THE ARMED FORCES OFFICER

ARMED FORCES INFORMATION SERVICE
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

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INTRODUCTION

When the original, hard cover edition of this work first appeared in November, 1950, it opened with a brief prefatory note: "This manual on leadership has been prepared for use by the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force, and is published for the information and guidance of all concerned."

The note was signed, "G. C. Marshall." The late General Marshall was then serving as Secretary of Defense. Some years earlier, when he was mountainously burdened as Army Chief of Staff, he had inspired the undertaking, due to his personal conviction that American military officers, of whatever Service, should share common ground ethically and morally. The idea was passed along for action to his successor, the late General Dwight D. Eisenhower.

This new and revised edition, while holding with the purpose initially outlined, is modified by an additional quarter century of national experience. Those who are truly concerned hopefully will get some guidance from it. The object at hand is to update the writing and not to reflect on lessons learned, which is a task for the angels. The bygone 25 years was no halcyon glide for the Armed Services and their leaders. If today's problems seem vast and nigh unprecedented, that does not make the times unique. Who now remembers when the American military officer could stack arms and still get by? Difficulty is a challenge, not an excuse, and there is much to be done. A more stable, more peaceful world may be in the making, but it will not arrive unassisted. The only way the United States can have a reasonable chance of staying out of war is by doing its part to keep war from breaking out. Ready military forces in sufficient numbers are the prerequisite of prevention, and the test of professionalism among officers must be the readiness of all forces.

Then too, by gaining a surer sense of direction, the officer body may contribute splendidly to the healing of the Nation's spirit and the restoration of its unity. Here is a prime and compelling obligation. Toward that end, no special magic, secret formula or professional panacea is proposed. Mansions are not raised by people besieged by doubt or soured by cynicism. Love of country is still the only possible refuge for intelligent American men and women in service; it is their sword

and shield and the emblem of their advance. Everything that enters into the making of truly superior military officers would qualify them to live more generously and rewardingly in any other company. That, essentially, is what this manual has to say. Hardly a new and radically different treatment of the subject, it is at least as old as the American Dream.

S. L. A. Marshall

Chapter 1

THE MEANING OF YOUR COMMISSION

To begin, the American qualifying to be an officer in the Nation's Armed Services takes an oath to uphold the Constitution of the United States against all enemies foreign and domestic, to bear true faith and allegiance and to discharge well and faithfully the duties of office.

For men and women alike, the commitment is absolute and permits of no mental or moral reservation.

Upon being sworn, the new officer is given a paper stating that the President has vested him or her with authority, having reposed "special trust and confidence" in the "patriotism, valor, fidelity and abilities" of that individual.

By these tokens, the Nation becomes a party to the contract. The device that is worn, the insignia and the uniform, identify the person with the power of the United States. Serving honorably, the officer will be sustained by the Nation, cared for through illness, shielded through life if disabled in service. Should the holder of the commission seek improved professional skills through higher studies, the Nation will support that ambition.

Toward no other profession within the society does the Nation express its obligation more fully, which is as it should be. Yet most Americans view this special status of the military officer with pride rather than envy. They agree with the principle that some unusual advantage should attend exceptional and unremitting responsibility.

The traditional esteem of the average citizen for the military officer is a major ingredient, indeed a prerequisite, of the national security. The Armed Services have recognized this since the time of Valley Forge. That is why there is such extreme emphasis on the imperative of personal honor in the military officer: not only the future of our arms but the well-being of our people depend upon a constant reaffirmation and strengthening of public faith in the virtue and trustworthiness of the officer body. Should that faith flag and finally fail, the citizenry would be reluctant to commit its young people to any military endeavor, however grave the emergency. The works of goodwill by which leaders of our military seek to win the trust and approval of the people are in that direct sense a preservative of our

American freedoms. By the same reasoning, high character in the military officer is a safeguard of the character of the Nation. Anything less than exemplary conduct is therefore unworthy of the commission.

Still, we must deal candidly with the hard realities. The officer body, being of human stuff, is not without fault, folly and failing. Furthermore, the public affection, while hardly fickle, is not so constant that there need be no concern about rewinning it through merit and greater dedication to duty.

Unfair though it may seem, any egregious failure of trust by a military officer builds up to a national scandal and reflects unduly on the officer body as a whole. Moreover, the military officer must suffer some loss in public favor from any national experience in war that stirs widespread dissent, protest and antimilitary clamor. For example, in the post-Vietnam period his prestige may have declined temporarily, consequent to these ill effects. But this is nothing new in our history. Between the Civil War and the 1898 war with Spain, the military was in worse disfavor, due to the unpopularity of the wars with the Plains Indians. Fortunately, there is always enough common sense and moral stamina in the officer corps for it to rise from such sloughs strengthened by the experience. The American military must but try the harder to preserve tradition, elevate standards and keep the trust when least loved—the way to solve a difficult problem hardly being to transfer one's attention to an insoluble one.

To these thoughts any new officer who is truly worthy of his commission should willingly subscribe. He will look beyond the letter of his obligation and will accept in his heart the total implications of his responsibility as an exemplar of dutifulness—the loyal leader and the faithful follower.

Easily said but hard to do, and were it otherwise, it would not be worth reflection. The newly-commissioned person, somewhat puzzled by it, might be inclined to reply: "My spirit is willing enough. But to what do I turn my thoughts? How do I comport myself so that while being obedient to duty, I may by example inspire others to make their best effort?" Here is a good question.

There is a one-word key to the answer among the four lofty qualities cited on every military officer's commission. That word is *fidelity*. As for *patriotism*, either an American loves his country or he would not seek commission at its hands, unless he be completely the rascal, pretending to serve only to work injury. *Valor*, on the other hand, cannot be fully vouchsafed, since it is not given to any person to know the depths or limits of his own courage. *Abilities* vary from person to person, and are partly what heredity and environment have made them. If nature had not imposed a ceiling, intellect or even genius might derive from mere striving.

Fidelity, on the other hand, because it comes of personal decision,

is the jewel within reach of every officer who has the will to possess it. It is the epitome of character, and fortunately no other quality in the individual is more readily recognized and honored by one's military associates. Given an officer body composed throughout of men and women who would try lastingly to better their professional capacities and further the efficiency and harmony within all forces, the Nation would become thrice-armed.

Great faith, rightness of mind, influence over other people, and finally, personal success and satisfaction come of service to the ideals of the profession. Let these strengths become reflected throughout the officer body and it may well happen that, due to their shining examples, the American people will grow more conscious of the need to keep strong their own faith and fiber.

But if the newly-commissioned officer accepts all of these somewhat platitudinous propositions as self-evident truths, there still may persist doubt as to (a) whether such high standards are compatible with the ultimate purpose of fighting forces, and (b) wherein the role of the military officer differs from authority over other persons in civilian life.

As to the fundamental, the qualified U. S. military officer is rated a gentle person, not by act of Congress, nor because it has been the custom of the people to afford him that deference, but specifically because none but a gentle person is fitted for his very special responsibilities. That is to say that, while the status is not conferred by the commission, the more perfect way to honor the uniform is to be the lady or the gentleman. How one holds one's self is, after all, a matter of personal choice.

This is not a piece of romanticism: it is distinctly the American tradition. In contrast to the countries of Europe, the United States has never sought to draw its officers from a particular class. In the four large wars of this century, thousands of Americans were commissioned who had had no real opportunity in their earlier environments. Conspicuously, some were commissioned in World War II even though they had never graduated from grade school or received formal education later. They were sound by nature. They had courage and common sense. Setting the good example, they could rally other men around them. Respecting authority, they also won it. It was not simply accidental that ultimately some of these individuals achieved star rank, since in the eyes of the Services, the wholeness and the integrity of the person counts more than his bloodlines. We say with Voltaire, "Whoever serves his country well has no need of ancestors."

Consistently, from the time of the Colonies, this Nation has abhorred press gangs, floggings, group punishments, martinetism and all of the other Old World military practices that demean the rank and file. Its military system was founded on the dignity of man just as was its Constitution. The system has sought always to advance itself by appealing to the higher nature of the individual. That is why its com-

missioned people need be gentle folk. To call forth steadfast loyalty in others and to enlist it in any high endeavor, one must first be sensible of their worthiest instincts and feelings.

Among the precepts, or gentle qualities, desired in every military officer of the United States are therefore these:

1. Dedication to human rights.
2. Respect for the dignity of the individual.
3. Fair play to all and favoritism toward none.
4. An active concern for all aspects of human welfare.
5. The will to deal with every person as considerately as if he were a blood relative.

Only the strong can hold to these principles. But there is no more certain measure of a person's capability to pursue a high purpose undeviatingly despite all temptation.

There is the other question: How should the military officer regard his profession? Simply to agree that the bearing of arms is highly honorable because the book so says is not enough if some reflection will make clear where the honor lies. To any officer who ponders this subject it should become apparent that civilization, as men have known it since history's dawn, has rested as a pyramid on a base of organized military power. There is no prospect of relief from this inheritance in our time. The unremitting drive of the Soviet Union toward preponderant war might brings into the open the military terms of the struggle for survivial. Short of agreement on controlled disarmament, either we stay armed in strength to safeguard the frontiers of freedom or we face the probability that all other resources will fail us.

Furthermore, for any military person to deny the role his profession has played in bringing about all that is best in the American present shows only a faulty understanding of the past. Our fighting people made possible the birth of our system of freedoms. Later they gave the Nation a new birth. Out of their blood and sweat came the more perfect union.

One may abhor war as deeply as did Walt Whitman, despise militarism absolutely, deplore every weakness or other impulse in man's imperfect nature that makes force necessary, and still agree that for the world as we know it the main hope is that peace-loving peoples will stay strong enough to deter aggression. It does not make the military person any less the humanitarian that he accepts this reality, that he faces toward the chance forthrightly, and that he believes that if all military power were stricken tomorrow, men would revert to a state of anarchy and there would ensue the total defeat of the forces that are trying to establish peace and brotherly love in our lives.

The complete identity of American military forces with the character of the people comes of this indivisibility of interest. To think of

the military as a guardian class apart, like Lynkeus "born for vision, ordained for watching," rather than as a strong right arm, corporately joined to the body and sharing its every function, is historically false and politically inaccurate. It is not unusual, however, for those whose task it is to interpret the trend of opinion to take the line that "the military" are thinking one way and "the people" quite another on some particular issue, as if to imply that the two are quite separate and of different nature. This is usually inaccurate in detail, and always misleading in general. It not only discounts the objects of their unity but overlooks the truth of its origins.

Maybe such critics should be invited to go to the root of the word. The true meaning of "populus," from which we get the word "people," was the "armed body" in the time of ancient Rome. The Roman in the days of the Republic could not conceive of a citizen who was not a warrior. It was the arms which a Roman's possession of land enabled him to get that qualified him to participate in the affairs of state. He had no political rights until he had fought. Nor is this concept alien to the ideals on which the Founding Fathers built the American system, since they stated it as the right and duty of every able-bodied citizen to bear arms. The Reserve Act of 1955 was a reaffirmation and direct application of that principle. Toward maintaining a sufficient armed force during a time of world crisis, it specified a period, beyond active service, wherein the returned individual would remain obligated for periodic training and subject to immediate call.

These points should mean much to every American who has chosen the military profession. A main point is that on becoming an officer the individual does not renounce any part of his fundamental character as an American citizen. He has simply signed on for the postgraduate course where one learns how to exercise authority in accordance with the spirit of liberty. The nature of his trusteeship has been subtly expressed by an American admiral: "The American philosophy places the individual above the state. It distrusts personal power and coercion. It denies the existence of indispensable men. It asserts the supremacy of principle."

An understanding of American principles of life and growth, and personal zeal in upholding them, are the bedrock of sound leadership in our Services. Moral and emotional stability is expected of an American officer; he can usually satisfy his superiors if he attains this equilibrium. But he is not likely to satisfy himself unless he can also achieve that maturity of character which expresses itself in the ability to make decisions in detachment of spirit from that which is pleasant or unpleasant to him personally, in the desire to hold onto things not by grasping them but by understanding them and remembering them, and in learning to covet only that which may be rightfully possessed.

An occasional officer has become wealthy while in the Service by making wise investments, through writings, by skill at invention, or

through some other means. The majority has no such prospect. Indeed, if love of money were the mainspring of all American action, the officer corps long since would have disintegrated, though it is fortunately true that modern legislation has fairly well closed the long-standing gap between military pay and reward for comparable responsibility in civilian life. But it is well said that the only truly happy people on earth are those who are indifferent to money because they have some positive purpose which forecloses it. Other than the Service, there is no environment more conducive to the leading of the full life by the individual who is ready to accept the word of the philosopher that the only security on earth is the willingness to accept insecurity as an inevitable part of living. One thought should be added: There is no surer portal to inner peace than the knowledge that one is participating fully in moving forward the great undertakings of one's day. It is the cornerstone of character. Once an officer has made this passage into maturity, and feels whole because the Service means more to him than all else, he will find kinship with the great body of his brothers-in-arms.

An Air Force jet-fighter pilot who had barely finished training was called to fly from his Carolina base to Adana, Turkey, during the 1958 Lebanon crisis. With four minutes of fuel left, he barely made contact with the tanker over the Azores, then flew on. On landing, mission completed, he said: "In my worst moment, I suddenly realized that staying with my gang meant more than anything in the world." The highest possible consequence can develop from the feelings of men mutually inspired by some great endeavor and moving forward together according to the principle that only those who are willing to serve are fit to lead. Completely immersed in action, they have no time for smallness in speech, thought, or deed. It is for these reasons that those who in times past have excelled in the leadership of American forces have almost invariably been great Americans first and superior officers second. The rule applies at all levels. The lieutenant who is not moved at the thought that he is serving his country is unlikely to do an intelligent job of directing other men. He will come apart at the seams whenever the going grows tough. Until men accept this thought freely, and apply it to their personal action, it is not possible for them to go forward together strongly. In the words of the British writer, Lionel Curtis: "The only force that unites men is conscience, a varying capacity in most of them to put the interests of other people before their own."

The Services are accustomed to being hammered. Like other human institutions, they are imperfect. Therefore, the criticisms are not always unjust. Further, there is no more reason why the Services should be immune to attack than any other organic part of our society and government.

It is an explicable contradiction of the American birthright that to

some of our people the military establishment is at best a necessary evil, and military service is an extraordinary hardship rather than an inherent obligation. Yet these illusions are rooted deep in the American tradition, though it is a fact to be noted that, despite periodic setbacks, we are growing somewhat wiser as we move along. In the years following the American Revolution the new union of States tried to eliminate military forces altogether. There was vast confusion of thought as to what freedom required for its own survival. Thomas Jefferson, one of the great architects of democracy, and still renowned for his "isolationist" sentiments, wrote the warning: "We must train and classify the whole of our male citizens, and make military instruction a regular part of collegiate education. We can never be safe until this is done."

Nonetheless, the hour came when the standing Army was reduced on paper to 80 men; nonetheless, the quaint notion has survived that an enlightened interest in military affairs is somehow undemocratic; and nonetheless, the recurring war has invariably found the United States inadequately prepared for the defense of its own territory.

Because there has been a holdover of these mistaken sentiments right down to the present, there persists in some military officers a defensive attitude toward their own profession which has no practical relation to the strength of the ground on which they stand. Toward any unfair and flippant criticism of the "military mind" they react with resentment, instead of with buoyant proof that their own minds are as plastic and as receptive to national ideals as those of any other profession. Where they should approach all problems of the national security with the devotion of the missionary, seeking and giving light, they treat this subject as if it were a private game preserve.

It suffices to say of this minority that they are barnacles on the hull of an otherwise staunch vessel. From such limited concepts of personal responsibility there can not fail to develop a foreshortened view of the dignity of the task at hand. The note of apology is injected at the wrong time; the tone of belligerency is used when it serves no purpose. When someone arises within the halls of government to say that the military establishment is "uneconomic" because it cuts no bricks, bales no hay, and produces nothing that can be sold in the marketplace, it is not unusual to hear some military men concur in this strange notion. Such acquiescence is wholly unbecoming.

The physician is not slurred as belonging to a nonproductive profession because he contributes only to the care and healing of the body, and through these things to the general well-being of society. Respect for formal education, organized religion and all of the enterprises built up around the dissemination of ideas is not less because the resultant benefit to society is not always tangible and saleable. Hence to say that the military, without which society could not endure in its present form, is "uneconomic" is to make the word itself altogether meaningless.

In that inner power of courage and conviction, which wells from the spiritual integrity of the individual, lies the strength of democracy. As to their ability to produce toward these ends, the Armed Forces can stand on the record. When shortly after World War II a census was taken among the returned people, 60 percent said that they had been morally strengthened by their military service in the American uniform. About 30 percent had no opinion or felt that military life had not changed them one way or the other. A small number considered themselves damaged. This is an amazing testimony in light of the fact that only a small fraction of American youth is schooled to believe that any spiritual good can come of military service. As to what it signifies, those who take a wholly materialistic view of the objects of the Republic are entitled to call the military establishment "uneconomic." The Services will continue to hold with the idea that strong nationhood comes not of the making of gadgets but of the building of character.

We beget goodwill in others by giving it. We develop courage in our following mainly as a reflection of the courage we show in our own actions. These two qualities of mind and heart are of the essence of sound officership. One is of little avail without the other, and each helps to sustain the other. As to which is the stronger force in its impact upon other people, no truth is more certain than the words written by the psychologist and philosopher, William James: "Evident though the shortcomings of a man may be, if he is ready to give up his life for a cause, we forgive him everything. However inferior he may be to ourselves in other respects, if we cling to life while he throws it away like a flower, we bow to his superiority."

Theodore Roosevelt once said that if he had a son who refrained from any worthwhile action because of the fear of hurt to himself, he would disown him. Soon after his return to civilian life, General Dwight D. Eisenhower spoke of the worthwhileness of "living dangerously." An officer of the United States Armed Forces cannot go far wrong if he holds with these ideas. It is not the suitable profession for those who believe only in digging-in and nursing a soft snap until death comes at a ripe old age. Who risks nothing gains nothing.

Nor should there be any room in it for professional smugness, small jealousies, and undue concern about privilege.

The Regular recognizes as his peer and comrade the officer from any of the Reserve components. That he is a professional does not give him a special eminence, but simply a larger measure of responsibility for the success of the total establishment. Moreover, he cannot afford to be patronizing without risking self-embarrassment, such is the vast experience which many Reservists have had on the active field of war.

Toward Services other than his own, any officer is expected to have both a comradely feeling and an imaginative interest. Any Army officer is a better person for having studied the works of Admiral Mahan

and familiarized himself with the modern Navy from first-hand experience. Those who lead sea-going forces can enlarge their own capacities by knowing more, rather than less, about the nature of the air and ground establishments. The submariner can always learn something useful to his own work by mingling with airmen; the airman becomes a better officer as he grows in qualified knowledge of ground and sea fighting.

But the fact remains that the Services are not alike. Unification has not altered this basic fact. The first requirement of a unified establishment is moral soundness in each of the integral parts, lacking which there can be no soundness at all.

Our military efforts in the nuclear age would be largely futile, and probably would bring on disastrous failures, if not undertaken with unity of purpose and action. Unified and specified commands have been created to achieve this unity. These commands are inter-Service organizations in the fullest sense, with the President and Secretary of Defense exercising direct operational control over them through the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

An officer assigned to a unified or specified command becomes part of an Armed Forces team and must give wholehearted support and paramount loyalty to the common enterprise. Nonetheless, he remains a member of his parent Service. Assignment to a unified or specified command should in no way or degree diminish his loyalty and pride in his Service or his fidelity to its traditions.

Chapter 2

FORMING MILITARY IDEALS

Any stranger making a survey of what Americans are and how they get that way would probably see it as a paradox that within the military establishment the inculcation of ideals is considered the most vital of all teaching, while in our gentler and less rigid institutions there is steadily less emphasis on this subject.

He would be entitled to the explanation that it is done not because this has always been the way of armies, navies, and other fighting forces, nor because it is universal in the military establishments of the twentieth century, but because nothing else would better suffice the American military system under present conditions.

There are two main reasons why.

The first is that we are an altogether unregimented people, with a strong belief in the virtues of rugged individualism and in the right of the average man to go along about as he pleases, so long as he does not do actual injury to society. Voluntary group cooperation rather than absolute group loyalty, developing from a strong spiritual bond, is the basic technique of Americans in their average life. It is enough to satisfy the social, political, and economic needs of a democracy, but in its military parts, it would be fatally weak. There would be no possibility of achieving an all-compelling unity under conditions of utmost pressure if no man felt any higher call to action than what was put upon him by purely material considerations.

Military ideals are therefore, as related to this purpose, mainly an instrument of national survival. But not altogether so, since in the measure that they influence the personal life and conduct of millions of men who move in and out of the Services, they have a regenerative effect upon the spiritual fiber of the Nation as a whole.

There is the second and equally important reason that whereas wars have sometimes been fought for ideal causes, as for example the American Revolution and the Civil War, war itself is never ideal, and the character of our people is such as to insist that on our side, its brutalities be minimized. When that rule is violated and there occurs senseless, orgiastic slaughter in the conduct of military operations, the excess is not more shocking to the public than to people in service. Any such incident must be charged to a failure in leadership. That there have

been such episodes, some of them recent, in which Americans afield have behaved barbarously, is undeniable. On the other hand, that they have been so few bespeaks soundness and decency in the American military character. The leader who lusts to kill for the sake of killing is not fit to command.

To speak of ethics, however, in the same breath with war may seem sheer cant and hypocrisy. But in the possibility that those who best understand the use and nature of armed power may excel all others in stimulating that higher morality which may some day restrain war lies a main chance for the future. The Armed Services of the United States encourage their people to take a deep personal interest in every activity that furthers the prospect of world peace without jeopardy to human liberty. But while so doing, they keep their powder dry.

To protect freedom's frontiers, Americans today do military duty in such faraway, difficult areas as Korea, Greenland and the Central Pacific atolls. Others on home guard, such as the crews manning isolated stations, stand duty rounds duller than any in our past, with less variety of work and little appeal to the imagination. Isolation, loneliness, long-term separation from a familiar environment, and monotonous watch-guard duty are a heavy load on morale. They become tolerable only when better men find themselves part of a dedicated company, which is another way of saying that service to ideals excludes pursuit of the soft life.

Military ideals are not different from the ideals that make any man sound in himself and in his relation to others. They are called military ideals only because the proving ground is a little more rugged in the Service than elsewhere. But they are all founded in hard military experience; they did not find expression because some admiral got it in his head one day to set an unattainable goal for his men, or because some general wished to turn a pious face toward the public, professing that his men were aspiring to greater virtue than anything the public knew.

The military way is a long, hard road, and it makes extraordinary requirements of every individual. In war, particularly, it puts stresses upon men such as they have not known elsewhere, and the temptation to "get out from under" would be irresistible if their spirits had not been tempered to the ordeal. If nothing but fear of punishment were depended upon to hold men to the line during extreme trial, the result would be wholesale mutiny and a situation altogether beyond the control of leadership. So it must be true that it is out of the impact of ideals mainly that men develop the strength to face situations from which it would be normal to run away.

Also, during the normal routine of peace, members of the Armed Services are expected to respond to situations that are more extensive, more complex, and take longer to reach fulfillment than the situations to which the majority of men instinctively respond. Even the length of the enlistment period looks like a slow march up a 60-mile

grade. Promotion is sometimes slow, duty sometimes monotonous. It is all too easy for the individual to worry about his own insignificance and to feel that he has become lost in the crowd. Under these conditions a man may go altogether bad, or simply get lazy and drift with the current. But nothing except a strong belief in the ideals he is serving will make him respond to the larger situation and give it his best effort. Ideals have the intensely practical end of strengthening men for the better discharge of the duties that devolve upon them in their day-to-day affairs.

What is the main test of human character? Probably it is this: that a man will know how to be patient in the midst of hard circumstance, and can continue to be personally effective while living through whatever discouragements beset him and his companions. Moreover, that is what every truly civilized man would want in himself during the calmer moments when he compares critically what he is inside with what he would like to be. That is specifically the reason why the promulgation of military ideals is initially a problem in the first person, singular. The Armed Services have in one sense a narrow motive in turning the thoughts of younger leaders toward a belief in ideals. They know that this is a lubricant in the machinery of organization and the best way to sweeten the lives of men working together in a group toward some worthwhile objective. But there is also a higher goal. All experience has taught that it is likewise the best way to give the individual man a solid foundation for living successfully amid the facts of existence, irrespective of his situation. The military system of the United States is not committed to grinding out warriors per se, but to the training of men and women in such manner that they will be able to play a better part anywhere, and will find greater satisfactions in what they do. All the time, when a Service seeks to emphasize to its ranks what is the "right thing to do," it is speaking of that course of conduct which in the long run is most necessary and useful to the individual.

As to what one person should seek in himself, in order to be foursquare with his own life and all others who are related to his personal situation, it is simple enough to formulate it and to describe what constitutes maturity of character. In fact, that can be done without mentioning the words "patriotism" and "courage," which traditionally and rightly are viewed as the very highest of the military virtues.

But there is this to be said about the nature of courage and patriotism, in the same breath that we agree they are essential in an officer of the fighting establishment—neither of these qualities of itself carries sufficient conviction, except as it is the product of those homelier attributes that give dignity to all action, in things both large and small, during the course of any average work day.

When Dr. Johnson remarked that patriotism is the last refuge of a scoundrel, he was not belittling the value of love of country as a force

in the lives of men, but, to the contrary, was pointing out that a profession of patriotism unaccompanied by good works was the mark of a man not to be trusted. In no other institution in the land will flag-waving fall as flat as in the Armed Services when the ranks know that it is just an act, with no sincere commitment to service backing it up.

There is a Civil War story from one of the campaigns against Stonewall Jackson in the Valley. A Confederate who had had his leg shot away turned on his pallet to regard a Union private who had just lost an arm, and said to him, "For what reason did you invade us and make all this trouble?" The boy replied simply: "For the old flag." That may sound like sentiment from a distant past. But turn to the story of Major Devereux (who retired as a brigadier general) and the Marine defense of Wake Island. He wrote that the "music" had always gone sour and had invariably broken down when he tried to play "The Colors." But on the morning of Pearl Harbor, when the flag was raised, the garrison already knew that the war was on. And for some reason that no one could account for, the bugler rose to the occasion, and, for the first time, every note came straight and true. Devereux said that every throat tightened and every head went higher. Yet Devereux was a remarkably unmelodramatic fighting man.

Or we might look again at Sandbag Castle, on the eastern flank of the Korean front in January, 1953. Crawling up the slope to the pinnacle is Sergeant Xavier Connors. He had been bombed at Pearl Harbor, wounded at Guadalcanal, and had fought through the Battle of the Bulge. That is not enough for Connors. He still dares the lightning. What bothers him is that his gun position has no flag. So he paints Old Glory on a bath towel and raises it high in the face of enemy fire from a trench 30 yards distant. It is repeatedly shot down only to have Connors raise it again, until at last the enemy tires of the game and the flag floats freely.

But to get back to those simpler virtues that provide a firm foundation for patriotism and may become the fount of courage, at least these few things would have to be emphasized among the fundamentals:

- A man has honor if he holds himself to a course of conduct because of a conviction that it is in the general interest, even though he is well aware that it may lead to inconvenience, personal loss, humiliation, or grave physical risk.
- He has veracity if, having studied a question to the limit of his ability, he says and believes what he thinks to be true, even though it would be the path of least resistance to deceive others and himself.
- He has justice if he acknowledges the interests of all concerned in any particular transaction rather than serving his own apparent interest.
- He has graciousness if he acts and speaks forthrightly, agrees warmly, disagrees fairly and respectfully, participates enthusiastically,

refrains from harboring grudges, takes his reverses in stride, and does not complain or ask for help in the face of trifling calamities.

- He has integrity if his interest in the good of the Service is at all times greater than his personal pride, and when he holds himself to the same line of duty when unobserved as he would follow if all of his superiors were present.

The list could be longer, but for the moment we can let it go at that. These standards are not counsels of perfection; thousands of officers have adhered to them. But it should be said as well that if all leaders at the lower levels in all of the Services were to conform in the same way, the task of higher command would be simplicity itself. The cause of much of the friction in the administrative machinery is that at all levels there are individuals who insist on standing in their own light. They believe that there is some special magic, some quick springboard to success; they mistakenly think that it can be won by bootlicking, apple-polishing, yessing higher authority, playing office politics, throwing weight around, ducking the issues, striving for cheap popularity, courting publicity, or seeking any and all means of grabbing the spotlight.

Any one of this set of tricks may enable a man to carry the ball forward a yard or two in some special situation. But one comment can be made without qualification: Of the men who have risen to supreme heights in the fighting establishment of the United States, and have had their greatness proclaimed by their fellow countrymen, there is not one career that provides any warrant for the conclusion that there is a special short-cut known only to the smart operators. True enough, a few men have gained fairly high rank by dint of what the late Mr. Justice Holmes called "the instinct for the jugular"—a feeling for when to jump, where to press, and how to slash in order to achieve quite predatory personal ends. That will occasionally happen in any walk of life. But from Washington, Wayne and Jones down to Eisenhower, Vandergrift, Nimitz, Ridgway and Burke, the men best loved by the American people for their military successes, were also men with greatness of soul. In short, they were idealists, though they likely would have disclaimed that label, since it somehow connotes the visionary rather than the intensely practical man.

But it isn't necessary to look at the upper brackets of history to find the object lesson. The things that any man remembers about his own father with love and reverence have to do with his forbearance, his charity toward other men, his strength and rightness of will, and his readiness to contribute of his force to the good of other people. Or if not his father, then it may be an uncle, a neighbor, or one of his school teachers.

In one way, however, it illuminates but half the subject to reflect that a man has to find purpose in himself before he can seek purpose

in any of the undertakings of which he is a part or in the society of which he is a member. No man is wholly sufficient unto himself, even though he has been schooled from infancy to live according to principles. His character, and the moral strength from which he gains peace of mind, need constantly to be replenished by the force of other individuals who think and act more or less in tune with him. His ability to remain whole and to bound back from any depression of the spirit depends in some measure on the chance that they will be upgrading when he is on the downswing. To read what the wisest of the philosophers have written about the formation of human character is always a stimulating experience; but it is better yet to live next to the man who already possesses what the philosophers are talking about. During World War II, there were quite a few higher commanders relieved in our forces because it was judged, for one reason or another, that they had failed in battle. Of the total number, there were a few who took a reduction in rank, went willingly to a lower post in a fighting command, uttered no complaint, kept their chins up, worked courageously and sympathetically with their commands, and provided an example of manhood that all who saw them will never forget. Though their names need not be mentioned, they were imprinted with the real virtue of the Services even more deeply than many of their colleagues who had no blemishes on their records. Their character had met the ultimate test. The men who had the privilege of working close to them realized this, and the sublime effect of this personal influence helped strengthen the resolve of many others.

Because there is so much at stake in the matter, the Services cannot depend solely upon such influence as may be exerted on their affairs by the occasional idealist, but must work for that chain reaction that comes of making the inculcation of military ideals one of the cardinal points of a strong, uniting, inner doctrine. The ideal object must be held high at all times, even though it is recognized that men are not perfect, and that no matter how greatly they may aspire, they will occasionally fail. Nor is the effort to lead other men to believe in the transcendent importance of goodwill made less effective because the leader has a conscience about his own weakness, provided he has the good sense not to flaunt it. He need not be a paragon of all the virtues to set an example that will convince other men that his ideals are worth following. No man alive possesses perfect virtue, which fact is generally understood. Many an otherwise ideal commander is ruthless in his exactions upon his staff; many a petty officer who has won the absolute love of all men with whom he served, has found himself in the middle because he couldn't think straight about his debts. But these things do not lessen the impact upon men of thinking together about common ideals and working together toward the fulfillment of some high obligation. The pursuit of ideals culminates in the experience of mutual growth. If that were not so, men who have served the arms

of the United States would not continue to have a special respect for the uniform and an extra reverence for the flag through the years after they have passed from the Service. These emotions are not the consequence of habit, but come of having known the comradeship of other men whom they loved and respected, who shared these same thoughts, and believed in the same body of ideals.

Any normal man loves his country, and it is natural in him to regard highly the symbols through which this affection is expressed. An American child of kindergarten age already feels an emotional attachment for the national emblem. The recruit who has just entered upon service can begin to understand that his regard for his uniform must be a far different thing from what he felt about his civilian attire, since it is identified with the majesty of the Nation. His training in military ideals starts at this point, and for the main part is carried forward subtly by transfer of this same feeling to all other objects associated with his military life. His perseverance in the care of weapons, in keeping his living quarters orderly, and in doing his full share of work is best insured, not through fear of punishment, but by stimulating his belief that any other way of going is unworthy of a member of a fighting Service.

Precision in personal habits, precision in drill, and precision in daily living are the high road to that kind of discipline which best insures cool and collected thought and unity of action on the field of battle. When men, working together, successfully attain to a high standard of orderliness, deportment, and response to each the other, they develop the cohesive strength that will carry them through any great crisis. For this reason mainly, military life is far more exacting than civil life. But the Services hold that what is best for the many can be achieved without cramping the personal life or blighting individuality and initiative. Within the frame of our system, we can achieve obedience and discipline without destroying independence and impulse.

This is idealism, though we seldom think about it in that light. Further, it is all the better that in the beginning these impressions are developed obliquely, rather than through the direct approach of reading a lecture on ideals and ethics, since it means that the man is assisted to reach certain conclusions by himself. As Kant pointed out, those things that a man learns pretty much on his own become the ideas that he is least likely to forget.

Looking at this subject in its largest aspect, it should be perfectly clear that any institution must know what its ideals are before it can become coherent and confident, and that there must be present in the form of clearly available ideals an imaginative conception of the good at which the institution aims.

This is fully recognized in the American Armed Forces. For many years, the program of indoctrinating military ideals has been inseparably linked with instruction in democratic ideals, teaching as to the American way of life and clear statement of the policies and purposes

of the Government of the United States in its relations with all other powers and peoples.

Moreover, it is an accepted principle in all Services that this mission cannot be carried forward competently except by those officers who are directly in charge of forces. It is not a job for chaplains or orientation specialists, because it cannot flourish unless it is in the hands of those leaders whom men know well and in whom they place their confidence. When men are well led, they become fully receptive to the whole body of ideas which their leaders see fit to put before them. There is no substitute for the magnetic, personal influence right at the helm, as the whole establishment well recognizes.

There are two points that follow as a matter of course. An officer's ability to talk effectively on these or other subjects to his men can be no better than his information, irrespective of his zeal or of his own firm belief in the ideals of his country and Service.

All other things being equal, his effectiveness will depend on the extent to which he participates in all of the other affairs of his organization. If he is remote from the spirit of his own unit, and indifferent to the varying activities that enter into the building of that spirit, he will not have a sympathetic audience when he talks to men about the grand objectives of the organization. There is something forbiddingly incongruous about an officer talking to troops on the ideal purposes of military service if all they see of him convinces them that he is loyal only to his own position and pay check. It can be said without any qualification that when an officer's interest in the unit is limited strictly to those things that have to be done in line of duty, even though he attends to them truly and well, he will never have a strong hold on the sympathy and imagination of his men. When he takes an enthusiastic part in the sports program of the ship, the company, the squadron or the battalion, though he may have no natural talent for sport, and when he is seen by his men attending religious services, his magnetism is increased. While the Supreme Court has held that compulsory church attendance in the Armed Services is contrary to the spirit of the Constitution, the influence of example was not lessened by that decision. Prayer before the evening meal at officers' messes was more general in Vietnam than ever before in the American forces. The American POWs returned from Hanoi bore witness that they found strength and comfort in religious communion.

Recognizing that teaching the duties of citizenship and providing information that will enable Americans to have a clearer understanding of their national affairs, are parts of the arch of morale and of a strong uniting comradeship, *the Armed Services nevertheless hold that the keystone of the arch, among fighting forces, is the inculcation of military ideals and the stimulation of principles of military action.* Unless orientation within the Services is balanced in that direction, the military spirit of all ranks will suffer and forces will lack a capacity to serve the Nation efficiently along the main line of resistance.

Finally, idealism is the bonding stuff of unity, lacking which men under arms are no better than a mob. "Do not discriminate!" One hears it said over and again in the Armed Services. And true enough, prejudice comes in many forms—racial, religious, class consciousness or more petty biases of the warped mind. All sorts of philosophical arguments may be mustered against it. But what is the imperative military reason why discrimination within the Armed Services is abhorrent and why there must be insistence on fair play and just treatment for all hands? Simply this—that the ultimate object of the Services is military victory should war eventuate. Under fire, organization falters and falls apart unless men are accustomed to working together like a band of brothers.

Fundamentally, the Military Code of Conduct, which was adopted for all members of the Armed Forces in 1955, was not a new set of commandments but rather the compact statement of those ideals on which American fighting men were supposed to have guided since the beginning of the Republic.

