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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
Headquarters 2d Squadron, 17th Cavalry  
101st Airborne Division (Ambl)  
APO San Francisco 96383

7 May 1971

National Report - Lessons Learned\* 2d Squadron, 17th Cavalry  
Period Ending 31 March 1971

ing General  
rborne Division (Ambl)  
(G-GC-H

... Significant Activities.

ing this reporting period Troop A participated in the Jefferson Glenn  
general support of the 101st Airborne Division. 1-2 January, inclement  
weather prevented combat operations in the AO. 3 January, VR of RT 616 showed signs  
of check traffic. Gunships received 12.7mm Anti-Aircraft fire at XD 910243.  
Troop A was hit with minor damage resulting. 4-5 January, inclement weather  
prevented combat operations in the AO. 9-16 January, Troop A performed Visual re-  
con in the AC with emphasis on RT 616, a Ranger Relay Team was inserted  
Numerous shot ats resulted throughout the period. Active 12.7mm pits  
were engaged. Bunkers were spotted for TAC AIR and Artillery. 18-21  
January, Troop A worked in close support with TAC AIR, ARA and Artillery to destroy  
cache sites, tunnels and spider holes along RT 616. 22-23 January,  
inclement weather prevented combat operations in the AO. 25 January, Several sensor  
activated and were visually checked for activity. 26-28 January, inclement  
weather prevented combat operations in the AO. 30 January, Troop A performed  
flank security for 1/5 Mech in Khe Sanh area of operations. A downed  
Troop 8th Cavalry was secured and rigged for extraction. 31 January, priority  
for units in Khe Sanh and Sheppard areas of operation. EDA of Arc

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Completed with satisfactory results noted.


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**SUBJECT: Operational Report- Lessons Learned**

2-3 February, Troop A conducted VR of RT 616, extracted two Ranger teams and inserted two others. Troop D was inserted to accomplish ground reconnaissance of RT 616. 4 February, Troop A ARP was inserted into Khe Sanh combat base, to secure the arrival of Troop D and Squadron HQ. 4-7 February bad weather precluded normal operations. 8 February, Troop A crossed the Lao tian border. Aircraft reported shot-ats with three aircraft reporting hits and aircraft flyable. 10 February, worked area West of Khe Sanh utilizing FAC and ARA. An Loh and AHIG were shot down, crews were extracted. Aircraft were destroyed by the crash. Seven NVA were KBH. 12-17 February were spent in support of ARVN ground elements operating in Laos. Troop A worked with FAC controlled Tac Air, AIA and it's organic gun ships to suppress enemy Anti-Aircraft fire, while teams continued their missions of VR for the ground forces. Approximately 16 NVA were KBH. 18-25 February, Troop A was engaged in it's assigned missions of VR and close screen to the ground forces. Weather during this period frequently delayed missions until 1100-1200 hrs. 26 February, Troop A had visual sighting on enemy armor. Two active tanks were sighted and an AHIG received 15 hits in the process of flying VR in the vicinity of LZ 31. 27-28 February, Troop A alternated with Troop C and Squadron Co as C&C to recover an Loh that had been shot down Vic XD 6225. Three 12.7mm Anti-Aircraft weapons were located in the area. 1 March, employed airstrikes against known and suspected enemy locations. 2-3 March, inclement weather prevented combat operations. 4-6 March, supported ARVNS at LZ Sophia and LZ Victory, employed TAC AIR and artillery on known positions. 6 March, Hac Bao were inserted to secure a downed crew at Vic XD 478 409. 7 March, Hac Bao and downed crew were extracted under heavy 12.7mm Anti-Aircraft fire from three weapons. One AHIG received 4 hits and returned



