



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
TROOP C, 2N SQUADRON (AIRMOBILE), 17TH CAVALRY
101ST AIRBORNE DIVISION (AIRMOBILE)
APO SAN FRANCISCO, CA 94621
~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

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SUBJECT: Combat After Action Feeder Report. Operation Jefferson Glen,
Monsoon Plan and Lom Son 719. (Feb 1971 thru 28 Feb 1971)

1. General Description of Activities During the Period:

During the reporting period, Troop C staged from Phu Bai Army Airfield from 1-4 Feb, Quang Tri Army Airfield for the next two days and for the remainder of the period, from Khe Sanh Army Airfield. During the month, Troop C conducted VR's screening actions, BDA's and air crew rescue missions. Our Arp manned a section of the Khe Sanh perimeter. The Hac Bao were used for downed aircraft security.

2. Significant Activities During the Period:

At 0743 hours, 8 Feb., Major James T. Newman led the first heavy pink team into Laos to VR around the Ranger LZ's. On 12 Feb, C Troop lost two Cobras to enemy fire on the Laotian border. The first crew is still listed as MIA. The second crew was extracted by Major Newman after he cut down a six inch tree with his main rotor. The area was engaged by Cobras, artillery and all available TAC Air in Laos, including one B-52. An estimated NVA regiment was rendered combat ineffective in this action. As the ARVN Ranger firebases came under increasing enemy pressure, C Troop concentrated its efforts in that area, performing VR's, screening and fire support through our Cobras. On 18 Feb, Maj. Newman extracted four of the five Americans in a downed Dust-Off from the Ranger firebase while under heavy small arms, AA fire and mortars. SP/4 Dennis Fujii did not leave his bunker due to intense fire. Later the same day, a LOH was shot down and exploded, the crew are still listed as MIA. The remainder of the month was spent primarily around the ARVN Ranger firebases, VR'ing and finally screening for their extraction, and then working around firebases 30 and 31.

3. Lessons Learned During the Period:

In the face of intense anti-air-craft fire from numerous mutually supporting weapons, the LOH becomes unusable. The LOH receives such a tremendous volume of fire from small arms and .50 Calibre that it is too vulnerable. The Cobras supporting the LOH are drawn into a position of attacking one gun while putting itself broadside to several others and losses become unacceptable. Firing at AA weapons or targets where AA is suspected should be done from altitude and the gun run should be broken off well before over flying the target area. If at all possible, mutually supporting AA guns should be engaged by TAC Air in support of Cavalry efforts.

4. Staff Officers Analysis:

Air Cavalry can work successfully in an area of heavy enemy AA when it utilizes all supporting elements and follows the lessons learned.

Armor can be effectively engaged by Cobra gunships using HEAT rockets with little additional hazard.

CLASSIFIED BY: SP4 JCL/KAN/DA
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED TWO YEAR
DATE: 12/1/91
DECLASSIFIED ON: 31 DECEMBER 1991

Malcolm W. Jones, Jr.
MALCOLM W. JONES, JR.
CPT, ARMOR
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GROUP 4

Downgraded at 3 year intervals;
Declassified after 12 years.