The all-Service Committee that drafted the Code did not anticipate that it would reform the renegade or right the rat. It did believe that it would help the stout of heart to band together, help one another, and resist the enemy.

In spirit, the Code hardly goes beyond what the citizen swears in pledging allegiance to the flag. The essence of the six articles is that the American fighter will hold his honor high, however he be assailed. He will not quit the fight, he will never say or do that which might hurt the United States or demean its uniform. In captivity, he will join with other loyal Americans to help them and himself. In sum, come hell or high water, he will acquit himself like a man.

That is not more than should be asked of an American who, sworn to defend his country, is assigned to the fire zone. So the Code is less a counsel of perfection than are, for example, the Ten Commandments, though the difficulty of full compliance with the latter stirs no demand for their revision or nullification.

As for whether the Code has meaningful value to the man undergoing the worst of military ordeals, there is this testimony by then Air Force Brigadier General John Peter Flynn on his return from a Hanoi prison, who said the prisoners were quite satisfied with the Code of Conduct. "We think it's a beautiful thing. It was sort of the anchor we needed in prison to keep ourselves straight. There were few things to grasp: the Code was one, religion another, love of country another...."

Even so, the Code need not be credited with more than it accomplished. Words on paper may not do more than generate an idea. If the Code stands, it is because it was validated by the resolute and constructive action of Flynn and his associates.

Chapter 3

RESPONSIBILITY AND PRIVILEGE

There is a common saying in the Services, and elsewhere, that greater privileges grow out of larger responsibilities, and that the latter justify the former. This is part truth and part fable.

In military organization, as in industry, business, and political life, the more important a man's position, the more lavish he is likely to be in his office appointments and living arrangements, and the greater the care that is apt to be taken in freeing him of trifling annoyances.

But that is only partly because of the need for him to conserve his time and energy. When men are successful, they like the good things of life. Why deny it? Not one individual in 10,000 would aspire to power and authority if it meant living like a hermit.

There is no way that the military establishment can denature human nature and change this determining condition. Nor is there any reason why it should wish to do so. Its people, like all others, develop a sense of well-being from those advantages, many of them minor, that attend and build prestige, both in private and in official life. The incentive system by which our country has prospered has always recognized that privilege is a reward for effort and enterprise. The American people have always accepted that reasonable, harmless privileges should attend merit. It is by enhancing the prestige of leaders and by making their positions attractive that the Armed Forces attract better officers and better members in general.

One of the keenest-minded Americans of our time has said: "Responsibilities are what devolve upon a person, and privileges are what he ought not to have, but takes." In a perfect universe, that would be a perfect truth. But men being as they are, prideful and desirous of any mark of recognition, privileges are the natural accompaniment of rank and station, and when not wilfully misused, may contribute to the general welfare. At all levels, men will aspire more, and their ambition will be firmer, if getting ahead will mean for them an increase in the visible tokens of deference from the majority, rather than simply a boost in the paycheck. To complain about this quality in human nature is as futile as regretting that the sun goes down.

However, since it is out of the abuse of privilege that much of the friction between authority and the rank-and-file arises, the subject can-

not be dropped at that point. What puts most of the grit into the machinery isn't that privileges exist, but that they are exercised too often by persons who are not motivated by a passionate sense of duty. For it is an almost inviolable rule of human behavior that the man who is concerned most of all with his responsibilities will be fretted least about the matter of his privileges, and that his exercise of any rightful privilege will not be resented by his subordinates because they are conscious of his merit.

We can take two officers. Lieutenant Doe enters military service with one main question in mind: "Where does my duty lie?" So long as he remains on that beam, he will never injure the morale of the Service by using such privileges as are rightfully his as an officer. But in the mind of Lieutenant Roe the other idea is uppermost: "What kudos do I get from my position?" Unless that man changes his ways, he will be a troublemaker while he remains in the Service, a headache to his fellow officers, and an object of resentment for those who are under him.

In recent years, we have learned a lot about American manpower. We have seen enough of the raw material under testing conditions to know that, with the exception of the occasional malcontent who was irreparably spoiled before he left home, American young people when brought into military organization do not resent rank and are amenable to authority. Indeed, they expect that higher authority will have certain advantages not common to the rank-and-file, because that is normal in our society in all of its workaday relationships.

But they do not like to have their noses rubbed in it by officers who, having no real moral claim on authority, try to exhibit it by pushing other people around. And when that happens, our people get their backs up. And they wouldn't be worth a hoot in hell if they didn't.

Even as privilege attends rank and station, it is confirmed by custom and modified by time and environment. What was all right yesterday may be all wrong tomorrow, and what is proper in one set of circumstances may be wholly wrong in another.

Take one example. In Washington's Continental Army, a first lieutenant was court-martialed and jailed because he demeaned himself by doing manual labor with a working detail of his men. Yet, in that same season, Major General von Steuben, then trainer and inspector of all the forces, almost terminated his usefulness because of the resentment he aroused by trying to rank a relatively junior officer out of his quarters. Today both of these usages seem out of joint. Any officer has the privilege of working with his men, if he needs exercise, wishes to see for himself how the thing is done, or feels that an extra hand is needed on the job at a critical moment. As for any notion that his quarters are his permanent castle no matter who comes, he had best not make an issue of the point!

But to emphasize it once again, duty is the greater regulator of the proper exercise of one's rights. Here we speak of duty as it was meant

by Giuseppe Mazzini, Italy's great patriot of the early nineteenth century, when he said: "Every mission constitutes a pledge of duty. Every man is bound to consecrate his every effort to its fulfillment. He will derive his rule of action from the profound conviction of that duty." For, finally, the key lies in this, that out of high regard for duty comes as a natural flow that sense of proportion which we call common sense.

Adjustment and dignity in any situation are impossible when minds are bent only on a pattern of behavior rather than on action that is consistent with the far objective. In the early stages of World War II, it was not unusual to see a junior officer walking on the public sidewalk, hands free, and looking important, while his wife tagged along, trying to keep step, though laden like a pack mule. This was because someone had told him that it was not in keeping with an officer's dignity to be seen heavily burdened. While the taboo was part of the old British military tradition, in the nature of things, anyone so lacking in gallantry as that would stimulate no respect for officers and would be asking for wife trouble.

Actually in these times there are relatively few special privileges that attend officership as such, and though our recent wars have prompted some excesses, the overall trend has been in the opposite direction. The unrelenting rigor of Korean operations affected all personnel alike, generated closer comradeship and sharpened the ideal. The officer who perforce "rode shotgun" for his jeep driver virtually counted that guarding a privilege. The lieutenant "checkerboarding" on running a long range reconnaissance patrol in the Vietnam jungle was no better favored than his men. He wore the same dress, ate the same chow, attracted as many leaches and waited his turn at medevac when wounded or hit by malaria.

In World War I, practically every junior officer had his orderly or striker, and some had two. Today's lieutenant shines his own boots, etcetera. The late General George C. Marshall as Army Chief of Staff functioned without a personal aide and many other flag officers have discovered that doing without one may be a boon to privacy as well as mobility.

Normally, an officer is not expected to stand in a chow line, or any other queue in line of duty. The presumption is that his time is more valuable to the Service than that of an enlisted person. Normally, an officer is not expected to pitch a tent or spend his energy on any hand labor incidental to housekeeping. Normally, he has greater freedom of action and is less bound by minor restrictions than the ranks.

But the accent in these statements is decidedly on the word normally. If a mess line were in an area under general fire, so that added waiting meant extra danger, only a poltroon would insist on being fed first. And while an officer wouldn't be expected to pitch a tent, he would dig his own foxhole, unless his other duties did not allow him the time. At that, there were a few high commanders in World War II and Korea who

made it a point of pride to do their own digging from first to last. Greater "freedom of action," too, can go out the window, since conditions arise, particularly in war, when freedom of action cannot be permitted anyone except the very top authority. When a general restriction is clamped down, the officer caught violating it is in more serious jeopardy than the enlisted offender.

As the entire body of this book is directed toward the consideration of the fundamental responsibilities of officership, the special comments in this chapter will relate mainly to propositions not stated elsewhere.

Though it has been said before, it can be said again: It is a paramount and overriding responsibility of every officer to take care of his men before caring for himself. From the frequent and gross violation of this principle by badly informed or meanly selfish individuals comes more embarrassment to officer-man relationships than perhaps from all other causes put together. It is a cardinal principle! Yet many junior officers do not seem to understand that steadfast fidelity to it is required, not lip service, since the loyalty of men simply cannot be commanded when they become embittered by selfish action.

Then how deeply does this rule cut? In line of duty, it applies right up to the hilt! When a command is worn, bruised and hungry, officers attend to their men's creature comforts and make sure that all is going well, before looking to their own needs. If an officer is on a tour with an enlisted man, he takes care that the man is accommodated as to food, shelter, medical treatment, or other prime needs, before satisfying his own wants; if that means that the last meal or the last bed is gone, his duty is to do without. If a command is so located that recreational facilities are extremely limited and there are not enough to go around, the welfare of the ranks takes priority over the interests of their commissioned leaders.

Why take care of your people first and all of the time? The answer is elementary. It's because it all comes back to you and you cannot get by unless they take care of you, especially in battle. Furthermore, it is out of this close association that courage and self-confidence strengthen in each of us. Few, if any, are born with these virtues. They are gifts from our ties with our fellows.

That this rule applies right to the end of the road is made clear by the Code of Conduct and its supporting philosophy. Made prisoner, the U. S. officer sheds none of his cloak of moral and lawfully imposed responsibility to devote the best of himself to caring for Americans of lesser rank. He must take the lead in organizing fellow prisoners to resist the enemy, aid and rally the more helpless of their own number, and plan escape. As on the battlefield, if the situation is in dissolution because no one has taken effective charge, it is the duty of the senior officer present voluntarily to take control and for all to follow.

These few concrete illustrations show, in general, what is expected. Once the main idea is grasped, the way of its total application becomes

clear. Officers do not go around playing pigtail to enlisted men. But they build loyalty by serving the men first, when all concerned are following a general line of duty together.

It is an abiding responsibility of all officers to maintain the dignity of the uniform and prevent anyone from sullying it. This means not only attention to his own dress, but to the uniform wherever it is worn publicly by any member of the United States forces. Where the offense is committed by a member of some other Service and the disgrace to the uniform is obvious, it is the duty of the officer to intervene, or to bring about intervention, rather than to walk out on the situation. This calls for judgment, tact, nerve. The offense must be real, and not simply an offense against one's private sensibilities. But indecencies, exhibitionism, and bawdiness of such a nature that if done on a reservation would warrant trial of the individual for unbecoming conduct will justify intervention by the officer under public circumstances.

Similarly, any officer has a responsibility to any enlisted person who is in personal distress, with no other means of ready help. Suppose the two just happen to meet in a strange community. The enlisted man's credentials are shown to be bona fide. But he has had his pocket picked, or has lost his wallet, or has just missed the train that would have carried him back from his leave on time, and he doesn't know what to do. For any officer to brush off a forthright request for aid or advice under such circumstances is an unofficerly act. Likewise, if one suspects, just from appearances, that the man is in trouble and somewhat beyond his depth, it will be found that, far from resenting a kindly inquiry, he will mark it to the credit of the whole fighting system.

To say that an officer owes a fellow officer no less consideration than this is to state the obvious. Officers meeting in transit usually get into conversation; it is a habit that adds much to one's professional education. When an officer is getting into a strange town, or arriving at a new post, anything done by a fellow officer to help him get oriented, or to make things friendly and easy for him furthers the comity of the officer body. Between officers of different Services these small courtesies are particularly appreciated. Nor does the matter end there. Within Unit A, the officers have the responsibility of continuing support to the officers of Unit B, Unit C, and so on. Though they are in a sense competing, each trying to build higher than the other, they must never forget that the basic technique of organization is cooperation. What "A" knows that has helped his unit, or whatever he can do to assist "B" and "C" without materially depriving himself, it becomes his official and moral obligation to transmit. An officer can never understand his own command problems very well unless he knows at least a little of how things are going in other units. And the statement can be reversed. He cannot judge the problems of other people unless he tries his best to understand his own people.

In an effort to get quick action, officers have resorted to by-passing

the chain of command. Not only are links of the chain skipped in issuing orders and instructions to subordinates, but many young officers fail to go through the next higher authority when reporting or requesting permission. Ignoring the chain of command is a gratuitous discourtesy to the "skipped links." It is also a grave violation of one of the basic principles of orderly military procedure. By-passing the command chain frequently creates confusion and disrupts the routine of organization.

There are many other minor articles within what is sometimes called the "unwritten code" which help to regulate life in the Services, and to dignify it.

But what counts most is not the knowing of the rule but the sharing of the spirit that gives it meaning and makes its proper administration possible.

Chapter 4

PLANNING YOUR CAREER

The main purposes of this book are to stimulate thought and to encourage the average young officer to seek truth for and in himself. It is never a good idea to attempt a precise formula about matters that are by nature indefinite and subject to many variable factors.

Thus, with respect to career planning, despite all of the emphasis put upon the subject in modern America, it would be plain error to infer that any person can become all-wise as to the direction that he should take with his own life simply by steeping himself in all of the information to be had on this subject.

That might qualify him to give top-lofty advice to all others on how to make the start up the right ladder, and he would win a reputation as a personnel expert, which in itself is no mean assignment. But in all probability he would still be doing better by himself than by any other individual.

Reflecting the trend elsewhere in the national life, the Armed Services are equipped to give their people the advantage of career management principles and to assist them to plan their professional careers. The opportunities and the job qualifications can be described. Also, somewhat more thoroughly than is done in civil life, the establishment's system of record-keeping throws a considerable light on the aptitudes of the individual. The qualified man is soon known by his military skill or specialty number or maybe two numbers. It might seem therefore, that things are so well-regulated that the prospect of everyone finding his niche is better than even.

The fact remains that the majority of individuals spend the greater part of their lives doing something other than what would bring out their best quality and give them the greatest satisfaction, mainly because accident, in one form or another, puts them into a particular channel, and inertia keeps them there.

A boy builds model airplanes. His hobby being a force in his youthful years, he becomes a pilot, and then discovers to his shocked amazement that he does not have his heart in machines but in the management of men. A man who has lived his life among guns, and who enjoys the feel and the working of them, enters the Service and permits himself to be made a food procurement specialist, having run that kind of

business in civil life only because he had inherited it from his father. An officer assigned to a weapons detail finds it hard going. And the fact that he takes delight in writing a good staff paper still does not signal to him that this is his main field and he should exploit it to the fullest!

To what do these things point? In particular, to this, that despite all of the help that may be provided by outside agencies, finding the straight thoroughfare in work is mainly a problem of searching self-examination and personal decision. The impression any other person may have of our talents and possibilities is largely formed by what we say, think, and feel about ourselves.

This does not require that constant introspection found in Cecil Forester's nervous hero, Captain Horatio Hornblower. That character doubtless would have died of stomach ulcers before winning his second stripe. It is not a matter of "How do I look to someone else?" but of "What do I know about myself?" The kind of work one likes best and does with the greatest facility, the avocational study that is pursued because it provides greater delight than an imposed responsibility, the talent one had as a youth but was dropped because of the press of making a living, the task that looks alluring, though one has lacked either the chance or the courage to try a hand at it—these are among the more fertile points of inquiry.

Weighing it out, the military officer has an unrivaled opportunity for fruitful experiment. Unlike his counterpart, the executive or specialist in civilian life, his routine on today's tour is not protracted endlessly. The variety of assignments, though hardly limitless, is ever-expanding. If the work in hand is not to his liking, so long as he performs faithfully, the chances are that he will get a better assignment next time, especially if he asks. The national decision to go to the all-volunteer force must enhance that prospect, since it will cut the flow in and out of the officer corps.

If, on the other hand, after varying assignments, an officer feels disenchanted with the service, it is his duty to resign, for the malcontented leader is a load on morale.

The fundamental decision to serve the country in the profession of arms is by nature patriotic. But an officer who regards such employment as simply a snug berth and a convenient livelihood is neither soundly patriotic nor intelligently selfish. Let's see why.

After signing on the line for his country, the individual's duty to himself is to strive by every honorable means to move ahead of his competition by growing more knowledgeable and better qualified. It is the inherent right of every officer to request such service as he believes will further his advancement, and far from discouraging the ambitious man, higher authority will invariably try to favor him. In no other mode of life are older men so ready to encourage the willing junior.

General H. H. Arnold, the great air leader of World War II, is an inspiring case study with respect to several of these points. He wrote in

Global Mission how he considered quitting the Army in disgust upon being commissioned in the infantry following graduation from West Point, so deeply was his heart set upon service in cavalry. But something held him to the assignment. Some years later he tried to transfer to ordnance because the prospect for advancement looked better. While still considering this change, he was offered a detail to the newly-forming aviation section of the Signal Corps, and took it, not because he had a clear vision of the future, but because it looked like a chance to get ahead. Thus, almost inadvertently, he met the opportunity from which came his world fame.

In the reforming of the establishment during the years that came later, the development of the nuclear submarine, the building of the first U. S. man-made satellite put in orbit, and the shaping of the Nation's ICBM armament were all main breaks in equally startling military career stories. None of the higher commanders directly identified with these achievements had planned things that way from the beginning. Their initial horizons were limited, and their ultimate handiwork went far beyond their earliest, rosiest dreams. Then the sky opened, revealing opportunity, and each of them, like the hero of an old rhyme "seen his duty a dead-sure thing and went for it thar and then."

Or take the careers of Frederick C. Weyand, W. R. Peers and Willard Pearson. All three had decided in youth to become educators. Early, they entered the Army during war, found they liked it, could readily adjust to varying assignments, and therefore stayed. All three becoming outstanding field generals in Vietnam, they were no less teachers of men.

This emphasizes another peculiar advantage belonging to the young officer who is trying to orient himself toward the line of greatest opportunity. In civil life, the man who flits from job to job is soon regarded as a drifter and unstable. In the military establishment, an ability to adjust from job to job and to achieve greater all-around qualification by making a successful record in a diversified experience becomes a major asset in a career. Generalship, in its real sense, requires a wider knowledge of human affairs, supported by specialized knowledge of professional techniques, than any other great responsibility. Those who get to the top have to be many-sided men, with skill in the control and guidance of a multifarious variety of activities. Therefore, even the young specialist who has his eyes on a narrow track, because his talents seem to lie in that direction, is well advised to raise his sights and extend his interest to the far horizons of the profession, even while directing the greater part of his force to a particular field.

After all, variety is the spice of life, as well as a high road toward perfection. Of Princeton's 1932 class, 161, or 59 percent, were in the Armed Forces during World War II. Questioned after the war, 70 percent of the total number replied that military service was interesting, broadening and profitable. But the main point was that they said in

overwhelming number that its great lure was that they were doing something new. They liked it because it gave them a legitimate excuse to quit their jobs and attempt a task wholly different. In the Services, a man may give vent to this natural desire without impairing his record, and, if he is young and not at all certain what is his favorite dish, the more he broadens his experience the more likely it becomes that he will sharpen his view of his own capabilities and discover talents he did not know he possessed.

Still, the advice is well given: "Don't press too hard in seeking the one most advantageous career niche." There is none that is ever precisely identifiable; unexpected opportunity lies closest to the spot where one makes most diligent use of his work time. A senior staff officer who had performed nobly in one of the most trying slots in the Eighth Army during Korea's darkest period later wrote a friend: "Three assignments are now open to me; which is the best career opportunity?" The friend replied: "Why don't you once move where you and your family will be happiest? The one best break is just as likely to occur there." The answer was well put. He who trails mainly after the sweet smell of success, identifying it only with promotion and prestige, excluding all else that makes life satisfying, must keep his nose so close to the ground that he is not likely to see the stars.

So when we say that "career planning" is a springboard to personal success within the Armed Forces, it is not with the narrow meaning that any officer should proceed to limit his field of interest, decide quickly and arbitrarily where he will put his plow and run his furrow, and then sit down and plot a schedule of how he proposes to become a success. That might suit some undertakings, but it will not conserve the strength of the officer body. Its consequence would be to stereotype the thinking faculties of a profession whose inner power flows from the questing imagination, eager curiosity, and versatility of its individuals. Intense specialization, to the exclusion of all peripheral areas of knowledge, warps the mind and limits the useful action and influence of its owner. In active operations, the keenest brain must still fall short of an ideally applied intellect, if its owner is relatively ignorant of personnel, deployment, and supply problems. To put it another way, George Catlett Marshall's name is honored around the world because, while maturing as a great military leader, he equally prepared himself for the role of statesman.

There are few men of great talent who initially have an unswerving inner conviction that they possess the final answer as to themselves. They may feel reasonably sure about what they would like to do, though still reserving an honest doubt about the validity of their instincts and of their power to compete. Even long and successful experience does not always allay this doubt. Said Washington, on being appointed Commander in Chief: "I beg it may be remembered by every man in this room that I this day declare with the utmost sincer-

ity, I do not think myself equal to the command I am honored with." Assurance or by its other name, self-confidence, is only a continuing willingness to keep trying, without fear of coming a cropper, but with a care for the constant strengthening of one's own resources. The motto of Admiral Robert E. Peary: "I will find a way or make one," is not over-bold; any officer can afford to paste the words inside his own hat. But in the hard game with which Peary's fame is forever linked, there were countless errors, an occasional hit, and at last a run.

The health and progressive spirit of the Armed Forces come of the many-sided officer who can make not one career for himself but three or four. Had officers from all Services been unwilling to go into the industrial workshops and scientific laboratories of the Nation to try their hands at wholly new lines of work, had successful cavalrymen been unable to evolve as leaders of armored forces, had ground officers, ship captains, and ensigns disdained taking to the air, had marines refused the risks of parachuting and naval officers not participated as observers with the infantry line to further SFC (shore fire control), we would have run out of wind before winning World War II.

Some months after the war ended, the Secretary of the Navy recognizing the dilemma confronting thousands of men who were asking whether the wave of the future would be to the specialist or to the all-around man, sent a message that applied not less to the officers of every Service:

"It is intended that the highest posts will be filled by officers of the highest attainments, regardless of specialty. Be assured, whatever may be your field of endeavor, that your future as an officer rests, as it always has, in your hands. The outstanding officer will continue to be he who attacks with all of his energy and enthusiasm the tasks to which he is assigned and who grows in stature and understanding with his years and with his experience. Responsibility comes to him who seeks responsibility. It is this officer, regardless of his field of effort, who will be called to high command."

There is not a chief of Service who would shade the general tone of this paragraph if asked to put before his own officers the one rule which, most closely followed, would most surely bring success. Nothing need be added to it and nothing should be taken away; it states the case.

At the same time, and as the message itself implies, specialization is here to stay. In the Armed Forces even the balanced, all-around man has his specialty. In the beginning, true enough, he may aspire only to being a soldier, sailor, airman, marine, or coastguardsman. That is good enough in the cocoon stage. But ultimately he emerges with the definite coloring of a ground fighter, a missileman, an engineer officer, a signalman, a submariner, a weapons man, a pilot, a radar officer, a transport officer, or something else. If his tact, bearing, and quick pick-up suggest to his superiors that he may be good staff material and he takes that route, there are again branch lines, leading out in roughly parallel direc-

tions, and embracing activities in the fields of personnel, intelligence, operations, supply, and military assistance. And each one of these main stems has smaller branches greatly diversified. The man with a love for logistics (and few have it) might some day find himself running railroads or managing a port. The engineer could become a salvage officer working a crew of deep sea divers, or as easily a demolitions expert running a company of dynamiters. The expert in communications? His next task might be setting up a radio station at either of the Poles, tying-in a battery of ICBMs to a remote control board in an underground console, or making a preliminary study of what is needed for contact with earth by a task force bound for the moon.

The requirements of his Service naturally are paramount, and these requirements will restrict the choice of an officer in determining his career. Nonetheless, there does exist considerable freedom of choice. Despite the popular theory that in the Armed Forces you take what you are given and like it, the placement of officers according to their main aptitudes and desires is a controlling principle of personnel policy.

It is recognized throughout the military establishment that, in general, men will do their best service in that field where they think their natural talents are being most usefully employed.

Among the combat line commanders in World War II there were doctors, dentists, lawyers, and even a few ministers. They could have had places in their regular corps, but they were permitted to continue with the duty of their own choice. One dentist later became a major general of the line; all who saw him in action recognized his preeminence as a combat leader. One general who won a second star as an infantry fighter in Korea had been a professor of agronomy before World War II. His division's chief of staff was also from the campus, where he had taught science.

Concerning the main problem of the officer in fitting himself for higher command, the controlling principle is well put in the words of Wallace B. Donham, former Dean of the Harvard University Graduate School of Business Administration: "The hope of the wisdom essential to the general direction of men's affairs lies not so much in wealth of specialized knowledge as in the habits and skills required to handle problems involving very diverse viewpoints which must be related to new concrete situations. Wisdom is based on broad understanding in perspective. It is common sense on a large canvas. It is never the product of scientific, technological, or other specializations, though men so trained may, of course, acquire it."

This puts just the right light on the subject. The military officer specializes strictly to qualify himself more highly in his main calling—the management of men in the practice of arms. Becoming a specialist does not ipso facto make him a better officer or win him preferment. It is part of the mechanism, though not the main wheel. As the late Admiral Forrest P. Sherman so well said: "We are not pushed willy-nilly

into specialization; there is never an excess of the all-around, highly competent combat officer."

Concerning his choice, all general advice is gratuitous. Whatever might be written here would be worth far less than the counsel or suggestion of any superior, especially the analytical, unprejudiced advice of one's commanding officer, or for that matter, a colleague, who has observed his work closely over a long period, who has some critical faculty, and whose good will is beyond question.

Particularly, the voluntary advice of such a person is worth notice. What is spontaneous usually has shrewd reason behind it. When counsel is deliberately sought, it may catch the consultant unaware, and in lieu of saying what is well considered, the advisor may offer a half-baked opinion rather than be disappointing. But when another person having one's trust, says: "Your natural line is to do thus-and-so," it is time to ask him why and check his reasoning with one's own. Worth just as much earnest consideration is his negative opinion, his strong feeling that what one is about to undertake is not particularly suitable.

These words apply in particular to the officer doing what he regards as a temporary tour of active duty, either to fulfill his obligation or because no better livelihood has yet opened to him, but still not thinking of himself as a professional at arms. No argument may be put to a career officer as to why he should stick it and as to how, once the decision is made, he should set his sail for success, that does not also apply to the non-careerist pondering whether he has at last found his niche for life. "Duty, honor, country" are words ringing with inspiration only to minds and hearts open to hear them. They will not stir or stay any individual who unconsciously rejects what is good while eternally chasing the illusion that something else may prove better. However, when a man feels that he is mastering his work to a degree that makes his personal life glow from a sense of high accomplishment, that realization automatically should raise the question: "Am I not in my proper place for the long pull?" On this question, the judgments of a young officer's military superiors and career associates about his fitness should weigh more heavily in the balance than counsel from all other sources.

As for the man himself, it remains to him to survey thoughtfully the whole range of possibilities, to keep his mind open and receptive to impressions, to experiment but take firm hold in so doing, to tackle each new task with as much enthusiasm as if it were to be his life work, to ask for difficult assignments rather than soft snaps, and to be calmly deliberate rather than rashly hasteful in appraising his own capabilities.

Self-study is a lifetime job. A great many engineers didn't realize that they were born to make nuclear fission possible until there was a three-way wedding between science, industry, and the military in 1940. Many officers who have had a late blooming as experts in the fields of electronics, computer management and supersonic speed had lived out successful careers before these subjects first saw daylight.

As Elbert Hubbard said, the only way to get away from opportunity is to lie down and die.

In one area, however, all who hold commissions, men and women alike, should seek to be specialists. This is the field of human relations, the art of winning friends and influencing people. Goodwill and fair play are the derivatives of more perfect knowledge.

Most commanders agree that if racial harmony is to be made a reality in the Armed Services, it is imperative that differences based on race, ethnic background, cultural heritage and language be lessened rather than accentuated. That is not to imply that every individual in uniform must give up his personal traits or surrender his identity. Were that even possible, it would not be desirable, for it would make military life unbearably dull. But it does mean that the individual, for the common good, needs to desist from capitalizing on those differences that set him apart.

Unlawful or unfair discrimination on the part of some persons within the Armed Services is acknowledged and deplored. More importantly, it is being located and eliminated to the extent that is humanly possible. While perfect ends are rarely attained on this earth, any person may command himself to deal with all others without prejudice. Every military officer owes that duty to his Service and to his country.

Chapter 5

KEEPING YOUR HOUSE IN ORDER

In one of Lord Chesterfield's letters to his son there is to be found this bit of wisdom: "Dispatch is the soul of business and nothing contributes more to dispatch than method. Fix one certain hour and day in the week for your accounts, keep them together in their proper order, and you can never be much cheated."

Although that is good advice in any man's league, there is just a little more reason why the military officer should adopt a system of accounting whereby he can keep his record straight, his affairs solvent, and his situation mobile than if he had remained in civil life.

He rarely, if ever, becomes permanently fixed in one location or remains tied to one group of individuals who know his credit, his ability, his past accomplishments, and his general reputation. In the nature of his calling, these things have to be reestablished from point to point, and if he personally does not take pains to conserve them, he can be certain only that no one else will.

On the whole, the attitude of the Services toward the private affairs and nonduty conduct of their officers can be best set forth by once again employing Chesterfield's phrases: "If you have the knowledge, the honor, and probity which you may have, the marks and warmth of my affection will amply reward you; but if you have them not, my aversion and indignation will rise in the same proportion."

Reassignment to a distant station is a day-to-day possibility in the life of any military officer. Yet this is not a general hardship; rather, it is because the pattern of work and environment changes frequently, and the opportunity to build new friendships is almost endless, that the best men are attracted to the Services. To vegetate in one spot is killing to the spirit of the individual who is truly fitted to play a lead part in bold enterprises, and for that reason there is something very unseemly and unmilitary about the officer who resists movement.

On the other hand, a move order is like a club over the head of the officer who hasn't kept his own deck clean, has made no clear accounting of himself, and is out of funds and harassed by his creditors.

Concerning the evils of running into debt, there is hardly need for a sermon to any American male who has brains enough to memorize his

social security number. As Mr. Micawber put it to David Copperfield, "The blossom is blighted, the leaf is withered, the god of days goes down upon the dreary scene, and in short, you are forever floored." The over-extension of credit is an American failing.

For these and many other reasons, the habit of systematic saving is an essential form of career insurance. The officer who will not deprive himself of a few luxuries to build up a financial reserve is as reckless of his professional future as the one who in battle commits his tactical reserve to front-line action without first weighing his situation.

In the old days, keeping up with the Joneses was almost a part of Service tradition. If the colonel's lady owned a bob-tailed nag, the major's wife could be satisfied with nothing less than a bay. And so on and on. Custom has become more reasonable. That doesn't mean that all colonels' ladies today are so modest that none ever tries to wear publicly her husband's eagles. It means only that if she does there is a trend wherein the society marks the pair as boors rather than proper examples.

There is one other kind of credit—the professional credit that an officer is entitled to keep with his own establishment. Junior officers are entitled to know what their superiors are often too forgetful to tell them—that if they have made some especially distinct and worthy contribution to the Service, it belongs in the permanent record. If, for example, an officer has sat on a major board or committee, or provided the idea that has resulted in an improvement of materiel, the fact should be noted in the 201 file, or its equivalent. Any officer is within propriety in asking this acknowledgment from his responsible superior. In fact, he cheats himself if he does not do it, for such credits are not entered automatically, and with the passage of time it becomes impossible to validate them. Even such a major item as a decoration for heroism in battle may be excluded from the individual file through careless clerkship. It happened to not a few men in Korea, and to many more in Vietnam, partly due to rotation.

The legal assistance office in an officer's immediate organization will usually suffice his needs in the drawing up of all papers essential to his personal housekeeping.

To make a will is merely good business practice, and to neglect it simply because one's holdings are small is to postpone forming the habits that mark a responsible person. Because of superstition and a reluctance to think about death, about three out of every four Americans die intestate. That is as foolish as leading men into battle without designating a second in command. The Armed Services counsel all officers to take the more responsible view, and they make it easy for their officers to do this tidying-up without cost.

A power of attorney enables one person to take certain legal steps for another in his absence, and execute papers that would usually require his signature. When an officer is going on an extended tour over-

seas, his interests are apt to be left dangling unless he leaves such a power with his wife, mother, best friend or some other person, thereby avoiding loss of money and excess worry.

The legal offices of the Services are available not only for performing the work but also for counseling as to its effect.

There is one other step that the responsible man takes on his own. It is not likely that his wife or any other person knows at any one time the whole story of his interests, obligations and holdings, as to where goods may be stored, savings kept, insurance policies filed, what debts are owed and what accounts are receivable. In the event of his sudden death, next of kin would be at a loss to know whom and where to call to get the estate settled smoothly, and with all things accurately inventoried. So it is a practical idea to keep an up-to-date check list in ledger form, but containing all pertinent information, so that all necessary documents may be made readily accessible. If for some private reason it is preferred not to leave this with next of kin, it can be kept in a top drawer at the office, where it could scarcely escape attention.

A current inventory of household goods is also a time-saving precaution. As changes occur, the list can be corrected and kept fresh. Then in case of a sudden move, there is almost nothing to be done in preparation for the movers, and in the event of loss anywhere along the line, one's own tables will assist in recovery. Goods are not infrequently mislaid, lost, or damaged when shipped or warehoused, and the more authentic the description of the goods in question, the better the chances for the claim. The officer or his spouse must insure that the inventory of household goods made by the moving company at the time of pick-up is accurate. This is the basic document to use in verifying a loss and submitting a claim for loss or damage.

For any officer, insurance is a necessity. How much it should be, and what its form, are matters for his judgment and conscience, and according to his circumstances. The Services do not try to tell a man how he should provide for his family. Men of honor need no such reminder, though they may be bothered by the question: "How much can I afford?" On that point, sufficient to say that it is not more blessed to be insolvent and worried about debts from being overloaded with insurance than for any other reason. Many retired officers supplement their pay by selling insurance. When a young Service officer wants insurance counsel, he will find that they are disposed to deal practically with his problem.

A few recurrent expenses, such as insurance premiums and bond purchases, can be met with allotments through the Finance or Disbursing Officer. The forms for the starting of an allotment are quite simple. When an officer is going overseas, if his dependents are not to follow immediately, an allotment is the best way to insure that they will get their income regularly. Under certain circumstances, it may also be arranged for allotments to be made to banks, as a form of steady saving.

Adverting for a moment to the question of what happens to an officer when he becomes ridden by debt and plagued by his creditors, it is a fair statement that the generality of higher commanders are not unsympathetic, that they know that shrewdness and thrift are quite often the product of a broadened experience, and that their natural disposition is to temper the wind to the shorn lamb, if there are signs that he is making a reasonable effort to restore himself. If it becomes clear that he is taking the Service for a ride and cares nothing for the good name of the officer body, they'll send him packing. A man harassed by debt, and not knowing how to meet his situation, is always well-advised to go to his commander, make a clean statement of the case, and ask for his counsel.

Every officer should be scrupulous about keeping a complete, chronologically arranged file of all official papers having anything to do with his status, movements, duties, or possessions. That may seem burdensome, but it is well worth doing, since one never knows when an old paper will become germane to a current question or undertaking.

Likewise, receipts are necessary whenever one spends money on anything (for instance, travel) on which reimbursement is expected from the Government. Regulations are clear on this point—the Government simply will not give the individual the benefit of the doubt. No receipt —no check from the Treasury.

The military society is a little more tightly closed than civilian society. For that reason the pressure from the distaff side is usually a little heavier. Wives get together more frequently, know one another better, and take a more direct interest in their husbands' careers than is common elsewhere. That has its advantages, but also its headaches. There is an occasional officer who is so immature in his judgments as to permit his wife's feelings about a colleague or a colleague's wife to supervene in the affairs of organization. Here is one way to ask for trouble.

Gossip is to be avoided because it is vicious, self-destructive, unmanly, unmilitary and, most of the time, untrue. The obligation of each officer toward his fellow officer is to build him up, which implies the use of moral pressure against whatever influence would pull him down. While the love of scandal is universal, and the Services cannot hope to rid themselves altogether of the average human failings, it is possible for any man to guard his own tongue and, by the example of moderation, serve to keep all such discussion temperate. Were all officers to make a conscious striving in this direction, the credit of the military as a whole, and the satisfactions of each of its members in his Service, would be tremendously increased. Besides, there is another point: gossip is the mark of the man insufficiently occupied with serious thought about his personal responsibilities. His carelessness about the destruction of the character of others is incidental to his indifference to those things that make for character in self.

The question needs be raised: What is the duty of a subordinate officer if he knows, or has reason to believe, that his superior is acting corruptly, or engaged in any illegal practice that should put him before a court? His first duty is to tell the absolute truth to any inspector or other official inquirer. Beyond that, if the offenses are of such gravity that he feels impelled to take direct action for the good of the Service, he should report it to higher authority, though for his own protection, he should proceed alone. So doing, he still may risk his own commission, but he will have proceeded honorably.

