350'x800' PARK APRON
- G - 60'x63' CON STRIP
- H - 60'x150' CON STRIP
- I - 30'x72' CON STRIP
- J - 20'x72' CON STRIP
- K - 36'x200' CON STRIP
- L - 36'x200' STRIP (NOTE 3)
- M - 60'x345' CON STRIP
- N - 60'x152' CON STRIP

NOTES

- 1 - PREVIOUSLY EXISTING BUT NEEDED EXTENSIVE REPAIR BEFORE USE
- 2 - EAST 200' MISSING & REPLACED W/ MX19 (NEW CONSTRUCTION)
- 3 - EAST END OF OLD PARKING APRON MISSING
- 4 - AREAS REMOVED WERE:
B2, C2, G2, H2, I2, J2, M2, N2

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87 WBD NASA Date 1/1969

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Appendix 5 (Statistical Data) to Annex K (Engineer) to Combat Operations
After Action Report LAMSON 719

1. Amount of matting placed:

- a. AM-2 189,968 SF (total in place was 320,180 SF)
- b. MX-19 250,820 SF
- c. M8A1 280,000 SF

2. Amount of matting recovered from Khe Sanh:

- a. AM-2 51,552 SF
- b. MX-19 279,816 SF
- c. M8A1 9,146 SF

3. Amount of penetrator distributed: 396,750 gallons

4. Tactical bridging employed:

- a. AVLB 8
- b. M4T6 12
- c. Bailey 3 (one damaged and replaced, one existing repaired)

5. Culverts implaced:

- a. 40 feet sections 92
- b. 70 feet sections 2

6. Kilometers of QL 9 widened to five meters or more: 23

7. Kilometers of tank trail constructed: 60

8. Helicopter pads constructed: 330,000 SM

9. Reroll/refuel pads constructed: 4 (60,000 SM)

10. Amount of land cleared: 101,430 acres

11. Areas cleared of mines:

- a. Roads 40 kilometers per day
- b. Areas 220,000 SM

Group 4

Downgraded at 3 year
intervals; declassified
after 12 years

5-K-1

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Appendix 5 (Statistical Data) to Annex K (Engineer) to Combat Operations
After Action Report LAMSON 719

12. Amount of protective berms constructed: 5,500 LF
13. Amount of rock spread on QL 9: 5,437 CY
14. Amount of potable water produced: 2,000,000 gallons

5-K-2

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 67 WBD NARA Date: 1/19/69

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**Appendix 6 (Chronology of Critical Events) to Annex K (Engineer) to
 Combat Operations After Action Report LAMSON 719**

30 Jan - D-Day 14th Engineer Battalion began work on QL 9. Task Force 326 landed at Khe Sanh and began work on airfield and QL 9.

31 Jan - D+1 QL 9 opened to Khe Sanh at 1130H. 27th Engineer Battalion moved heavy equipment to Khe Sanh.

1 Feb - D+2 Began construction of FSA 26-1.

2 Feb - D+3 AVLB launcher crossed class 35 M4T6 bridge and caused bridge to collapse.

3 Feb - D+4 AVLB placed where M4T6 bridge collapsed. Tank retriever towing a tank crossed a class 55 Bailey bridge and caused failure of bridge.

4 Feb - D+5 Began construction of FSA 26-2. Dirt assault runway completed 1530H. First C130 landed at Khe Sanh, produced six to eight inch ruts in dirt assault runway. Decision made to mat entire strip.

5 Feb - D+6 Heavy compaction equipment moved to Khe Sanh.

6 Feb - D+7 QL 9 opened to the Laotian border. Began construction of helicopter pads at Khe Sanh.

7 Feb - D+8 New Bailey bridge constructed where failure occurred D+4.

8 Feb - D+9 Began hauling supplies and materials for Support Command.

11 Feb - D+12 Began laying MX19 matting on assault runway.

14 Feb - D+15 CH47 helicopter raised 400 feet of matting and shifted it out of alignment. Approximately six hours required to slide it back into place.

15 Feb - D+16 Assault runway matting completed, second C130 landed successfully at Khe Sanh. Field opened to C130 operations. Task Force 326 released from OPCON to 45th Engineer Group.

16 Feb - D+17 Began construction of taxiways.

17 Feb - D+18 Began construction of helicopter areas at Lang Vei.

6-K-1

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 after 12 years



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67 WRP NARA Date 1/19/09

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Appendix 7 (Khe Sanh Airfield) to Annex K (Engineer) to Combat Operations
After Action Report LAMSON 719

ROADS
TRAILS
BERMS
HELIPAD
POL POINT

LEGEND



41 7-K-1 UNCLASSIFIED 42

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 Authority MD921673
 By MRD NARA Date 1/19/69

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Appendix 8 (ARVN Engineer Effort) to Annex K (Engineer) to Combat Operations After Action Report LAMSON 719

7 Feb - D+8 Co B, 102d Engr Bn was lifted from Cam Lo to FSB Phu Loc at XD 686454 with the 1st Ranger Gp, and constructed the fire base at that location to include helipads, artillery positions, defensive positions, and 1800M of roads. The 101st Engr Bn moved to Ta Bat (XD 725364).

8 Feb - D+9 The 101st Engr Bn crossed the Laotian Border and opened QL-9 to XD 615381 installing two culverts in the road.

9 Feb - D+10 The 101st Engr Bn opened QL-9 to XD 558378.

10 Feb - D+11 QL-9 opened to XD 527385.

11 Feb - D+12 118th Engr Co (LC) began clearing area around Ta Bat airfield.

13 Feb - D+14 Began opening of Route 14 (XD 525422) and construction of A Loui FSB. Work included construction of defensive positions, artillery positions and emplacement of 3 anti-tank minefields: two (2) at FSB 31, and one (1) between XD 512392 and XD 525391. Work was also began on the construction of LZ Lima.

14 Feb - D+15 Began construction of FSBs at XD 525422, XD 692216, (Hotel 2) and XD 534344 (Delta 1).

16 Feb - D+17 Began construction of a FSB at XD 502407 and expanding the one at XD 686454 (Phu Loc). Elements of the 118th Engr Co (LC) began clearing both sides of QL-9. Initially 100M were cleared on each side of the road but this was later reduced to 50M each side.

25 Feb - D+26 Attacks by indirect and direct fire and numerous mining incidents began against the 118th Engr Co (LC) on QL-9 slowing progress considerably.