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to base where it was determined to be non flyable. A truck (5 ton) was destroyed and a bulldozer spotted. Area was marked for a FAC. 8-10 March in inclement weather prevented combat operations. 11 March, Troop A conducted a VR of LZ Aloui, LZ Bravo, LZ Alpha and LZ Hotel to determine condition. Sighted 5 2½ ton trucks and marked for a FAC. ARA was utilized on selected targets. 12-13 March, Troop A missions were VR and screen Vic LZ Sephia. 14-15 March, inclement weather prevented combat operations. 16-23 March, Troop A supported the 1st ARVN Division vicinity of LZ Brown with heavy teams. Air strikes were employed and remaining targets were turned over to the FAC on station. During this period an AHIC was shot down by small arms fire Vic XD 439405. Crew was extracted. Tanks were sighted on 19 March and were marked for the FAC. 24 March, continued support to 1st ARVN Division with heavy Cav teams. Marginal weather on 25 March prevented working in the AO until 1400 hrs. Route recon of 616 revealed no significant spots and no traffic, past three days. 26-28 March, Troop A performed in Visual recon role in the Lao tian and Vietnamese Salient areas to spot possible targets of opportunity. Heavy small arms fire was received throughout the area of interest. 29-30 March, supported insertion of ARVN near XD 6802. And performed VR in Lao-tian Salient.

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b. During this reporting period Troop B participated in the Jefferson Glenn operation in general support of the 101st Airborne Division. With a primary mission of intelligence gathering through Visual reconnaissance. 1-11 January 1971, Troop B was able to accomplish only limited Visual reconnaissance due to low ceilings and inclement weather. On 6 January a detailed search was made for a missing AHIG from Troop C 2/17. During this search a AHIG listed as missing since 1969 was found near FSB Veghel. The Aero Rifle Platoon of Troop B was later inserted on this crash site to recover the remains of the crew. 14 January, an Loh was shot down at YD 385001 Vic Aloui airstrip. The aircraft and crew were secured. 16 January, the Troop B ARP secured a downed aircraft Vic YC 830889. Additionally on 16 January an Loh was shot down due to 12.7mm Anti-Aircraft fire Vic YC 558794. The crew was recovered, the aircraft was lost due to fire. 17 January, the Troop B ARP was again inserted on a downed FLIR aircraft Vic YC 870985. 19 January, Troop B ARP was inserted on a suspected enemy location Vic FSB Musket. From 20-27 January, Troop B worked in the area of the Reung Reung Valley YC 8584 supporting Co L Rangers. 30 January, Troop B operations moved to Quang Tri to support operations Dewey Canyon II vicinity Khe Sanh. 9 February, Troop B inserted five Ranger teams. 10 February, Troop B lost 2 Loh aircraft. The first while on convoy cover in the Hai Van Pass. Troop B ARP was inserted on the site and aircraft and crew were extracted. The second was shot down in the A Shau Valley by 12.7mm Anti-Aircraft fire. The aircraft was destroyed and the crew are listed as MIA. From 11-14 February, Troop B worked the Division recon zone detecting enemy truck traffic and destroying a truck a bulldozer. 15 February, a UH1H on a night Ranger extraction crashed resulting in seven US KIA. On 16 February, five Ranger teams were extracted. From 19-20 February, Troop B supported Ranger teams and continued the Visual re-

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connaissance in the recon zone. 21 February, an AHIG indirect support of a Ranger contact fired too close to friendly troops, resulting in one KIA and two WIA. The team was extracted. 24 February, a Troop B Loh suffered a tree strike and set down on FSB Tomahawk. The aircraft was recovered. 25 February, Troop B extracted a Ranger team with PCW Vic YD 719901. 26-27 February, Troop B secured for extraction of two aircraft Vic YD 719901 and YD 531132. 28 February, Troop B conducted Visual reconnaissance in the Division recon zone mapping enemy infiltration routes and directing air strikes in the A Shau Valley. 1-31 March, Troop B worked in the Division recon zone conducting Visual reconnaissance, checking sensor activations and URS reports. 5-6 March, Troop B ARP secured a downed AHIG at YD 865211 and a UH1H at YD 391361. 13 March, an Loh received an unknown amount of 12.7mm Anti-Aircraft and SAF Vic YD 199129. The aircraft crashed and burned resulting in two US MIA. 14-17 March, Troop B ARP secured a downed UH1H Vic YC 727143 and an AHIG at YD 357472. 22 March, Troop B ARP secured a downed AHIG at YD 961162. 24 March, extracted Ranger teams 19s and 19w when team became in contact. 29 March, Pink team coverage was provided for downed UH1H at YD 030025. 30 March, Troop B ARP was inserted at YD 513031 to reinforce Ranger team 19h in the capture of 2 NVA POW's. During the entire reporting period additional missions included BDA of airstrikes and Arc Lights and limited ground reconnaissance.