As for the rest of it, we can turn back to Chesterfield, with whom we started. For how might anyone state it more neatly than with these words?

"Were I to begin the world again with the experience which I now have of it, I would lead a life of real, not imaginary, pleasure. I would enjoy the pleasures of the table and of wine, but stop short of the pains inseparably annexed to the excess of either.

"I should let other people do as they would without formally and sententiously rebuking them for it. But I would be most firmly resolved not to destroy my own faculties and constitution in complaisance to those who have no regard for their own.

"I would play to give me pleasure, but not to give me pain. That is, I would play for trifles in mixed companies, to amuse myself and conform to custom. But I would take care not to venture for sums which if I won I would not be the better for, but if I lost, should be under a difficulty to pay."

Chapter 6

GETTING ALONG WITH PEOPLE

The proposition can be stated almost as simply as doing right-face. Hear this:

"If you like people, if you seek contact with them rather than hiding yourself in a corner, if you study your fellow men sympathetically, if you try consistently to contribute something to their success and happiness, if you are reasonably generous with your thoughts and your time, if you have a partial reserve with everyone but a seeming reserve with no one, if you work to be interesting rather than spend to be a good fellow, you will get along with your superiors, your subordinates, your roommate, and the human race."

It is easy enough to chart a course for the individual who is wise enough to make human relationships his main concern. But getting the knack of it is sufficiently more difficult, that it is safe to say more talk has been devoted to this subject than to any other topic of conversation since Noah quit the Ark. From Confucius down to Emily Post, greater and lesser minds have worked at gentling the human race. By the scores of thousands, precepts and platitudes have been written for the guidance of personal conduct. The odd part of it is that despite all of this outpouring, most of the frictions in modern society arise from the individual's feeling of inferiority, his false pride, his vanity, his unwillingness to yield space to any other man, and his consequent urge to throw his own weight around. Goethe said that the quality that best enables a man to renew his own life, in his relation to others, is to become capable of renouncing particular things at the right moment in order warmly to embrace something new in the next.

That is earthy advice for any officer. For who is regarded as the strong person in military service—the individual who fights with tooth and nail to hold to a particular post or privilege? Not at all! The highest respect is given only to him who at all times is willing to yield his place to a worthy successor, because of an ingrained confidence that he can himself succeed as greatly in some other sphere.

For a fresh start in this study of getting along with people, we could not do better than quote what was published years ago in the United States Coast Guard magazine. Under the title "Thirteen Mistakes," the

coastguardsmen raised their warning flares above that many pitfalls. It is a mistake:

1. To attempt to set up your own standard of right and wrong.
2. To try to measure the enjoyment of others by your own.
3. To expect uniformity of opinions in the world.
4. To fail to make allowance for inexperience.
5. To endeavor to mold all dispositions alike.
6. Not to yield on unimportant trifles.
7. To look for perfection in our own actions.
8. To worry ourselves and others about what cannot be remedied.
9. Not to help everybody wherever, however, whenever we can.
10. To consider impossible what we cannot ourselves perform.
11. To believe only what our finite minds can grasp.
12. Not to make allowances for the weakness of others.
13. To estimate by some outside quality, when it is that within which makes the person.

The unobserving officer will perhaps dismiss this list as just so many cliches. The reflective one will accept it as a negative guide to positive conduct, for it engages practically every principle vital to the growth of a strong spiritual life in relation to one's fellow men.

Certain of these points stand out as prominently as pips on a radar screen to the military officer bent on keeping his own ship out of trouble. The morals contained in Points 4, 5, 12 and 13 all come to bear in the story told by Sgt. Fred Miller about Pvt. Fred Lang of Hospital No. 1 on Bataan. Miller had tried to do what he could for Lang, but no one else in the detachment was willing to give him a break. He was an unlettered hillbilly and, being ashamed of his own ignorance, he was shy toward other men. The rest of the story is best told in Miller's words.

"When the Japs made their first bombing run on Marivales, most of us, being new at war, huddled together under such cover as we could find. Some people were hit outside. We stayed where we were. But we looked out and saw Lang. He was trying to handle a stretcher by himself, dragging one end along the ground in an effort to bring in the wounded. I remember one member of our group remarking, 'Look at old Lang trying to do litter drill right in the middle of a war.' Lang was killed by an enemy bomb that night. I guess he had to die to make us understand that he was the best man."

There is hardly an American who has been in combat but can tell some other version of this same story, changing only the name and the surroundings. All too frequently it happens in the Services—we look at a man, and because at a casual inspection we do not like the cut of his jib, or the manner of his response, or are over-persuaded by what someone else has said about him, we reach a permanent con-

clusion about his possibilities, and either mentally write him off or limit our own ability to give him help.

That is especially likely to happen when the person is somewhat withdrawn, whether because he is the member of another race, or is illiterate or has been socially disadvantaged from some other cause. It is unfortunately particularly true of the attitude of too many males toward women in service: there is an upstaging, as if they did not truly belong, instead of a warm and respectful comradeship. The all-volunteer standard should make that stance as obsolete as the musket, for it obviously necessitates greater numbers of women in service.

It suffices to say that when any officer has the inexcusable fault that he makes snap judgments on his own people, he will not be any different in his relations with all other persons, and will stand in his own light for the duration of his career. This leads to one other observation. When any man, bearing a bad efficiency report, comes to a new organization, it is a fact to be noted with mild interest, but without any prejudice whatever. Every new assignment means a clean slate, and there should be no hangover from what has happened, including the possible mistaken judgments of others. The system was never intended to give a dog a bad name. To be perpetually supervised, questioned, and shadowed is to be doubted, and doubt destroys confidence and creates fear, slyness, and discontent in the other individual. Every person is entitled to a fresh hold on security with a new superior. Any wise and experienced senior commander will tell you this, and will cite examples of men who came to him with a spotty record, who started nervously, began to pick up after realizing that they were not going to get another kick, and went on to become altogether superior. For any right-minded commander, it is far more gratifying to be able to salvage human material than to take over an organization that is sound from bottom to top.

However, the truth in Point 9 applies universally. The studied effort to be helpful in all of our relations with our fellow men, and to give help not grudgingly, but cheerfully, courteously and in greater measure than is expected, is the high road to wide influence and personal strength of character. More than all else, it is the little kindnesses in life that bind men together and help each wayfarer to start the day right. These human touches are like bread cast upon the water; they ultimately nourish the giver more than the direct beneficiary. One of our best-known corps commanders in the Pacific during World War II made it a rule that if any man serving under him, however unimportant, was promoted or given any other recognition, he would write a letter to the man's wife or mother, saying how proud he felt. He was not a great tactician or strategist. But because of the little things he did, men loved him and would ride to hell for him, and their collective moral strength became the bastion of his professional success.

Of Maj. Gen. Henry T. Allen, who commanded our Army of Occupation in Germany after the first world war, a distinguished contemporary once said: "It surprised us that Allen did so well: in the old Army we regarded him as a swashbuckler." Maybe that was because Allen was a cavalryman and liked to strut, and he liked to see chestiness in his own people, right down to the last file. But General Allen was infinitely considerate of the dignity of other men, and he disciplined himself to further their growth and give them some mark of his thoughtful regard so far as lay within his power. It was because of his rich understanding of humanity, and not through any genial slackness, that he kept a tight hold on discipline. To the units he commanded he gave his own tone. He warmed men instead of chilling them with fear. Thousands returned to civil life better equipped for the passage because of what they had seen him do and heard him say.

So we can link Points 1, 6, 7, and 8 from the Coast Guard's list into one binding truth not less essential to sound officership than to action anywhere that seeks the cooperation and goodwill of men: It is not more blessed to be right than to be loved; Henry Clay's remark that he would rather be right than President notwithstanding. The absolute perfectionist is the most tiresome of men, and a waster of time and nerves. The stickler, the fly-speckler, the bully, and the sadist serve only to load down those parts of the establishment they touch; their subordinates spend part of their own strength clearing away the wreckage these misfits make.

Other than these comments, it is not necessary to say a great deal about the inner qualities that give an officer a free-wheeling adjustment with other persons in all walks of life. Once again, however, it might be well to speak of the importance of enthusiasm, cheerfulness, kindness, courtesy, and justice, which are the safeguards of honor and the tokens of mutual respect between one person and another. This last there must be if people are to go forward together, prosper in one another's company, find strength in the bonds of mutual service, and experience a common felicity in the relationship between the leader and the led.

But it is sadly the case that the reputation of anyone, as to what he is inside, is formed in large measure by what others see of him from the outside. That is what makes poignant the story of Pvt. Fred Lang; like a singed cat, he was better than he looked. In the military service, more than elsewhere in life, manners heavily weight the balance, for the twin reasons that the uniform invariably makes its wearer conspicuous, and that from the public point of view the military officer is supposed to look the part. He is expected to be the embodiment of character, given to forthright but amiable speech, capable of expressing his ideas and purpose clearly, careful of customs and good usage, while carrying himself with poise and assurance. For if he does not

have the aura of vitality, confidence, and reflection that is expected in a leader, it will be suspected that he is incapable of playing the part. However unfairly discriminating that judgment may seem to be in comparison with the attitude toward other professions, it has a logical basis. The people are willing to forgive preoccupation in all others, since how an engineer dresses has no relation to his skill as a mathematician, and when a doctor mumbles, it doesn't suggest that he would be clumsy with a scalpel. But when people meet an uncivil or unkempt officer, or see an untidy soldier, airman, or bluejacket on the street, they worry that the national defense is going bad. One reason for the great prestige of the Marine Corps is that the public seldom, if ever, sees a sloppy marine, though its members do sometimes look a little gruesome on the field of battle.

The officer body does have its share of "characters." Some are men born in an uncommon mold, with a great deal of natural phlegm in their systems, a gift for salty speech, and a tendency to drawl their words as if their thoughts were being raised from a deep well. Usually, they are men of extraordinary power, and are worth any dozen of that individual who scuttles about like a water bug, making an exhibition of great energy but, like the whirling dervish, keeping in such constant motion that he has no chance to observe what goes on under his nose. Here, as in all things, it is steadiness that does it. The blunt soldier or the old sea-dog type of naval officer is endurable and even lovable in the eyes of most people when he has done his scrapping with fire rather than firewater, when his personal credentials are sound, and when his outward manner is bluff in both meanings of the word. But the fakers who affect the crusty manner, the glaring eye, and the jutting jaw, simply because they are wearing military suits and think mistakenly that these things are in the tradition, will be recognized as counterfeit as quickly as a three dollar bill.

There is nothing else that serves as well as the natural manner, with some polishing of the surfaces here and there and a general tightening at the corners.

While a partial check list is not likely to reform the establishment overnight, if kept simple enough, it may afford help to an occasional individual instead of giving him the fear that he is falling apart at the seams.

At the same time he is making a favorable impression on all who see him. Clumsy, one-sided postures, fidgeting on a chair, slouching while sitting or standing, moving along at a shambling gait, and speaking with the chin down on the chest produce quite the opposite effect. Rightly or wrongly they are taken as a sign of indolence, fatigue, or inattention. There is always an hour for complete physical relaxation, for stretching and letting the muscles rest; Winston Churchill attributed a large part of his vigor and recuperative powers to the habit of taking a 30-minute cat nap in midday. That is a smart trick if one can master it.

In the Services, as in any situation in life in which deference to high opinion is compelled by the nature of an undertaking, the younger hands will do well to consider the wisdom of the precept, "Be patient with your betters."

It is lamentably bad judgment to act by any other rule. Where differences of opinions exist, time and forbearance often will work the desired change, though stubbornness or rudeness would utterly fail. More than that, a junior owes this much consideration to any senior whose heart is in the right place. It is bad manners and poor tactics to attempt publicly to score a victory over a senior in any dispute, or to try by wit to gain the upper hand of him in the presence of others. Though the point may be gained for the moment, it is usually at the cost of one's personal hold on the confidence of the senior.

But there is also the other side of the case—that the superior should deal considerately with any earnest proposal from his subordinate, rather than dash cold water in his face just because he has not thought through his proposition. One of the best-loved American editors, Grove Patterson, of Toledo, Ohio, was remembered by every young journalist who ever came under him because of the care with which he supported every man's pride. A youngster would go in to him filled with enthusiasm for some idea that he himself had not bothered to view in the round. Patterson would listen carefully, and would then say: "That's a corking idea. Take it and work it out carefully, going over every aspect of it. Then bring it back to me." On second thought, the youngster would begin having his own doubts, and would shortly begin hoping that the chief would forget all about the subject, which he invariably did. Many celebrated commanders in our military Services have won the lasting affection of their subordinates by employing exactly this method.

Men like the direct glance. They feel flattered by it, particularly when they are talking; and in conversation they like to be heard through, not interrupted in mid-passage. That is true whatever their station. Nobody likes to be bored, but fully half of boredom comes from lack of the habit of careful listening. The man who will not listen never develops wits enough to distinguish between a bore and a sage and therefore cannot pick the best company. The vacant stare, the drifting of eyes from the speaker to a window or a picture or a passing blonde, though greatly tempting in the midst of long discourse, are taken only as signs of inattention. Many a young officer called on the carpet for some trivial business has managed to square himself with his commander just by looking straight and talking straight in the few moments that decided his future.

Elsewhere in this book, a great deal is said about the importance of the voice and of developing one's powers of conversation. Little need be added here. But there is no excuse for the officer who so muffles his voice that others must strain to hear what he is saying—unless he

is suffering from laryngitis. It is simple enough to keep the chin up and let the words roll out. Many persons have the bad habit of letting the voice drop at the end of a sentence; the effect on the other party is like watching a man run away from a fight. For clear understanding and to create a good impression, there should be a cheerful lift upward at the end of a sentence.

Also, officers who look at lecturing simply as part of the routine tend to fall into either the singsong rhythm one frequently hears in college professors and certain radio announcers, or go all out for the sonorous intonations beloved by many of the clergy. Many young officers get into these same cadences whenever they talk to men, and before they know it they are trying the same thing in the family circle. They sound like alarm clocks running down, but instead of arousing the house they are an invitation to slumber. Either on the lecture platform or in person-to-person conversation, there is no valid reason why it is ever necessary to take the tone which suggests that the talk is one-sided. Words can be crisply uttered and still be personally directed, but not if the speaker is looking at the floor, the moon, or the rafters. To discuss a question amicably is the best way to gain clear insight into it; when a man argues violently, his purpose usually is not to serve wisdom but to prevail despite his lack of it, thus stultifying both himself and his adversary.

Clothes are important. They have to be. Even streakers cannot go very far without them. But a fresh press counts more than a new suit by a Fifth Avenue tailor left unpressed, and neatness beats lavishness any day of the week.

Carefulness in the little things counts much. Men and women develop an aversion to the individual who cannot remember their names, their titles or their stations, but they will warm to the person who remembers, and they will overlook most of his other shortcomings. Likewise, they are won by any words of appreciation or of interest in what they are doing. Get a person talking about his business, his hobby or his family, and you are on the inside track toward his friendship. As for senior commanders, when the hour comes for them to bat the ball back and forth in friendly conversation, there is nothing they enjoy more than reminiscing about experiences in battle. Other than inveterate surgical patients, no one can outdo them in talking about their operations.

It isn't lengthy advice that is needed on this subject, since the person commissioned is considered to have graduated from at least the kindergarten of good manners. What counts is simply caring about it, not to be ingratiating to other people but for the sake of one's own dignity and self-respect.

Officers owe it to themselves, to their families, to the country, and to their Service to participate in the civic affairs in their communities. Since the Defense Department is one of the truly vital institutions

of the Nation, officers also have the moral obligation to do whatever they can to promote close, cordial relations between the American public and the Armed Forces.

Only an informed, alert, and sympathetic public can give the Armed Forces the support they need. A truism often overlooked or forgotten by too many officers is that, in the final analysis, our Armed Services are as good and as efficient, and have the means to perform their missions only to the extent that they have public backing. And the public in the United States is the civilian population that pays the taxes, supplies the men for the Armed Forces, and elects the President and the Congress who shape our military policies.

An officer sheds neither his rights nor his obligations as an American citizen. For obvious reasons he must avoid active participation in partisan politics, although he has the same obligation as the civilian citizen to vote in elections.

Too often, however, officers of the Armed Forces tend to forget they are part of the community in which they live, or of the community adjacent to the post or base where they are quartered. All too frequently do they form into groups and set themselves apart from the civilian community at large.

One last point must be made which is as appropriate here as under any other heading. American forces today do routine duty on foreign soil in many parts of the globe. They are there by grace of our friends and because of our mutual need, in order that world peace may be preserved and the Communist tide restrained from flooding every free land.

It is something new in human affairs. There is no higher tribute to the American military character, to the gentility and wisdom of leadership, as well as to the decency and understanding of our average person in uniform, than that this has gone on for many years and our presence is still welcomed and honored by peoples to whom we were once strangers and whose customs and traditions we thought of as being wholly alien to our own. Experience with them has made us wiser and more greatly aware that many of the ideals they hold high in common with us have made us more alike than unlike.

Few things are more vital to the foreign policy and security of the United States than that our relationships be maintained at the highest possible level. That there are periodic setbacks due to stresses not subject to control by the military but makes that part of the mission more urgent. "Diplomats and Warriors" may sound like a corny phrase but it expresses the central idea. The acts and words of an American military officer abroad have tenfold the impact for good or evil of anything done by the touring civilian. Though love may not always be won, any officer may bear himself as if believing that because he is an American, everything he does has consequence. The dignity and majesty of the United States are part of his keeping and he does not

disavow them when he gets out of uniform. That awareness should not make him overreact due to self-consciousness, if he is truly fit for a commission. For being a special ambassador of his country is part of the contract.

The way is clear. We are there as guests, with all those obligations of courtesy, respect, and honor that attend the role. But we are there as friends, also, joining hands with them in a great endeavor that will be furthered to the extent that the working partnership is made more congenial. To get to know them better, and to enable them to see us with clearer eyes, make up half the task and its most rewarding part.

It is primarily an information undertaking. The officer on duty abroad is charged to become a student of the history, culture, customs, and geography of the nation temporarily his home. If he commands forces, or holds any position where he may influence their thoughts, it is his duty to further their education in these matters and to stimulate their interest in pursuing the same kind of knowledge.

"It's a large order. It takes time. I haven't enough of it." For once, no one can fall back on the old familiar excuse. Thousands of American officers since World War II have made this kind of adjustment to the overseas environment, and the payoff in increased goodwill has been such that command has little patience with those who resist it.

Chapter 7

LEADERS AND LEADERSHIP

In that gallery of great Americans whose names are conspicuously identified with the prospering of the national arms in peace and war, there are almost as many types as there are men.

There were a certain few qualities they had to possess in common or their names would never have become known beyond the county line.

But these were inner qualities, often deeply buried, rather than outward marks of greatness that men recognized immediately upon beholding them.

Some almost missed the roll call, either because in early life their weaknesses were more apparent than their strengths, or because of an outward seeming of insignificance, which at first fooled their contemporaries.

In the minority are the few who seemed marked for greatness almost from the cradle, and were acclaimed for leadership while still of tender years.

Winfield Scott, a brigadier in the war of 1812 when brigadiers were few, and Chief of Staff when the Civil War began, is a unique figure in the national history.

George Washington, Adjutant of the State of Virginia at 21, is one other military infant prodigy who never later belied his early fame.

The majority in the gallery are not like these. No two of them are strikingly alike in mien and manner. Their personalities are as different, for the most part, as their names. Their characters also ran the length of the spectrum, or nearly, if we are talking of moral habit rather than of conscientious performance of military duty. Some drank their whiskey neat and frequently; others loathed it and took a harsh line with any subordinate who used it.

One of the greatest generals in American history, celebrated for his fighting scarcely more than for his tippling, would walk from the room if any man tried to tell an off-color story in his presence. One of the most celebrated and successful of our World War II admirals endeared himself to millions of men in all ranks by his trick of gathering his chief subordinates together just before battle, issuing his orders sternly and

surely, and then relaxing long enough to tell them his latest parlor story, knowing that finally it would trickle down through the whole command.

In Korea, one infantry division commander was a skilled banjo player. Up at the front, he formed a small orchestra of enlisted men and fitted into it. Between fire fights, they played for troops. The men loved him for it. Later, he became one of the Army's ranking generals and was named to one of its top posts. His name: Arthur G. Trudeau.

Among the warriors in this gallery are men who would bet a month's pay on a horse race. There are duellists and brawlers, athletes and aesthetes, men who lived almost saintly lives and scholars who lived more for learning than for fame.

Some tended to be so over-reclusive that they almost missed recognition; others were hail-fellow-well-met in any company.

Their methods of work reflected these extreme variations in personal type, as did the means they used to draw other men to them, thereby setting a foundation for real success.

Part of their number commanded mainly through the sheer force of ideas; others owed their leadership more to the magnetism of dynamic personality.

In the very few there was the spark of genius. All things seemed to come right with them at all times. Fate was kind, the openings occurred, and they were prepared to take advantage of them.

But the greater number moved up the hill one slow step at a time, not always sure of their footing, buffeted by mischance, owning no exalted opinion of their own merits, reacting to discouragement much as other men do, but finally accumulating power as they learned how to organize the work of other men.

While a young lieutenant, Admiral Sims became so incensed when the United States would not take his word on a voucher that he offered to resign.

General Grant signally failed to organize his life as an individual before a turn of the wheel gave him his chance to organize the military power of the United States in war.

General Sherman, who commanded the Army for almost 15 years, was considered by many of his close friends to be a fit subject for confinement as a mental case just before the Civil War.

General Meade, one of the calmest and most devoted of men in his family relationships, lacked confidence in his own merits and was very abusive of his associates during battle.

Admiral Farragut, whose tenderness as an individual was demonstrated during the 16 years in which he personally nursed an invalid wife, was so independent in his professional thought and action that both in and out of the Navy he was discredited as a "climber." He got into wretched quarrels with his superiors mainly because he felt his assignments afforded him no distinction. The Civil War gave him his opportunity.

General Winfield Scott, as firm a commander as any in our history, plagued the Army with his petty bickering over rank, seniority, and precedent.

Being human, they had their points of personal weakness. A newly appointed ensign or second lieutenant also has chinks in his armor, and sometimes views them in such false proportion that he doubts his own potential for high responsibility.

There is not one perfect life in the gallery of the great. All were molded by the mortal influences surrounding them. They reacted in their own feelings, and toward other men, according to the rise and fall of their personal fortunes. They sought help where it could be found. When disappointed, they chilled like anyone else. But along with their professional talents, they possessed in common a desire for substantial recognition, accompanied by the will to earn it fairly, or else the Nation would never have heard their names.

All in all it is a much mixed gallery. If we were to pass it in review and then inspect it carefully, it would still be impossible to say: "This is the composite of character. This is the prototype of military success. Model upon it and you have the pinnacle within reach."

The same thing would no doubt hold true of a majority of the better men who commanded ships, squadrons, regiments, and companies under these commanders, and at their own level were as superior in leadership as the relatively few who rose to national prominence because of the achievements of the general body.

The same rule will apply tomorrow. Those who come forward to fill these places, and to command them with equal or greater authority and competence, will not be plaster saints, laden with all human virtue, spotless in character, and fit to be anointed with a superman legend by some future Parson Weems. They will be men with ambition and a strong belief in the United States and the goodness of a free society. They will have some of the average man's faults and maybe a few of his vices. But certainly they will possess the qualities of courage, creative intelligence, and physical robustness in more than average measure.

What we know of our great leaders in the current age should discourage the idea that only a genius may scale the heights. Trained observers have noted in their personalities and careers many of the plain characteristics each man feels in himself and mistakenly regards as a bar to preferment.

Drew Middleton, the American correspondent, wrote of General Carl "Tooey" Spaatz: "This man, who may be a heroic figure to our grandchildren, is essentially an unheroic figure to his contemporaries. He is, in fact, such a friendly, human person that observers tend to minimize his stature as a war leader. He is not temperamental. He makes no rousing speeches, writes no inspirational orders. Spaatz, in issuing orders for a major operation involving 1,500 airplanes, is about as inspiring as a groceryman ordering another five cases of canned peas."

An interviewer who called on General Ira C. Eaker when he was leading the 8th Air Force against Germany found "a strikingly soft-spoken, sober, compact man who has the mild manner of a conservative minister and the judicial outlook of a member of the Supreme Court. But he is always about two steps ahead of everybody on the score, and there is a quiet, inexorable logic about everything he does." Of his own choice, Eaker would have separated from military service after World War I. He wanted to be a lawyer, and he also toyed with the idea of running a country newspaper. In his off hours, he wrote books on aviation for junior readers. On the side, he studied civil law and found it "valuable mental training."

On the eve of the Guadalcanal landing, General A. A. Vandegrift's final order to his command ended with the stirring and now celebrated phrase: "God favors the bold and strong of heart." Yet in the afterglow of later years, the Nation read a character sketch of him that included this: "He is so polite and so soft-spoken that he is continually disappointing the people whom he meets. They find him lacking in the fire-eating traits they like to expect of all marines, and they find it difficult to believe that such a mild-mannered man could really have led and won the bloody fight." When another officer spoke warmly of Vandegrift's coolness under fire, his "grace under pressure," to quote Hemingway's phrase, he replied: "I shouldn't be given any credit. I'm built that way."

The point is beautifully taken. Too often the man with great inner strength holds in contempt those less well endowed by nature than himself.

Brilliance of intellect and high achievement in scholarship are an advantage, though in the end they have little or no payoff if character and courage are lacking. Thousands of officers who served in Vietnam, some dubious about the wisdom of the national policy, questioning whether the tight rein on operations made military sense, still believed that "My country right or wrong" is the only course possible for one who has taken the oath.

No, brain trusting and whizz kidding are not what it takes. Of 105 major generals who served in World War I, 56 had failed to score above the middle of their class in mathematics. Of 275 in World War II, 158, or 58 percent, were in the middle group or among the dubs in the same subject. General William C. Westmoreland, who commanded in Vietnam and was later Army Chief of Staff, had punched practically none of the buttons. As for military schooling, for over 30 years after graduating from West Point, he attended only Cooks and Bakers School and the Airborne School. One of his outstanding subordinates, a two-star general, respected and loved by all who served under him, had joined the service at the age of 15 out of reform school to straighten himself out. By sweat and study, he won his sergeant's stripes at 18 and his commission at 21. He made his resolve and stayed with it, which was

the main thing. The solution of every problem, every achievement is, as Justice Holmes said, a bird on the wing; and he added, one must have one's whole will on one's eye on that bird. One cannot be thinking of one's image, or one's place in history—only of that bird.

While there are no perfect men, there are those who become relatively perfect leaders of men because something in their makeup brings out in strength the highest virtues of all who follow them. That is the way of human nature. Minor shortcomings do not impair the loyalty or growth of the follower who has found someone whose strengths he deems worth emulating. On the other hand, to recognize merit, you must yourself have it. The act of recognizing the worthwhile traits in another person is both the test and the making of character. The man who scorns all others and thinks no one else worth following parades his own inferiority before the world. He puts his own character into bankruptcy just as surely as does that other sad sack of whom Thomas Carlyle wrote: "To recognize false merit, and crown it as true, because a long trail runs after it, is the saddest operation under the sun."

Sherman, Logan, Rawlins, and the many others hitched their wagons to Grant's star because they saw in him a man who had a way with other men, and who commanded them not less by personal courage than by patient work in their interest. Had Grant spent time brooding over his own civilian failures, he would have been struck with a disorderly camp and would never have gotten out of Illinois. He was not dismayed by his own shortcomings. Later he said: "I doubt that any of my officers ever discovered that I hadn't bothered to study tactics."

The nobility of the private life and influence of General Robert E. Lee and the grandeur of his military character are known to every American school boy. His peerless gifts as a battle leader have won the tribute of celebrated soldiers and historians throughout the world. Likewise, the deep religiosity of his great lieutenant, Stonewall Jackson, the fiery zeal and almost evangelical power with which he lifted the hearts of all men who followed him, are hallmarks of character that are vividly present in whatever context his name happens to be mentioned.

If we turn for a somewhat closer look at Grant, it is because he, more than any other American soldier, left us a full, clear narrative of his own growth, and of the inner thoughts and doubts pertaining to himself which attended his life experience. There was a great deal of the average man in Grant. He was beset by human failings. He could not look impressive. He had no sense of destiny. In his great hours, it was sweat, rather than inspiration, dogged perseverance, rather than the aura of power, that made the hour great.

Average though he was in many things, there was nothing average about the strong way in which he took hold, applying massive common sense to the complex problems of the field. That is why he is worth close regard. His virtues as a military leader were of the simpler sort that plain men may understand and hope to emulate. He was direct in

manner. He never intrigued. His speech was homely. He was approachable. His mind never deviated from the object. Though a stubborn man, he was always willing to listen to his subordinates. He never adhered to a plan obstinately, but nothing could induce him to forsake the idea behind the plan.

History has left us a clear view of how he attained to greatness in leadership by holding steadfastly to a few main principles.

At Belmont, his first small action, he showed nothing to indicate that he was competent as a tactician and strategist. But the closing scene reveals him as the last man to leave the field of action, risking his life to see that none of his men had been left behind.

At Fort Donelson, where he had initiated an amphibious campaign of highly original daring, he was not on the battlefield when his army was suddenly attacked. He arrived to find his right wing crushed and his whole force on the verge of defeat. He blamed no one. Without more than a fleeting hesitation, he said quietly to his chief subordinates: "Gentlemen, the position on the right must be retaken." Then he mounted his horse and galloped along the line shouting to his men: "Fill your cartridge cases quick; the enemy is trying to escape and he must not be permitted to do so." Control and order were immediately reestablished by his presence.

At Shiloh the same thing happened, only this time it was worse; the whole Union Army was on the verge of rout. Grant, hobbling on crutches from a recent leg injury, met the mob of panic-stricken stragglers as he left the boat at Pittsburgh Landing. Calling on them to turn back, he mounted and rode toward the battle, shouting encouragement and giving orders to all he met. Confidence flowed from him back into an already beaten Army, and in this way a field nearly lost was soon regained, with decisive help provided by Buell's Army.

The last and best picture of Grant is on the evening after he had taken his first beating from General Lee in the campaign against Richmond. He was new with the Army of the Potomac. His predecessors, after being whipped by Lee, had invariably retreated to a safe distance. But this time, as the defeated army took the road of retreat out of the Wilderness, its columns got only as far as the Chancellorsville House crossroad. There the soldiers saw a squat, bearded man sitting horseback, and drawing on a cigar. As the head of each regiment came abreast of him, he silently motioned it to take the right-hand fork—back toward Lee's flank and deeper than ever into the Wilderness. That night, for the first time, the Army sensed an electric change in the air over Virginia. It had a man.

"I intend to fight it out on this line" is more revealing of the one supreme quality that put the seal on all of U. S. Grant's great gifts for military leading than everything else that the historians have written of him. He was the essence of the spirit that moderns call "seeing the show through." He was sensitive to a fault in his early years, and carried to

his tomb a dislike for military uniform, caused by his being made the butt of ridicule the first time he ever donned a soldier suit. As a junior officer in the Mexican War, he sensed no particular aptitude in himself. But he had participated in every engagement possible for a member of his regiment, and had executed every small duty well, with particular attention to conserving the lives of his men. This was the school and the course that later enabled him to march to Richmond, when men's lives had to be spent for the good of the Nation.

In more recent times, one of the great statesmen and soldiers of the United States, Henry L. Stimson, has added his witness to the value of this force in all enterprise: "I know the withering effect of limited commitments and I know the regenerative effect of full action." Though he was speaking particularly of the larger affairs of war and national policy, his words apply with full weight to the personal life. The truth seen only halfway is missed wholly; the thing done only halfway had best not be attempted at all. Men can't be fooled on this score. They will know every time when the arrow falls short for lack of a worthwhile effort. And when that happens, confidence in the leader is corroded, even among those who themselves were unwilling to try.

There have been great and distinguished leaders in our military Services at all levels who had no particular gifts for administration and little for organizing the detail of decisive action either within battle or without. They excelled because of a superior ability to make use of the brains and command the loyalty of well-chosen subordinates. Their particular function was to judge the goal according to their resources and audacity, and then to hold the team steady until the goal was gained. So doing, they complemented the power of the faithful lieutenants who might have put them in the shade in any IQ test. Wrote Grant: "I never knew what to do with a paper except to put it in a side pocket or pass it to a clerk who understood it better than I did." There was nothing unfair or irregular about this, it was as it should be. All military achievement develops out of unity of action. The laurel goes to the man whose powers can most surely be directed toward the end purposes of organization. The winning of battles is the product of the winning of men. That aptitude is not an endowment of formal education, though the man who has led a football team, a class, a fraternity or a debating society is the stronger for the experience he has gained. It is not unusual for those who have excelled in scholarship to despise those who have excelled merely in sympathetic understanding of the human race. But in the military Services, though there are niches for the pedant, character is at all times at least as vital as intellect, and the main rewards go to him who can make other men feel toughened as well as elevated.

Quiet resolution.

The hardihood to take risks.

The will to take full responsibility for decision.

The readiness to share its rewards with subordinates.

An equal readiness to take the blame when things go adversely.

The nerve to survive storm and disappointment and to face toward each new day with the scoresheet wiped clean, neither dwelling on one's successes nor accepting discouragement from one's failures.

In these things lie a great part of the essence of leadership, for they are the constituents of that kind of moral courage that has enabled one man to draw many others to him in any age.

It is good, also, to look the part, not only because of its effect on others, but because, from out of the effort made to look it, one may in time come to be it. One of the kindliest and most penetrating philosophers of our age, Abbé Ernest Dimnet, has assured us that this is true. He says that by trying to look and act like a socially distinguished person, one may in fact attain to the inner disposition of a gentleman. That, almost needless to say, is the real mark of the officer who takes great pains about the manner of his dress and address, for as Walt Whitman said: "All changes of appearances without a change in that which underlies appearances are without avail." All depends upon the spirit in which one makes the effort. By his own account, U. S. Grant, as a West Point cadet, was more stirred by the commanding appearance of General Winfield Scott than by any man he had ever seen, including the President. He wrote that at that moment there flashed across his mind the thought that some day he would stand in Scott's place. Grant was unkempt of dress. His physical endowments were such that he could never achieve the commanding air of Scott. But he left us his witness that Scott's military bearing helped kindle his own desire for command, even though he knew that he could not be like Scott.

Much is said in favor of modesty as an asset in leadership. It is remarked that the man who wishes to hold the respect of others will mention himself not more frequently than a born aristocrat mentions his ancestor. However, the point can be labored too hard. Some of the ablest of the Nation's military commanders have been anything but shrinking violets; we have had now and then a hero who could boast with such gusto that this very characteristic somehow endeared him to his men. But that would be a dangerous tack for all save the most exceptional individual. Instead of speaking of modesty as a charm that will win all hearts, thereby risking that through excessive modesty a man will become tiresome to others and rated as too timid for high responsibility, it would be better to dwell upon the importance of being natural, which means neither concealing nor making a vulgar display of one's ideals and motives, but acting directly according to his dictates.

This leads to another point. In several of the most celebrated commentaries written by higher commanders on the nature of generalship, the statement is made rather carelessly that to be capable of great mili-

tary leadership a man must be something of an actor. If that were unqualifiedly true, then it would be a desirable technique likewise for any junior officer; he, too, should learn how to wear a false face and play a part that cloaks his real self. The hollowness of the idea is proved by the lives of such men as Robert E. Lee, W. T. Sherman, George C. Marshall, Omar N. Bradley, Carl A. Spaatz, William H. Simpson, Chester A. Nimitz, Harold K. Johnson, Matthew B. Ridgway, Lew Walt, Creighton W. Abrams and John S. McCain, Jr., to mention only a few. As commanders, they were all as natural as children, though some had great natural reserve, and others were warm and much more outgoing. They expressed themselves straightforwardly rather than by artful striving for effect. There was no studied attempt to appear only in a certain light. To use the common word for it, their people did not regard them as "characters." This naturalness had much to do with their hold on other men.

Such a result will always come. He who concentrates on the object at hand has little need to worry about the impression he is making on others. Even though they detect the chinks in the armor, they will know that the armor will hold.

On the other hand, a sense of the dramatic values, coupled with the intelligence to play upon them skillfully, is an invaluable quality in any military leader. Though there was nothing of the "actor" in Grant, he understood the value of pointing things up. To put a bold or inspiring emphasis where it belongs is not stagecraft but an integral part of the military fine art of communicating. System that is only system is injurious to the mind and spirit of any normal person. One can play a superior part well and maintain prestige and dignity, without being under the compulsion to think, speak, and act in a monotone. In fact, when any military commander becomes over-inhibited along these lines because of the illusion that this is the way to build a reputation for strength, he but doubles the necessity for his subordinates to act at all times like human beings rather than robots.