2 Mar - D+31 Minefield emplaced at XD 686454 (Phu Loc).

6 Mar - D+35 Mines emplaced on Ho Chi Minh Trail from XD 525341 to XD 529335.

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Appendix 8 (ARVN Engineer Effort) to Annex K (Engineer) to Combat Operations After Action Report LAMSON 719

1. The ARVN I Corps planning group did not include the Corps Engr/10th Engr Gp Commander. All initial engineer planning to include material and equipment estimates was conducted by the I Corps G-4. From these planning conferences fragmentary orders were issued to the engineers for the movement of troops from their home base. On D-1, 29 Jan 71, the I Corps Engr/10th Engr Gp Commander was briefed at Dong Ha.
2. The 8th ARVN Engr Gp Commander was not briefed on his mission, to support the I ALC in construction of Logistical Areas, prior to the initiation of the operation. This caused a delay in the completion of construction on two separate occasions as additional equipment and personnel were required to move from Da Nang in support of a particular construction project. Both projects could have been adequately planned had the engineers been allowed proper time for planning.
3. The following is a chronological listing of events:

31 Jan - D+1 Units of the 10th ARVN Engr Gp stationed in Da Nang depart for Dong Ha.

1 Feb - D+2 Units closed Dong Ha.

2 Feb - D+3 The 101st Engr Bn, 10th Engr Gp moved from Hue to Ga Lu. The 102d Engr Bn (-) closed Khe Sanh and began clearing assembly areas and constructing bunkers for the I Corps Forward CP, the 1st Inf Div and 1st Airborne Div.

3 Feb - D+4 101st Engr Bn closed Khe Sanh at 1115 hours. Attachment specified in ARVN operations orders #19 & #20 became effective as follows:

Hqs & A Companies, 102d Engr Bn attached to 1st Inf Div	1st Ranger Gp
Co B, 102d Engr Bn	1st Armor Bde
Co C, 102d Engr Bn	1st Airborne Div
101st Engr Bn	

4 Feb - D+5 One company of the 8th Engr Gp closed Khe Sanh and began construction of logistical areas for I ALC.

6 Feb - D+7 118th Engr Co (LC) (-) closed Khe Sanh. Two dozers were attached to I ALC to assist the 8th Engr Gp, and an additional Company from the 8th Engr Gp was moved to Khe Sanh to hasten the completion of the logistical area. Two other land clearing dozers were attached to the 1st Airborne Div to clear their CP area.

8-K-1

Group 4

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Appendix 8 (ARVN Engineer Effort) to Annex K (Engineer) to Combat Operations After Action Report LAMSON 719

19 Mar - D+48 to 23 Mar - D+52 On 19 Mar the 101st Engr Bn and Co C, 102d Bn moved along QL-9 from A Loui to FSB Alpha. On 20 Mar these units with the 2d Plt, 118th Engr Co (LC) moved to Bravo with the armored column. Tank positions were prepared at Bravo. During the period 21 - 23 Mar, units proceeded to Ta Bat. During this move, all equipment was lost after a decision was made to leave QL-9 in favor of a trail, a stream crossing, and 2 fords on the Xe Pon river.

27 Mar - D+56 The 10th Engr Gp (- Co B, 102d Engr Bn) returned to their home bases.

28 Mar - D+57 Co B, 102d Engr Bn was lifted to XD 686454 and emplaced an anti tank minefield.

4. Summary of work accomplished.

a. Strength of 10th Engineer Group units (1 Mar) and casualties.

UNIT	STRENGTH	CASUALTIES		
		KIA	WIA	TOTAL
101 Bn	354	20	49	69
102 Bn	350	6	55	61
10 Group Hq	21	—	—	—
116 P. B. Co	67	—	—	—
117 F. B. Co	53	—	—	—
127 F. B. Co	80	—	2	2
114 D. T. Co	26	0	2	2
115 L. E. Co (Included in others)		0	1	1
118 L. C. Co	73	1	12	13
TOTAL	1024	27	121	148

b. Major work accomplishments:

(a) Construct 11 major fire support bases at Ta Bat, Phu Loc, A Loui, Lang Vei, Hotel 2, Delta 1, Alfa, Bravo, New Phu Loc (Dong A Hai), Hill 31, and Snake.

(b) Construct, open, or improve 56 kilometers of road.

QL-9 (Ta Bat to A Loui); install 6 culverts (Brdg 1-6)

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Appendix 8 (ARVN Engineer Effort) to Annex K (Engineer) to Combat Operations After Action Report LAMSON 719

Ta Bat Airfield Access Road	2.5
Route 14, A Loui	7.5
Red Devil Drive, improve only (Khe Sanh Airfield to New Phu Loc)	15
QL-9 (XD 830379) to Snabe Hill (XD 841345)	5

(c) Provide 5 demolition teams (3 to 5 men each) per engineer company utilized to destroy supplies and equipment when circumstances prevented evacuation.

(d) Provided major land clearing at the following locations:

	<u>Square Meters</u>
I Corps Tac/1st Div, Ham Nghi	40,000
FSB A Loui	70,000
FSB Ta Bat, Lao Bao Airfield and access roads	230,000
FSB Phu Loc	10,000
Staging Area, 118 LC (Vic Ta Bat)	5,000
101 Bn, Vic A Loui	30,000
Road from QL-9 to FSB Snabe	40,000
QL-9 from Ta Bat to 1.5 kilometers west of Alpha (XD 580371) 40 - 100 meters	50,000
	<u>701,000</u>
TOTAL	1,176,300

(e) Construct 7 anti-tank minefields at: A Loui (2), Hill 31 (2), Delta 1, Phu Loc, and New Phu Loc.

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Annex L (Information) to Combat Operations After Action Report LAMSON 719

1. (U) Operation DEWEY CANYON II and the following operation, LAMSON 719, was initiated on 30 Jan 71, at which time Headquarters, XXIV Corps (Forward) relocated to Quang Tri Combat Base. COMUSMACV declared an embargo on news coverage of the entire operation on 29 Jan 71, and it was the task of the XXIV Corps Information Officer to insure that all correspondents in the area were made aware of the embargo. The Da Nang Press Center was in the process of closing, and the Information Office of the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech) was not adequately staffed or equipped to handle the large influx of civilian and military correspondents arriving to cover these operations. The XXIV Corps Information Officer established a press camp at Quang Tri airfield on 31 Jan 71 to provide mess and billeting accommodations, to arrange transportation, and to extend administrative and communications assistance to MACV accredited correspondents arriving in the area of operations.

2. (U) MISSION. To perform public information and command information functions in support of Operation DEWEY CANYON II/LAMSON 719, and to provide press camp services and facilities for MACV accredited representatives.

3. (U) EXECUTION.

a. General. The XXIV Corps Information Office (FWD) was established and became operational at Quang Tri Combat Base on 30 Jan 71. The Quang Tri Press Camp became operational at the Quang Tri airfield on 31 Jan 71. (See Appendix 1, Organizational Chart).

b. Public Information.