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c. During the 1 January to 31 January reporting period, Troop C staged from Phu Bai Army Airfield participating in Jefferson Glenn operations, in general support of the 101st Airborne Division, with a primary mission of intelligence gathering through Visual reconnaissance. 1-10 January, Monsoon weather prohibited extensive reconnaissance of the Division recon zone. 11-30 January, was marked by improving weather which enabled Troop C to continue the Visual reconnaissance of the Division recon zone. A heavy increase in enemy activity was noted during this period around the Aloui airstrip and west of Tiger Mountain. An estimated NVN company was pin pointed. A "Cavalry Cobra" raid was launched and a BDA in the fifteen foot high elephant grass revealed 3 NVA KBN. It is felt that better results were obtained than those indicated by the HDA, as the team was able to silence rather intense fire in the area. During this period Troop C reacted with its Aero Rifle Platoon to five downed aircraft. Additionally Troop C supported three Ranger teams in contact. From 1-4 February Troop C staged from Phu Bai Airfield. From 5 February to 28 February, it staged from Khe Sanh combat base. 8 February, 0743 hours the Troop C commander, Major James T. Newman led the first heavy Cav team into Laos in support of the Vietnamese Rangers. 12 February, Troop C lost two AHIG's to hostile fire on the Laotian border. One crew is listed as MIA. The second crew was extracted. The area of the contact was engaged by Artillery, TAC AIR and one B52 strike. 18 February, the Troop commander extracted four or five Americans from a downed Dustoff aircraft, while the Ranger firebase was under heavy small arms, Anti-Aircraft fire and Mortars. Additionally on the 18th an Loh was shot down and it exploded. The crew is still listed as MIA. The remainder of the month of February was spent in a primary role of screening for extraction of Vietnamese Ranger firebases and working firebases 30 and 31. 1-31 March, Troop C staged out of Khe Sanh com-

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bat base in general support of Lam Son 719. During this period Troop C ARF manned a portion of the Khe Sanh perimeter. The ARVN movement of their forces enabled the Troop to resume it's full time job of reconnaissance. Troop C was assigned recon zone that extended westward to Techepone and to the north of Highway 9. After the ground objectives had been reached and withdrawal began, Troop C began close support by screening PZ's and reconnaissance of flights routes. The Troop also acted in resupply capacity on occasion during this period.

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d. In the period of 1-28 January, Troop D performed it's assigned missions of Eagle Reaction Force, Perimeter Defense and acted as immediate Reaction Force with Troop(-) to all insertions of any Squadron Aero Rifle Platoon. 1-4 January, overflights of the perimeter defenses were made with respect to possible enemy routes of infiltration, and possible ambush sites. Reports submitted covering this activity indicated areas of possible improvement. 28 January, warning order for movement to Quang Tri was issued. Troop was to further prepare to carry out combat operations. 2 February, Troop D made a combat assault Vic XD 854238, to conduct a ground bomb damage assessment (BDA) and a ground reconnaissance of the surrounding area that had been tentatively identified as a NVA headquarters complex. The Troop was extracted at 031500 hrs at XD 854238 and XD 848236, FZ's were green, 4 February, Troop D moved to Khe Sanh combat base in support of Lam Son 719, Headquarters (-) by convoy and two platoons by air. 5-14 February, Troop D hardened the perimeter defenses. Bunkers, fighting positions and overhead cover were given priority. 15 February, Troop D was given the responsibility of security for the rearm refuel point at La Cau, XD 814368, and at this time assumed control of the Aero Rifle Platoons of the assigned and opcon Air Cav Troops. Ambush and sweep operations in the Squadron AO were accomplished as part of the perimeter defense plan through 14 March. 15 March, Khe Sanh combat base began to receive daily Artillery attacks by NVA 122mm field guns. 23 March, at 0230 hrs, Troop D repulsed a Sapper attack by the 2nd Co 15th NVA Engineer Battalion. This 40 man attack, supported by indirect fire, 60mm Mortars, and RPG's penetrated the 3rd Platoon position in it's attempt to reach the airfield FOL and rearm points. The enemy broke contact at 0645 hours. A first light check revealed 14 NVA KIA, 1 POW, 9 AK-50's, 3 RPG launchers and one