Coupled with self-control, consideration and thoughtfulness will carry a man far. Men will warm toward a leader when they come to believe that all the energy he stores up by living somewhat within himself is at their service. But when they feel that this is not the case, and that his reserve is simply the outward sign of a spiritual miserliness and concentration on purely personal goals, no amount of restraint will ever win their favor. This is as true of him who commands a whole Service as of the leader of a squad.

To speak of the importance of a sense of humor would be futile, if it were not that what cramps so many men isn't that they are by nature humorless as that they are hesitant to exercise what humor they possess. Within the military profession, this is as unwise as to let the muscles go soft or to spare the mind the strain of original thinking.

Great humor has always been in the military tradition. The need of it is nowhere more delicately expressed than in Kipling's lines:

My son was killed while laughing at some jest,
I would I knew
What it was, and it might serve me in a time
When jests are few.

Marcus Aurelius, Rome's soldier philosopher, spoke of his love for the man who "could be humorous in an agreeable way." No reader of Grant's *Memoirs* (one of the few truly great autobiographies ever written by a soldier) could fail to be impressed by his light touch. A delicate sense of the incongruous seems to have pervaded him; he is at his whimsical best when he sees himself in a ridiculous light. Lord Kitchener, one of the grimmest warriors ever to serve the British Empire, warmed to the man who made him the butt of a practical joke. There is the unforgettable picture of Admiral Beatty at Jutland. The *Indefatigable* has disappeared beneath the waves. The *Queen Mary* had exploded. The *Lion* was in flames. Then word came that the *Princess Royal* was blown up. Said Beatty to his Flag Captain, "Chatfield, there seems to be something wrong with our—ships today. Turn two points nearer the enemy." Admiral Nimitz, surveying the terrible landscape of the Kwajalein battlefield for the first time, said gravely to his staff: "It's the worst devastation I've ever seen except for that last Texas picnic in Honolulu." There is a characteristic anecdote of General Patton. He had just been worsted by higher headquarters in an argument over strategy. So he sat talking to his own staff about it, his dog curled up beside him. Suddenly he said to the animal: "The trouble with you, too, Willy, is that you don't understand the big picture." General Eisenhower, probably more than any other modern American commander, had the art of winning with his humor. He would have qualified under the English essayist Sydney Smith's definition: "The meaning of an extraordinary man is that he is eight men in one man; that he has as much wit as if he had no sense, and as much sense as if he had no wit; that his conduct is as judicious as if he were the dullest of human beings, and his imagination as brilliant as if he were irretrievably ruined."

In Korea, just before the first battle of Pork Chop Hill began, Lt. Thomas V. Harrold heard a loud wailing from the Communist trench and asked his company its meaning.

"They're prayer singing," said an interpreter. "They're getting ready to die."

Said Harrold: "Then I guess we ought to be singing too."

And not a bad idea. The 1st Marine Division, fighting its way back from the Chosin Reservoir in December 1950, was embattled amid the snows from the moment the column struck its camp at Hagaru. By midnight, after heavy loss through the day, it had bivouacked at Kotori, still surrounded, still far from the sea. Maj. Gen. Oliver P. Smith was

alone in his tent. It was his bad moment. The task ahead seemed hopeless. Suddenly he heard music. Outside some truckers were singing the Marine Hymn. "All doubt left me," said Smith. "I knew then we had it made."

Concerning leadership within the terms here set forth, the final thought is that there is a radical difference between training and combat conditions.

In training the commander may be arbitrary, demanding, and a hard disciplinarian. But so long as his sense of fair play in handling his men becomes evident to them, and provided they become aware that what he is doing is making them more efficient than their competition, they will approve him, if grudgingly, stay loyal to him, and even possibly come to believe in his lucky star.

They are more likely to do it, however, if he takes a fatherly interest in their personal welfare. But that feeling doesn't have to come naturally to a man for him to win the respect of troops. If he knows his business, they're on his team.

When it comes to combat, something new is added. Even if they have previously looked on him as a father and believed absolutely that being with him is their best assurance of successful survival, should he then show himself to be timid and too cautious about his own safety, he will lose hold of them no less absolutely. His lieutenant, who up till then under training conditions has been regarded as a mean creature or a sniveler, but on the field suddenly reveals himself as a man of high courage, can take moral leadership of the company away from him, and do it in one day.

On the field there is no substitute for courage, no other binding influence toward unity of action. Troops will excuse almost any stupidity; excessive timidity is simply unforgiveable. This was the epitome of Captain Queeg's failure in *The Caine Mutiny*. Screwball that he was, and an oppressor of men, his other vices would have been tolerable had he, under fire, proved himself somewhat better than a coward.

Chapter 8

MAINSPRINGS OF LEADERSHIP

To what has been said just a few things should be added, so that the problem of generating greater powers of leadership among the officers may be seen in full dimension.

The counselor says: "Be forthright! Be articulate! Be confident! Be positive! Possess a commanding appearance!" The young man replies: "All very good, so far as it goes. I will, if I can. But tell me, how do I do these things?" He sees accurately enough the main point, that these manifestations are but derivatives of other inner qualities that must be possessed, if the leader is to travel the decisive mile between wavering capacity and resolute performance.

So the need is to get down to a few governing principles. Finding them, we may be able to resolve finally any argument as to whether leadership is a God-given power or may be acquired through earnest military teaching.

Two learned American commanders have spoken their thoughts on this subject. The weight of their comment is enhanced by the conspicuous success of both men in the field of moral leading.

Said the late Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, when Chief of Naval Operations: "I concur that we can take average good men and, by proper training, develop in them the essential initiative, confidence, and magnetism which are necessary in leadership. I believe that these qualities are present in the average men to a degree that he can be made a good leader if his native qualities are properly developed."

Said General C. B. Cates, when Commandant of the Marine Corps: "Leadership is intangible, hard to measure and difficult to describe. Its qualities would seem to stem from many factors. But certainly they must include a measure of inherent ability to control and direct, self-confidence based on expert knowledge, initiative, loyalty, pride, and a sense of responsibility. Inherent ability obviously cannot be instilled, but that which is latent or dormant can be developed. The average good man in our Service is and must be considered a potential leader."

There are common denominators in these two quotations that clearly point in one direction. When we accent the importance of extra initiative, expert knowledge, and a sense of responsibility, we are saying, in

other words, that out of unusual application to duty comes the power to lead others in the doing of it.

The matter is as simple and as profound as that; if we will consider for a moment, we will see why it could hardly be otherwise.

No normal young person is likely to recognize in himself the qualities that will persuade others to follow him. On the other hand, any individual who can carry out orders in a cheerful spirit, complete his work step by step, use imagination in improving it, and then when the job is done, can face toward his next duty with anticipation, need have no reason to doubt his own capacity for leadership.

But it does not follow that every person can be taught to lead. In most people, success or failure is caused more by mental attitude than by mental capacity. Many are unwilling to face the ordeal of thinking for themselves and of accepting responsibility for others. But the person determined to excel at his own work has already climbed the first rung of the ladder; in that process he perforce learns to think for himself while setting an example to those who are around him. Out of application to work comes capacity for original and creative progress. The personality characteristics, emotional balance, and so forth, which give him excellence in the things he does with his own brain and hand will enable him to command the respect, and in turn, the service of other people.

To this extent, certainly, leadership can be learned. It is a matter of mastering simple techniques that will give more effective expression to the character and natural talents of the individual.

It is therefore not an arbitrary standard for measuring leadership capacity in men and women that puts the ability to excel in assigned work above everything else. The willingness and ability to strive, and to do, are best judged by what we see of them in action. If they are indifferent to assigned responsibilities, they are bad risks for larger ones, no matter how charming their personalities or what the record says about their prior experience and educational advantages. Either that proposition is both reasonable and sound, or Arnold Bennett was singing off key when he said: "I think fine this necessity for the tense bracing of the will before anything worth doing can be done. It is the chief thing that distinguishes me from the cat by the fire."

Love of work is the sheet-anchor of the person who truly aspires to command responsibilities; that means love of it, not for the reward or for the skill exercised, but for the final and successful accomplishment of the work itself. For out of interest in the job comes thoroughness, and it is this quality above all that distinguishes the willing spirit. The willingness to learn, to study, and to try harder are requisite to individual progress and the improvement of opportunity—the process that Thomas Carlyle described as the "unfolding of one's self." Thus it can be taken as an axiom that any person can lead who is determined to become master of that knowledge which an increased responsibility

would require of him; and by the same token, that to achieve maximum efficiency at one's own working level, it is necessary to see it as if from the perspective of the next level up. To excel in the management of a squad, the leader must be knowledgeable of all that bears upon the command of a platoon. Otherwise the mechanism lacks something of unity.

Mark Twain said at one point that we should be thankful for the indolent, since but for them the rest of us could not get ahead. That's on target, and it emphasizes that how fast and far each of us travels is largely a matter of free choice.

Personal advancement within any worthwhile system requires some sacrifice of leisure and more careful attention to the better organization of one's working routine. But that does not demand self-sacrifice or the forfeiting of any of life's truly enduring rewards. It means putting the completion of work ahead of golf and bridge. It means rejecting the convenient excuse for postponing solution of the problem until the next time. It means cultivating the mind during hours that would otherwise be spent in idleness. It means concentrating for longer periods on the work at hand without getting up from one's chair. Yet after all, these things do not require any extraordinary faculty. The ability of the normal man to concentrate his thought and effort is mainly the product of a personal conviction that concentration is necessary and desirable. Abbé Dimnet said: "Concentration is supposed to be exceptional only because people do not try and, in this, as in so many things, starve within an inch of plenty." And as to the mien and manner that will develop from firm commitments, another wise Frenchman, Honoré Balzac, gave us this: "Conviction brings a silent, indefinable beauty into faces made of the commonest human clay." Here is a great part of the secret. It is in the exercise of the will that the men are separated from the boys, and that the officer who is merely anxious for advancement is set apart from the one who is truly ambitious to become superior in his life calling. Even a lazy-minded superior, in judging of his subordinates, will rarely mistake the one condition for the other.

When within the Services we hear the highest praise reserved for the man "with character," that is what the term means—application to duty and thoroughness in all undertakings, along with that maturity of spirit and judgment that comes by precept, by kindness, by study, by watching, and above all, by example. The numerous American commanders from all Services who have been accorded special honor because they rose from the ranks have invariably made their careers by the extra work, self-denial, and rigor which the truly good man does not hesitate to undertake. The question facing every young officer is whether he, too, is willing to walk that road for the rewards, material and spiritual, that will sure attend it.

There is always that commonest of excuses for rejecting the difficult and taking life easy. "I haven't time!" But for the man who keeps his

mind on the object, there is always time. Figure it out! About us in the Services daily we see busy men who somehow manage to find time for whatever is worth doing, while at the adjoining desks are others with abundant leisure who can't find time for anything. When something important requires doing, it is usually the busy man who gets the call.

Of the many personal decisions that life puts upon the military officer, the main one is whether he chooses to swim upstream. If he says yes to that, and means it, all things then begin to fit into place. Then will develop gradually but surely that well-placed inner confidence that is the foundation of military character. From the knowing of what to do comes the knowing of how to do, which is likewise important. The preeminent quality that all great commanders have owned in common is a positiveness of manner and of viewpoint, the power to concentrate on means to a given end, to the exclusion of exaggerated fears of the obstacles that lie athwart the course. Military service is no place for those who hang back and view through a glass darkly. The man who falls into the vice of thinking negatively must perforce in time become fearful of all action; he lacks the power of decision, because it has been destroyed by his habit of thought, and even when circumstances compel him to say yes, he remains uncommitted in spirit.

But the shadow should not be mistaken for the substance. Positiveness of manner and redoubtable inner conviction stem only from the mastery of superior knowledge, and this last is the fruit of application, preparation, thoroughness, and the willingness to struggle to gain the desired end.

Chapter 9

HUMAN NATURE

In the history of American arms, the most revealing chapter as to the nature of the human animal does not come from any story of the battlefield, but from the record of 23 white men and two Eskimos who, on August 26, 1881, set up in isolation a camp on the edge of Lady Franklin Bay to attempt a farthest north record for the United States.

The expedition under command of 1st Lt. A. W. Greely, USA, expected to be picked up by a relief ship after one year, or two years at most. Its supply could be stretched to cover the maximum period. But the winters were so unduly harsh that the rescue mission could not break through the ice to keep the rendezvous. During the first year, two members of the party had set a new far north mark. The party as a whole—3 officers, 19 enlisted men, 1 civilian surgeon, and the 2 natives —had survived a winter closer to the Pole than civilized men had ever lived before. They had remained in reasonably good personal adjustment to each other despite the Arctic monotony. The discipline of the camp had been strict. Rules of subordination, sanitation, work-sharing, and religious observance had been maintained without major friction. Lectures were given regularly, and schools were organized. Though it is recorded that the men became melancholy, sleepless, and irritable because of the long Arctic night, tempers were still so good that an honor system within the camp meted out extra duty to any man using an oath. The comradely feeling remained alive within the party throughout the first winter, though morale had its first blow when Greely issued an unwise order forbidding enlisted men to go more than 500 yards from the base without permission. The strain was beginning to tell, but there was no fatal rift in the working harmony of the group while supply and hope remained reasonably full.

June of the second year came and passed, and no relief ship arrived. In August, Greely decided on a retreat, intending to fall back on bases that were supposed to hold food stores. Thereafter disaster piled upon disaster, most of it having to do with the lack of food, and the varying animal and spiritual reactions of men to a situation of utmost desperation. When the Greely Expedition was at last rescued at Cape Sabine on June 22, 1884, by the third expedition—the Revenue Cutter Bear

and the Thetis under Commander Winfield S. Schley, USN—only seven men remained alive. Even in these, the spark of life was so feeble that their tent was down over them and they had resigned themselves to death. Two died soon after the rescue, leaving five. Most of the other 20 had perished of slow starvation, but not all. Some had been shot. Others had met death with utmost bravery trying to save their failing comrades.

All that happened to Greely's party during the months of terrible ordeal is known because of a diary that records also the main stresses—the fight of discipline against the primal instincts in men, the reversion of the so-called civilized man to his real type when he knows that death is at his elbow, the strength of unity that comes of comradeship, and also the weakness in some individuals that makes it impossible for them to measure up to honor's requirements.

Men are of all kinds. Some remain base, though given every opportunity to develop compassion. Others who may appear plodding and dull, and have been denied opportunity, still have in them an immortal spark of love for humanity that gives them an unbreakable bond with their fellows in the hours of crisis.

What the case history of the Greely Expedition indicates is that in the determining number of men, the potential is sound. Given wise, understanding leadership, they will stand together, and they will either persuade the others to go along, or they will help break them if they resist. If that were not the truth of the matter, no military commander in our time would be able to make his forces keep going in battle.

Until the end, discipline was maintained in Greely's force. But this was not primarily due to Lieutenant Greely, the aloof, strict disciplinarian who commanded by giving orders instead of by trying to command the spirits and loyalties of men. That any survived was due to the personal force and example of Sgt. (later Brig. Gen.) David L. Brainard, who believed in discipline as did Greely and supported his chief steadfastly, but also supplied the human warmth and helping hand that rallied other men, where Greely's strictures only made them want to fight back. Brainard was not physically the strongest man in the expedition, nor necessarily the most self-sacrificing and courageous. But he had what counted most—mental and moral balance.

Among the most fractious and self-centered of the individuals was the camp surgeon, highly trained and educated, and chosen because he seemed to have a way with men. Greely was several times at the point of having him shot; the surgeon's death by starvation saved Greely that embarrassment.

Among the most decent, trustworthy, and helpful was Jens, the simple Eskimo, who died trying to carry out a rescue mission. He had never been to school a day in his life.

There were soldiers in the party whom no threat of punishment or sense of pity could deter from taking advantage of their comrades, for

instance, rifling stores, cheating on duty, and even stealing arms in the hope of doing away with other survivors. When repeated offenses showed that they were unreformable, they were shot.

But in the greater number, the sense of pride and honor was stronger even than the instinct for self-preservation, though these were average enlisted men, not especially chosen because their records proved they had unusual fortitude.

Private Schneider, a youngster who loved dogs and played the violin, succumbed to starvation after penning one of the most moving deathbed statements ever written: "Although I stand accused of doing dishonest things here lately, I herewith, as a dying man, can say that the only dishonest thing I ever did was to eat my own sealskin boots and the part of my pants."

Private Fredericks, accused in the early and less trying period of meanness and injustice to his comrades, became a rock of strength in the weeks when all of the others were in physical collapse or coma, and was made a sergeant because of the nobility of his conduct. Yet this youth's ambition was to be a saloonkeeper in Minneapolis.

There is still an official report on file in the Department of Army which describes Sergeant Rice as the "bravest and noblest" of the expedition. He is identified with most of its greatest heroisms. The man was apparently absolutely indomitable and incorruptible. He died from freezing on a last forlorn mission into the Arctic storm to retrieve a cache of seal meat for his friends. Fredericks, who had accompanied him, was so grief-stricken at the tragedy that he contemplated dying at his side, then reacted in a way that signifies much in a few words, "Out of the sense of duty I owed my dead comrade, I stooped and kissed the remains and left them there for the wild winds of the Arctic to sweep over."

Such briefly were the extremes and the middle ground in this body of human material. At one end were the amoral characters whose excesses became steadily worse as the situation blackened. At the other were Brainard and Rice—good all the way through, absolute in integrity and adjusted perfectly to other men. In between these wholly contrasting elements was the group majority, trying to do their duty, with varying degrees of success. That middle stratum would include Greely, strong in self-discipline but likewise brittle. It would include Lieutenant Lockwood, a lion among men for most of the distance, but totally downcast and beaten in the last dreadful stretch; Israel, the youngest of the party, who won the love of other men by his frankness and generosity; Sergeant Gardiner, who was always ready to share his scraps of food with whomever he thought needed them more; Private Whisler who died begging his comrades to forgive him for having stolen a few slices of bacon; and Private Bender who alternated between feats of heroism and acts of miscreancy.

Other than their common experience, there was probably nothing

unusual about this group of men. They were an average slice of American manpower as found in the Services of that day, and, as to fundamentals, men have changed little if any since. Those who had the chance to study American men under the terrible rigor of Japanese imprisonment during World War II give an analysis not unlike the chronicle of the Greely party. In some prisoners, character, and sanity with it, held fast against every circumstance. In others, some of whom had been well educated and came from gentle homes, brute instincts were uppermost.

Until the latter half of the present century, the Armed Services of the United States did not possess, out of their own experience, a sufficient body of data to warrant firm conclusions on this subject. Earlier trials were either too minor to be regarded as significant, as happened with the Greely party, or were not scientifically researched, as in the case of the Americans who suffered in Japanese camps. There is now, however, a plethora of data on behavior patterns, group response and individual deviation under extreme hardship and oppression. It comes from the trial, torment and torture of Americans in the Communist POW camps south of the Yalu River, 1950–53, and around Hanoi, 1964–73. None of it is incompatible with what was to be learned from the Greely party. Some of the most ignominious failures were well born and had been given every advantage. Many of the most heroic resistors had not been previously marked as outstanding individuals. More to the point, the great majority behaved honorably. Men who lead fighting forces are warranted in drawing this hopeful conclusion from the American record in the Communist camps, for it is from such crucibles as these, even more than from the remittent stresses of combat, that we come to see most clearly the inner nature of man and can get the truest measure of the American military character.

Snap judgment on the data might lead to the conclusion that every individual is exactly according to his own mold, that influence from without cannot catalyze character, and that hence training has little to do with winning loyalty and instilling dutifulness. That would be as radically false as to believe that training, when properly conducted, can make all men alike and can infuse all ranks with the desire for a high standard. The vanity of that hope can be read out of what happened to the force at Cape Sabine. But the positive lesson glows even more brightly. The good sergeant, Brainard, wrote of his lieutenant, Lockwood, that he "loved him more than a brother." It was the Service that taught him the worth of that attachment; Brainard's superb courage developed initially out of his unbounded admiration for Lockwood's dauntlessness, and in time the copyist outdistanced the model. Emotionally, Greely and Brainard were quite unlike. One was a New England Puritan, the other a hardboiled sergeant. But they became as one in the interests of the force; Service training had made that possible.

Psychologists tell us that every sense impression leaves a trace or imprint of itself on the mind, or in other words, that what we are and what we may become are influenced in some measure by everything touching the circumference of our daily lives. The imprints become memories and ideas, and in their turn build up the consciousness, the reason, and finally the will, which translates into physical action the psychological purpose. In the process moral character may be shaped and strengthened; but it will not be transformed if it is dross in the first place. That is something that nearly every combat leader has learned in his time under fire; the man of whom nobody speaks good, who is regarded as a social misfit, unliked and unliking of his comrades, will usually desert under pressure. There are others who have the military look but will be just as quick to quit and look to themselves in a crisis; underneath, they are made of the same shoddy stuff as the derelict, but have learned a little more of the modern art of getting by. Leadership, be it ever so inspired, cannot make a silk purse of a sow's ear. But, as shines forth in the record of Greely and his men, it can reckon with the fact that the majority is more good than mean, and that from this may be developed the strength of the whole. In the clutch the men at Cape Sabine who believed in the word "duty," and who understood spiritually that its first meaning was mutual responsibility, remained joined in an insoluble union. That was the inevitable outcome, leadership doing its part. The minority had no basis for organic solidarity, as each of its number was motivated only by self-interest. Goodwill and weakness may be combined in one man; bad will and strength in another. High moral leading can lift the first man to excel himself; it will not reform the other. But there is no other sensible rule than that all men should be approached with trust and treated as trustworthy until proved otherwise beyond reasonable doubt.

To transfer this thought to even the largest element in war, it will be seen that it is not primarily a cause that makes men loyal to each other, but the loyalty of men to each other that makes a cause. The unity that develops from man's recognition of his dependence upon his fellows is the mainspring of every movement by which society, or any autonomy within it, moves forward.

It is a common practice to say, "Men are thus-and-so." Nothing is more attractive than to make some glittering generalization about mankind, and from it draw a moral for the instruction of those who work with human material. But from all that we have learned through the experience of men under inordinate pressure, either in war or wherever else military forces have been sorely tested, it would be false to say either that the desire for economic security, or the instinct of self-preservation, is the driving force in every man's action. To those who possess the strength of the strong, honor is the main shaft; and they can carry a sufficient number of the company along with them to stamp their mark upon whatever is done by the group. No matter how great

their personal strength, however, they, too, are dependent on the others. There is little possibility of growth for any man except through the force and by the works of those about him, though the manner of his growth is partly a matter of free choice. To most men, the setting of the good example is a challenge to pride and a stimulus to action. To nearly every member of the race, confidence and inspiration come mainly from the influence that living associates have upon them. Therefore, that training is most perfect which takes great advantage of this truth, employing it in balance toward the development of a spirit of comradeship and the doing of work with a manifestly military purpose. Peace training is war training and nothing less. There is no other basis for the efficient operation of military forces even when the skies are clear. But no commander or instructor can convince men of the decisive importance of the object if he himself regards it as only an intellectual exercise.

It is vain to expect that training can bring men forward uniformly. The better men advance rapidly; the men of average attainments remain average; the below-average lose additional ground to the competition. In consequence, the chance for balance in the organizational structure depends upon the leader progressing in such close knowledge of his men that those who are strong in various aspects of the team's general requirements compensate for the weaknesses of others, irrespective of their military specialties. It is not less essential that the followers know each other and prepare themselves to complement each other. Obviously, this cannot be done when personnel changes are so frequent that those concerned have no chance to see deeper than the surface.

Even when to do any labor meant sapping the small store of energy derived from a few ounces of food each day, Greely's men kept alive the spark of morale and mutual support by maintaining a work schedule, until the day came when there was no longer a man who could stand. To fight off despondency, they held to a nightly schedule of lectures and discussions in their rude shelters, until speech became an agony because of throats poisoned by eating caterpillars, lichens, and saxifrage blossoms. In their worst extremity, Private Fredericks, unlettered, but a man of great common sense and moral power, became the doctor, cook, and forager for the party.

Men do not achieve a great solidarity, or preserve it, simply by being together. Their mutual bonds are forged only by doing together that which they have been convinced is constructive. Their view of its importance is usually contingent upon what others tell them, and upon a continuing emphasis on it. Unity is at one time a consequence of, and a cause and condition for, great accomplishment. Toward that end, it is neither vital nor desirable that all members of the group coincide in their motives, ideas, and methods of expression. What is important is that each man should know, and to a reasonable extent incorporate

into his own life, the thoughts, desires, and interests of the others. Such sentiments, fixed by repetition, remain as a habit during the life of the group and provide the basis for disciplined action. But when men are not thus drawn together and the cord of sympathy remains unstrung, there is no basis for control, nor any element of contact by which the group may identify itself with some larger entity and profit by transfusion of its moral strength.

The absence of a common purpose is the chief source of unhappiness in any collection of individuals. Again, here is the reason why hundreds of American fighters died during Communist captivity in North Korea, although, according to medical testimony, they were not mortally stricken by disease or undernourishment. They gradually lost the will to live which might have been rallied had the prisoners early enough banded together to work for one another. There was no common purpose.

Lacking common purpose, and the common standard of justice, which is at the same time its derivative and chief agent, men become more and more separate entities, each fighting for his own right, each prey to his own fears, each increasingly doubting all others. Men along a fire line cannot continue to stand fast and fight, once they move out of sight and sound of one another. Small groups may stay united at great distance from other groups, so long as they maintain radio contact. But in the hour of danger, individuals must have direct feel of one another. Even a hardened warrior will run in blind panic from a shellburst at safe distance if he is walking absolutely alone, unobserved, across an empty field.

Yet paradoxically, if an organic unity is to develop within any body of free men drawn from a free society to serve its military institutions, and if the maximum use is to be made of their possibilities, the processes of the institution must stimulate respect for the dignity of the individual, for his rights, and not less, for his desire for worthwhile recognition. The profile of every man depends upon the space others leave him. "Of himself," said Napoleon, "a man is nothing." But every man also contributes with his every act to the level of what his group may attain. One of the foremost leaders in the United States Navy in World War II said this about the integrity of personality: "Every person is unique. Human talents were never before assembled in exactly the same way that they have been put together in yourself. Nothing like you ever happened before. No one can predict with accuracy how you will grow in your particular combination of skills if allowed complete freedom of movement." If there is one word out of place in that statement, it is "complete." No one has complete freedom but a buccaneer, and it is for his exercise thereof that organized society swings him from a gibbet. It is only when personal freedom of action operates within an area limited by the rights and welfare of others that subordination, in its best sense, takes place. To direct a

body of individuals toward the acceptance of this principle, so that thereby they may attain social coherence as a group while developing greater strength of personal character, is the most solid contribution that an officer can make to the arms of this Nation.

He can succeed in this without being godlike in wisdom or ultra-perfect in temper. But it is necessary at least that he be interesting, and that he know how to get out of his own tracks, lest he be over-run by his own people. Whatever his rank, it is impossible for any man to lead if he is himself running behind. This bespeaks the need of constant study, the constant use of one's personal powers, and the exercise of the imagination. As people advance, what was good soon ceases to be good simply because something better is possible; once they begin to acquire a sense of organization, they also come to take the measure of those who are over them. They will then move instinctively toward the one person who possesses the greatest measure of social energy. The accolade of leadership is not inherent in the individual but is conferred on him by the group. It does not always follow that the individual can develop an influence with others that is proportionate to his talents and capacity for work. Leadership in work is a main requirement, but if the group does not warm toward the appointed leader, if its members cannot feel any enthusiasm for him, they will be hypercritical of whatever he does.

History confirms, and a study of the workings of the human mind supports, one proposition accepted by the great captains of war as a truism. "There are no bad troops: there are only bad leaders." Taking on percentage what we already know of our average American raw material as it has proved itself in every war, and as it has been studied in such a laboratory as the camp at Cape Sabine, no exception can be taken to that statement. On the other hand, we know equally well that leadership can be taught and it can be acquired. Much of our best material lies fallow, awaiting a hand on the shoulder and the touch of other men's confidence before it can step forward. This is not because men with a sound potential for leading must necessarily have an outward air of modesty among their major virtues, but because a person —particularly a young person—cannot gain a sense of his power among his fellows except as they give him their confidence and kindle his natural desire to be something better than the average.

Colonel W. T. Sherman had to be kindled by the warm touch of President Lincoln and steeled by the example and strong faith of General U. S. Grant before he could believe in his own capacity for generalship. We all live by information and not by sight. We exist by faith in others, which is the source toward generating greater faith in ourselves.

About the elements of human nature, it is good that an officer should know enough that he will be able to win the faith of his followers. But it is folly to believe that he should pursue his studies in this sub-

ject until he habitually looks at men as would a scientist putting some specimen under a powerful microscope.

Self-consciousness is by no means a serious fault in anyone confronted by a new set of responsibilities and working among new companions. There is scarcely an officer who has not felt it, particularly in the beginning, before he is assured in his own presence. But if the greater part of the officer body were ever to become absorbed in the business of taking men apart to see what makes them tick, thereby superinducing self-consciousness all down the line, an irremediable blight would come upon the Services. There is no need to look that deeply. What matters mainly is that an officer will know how people are won to accept authority, how they can be made to unify their own strength, how they can be helped to find satisfaction and success in their employment, how the strong can be chosen for preferment, and finally, how they can be conditioned to face the realities of combat.

The chronicles of effective military leadership date back to Gideon and his band. Therefore any notion that it is impossible for an officer to make the best use of his men unless he is armed with all available research data and can talk the language of the philosopher and modern social scientist is little more than a twentieth-century conceit. To seek and use all pertinent information is commendable, but truth comes of seeing all things in their natural proportions. To know more than is necessary blunts one's own weapons. The application of common sense to the problem is more vital than the possession of an inexhaustible store of data that has no practical bearing upon the matter at hand.

Chapter 10

GROUP NATURE

In the same way that knowledge of individual nature becomes the key to building strength within the group, an understanding of crowd nature is essential to the conservation of the unique powers within the individual, particularly under conditions of extreme pressure.

Whereas the central object of barracks discipline is to raise a safeguard against any military body reverting to crowd form under trial by fire, history shows that paralysis both of leadership and of the ranks, obliviousness to orders, forgetfulness of means of communication, disintegration, and even panic are the not uncommon reactions of military forces when first entering into battle.

Furthermore, when afield and under the stress of war, if aware that their effort and sacrifice is little valued and even derided by major elements on the home front, they can become unruly and nigh mutinous. This is not because Americans are hypersensitive: military bodies, the world over, react in much the same way to the indifference, hostility and turbulence within the society. From Bunker Hill and Brandywine, down to the withdrawal to the Pusan Perimeter and the closeout of force in South Vietnam, the American record shows that our troops are susceptible to these ill effects. Therefore our peacetime training needs to be reappraised with a critical eye to the main issue.

Any of these unsteady reactions can be minimized, if not prevented, by training that anticipates the inevitable disorders of campaigning—including those of a material sort as well as the disorders of the mind—and acclimates men to the realities of the field in war. All may be averted or minimized if leadership is braced to the shock and prepared to exercise strong control. Indeed, it is a truth worthy of the closest regard that the greater number of the disarrangements that take place during combat are due to leadership feeling a tightening of the throat and a sticking of the palate and failing to do what the intellect says should be done.

To take any action, when even to think of action is itself difficult, is the essential step toward recovery and the surmounting of all difficulty. It is not because of a babel of mixed voices and commands that military bodies not infrequently relapse into helplessness and stagna-

tion in the face of the enemy. From that cause there may occur an occasional minor dislocation. Their damaging consequence is trivial compared to the failures that come of leadership, at varying levels, not acting promptly to exercise authority when nothing else can resolve the situation. Among the commonest of experiences in war is to witness troops doing nothing, or worse, doing the wrong thing, without one commanding voice being raised to give them direction. In such circumstance, any man who has the nerve and presence to step forward and give them an intelligent order in a manner indicating that he expects to be obeyed, will be accepted as a leader and will be given their support.

For this reason, under the conditions of modern battle, the coherence of any military body comes not only of men being articulate all down the line but of building up the dynamic power in each individual. It is a thoroughly sound exercise in any unit to give every man a chance to take charge and give orders in drill or other limited exercises, once he has learned what the orders mean. By the same token, it is good practice for the junior leader to displace a private in a training exercise and become commanded for a time, to sharpen his own perspective.

Progress comes of making the most of our strengths rather than looking for ways to repair weaknesses. This is true in things both large and small. The platoon leader who permits himself to be bedeviled by the man who won't or can't keep step cannot do justice to the ambitions of the 10 strongest men beneath him, upon whom the life of the formation would depend, come an emergency. To nourish and encourage the top, rather than to concentrate effort and exhaust nerves in trying to correct the few least likely prospects, is the healthy way of growth within military organization.

Not all men are fitted by nature for the precisions of life in a barracks. They may accept its discipline while not being able to adjust to its rhythm. The normal temptation to despair of them needs to be resisted if only for the reason that experience has proved they sometimes make the best men in combat. There are many types that fit into this category—the foreigner but recently arrived in America, the miner who has spent most of his years underground, the boy from the sticks who has known only the plough and furrow, the woodsman, the reservation Indian, and the individuals of all races who have had hard taskmasters or other misfortune in their civilian sphere, and expect to be hurt again. It is not unusual for this kind of material to show badly in training because of an ingrained fear of other men. At the same time, they can face mortal danger. To harass the man who is trying but can't quite do it therefore cuts doubly against the strength of organization. It may ruin the man; it may also give his comrades the feeling that he isn't getting a fair break.

The military crowd requires, above all, maturity of judgment in its leaders. It cannot be patronized safely. Nor can it be treated in the

classroom manner, as if wisdom were being dispensed to schoolboys. When it has been remiss, it expects to catch unshirted hell for its failings, and though it may smart under a just bawling out, it will feel let down if the commander quibbles. But any officer puts himself on a skid and impairs the strength of his unit if he takes to task all hands because of the willful failings of a few. Strength comes to men when they feel that they are grown up and as a body are in control and under control, since it amounts to the same thing; it is only when men unite toward a common purpose that control becomes possible. In this respect, the servant is in fact the master of the situation, fully realizes it, and is not unprepared to accept proportionate responsibility.

It is a sign of a good level of discipline in a command when orders are given and faithfully carried out. But it is a sign of a vastly superior condition when the people are prepared to demand those orders they know the situation requires, if the unit is to be helped. No competent subordinate sits around waiting for someone else to give impulse to movement if his senses tell him that things are going wrong. He either suggests a course of action to his superior, or asks authority to execute it on his own, or in the more desperate circumstances of the battlefield he gives orders on his own initiative. To counsel any lesser theory of individual responsibility than this would leave every chain of command at the complete mercy of its weakest link, and throughout the general establishment would be denied the inspiration that comes of the upward thrust of energy and ideas.

This latter characteristic in the people composing any organization is the final statement of moral responsibility for success. Within military forces, an element of command is owned by every man who is doing his duty with intelligence and imagination. That puts him on the side of the angels, and the pressure he exerts is felt not only by his subordinates but by those topside who are doing less. Many a lazy skipper has snapped out of it and at last begun to level with his organization because he felt the hot breath of a few earnest subordinates on his neck. Many a battle unit has held to ground it had been ready to forsake because of the example of an aid man who stayed at his work and refused to forsake the wounded. General Dwight D. Eisenhower was thinking of these things when he said during World War II: "There is among the mass of individuals who carry rifles in war a great amount of ingenuity and efficiency. If men can talk naturally to their officers, the product of their resourcefulness becomes available to all." But the art of open communication requires both receiving and sending, and the besetting problem is to get officers to talk naturally to men.

In the seventeenth century Marshal Maurice de Saxe rediscovered cadenced marching which, along with the hard-surfaced roads of France, had remained buried since the time of the Romans. He reinstituted precision marching and drill within military bodies, and by that action

changed European armies from straggling mobs into disciplined troops. The effects of that reform have been felt right down to the present. Baron von Steuben, the great reorganizer of the forces in George Washington's Army, simply built upon the principles de Saxe had set forth one century earlier. These two great architects of military organization founded their separate systems upon one controlling idea—that if men can be trained to think about moving together, they can then be led to move toward thinking together. De Saxe wanted keen men, not automatons; in that, he was singular among the captains of his day. He started the numbering of regiments so that they would have a continuing history and thereby benefit from esprit de corps. He was the first to see the great importance of battle colors and to standardize their use. Of his own military opinions he wrote: "Experts should not be offended by the assurance with which I deliver my opinions. They should correct them; that is the fruit I expect from my work."

