

DECLASSIFIED	
Authoris/	NNDS93541
By	BN.
NARA Date 4/5/00	

20 ~~00~~Xo ~~JK~~

S-3 uB

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
 TROOP C 2D SQUADRON(AMBL) 17TH CAVALRY
 101ST AIRBORNE DIVISION(AMBL)
 APO SAN FRANCISCO 96383

SUBJECT: Combat After Action Feeder Report.
 (1 August 1971 thru 31 August 1971)

1. General Description of Activities During Period:

The Troop concentrated on its primary mission of armed aerial reconnaissance during the month of August, with emphasis on the Ashau Valley, the Roung Reung Valley, and the Elephant Valley. During the month the Cavalry AO was extended on the northern side, almost doubling the size of the AO. The ARP was inserted twice, both occasions on cold LZ's.

2. Significant Activities During the Period.

During the first week the majority of assets were used supporting the ARVN vicinity of Hueng Vueng. During the second and third weeks, the Cav found greatly increased activity in RZ 7 adjacent to the Laos border and the province boundary in vicinity of FSB Pike. On 13 Aug, the Troop received an AO extension south of RZ7. A high level of activity was found in the area. TAC Air was employed with devastating effect on the enemy bunker complexes. During the middle of the month, the Troop supported the 2nd Brigade, vicinity of FSB Rifle, and found an amm cache site. TAC air and artillery were employed. An estimated 75 secondary explosions were recorded on 14 Aug 1971. In the last week of the period, activity again increased in vicinity of FSB Lillian in the lower Ashau Valley. Also activity decreased in RZ's 8 and 9. On 7 Aug thru 11 Aug ARA gunships were attached to the Troop. They were used as the high ship on a heavy pink team.

3. Lessons Learned During the Period.

The Brigade units should be aware that the Cavalry is best employed in armed aerial reconnaissance. Many commanders want to use the Cavalry in the role of ARA to destroy bunkers and fighting positions other than recon. On 7 Aug A Battery 4/77 ARA furnished a section of gunships to support the Cavalry effort. There was no advance warning to the Troop and no advance coordination made. The ARA pilots came with no 1:50,000 maps and the gunners were new men with little time in country and no experience in reading maps. On 3 Aug it took 45 minutes for a CH-47 to make initial radio contact for a pickup of a downed AH1G.

UNCLASSIFIED

Authority MND873541
By BN NARA Date 4/5/00

4. Staff Officer's Analysis:

Coordination is a must when working for or with another unit. When a mission is received, all callsigns, frequencies, friendly positions and fire clearances should be given. The ground units should be aware of what assets are available and how they are best used.

Wayne M Baker
WAYNE M BAKER
CPT, CE
Operations Officer