(1.) Within the bounds of military security, the policy was to provide timely, factual, complete, and understandable information concerning US participation and support of the operation and to afford accredited correspondents the opportunity to gather and transmit news as expeditiously as possible.

(2.) An embargo was placed on Operation DEWEY CANYON II on 30 Jan 71 for the safety of participating troops. This embargo was lifted at 0830 (GMT), 4 Feb 71 (1630 Saigon time). The press corps was notified that, "The embargo had served its purpose in that our casualties have been at an absolute minimum and we now are in a position to provide routine coverage of the operation.

(3.) Release authority concerning the operation was maintained by MACV and all ground rules contained in MACV Directive 360-1 remained in effect.

(4.) Evening news briefings concerning US unit actions and engagements were conducted at the Quang Tri Press Camp beginning on Sunday, 31 January, and terminating on Sunday, 4 April. (See Appendix 2, Sample US Evening Briefing).

(5.) To avoid confusion in reporting, it was announced to the press on 9 February that the term DEWEY CANYON II was being discontinued, and that henceforth, US operations in the area would be reported by action or engagement. Air and artillery support provided to ARVN operation LAMSON 719, which began 8 February, would be identified with that operation.

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Annex 5. (Information on Command Operations After Action Report LAMSON 719)

(6). At 1700 hours on 12 February, an ARVN spokesman conducted a news conference and gave the press a briefing concerning ARVN operations LAMSON 719. Effective this date, joint US/ARVN briefings were conducted at the Da Nang Tri Phuoc Camp each evening beginning at 1700 hours. (See Appendix 5, Sample ARVN Evening Briefing).

(7). Press memoranda were issued by the XXIV Corps Information Officer to cover specific situations and/or problem areas. (See Appendix 6, Sample Memorandum for Correspondents).

(8). Specific queries by members of the press were taken at the evening briefing, and the XXIV Corps Information Officer would then obtain the desired information in as timely manner as was possible.

c. Command Information.

(1). At the beginning of the operation, commanders at all levels were directed to inform all participating troops of the purpose of the operation, the mission of their particular unit, and why their particular role was important to the success of the overall operation.

(2). The XXIV Corps Information Office (FWD) published Operation LAMSON 719 news highlights weekly and distributed them to participating troops (See Appendix 5, Sample Operation LAMSON 719 News Highlights).

(3). Free distribution for Stars & Stripes was made to all participating units. In coordination with USARV Information Office and the Stars & Stripes distribution system, an additional 1,000 copies of the Stars & Stripes were airlifted daily from Da Nang AFB to Khe Sanh for further distribution with the Class I Supplies.

(4). The XXIV Corps Information Office compiled and produced a series of five-minute news summaries featuring highlights of Operation LAMSON 719. These programs were aired over AFVN Quang Tri and designed to keep the troops in the field informed of the progress of the operation. (See Appendix 6, Sample Radio Script).

(5). At the conclusion of Operation LAMSON 719, commanders at all levels were urged to utilize every command information tool available to insure maximum dissemination of information about the result of the operation down to the individual soldier. (See Appendix 7, CG, XXIV Corps Message, DMO 060612 April 71).

d. Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces. Daily activity briefings were conducted by I Corps Information Office. These briefings were supplemented by a daily written release. These briefings provided the bulk of information released on the operation. After 8 February, I Corps Information Office's responsibility for releasing information increased markedly due to

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Annex L (Information) to Combat Operations After Action Report LAMSON 719

ARVN dominance of the combat operations. In addition to the briefings and written releases, I Corps conducted numerous interviews with senior commanders, provided press escorts on a daily basis and arranged the President's news conference on 31 March 1971.

4. (U) ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS.

a. B billeting. In coordination with the Information Officer and the Engineer Officer of the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech), arrangements were made to obtain three Butler-type buildings at the Quang Tri airfield to house the accredited correspondents and to facilitate scheduled briefings and other administrative and control procedures. One of the buildings was divided in half, with one half being used for press briefings, communications, and administrative matters. There was ample room in this area for all correspondents to work at night writing copy. The other half was used for billeting military support personnel. The other two buildings were used to billet the correspondents. Forty beds and twenty-five cots/stretchers, complete with blankets and sheets, were obtained from various supply resources.

b. Messing. A field-ration mess was run by the 335th Transportation Company, 23d Infantry Division, adjacent to the press camp and all correspondents were allowed to eat in this facility at specified times. Cash collection sheets were utilized.

c. Transportation.

(1.) For the duration of the operation, the XXIV Corps Information Office furnished two 3/4 ton trucks to provide ground transportation for correspondents. In addition, I Corps Advisory Group Information Office provided one pick-up truck for this purpose.

(2.) Beginning on 4 February, XXIV Corps Aviation supplied a dedicated UH-1H helicopter, and sometimes two, to be used to transport correspondents to areas of interest within RVN. This helicopter was only made unavailable approximately five days, when the tactical mission required the use of all available helicopter assets. This dedicated helicopter flew more than 150 sorties within RVN in support of the press.

(3.) Beginning on 26 February, the US command dedicated one UH-1H and two helicopter gunships to CG, I Corps, for the purpose of transporting correspondents into Laos. It was originally planned that the I Corps dedicated helicopter would be programmed for two lifts per day, with six correspondents per lift, into and out of Laos. On 8 March, two additional UH-1H's were added, thus eliminating the need to shuttle the correspondents to areas in Laos. The third dedicated UH-1H was utilized as a chase ship for the two primary helicopters. On days when the tactical situation would not permit lifts into Laos, all three ships were used to transport correspondents to areas of interest in-country. The US dedicated helicopters to I Corps flew 14 sorties to and from bases in Laos and more than 100 in-country sorties during the operation.

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Annex I. (Information) to Combat Operations After Action Report LAMSON 719

(4.) Every morning a roster was compiled for the press helicopters. The pilots were briefed, and when possible, escorts were assigned for each location in RVN. Correspondents not able to ride the press helicopters were escorted out to the POW pad at Quang Tri airfield and assisted in getting rides on helicopters going west. (See Appendix 8, Summary - Press Operations).

(5.) Accreditation. All correspondents requesting billeting or transportation from the Quang Tri Press Camp were required to show their MACV press card to one of the press officers. This precaution was taken to insure that all correspondents covering the operation were accredited by MACV, and thus would be bound by MACV ground rules. During 66 days of operation, the Quang Tri Press Camp offered assistance to 234 correspondents from 68 agencies representing virtually every Free World nation.

c. Lessons Learned.

(1.) Planning. The highly classified, limited access policies in effect during the planning stage of Operation LAMSON 719 precluded any prior planning of public/command information and press requirements which are inherent in any operation of this scope and magnitude. Since information plans and/or annexes were nonexistent, there was a definite lack of specific public affairs guidance in the initial phase of the operation. Information Officers, both US and ARVN, at every level should be provided information at the earliest possible time during the planning phase to facilitate the preparation and coordination of appropriate information annexes which would include detailed and specific guidance.