Now to take a look at von Steuben. He was the drillmaster of the American Revolution, but he was also its greatest student of the human mind and heart. He wrote the drill regulations of the Army and, as he wrote, committed them to memory. Of his labors he said: "I dictated my dispositions in the night; in the day I had them performed." But he learned the nature of the human material for which he believed these exercises were suited by visiting the huts of the half-clad soldiers of Valley Forge, personally inspecting their neglected weapons and hearing from their own lips of their sufferings. His main technique in installing his system was to depend upon the appeal of a powerful example; to remove all doubt of exactly what was wanted, he formed a model company and drilled it himself. He was a natural man; troops warmed to him because of an unabashed use of broken English and his violently explosive use, under stress, of "gottam!" which was his only quasi-English oath. In countenance he was strikingly like General George S. Patton and there were other points of resemblance. A private soldier at Valley Forge was impressed with "the trappings of his pistols, the enormous holsters of his pistols, his large size, his strikingly martial aspect." But while he liked to dine with great men at his table, he chose to complete his list with officers of inferior rank. Once at Valley Forge he permitted his aides to give a dinner for junior officers on condition that none should be admitted that had on a whole pair of breeches. This was making the most of adversity. While wearing two stars and serving as Inspector General of the Army, he would still devote his whole day to drilling a squad of 10 or 12 men to get his system going. To a former Prussian associate he wrote this of Americans: "You say to your soldier, 'Do this!' and he doeth it; but I am obliged to say, 'This is the reason that you ought to do that,' and then he does it."

This was the key to the phenomenal success of his system.

Within six weeks after he began work at Valley Forge, the Continental Army was on a new footing of self-confidence. His personal dili-

gence in inquiring into the conduct of all officers toward their men, and his zeal in checking the accoutrement and carriage of every soldier established within the Army its first standard of inspection. Officers began to divide their scant rations with their men so that they would perform better. But though he drilled the men of Valley Forge in marching and maneuver, Steuben paid no attention to the manual of arms; he let that wait until after he had gone into battle with these forces. He explained why: "Every colonel had introduced a system of his own and those who had taken the greatest pains were naturally the most attached to their work. Had I destroyed their productions, they would have detested me. I therefore preferred to pay no special attention to this subject until I had won their confidence." To take hold at the essential point and postpone action on the relatively unimportant, to respect pride and natural dignity in others, and, finally to demonstrate that there is a better way to win loyalty and to use loyalty as the portal to more constructive collective enterprise—all of these morals shine in this one object lesson. The most revealing light upon the character of Steuben is shed by the episode in which he had one Lieutenant Gibbons arrested for an offense, which he later learned another person had committed. He then went before the regiment. It was raining hard, but he bared his head and asked Gibbons to come forward. "Sir," he said, "the fault which was committed might, in the presence of an enemy, have been fatal. Your Colonel tells me you are blameless. I ask your pardon. Return to your command."

Mistakes will occur. Tempers will go off half-cocked even among men of good disposition. Action will be taken on impulse rather than full information, despite every warning about its danger. But no officer doing serious injustice to a subordinate can afford to make less amends than Steuben did, if he wants to retain respect. Admiral Halsey wrote about how he had once relieved one of his captains in battle, found months later that he had misjudged him, and then tried by every means within his power to make redress.

The main connecting link between the perfecting of group action in training and the end product of unity and economy of operations in battle has never been succinctly expressed even by such masters as de Saxe and von Steuben, though they felt it by profound instinct. The time-honored explanation is that when men accustom themselves to obeying orders, the time ultimately arrives when they will obey by habit, and that the habit will carry over into any set of circumstances requiring response to orders. This has the quality of relative truth; it is true so far as it goes, but it undersells the major values.

The heterogeneous crowd is swayed by the voice of instinct. Properly trained, any military unit, being a homogeneous body, should be swayed by the voice of training. Out of uniformity of environment comes uniformity of character and spirit. From moving and acting together men grow to depend upon and to support each other, and to

subordinate their individual wills to the will of the leader. And if that were all that training profited them, they would rarely win a battle or a skirmish under modern conditions!

Today the supreme value of any training at arms which fixes habit is that, under conditions of absolute pressure, it enables men to take the primary steps essential to basic security without excessive taxing of their mental faculties and moral powers; this leaves their senses relatively free to cope with the unexpected. The unforeseen contingency invariably happens in battle, and its incidence supplies the extreme test of the efficacy of any training method. Surprise has no regard for the importance of rank; in combat, any unit's fortune may pivot on the judgment and initiative of the man who last joined it. Therefore the moral object in training is best stated by endorsing outright words once used by a wise Frenchman, Dr. Maurice Campeaux: "It should be the subordination of the individual's will to the leader's, and not its surrender or destruction." All training at all levels has a dual object—to develop us all as leaders and as followers of leaders. Training techniques are nearest perfect when they serve evenly these parallel purposes. In consequence, when any officer thinks only about: "What is policy?" rather than "What should policy be for the good of the Service?" he has trained his sights too low.

Even in modern warfare, however, there are exceptional circumstances in which success is altogether dependent upon the will and judgment of the leader and undeviating response to his orders. The commander of a buttoned-up tank is the master of its fortunes, and what happens for better or worse is according to the strength of his personal control. Within a submerged submarine during action, the situation is still more remarkable. Only one man, the commander of the boat, can see what is occurring, and he sees only with one eye; the resolving of every situation depends on his judgment as to what should be done. Yet those who have the surest knowledge of this service have said that the main problem in submarine warfare is to find a sufficient body of officers who will rise superior to the intricacies of their complicated machines, and making their own opportunities, will take advantage of them. That is hardly unique. The same quality is the mark of superiority in any individual serving with a combat arm. The military company will double its efforts for a leader when success rides on his coattails; but he needs first to capture their loyalty by keeping his contracts with them. His luck (which, despite all platitudes to the contrary, is an element in success) begins when his people start to believe that he was born under the right star. But they are not apt to be so persuaded unless he can make his outfit shine in comparison with all others. One argument for establishing a low AWOL rate and a high disciplinary and deportment record within any unit is that such a record convinces higher authority that the unit is well run and is trying and that it is therefore entitled to any extra

consideration that may be requested. All who have been closely identified with the inner working of any high headquarters in the American establishment know that it gauges this way. On the other hand, the fundamental idea is almost as old as the hills. Turning back to Cicero, we will find these words: "Neither the physician nor the general can ever, however praiseworthy he may be in the theory of his art, perform anything highly worthwhile without experience in the rules laid down for the observation of all small duties." The Old Roman added that between men nothing is so binding as a similarity of good dispositions.

Within the Armed Forces and granting to each organization the same quality of human material, the problem of achieving organic unity in the face of the enemy is one thing on a ship, and quite another among land-fighting forces. Loyalty to the ship itself provides an extra and compelling bond among naval forces. Given steadiness in the command, men will fight the ship to the limit. The physical setting of duty is defined by material objects close at hand. The individual has only to fit himself into an already predetermined frame. He knows when he is derelict, and he knows further that his dereliction can hardly escape the eye of his comrades. The words: "Now Hear This!" have the particular significance that they bespeak the collected nature of naval forces, and the unifying force of complete communications.

If the situation were as concrete and the integrating influences as pervading among field forces as in the Navy, land warfare would be relieved of a great part of its confusions. In our past, except among troops defending a major fortress with all-around protection, there was nothing to compare with it. As armament changes its face somewhat under the impact of the atomic revolution, we see emerging something new in land-based defense, in which the human element must be similarly close-knit and subject to absolute direction by one controlling brain. ICBM and ABM operations have this character, and a guided missile command, in some lesser degree, also partakes of it. In neither is there room for free-wheeling action or judgment or variation of approved techniques.

Field movement offers the absolute contrast. It is always diffusing. As fire builds up against the line, its members have less and less a sense of each other, and less a feeling that as individuals they are getting support. Each file is at the mercy of the contact with some other file and, if the contact breaks, sees only darkness in the enveloping situation. Men then have to turn physically back toward one another to regain the feeling of strength that comes of organization. That, in brief, is the mathematical and psychological reason why salients into an enemy defense line invariably take the form of a wedge; it comes of the movements of unnerved and aimless men huddling toward each other like sheep awaiting the voice of the shepherd. The natural in-

stincts always take over in the absence of strong leadership. Said the French General de Maud'huy: "However perfectly trained a company may be, it always tends to become once again the crown when suddenly shocked."

But the priceless advantage that can be instilled in the military crowd by a proper training is that it also possesses the means of recovery. That possibility—the resolution of order out of chaos—reposes within every man who has gained in the Service a confidence that he has some measure of influence among his fellows. The welfare of the unit machinery depends upon having the greatest possible number of human shock absorbers—men who in the worst hour are capable of stepping forward and saying: "This calls for something extra and that means me." The restoration of control upon the battlefield, and the process of checking fright and paralysis and turning men back to essential tactical duties, does not coalesce simply of constituted authority again finding its voice and articulating its strength to the extremities of the unit boundary. Control is a man-to-man force under fire. No matter how lowly his rank, any man who controls himself contributes to the control of others. A private can steady a general as surely as a cat can look at a king. There is no better ramrod for the back of a senior who is beginning to buckle than the sight of a junior who has kept his nerve. Land battles, as to the fighting part, are won by the intrepidity of men in grade from private to captain mainly. Fear is contagious, but courage is not less so. The courage of any one man reflects in some degree the courage of all those who are within his vision. To the man who is in terror and bordering on panic, no influence can be more steadying than that of seeing some other man near him who is retaining self-control and doing his duty.

The paralysis that comes of fear can be lifted only through the resumption of action that will again give individuals the feeling of organization. This does not necessarily mean ordering a bayonet charge or the firing of a volley at such-and-such o'clock. It may mean only patting one man on the back, "talking it up" to a couple of others, sending someone out to find a flank, or turning one's own self to dig in, while passing the word to others to do likewise. This is action in the realest sense of the term. Out of reinvigorating men toward the taking of many small actions develops the possibility of large and decisive action. The unit must first find itself before doing an effective job of finding the enemy. Out of those acts that are incidental to the establishing of order, a leader reaffirms his own power of decision.

Such things are elementary and in the very nature of the fire fight. While there is much more to be said about the play of moral forces in the trial and success of the group under combat conditions, most of it is to be learned from other sources. It is the duty of every officer to study all that he can of this subject, and apply it to what he does in his daily rounds.

There is no rule for the moral unifying of military forces under the pressures of the battlefield that is not equally good in the training that conditions troops for this eventuality. For the group to feel a great spiritual solidarity and for its members to feel bound together by mutual confidence and the satisfactions of a rewarding comradeship marks the beginning of great enterprise. But it is no more than that. Unaccompanied by a strengthening of the military virtues and a rise in the martial spirit, a friendly unity will not of itself point men directly toward the main object in training, nor enable them to dispose themselves efficiently toward each other when they enter battle.

It does not make the military person less an agent of peace and more a militarist that he cherishes his membership within the fighting establishment and thinks those thoughts that would put his arms to efficient use. The military establishment neither declares nor makes war; these are acts by the Nation. But it is the duty of the military establishment primarily to succor the Nation from any great jeopardy. When serving as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Earle G. Wheeler, in taking note of a changing public attitude toward the military, said he saw no change in the military's own concept of duty. His words: "What the military has tried to do for nearly two centuries of American history—and I hope will go on trying to do—is, if possible, to prevent wars, minimize the pain of peacetime defense as much as possible, and yet protect the American people so that they can live in peace and freedom as they wish."

Yet change and adjustment there must continue to be, in matters not so fundamental. The more recent reforms in military life, some of which were obnoxious to the orthodoxy of retired officers, were not a luxury or even an idea whose time had come, mirroring the changes in the rest of American society. They were a necessity, largely because, during the last five years of the Vietnam War, the prestige of the military had plummeted. There was no alternative but to concentrate on people, their comforts and even more their rights, if Service appeal to the young people of the nation was to be revivified.

"Honesty," said Mr. Lincoln, "is the best policy." But one is neither honest nor politic unless he deals fairly and squarely with all others. For the military officer, it is a governing principle and it applies across the board—assignments of duty, rewards and punishments, living arrangements, requirements as to obedience and courtesy, etcetera.

The list should make fairly obvious the main reason why. Unlike civilian employment, military service regulates almost as many aspects of the individual life as does the head of a household, and sometimes more. Furthermore, we know that from the minority groups come some of the most courageous and skilled combat hands serving the flag. Military units may only operate efficiently as a kind of fellowship; their force, other things being equal, is in ratio to their harmony. The word

for it is comradeship, which cannot thrive amid injustice, prejudice, partiality and suspicion.

None of this is meant to imply that the officer who believes in equal treatment for all hands and holds to that rule resolutely will thereby avoid trouble and keep his record clean. That it is the right thing to do, and at the same time the line of main chance, though the best argument for it, may not insure that the course will be always safe and smooth.

As goes the line in an old song, "Some gentlemen don't love love, they just like to kick it around." Malcontents and militant troublemakers are to be found in every walk of life. The Armed Services cannot escape them. They enlist with a grievance, fancied or otherwise, or with a fixed grudge against society that is rarely reformable. Given the opening, they will try to poison, and if possible, ruin organization. What is said about the bad apple applies to them. It would be as unrealistic to pretend that they do not exist as to suggest that their prejudices and attitudes are always amenable to reason.

The detection, isolation and elimination from service of such individuals is but another command responsibility to be approached with firmness, meaning without undue worry about possible consequence to self. In every meaningful decision in an officer's life there is unavoidable risk. This one entails the likelihood of being accused of prejudice or even oppression.

But if that be bad news, it is always followed by the good. In any such action, the officer will be supported and sustained by loyal, right-thinking people, which means the vast majority of those who serve, his peers, as well as his subordinates.

Service people should pride themselves that the first determining moves toward integration came within the Military Establishment. That was done in following the Commander-in-Chief's order of 1948, well prior to the issuance of sweeping decisions by the Supreme Court. The Armed Services abolished segregation early and for their own good.

Since then, progress in the desired direction has been steady, though not without difficulty, friction and accusations of discrimination. Criticism there will always be; we need more of it, rather than less, so long as it is tempered with knowledge and good judgment. Just as in the initiation of reform to make reality of a Constitutional ideal the Armed Services were first, they will continue to set the strong example for society. It is no mere shibboleth in the military: Equal opportunity for all service people, irrespective of sex, difference in race, cultural background or formal educational attainment, is the only practical standard.

But the connotation should be perfectly clear: the standard is maintained only when the individual best qualified mentally, morally and as to personality and proved performance, is given preferment. There

can be no substitute for merit under the rule of equal opportunity. When superior ability and outstanding character are matched in the same individual, any other choice is an affront to service discipline and human dignity.

Every service officer's loyalty, as the greatly distinguished soldier, General Matthew B. Ridgway, has so cogently pointed out, is first to his country, second to his Service, and third to his superior. Such is mortal fallibility, in places high and low, that no other assessment of the officer's line of obligation is compatible with the word—fidelity. Hewing to that line, the young officer cannot go wrong in his duty to country and self. For it is the Constitution of the United States, above all other documents, that sets forth human rights and the dignity of man above every material interest.

Prejudice, racial and otherwise, there has been, is now, and may long be. No one person, no court, no sitting of military councils may eradicate it from a nation or a military unit, by fiat. But any individual may contend against it through his lifetime. For the American military officer, whatever his origins, bloodlines and earlier reflections, there is no other choice consonant with his growth, what his Service expects of him, and the well-being of his country.

The lines of action, when prejudice becomes a blight to organizational harmony, particularly when racial incidents occur, are to be found in directives and counseling papers published by each of the Armed Services. Commended to careful and continuing study by all officers, they need not be repeated here.

Chapter 11

ENVIRONMENT

The saying of the Old Sergeant that, "It takes a war to knock the hell out of the Regular Army," applies as broadly to war's effects upon the general peacetime establishment.

In the rapid expansion of the Armed Forces that comes of a national emergency, nothing seems to remain the same. Old units fill up and change their character. By the time they have sent out three or four cadres of commissioned and enlisted leaders to form the base for entirely new organizations, little remains of the moral foundation of the parent unit except an honored name.

Promotion is rapid and moves are frequent among the higher commanders. No sooner does a man feel fairly settled under a new commander and confident that he will get along, than he looks up to see someone else filling the seat.

Installations grow like mushrooms. Schools multiply at a phenomenal rate. The best qualified men are taken away so that they will become better qualified, either by taking an officers' course or through specialist training. Their places are taken by men who may have an equal native ability, but haven't yet mastered the tricks of the trade. This piles high the load of work on those who command.

The intake and the pipelines in all Services fill with men of a quite different fiber and outlook than those who commonly pass through the peacetime training establishment.

Particularly in those who flow to the Army in a draft there is a curious mixture of the good with the bad. The illiterates, the low IQs, and the men who are physically a few notches below par are passed for service, though under normal conditions the recruiting standards shut them out. At the other end of the scale are the educated men from the colleges and the robust individuals from the factory and farm. In natural quality they are as well suited to the Service as any who seek it out in peacetime, though in disposition they are likely to be a little less tractable. On the whole, however, there is no radical difference between them, if we look at both groups simply as training problems for the study of the officer.

In the midst of war, when all else is in flux, at least one thing stands

fast. The methods, the self-discipline, and the personality that will best enable the officer to command efficiently during peace are identical with the requirements that fit him to shape new material most effectively under the conditions of war.

This is only another way of saying that for his own success, in addition to the solid qualities that win him the respect of others, when war comes the officer needs a vast adaptability and a confidence that will carry over from one situation to another or he will have no peace of mind.

It is only to the person who is burdened with unnecessary and exaggerated fears, and who mistakes for a fancied security the privilege of sitting quietly in one place, that the uprooting that comes with war is demoralizing. The natural officer sees it as an hour of opportunity, and though he may not like anything else about war, he at least relishes the strong feeling of personal competition that always develops when there are many openings inviting many men. As one World War II commander expressed it: "During the war the ball is always kicking around loose in the middle of the field and any man who has the will may pick it up and run with it."

Promotion, however, and the invitation to try one's hand at some greater venture do not come automatically to an officer because of the onset of war. The man who has marked time on his job becomes relatively worse off, not only because the competition is keener but because for lack of anything marking him for preferment, there is no good reason why he should get it. Years of service are not to a man's credit short of some positive proof that the years have been well used. The following are among the reasons why certain officers are marked for high places and find the door wide open, come an emergency:

1. A consistently superior showing in the efficiency report.
2. A record attesting that they have done well in Service Schools.
3. The ability to attract the eye of some high-placed superior by exceptional performance on maneuvers, in committee work, or any other testing situation.
4. In addition to general dutifulness, the development to a conspicuous degree of special talents such as writing, instructing, lecturing, and staff administration.
5. Fluency in other languages.
6. Wide and resourceful study in the fields of military history, military geography, national military policy, and logistics.
7. The advancement of an original idea that has led to a general improvement in any one Service.

Any and all of these are extra strings to one's bow. They are the means to greater satisfaction during peacetime employment and the source of great personal advantage during war. But they should not be

mistaken for the main thing, which is to excel in command and to be recognized as deserving of command—the rightful ambitions of every military officer.

This holds true of the person who is so patently a specialist that it would be wrong to waste him in a command responsibility. If he understands the art of command, and his personality and moral fortitude fit him for the leading of men, he will be in better adjustment with his circumstances anywhere in the Services, and will be given greater respect by his superiors. This rule is so absolute in its workings as to warrant saying that everyone who wears the insignia of an officer in the Armed Forces of the United States should aspire to the same bearing and the same inner confidence in his power to meet others and move them in the direction he desires that is to be marked in a superior unit commander.

The natural leader is the real specialist of the Armed Services. He is as prodigious, and as much a man apart, as the wizard who has mastered supersonic speeds and taken a walk on the moon. Here we speak not alone of the ability of an officer fully to control and develop his element under training conditions, but to take the same element into battle and conserve the total of its powers with maximum efficiency. The man who resolves to develop within himself the qualities that serve such an object is moved by the worthiest of all ambitions, for he has undertaken one of the most complex tasks within human reach.

The self-assurance that one has promise in the field of command is in part a derivative of growth and in part a matter of instinct. But to the normal young officer, it comes as something of a delightful surprise to learn that when he speaks other men will listen, when he reasons they will become convinced, and when he gives an order his authority is accepted. Far from being a bad quality, this ingenuousness is wholesome because it reflects warm appreciation of what has been given him. It does not lessen confidence if a commander feels this way about those who are within his charge throughout his command. The best results flow when the working loyalty of other men is accepted like manna from heaven, with gratitude rather than with gratification. Simply to feel that it is one's rightful portion is the best proof that it is not, and leads to cockiness, windiness, and self-adulation, with attendant loss of the sympathy of other men. The consequence to the individual whose dream of success is only that he will take on more and more authority is that he will suffer from more and more one-sided development. The great humanitarian, Dr. Albert Schweitzer, holds up to other self-reliant men the example of Defoe's hero, Robinson Crusoe, because he is continually reflecting on the subject of human conduct, and he feels himself so responsible for this pursuit that when he gets in a fight he thinks about how he can win it with the smallest loss of human life. The conservation of men's powers, not the spending thereof, is an object of main concern to the truly qualified military commander.

At the same time, there should be no mistake about the manner in which command is exercised. To command is not simply to compel or to convince but a subtle mixture of both. Moral suasion and material compulsion are linked in its every act. It involves not only saying that this is the best thing to do but implying that the thing had best be done. Force and reason are inseparably linked in its nature, and the force of reason is not more important than the reason of force, if the matter is to be brought to a successful issue. The mainspring of loyalty is that just demands will be put upon it. It cannot endure and strengthen except through finding material means of expression. When men are given absolute freedom, there can be no strong, uniting bond between them. As for absolute security, outside of the walls of a penitentiary it is virtually nonexistent, though one would scarcely look inside the walls expecting to find loyalty. In brief, being an active force in the lives of humankind, loyalty is developed through unifying action. The more decisive the action becomes, the greater becomes the vitality of the bond. Veterans look back with an esteem, amounting almost to the love that a son feels for his father, toward the captains who led them well on the battlefield. But the best skipper they ever had on a training detail gets hardly more than a kind word.

It has already been said that the man with a preeminent ability to organize and direct the action of the military group has an outstanding and greatly prized talent. The assumption that the holder of a commission in the Armed Forces of the United States is possessed of this quality in some degree goes with the commission. But all men vary in their capacities to respond confidently to any particular situation. Some, no matter how hard they try, lack the keen edge.

To the officer who discovers that he is especially suited by temperament and liking to the leading of combat forces, it comes, therefore, almost as a personal charge that he will let nothing dissuade him from the conviction that his post of duty is with the line. Though he may seek other temporary duty to advance his own knowledge and interests, he should remain mentally wedded to that which he does best, and which most other men find difficult.

If it is a good rule for him, it applies just as well to all others within his charge. This means close attention to the careers of all junior leaders from the enlisted ranks, toward the end that fighting strength of the establishment will be conserved. Rear echelons will sometimes scuttle a fine natural leader of a tactical platoon simply because it has been discovered that in civilian life he ran a garage and there is a vacancy for a motor pool operator, or they will switch a gunner who is zealous for his new work back to a place in the rear, because the record book says that he is an erstwhile, though reluctant, keeper of books. From their point of view, this makes sense. But they are not always aware of how difficult and essential it is to find men who can lead at fighting and sometimes they do not care. It is a point that all officers need to ponder,

for in our modern enthusiasm over the marvels that can be worked by a classification system, we tend to overlook that fighting power is the main thing, and that the best hands are not to be found easily.

When war comes, there are vast changes in the tempo and pressure of life within the military establishment. Faced with new and unmeasured responsibility, almost every man would be depressed by the feeling that he is out far beyond his depth if he were not buoyed by the knowledge that every other man is in like case and that all things are relative. Once these points are recognized, the experience becomes exalting. A relatively junior officer finds himself able confidently to administer a policy applying to an entire Service; a bureau, which might have been laboring to save money in the purchase of carpet tacks and pins, becomes suddenly confronted with the task of spending billions, and of getting action whatever the cost.

But despite the radical change in the scale of operations, the lines laid down for the conduct of business remain the same. The regulations under which the Armed Services proceed are written for peace and war and cover all contingencies in either situation. The course of personal conduct set forth for an officer under training conditions is the standard he is expected to follow when war comes. Administration is carried out according to the same rules, though it is probably true that there is less "paper doll cutting"—meaning that the tide of paper work, though larger in volume, is more to the point. To the young officer it must oftentime seem that under peacetime training conditions he is being called on constantly to read reports that should never have been written in the first place and is required to write memoranda that no one should be forced to read in the second place. For that matter, the same thought occurs not infrequently to many of his seniors. But there is this main point in rebuttal—it is all a part of the practice and conditioning for a game that is in deadly earnest when war comes. If the Armed Forces in peacetime were to limit correspondence up and down the line to those things that were either routine or altogether vital, few men would develop a facility at staff procedures.

In one sense, the same generalization applies to the workings of the security system. There is the common criticism that the Services always tend to over-classify papers and make work for themselves by their careful safeguarding of "secrets" in which no one is interested. The idea is not without warrant; part of the trouble stems from the fact that the line between what can safely be made of public knowledge and what cannot is impossible of clear definition. There is, however, the other point that it is only through officers' learning during peacetime how to safeguard security, handle papers according to regulations, and keep a tightly buttoned lip on all things that are essentially the business of the Service that they acquire the disciplined habit which matures not only their personal success but the national safety when war comes.

Oftentimes the rules seem superfluous. A man scans a paper and sees that the contents are innocuous, and, ignoring the stamp, he leaves the document on his desk because he is too lazy to unlock the file. But the rules mean exactly what they say, and because their purpose is of final importance to the Nation, they will be enforced. There is no surer way for an officer to blight an otherwise promising career than to become careless about security matters. The superior who looks lightly on such an offense is seeking trouble for himself. It is sadly true that in our time civilian writers and some people working for the Armed Services have violated security rules egregiously, with impunity, and even enlarged their national reputations and incomes by so doing. Some of these incidents remain notorious: the law was flouted and the offenders got away with it. But all such citations will not help the military officer brought before a court for a similar offense.

A clean distinction must be made, however, between compliance with the law and unthinking submission to the bind of regulations. The latter were not written to hamper or hamstring action clearly required by circumstance. They are a general guide to conduct, and though they mean what they say, they are not completely inflexible. Room for judgment is implied. An occasional unforeseen circumstance arises in which it is nonsensical, or even impossible, to adhere to the letter of regulations, as of orders. It is then essential that an officer use plain common sense, acting according to the spirit of the regulation, so that it is clearly manifest he did the best possible thing within the determining set of conditions. For example, in the European Theater, the historian had charge of 42 tons of documents, all classified "Confidential," "Secret," or "Top Secret." There were not enough safes or secured files in the whole of France to hold this material, which meant that established procedures could not be followed. A permanent guard and watch was put on the archives. Wooden cases were made from scrap lumber. Ample fire-fighting equipment was brought in. Personnel were drilled in evacuating the material in its order of importance, should fire occur. The set-up was inspected twice daily by the commander or his executive. Though these arrangements still fell short of the letter of regulations, they perforce had to satisfy any inspector because there was no sounder alternative.

When circumstances require any officer to take a course which, while appearing to him to be in the best interests of the Service, runs counter to the lines of action laid down by constituted authority, he has the protection that he may always ask for a court to pass judgment on what he had done. We are all prone to associate the court-martial process only with the fact of punishment, but it is also a shield covering official integrity. The privilege of appealing to the judgment and sense of fair play of a group of one's fellow officers is a very comforting thing in an emergency situation requiring a desperate decision and engaging conflicting interests. It gives one a feeling of backing even when circum-

stances are such that one is making a lonely decision. Almost needless to say, cases of this sort are far more likely to occur in war than during peace.

Inspection takes on a somewhat different hue during war. It becomes more frequent but, on the whole, less zealous with respect to spit-and-polish and less captious about the many little things that promote good order and appearance throughout the general establishment. This condition is accentuated as organizations move closer to the zone of fire. High authority becomes more engrossed in the larger affairs of operation. At all levels more and more time is taken in dealing with the next level above, which means that less and less can be given to looking at the structure down below.

What, then, is the key to overall soundness in the Armed Forces in any hour of great national peril? This, that in all Services, at all times and at all levels, each officer is vigilant to see that his own unit, section, or office is inspection-proof by every test that higher authority might apply.

It should not require the visit of an inspector to any installation to apprise those who are in charge as to what is being badly done.

The standards are neither complex nor arbitrary. They can be easily learned. Thereafter, all that is needed are the eyes to see and the will to insist firmly that correction be made.

In officership, there is simply no substitute for personal reconnaissance, nor is there any other technique that in the long run will have half its value. General Carl A. Spaatz, the first leader of our independent Air Force, was so renowned for this disciplined habit of getting everywhere and seeing everything that, even when he was a relatively young major, a story about his ubiquitousness gained Service-wide fame. An ailing recruit was being examined by a doctor at March Field. "Do you see spots before your eyes?" the doctor asked. "Lord," groaned the recruit, "do I have to see him in here, too?"

Once formed, the habit of getting down to the roots of organization, of seeing with one's own eyes what is taking place, of measuring it against one's own scale of values, or ordering such changes as are needed, and of following through to make certain that the changes are made, become the mainspring of all efficient command action.

In battle, there is no other way to be sure. In training, there is no better way to move toward self-assurance.

Chapter 12

THE MISSION

There is a main reason why the word "mission" has an especial appropriateness to the Armed Forces and implies something beyond the call of duty. The aims of the United States do not advance simply through the process of correct orders being given and then executed with promptness, vigor and intelligence.

That is the greater part of the task, but it is by no means all. Military systems reflect the limitations and imperfections of their human material. Whatever his station and experience, no officer is wise enough and so all-seeing that he can encompass every factor in a given problem, make correct judgment on every area of weakness, foresee all of what has not yet happened, and then write the perfect analysis and solution for the guidance of his subordinates.

The perfecting of operations and the elimination of grit from the machinery therefore become properly the concern of all, and they should direct their thought and purpose to furthering the harmony and efficiency of the establishment, taking personal action where it is within one's own province, or calling the matter to the attention of higher authority when it is not. In this direct sense, every ensign and second lieutenant has a personal responsibility for the general well-being of the security structure of the United States. It is fact and not theory. In World War II, many of the practical ideas that were made of universal application in the Services were initiated by men of very junior rank. But the extent to which any man's influence may be felt beyond his immediate circle depends first of all upon the thoroughness with which he executes his assigned duties, since nothing else will give his superiors confidence in his judgments. It is only when he is exacting in small things, and is careful to "close the circuit" on every minor assignment, that he qualifies himself to think and act constructively in larger matters, through book study and imaginative observation of the situation that surrounds him. At this stage, an officer is well on the road to the accomplishment of the general mission.

When an order is given, what are the responsibilities of the person who receives it?

In sequence they are these:

1. To be certain that he understands what is required.
2. To examine and organize his resources as promptly as possible.
3. Fully to inform his subordinates on these points.
4. To execute the order without waste of time or means.
5. To call for support if events prove that his means are inadequate.
6. To fill up the spaces in the orders if there are developments that had not been anticipated.
7. When the job is done, to prepare to go on to something else.

Lt. Gen. Sir Frederick Morgan, who planned the invasion of Normandy, put the matter this way: "When setting out on any enterprise, it is as well to ask oneself three questions. To whom is one responsible? For precisely what is one responsible? What are the means at one's disposal for discharging this responsibility?"

Nothing so warms the heart of a superior as, upon giving an order, to see his subordinate salute, say "Yes sir," then about face and proceed to carry it out all the way, without faltering or looking back. This is the kind of man that a commander will choose to have with him every time, and that he will recommend first for advancement.

On the other hand, clarification of the object is not only a right but a duty, and it cuts both ways. Orders are not always clear, and no superior is on firm ground when he is impatient of questions that are to the point, or resentful of the man who asks them. But it is natural that he will be doubtful of the man whose words show either that he hasn't heard or is concerned mainly with irrelevancies. The cultivation of the habit of careful, concentrated listening, and of collected thought in studying any problem is a main portal to successful officership.

To say that promptness and positiveness in the execution of a mission are at all times major satisfactions does not imply that the good man, like an old fire horse, moves out instantly at the clang of a bell. Soundness of action involves a sense of timing. Thoroughness is the way of duty rather than a speed that goes off on impulse. There is frequently a time for waiting; there is always time for acute reflection. The brain that works "like a steel trap" exists only in fiction. Even such men as General Eisenhower and Admiral Nimitz or, for that matter, the Joint Chiefs as a body have at times deferred decision temporarily while waiting for a change in circumstance to help them make up their minds.

This is normal in the rational individual; it is not a sign of weakness. Rather than to cultivate a belief in one's own infallibility, the mature outlook for the military man is best expressed in the injunction of the Apostle Paul: "Let all things be done decently and in order." Grant wrote of the early stage of his advance on Richmond: "At this time I was not entirely decided as to how I should move my Army." From the

pen of General Eisenhower come these words: "The commander's success will be measured more by his ability to lead than by his adherence to fixed notions." Thus, in the conduct of operations not less than in the execution of orders, it is necessary that the mind remain plastic and impressionable.

Within military organization, it is commonly said that refusal to obey an order is unthinkable. Still, it is not true. The idea of undeviating compliance with a military order is not sensible and is offensive to American military tradition. The order may be unlawful. Or it may have issued from a commander who has lost his reason under stress. An American under arms must not comply with an order to do that which is obviously a crime. If directed by a superior to commit atrocities, for example, he must decline and say why. Any order that clearly would doom or disgrace his unit, serving no worthwhile purpose, likewise calls for objection. To protest that some other order would better serve is not undutiful in a subordinate any more than in a staff. This is not a thin question of one value judgment as opposed to another. To oppose, one must be certain enough of what is right to stake his career, or more than that, on the issue. So doing, he will get backing, though the risk is still there: no fit officer, commissioned or NCO, withholds for that reason.

To disobey, or to support disobedience, under any other set of circumstances is, on the other hand, inexcusable, a wound to organization and a military crime. By the same rule, insistence that an order be carried out undeviatingly, simply because it has been given, does not of itself win respect for the authority uttering it. Its modification, however, should never be in consequence of untempered pressure from below. To change or rescind is justified only when a reestimate of all of the available facts indicates that some other order will serve the general purpose better.

Korean operations provide one luminous example. Ordered to attack westward from Udamni in early December 1950, the 5th and 7th U. S. Marine Regiments were soon withering under the fire of a Chinese Communist army, which came at them from all sides. The two commanders decided on their own to call off the attack and withdraw to a siege position around the village. There the commander of the 7th, who was senior, proposed that for the duration of the siege all main decisions should be made by a council of war formed of the two commanders and their executives. His reasoning was that the two regiments had become insolubly joined in a cause where the jeopardy was equal and nearly absolute; four heads were likely to prove better than one. That is how it was done. Days of unrelenting pressure followed, but the working harmony of the council survived the worst the enemy could do.

Taking counsel of subordinates in any enterprise or situation means giving them full advantage of one's own information and reasoning, weighing with the intellect whatever thought or argument they may contribute to the sum of considerations, and then making, without com-

promise, a clean decision as to what is best done. To know how to command obedience is a very different thing from making men obey. Obedience is not the product of fear, but of understanding, and understanding is based on knowledge.

On D-day in Normandy, Lt. Turner B. Turnbull undertook to do with his platoon of 42 men a task that had been intended for a battalion; he was to block the main road to enemy forces pressing south from the Cherbourg area against the American Army's right flank. In early morning he engaged a counterattacking enemy battalion, supported by mortars and a self-propelled gun, at the village of Neuville au Plain. The platoon held its ground throughout the day. By dusk the enemy had closed wide around both its flanks and was about to cut the escape route. Turnbull had 23 men left. He said to them, "There's one thing left to do; we can charge them." Pfc. Joseph Sebastian, who had just returned from reconnoitering to the rear, said, "I think there's a chance we can still get out; that's what we ought to do." Turnbull asked of his men, "What's your judgment?" They supported Sebastian as having the sounder idea. In a twinkling Turnbull made his decision. He told the men to get set for the run; he was losing men even while he talked; he ordered that the 12 wounded be left behind. Cpl. James Kelly, first aid man, said he would stay with the wounded. Pfc. Sebastian, who had argued Turnbull into a withdrawal, volunteered to stand his ground and cover the others with a BAR. Cpl. Raymond Smitson said he would stay by Sebastian and support him with hand grenades. Sgt. Robert Niland started for one of the machine guns to help Smitson and Sebastian in covering the withdrawal, but was shot dead by a German closing in with a machine pistol before he could reach the gun. The 16 remaining survivors took off like so many shots fired from a pistol, at full speed but at intervals, to minimize the target. All got back to their battalion, though Turnbull was killed in action a few days later. Their one-day fight had preserved the flank of an Army. For economy of effort and power of decision, there is hardly a brighter example in the whole book of war.

To encourage subordinates to present their views and to weigh them in the light of reason is one of the surest ways to win their confidence while refining one's own information and judgments. However, to leave final decision to them in matters that are clearly in the area of one's own responsibility is fatal to the character of self and to the integrity of the force.