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9mm pistol captured along with numerous small arms ammunition and demolition equipment. An additional 6 NVA are estimated KIA. (Bodies were recovered by retreating enemy). US losses were 3 KIA, 5 WIA major, 13 WIA minor. 27 March, Troop D was given order to return to Quang Tri. Area was evacuated in approximately 1 hour with minimum exposure to possible indirect fire, attack. 28 March to the end of the reporting period Troop D acted as the Squadron Reaction Force for downed aircraft and crew security.

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## 2. Lessons Learned:

a. Personnel None

b. Intelligence None

c. Operations

1. Use of the McGuire Rig

2. The OH6A as a Scout vehicle

3. Marking capability for C&amp;C aircraft and Scouts

d. Organization

1. The Air Force Tactical Air Control Party

2. The Squadron Flight Surgeon


e. Training

1. Helicopter touchdown autorotation

f. Logistics None

g. Communications None

h. Material None



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## c. Operations

## 1. Use of the McGuire Rig for extraction.

a. Observation: Careful consideration of all factors of aircraft flight must be considered prior to committing an air crew to a McGuire extraction.

b. Evaluation: The loss of a Troop B UH1H executing a McGuire extraction during marginal weather conditions at night, brought the McGuire Rig into focus. It's inherent limitations, instability and not being able to draw the extracted person into the aircraft cabin area suspect cause of the accident mentioned.


c. Recommendation: That whenever possible, the use of the McGuire Rig be utilized as the low priority method of extraction. Medivac support is decidedly more advantageous, both in terms of immediate medical attention and safety.

## 2. The CH6A as a Scout Vehicle.

a. Observation: The OH6A and other observation type helicopters are, from a doctrinal point of view, the eyes of the Division.

b. Evaluation: The Observation helicopter asset is presently constituted, provides a very minimally effective capability of reconnaissance in Anti Aircraft weapon environment. The Anti-Aircraft weapons faced during Lam Son 719 can hardly be classified as technically sophisticated, with many of them bearing design and manufacture dates in the late 1930's and early 1940's. Yet by sound tactical employment, and aggressive techniques, the enemy was able to effectively limit our observation capability with the CH6A because of it's inability to survive hits by other than a small caliber weapon.

c. Recommendation: The AHIG proved to be an effective observation helicopter when pressed into service in this role. It's success could be incorporated into the next generation of observation helicopters intended for use



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in a reconnaissance role. A moveable turret firing to both sides is a must. This alone will enable the scout to surprise immediately, without flying towards the target. This very critical time between receiving fire and the acquisition of the target by the escort gunship is the difference many times between survival and casualty. Additionally, consideration must be given to providing some protection to the crew, of the most vulnerable member of the Cav team.

### 3. Marking Capability for C&C aircraft and Scouts.

a. Observation: As presently employed the C&C aircraft and scout must mark targets, LZ's, PZ's with a smoke grenade.

b. Evaluation: In the fast moving environment of Lam Son 719 where Anti aircraft positions were numerous and well concealed, a rapid marking capability is required. To take the time to verbally describe the target to the supporting elements, whether it be organic gunships, ARA or an Air Force FAC is too slow. Valuable time is lost in the transition of your sight picture to that of the supporting fires. The C&C aircraft who from an employment standpoint, should stay high to provide a good overview, is forced to descend into the action to mark, with the attendant degrading of his primary function. The scout on the other hand must overfly a hostile area, if he is to use smoke grenades to mark relative positions.

c. Recommendations: That C&C aircraft and scouts are afforded the, "state of the art", provisions to mark targets or positions with some degree of standoff.