(2.) Release of Information. The release of timely and factual information at the lowest level possible is the best defense against speculation and inaccurate reporting on the part of the press. Provisions of MACV Directive 360-1, which dictates that COMUSMACV is the sole clearance and releasing authority concerning US military operations, precludes on-the-scene release of timely information. This was a source of irritation to the correspondents who were in the area of operation. The delays involved in obtaining clearance from MACV, which sometimes took hours, was invariably interpreted by the correspondents as a "stalling" tactic, and was a source of antagonism from the very beginning. In future operations of this magnitude, MACV should either delegate release authority to the senior US commander on the scene, or send a MACV team to the area to act as the MACV releasing authority.

(3.) Transportation. Travel restrictions imposed on correspondents, particularly the initial order that correspondents were not allowed to travel into Laos aboard US helicopters were the major cause of friction and bad feeling on the part of the press. By the time that this ruling was modified to allow them to go into Laos aboard a dedicated press helicopter, the

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Annex L (Information) to Combat Operation After Action Report LAMSON 719

tactical situation had changed to the point that responsible ARVN commanders were reluctant to allow them to do so because of their concern for the safety of the newsmen, as well as the safety of the dedicated helicopters and crews. Within the confines of military security and non-interference with military operations, correspondents should be allowed access to all modes of transportation into and out of the area of operation. Restrictions on their movement should be kept to an absolute minimum.

5. (U) COMMAND AND SIGNAL.

- a. Since commercial facilities were not available, military communications outlets were utilized by the press corps.
- b. The XXIV Corps Signal Office arranged two direct lines to the Da Nang AFB operator, and two lines on the Quang Tri Army circuit. The two direct lines to the Da Nang AFB operator were of immeasurable value in getting copy to Saigon in a timely manner.
- c. Seventh Air Force supplied liaison personnel to assist correspondents in transporting their film and copy aboard Air Force aircraft leaving Quang Tri for Da Nang and Saigon. In addition, one Air Force man was on duty at the Quang Tri airport to assist correspondents in arranging transportation to Saigon or other points south.

APPENDICES

1. XXIV Corps Information Office (Forward) Organizational Chart
2. Sample US Evening Briefing
3. Sample ARVN Evening Briefing
4. Sample Memorandum for Correspondents
5. Operation LAMSON 719 News Highlights, compiled by XXIV Corps Information Office (Forward)
6. ARVN Quang Tri Radio Spots, compiled by XXIV Corps Information Office (Forward)
7. CG, XXIV Corps Message
8. Summary, Press Operations


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Appendix 1 (Organizational Chart) to Annex L (Information) to Combat Operation After Action Report LAM SON 719



* USARV/MACV AUGMENTATION

** ALSO COMMANDER OF DANANG PRESS CENTER

*** ALSO IO OF 1/5th MECH

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Authority: MW921673
67 WRP NARA Date: 1/19/69

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Appendix 2 (Sample US Evening Briefing) to Annex L (Information) to Combat Operations After Action Report LAMSON 719

EVENING BRIEFING

2 April 1971

1. (U) At 1615 yesterday, a cavalry element of the 1/5th, while operating in an area 15 kilometers northwest of Khe Sanh observed 20 to 30 enemy soldiers. The unit engaged the enemy with gunships and air strikes, resulting in ten NVA killed, with no US casualties.
2. (U) At 1645 yesterday, an element of the 3rd Bde., 101st Airborne Division, operating in an area nine kilometers north of Vandegrift received less than 15 rounds of 122mm rockets, resulting in a negative casualties or damage. Artillery and air strikes were employed at suspected enemy locations which resulted in five NVA killed and three secondary explosions.
3. (U) At about 0500 this morning, a cavalry unit of the 1/5th, while operating in an area six kilometers northwest of Khe Sanh was engaged by an unknown size enemy force employing RPG's. The unit responded with organic weapons, resulting in nine NVA killed, five AK-47's, 20 grenades, four shape charges, and five satchel charges captured. There were no US casualties.
4. (U) At 0945 this morning, an element of the 3rd Bde., 101st Airborne Division, while operating in an area nine kilometers north of FSB Vandegrift engaged and killed two NVA, and captured one AK-47, and one RPG launcher. There were no US casualties.
5. (U) US helicopters flew more than 460 sorties in support of Operation LAMSON 719 during the 24-hour period ending at 0600 this morning. Of these, approximately 180 were gunships, 280 were troop lift. In addition, fighter bombers from the USAF, USN and USMC flew more than 200 strikes while SAC B-52's flew 13 strikes in support of the operation.

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Appendix 3 (Sample ARVN Briefing) to
Annex L (Information) to Combat Operations After Action Report LAMSON 719

REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM
ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM
I CORPS AND MILITARY REGION 1
POLITICAL WAREFARE BLOC
INFORMATION OFFICE

I CORPS FORWARD
Rel. No. 025-71 (Morning)

8 March 1971

OPERATION LAMSON 719

1. (U) Between 1500 hours to 1800 hours yesterday, an infantry battalion of the 1st ARVN Division found bodies of 112 enemy soldiers, 46 crew-served, 18 AK weapons while searching in an area 42 kilometers west of Lang Vei.
2. (U) At 1520 hours yesterday, a Marine battalion conducted a search 4 kilometers southwest of Lang Vei, killing six enemy soldiers and capturing one individual weapon. No friendly casualties.
3. (U) At 1630 hours yesterday, another Marine battalion contacted an unknown size enemy force 20 kilometers southwest of Lang Vei. Eleven enemy soldiers were killed, one B-40 rocket launcher, four AK's, 80 B-40 rounds, 18 rounds of 82mm. mortar, 2,000 rounds of AK ammo were captured. In addition, friendly forces discovered 25 enemy bodies in the same area. No friendly casualties.
4. (U) At 1340 hours yesterday, a Marine battalion made contact with the enemy 10 kilometers southwest of Lang Vei, killing 12 enemy soldiers, capturing one 12.7 mm. anti-aircraft machine gun. Friendly forces suffered two wounded.
5. (U) ACCUMULATIVE CASUALTY REPORT--Since the beginning of LAMSON 719, 6,052 enemy soldiers have been killed, 29 prisoners detained, two defectors received, while 716 crew-served weapons, 2,017 individual weapons were captured.

Ground forces, along with artillery and air strikes, destroyed 93 enemy tanks, 149 Molotova trucks, two 3/4-ton trucks, 400 bicycles, 608 houses, four generators, three water pumps, 529,000 liters of fuel, 13,031 tons of munitions, 7,010 meters of pipeline and a great quantity of foodstuffs and equipment.