The record of American forces in Vietnam through ten years was generally bright and commendable. But it was sullied by several shocking incidents that, becoming national scandals, will likely be remembered after the good is forgotten by the public. They had some aspects in common. Each incident stemmed from the issuing of an arbitrary and baneful order doing violence to direction from higher authority. In no case was there adequate consultation of peers and superiors. The resulting action was so repugnant to the standards and practices of

American Forces that covering up and falsifying reports almost inevitably compounded the crime. The dire end is usually the sequel to the wrong-headed start. Service people have better reason to remember these painful episodes than do civilians. Any one of them might have been averted had one strong individual raised his voice in warning and protest.

Any officer is one among many. Behind the smallest unit is the total power of the combined forces. In the main, effectiveness develops out of unity of effort. To commit one's force to desperate, unhelped enterprises, when there is support at hand that may be had for the asking, may be one road to glory, but it is certainly not the path to success in war. The charge of the Light Brigade at Balaklava was made immortal by Tennyson's poem, but it was as foolhardy as asking a troop of Boy Scouts to capture Gibraltar. In battle, a main obligation of those who lead is to make constant resurvey of the full horizon of their resources and means of possible support. This entails in time of peace the acquisition of a great body of knowledge seemingly unrelated to the administration of one's immediate affairs. It entails, also, facing forthrightly every task or assignment, giving it a full try, sweating out every obstacle, while not being hesitant to ask for help or counsel if the task proves to be beyond one's powers. To give it everything, though not quite making the grade personally, is merely an exercise in character building. But to have the mission fail because of false pride is inexcusable.

The prayer that Sir Francis Drake wrote down for his men as he led them forth to a great adventure might well be repeated by any leader in the hour when he begins to despair because, in spite of his striving, he has not gained all he sought: "O Lord God, when Thou givest to thy servants to endeavour any great matter, grant us also to know that it is not the beginning, but the continuing of the same until it is thoroughly finished, which yieldeth the true glory."

The courage to start will carry a man far. Under the conditions of either war or peace, it is astonishing how many times all things come in balance for the man who is less fearful of rebuff than of being counted a cypher. One of Britain's great armored leaders, Lt. Gen. Sir Giffard Martel, digested the lesson of his whole life experience into this sentence: "If you take a chance, it usually succeeds, presupposing good judgment." One American general put it even more positively: "Ours is the constant fight between progress and making sure you never make a mistake." Finally, it comes to that, for the willingness to accept calculated risks is central to effective personal performance in the military profession. There must be careful collection of data. There must be weighty consideration of all known and knowable factors in the given situation. But beyond these things, what?

To convey the idea that an officer must by ingrained habit dispose himself to take action, only after he has arrived at an exact formula pointing exclusively in one direction, would mean only that under the

conditions of war he could not get off his trousers-seat. For such fullness of information and confidence of situation are not given to combat commanders once in a lifetime.

It is customary to treat "estimate of situation" as if it were pure mathematical process, pointing almost infallibly to a definite result. But this is contrary to nature. The mind of man does not work that way, nor is it consistent with operational realities. Senior commanders are as prone as even the newest junior lieutenant to labor in perplexity between two opposing courses of action during times of crisis, and then make their decisions almost with the abruptness of an explosion. It is post-decision steadiness more than pre-decision certitude that carries the day. A large part of decision is intuitive; it is the by-product of the subconscious. In war, much of what is most pertinent lies behind a drawn curtain. The officer is therefore badly advised who would believe that a hunch is without value, or that there is something unmilitary about the simple decision to take some positive action, even though he is working in the dark.

The youthful Col. Julian Ewell (later Lt. Gen.) of the 501st Parachute Infantry Regiment, reaching Bastogne, Belgium, on the night of December 18, 1944, with only his lead battalion at hand, insisted that he be given orders, even though higher headquarters could tell him almost nothing about the friendly or enemy situations. He got his orders, and with the one battalion moved out through the dark to counterattack. So doing, he stopped cold the German XXXXVII Panzer Corps and compelled Hitler to alter his Ardennes plan.

To grasp the spirit of orders is not less important than to accept them cheerfully and afterwards keep faith with the contract, for the letter of an instruction does not relieve him who receives it from the obligation to exercise common sense. In the Carolina maneuvers of 1941, a soldier stood at a road intersection for three days and nights directing civilian traffic, simply because the man who put him there had forgotten all about him. Though he was praised at the time, he was hardly a shining example to hold up to troops. Diligence and dullness are not mutually exclusive traits. The model who is well worth pondering by all Services is Chief Boatswain's mate L. M. Jahnsen who on the morning of Pearl Harbor was in command of the yard garbage scow YG-17. It was collecting refuse from the fleet when the first Japanese planes came over. As the West Virginia began to burn, Jahnsen headed his scow into the heat and smoke and ordered his men to man their single fire hose. The old assignment forgotten, with overheated ammunition exploding all around him, he stood there directing his men in all they could do to lessen the ruin of the fleet.

In the Armed Forces, a special glory attends those whose heroism or service is "above and beyond the call of duty." But they owe their fundamental character to the millions of men who have followed the path of duty above and beyond the call of orders.

Whatever the nature of an officer's assignment, there are compensations. The conventional attitude is to speak disparagingly of staff duty, sniff at service with a higher administrative headquarters as if it were somehow lacking in true masculine appeal, and express a preference for duty "at sea," "with troops" or "in the field." Although most of this is flapdoodle, it probably does no more harm than Admiral William F. Halsey's grimace over the fact that he once "commanded an LSD—Large Steel Desk." He is a poor stick of a military person who has no natural desire to try his hand at the direct management of other people, if for no better reason than to test his own mettle.

Staff work, however, has its own peculiar rewards. Chief among them are the broadening of perspective, a more intimate contact with the views, working methods, and personality characteristics of higher commanders, and the chance to become acquainted with administrative responsibility from the viewpoint of policy. Although it sounds mysterious and even forbidding until one has done it, the procedures are not more complex nor less instructive than in any other kind of assignment.

There are no inside secrets about what goes on here that will not work equally well elsewhere. The staff is simply the servant of the general force; it exists but to further the welfare of the fighting establishment. Those within it are remiss if they fail to keep this rule uppermost. Consequently, no special attitude is called for other than an acute receptiveness. The same military bearing and the same naturalness of manner that enable an officer to win the confidence and working loyalty of his people will serve just as well when dealing with higher authority.

Chapter 13

KNOWING YOUR JOB

In one of his little-known passages, Robert Louis Stevenson drew the perfect portrait of the man who finally failed at everything because he just never learned how to take hold of his work.

It goes like this: "His career was one of unbroken shame. He did not drink. He was exactly honest. He was never rude to his employers. Yet he was everywhere discharged. Bringing no interest to his duties, he brought no attention. His day was a tissue of things neglected and things done amiss. And from place to place and from town to town he carried the character of one thoroughly incompetent."

No one would say that the picture is overdrawn or that the poor devil got other than his just desserts. In the summing up, the final judgment that is put on an officer by his peers depends on his value as a working hand. If he has other serious personality faults, they may be overlooked as somewhat beside the point, provided that he levels with his job. But if he embodies all of the surface virtues and is shiftless, any superior with sense will mark him for the discard, and his coworkers will breathe a sigh of relief when he has gone on his way.

In the Armed Forces, the tone of grudging admiration is never missing from such familiar comments as:

"He's a queer duck, but he has what it takes."

"We can't get along with him, but we can't get along without him."

By such words we unconsciously yield the palm to the person who, whatever his other shortcomings, excels us in application to duty. One of the worst rascals ever raised in Britain said that while he wouldn't give a farthing for virtue, he would pay 10,000 pounds for character, because, possessing it, he would be able to sell it for much more.

Is it possible, then, that men of thoroughly good intentions will neglect the one value which a knave says is worth prizing? It certainly is. We have seen officers of the Armed Forces who, thinking themselves employed all day, would still, if they made an honest reckoning of the score after tattoo sounded, be compelled to say that they had accomplished little, if anything. Lacking some compelling duty, they may have read several hours mechanically, neither studying what was written nor making notes nor reflecting on the value and accuracy of it. Such papers as they signed, they had glanced over perfunctorily. If any

subordinates approached them with some small matter, they reacted by trying to get rid of him as quickly as possible. When they entered the company of their fellow officers, they partook of it as little as they could, not bothering to enter vigorous conversation, failing to make any note of the character and manner of their associates, and learning not at all from the words that were said.

It is all good enough, and yet, oddly, it is neither good nor is it enough. That idea of what life in the officer corps is meant to be simply cannot stand up under the pressures of modern operations. True enough, assignments do not all have the same level of work requirement, and one is sometimes handed a wide open opportunity to goldbrick. But taking advantage of it is like the dope habit; the more it is sniffed, the greater becomes the craving of the nervous system. It is harder to throw off sloth than to keep it from climbing onto one's back in the first place. And, finally, the truth of the matter is this, that there is never any assignment given a military officer that entitles him to waste any of the working hours of his day. Though he be marking time in a casual depot or replacement center, there still awaits his attention the entire range of military studies, through which he can advance his own abilities. And if he is not of a mind for tactics, map-reading, military law, and training doctrine, it still follows that the study of applied psychology, English composition, economic geography, and foreign languages will further his career. Just as a rough approximation, any officer's work week should comprise about 50 percent execution and the other half study, if he is to make the best use of his powers. The woods are loaded with go-getters who claim they are men of action and therefore have no need of books, that they are "the flat bottoms who can ride over the dew." Though they are a little breezier, they are of the same bone and marrow as the drone who is always counseling half speed. "Don't sweat; just get by; extra work means short life; you're better off if they don't notice you." This chant can be heard by anyone who cares to listen; it's the old American invitation to mediocrity. But while mediocre, as commonly used, means "indifferent, ordinary," it also has in old English the odd meaning of "a young monk who was excused from performing part of a monk's duties." And that, too, fits. It is always worthwhile to ask a few very senior officers what they think of these jokers who refuse to study. They will say that the higher up you go, the more study you have to make up because of what you missed somewhere along the line. They will say also that when they got to star rank, things didn't ease off a bit.

But not all wisdom is to be found in books, and at no time is this more true than when one is breaking in. What is expected of the novice in any field is that he will ask questions, smart ones if possible, but if not, then questions of all kinds, until he learns that there is no such item as reveille oil and that skirmish line doesn't come on spools. For on one point there should be no mistake: the newly appointed offi-

cer is a novice. Though many things go with the commission, the assumption that he is all wise to all ways of the Service, and will automatically fit into his element as neatly as a loaded ship settles down to its Plimsoll mark, just isn't among them. Seniors are rarely, if ever, either patronizing or intolerant of the greenness of a new officer; they just stand ready to help him. And if he doesn't permit them to have that chance because he would rather pretend that he knows it all, they will gradually become bored with him because of the manifest proof that he knows so very little.

Wisdom begins at the point of understanding that there is nothing shameful about ignorance; it is shameful only when a man would rather remain in that state than cultivate other men's knowledge. There is never any reason why he should hesitate, for it is better to be embarrassed from seeking counsel than to be found short for not having sought it.

In one of the toughest trades in the world of affairs—that of the foreign correspondent—initial dependence upon one's professional colleagues is the only certain stepping stone to success. A man arrives in a strange country feeling very much alone. His credentials lack the weight they had at home. The prestige of his newspaper counts for almost nothing. Even the name of his home city stirs little respect. The people, their ways, their approaches, and their taboos are foreign to him. This sweeping environmental change is crushing to the spirit; it would impose an almost insuperable moral handicap if the newcomer could not go to other Americans who have already worked the ground, ask them how the thing is done, seek their advice about dealing with the main personalities, learn from them about the facilities for processing copy, and soak up everything they have to say about private and professional procedures. Then, as the ropes grow gradually familiar in the grasp, confidence and nervous energy come flooding back.

Surely there is a close parallel between this experience and that of the journeyman moving from the familiar soil of civilian life to the terra incognita of military life. But there is also the marked difference that everyone he meets can tell him something that he needs to know. More particularly, if he has the ambition to excel as a commander of men rather than as a technician, the study of human nature and of individual characteristics within the Armed Forces become a major part of his training. That is the prime reason why the life of any tactical leader becomes so very interesting, provided he possesses some imagination. Everything is grist for his mill. Moreover, despite the wholesale transformation in the scientific and industrial aspects of war, there has been no revolution in the one thing that counts most. Ardant du Picq's words, "The heart of man does not change," are as good now as when he said them a century ago. Whatever one learns for certain about the nature of man as a fighting animal can be filed for ready reference; the hour will come when it will be useful.

We have emphasized the value of becoming curious, and of asking questions about what one doesn't know, and have said that even when the questions are a little on the dumb side, it does no harm. But the ice gets very thin at one point. The same question asked over and again, like the same error made more than once, will grate the nerves of any superior. It is the mark of inattention and the beginning of that "tissue of things neglected and things done amiss" that put Stevenson's odd-ball character in the ditch. When an officer lets words go in one ear and out the other like water off a duck's back, to quote the Dutch janitor, he is chasing rainbows by rubbing fur in the wrong direction.

Ideally, an officer should be able to do the work of anyone serving under him. There are even some command situations in which the ideal becomes altogether attainable and a wholly practicable objective. For it may be said without qualification, that if he not only has this capability, but demonstrates it so that his men begin to understand that he is thoroughly versed in the work problems that concern them, he can command them in any situation. This is the real high ground of command capacity, and nothing else so well serves to give an officer a firm position with all who serve under him. For as has been said elsewhere in this book, administration is not of itself a separate art or a dependable prop to authority. When administrators talk airily of things they clearly do not understand, they are simply using the whip on the team without having control of the reins.

However, the greater part of military operation in present days is noteworthy for the extreme diversity and complexity of its parts, and instead of becoming more simplified, the trend is toward greater elaboration. Indeed, the rate of change has accelerated steadily since 1945, and military power, paced by discoveries in the physical sciences, has undergone a more radical transformation than in all previous centuries. Such has been the projected growth of applicable knowledge in this field, and the personnel procurement and training requirements appropriate thereto, that at first the manpower system managers were appalled by it, feeling they could never get qualified technicians in sufficient number. That problem diminished slightly as they began to deal with it, although it remains a critical and continuing one, as requirements increase almost geometrically.

It will do so with the average good officer. No one expects him to know more about radio repair than the repairman, more about mapping than the cartographer, more about moving parts than a gunsmith, more about radar than a specialist in electronics, more about cypher than a cryptographer, and more about handling a critical mass safely than the sergeant especially schooled for the task. If the Services were to set any such unreasonable standard for the commissioned body, all would shortly move over into the lunatic fringe. Science has worked a few wonders for the military establishment, but it hasn't told us how to produce that kind of person.

Plainly, there must be a somewhat different approach to the question of what kind of knowledge an officer is expected to possess, or the requirement would be unreasonable and unworkable.

The distinction lies in the difference between the power to do a thing well and that of being able to judge when it is well done. A man can say that a book is bad, though not knowing how to write one himself, provided he is a student of literature. Though he has never laid an egg, he can pass fair judgment on an omelet if he knows a little about cookery and has sampled many good eggs and detected a few that were overripe.

Adjustment to a job and, finally, mastery of it, by a military officer come of persistent pursuit of this principle. The main technique is study and constant reexamination of criteria. To take the correct measure of standards of performance as to the value of the work itself and as to the abilities of personnel, one must become immersed in knowledge of the nature and purpose of all operations. There is no shortcut to this grasp of affairs. The sack is filled bean by bean. Patient application to one thing at one time is the first rule of success; getting on one's horse and riding off in all directions is the prelude to failure. All specialists like to talk about their work; the interest of any other man is flattering; all men grow in knowledge chiefly by picking other men's brains. Book study of the subject, specialized courses in the Service schools, the instructive comments of one's superiors, the informed criticism of hands further down the line, and the weighing of human experience at every source and by every recourse are the paths to an informed judgment. It was the scientist, Thomas Huxley, who reminded us that science is only "organized common sense."

Other things being equal, the prospect for any man's progress is largely determined by his attitude. It is the receptive mind, rather than the oracle, that inspires confidence. General Eisenhower said at one point that, after 40 years, he still thought of himself as a student on all military questions, and that he consciously mistrusted any man who believed he had the full and final answer to problems which by their nature were everchanging.

But priggishness about knowledge is not more hurtful than is the arbitrary use of it to limit action. To rule by work rather than to work by rules must be the abiding principle in military operations, for, finally, when war comes, nothing else will suffice. In peacetime, absolute accountability is required because dollar economy in operations is a main object. This entails adherence to rigid forms, time-consuming, but still necessary. In many of war's exigencies, these forms frequently have to be swept aside to bring victory as quickly as possible and to save human life.

Take one example: In some quarters, it is still regarded as a main blunder by the American military that in 1965 so much money was "wasted" by our high command in Vietnam. Fleets of ships went forth

laden with military supply. There were no ports to receive them. So they idled offshore for weeks in some instances while the demurrage piled up. Still not understood is that the "wastage" resulted from a command decision deliberately made by General William C. Westmoreland, as courageous and right-minded a decision as any military chief was ever called to make. It was a new kind of problem not covered by the book and with no guidance from higher authority.

In July, 1965, the war was about to be lost; it could be saved only by deploying American troops inland as fast as they arrived, despite the lack of base facilities. The one solution to the seeming dilemma was to treat the ships as floating warehouses and to hell with the demurrage. If infantrymen could be fed into battle with only "hot cargo" items—ammunition, medicines, rations—getting along without toothpaste, jungle boots, toilet paper, cigarettes and all manner of PX supply, the taxpayer ought to be able to take his part of the rap. That is how Westmoreland reckoned it.

In all walks of life, however, this readiness to grasp the nettle firmly is by no means common in individuals at any level of responsibility. The tendency is to shy off from decisions that, however right and just, are not likely to be popular.

But there is also a far wider vista than that which is to be scanned only within the Armed Forces, and its horizons are almost infinite. The American way of warfare utilizes everything within the national system that may be applied to a military purpose toward the increase of training and fighting efficiency. Much of our potential strength lies in our industrial structure, our progress in science, our inventiveness, and our educational resources. Toward the end that all of these assets will be given maximum use, and every good idea that can be converted to a military purpose will be in readiness to serve the Nation when war comes, there must be a continuing meeting of minds between military leadership and the leaders and experts in these various other fields during peace.

That union cannot be perfected, however, unless there is a sufficient number of persons on both sides of the table who can think halfway into the field of the expert opposite. Just as the civilian specialist in electronics, airplane manufacture, or motion picture production needs to know more about the military establishment's problem and requirements if he is to do his part, the military officer with whom he is dealing needs to be informed on industry's resources, possibilities, and limitations if he is to enable the civilian side to do its part well. The same for science. The same for education and all other backers of the fighting force.

An observant Englishman, D. W. Brogan, in a book written during World War II, *The American Character*, gave us this thought: "The American officer must think in terms of material resources, existing but not organized in peacetime and taking much time and thought

and experiment by trial and error to make them available in wartime. He finds that his best peacetime plans are inadequate for one basic reason: that any plan which in peacetime really tried to draw adequately on American resources would cause its author to be written off as a madman; and in wartime, it would prove to have been inadequate, pessimistic, not allowing enough for the practically limitless resources of the American people—limitless once the American people get ready to let them be used. And only war can get them ready for that. The American officer can draw then, but not before, on an experience in economic improvisation and in technical adaptation which no other country can equal."

Read years later, these words seem flushed with optimism. Today the world is locked in an intense struggle between communism and freedom. It is split into two camps, each having the capacity to destroy the other. The Soviet Union has made a rapid post-war march as a challenging power. Its heavy industry has been vastly expanded and its educational system reshaped to further the Soviet purpose of world domination by communism. The national policy now accepts the proposition that the United States cannot in the future aim for more than parity with the Soviets in military power. Some national leaders, and not a few experts, on the other hand, contend that the USSR has already forged ahead of us. In 1970, a group of outstanding citizens, none identified with government or connected with the military, reported to the President after one year's study of the situation, that (a) the period of clear U. S. military superiority was ended, and (b) the vital interests of the U. S. and the freedom of its citizens are not to be reckoned secure during the 1970's. If this estimate is as realistic as it is bleak, it says that NATO and our other alliances are indispensable to national survival.

If we agree that's how things stand, today's situation makes doubly valid Brogan's other main point, wherein he speaks of how the Nation's potential must be viewed by the military. Its essence is that unless the American officer can think of the whole Nation as his workshop and, along with his other duties, will apply himself as a student, seeking to understand more and more about the richness and the adaptability of our tremendous resources, neither he nor the country will be relatively ready when war comes.

There is a last point to be made on the matter of attitude. The most resolute opposition to changes in any system usually comes from those who control it. That is universally true, and not peculiar to military systems; but the Services are foremost in recognizing that, as a consequence, the encouragement of original thought at the lower levels is essential to overall progress.

All depends upon the manner. We can ponder the words of William Hazlitt, "A man who shrinks from a collision with his equals or superiors will soon sink below himself; we improve by trying our strength

with others, not by showing it off." They are good so far as they go, but something new should be added. There is a vast difference between contending firmly for ideas that seem progressive when one is reasonably sure of one's facts and the habit of throwing one's weight around through a mistaken belief that this of itself manifests an independence of spirit that compels respect.

Truculence can never win the day. Restraint, tolerance, a sense of humor and of proportion, and the force of logic are the marks of the person qualified for intellectual leading. In the Armed Forces, even if such an officer has no great rank, there is practically nothing he cannot carry through, if his proposals have the color of reason and propriety, and if he will keep his head, keep his temper, and keep his word.

There is more to be discovered about training, manpower management, and combat leading than has ever been learned.

But, as with all problems developing within group organization, one truth applies: the problem itself must first be seen, its proportions fully developed, and its causes analyzed until they are competently understood, before true progress becomes possible. These things done, the final approved solutions will almost automatically suggest themselves.

Final accomplishment is not so much a matter of wisdom in dreaming up a formula as of diligence in learning all possible about the problem. When superiors stress the vital importance of completed staff work, what they mean to say is: "You must have absolute command of your data above all else."

Advance comes from patient, plodding work in the collecting of information. Imaginative use of it is but a by-product of the main thing. Intuitive judgment comes out of sweat.

Chapter 14

WRITING AND SPEAKING

Other things being equal, a superior rating will usually be given to the officer who has persevered in his studies of the art of self-expression, while his colleague who attaches little importance to what may be achieved through working with the language will be marked for mediocrity.

A moment's reflection will show why this has to be the case and why mastery of the written and spoken word is indispensable to successful officership.

As the British statesman, Disraeli, put it, "Men govern with words." In the Armed Forces command is exercised through what is said that commands attention and understanding and through what is written that directs, explains, interprets, or informs.

Battles are won through the ability of men to express concrete ideas in clear and unmistakable language. All administration is carried forward along the chain of command by the power of men to make their thoughts articulate and available to others.

There is no way under the sun that this basic condition can be altered. Once the point is granted, any officer should be ready to accept its corollary—that superior qualification in the use of the language, both as to the written and the spoken word, is more essential to military leadership than knowledge of the whole technique of weapons handling.

It then becomes strictly a matter of personal decision whether the officer will seek to advance himself along the line of main chance or will take refuge in the excuse offered by the great majority: "I'm just a simple fighting man with no gift for writing or speaking."

How often these or similar words are heard in the Armed Forces! And the pity of it is that they are usually uttered in a tone indicating that the speaker believes some special virtue attaches to this kind of ignorance. There is the unmistakable innuendo that the man who pays serious attention to the fundamentals of the business of communication is somehow less possessed of sturdy military character than himself. There could hardly be a more absurd or disadvantageous professional conceit than this. It is the mark only of an officer who has no ambition to qualify properly and is seeking to justify his own laziness.

Not all American military leaders have been experts at polishing a phrase or giving succinct expression and continuity to the thoughts that made them useful in command. But of those who have excelled in the conduct of great operations, at least four out of five made some mark in the field of letters. A long list would include such names as U. S. Grant, W. T. Sherman, Robert E. Lee, John J. Pershing, James G. Harbord, Henry T. Allen, Dwight D. Eisenhower, George S. Patton, Jr., H. H. Arnold, Omar N. Bradley, Douglas MacArthur, William F. Halsey, W. B. Smith, Joseph W. Stilwell, Nathan Twining, Matthew B. Ridgway and Robert L. Eichelberger, among many others.

Of them all, it can be said without exception that they acquired their skill at self-expression by sustained practice, which was part of a self-imposed training in the interests of furthering their military efficiency. No one of them was a born writer. Nor did any owe his abilities as a writer to any other person. Writers are self-made. But it is a reasonable speculation that history might never have heard of the greater number of these men had they not worked diligently to become proficient with the pen as well as with the sword. Granting that they had other sound military qualities, an acquired ability to express themselves lucidly and with force became the portal to preferment. The same thing holds true of their celebrated military contemporaries almost without exception. Even those who had no public reputation for authorship, and would have been ill at ease if called upon to speak to an average audience, knew how to use the language in presenting their thoughts to their staffs and their troops, whether the occasion called for a clear operational order, a doctrinal exposition, or an inspirational message on the eve of battle.

Wherever one looks, the same precept may be noted. It was not coincidence merely, but related cause and effect, that Ferdinand Foch was one of the ablest military writers of the twentieth century before he won immortality on the field of war, that the elder von Moltke was as skilled with ink as with power, and that we still marvel at the picture of the great von Steuben dictating drill manuals far into the night so that there would be greater perfection in his formations on the following day. The command of language was one of the main sources of their power over the multitude.

As it was with these commanders, so it is with leadership at every level: Men who can command words to serve their thoughts and feeling are well on their way to commanding men to serve their purposes.

All senior commanders respect the junior who has a facility for thinking an idea through and then expressing it comprehensively in straight unvarnished phrases. Moreover, even when they are stilted in their own manner of expression, they will warm to the man whose style achieves strength through its ease and naturalness. They will quickly make note of any young officer who is making progress in this direction and will want to have him around. Staff work could

not be carried forward at any of its levels if it were not for this particular talent, and command would lose a great part of its magnetism.

Toward the building of a career, the best break that can come to any young man is to have three or four places bidding simultaneously for his services. There are possibly better arguments than that as to why perfection in writing should be a main pursuit of the military officer; for example, the sense of personal attainment that comes of it.

Any person who has the brain to qualify for a commission can make of himself a competent writer. Because of natural limitations, he may never come to excel in this art. But if he has had average schooling, knows how to open a dictionary, can find his way to a library, is willing to commit himself to long study and practice, particularly in nonduty hours, and will finally free himself of the superstition that writing is a game only for specialists, he can acquire all the skill that is necessary to further his advance within the military profession.

That is the great difference between writing ability and specialized knowledge in such fields as electronics and atom research.

But where should work begin? How about a little practical advice?

The only way to learn to write is to write. That is it—there is no other secret than hard, unremitting practice. Most writers at the start are mentally muscle-bound and poorly coordinated. They have thoughts in their heads. They think they can develop them clearly. But when they try to apply a largely dormant vocabulary to the expression of these thoughts, the result is stiff and self-conscious.

The only cure for this is constant mental exercise with one's pen or over one's typewriter. After someone has written perhaps a half million relatively useless words, there comes, sometimes almost in a flash, and at other times gradually, a mastery not only of words but of phrases, sentences, and the composition of ideas. It is a kind of rhythmic process, like learning to swim or to row a boat or to pilot an airplane. When a writer has at last conquered his element, his personality and his character can be transmitted to paper. What is said will reflect the force, adaptability, reason, and musing of the writer. In fact, the discipline through which one learns to write adds substance to thought, whereby one's ideas are given body and connection. Such common faults as wordiness, over-statement, faulty sentence structure, and weak use of words are gradually corrected. With their passing, confidence grows. This does not mean, however, that the task then becomes easy. Though its rewards will increase, good writing continues to be a strain even to the person who does it well. Most celebrated men of letters never get beyond the "sweating" stage, but have to fight their way through a jungle of words, and rewite almost endlessly, before finding satisfaction in their product.

This description makes it all seem more than a little formidable. But what was promised in the first place was that any military officer who will accept the necessary discipline can make himself reasonably

proficient as a writer, and thereby further his professional progress. What he writes about during the conditioning period makes very little difference. It might be an operational order one night, a treatise on discipline the next, a lecture to his men on the elements of combat the third. Fortunately, the list of topics within the Armed Forces and directly applicable to their operations is practically inexhaustible. That is a main reason why the military establishment is a better school for writing than perhaps any other organization in our society.

Winston Churchill, whose gift of forceful expression is the envy of all other writing men, won his literary spurs in his early twenties as a soldier with the Malakand Field Force. He saw the essential idea —that to learn English he had literally to learn, just as though he had been acquiring Latin or French. As a writer, his main strength was his employment of Anglo-Saxon, the words of our common speech.

But simply to take regular exercise in composition is not quite enough. To progress as a writer, one must become a student of the best things that have been written by men who understand their craft. A military officer can do that without going beyond the field of military studies, if that is his disposition, such is the richness and variation of available works in this realm of literature. The purpose is not only to seek great ideas for their own sake but to make careful note of the manner in which they are expressed. So doing, one unconsciously invigorates his own powers and adopts techniques the masters have used to great advantage.

To paraphrase what a distinguished journalist once said on this subject in a speech to young writers: "For an officer it is in the first place a shame to be ignorant—ignorant, as not a few are, of history and geography; and in the second place, it is a pity that any officer should lack a vigor in writing which can be produced through imitation of vigorous writers."

As to what is best worth seeking, a man cannot go wrong by "falling in love" with the works of a relatively limited number of authors who charm him personally. It is all right to widen the field occasionally, for diversion, for contrast, for sharpening style, and for balancing of ideas, but strength comes of finding a main line and holding to it. No man can read a book with sympathetic understanding without taking from it something that makes him more complex and more potent.

The main test is in this: If you read a book and feel stirred by it, even though alternately you strongly agree with certain of its passages and warmly contend against others, something new has been added. The writer is making you see things. Your own powers of observation are being made more acute. All good writers are in a sense hitch-hikers. While going along for the ride and enjoying the essence of some highly developed mind, they are not loath to study the technique by which some other writer develops his driving power, and to make note of his strong words and best phrases for possible future use.

It is a good habit to underscore passages in books that have contributed something vital to one's own thought—always provided that the books have not been borrowed.

Without mentioning names, we can take a cue from a man who some years ago entered one of the Services while still a youth. He had had little formal education, but he began an earnest study of military literature, and the search for knowledge whetted his thirst to join the company of those who could speak to the world because they had something to say. He read such books as were at hand and clipped pieces from magazines and newspapers that had particularly appealed to him, for one reason or another. Whenever he saw a new word, he wrote it down and sought the meaning in the dictionary, considering whether it had a shade of meaning that added anything important to his vocabulary. This done, he wrote sentences, many sentences, employing his new words in various ways, until their use became instinctive. On this foundation alone, he built his career as a national writer. There was nothing extraordinary about this start and the ultimate result. Literally thousands of Americans have qualified themselves for one branch or another of the writing profession by what they learned to do in military service. Too, an ability to "organize a good paper" has been a large element in the success of most of the men who have moved from the military circle into top posts in the diplomatic service, in education, or in industrial administration. Had they been capable only of delegating this kind of work, their powers would never have been recognized.

As a practical matter, it is better to concentrate on a few elementary rules-of-thumb, such as are contained in the following list, than to bog down attempting to heed everything that the pedants have said about how to become a writer.

The more simply a thing is said the more powerfully it influences those who read. Plain words make strong writing.

There is always one best word to convey a thought or a feeling. To accept a weaker substitute, rather than to search for the right word, will deprive any writing of force.

Economy of words invigorates composition.

To quote Carl Sandburg: "Think twice before you use an adjective."

It is better to use the adverb because an adverb enhances the verb and is active, whereas the adjective simply loads down the noun.

On the other hand, it is the verb that makes language live. Nine times out of ten the verb is the operative word giving motion to the sentence. Hence, placing the verb is of first importance in giving strength to sentence structure.

In all writing, but in military writing particularly, there is no excuse for vague terminology or phrases that do not convey an exact im-

pression of what was done or what is intended. The military vocabulary, unfortunately, is laden with words and expressions that sound professional but do not have definite meaning. They vitiate speech and the establishment would gladly rid itself of them if a way could be found. Officers fall into the habit of saying "performed," "functioned," or "executed" and forget that "did" is in the dictionary. A captain along the MLR (main line of resistance) notifies his battalion commander that he has "advanced his left flank," when all that has actually occurred is that six riflemen from the left have crawled forward to new and possibly untenable ground.

It is better at all times to rein in. The strength of military writing, like the soundness of military operations, gains nothing through overstatement and artificial coloring. The bigger the subject the less it needs embroidery.

Another sound rule is do not overload your writing with too many quotations from the "authorities." Particularly in military writing, it is noxious, and may become such a habit that the reader concludes the writer is either uncertain of his theme or cannot think for himself.

Nothing is to be said in favor of working from outlines if one finds it more natural to work without them. They do sometimes limit the flow of thought. The same is to be said of the business of rewriting. The beginner who takes to writing slowly may find that by concentrating, he can get it right to begin, and by eliminating rewriting, he can save much time. Though few of the schools go along with these ideas, each individual must find his own way. There is no one best procedure.

For lucidity and sincerity, the important thing is to say what you have to say in whatever words most accurately express your own thoughts. That done, it is pointless to worry about the effect on the audience.

The list of suggestions could be extended indefinitely. But enough has been said to stake out a main line for those who have already decided that this subject deserves their interest.

A majority of the world's most gifted writers would in all probability be struck dumb if put before an audience; though dealing confidently with ideas, they lack confidence when dealing with people. The military officer has need of both talents, and as to where the emphasis should be placed, it is probably more important that he should speak well than that his writing should be polished. A unit commander may permit a clerk or a subordinate to do the greater part of his paper work, either because his own time is taken with other duties or because he is awkward at it, but if he permits any other voice to dominate the councils of the organization, he soon ceases to exercise moral authority over it.

Of this there is no question. The judgment men take of their superior is formed as much by what he says and how he says it as by his action.

The matter of nerve is a main element in speaking. When an officer is ill at ease, fidgety, and not to the point, the vote of his command for the time being is "no confidence," and so long as he remains that way, there will be little change, though his goodwill shines forth through other acts.

On the other hand, military people form an extremely sympathetic audience. But even if that were not true, the ranks have a generous spirit and are ever disposed to give the newcomer an even break. If he meets them confidently and calmly, measures his words, smiles at his own mistakes, and breaks it off when he has covered his subject, they'll pay no attention to his little fumbles, and they'll approve of him. There is no better way to pick up prestige than through instruction or discourse that commands attention, for despite all that is said in favor of the "strong, silent man," troops like an officer who is outgiving and who has an intelligence they can respect because they have seen it at work.

As for how an officer should talk to troops, his manner and tone should be no different than if he were addressing his fellow officers or, for that matter, a group of his intellectual and political peers from any walk of life. If he is stuffy, he will not succeed anywhere. If he affects a superior manner, that is a mark of his inferiority. If he is patronizing and talks to them as a teacher might talk to a class of adolescents, the rug, figuratively, will be pulled from under him. His audience will put him down as a chump.

It is curiously the case that the junior officer who can't get the right pitch when he talks to the ranks will also be out of tune when he talks to his superiors. This failing is a sign mainly that he needs practice in the school of human nature. By listening a little more carefully to other men, he may himself in time attain maturity.

Concerning subject matter, it is better always to aim high than to take the risk of shooting too low. It is too often the practice to spell out everything in words of one syllable so that the least literate listener in the organization will be able to understand it. When that is done, it insults the intelligence of the keenest men, and nothing is added to their progress. The target should be the intellect of the upper 25 or 30 percent. When they are stimulated and informed, they will bring others along, and even those who do not fully understand all that was under discussion will have heard something to which to aspire. The habit of talking down to troops is one of the worst vices that can afflict an officer.

There are no dull lecture topics; there are only dull lecturers. A little eager research will enliven any subject under the sun. Good lecturing causes men's imaginations to be stirred by vivid images. Real good is accomplished only when they talk to each other of what they have heard and thereby sharpen their impressions. Schopenhauer somewhere observes that "people in general have eyes and ears, but not

much else—little judgment and even little memory," which isn't far wrong. Consequently, competent lecturing entails the employment of every technique that can be used to hammer a point home. In this way, a truth or a lesson has a better chance of sticking because it is identified with some definite image. Simply to illuminate this point, it is noted that the jests that best stick in the memory are those which are associated with some incongruous situation. To relate a pertinent anecdote, to provide an apt quotation from some well-known authority, and to draw upon our own rich battle history for illustrative materials are but a few of the means of freshening any discussion while sharpening its purpose. Men are always ready to listen to the story of other men's experience if it is told with vigor. And as far as combat is concerned, such teaching is in point, for what has happened once will happen again.

For his way as an instructor of young infantry officers of the A. E. F. in 1918, Lt. Col. H. M. Hutchinson of the British Army was awarded our D. S. M. Officers who sat at his feet at Gondrecourt were unlikely ever to forget the point of such an anecdote as:

"There will be no 'Stack arms' in my army. It is a thing one sees on a brewer's calendar—The Soldier's Dream—showing a brave private sleeping under a stack of rifles which it will take him a good half-hour to untangle when the call comes to stand to. No, a soldier had better carry the rifle with him to his meals, have it beside him always, lavish his care upon it, and in short treat it more like a wife than a weapon.