### d. Organization

#### 1. The Air Force Tactical Air Control Party (TACP).

a. Observation: The employment of a Forward Air Controller (FAC) with

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the Cav team in Laos was infinity successful in a "hunter killer" role.

b. In a combat enviroment, close coordination must be made between complementing arms of the United States Military. The Cav team concept of Visual reconnaissance and target acquisition is a proven formula. On the other hand, many hard targets prove to be stubborn for the Cav team to destroy, with organic fire power. The Cav team working with FAC can bring fire power to bear on these targets that is appropriate. The Cav team and FAC are mutually supporting and provide each other protection. This close working relationship was made possible only after the 2/17 Cav had a TACP attached. The TACP was instrumental in working out the minute coordination details that spell success.

c. Recommendation: Consideration be given to the attachment of a small TACP, with organic communication equipment, to the Air Cavalry Squardon when it is anticipated that TAC AIR will be employed by the Cav team. Ample precedent exists to support this recommendation.

## 2. The Squadron Flight Surgeon

a. Observation: The work load of the Squadron Flight Surgeon is unwieldy.

b. Evaluation: The medical work load coupled with the professional administrative requirements are in excess of the capacity of one mans ability to fulfill.

c. Recommendation: The addition of a professionally competent Medical Service Corps Officer would ease the administrative work load sufficient to enable the Flight Surgeon to perform his primary duties more expeditiously.

## 3. Training

## a. Helicopter touchdown autorotations

1. Observation: Aircraft are being subjected to accident producing manuevers, while ostensibly training to prevent accidents.

2. Evaluation: Several helicopter accidents have resulted locally from the

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determination to be proficient in an emergency maneuver that exposes the aircraft and crew to critical flight envelope. The touchdown autorotation, while necessary in the initial checkout in an aircraft, has questionable value as a continuing repetitive requirement.

3. Recommendation: Available data from USABAAR and Headquarters USARV be screened to provide a data base. This data base to then be used to determine the feasibility of eliminating the touchdown autorotation as a check ride maneuver, when not performing transition training or instructor pilot qualification.

*William P. Stubbs*  
William P. Stubbs  
Cpt S-3

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## 2. Lessons Learned:

a. Personnel	None
b. Intelligence	None
c. Operations	
1. Use of the McGuire Rig	
2. The CH6A as a Scout vehicle	
3. Marking capability for C&C aircraft and Scouts	
d. Organization	
1. The Air Force Tactical Air Control Party	
2. The Squadron Flight Surgeon	
e. Training	
1. Helicopter touchdown autorotation	
f. Logistics	None
g. Communications	None
h. Material	None

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
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a. Observation: The OH6A and other observation type helicopters are, from a doctrinal point of view, the eyes of the Division.

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c. Recommendation: The AHIG proved to be an effective observation helicopter when pressed into service in this role. Its success could be incorporated into the next generation of observation helicopters intended for use



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c. Recommendations: That C&C aircraft and scouts are afforded the, "state of the art", provisions to mark targets or positions with some degree of standoff.

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a. Observation: The employment of a Forward Air Controller (FAC) with

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b. In a combat enviroment, close coordination must be made between complementing arms of the United States Military. The Cav team concept of Visual reconnaissance and target acquisition is a proven formula. On the other hand, many hard targets prove to be stubborn for the Cav team to destroy, with organic fire power. The Cav team working with FAC can bring fire power to bear on these targets that is appropriate. The Cav team and FAC are mutually supporting and provide each other protection. This close working relationship was made possible only after the 2/17 Cav had a TACP attached. The TACP was instrumental in working out the minute coordination details that spell success.

c. Recommendation: Consideration be given to the attachment of a small TACP, with organic communication equipment, to the Air Cavalry Squardon when it is anticipated that TAC AIR will be employed by the Cav team. Ample precedent exists to support this recommendation.