Friendly casualties were 435 killed, 1,495 wounded and 100 missing in action.

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Appendix 4 (Sample Memo for Correspondents) to
Annex L (Information) to Combat Operations After Action Report LAMSON 719

AVII-10 (FWD)

16 February 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR CORRESPONDENTS

SUBJECT: Filming and Reporting Casualties

1. (U) Reference MACV Directive 360-1, Annex A, Para. 3, Subj: Rules Governing Public Release of U.S. Military Information in Vietnam.
2. (U) Casualty information, as it relates to the notification of next of kin, is extremely sensitive.
3. (U) By executive direction, next of kin of U.S. military fatalities are to be notified in person by an officer or senior non-commissioned officer of the appropriate service. There have been instances in which next of kin have first learned of the death or wounding of the loved one through the news media. The problem is particularly difficult for the visual media. Casualty photographs can show a recognizable face, name tag, jewelry, or other identifiable feature or item. The anguish that sudden recognition at home can cause is out of proportion to the news value of the photograph or film. Hence, photographs and films of recognizable U.S. casualties are not releasable until next of kin have been notified. Notification of next of kin can be verified with the MACV Office of Information (MACOI) or the Directorate of Defense in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs).
4. (U) An assessment of U.S. casualties that a correspondent actually sees in an action may be used. However, to protect security of the unit concerned and minimize anguish on the part of families at home, correspondent are requested not to identify units smaller than brigade, regiment or equivalent size in connection with casualty figures.
5. (U) Official total U.S. casualty figures in Vietnam on a weekly and cumulative basis are released by the Department of Defense and MACV on the basis of reports from the individual services to the Department of Defense. Because of unavoidable late casualty reporting, these figures are subject to up-dating.

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67 WRD NARA Date 1/19/04

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XXIV CORPS

ARMY MARINES AIR FORCE NAVY



Appendix 5 (Sample Highlights) to Annex L
 (Information) to combat operations After Action
 Report LAM SON 719.

NEWS HIGHLIGHTS

OPERATION LAM SON 719 (A REVIEW)

Khe Sanh and Lang Vei...Highway 9 and the Rockpile...Quang Tri City and Dong Ha... These places, among many others, commanded the headlines of the world during much of 1968. They conjure up memories of the fierce and bloody fighting that occurred in Quang Tri Province during and after the North Vietnamese Tet Offensive.

Much has changed since then.

Massive and audacious operations, such as 1969's Dewey Canyon and Apache Snow, served to route out and destroy many enemy elements that remained in Quang Tri, South Vietnam's northernmost province.

The operations, conducted jointly by United States and South Vietnamese forces, helped to bring to the area a security it had not known since the war began.

Combined operations since 1969 have pre-empted any enemy plans to once again stage a major offensive in northern Military Region 1. It was determined, however, that the security of South Vietnam could never be permanent with the intricate supply and infiltration routes that the North Vietnamese had in eastern Laos, bordering Quang Tri Province.

Thus, the United States and South Vietnam once again joined together to mount Operation Dewey Canyon II, or Lam Son 719, as it is now called.

The purpose of the operation is to interdict the enemy's supply and infiltration routes for South Vietnam and Cambodia, as well as potential staging areas in Military Region 1.

Announcement of the operation, which began on January 30, was delayed to insure the safety and security of American and South Vietnamese forces moving into the area.

Included in the operation are elements of the U.S. 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized) augmented by elements of the 101st Airborne

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Appendix 5 (Sample 1) Appendix to Annex I (Information) to combat operation
After Action Report (see Box 14, Cont'd.)

Division (Airmobile) and the 7th Infantry Division (American).

RVNAF participation includes elements of the ARVN Airborne Division, the 1st ARVN Infantry Division, a brigade of the Vietnamese Marine Corps, the 1st ARVN Ranger Group, and the 1st Armored Brigade.

As these forces deployed, U.S. 7th Air Force airlift and RVNAF air elements moved troops and logistics northward to Military Region 1.

The operations began at 0100 hours on the 30th with elements of Task Force 1/5 moving westward along Highway 9 toward Khe Sanh, scene of the vicious enemy assault on U.S. Marines in 1968. While the main force moved overland, other elements of the brigade (with units of the 101st and 23rd Divisions under operational control) made helicopter assaults into the Ham Nghi, or Khe Sanh, area.

Elements of the 45th Engineer Group accompanied the overland forces, moving into the Ham Nghi area to begin to work on improving the old Khe Sanh airfield. Elements of the 101st Airborne engineers, meanwhile, worked around the clock on a second dirt-assault strip alongside the former one, and on improving Highway 9. While U.S. elements worked consolidating their positions and conducting recon operations, ARVN units, which had been airlifted to Dong Ha, began to deploy to the Ham Nghi area. The date was February 3.

The following day, a news embargo which had been placed on the operation was lifted. The size of the operation was disclosed at that time: more than 9,000 American troops and 20,000 South Vietnamese were involved.

Accounts in newspapers in the United States read like this from the New York Times' February 4 editions, "The joint South Vietnamese-American force sweeping along the Laotian border in northwestern South Vietnam has encountered only light and scattered resistance...."

Controversy over the action developed immediately. The Soviet Union and Red China denounced the operation as a "provocation;" United Nations Secretary General U Thant outwardly questioned it as a threat to the Geneva Agreement of 1962, making Laos a neutral country; but in the United States, President Nixon and Defense Secretary Melvin Laird defended the drive, saying it would expedite withdrawal of American forces from Southeast Asia. While not speaking of an invasion, the President and Laird emphasized that no American ground troops would be used in any invasion of Laos.

Speculation swirled as to what the amassed troops near the Laotian border would do. An invasion of Laos appeared imminent. Between the 4th and 7th of February, engineer elements opened Highway 9 to all tracked and wheeled vehicles to within 100 meters of the Laotian border. ARVN engineers completed the work to the border.

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Appendix 5 (Sample Highlights) to Annex L (Information) to Combat Operation
After Action Report LAMSON 719---(Con't.)

And a sign was erected at the border, reading in English: "NO U.S.
PERSONNEL BEYOND THIS POINT."

On February 8th, the guessing was ended as South Vietnamese forces pushed across the border into Laos. The incursion also marked the end of operation Dewey Canyon II and the beginning of Operation Lam Son 719. (Lam Son was the site of a great Vietnamese victory over Chinese invaders six centuries ago.)

This operation is one of the most significant of the war, for it marks only the second time ARVN ground forces have embarked on a major operation by themselves. It, too, is a major test of President Nixon's Vietnamization program.