"I am reminded of the times in South Africa when we would come to a country inn where a chap could stop for beer. Well, a soldier would walk into the place, and immediately he would stand his rifle in a corner—like an umbrella, you know—'We've arrived!'—and he'd get well into his beer and a song, say, and suddenly firing would break out on the inn from four sides.

"It seemed that a Boer had slipped into the entry and picked up all the rifles and passed them around to his mates in the bushes, and—well—there you are!"

Or this, in which the whole lesson of exactitude in the written communication is implicit:

"Now on the subject of messages, it might be well to say immediately that as far as I know no one ever received a written message during a battle. They may be written, but that I think is as far as it goes. However, they are occasionally received before and after battles, and in this connection let me say that it is no earthly good writing generalities to signify time and places.

"I mean to say, suppose you are writing a message and you write 'Report after breakfast.' Well to Sergeant Ramrod it might mean to stand-to at 3 o'clock in the morning; while to Captain Brighteyes it would mean, say, 8 o'clock. But to Colonel Fluefish it would signify sometime after 11, depending quite a bit on how the old fellow felt.

"So it is better to say 7 o'clock in the morning, if that is what you mean, for after all there is only one 7 o'clock in the morning. And, by the way, I must warn you chaps against the champagne on sale in the Cafe de l'Univers down here in the square. It is made in the basement—of potatoes."

An explicit instruction barring any possibility of mistake? Well, not quite. There is the story of Colonel (later Lt. Gen.) Bob Sink in Holland, September, 1944. He had the 506th Parachute Regiment marching in late evening to take the city of Eindhoven from the Germans when a canal bridge was blown up in his face. So he decided to bivouac on the bank and resume march at first light. Consulting the almanac to get the time, he said to his staff: "Wake me at six o seven in the morning, not one minute sooner, not one minute later," and then got into his sack.

When Sink was shaken awake the next morning, the sun was already one hour high. He came out of the sack roaring, "I told you to wake me at first light!"

"Oh, no, you didn't, Colonel, you said six o seven."

"It's the same damned thing!"

"No sir, it isn't, we had time change last night."

Some of the experts warn the lecturer who is only a beginner against the use of humor, commenting that if a joke is unlaughed at, it is disconcerting to all concerned. The only intelligent answer to that is: "Well, what of it?" The speaker who is going to cringe every time one of his passages falls a little flat had better not start. This happens at times to every lecturer; there are good days and bad days, live audiences and sour ones. If a man takes his work seriously, it is hardly within nature for him to harden his emotions against an unexpectedly dull reaction. But he can keep from ever showing that he is upset if as a speaker he consciously forms the habit of rapidly driving on from one point to another.

Thus, as to the use of humor in public address, it is not only an asset but almost a necessity. It is better to try with it and to fall flat occasionally, thereby sharpening one's own wit through better understanding of what goes and what does not, than to attempt to go along humorlessly. Said William Pitt: "Don't tell me of a man's being able to talk sense. Everyone can talk sense. Can he talk a little nonsense?" Even more to the point is the remark of Thomas Hardy that men thin away to insignificance quite as often by not making the most of good spirits when they have them as by lacking good spirits when they are indispensable. Fighting is much too serious a trade to have a large place for men who are dry as dust.

One of the spellbinders of ancient Greece, we are told, orated on the sands with his mouth filled with pebbles. In World War I, it was the custom of many higher commanders to take their officers out for voice exercises and have them talk through 150 feet of thicket! They were not

satisfied unless the words came through distinctly on the far side. If, under average acoustical conditions, a military officer cannot get across to 500 men, he needs to improve his voice placement. It is remarkable what wonders can be worked by consistent exercise of the vocal cords.

The final thought is that it is all a matter of buildup. An officer can cut his audience to his own size, and strengthen his powers and his confidence as he goes along. That is his supreme advantage. He can start with a short talk to a minor working detail and move from that to a more formal address before a slightly larger group. By taking it gradually, and increasing his store of knowledge in the interim period, he will see the time come when he can hold any audience in the hollow of his hand.

This is precisely the routine that was followed by most of the military leaders who have been celebrated for their command of speech.

Chapter 15

THE ART OF INSTRUCTION

Keep it simple.
Have but one main object.
Stay on the course.
Remain cheerful.
Be enthusiastic.
Put it out as if the ideas were as interesting and novel to you as to your audience.

By abiding by these few simple rules you will keep cool, preserve continuity, and hold your audience.

Instruction is just about the begin-all and end-all of every military officer's job. He spends the greater part of his professional life either pitching it or catching it, and the game doesn't stop until he is at last retired. Should he become a Supreme Commander even, this is one thing that does not change; it remains a give-and-take proposition. Part of his time is taken instructing his staff as to what he wants done, and just as much of it is spent in being instructed by his staff as to the means available for the doing of it.

Instruction is the generator of unified action. It is the transmission belt by which the lessons of experience are passed to untrained men. Left uninstructed, men may progress only by trial-and-error and the hard bumps that come of not knowing the way.

Need more than that be said to suggest that the officer who builds a competent skill in this field, so that it becomes a part of his reputation, has at the same time built the most solid kind of a foundation under his military career?

The Services do not discard that kind of officer when the economy pinch comes and the establishment has to contract. Even the Reservist, who is known as a good instructor, is on the preferred list. The Regular with this talent is in demand by the schools as by line organizations. In any period of emergency, such officers move rapidly to the top; there are always more good jobs than there are good men. Look back over the lineup of distinguished commanders from World War II up through Vietnam! It will be found that a high percentage of them first attracted notice by being good school men.

In the Services, in all functions related to the passing along of information, the accent is on "knowing your stuff." The point is substantial but not conclusive. It is in the way that instruction is delivered as much as in its contents that its value lies. The pay-off is not in what is said, but in what sinks in. A competent instructor will not only teach his men but will increase his prestige in the act. There are many inexpressibly dull bores who know what they're talking about but still haven't learned how to say it because they are contemptuous of the truth that it is the dynamic flow of knowledge rather than the static possession of it that is the means to power and influence. As technicians, they have their place. As instructors, they would be better off if they knew only half as much about their subject and twice as much about people.

To know where truth lies is not more important than knowing how to pitch it. Take the average American military audience: What can be said fairly of its main characteristics? Perhaps this—that it is moderately reflective; that it is ready to give the untried speaker a break; that it does not like windiness, bombast, or prolonged moralizing; that it refuses to be bullied; and that it can usually be won by the light touch and a little appeal to its sporting instinct. It is the little leavening in the bread that makes all the difference in its savor and digestibility.

In World War I, an American major, name now long forgotten, was given the task of making the rounds of the cantonments, talking to all combat formations, and convincing them that the future was bright—hardly a Boy Scout errand. Yet wherever he went, morale was lifted by his words. In substance, what he said was this:

"None of us cares about living with any individual who wants every break his own way. But when the odds are even, the gamble is worth any good man's time. So let's look at the proposition. You now have one chance in two; you may go overseas, you may not. Suppose you do. You still have one chance in two. You may go to the front, or you may not. If you don't, you'll see a foreign country at Uncle Sam's expense; if you do, you'll find out about war, which is the toughest chance of them all. But up there, you still have one chance in two; you may get hit, or you may not. If you breeze through it, you'll be a better man for all the rest of your life. And if you get hit, you still have one chance in two. You may get a small wound, and become a hero to your family and friends. Or there is always the last chance that it may take you out altogether. And while that is a little rugged, it is at least worth remembering that very few people seem to get out of this life alive."

That was as simple an idea as any military instructor ever unloaded, and yet troops cheered this man wherever he went.

Lt. Col. Hutchinson of the British Army, already described in this book as an instructor who made a powerful impression on the American Army in World War I because of his droll wit, was a master hand at taking the oblique approach to teach a lesson. Veterans still remember the manner and the moral of passages such as this one:

"On the march back from Mons—and I may say that a very good army sometimes must retreat, though no doubt it wounds the sensibilities to consider it—we did rather well. But I noticed often the confusion caused by marching slowly up one side of a hill and dashing down the other. It is a tendency of all columns on foot.

"A captain is sitting out in front on a horse, with a hell of a great pipe in his mouth and thinking of some girl in a cafe, and of course he moves slowly up the hill. He comes to the top and his pace quickens. Well, then, what happens? The taller men are at the top of the column, and they lengthen their stride—but what becomes of Nipper and Sandy down in the twentieth squad? Half the time, you see, they are running to catch up. So the effect is to jam the troops together on the upgrade and to stretch them out going down—you know—like a concertina."

Where then is the beginning of efficiency in the art of instruction? It resides in becoming diligent and disciplined about self-instruction. No man can develop great power as an instructor, or learn to talk interestingly and convincingly, until he has begun to think deeply. And depth of thought does not come of vigorous research on an assignment immediately at hand, but from intensive collateral study throughout the course of a career. We are all somewhat familiar with the type of commander who, when asked, "What are your officers doing about special studies, so that they may better their reading habits and further their powers of self-expression?" will puff himself up by replying, "They are kept so busily employed that they have no time for any such exercise." This is one way of saying that his subordinates are kept busy to get essential work done.

Research, on the spot and at the time, is vital and necessary so that the presentation of any subject will be factually freshened and documented. But its nature and object should not be overrated. The real values can be compared to what happens to a pitcher when he warms up before a game. This is merely an act of limbering the muscles; the true conditioning process has already taken place, and it has been long and arduous.

It is the same with immediate research in its relation to continuing military study toward the perfecting of instructorship. What gives an officer power and conviction on the platform or before a group is not the thing he learned only yesterday, having been compelled to read it in a manual or other source, but the whole body of his thought and philosophy as it may be directed toward the invigorating of any presentation on any subject. If he forms the habit of careful reflection, then almost everything he reads and hears other people say that arouses his own interest becomes of ultimate use.

Like 10 years in the penitentiary, it's easy to say but hard to do. So much time, seemingly, has to be wasted in profitless study to find a few kernels of grain amid much chaff. Napoleon said at one point that the trouble with books is that one must read so many bad ones to find some-

thing really good. True enough, but even so, there are perfectly practical ways to advance rapidly without undue waste motion. Consider this: Among one's superiors there are always discriminating men who have "adopted" a few good books after reading many bad ones. When they say that a text is worthwhile, it deserves reading and careful study.

The junior who starts building a working library for his professional use cannot do better than to consult those older men who are scholars as well as leaders, and ask them to name five or six texts that have most stimulated their thought. It comes as a surprising discovery that some of the titles that are recommended with the greatest enthusiasm are not among the so-called classic on war. The well-read man need not have more than 40 or so books in his home, provided that they all count with him and he continues to pore over them and to ponder the weight of what is said. On the other hand, the ignorant man is frequently marked by his bookshelf stocked with titles, not one of which suggests that he has any professional discernment.

The notebook habit is invaluable, nay, indispensable to any young officer who is ambitious to perfect himself as an instructor. Most men who are distinguished for their thinking ability are inveterate keepers of scrapbooks and of reference files where they have put clippings and notes that jogged their own thoughts. This is not a cheap device leading to the parroting of others; the truth is that the departure line toward original thinking by anyone is established by the mental energy he acquires through imaginative noting of other people's ideas.

To get back to the notebook, it should be loose-leaf and well-bound, else it is not likely to be given permanent use. Whether it is kept at home or at the office is immaterial. What matters is that it be made a receptacle for everything one hears, reads, or sees that may be of possible future value in the preparation of classroom work. Books may not be clipped; but short, decisive passages can be copied, and longer ones can be made the subject of a reference item. Copying is one way of fixing an idea in the memory. While on the subject of books, it is all right to quote the classics when they are in point and to be able to refer to the great authorities on the science of war. But it is more effective by far to read deeply into such writers as Clausewitz, Mahan, and Fuller, and to find some of their strongest but least-known passages for one's self, than to rely on the more popular but shop-worn quotations in general circulation. Such old chestnuts as, "The moral is to the material as three to one," do not refresh discourse. And possibly the correct equation is four or five to one.

Even so, the classics are only one small field worth cultivating. Major speeches by current military leaders often contain a passage or two well worth salting away. The writings of the philosophers, the publications of the industrial world, the daily press, and the scientific journals are goldmines containing rich nuggets of information and of choice expression worth study and preservation.

In fact, the military instructor has the whole world as his reference library. His notebook should be as ready to receive some especially apt saying by a new recruit as the more ponderous words uttered by the sages. And it should contain comments on techniques and methods used by other speakers and instructors that were visibly unusually effective.

Above all, the consistent use of obvious and stereotyped devices and methods of presentation should be avoided. For the fact is that no one has yet discovered the one best way. In our military thinking, we tend to get into a rut and to use none but the well-tried way. For example, we overwork the twin principles of thought-surprise and thought-concentration, and in the effort to produce dramatic effect, we sometimes achieve only an anticlimax. Using the techniques of the advertising world, the military instructor puts his exhibits behind a screen in order to build up anticipation, and at the appropriate moment he yanks the cover off. This is perfectly effective in some instances. But it becomes a *reductio ad absurdum* when he is working with only one chart or a pair or so of objects. Let's say that he is talking about one machine gun, and he has one chart highlighting its characteristics. How much more impressive it would be if these objects were in the open at the beginning and he were to start by saying: "Gentlemen, I am talking about this one gun and what keeps it going. It is more important that you see and know this gun from this moment than that you be persuaded by what I am about to say."

It is a very simple but inviolable rule that when there is an obvious straining to produce an effect by the use of any training aid, the effect of the training aid is lost and the speaker is proportionately enfeebled. A famous World War II Chief of Staff, Lt. Gen. W. B. Smith, said of all operations: "It is the chaps, not the charts, that get the job done."

What needs to be kept in mind is the psychological objective in the use of all training aids. The scientists tell us, and we can partly take their word for it, that people learn about 75 percent of what they know through their sight, 13 percent through their hearing, and 12 percent through their other senses. But this is a relative and qualitative, rather than an absolute, truth. It has to be so. Otherwise, book study, which employs sight exclusively, would be the only efficient method of teaching, and oral instruction, which depends primarily on sound impact, would be a wasteful process.

The more fundamental truth is that when oral instruction is properly done, the mind becomes peculiarly receptive because it is being bombarded by both sight and sound impressions. Nor is this small miracle wrought primarily by what we call training aids. The thoughts and ideas that remain most vivid in the memory get their adhesive power because some particular person said them in a graphic way in a pregnant moment. Our working thoughts are more often the product of an association with some other individual than not. We remember words

largely because we remember an occasion. We believe in ideas because first we were impressed by the source whence they came.

The total impression of a speaker—his sincerity, his knowledge, his enthusiasm, his mien, and his gestures—is what carries conviction and puts an indelible imprint on the memory. Man not only thinks, but he moves, and he is impressed most of all by animate objects. Vigorous words mean little or nothing to him when they issue from a lackluster personality.

Artificiality is one of the more serious faults, and it is unfortunately the case that though an instructor may be solid to the core, he will seem out of his element unless he is careful to avoid stilted words and vague catch-all phrases and connectives. Strength in discourse comes of simplicity.

But it has become almost an American disease of late that we painfully avoid saying it straight. "We made contact, and upon testing my reaction to him, I found it distinctly adverse" is substituted for "I met him and I didn't like him." But what is equally painful is to hear public remarks interlarded with such phrases as "It would seem," "Without further ado," "Now as I was saying," "And so, in closing," "Permit me to call your attention to the fact," or "Let us reflect briefly"—which is often the prelude to a two-hour harangue.

Not less out of place in public address is the apologetic note. The man who starts by explaining that he is unaccustomed to public speaking or badly prepared, is simply asking for the hook. "To explain what I mean" or "To make myself clear" causes the audience to wonder why he didn't say it that way in the first place. But the really low man on this totem pole is the one who says, "Perhaps you're not getting anything out of this."

A speaker does not have to go off like a Gatling gun merely because he is facing a crowd. Mr. Churchill, one of the great orators of the century, made good use of deliberate and frequent pauses. It is a trick worth any young speaker's cultivation, enabling the collection of thought and the avoiding of tiresome "and ah-h-h's."

Likewise, wearing a military uniform does not require that a man's speech be terse, cold, given to the biting of words, and the overemployment of professional jargon. Training instruction is not drill. Its efficiency does not come of its incisiveness but of the bond of sympathy that comes to prevail between the instructor and his followers.

Another main point: It is disconcerting to talk about the ABCs if the group already knows the alphabet. To devote any great part of a presentation to matters which the majority present already well understand is to assure that the main object will receive very little serious attention. Thus, in talking about the school of the rifle, only a fool would start by explaining what part of it is the trigger and from which end the bullet emerges, though it might be profitable to devote a full

hour to the discussion of caliber. Likewise, in such a field as tactical discussion, the minds of men are more likely to be won and their imagination stirred through giving them the reasoning behind a technique or method than by telling them simply how a thing is done.

In talk, as in tactics, at the beginning the policy of the limited objective is a boon to confidence. It scares any green man to think about talking for an hour. But if he starts with a subject of his own choice and to his liking, and works up to a 15-minute talk for a group of platoon size, he will quickly develop his powers over the short course; the switch from sprinting to distance running can be made gradually and without strain. But it's easy that does it, and one step at a time. Three main points are enough in any period of instruction.

Excessive modesty is unbecoming. No matter how firm his sources or complex his subject, any instructor should form the habit of adding a few thoughts of his own to any presentation. It is not a mark of precocity but of interest when an instructor knows his material and its application to the human element sufficiently well to express an occasional personal opinion. Since he is not a phonograph record, he has a right to say, "I think" or "I believe." Indeed, if he does not have his subject sufficiently in hand that it has stirred his own imagination, he is no better than a machine.

That leads to a discussion of outlines. They are necessary if any subject is to be covered comprehensively. But if they are overelaborated, the whole performance becomes automatic and dull. A little spontaneity is always needed. Even when working from a manuscript, a speaker should be ever ready to depart from his text if a sudden idea pops into his mind. It is better to try this and to stumble now and then than to permit the mind to be commanded by words written on paper.

Likewise, revision of outline between talks is the way of the disciplined mind. An intelligent person so engaged sees in the midst of discussion points that need strengthening and bets that have been missed. Notes should be revised as soon as the period is completed.

There are many methods of instruction, among them being the seminar, critique, group discussion, and conference. Every young officer quickly learns about them in the schools and gets to know the circumstances under which one form or another can be used to greatest advantage.

It suffices to say that their common denominator, insofar as personal success and ease of participation are concerned, is the ability to think quickly and accurately on one's feet; the one best school for sharpening this faculty is the lecture platform. Keenness is a derivative of pressure.

Use of a tape recorder, so that one can get a playback after talking, is an aid to self-criticism. But it is not enough. A speaker will often miss his own worst faults because they came of ignorance in the first place; also, voice reproduction proves nothing about the effectiveness of one's presence, expression, and gesture. It is common-sense professional pro-

cedure to ask the views of one or two of the more experienced members of the audience as to how the show went over and what were its weak points.

There is one hidden danger in becoming too good at this business. Too frequently, polished speakers fall in love with the sound of their own voices and want to be heard to the exclusion of everyone else. In the Armed Forces, where the ideal object is to get 100 percent participation from all personnel, this is a more serious vice than snoring in a pup tent.

When an officer feels any temptation to monopolize the discussion, it is time to pray for a bad case of laryngitis.

Chapter 16

DISCIPLINE

Though many of the aspects of discipline can be discussed more appropriately in other sections of this book, an officer must understand its particular nature within American military forces if he is to win from his people obedience coupled with active goodwill.

It frequently happens that the root meaning of a word more nearly explains the whole context of ideas with which it is legitimately associated than the public's mistaken use of the same word. Coming from the Latin, "to discipline" means "to teach." Insofar as the military establishment of the United States is concerned, nothing has to be added to that definition. Its discipline is that standard of personal deportment, work requirement, courtesy, appearance, and ethical conduct which, inculcated in men and women, will enable them singly or collectively to perform their mission with an optimum efficiency.

Military discipline, in this respect, is no different from the discipline of the university, a baseball league, or a labor union. It makes specific requirements of the individual; so do theirs. It has a system of punishments; so do theirs. These things are but incidental to the end result. Their main object is to preserve the interests and further the opportunity of the cooperative majority. But the essential difference between discipline in the military establishment and in any other free institution is this—if a person in the military objects, he still does not have the privilege of quitting tomorrow, and if he resists or becomes indifferent and is not corrected, his bad example will be felt to the far end of the line.

It is simply not true that the American in uniform has the same latitude in the exercise of his rights as the American civilian. For example, the Constitution declares in Section 8 that the Congress shall "...make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces." Then Article I of the Bill of Rights says: "Congress shall make no law...abridging the freedom of speech." Within that right, the civilian may speak abusively of the President without getting into trouble, provided he does not threaten the President's life. But under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, these words appear: "Any officer who uses contemptuous words against the President, Vice President... shall be punished as a courtmartial may direct."

Though the failure to stop looting by our forces during World War II along with the redeployment riots that followed the war are fading memories, they underscored a lesson confirmed many times by American experience at arms. Far better remembered are the Navy shipboard riots and the erosion of discipline, morale and dutifulness in parts of the field Army during the closing years of war in Vietnam. The Service malaise was said to be a military fallout from permissiveness back home. Whether that was a sufficient excuse, the slippage was grievous enough that, following an inspection tour of Vietnam in the summer of 1969, the Army Chief of Staff reported to the President that he had noted a deterioration in discipline, a condition he attributed to an increasingly permissive society, rather than to poor leadership. The lesson differed none from that of 1945, though the threat to good order was more extreme. The time to halt regression is when it starts. The surgery must be swift and sure. By far, the most contagious of all moral diseases is insubordination, and it has no more respect for rank than has the plague. When higher authority winks at its existence among the rank and file, it will contaminate upward as well as down. Once a person in authority condones remissness, his own belief in discipline begins to wither. The officer who tolerates slackness in the dress of his men soon ceases to tend his own appearance, and if he is not called to account, his sloppy habits will begin in turn to infect his superior. There is only one correct way to wear the uniform. When any deviations in dress are condoned within the Services, the way is open to the destruction of all uniformity and unity.

This continuing problem of stimulating all ranks to toe-up to that straight line of bearing and deportment that will build inner confidence and win public respect is the main reason why, as George Washington put it: "To bring men to a proper degree of subordination is not the work of a day, a month, or a year." It calls not simply for the high-minded attitude toward the profession of arms but for an infinitely patient attention to a great variety of detail. An officer has a disciplined hold upon his own job only when, like the aircraft pilot preparing to take off, he makes personal check of every point where the machinery might fail. The stronger his example of diligence, the more earnestly will it be followed by the ablest and most loyal of his subordinates; they in turn will carry others along. No leader ever fails his men—nor will they fail him—who leads them in respect for the disciplined life. Between these two things—discipline in itself and a personal faith in the military value of discipline—lies all the difference between military maturity and mediocrity. A salute from an unwilling man is as meaningless as the moving of a leaf on a tree; it is a sign only that the subject has been caught by a gust of wind. But a salute from the man who takes pride in the gesture because he feels privileged to wear the uniform of the United States, having found military service good, is the epitome of military virtue. Of those units that were most effective and

capable of the greatest measure of self-help during World War II, Korea and Vietnam combat, it was invariably remarked that they observed the salute and the other rules of military courtesy better than the others, even when engaged.

The level of discipline is in large part what the officers in any unit choose to make it. The general aim of regulations is to set an overall standard of conduct and work requirement for all concerned. Training schedules, operational directives and other work programs serve the same end. But there is still a broad area in which the influence of every officer is brought to bear. To state what is required is only the beginning; to require what has been stated is the positive end. The rule of courtesy may be laid down by the book; it remains for the officer, by setting the good example for his men, to stimulate their acceptance of orderly military habits. A training schedule may stipulate that certain tasks be carried out, but only the officer in charge can assure that the work will be done faithfully.

The level of discipline should at all times be according to what is needed to get the best results from the majority of dutiful individuals. There is no practical reason for any sterner requirement than that, and there is no moral justification for countenancing anything less. Discipline destroys the spirit and working loyalty of the general force when it is pitched to the minority of discontented, undutiful people within the organization, whether to punish or to appease them. When this common sense precept is ignored, the results invariably are unhappy.

However, it is not here implied that what has to be done to build strong discipline in military forces will at all times be welcomed by the first-class people within a unit, or that their reaction will always be approval. Rather, it is to say that they will accept what is ordered, even though they may gripe about it, and that ultimately their own reason will convince them of the value of what is being done.

Until men are severely tried, there is no conclusive test of their discipline nor proof that their training at arms is satisfying a legitimate military end. The old game of follow-the-leader has no point if the leader, like the little girl in a Thomas Hardy novel, is balked by insuperable obstacles one-quarter inch high. All military forces remain relatively undisciplined until physically toughened and mentally conditioned to unusual exertion. Consider the road march! No troops could possibly enjoy the dust, the heat, the blistered foot, and the aching back. But hard road marching is necessary if a sound foundation is to be built under the discipline of fighting forces, particularly those whose labors are in the field. And the gain comes quickly. The rise in spirits within any organization that is always to be observed after they rebound from a hard march does not come essentially from the feeling of relief that the strain is past, but rather from satisfaction that a goal has been reached. Every normal person needs to have some sense of a contest, some feeling of resistance overcome, if he is to make the best

use of his faculties. Whatever experience serves to give him confidence that he can compete with others helps to increase his solidarity with them.

This quotation is lifted from an official report on operations of the U. S. Eighth Army, Korea, 1951: "American infantry is finding Korea a good testing ground. After any severe rigor, unit morale invariably upgrades. The reaction is marked by such words as: 'The outfit had to be good to get through that.' The hard requirements of situation not infrequently compelled a company to stand guard on a lonely peak for 48 hours or more, without food, and with canteens drained after the first few hours. Upon being finally relieved, they did not complain of the hardship undergone. They commented on it boastfully."

It must be accepted that discipline does not break down under the strain of placing a testing demand upon the individual. It is sloth, not activity, that destroys discipline. Troops can endure hard going when it serves an understandable end. A considerable part of training is necessarily directed toward conditioning them for unusual hardship and privation. They can take this in stride. But no power on earth can reconcile them to what common sense tells them is unnecessary hardship that might have been avoided by greater intelligence in their superiors. When they are overloaded, they know it. When they are required to form for a parade two hours ahead of time because their commander got overanxious or didn't know how to write an order, again they know it! And they are perfectly right if they go sour when this kind of thing happens a little too often within the command.

In our system, that discipline is nearest perfect which assures to the individual the greatest freedom of thought and action while at all times promoting his feeling of responsibility toward the group. These twin ends are convergent and interdependent for the exact converse of the reason that it is impossible for any man to feel happy and successful if he is in the middle of a failing institution. War and all training operations in preparation for war have become more than ever a problem of creating diversity of action out of unity of thought. Its modern technological aspects not only require a keener intelligence in the average serviceman but a higher degree of initiative and stronger confidence in his own judgment. If the individual is cramped by monotonous routine or made to feel that he cannot move unless an order is barked, he cannot develop these qualities, and he will never come forward as a junior leader. On the other hand, the increased use of the machine in military operations, far from lessening the need of mutual support and unified action, has increased it. One of the hazards of high velocity warfare is that reverse and disaster can occur far more swiftly than under slower systems. Thus the need for greater spiritual integration within forces and increased emphasis upon the value of more perfect communication in all forms, while at the same time each individual is trained to initiate action for the common good. Only thus

can the new discipline promote a higher efficiency based on a stronger person-to-person loyalty. In the words of Du Picq, who saw so deeply into the hearts of fighting men: "If one does not wish bonds broken, one should make them elastic and thereby strengthen them."

The unique nature of military service is the key to the character of the discipline of its several forces. In the United States, we have fallen into the sloppy habit of saying that a soldier, sailor, airman, marine, or coastguardsman is only an American civilian in disguise. The corollary of this quaint notion is that all military organization is best run according to the principles of business management. Both of these ideas are to be disputed on two grounds: they are contrary to truth and they sell human nature short. The military officer is not only an administrator but sometimes a magistrate, and it is this dual role that makes his function radically different from anything encountered in civil life—to say nothing of the singleness of purpose by which the Services move forward. Moreover, the military officer deals with the most plastic human material in the society—men who, in the majority, the moment they step into uniform, are ready to seek his guidance toward a new way of life.

These false notions, however, are but tangential aspects of a much larger illusion—that the Armed Forces of the United States, since they serve a democracy, can improve themselves by becoming more and more democratic. Authority is both mocked and questioned in democratic countries today, not only in government but in industry, the school, the church, and the home. But to the extent that military people lose their faith in its virtue and become amenable to ill-considered reforms simply to please the public, they relinquish the power to protect and nurture that growth of free men, free thought, and free institutions which began among a handful of soldiers in Cromwell's army and was carried by them after the Restoration to the North American mainland. The relation of the Armed Forces to American democracy is that of a shield covering the body. But no wit of man can make the military establishment a wholly "democratic" institution in its processes without vitiating its strength, since it progresses through the exercise of unquestioned authority at various levels.

One of these levels is the plane on which an ensign or second lieutenant conducts his daily dealings with his people. George Washington left behind these words, which are as good today as when he uttered them from his command post: "Whilst men treat an officer as an equal, regard him no more than a broomstick, being mixed together as one common herd, no order nor discipline can prevail." Out of his experience in the handling of deck divisions during World War II, Edmund A. Gibson, boatswain's mate first class, also said something which, put alongside Washington's words, brings the whole subject of officer-man relationships into proper perspective: "Speaking for Navy men, I am certain that they are entirely without any feeling of inferiority, social

or otherwise, to their officers. If superiority or inferiority of any kind enters into their contemplation at all, it is in the shape of a conviction, doubtless a wrong one, that every serviceman, as a professional warrior, is above the narrow interests which obsess the civilian."

Those Americans who have served both as officer and under-officer well understand the appropriateness of these two ideas, each to the other—that the superior position of the officer must be preserved for the good of the Service, but with recognition of the individual equality of the enlisted member. They know, if they have observed well and truly during their service in the ranks, that the highest type enlisted member wants his officer to act the part, maintain dignity, and support the ideals that are consonant with the authority vested in him by the Nation. But at the same time he expects his officers to concede to him his right to a separate position and to respect his privacy.

In the military service of the United States, there is always room for firm and forthright friendship between officer and enlisted person. There is room for a close, uniting comradeship. There is room for frank intellectual discussion and the exchange of warm humor. There is room for that kind of intimacy which enables each to see the other as a human being and know something of the other's emotions, while clearing the atmosphere for honest counsel on personal and organizational problems.

But there is no room for familiarity, since it will breed contempt. When it occurs, respect flies out the window, the officer loses part of his command authority, and discipline breaks down. Familiarity cannot obtain between the superior and the subordinate without the vice of favoritism entering into the conduct of organizational matters, even though the former is guilty only of an over-zealous goodwill and the latter is otherwise sensible to the interest of the unit. The main damage comes from the impact on other persons. It is when all the bars are let down that men communicate those inner failings which a greater reserve would keep under cover. Familiarity toward a superior is a positive danger; toward a subordinate, it is unbecoming and does not increase his trust. In excess, it can have no other effect than a breach of confidence on both sides.

Changes in the environmental situation do not alter the natural proprieties of this relationship between any two persons, the one having higher authority and the other having the obligation of obedience. Under the conditions of modern war, the two not infrequently may be required to work together as a unit, almost apart from the influence of organizational discipline. Hardship and necessity may compel them to extend the limit of personal accommodation to each other. They may go into battle together. They may sleep in the same foxhole. They may drink from a common canteen and draw upon each other for the means to keep going. But in adapting one's course according to the rigors of any unconventional situation, authority is maintained only

through the exercise of a higher sense of responsibility. How the rule is to be applied depends wholly upon the particular circumstances. But the rule itself remains inflexible.

Officers and men working together as a compact team, in any type of military operation where success and coordinated action in the face of danger depends mainly upon the moral resources within one small group, develop a closer camaraderie and become less formal than is normal elsewhere in the Services. The close confinement in which tank, airplane, and submarine crews must operate would stifle morale and torture nerves otherwise. Whatever the patience of men under such conditions, sooner or later they get on each other's nerves. Therefore that system of relationships is best which is least artificial and most relaxing to the human spirit. But to construe this as a deviation from the standards of discipline is to mistake the means for the end.

Chapter 17

MORALE

To grow in knowledge of how to win a loyal and willing response from military forces there must first be understanding of the springs of human action, what they are, and how they may be directed toward constructive ends. This gained, the course that makes for the perfecting of forces during peacetime training need only be extended to harden them for the risk and stress of war.

The mainspring is morale. The meaning of the word is already known in a general way. A World War II bluejacket said it this way: "Morale is when your hands and feet keep working when your head says it can't be done."

The handiest beginning is to consider morale in conjunction with discipline, since in military service they are opposite sides of the same coin. When one is present, the other will be also. But the instilling of these things in military forces depends upon leadership understanding the nature of the relationship.

As to discipline, until very recently military forces tended to stress the pattern rather than the ideal. The elder Moltke, one of the great masters of the military art, taught his troops that it was of supreme importance that they form accurately in training, since the perfection of their formations would determine their efficiency in battle. Yet in the Franco-Prussian War, these formations proved utterly unsuited to the heavily wooded terrain of the theater, and new ones had to be devised on the spur of the moment.

This is the familiar story. It was repeated by United States forces in World War II during the Normandy hedgerow fighting and in the invasions of the Central Pacific atolls. Troops had to learn the hard way how to hit and how to survive in moving through jungle or across the mountains and desert. Again, 20 years later in Southeast Asia, the environment necessitated new and previously untested patterns of operation. When that happened, the only disciplinary residue that mattered was obedience to orders. The movements troops had learned through practice were of less value than the spiritual bond between one man and another. The most valuable lesson was that of mutual support. And unless this lesson was supplemented by confidence in the judg-

ment of those in authority, it is to be doubted that they were helped at all.

Finally, confidence is the sine qua non of all useful military power. The moral strength of an organic unity comes from the faith in ranks that they are being wisely directed and from faith up top that orders will be obeyed. When forces are tempered by this spirit, there is no limit to their enterprise. They become invincible. Lacking it, however, any military body, even though it has been compelled to toe the mark in training, will deteriorate into a rabble under conditions of extraordinary stress in the field, as did McDowell's army at Bull Run in the Civil War.

In its essentials, discipline is not measured according to how a man keeps step in a drill yard, or whether he salutes at just the right angle. The test is how well and willingly he responds to his superiors in all vital matters and, finally, whether he stands or runs when his life is at stake. History makes this clear. There are countless examples of successful military forces that had almost no discipline when measured by the usual yardsticks, yet had a high battle morale productive of the kind of discipline that beats the enemy in battle. The French at Valmy, the Boers in the South African War, and even the men of Capt. John Parker, responding to his order on the Lexington Common, "Don't fire unless fired upon, but if they mean to have a war, let it begin here," each bore witness that men who lack training and have not been regimented still may express themselves as a cohesive force on the field of fire, provided they are well led.

If we accept the basic premise that discipline, even within the Armed Forces of the United States, is not a ritual or a form but simply that course of conduct which is most likely to lead to the efficient performance of an assigned responsibility, it will be seen that morale does not come of discipline, but discipline of morale.

True enough, our recruits are given a discipline almost from the moment that they take the oath. Their first lesson is the necessity for obedience. They are required immediately to conform to a new pattern of conduct. They respond to disciplinary treatment even before they learn to think as a group and before the attitude of the group has any influence upon them. Discipline bears down before morale can lift up. Momentarily, they become timid before they have felt any pain. These first reactions help condition the man to his new environment. They are in part demoralizing, but on the upswing the individual begins to realize that half the fun in life comes of seeing what one can do in a new situation. The foundation of his morale is laid when he begins to think of himself as a member of the fighting establishment rather than as a civilian. Thereafter, all that is done to nourish his military spirit and to arouse his thirst for professional knowledge helps to build his moral power.

But follow the man a little longer. The time quickly comes when he knows his way around in the Service. His earlier fears and hesita-

tions are largely gone. He acquires strength and wisdom from the group. He becomes able to judge his own situation against an attainable standard within the Service. He is critically conscious of the merits of his superiors from what he has himself experienced and what others tell him. He knows what is boondoggling and what is not. He has identified Mickey Mouse.

From that point on, discipline has little part in alerting the individual or in furthering the building of his moral power. What moves him mainly is the knowledge that he is a personal success, and that he belongs to an efficient unit which is in capable hands. Certain of the outer signs of discipline, such as the cadence of the march or snap in the execution of the manual, may subconsciously reinforce his impression of these things. But if he feels either that he is an outsider or that the club isn't worth joining, no amount of spit and polish will alter his opinion.