## 2. The Squardon Flight Surgeon

a. Observation: The work load of the Squardon Flight Surgeon is unwieldy.

b. Evaluation: The medical work load coupled with the professional administrative requirements are in excess of the capacity of one mans ability to fulfill.

c. Recommendation: The addition of a professionally competent Medical Service Corps Officer would ease the administrative work load sufficient to enable the Flight Surgeon to perform his primary duties more expeditiously.

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a. Helicopter touchdown autorotations

1. Observation: Aircraft are being subjected to accident producing manuevers, while ostensibly training to prevent accidents.

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3. Recommendation: Available data from USABAAR and Headquarters USARV be screened to provide a data base. This data base to then be used to determine the feasibility of eliminating the touchdown autorotation as a check ride maneuver, when not performing transition training or instructor pilot qualification.

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connaissance in the recon zone. 21 February, an AHIG indirect support of a Ranger contact fired too close to friendly troops, resulting in one KIA and two WIA. The team was extracted. 24 February, a Troop B Loh suffered a tree strike and set down on FSB Tomahawk. The aircraft was recovered. 25 February, Troop B extracted a Ranger team with POW Vic YD 719901. 26-27 February, Troop B secured for extraction of two aircraft Vic YD 719901 and YD 531132. 28 February, Troop B conducted Visual reconnaissance in the Division recon zone mapping enemy infiltration routes and directing air strikes in the A Shau Valley. 1-31 March, Troop B worked in the Division recon zone conducting Visual reconnaissance, checking sensor activations and URS reports. 5-6 March, Troop B ARP secured a downed AHIG at YD 865211 and a UH1H at YD 391361. 13 March, an Loh received an unknown amount of 12.7mm Anti-Aircraft and SAF Vic YD 199129. The aircraft crashed and burned resulting in two US MIA. 14-17 March, Troop B ARP secured a downed UH1H Vic YC 727143 and an AHIG at YD 357472. 22 March, Troop B ARP secured a downed AHIG at YD 961162. 24 March, extracted Ranger teams 19s and 19w when team became in contact. 29 March, Pink team coverage was provided for downed UH1H at YD 030025. 30 March, Troop B ARP was inserted at YD 513031 to reinforce Ranger team 19h in the capture of 2 NVA POW's. During the entire reporting period additional missions included BDA of airstrikes and Arc Lights and limited ground reconnaissance.

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(C) c. During the 1 January to 31 January reporting period, Troop C staged from Phu Bai Army Airfield participating in Jefferson Glenn operations, in general support of the 101st Airborne Division, with a primary mission of intelligence gathering through Visual reconnaissance. 1-10 January, Monsoon weather prohibited extensive reconnaissance of the Division recon zone. 11-30 January, was marked by improving weather which enabled Troop C to continue the Visual reconnaissance of the Division recon zone. A heavy increase in enemy activity was noted during this period around the Aloui airstrip and West of Tiger Mountain. An estimated NVN company was pinpointed. A "Cavalry, Cobra" raid was launched and a HDA in the fifteen foot high elephant grass revealed 3 NVA KBH. It is felt that better results were obtained than those indicated by the HDA, as the team was able to silence rather intense fire in the area. During this period Troop C reacted with its Aero Rifle Platoon to five downed aircraft. Additionally Troop C supported three Ranger teams in contact. From 1-4 February Troop C staged from Phu Bai Airfield. From 5 February to 28 February, it staged from Khe Sanh combat base. 8 February, 0743 hours the Troop C commander, Major James T. Newman led the first heavy Cav team into Laos in support of the Vietnamese Rangers. 12 February, Troop C lost two AHIG's to hostile fire on the Lactian border. One crew is listed as MIA. The second crew was extracted. The area of the contact was engaged by Artillery, TAC AIR and one B52 strike. 18 February, the Troop commander extracted four or five Americans from a downed Dustoff aircraft, while the Ranger firebase was under heavy small arms, Anti-Aircraft fire and Mortars. Additionally on the 18th an Loh was shot down and it exploded. The crew is still listed as MIA. The remainder of the month of February was spent in a primary role of screening for extraction of Vietnamese Ranger firebases and working firebases 30 and 31. 1-31 March, Troop C staged out of Khe Sanh com-