The United States continues its operations in Military Region 1 in support of Lam Son 719 to include air and artillery cover. As South Vietnamese forces crossed the border, the U.S. command in Saigon reiterated the President's statement that no American ground forces would be sent into Laos.

Coverage of the incursion was reported like this item from the February 8th editions of the Washington Post:

"The sky was filled with American helicopters, including cobra gunships and troop transports as South Vietnamese armored personnel carriers crossed the border into Laos on Highway 9 shortly after 7 a.m. The move is aimed at cutting off communist supply lines along the Ho Chi Minh Trail..."

Following the announcement of the invasion, State Department spokesmen emphasized the Lactian operation, "Will be limited in time and area." While the time element was not defined, the spokesmen said the operation would be confined to the area of Laos between the 16th and 17th parallels.

During the first 6 days of the incursion, South Vietnamese forces pushed--with little resistance--12 miles inside Laos. Poor weather and growing enemy attacks forced the ARVN to consolidate its position. To date, the South Vietnamese have succeeded in cutting off four main supply channels along the Ho Chi Minh Trail.

On February 18, an estimated North Vietnamese regiment launched a massive mortar, rocket, artillery and small arms attack on two ARVN Ranger firebases.

The bases were located 6 miles inside Laos and are 9 miles north of Highway 9. They overlooked a key branch of the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Poor weather at the outset of the assault prevented U.S. air support from reaching the position.

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Appendix 5 (Sample Highlights) to Annex L (Information) to Combat Operation After Action Report LAMSON 719--(Con't.)

Friendly casualties during the four-day siege, according to ARVN sources in Saigon, were 100 killed, 143 wounded and 78 missing in action. Enemy casualties were put at 639 killed.

During the assault on the ranger position, a crew chief on a U.S. medical evacuation helicopter, Specialist 5 Dennis M. Fujii, distinguished himself.

While on a casualty pickup run inside Laos, his helicopter was shot down. A rescue chopper was sent in for the crew. Four members of the crew were extracted from the position, but heavy enemy mortar and small arms fire made it impossible to pickup Fujii.

For two and a half days, Fujii remained in that position, and with a radio he had secured, directed air attacks, helicopter gunship attacks and flare ships in defense of the position.

He was extracted on February 20, but the rescue chopper he was aboard was hit by ground fire and crashed at another ranger position 4 kilometers south of the first position.

He continued to call in air strikes and was successfully evacuated from Laos two days later.

For his actions during that four-day period, Fujii was presented with the Silver Star by MG Thomas Tarpley, Commander of the 101st Airborne Division, on behalf of LTG James W. Sutherland Jr., Commander of the XXIV Corps.

On the American side of the operation, cross-border results have been impressive.

Through the 24th of February, U.S. air support operations have accounted for about 500 enemy soldiers KILLED IN ACTION. In addition to this, air crews, FAC's and South Vietnamese ground forces have reported more than 500 secondary explosions, 230 secondary fires and nearly 350 damaged or destroyed vehicles.

Other results reported include the destruction of more than 120 supply and weapons caches, 115 bunkers, 35 gunsites and nearly 450 structures.

Among significant results are the destruction of more than 500 tons of ammunition by SAC bombers on February 16 and an additional 300 tons by a TAC strike on the 14th. On the 18th and 19th, U.S. helicopter gunships severed and ignited four petroleum pipelines paralleling the Ho Chi Minh Trail in eastern Laos. Fires were reported burning for several days.

U.S. sorties flown in support of the operation through February 28th totaled nearly 18,000.

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Appendix 5 (Sample Highlights) to Annex L (Information) to Combat Operation After Action Report LAMSON 719--(Con't.)

Aircraft losses in the lower panhandle of Laos due to hostile action are 22, including 20 helicopters and 2 F-4 fighter bombers. Aircraft losses due to non-hostile action are 2, as a result of a mid-air helicopter collision. Casualties due to hostile action in Laos are 17 killed, 20 wounded and 14 missing in action.

Through the 27th of February, the ARVN reported the following: 2,461 enemy killed, 8 enemy soldiers detained and 2 enemy defections. The ARVN also reported 244 crew served and 1,321 individual weapons captured.

ARVN ground forces, artillery and tactical air strikes also destroyed 16 Russian Tanks, 86 trucks, 400 bicycles, 528,000 liters of fuel, 4 generators, 3 water pumps, 7,000 meters of pipeline, 500 packages of uniforms, 1 ton of canvas boots and gloves, 12 radios, 500 batteries, 25 protective masks, 12,715 tons of munitions, thirty 122mm. rocket rounds, 2 training centers and large quantities of food and equipment. ARVN casualties through the 28th were reported as 310.

The above is an authorized news summary published by the Information Office, XXIV Corps, APO San Francisco, 96349. Views and opinions expressed are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army.

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Appendix 6 (Sample Radio Spots) to
Annex L (Information) to Combat Operations After Action Report LAMSON 719

(U) (OPEN AND CLOSE FORMAT FOR THE OPERATION LAMSON 719 PROGRAM--THE OPEN AND CLOSE WAS PRODUCED WITH A MUSIC BACKGROUND AND THE SAME WAS USED WITH EACH PROGRAM.)

OPEN:

(U) OPERATION LAMSON 719---COMPILED AND PRODUCED BY THE INFORMATION OFFICE, XXIV CORPS FORWARD. A LOOK AT OPERATIONS BY THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM MILITARY FORCES INVOLVED IN OPERATION LAMSON 719 IN LAOS AND U.S. MILITARY SUPPORT OF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE IN THIS OPERATION

CLOSE:

(U) OPERATION LAMSON 719 IS AN AUTHORIZED SUMMARY OF ACTIVITIES OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM MILITARY UNITS INVOLVED IN THE OPERATION AND U.S. MILITARY SUPPORT OF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE. OPERATION LAMSON 719 IS COMPILED AND PRODUCED BY THE INFORMATION OFFICE OF THE XXIV CORPS AND BROADCAST IN CO-OPERATION WITH THE AMERICAN FORCES VIETNAM NETWORK, QUANG TRI.

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The following releases on Operation LAMSON 719 were broadcast at 1900 hours on the evening of 2 April 1971, from AFVN, Quang Tri, by personnel of the XXIV Corps, Information Office.

(U) SPECIALIST FOUR PAUL A LAGENOUR WAS AWARDED THE SILVER STAR YESTERDAY BY MAJOR GENERAL THOMAS M. TARPLEY, COMMANDING GENERAL OF THE 101ST AIRBORNE DIVISION (AIRMOBILE) AFTER SPENDING TWELVE DAYS EVADING ENEMY FORCES IN THE SOUTHERN PANHANDLE OF LAOS. SPECIALIST LAGENOUR WAS WORKING AS A DOOR DUNNER WITH THE 48TH ASSAULT HELICOPTER COMPANY WHEN HIS HELICOPTER WAS SHOT DOWN OVER LAOS ON MARCH 19TH. AFTER BEING GROUNDED, HE JOINED WITH THE 2ND ARVN AIRBORNE BATTALION AND WHILE WITH THE BATTALION HE OPERATED THE RADIO AND SUCCEEDED IN DIRECTING AIR STRIKES, ARTILLERY, GUNSHIPS, AND FLARE SHIPS. DURING A CONTACT WITH ENEMY FORCES, LAGENOUR ALONG WITH FOUR OTHER ARVN AIRBORNE SOLDIERS, WERE SEPARATED FROM THE BATTALION. ARMED WITH INDIVIDUAL WEAPONS AND A COMPASS THE GROUP ATTEMPTED TO MOVE SOUTHWARD IN AN EFFORT TO LOCATE A FRIENDLY UNIT. AT ONE POINT THEY SUCCEEDED IN SIGNALING GUNSHIPS WORKING IN THE AREA, HOWEVER, DARKNESS CAME BEFORE THEY COULD BE PICKED UP. LATER, THREE OF THE ARVN SOLDIERS WERE CAPTURED BY AN NVA ELEMENT. LAGENOUR AND THE REMAINING ARVN SOLDIER EVADED THE ENEMY FORCES AND MADE THEIR WAY INTO THE MOUNTAINS WHERE THEY WERE JOINED BY AN ARVN MARINE CORPS SOLDIER. THE THREE WORKED THEIR WAY EASTWARD UNTIL THEY SPOTTED WHAT THEY BELIEVED TO BE AN AMERICAN TANK UNIT. ON WEDNESDAY AFTERNOON, MARCH 31ST, SPECIALIST LAGENOUR AND HIS TWO COMPANIONS WERE ABLE TO JOIN UP WITH AN ELEMENT OF THE 1/5TH INFANTRY NEAR LANG VEI. THEY WERE ALL EVACUATED

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Appendix 6 (Sample Radio Spots) to
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TO THE 18TH SURGICAL HOSPITAL AND FROM THERE LAGENOUR WAS EVACUATED TO THE 85TH EVAC HOSPITAL FOR TREATMENT OF A WOUND HE RECEIVED WHILE WITH THE 2ND ARVN AIRBORNE BATTALION.

(U) WEDNESDAY AFTERNOON AN ELEMENT OF THE ARVN HAC BAO COMPANY REPORTED FINDING THE BODIES OF EIGHTY-FIVE NORTH VIETNAMESE SOLDIERS IN AN AREA IN THE SOUTHERN PANHANDLE OF LAOS WHICH HAD BEEN KILLED BY AIRSTRIKES. THEY ALSO FOUND EIGHTEEN WEAPONS WHICH HAD BEEN DESTROYED.

(U) YESTERDAY MORNING ELEMENTS OF THE HAC BAO COMPANY WHILE OPERATING IN THE SOUTHERN PANHANDLE OF LAOS DISCOVERED AN ENEMY P-O-L DUMP OF AN APPROXIMATE 1,000 GALLON CAPACITY. AFTER THE ELEMENT HAD DESTROYED THE P-O-L THEY FOUND A 1.5 KILO-WATT GENERATOR WHICH HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN DESTROYED BY AIR STRIKES. THEY ALSO LOCATED AN EMPTY CAVE IN THE AREA WHICH HAD BEEN UTILIZED IN THE PAST BY THE ENEMY TO HIDE TANKS.

(U) YESTERDAY AFTERNOON A UNIT OF THE HAC BAO COMPANY MADE CONTACT WITH AN UNKNOWN SIZE ENEMY FORCE WHICH RESULTED IN ONE NVA SOLDIER KILLED AND ONE AK-47 RIFLE CAPTURED. ABOUT ONE AND A HALF HOURS LATER THE UNIT ALSO FOUND AND DESTROYED TWELVE HUTS, THIRTY-EIGHT INDIVIDUAL AK WEAPONS, SEVEN TONS OF RICE, AND ONE TON OF MUNITIONS INCLUDING 60MM AND 82MM MORTAR ROUNDS.

(U) DONG HA COMBAT BASE RECEIVED LESS THAN FIFTEEN ROUNDS OF 122MM. ROCKETS BETWEEN 0300-0315 HOURS YESTERDAY MORNING MARCH 31. THE ROUNDS IMPACTED IN THE VICINITY OF THE I-CORPS FORWARD COMPOUND AT DONG HA. THE ATTACK RESULTED IN LIGHT CASUALTIES AND LIGHT MATERIAL DAMAGE. COUNTER BATTERY FIRE WAS CONDUCTED.

(U) ALSO, A SOUTH VIETNAMESE MARINE DIVISION COMPOUND RECEIVED LESS THAN SEVEN ROUNDS OF 122MM ROCKETS ON WEDNESDAY AFTERNOON. THERE WERE NO CASUALTIES OR DAMAGE AS A RESULT OF THE ATTACK. COUNTER BATTERY WAS FIRED WHICH RESULTED IN TWO SECONDARY EXPLOSIONS.

(U) AT 1430 HOURS MONDAY, MARCH 26, AN ELEMENT OF THE THIRD BRIGADE, 101ST AIRBORNE DIVISION DISCOVERED AN ENEMY CAVE IN AN AREA NINE KILOMETERS NORTH OF FIRE SUPPORT BASE VANDERGRIFT. A SEARCH OF THE AREA REVEALED A CACHE OF ENEMY SUPPLIES IN THE CAVE, CONSISTED OF 35 82MM MORTAR ROUNDS, SIX 60MM MORTAR ROUNDS, NINE 75MM RECOILESS RIFLE ROUNDS, 600 AK-47 ROUNDS, 25 CHICOM GRENADES AND SIX BOXES OF FIRING DEVICES.