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bat base in general support of Lam Son 719. During this period Troop C ARK manned a portion of the Khe Sanh perimeter. The ARVN movement of their forces enabled the Troop to resume it's full time job of reconnaissance. Troop C was assigned recon zone that extended westward to Techepane and to the north of Highway 9. After the ground objectives had been reached and withdrawal began, Troop C began close support by screening PZ's and reconnaissance of flights routes. The Troop also acted in resupply capacity on occasion during this period.



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light was completed with satisfactory results noted.

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(D) 2-3 February, Troop A conducted VR of RT 616, extracted two Ranger teams and inserted two others. Troop D was inserted to accomplish ground reconnaissance of RT 616. 4 February, Troop A ARP was inserted into Khe Sanh combat base, to secure the arrival of Troop D and Squadron HQ. 4-7 February bad weather precluded normal operations. 8 February, Troop A crossed the Lao tian border. Aircraft reported shot-ats with three aircraft reporting hits and aircraft flyable. 10 February, worked area West of Khe Sanh utilizing FAC and ARA. An Loh and AHIG were shot down, crews were extracted. Aircraft were destroyed by the crash. Seven NVA were KBH. 12-17 February were spent in support of ARVN ground elements operating in Laos. Troop A worked with FAC controlled Tac Air, ARA and it's organic gun ships to supress enemy Anti-Aircraft fire, while teams continued their missions of VR for the ground forces. Approximately 16 NVA were KBH. 18-25 February, Troop A was engaged in it's assigned missions of VR and close screen to the ground forces. Weather during this period frequently delayed missions until 1100-1200 hrs. 26 February, Troop A had visual sighting on enemy armor. Two active tanks were sighted and an AHIG received 15 hits in the process of flying VR in the vicinity of LZ 31. 27-28 February, Troop A alternated with Troop C and Squadron Co as C&C to recover an Loh that had been shot down Vic XD 6225. Three 12.7mm Anti-Aircraft weapons were located in the area. 1 March, employed airstrikes against known and suspected enemy locations. 2-3 March, inclement weather prevented combat operations. 4-6 March, supported ARVNS at LZ Sophia and LZ Victory, employed TAC AIR and artillery on known positions. 6 March, Hac Bao were inserted to secure a downed crew at Vic XD 478 409. 7 March, Hac Bao and downed crew were extracted under heavy 12.7mm Anti-Aircraft fire from three weapons. One AHIG received 4 hits and returned

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to base where it was determined to be non flyable. A truck (5 ton) was destroyed and a bulldozer spotted. Area was marked for a FAC. 8-10 March in inclement weather prevented combat operations. 11 March, Troop A conducted a VR of LZ Aloui, LZ Bravo, LZ Alpha and LZ Hotel to determine condition. Sighted 5 2½ ton trucks and marked for a FAC. ARA was utilized on selected targets. 12-13 March, Troop A missions were VR and screen Vic LZ Sophia. 14-15 March, inclement weather prevented combat operations. 16-23 March, Troop A supported the 1st ARVN Division vicinity of LZ Brown with heavy teams. Air strikes were employed and remaining targets were turned over to the FAC on station. During this period an AHIG was shot down by small arms fire Vic XD 439405. Crew was extracted. Tanks were sighted on 19 March and were marked for the FAC. 24 March, continued support to 1st ARVN Division with heavy Cav teams. Marginal weather on 25 March prevented working in the AO until 1400 hrs. Route recon of 616 revealed no significant spots and no traffic, past three days. 26-28 March, Troop A performed in Visual recon role in the Lao tian and Vietnamese Salient areas to spot possible targets of opportunity. Heavy small arms fire was received throughout the area of interest. 29-30 March, supported insertion of ARVN near XD 6802. And performed VR in Lao tian Salient.