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 67 WMD NARA Date 1/19/64

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Appendix 7 (CG, XXIV Corps Message) to
 Annex L (Information) to Combat Operations After Action Report LAMSON 719

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
 Headquarters, XXIV Corps
 (SEAL) APO San Francisco 96349

AVII-CG

31 March 1971

SUBJECT: Assessment of the Results of LAMSON 719 (U)

TO: CG, 101st Abn Div (Ambl), APO 96383
 CG, 23d Inf Div, APO 96374
 CG, 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech), APO 96377
 CG, Da Nang Support Command, APO 96349
 CG, XXIV Corps Artillery, APO 96349
 DSA, I Corps and Military Region 1, APO 96349
 SA, 1st ARVN Div, 2d ARVN Div, 1st Abn Div, VNMC Div,
 1st Armored Bde (THRU: DSA, I Corp and MR1, APO 96349)

1. (U) In assessing the results and effect LAMSON 719 had on the operations and plans of NVA and RVNAF forces, the operation must be placed in the proper relationship with regard to the assessment made in Sep-Oct 1970, of NVA plans and intentions.
2. (U) By late September and early October 1970, it became obvious from various enemy actions and intelligence sources that the NVA planned to:
 - a. Attempt to strangle Phnom Penh and overthrow the Lon Nol government.
 - b. Continue the aggression against RVN and rebuild its bases along the Cambodian border adjacent to III and IV Corps.
 - c. Conduct an intensified resupply and reinforcement operation in southern Laos beginning with the dry season (mid-October to mid-April 1971).
 - d. Build up supplies and equipment in MR1 to supply large scale operations in that area during the 1971 dry season in Quang Tri (P) and Thua Thien (P).
3. (U) During the period October 1970 to April 1971, the GVN and RVNAF had to take actions, within their capabilities, to accomplish the following objectives:
 - a. Support in Cambodia a non-Communist government either truly neutral or friendly to the GVN, and prevent the rebuilding and restocking of NVA base areas in Cambodia along the RVN border.
 - b. Interrupt or delay the flow of supplies and equipment from RVN through Laos to RVN and Cambodia.

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AVII-CG
SUBJECT: Assessment of the Results of LAMSON 719

31 March 1971

c. Continue to fight successfully the war in RVN and to advance the RD program and at the same time make available RVNAF forces for operations in Cambodia and Laos.

4. (U) The FWMAF in RVN and in SE Asia were prepared to assist and support the GVN in achieving these objectives.

5. (U) Interdiction of the entry points from NVN into southern Laos was started in mid-October and has continued. The destruction of enemy trucks was initiated by the 7th Air Force using the most effective weapons systems available. The attack of enemy trucks on the Laos route system has enjoyed more success than in previous years and new records of kills were reached in December and January.

6. (U) ARVN operations into Cambodia with the mission of opening land and water routes to the capital were started in November 1970, and have been successful. Operations against NVA divisions in Cambodia were started in January 1971, and are continuing.

7. (U) BA604 and the route structure through it offered the greatest potential for attack by GVN forces. During December and January there was a sharp increase in the amount of supplies moved into BA 604 and 611. Only a small portion of these supplies have been moved on to the south. In previous years the enemy has reached his peak efficiency in February and March in moving supplies to the south. Therefore, the timing of an attack on BA 604 and 611 during February and March would present the highest probability of inflicting the greatest damage on the enemy resupply and reinforcement plans. Therefore, the GVN decided to commit 3 (+) ARVN divisions to LAMSON 719 to commence in early February 1971.

8. (U) The fact that ARVN forces could at the same time conduct two out-of-country operations (Cambodia and Laos) and concurrently continue the conflict in RVN and progress with the RD program is remarkable.

9. (U) The total effect and results of LAMSON 719 may not be accurately determined for several more months. However, we can confidently state that these results have been achieved:

a. Enemy plans for movement of supplies and equipment south during February and March were changed by LAMSON 719.

b. There is much evidence that units and replacement personnel enroute south were diverted to enemy force opposing LAMSON 719.

c. Thousands of tons of ammunition, POL and other supplies and equipment were destroyed by LAMSON 719 forces including US air assets. The enemy had plans to use these in some area other than BA 604. In fact, there is some evidence that some equipment and supplies moved into storage areas in MMR1 had

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Appendix 7 (CG, XXIV Corps Message) to
 Annex L (Information) to Combat Operations After Action Report LAMSON 719

AVII-CG

31 March 1971

SUBJECT: Assessment of the Results of LAMSON 719

to be removed and returned to Laos to help support enemy forces opposing LAMSON 719.

d. We know that enemy personnel losses were very heavy. Of course, these losses can eventually be replaced. However, the requirement to replace losses in such Regts as the 1st VC, 29th, 36th, 64th, 102d, and 803d will draw off replacement personnel programmed for other units. MF and LF units in the provinces will probably be on low priority for replacements from NVN.

e. One of the most valuable results of LAMSON 719 is the detailed knowledge now available concerning the POL pipeline, depot locations and road and trail network in BA 604. This will permit more precise targeting in the future and should assist in further destruction of enemy storage areas, truck parks, depots, and other logistics installations.

f. As far as ARVN is concerned, LAMSON 719 has added to their confidence and experience. Also, the exploits of companies, battalions, individual officers and enlisted men will add to the history and tradition of the ARVN units that participated in LAMSON 719. Certainly the hard battles of the Rangers and the Airborne Division against the heavy attacks by elements of two NVA divisions supported by tanks contributed in a major way to the success of LAMSON 719 and will add to the history and tradition of these fine units. The exploits of individuals and units of the 1st ARVN Division will add much to the already glorious history of that division.

10. (U) In the weeks and months ahead, US advisors and commanders who work with and support RVNAF must stress the noteworthy performance and achievements of the RVNAF and the general positive aspects of the results and effects of LAMSON 719. The RVNAF needs to be reassured that its efforts and sacrifices during LAMSON 719 were significant in furthering the overall GVN effort against continued NVA aggression against RVN. At the same time, advisors must tactfully stress the correction of deficiencies determined during the operation and take those actions necessary to maintain the forward momentum of the RVNAF.

/s/ James W. Sutherland, Jr.
 JAMES W. SUTHERLAND, JR.
 Lieutenant General, USA
 Commanding

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REF ID: A621673
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Authority: MD921673
67 WBD NARA Date: 1/19/04

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Appendix 7 (C6, XXIV Corps Message),
Annex I (Information) to Combat Operations Annex Action Report LAFSON 719

FIGURE 6: List of Commanders

TC, CG, USAF ABN 1001 (AFM 1001)

CG, 1001 AFM 1001

CG, 1ST ABN 572 1001 (AFM 1001) QTR RVN

CG, XXIV CORPS ARMY RVN

CG, USASMACOM D41 RVN

DBA 1 1001 (AFM 1001)

CG, 1001 (AFM 1001)

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ATT-6)

SUBJ: Assessment of the Results of LAFSON 719

S-10 SUTHERLAND

A. XXIV Corps Ltr., Assessment of the Results of LAFSON 719, 31 Mar 71

1. Now that Operation LAFSON 719 has been completed, I consider it appropriate that the achievements and results of this operation be brought to the attention of every individual concerned. I properly informed and advised all soldiers, the higher command, and the public of the results of this operation toward the end of the operation. It is the responsibility of the command to be the primary and sole credible source of information. I am sure that in the given circumstances, no collateral findings, such as those mentioned in the LAFSON 719 report, will be made public.

2. While the total effects and findings of LAFSON 719 may not be immediately determinable for several reasons, the letter referenced above contains a number of items I consider significant as an initial assessment of the

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