He is able to recognize a right and reasonable discipline as such, even though it causes him personal inconvenience, because he has acquired a sense of military values. But if the discipline is either unduly harsh or unnecessarily lax, he likewise realizes it and wears it as a hair shirt, to the undoing of his morale.

Though the individual, like the group, can be hurt by being pushed beyond sensible limits, his spirit will suffer even more sorely if no real test is put upon his abilities and moral powers. The greater his intelligence, the stronger will be his resentment. That is a law of nature. The enlightened mind has always the greatest measure of self-discipline. But it also has a higher sense of what constitutes justice, fair play, and a reasonable requirement in the performance of duty. If denied these things, the person will come to hold his chief, his job, and himself in contempt. The greater part of man's satisfactions comes of activity, and only a very small remnant comes of passive enjoyment. Forgetting this rather obvious fact in human nature, social reformers aim at securing more leisure rather than at making work itself more satisfactory. But the fact need not be forgotten in military service.

Even to those who best understand the reasons for the regimenting of military forces, a discipline wrongfully applied is seen only as indiscipline. Invariably it will be countered in its own terms. None can become insubordinate as quickly or react as violently as a group of senior noncommissioned officers, brought together in a body and then mishandled by officers who are ignorant of the customs of the Service and the limits of their own authority. Not only are they conscious of their rights, but they have greater respect for the state of decency and order that is the mark of a proper military establishment than for the insignia of rank. It is this firm feeling for the fitness of things and a boundless allegiance to authority when it is reasonably exercised, that make the NCO and the petty officer the backbone of discipline in the United States Armed Forces. Sergeant Evans of William H. Haines' novel and play, *Command Decision,* is an archtype of the best ball

carriers among them. In a sense, they remain independent workmen rather than tools of authority, until the hour comes when they fall in completely with someone that their own nature tells them is good. In the past, we have not always made the wisest use of this latent strength. The normal desire of the veteran who has won his stripes by hard service is to support his officers and reduce the friction from down below. Whatever is done to lessen his dignity and prestige damages morale and creates new stresses in the relations between officers and the ranks. When he is rebuffed, either because those above him are indifferent to his pride or are unaware that he is their chief advocate among the men, the military machinery loses its cushion and becomes subject to increasing shock. Said a newly arrived lieutenant to an old sergeant of the 12th Cavalry: "You've been here a long time, haven't you?" "Yes sir," replied the sergeant. "The troop commanders, they come and they go, but it don't hurt the troop."

To comment on these things, however, is to emphasize once again the importance of the judgment of the officer in dealing with all of his military associates in such manner that he will support that native pride, without which the person cannot remain whole. To lecture troops about the importance of morale and discipline serves no earthly purpose if the words are at odds with the general conditions that prevail in the command. Words impose their values only as a reflection of the leader's entire thought concerning his men. At the same time, it should be remembered that even when things are going wrong at every other level, men will remain loyal and dutiful if they see in the one junior officer who is nearest them the embodiment of the ideals they believe should apply throughout the Service. That is the main object lesson in that remarkable novel, *Mister Roberts,* written around a World War II Navy auxiliary ship.

Morale comes of the mind and of the spirit. The question is how it is to be developed. Admiral Ben Moreell has stated a formula in his explanation of what made the Seabees notable for competence and devotion to duty during World War II. This is what he said: "We used artisans to do the work for which they had been trained in civil life. They were well led by officers who 'spoke their language.' We made them feel that they were playing an important part in the great adventure. And thus they achieved a high standard of morale." The elements underscored by Admiral Moreell deserve special note.

Satisfaction in a work program.

Mutual confidence between leaders and ranks.

Confidence that all together were striving for something more important than themselves.

Under training conditions or in combat, the mental ills and the resulting moral and physical deterioration that sometimes beset military forces cannot be cured simply by the intensification of disciplinary methods. It is true that the signs of recovery will occasionally attend

the installation of a more rigid, or less rigid, discipline. This onset is, in fact, usually due to the collateral influence of an increased confidence in the command, whereby men are made to feel that their own fortunes are on the mend. Then discipline and morale are together revitalized almost as if by the throwing of an electric switch.

In Army history, there is no better example of the working of this principle than the work of Brig. Gen. Paul B. Malone at St. Aignan-sur-Cher, France, in 1919. He took over a command where slackness and indiscipline were general. The men were suffering terrible privation, and too many of their officers were indifferent to their needs. Many of the men had been battle casualties. Some had been discharged from hospitals before their wounds were healed. The feeding kitchens were abominable. The camp was short of firewood and other supplies. In freezing weather, men were sleeping on the ground with only a pair of blankets apiece. The death toll from influenza, pneumonia and the aggravation of battle wounds, rose daily. Despair and resentment over these conditions began to express itself in semi-violent form. Every fresh breach of discipline was countered with harassing punishments, until an air of wretched stagnation hung over the whole camp. General Pershing visited the base. The men refused to form for him. When he tried to address them at a mass meeting, they wouldn't hear him out. They hurled mud and stones until he quit the stand. Instead of taking any action against the men, he sent for General Malone.

The new commander arrived without any instructions except to determine what was wrong and correct it. With soldierly instinct, he recognized that the indiscipline of the camp was an effect and not a cause. But even as he gave orders toward relieving the physical distress of the men, he demanded that they return to orderly habits.

He walked around the areas. Already, on his order, duckboards were being laid through the mud, and the whole physical setup was in process of reorganization. The men, grown listless from weeks of maltreatment, paid no heed. "Get on your feet! I'm your general! I respect you, but I demand your respect!" were his words. They restored the situation. The first impact of this one man on that camp was never forgotten by anyone who saw it. It is a point to remember. A firm hold at the beginning pays tenfold the dividend of a timid approach, followed by a show of firmness later on. Within 48 hours the physical condition of the camp was showing improvement, and 60,000 men were again doing their duty and bearing themselves in a military manner. The lessons from this one incident stand out like beams from a searchlight.

One man is able to accomplish a miracle by an act of will accompanied by good works.

The morale of the force flows from the self-discipline of the commander, and in turn, the discipline of the force is reestablished by the upsurge of its moral power.

The inculcation of military habits and thoughts is the only means by which these forces may be made to work together toward more salutary ends, so that control can be exercised promptly.

When the redeployment period following World War II threatened a complete collapse of the morale of the general military establishment, the remedy attempted by some unit leaders was to relax both discipline and the work requirement all around. Other officers met this crisis by improving the conditions of work, setting an example that proved to the men that they believed in its importance, and paying careful attention to the personal problems of their people. They found that they could still get superior performance in the midst of chaos. Organic strength materializes in the same way on the field of war. However adverse the general situation, men will stick to the one man who knows what he wants to do and welcomes them to a full share in the enterprise.

The rule applies whatever the scale of the enterprise. No man who leads a squad or a squadron, a group of individuals or a group of armies, can develop within his force a well-placed confidence in its own powers if he is uncertain of himself or doubtful of his object. The moral level of his people is mainly according to the manner in which he expresses his personal force working with, and for, them. If he is timid or aloof, uncommunicative and unenthusiastic, prone to stand on his dignity and devoid of interest in the human stuff of those who are within his charge, they will not respond to him, and he will have raised a main obstacle to his own success.

It would be futile to make these comments on the nature of moral leadership if it were not fully within the power of the average young officer to cut his cloth according to the suggested pattern. The commonplace comment that a person's nature cannot be changed is untrue. The character of each of us and of all of our acquaintances are much affected by circumstances. No one's impulses are fixed from the beginning by his native disposition; they remain plastic until the hour of his death, and whatever touches his circumference influences them for better or worse. The power of decision develops only out of practice. There is nothing mystic about it. It comes of a realistic willingness to accept life's risks, recognizing that only the faint of heart are comforted by thoughts of an existence devoid of struggle.

Where there is no marching bravely into the dark, no noble but ungrounded venture of faith, the word "decision" is hardly justified, either in combat or in the smaller affairs of life. One doesn't "decide" where to walk if the path is well indicated, or how to get there, if the course can be determined through staff argument or the feeding of numbers into a machine.

True decision, by its nature, in combat and elsewhere consists in determining a line of action when choices are equally difficult. All war is a gamble. Its chief prizes fall only to the player who, weighing the

odds carefully when he moves from situation to situation, will not hesitate to plunge when he feels by instinct that his hour has arrived. Of necessity military training systems instill in leaders respect for the wisdom of well-considered action and of closely reasoned estimates as a basis for action. This is the mainstream of all education preparatory to battle. But there always comes a time in combat when the most careful planner must also be foremost in willingness to take a superb risk. The ablest young company and battalion leaders are men of such disposition. They are painstaking in planning and preparation. They make their dispositions with due care. They insist on personal reconnaissance to a point where it nettles their subordinates. Thus they have at all times the feel of their own situation, which is one half the battle. But at the opportune moment they are ready to "shoot the works."

The art of leadership, the art of command, whether the forces be large or small, is the art of dealing with humanity. Only the officer who dedicates his thought and energy to his men can convert into coherent military force their desire to be of service to the country. Such were the fundamental values that Napoleon had in mind when he said that those who would learn the art of war should study the Great Captains. He was not speaking of tactics and strategy. He was pointing to the success of Alexander, Caesar, and Hannibal in moulding raw human nature, and to their grasp of the thinking of their men and of how to direct it toward military advantage. These are the grand objects.

Diligence in the care of men, administration of all organizational affairs according to a standard of resolute justice, military bearing in one's self, and finally, an awareness of the simple facts that men in a fighting establishment wish to think of themselves in that light and that all military information is nourishing to their spirits as to their lives, are the four fundamentals by which the commander builds an all-sufficing morale in those who are within his charge. Here is the very essence of professionalism, the spirit that must pervade the officer body of the all-volunteer Services.

There are other motor forces and mechanisms, most of which come under the heading of management principles, and are therefore discussed in other portions of this volume. The exception is the greatest force of all—patriotism. It may be deemed beyond argument that belief in the social order and political doctrine of their country is the foundation of a loyal, willing spirit in military forces. Yet this alone cannot assure efficiency in training or a battle elan that results from proper training methods. There is nothing more soulless than a religion without good works unless it be a patriotism that does not concern itself with the welfare and dignity of the individual. This is a simple idea, though wise men in all ages have recognized it as one of the more profound truths. From Aristotle on down, the philosophers have said that the main force in shaping the characters of people is not teaching and preaching, though these, too, are important, but the social climate in

which they live. In an age when there is widespread presumption that practical problems can be solved by phrases, the military body needs more than ever to hold steadfastly to first principles. It does no good for an officer to talk patriotism to his people unless he stands four-square with them, and they see in him a symbol of what is right—the best thing for them, as for the Nation. Under those circumstances, he can always talk to them about the cause, and what he says will help morale.

In the Normandy invasion, a young commander of paratroops, Lt. Col. Edward S. Krause, was given the task of capturing a main enemy communications center. Three hours before the take-off he assembled his battalion, held a small American flag in front of them, and said: "This was the first flag raised over the city of Naples. You put it there. I want it to be the first flag raised over a liberated town in France. The mission is that we will put it up in Ste. Mere Eglise before dawn. You have only one order—to come and fight with me wherever you land. When you get to Ste. Mere Eglise, I will be there."

The assignment was kept. Next morning, Krause and his men raised the flag together, even before they had completed capture of the town. As Americans go, they were extremely rugged individualists. But they were proud of every line in that story.

Chapter 18

ESPRIT

To proceed toward a better understanding of esprit and its part in the building of military forces, it is necessary to look beyond the organization and consider the man.

The life of any socially upright individual is organized around only a few basic loyalties, and the degree of satisfaction he derives from existence can usually be measured in terms of his service to them. He is loyal first to himself, for failing that, he fails in loyalty to all else. If he cannot acquit himself ably for his own sake, he cannot do honor to anything less personal. Along with loyalty to self come loyalty to his beliefs, loyalty to family, loyalty to country, loyalty to friends, and loyalty to humanity in general.

Stated as a factual and not as an ideal matter, the interesting and important thing that happens to a man when he enters military service is that, the moment he takes the oath, loyalty to the arms he bears ranks first on the list, above all other loyalties. To get ahead, to serve himself well, he must persevere in ways that are most useful to the organization. If the circumstances of his family are reduced because of this new loyalty, his means of compensating them is to strive for such honor as may come to him through service to the United States. In his life, service to country is no longer a beautiful abstraction; it is the sternly unremitting obligation of service to the regiment, the squadron, or the ship's company. He parts with old friends and finds new ones.

In this radical reorientation of the individual life and the arbitrary imposition of a commanding loyalty is to be found the key to the esprit of any military organization. Too long esprit has been regarded as something bequeathed to the unit and therefore a relic of the past. Esprit is a dynamic and vital substance, conducted by older to newer members of a unit. We can banish from our minds the idea that esprit is what the regiment, the ship, or the squadron gives the man because of some spark its past deeds and the legends thereof have lighted in him. Esprit, at all times, is what the unit gives the man in terms of spiritual force translated into constructive good. Considering what the unit has taken from him initially, its obligation is very great indeed.

To see this clearly, we need to look once again at what happens to the individual when he puts on the uniform. The basis of his life

changes in broad, fundamental ways. His legal status is changed; the extent and intensity of his obligations are magnified. He puts aside the banner of individualism for that of obedience. Yet in the words of Chester Barnard, former President of the National Science Foundation, "Scarcely a man, I think, who has felt the annihilation of his personality in some organized system, has not also felt that the same system belonged to him because of his own free will he chose to make it so."

To that must be added the further thought that while the military Service is antecedent to the individual who enters it, that individual is also in a sense antecedent to the Service. He becomes a factor in the equation that expresses the achievement or the failure of the Service in its particular mission. The thoughtful commander will give careful regard to that relationship. One person cannot make or break an army or a navy, but he can help break it, since each Service at all times derives its nature from the quality and wills of its people. General Harbord, in *The American Army in France*, expressed it this way: "Discipline and morale influence the inarticulate vote that is constantly taken by masses of men when the order comes to move forward—a variant of the crowd psychology that inclines it to follow a leader. But the Army does not move forward until the motion has carried. 'Unanimous consent' only follows cooperation between the individual men in ranks."

But we can go one step beyond General Harbord's suggestion that the multiplied individual acceptance of a command alone gives that command authority. It is not less true that the multiplied rejection of a command nullifies it. In other words, authority is the creature more than the creator of discipline and obedience. In the modern (20th century) experiences of our arms under the stress of battle, there are some few instances of troops being given orders and failing to obey. The determining number of men in ranks had lost the will to comply, and the appointed leader thereby had lost his capacity to command.

Yet Vietnam, that most controversial and least popular of our wars, proved that our system works. The untoward incidents were remarkably few and most were attributable to weak leadership. In the high crises of action, our forces without exception were obedient and gave their best, which is the best measure of the wisdom and steadiness of those who led. In the final analysis, authority is contingent upon respect far more truly than respect is founded upon authority.

Esprit, then, is the product of a thriving mutual confidence between the leader and the led, founded in the faith that together they possess a superior quality and capability. No "imperishable record" of past greatness can make men serve with any more vigor, if they are being served badly. Nor can it sustain the fighting will of the organization so much as one mil beyond the radius within which living associations enable people to think great thoughts and act honorably toward their associates. Unless the organization's past conveys to its officers a sense

of having been especially chosen and unless they respond to this trust by developing the strongest sense of duty toward their subordinates, the old battle records might as well be washed down the drain, since they will not rally a single man in the hour of danger. Said Col. LeRoy P. Hunt in a mimeographed notice to his troops just before the Guadalcanal landing: "We are meeting a tough and wily opponent but he is not sufficiently tough and wily to overcome us because We Are Marines." (The capitals are Hunt's.)

Personality plays a part in the ability to command, both under training conditions and under fire. But though a man be a veritable John Paul Jones or Mad Anthony Wayne in the time of action, his hardihood cannot wholly undo any prior neglect of his men. While men may be rallied for a short space by someone setting an example of great courage, they can be kept in line under conditions of increasing stress and mounting hardship only when loyalty is based upon a respect which the commander has won by consistently thoughtful regard for the welfare and rights of his people, and a correct measuring of his responsibility to them.

There are a few governing principles, and before considering their application in detail we should think first about the individual enlisted man. He is a man; he expects to be treated as an adult, not as a schoolboy. He has rights; they must be made known to him and thereafter respected. He has ambition; it must be stirred. He has a belief in fair play; it must be honored. He has the need of comradeship; it must be supplied. He has imagination; it must be stimulated. He has personal dignity; it must not be broken down. He has pride; it can be satisfied and made the cornerstone of his character, once he gains assurance that he is playing a useful and respected part in a superior and successful organization. To give individuals working as a group the feeling of great accomplishment together is the crowning achievement of inspired leadership.

Read this official summation of how and why Americans rebounded from defeat in North Korea and note that the words were written up front in early 1951: "The key to the recovery of the Eighth Army is the revival of the spirit of the good company—an intense pride in unit, the feeling in Able that it is better than Baker and can prove it when the chips are down. Good weapons usage and the tightening of tactical arrangements are the by-product of this revival, not its cause. It is noteworthy that the units which speak with the greatest enthusiasm about what they represent as a company, and how they rate themselves with respect to their friendly competition, are also the best composed in battle, the most efficient operators, the ones with the lowest rate of overall weapons difficulty."

In the degree that the disciplinary method and the training procedure of the military service and the common sense of superiors combine to nourish these satisfactions in the individual, esprit de corps comes

into being and furthers his advance in the practice of arms and his potential usefulness as a fighting man. He becomes loyal because loyalty has been given to him. He learns to serve an ideal because an ideal has served him. For it is to be remembered that while it is the Armed Forces of the Nation that disengages the man from his old moorings, it is the regiment or the ship's company or the squadron that gives him a fresh anchor and enables him to feel secure again. The Service cancels out the man's old life; the unit gives him a fresh start in a new environment, which may prove salutary or utterly damnable, as the man and the unit together make it. Where there is enlightened leading, neither can fail the other. The majority of men, so long as they are treated fairly and feel that good use is being made of their powers, will rejoice in a new sense of unity with new companions even more than they will mind the increased separation from their old associations.

This is the primary gift of the organization to the person and the primary advantage of its relationship to him. Once it has given the individual a sense of belonging, it restores his balance. It is this feeling of possession that is the beginning of true esprit. Without it, the newcomer becomes a derelict. Indeed, we may go so far as to say that the man who lacks that feeling, and does not aspire to it, will almost invariably be unsuited for combat or any military responsibility of consequence, not because he is disrespectful of tradition, but because he is a social misfit.

Referring once again to the list of satisfactions due the person, it will be noted that they differ little, if at all, from the demands of his spirit before he put on the uniform. But there should be marked also the vital difference that, whereas a complex of social and economic forces and of totally disconnected influences contribute to his outlook while he is a civilian, the measure of his satisfactions is almost wholly in the hands of the organization, once he has raised his right hand and taken the oath of military service to country. The condition of his health, the amount of his pay, the advantageous use of his leisure time, his diet, his sleeping habits, even the manner in which he shaves and wears his hair, are of organizational concerns. Within the new unit, he may either attain greatly or miserably fail. It should speak to him with the voice of Stentor, the bronze voice of 10,000 men—meaning the thousand or so who are still with the ship, the group, or the regiment, and the thousands who are in the shadows but who once served it well, thereby inspiring those who follow to give an extra portion of service to their fellows. Unless tradition has that effect upon the living, it will not produce esprit, but military "mossbackism."

What does this imply in terms of practical application? Simply that the custodianship of esprit must ever be in the hands of the officer. For this simple reason: Insofar as his ability to mold the character of military forces is concerned, the qualifying test of the leader is the

judgment placed upon his military abilities by those who serve directly under him. If they do not deem him fit to command, he cannot train them to obey. But if they see in one man directly over them a steady example, the strongest of their number will model after him.

This point is irreducible. Though an officer has absolute confidence in himself, and though he possesses an instinct amounting to genius for the material things of war, these otherwise considerable gifts will avail him little or nothing if his manner is such that his troops remain unconvinced of his capacity and stay doubtful of his power to maintain command in periods of extreme trial. He will fail because he has not sufficiently regarded

LOOKS, ACTIONS, WORDS.

Among military men there has been much mistaken praise for the virtue of "mechanical obedience." There is no such thing. Men think in their smallest actions; if this were not so, it would not be possible to lead them. What has been blindly termed "mechanical response" requires perhaps a higher concentration of will than any other type of action, and hence of thought itself, since the two are inseparable. The forces in which this characteristic was notable have even been those that were led with the highest degree of intelligence and grasp of human nature. For unity of spirit and of action, which is the essence of esprit de corps, is of all military miracles the most difficult to achieve.

Yet its dominating principle is simple. It comes of integrity and clarification of purpose. The able officer is not a Saul waiting for the light to strike him on the Damascus road, but a Paul having a clear understanding that unless the trumpet give forth a certain sound at all times, none shall prepare himself for the battle.

Given such officers, the organization comes to possess a sense of unity and fraternity in its routine existence that expresses itself as the force of cohesion in the hour when all ranks are confronted by a common danger. It is not because of mutual enthusiasm for an honored name but because of mutual confidence in one another that the ranks of old regiments or the bluejackets serving a ship with a great tradition are able to convert their esprit into battle discipline. Under stress they move and act together because they have learned the great lesson, and experience has made its application almost instinctive—that only in unity is there safety. They believe that they can trust their comrades and commanders as they would trust their next of kin. They have learned the necessity of mutual support, and the danger serves but to bind them closer.

But the race is not always to the swift nor the battle to the strong. The newest unit—one born only yesterday—is as susceptible to a vaulting esprit as any which traces its founding to the beginnings of the Republic. Led by those who themselves are capable of great endeavor, who are quick to encourage and slow to disparage, and are ever ready to make due acknowledgment of worthy effort and to let men know

wherein they are forging ahead, any military organization serving our flag will come to count this among its strengths.

There are no tricks to the building of esprit. Its techniques are those that come naturally in the course of stimulating the interests of the ranks in all of the great fundamentals of the military profession, rather than selling short their intelligence, and taking it for granted that they want nothing beyond the routine of work, liberty, mess call, and payday.

But there is one pitfall. Toward the building of esprit, the attitude, "My organization first, and the rest nowhere," never pays off. It begins with the idea, "The Service first, and my unit the best in the Service." In all human enterprise, the whole is greater than the sum of the parts. The citizen who thinks most deeply about his country will be the first to share the burdens of his community and neighborhood. The man who feels the greatest affection for the Service in which he bears arms will work most loyally to make his own unit feel a rightful pride in its own worth. Among all of the Armed Services, none has been more faithful to this principle than the United States Marine Corps. Among its members, being a marine is the thing that counts mainly; after that comes service to the regiment or battalion. Even the other Services marvel at the result. Though they take due pride in their own virtues and accomplishments, they still regard the esprit of the marine with admiration and more than a little envy. What is the secret? Perhaps it is this, that the Corps emphasizes the rugged outlet for its people's energies and never permits its members to forget that the example of courage is their most precious heritage.

Today, most combat forces are assigned to one of several unified or specified commands, which President Eisenhower once described as the "cutting edge of our military machine." Through these commands our Armed Forces achieve the unity of effort without which successful warfare in the nuclear age cannot be waged. They can win victory in battle only if they operate together under unified direction. An officer should remain faithful to his own Service, but when he becomes part of an all-Service combat team, his primary loyalty must be to the larger organization of which his unit is a part.

Chapter 19

KNOWLEDGE OF YOUR PEOPLE

"Without disparaging any of the other qualities of leadership, in the last analysis it is the authority of the commander that gets the job done when the job is really tough to do... A martinet cannot do the officer's job... I fully agree with the value of frequent talks by the commander with his subordinates, and the desirability of explaining why, as well as how, things must be done... But a compelling 'why' must remain: because the Old Man said so. If we relinquish that point, a disciplined enemy would clobber us while we debate what we should do."

While the words were written by General Hamilton H. Howze some years after his retirement, they would be cheerfully seconded by every junior leader and veteran NCO who has successfully led troops in combat. But for the exercise of authority, sometimes arbitrary, the Armed Services would have no hold on the future. All professionals understand this and the majority of young Americans, on entering service, readily accept it. But on the other hand, the successful life of organization depends upon helping the ranks to exercise their own powers, meaning that their initiative should never be chilled by supercilious advice, harassment or thoughtless correction.

People will go ahead and act responsibly on their own when given the confidence and, if they want it, the friendship, of their commander. But they cannot be treated like adolescents. The lash will ruin them and the curb will merely subdue what needs to be brought forward. As in handling a horse with a good temper and a good mouth, nothing more is needed than that gentle touch of the rein which signals that things are under control.

From where the executive sits, the main secret of building strength within organization comes of identifying his most dependable junior leaders, and of associating his authority with theirs, so it is unmistakable in whose name they are speaking and acting. One of the acid tests of qualification in officership is the ability properly to delegate authority, to put it in the best hands, and thereafter to uphold those hands. If an officer cannot do that, and if he is mistrustful of all power save his own, he cannot command in peace, and when he goes into battle, his unit strength will fragment. The parts will not be rewelded thereafter until some stronger character takes hold.

Command is not a prerogative, but rather a responsibility to be shared with all who are capable of filling up the spaces in orders and of carrying out what is not openly expressed, though it may be understood. Admittedly, it is not easy for a young officer, who by reason of his youth is not infrequently lacking in self-assurance and in the confidence that he can command respect, to understand that as a commander he can grow in strength only in the measure that he succeeds in developing the latent powers of his subordinates. But if he resists this idea, his personal resources will never become equal to the strain that will be imposed upon him. The power to command resides largely in the ability to see when a proper initiative is being exercised—and in giving it moral encouragement. When an officer feels that way about his job and his people, he will be reluctant to question an action by a junior that might be narrowly construed as an encroachment upon his own authority. Restraints on their initiative may reduce some men to automatons. They give only what is asked, or less, according to the pressing of a button.

There are others who have as sound a potential as the already-made leaders, but lack the same confidence because they were not constructively handled in earlier years. They require greater personal attention, because frequent contact with their superiors, along with words of approval and advice as needed, will do more than all else to put a firmer base under them. They must be encouraged to think for themselves as well as to obey orders, to organize as well as to respond, if they are to become part of the solution rather than remaining part of the problem of command.

Careful work among these "sleepers" is as productive as spading the ground and sprinkling a garden patch. When an officer takes hold of a new unit, his main chance of making it better than it was lies in looking for the overlooked men. He uses his hand to give them a firm lift, but that hand will not be available for that purpose if he spends any of his time tugging at men who are already on their feet and moving in the right general direction.

In the words of a former distinguished armored commander in our forces: "To the military leader, men are tools. He is successful to the extent that he can get the men to work for him. Ordinarily, and on their own initiative, people run on only 35 percent capacity. The success of a leader comes of tapping the other 65 percent." This is a pretty seasoned judgment on men in the mass, taking them as they come, the mobile men, the slow starters, the indifferent, and the shiftless. Most Americans in the military want to do what is expected of them. When the individual does not do so, it is usually because his instructions have been so doubtful as to befog him or give him a reasonable excuse for noncompliance. This view of things is the only tenable position an officer or enlisted leader can take toward his subordinates. He will recognize the exceptions, and if he does not then take appropriate action, it is only because he is himself shiftless or is overly compassionate toward others of his own fraternity.

As much as any other profession, and even possibly a little more, we take pride in the pat solution and in proof that long-applied processes amply meet the test of newly unfolding events. It is the military habit to "plow deep in broken drums and shoot crap for old crowns," as the poet, Carl Sandburg, put it. But despite all the jests about the Gettysburg Map, we wouldn't know where we're going if we couldn't be reasonably sure of where we've been.

Therefore, it is as well to say now that from all of the careful searching made by the Armed Services as to the fighting characteristics of Americans during World War II and in the two conflicts in Asia, not a great deal was learned in addition to what was already well known, or surmised. The criteria that had been used in the earlier system of selection proved to be substantially correct; at least, if it had faults, they were innate in the complex problem of weighing human material and were beyond correction by any rule of thumb or judgment. Men were chosen to lead because of personality, intelligence at their work, response to orders, ability to lead in fatigues, or in the social affairs of organization, and the disciplinary record.

In combat these same men carried 95 percent of the load of responsibility and much of the dynamic for the attack. But in every unit there was almost invariably a sprinkling of individuals, who, having shown no prior ability when measured by the customary yardsticks of courtesy, discipline, and work, became strong and pivotal in any situation calling for heroic action. They could fight, they could lead, they knew what should be done, they could persuade other men to rally around, and by these things they could command instantly the previously withheld respect of their superiors.

All concerned recognize the extreme importance of the problem and would like to do something about it. What is as yet only vaguely seen is the large possibility that the problem might be self-liquidating, if all junior officers became more concerned with learning much more about the private character and personal nature of their subordinates. This does not mean invading their privacy; it implies giving every man a fair chance to open up and talk freely, without fear of contempt. It means studying the background of a man still more carefully than one would read a tactical map. These are usually repressed men; many of the foreign-born are to be found among them; they cover up because of pride, but they are not afraid of physical danger. Once anyone, and particularly a superior, gets through the outer shell, it may have a catalytic effect on what is happening inside. If such men did not have basic loyalty, they would never fight. When at last they give their loyalty to an individual, they are usually his to command and will go through hell or high water for him.

There was an Oklahoma miner named Alvin Wimberly in the 90th Division during World War I. On the drill field he could do nothing correctly. He couldn't step off on the left foot; he would frequently drop his piece while trying to do right shoulder. Solely because his case was

unfathomable, his platoon leader asked that he be taken to France with the unit instead of separated with the culls. At the front, Wimberly immediately took the lead in every detail of a dangerous sort, such as exploding a mine field, or hunting for traps and snares. His nerve was inexhaustible, his judgment sure. There was, after all, a simple key to the mystery. Wimberly had led a solitary life as a dynamiter, deep underground. He was frightened of men, but danger was his element. When he saw other men recoil at what bothered him not at all, he realized that he was the big man, though he stood only 5 feet 3 inches in his socks.

To know people, it is not necessary to coddle or humor them, and no officer can make a sorrier mistake than to take the overly nice, worrying attitude toward them. This, after all, is simply the rule of the well-bred person, rather than an item peculiar to the code of the military officer. But the worrying attitude is a little less becoming in the latter than in anyone else, because, when a man puts on fighting clothes in the name of his country, it is an insult to patronize him.

In any situation where people working together need to know one another better, someone has to break the ice. Where does the main responsibility lie within a military unit? True enough, the junior has to salute first, and in some Services is supposed to say, "Good morning!" first, though beating a man to the draw with a greeting is one way to win him.

However, the main point is this: unless an officer has been an enlisted member, it is almost impossible for him to know how formidable, and even forbidding, rank at first seems to the person down under.

Many recruits have such a mistaken hearsay impression of our military system, that it is for them a cause for astonishment that any officer enjoys free discussion with them. They feel at first that there is a barrier which only the officer is entitled to cross; it takes them a little while to learn better.

Moreover, in the continuing relationship, it is the habit of the average well-disciplined enlisted person to remain reticent and talk only on official matters, unless the officer takes the lead in such way as to invite general conversation. For that matter, the burden is the same anywhere in the Services in relations between a senior officer and his subordinates, and the former must take the lead if he expects really to know his people.

Many newly joined officers believe, altogether mistakenly, that there is some strange taboo against talking to enlisted people except in line of duty, and that if caught at it, they will lose dignity. There is always the hope that they will remain around long enough to learn better.

Much is said about "new" problems in the Services, though new is a battle-weary word, the innocent victim of most advertising campaigns. Alcoholism and drug abuse come under that heading. Acute though they be as command problems they are but facets of the age-old com-

mitment to take care of one's people. Grog and the military have been compatible since long before Caesar paraded his Legions and it is the exceptional American warrior who is indifferent to its attractions, though at one point in Vietnam the Commander of the First Cavalry Division learned by polling that 65 percent of his fighters preferred cold soda pop to iced beer. Within the officer body, booze has occasionally wrecked careers. As to the enlisted body, the general disposition has been to forgive the payday drunk so long as he does not mess up organization.

Hard drugs, such as heroin, LSD and speed pills, are a different proposition. The problem in the Armed Services became acute during the latter Vietnam years, and the best method of coping with it is still in dispute within the Military Establishment, while the experts advising the general society also disagree. The overall policy of the military is to try to cure and rehabilitate the victim, not that such effort directly benefits the Armed Services (it is inordinately costly) but as an obligation to the Nation and to its serving people.

No officer is commissioned to become a reformer or soul-saver. But the commission assumes that he must be concerned with the good of people, and first of all, his own people. The drug addict within the unit, like the downgrading alcoholic, being a dead weight on organization, calls for his help. Identification, counseling and seeking advice from the experts in treatment centers are steps in the process. Either one approaches the task with sympathy or had better leave it alone. The NCOs and petty officers invariably have surer information about such personnel problems than does the most observant officer. Here is but one more reason why the superior officer cultivates them on a give-and-take exchange of information and viewpoint basis.

Nothing in the history and tradition of the American Armed Forces suggests that the officer and NCO must look at Service problems from markedly divergent perspectives. To the contrary, when they see eye-to-eye, their Service is strengthened. Additional instructions about an officer's need to be informed on the problems of drug and alcoholic addiction are to be found in papers published by his Service and by the Department of Defense.

Chapter 20

RELATIONSHIPS WITH YOUR PEOPLE

Since much of this writing has dwelt on the interpersonal relationships of the officer as a leader, the purpose at hand is to cover certain points not treated elsewhere. Within the military, simply to get along with people is not enough. An officer's prime responsibility is to develop them and make the most of their talents thereby strengthening his Service.

Nothing else is more important. Mastering the know-how, then doing it, is the cornerstone of the successful career. Put aside, for the moment, the word "duty." The question is: "How do I get ahead?" For the young officer who aspires to high command there is but one way to go. If he is to be attentive to the welfare of his subordinates, he must understand what motivates them individually. The prerequisite thereof is continuing study of their personalities and character traits.

This is the main course. The principles of war have evolved from centuries of observation of how people react singly and in the mass. The successful commander's knowledge of how and when these principles apply in various situations derives fundamentally from his observation of individuals and of people working together in groups and responding to leadership under many different conditions of fatigue, acute stress and emotion.

The roots of such wisdom are not in book study: books but provide an index to what should be sought. The primary study in the school of war is of men's powers, of their physical resources and limits, their responses to work, hope, fear and discouragement, and of the weight of the moral factor in everything they do. Man is of flesh and blood and will fail in crisis if he has been pushed too far. But in the military, he is also a member of a great brotherhood whose fellowship can make the worst misery tolerable and afford him undreamed strength and courage. These are among the things that need to be studied and understood. It is only when an officer can stand and say that he is first of all a student of human material that all of the technical and material aspects of military operations begin to conform toward each other and to blend into an orderly pattern. And the laboratory is right outside the office door.

By the numbers, it isn't a difficult assignment. The schools have found by experiment that the average officer can learn the names of 50

men in between 7 and 10 days. If he is in daily contact with men, he should know 125 of them by name and by sight within one month. He is not likely to work in constant close contact with larger numbers than that.

This is the best way to make an intelligent start. So long as a subordinate is just a number, or a face, to the officer, there can be no deep trust between them. Anyone loves to hear the sound of his own name, and when his superior doesn't know it, he feels like a cipher.

Now as to this breaking-in or shaking-down process, let us look at a few more pertinent numbers, just for the fun of it. The Services have learned more or less empirically that a truly superior junior officer, with a good memory for faces and a system for the indexing of them, can get to know as many as 240 men by name within one month after meeting them. One such officer explained his personal system: "I talk to each man for 20 minutes. Briefly, I explain what I expect of him. Then I try to get him to talk to me. About one man in two will open up—usually to discuss some personal problem. Once he does, his identity becomes fixed in my mind. It is twice as hard to remember the others who clam up; so I concentrate on them."

But of the 240 men whom he knows by sight and by name, the same officer will not be able to identify more than 15 or 20 of their voices heard as a cry in the night or on radio or telephone, when no name is given. Of this comes much of the diffusion in night operations; a squad can fall apart because its members don't know one another's voices.

Another figure: newly arrived in a ground unit, a good junior officer will need about one week before he begins to feel at home, and can do effective work, giving orders confidently because he knows that they will be carried out. The support he receives from below has more to do with this change than anything said by his superiors to build him up. Let's suppose that the same able officer is lacking in maneuver or combat experience. Should the unit into which he is settled suddenly move into the field, another brief period of adjustment must ensue before he takes hold, feels seasoned, and confidently gives orders to the same people.

As with any other introduction, an officer meeting an enlisted man for the first time is not privileged to be inquisitive about his private affairs. In fact, nosiness and prying are unbecoming at any time, and in no one more so than in a military officer. On the other hand, any man is flattered if he is asked about his work or his family, and the average enlisted man will feel complimented if an officer engages him in small talk of any kind. Greater frankness, covering a wide variety of subjects, develops out of longer acquaintance. It should develop as naturally and as easily as in civilian walks of life; rank is no barrier to it unless the officer is overimpressed with himself and bent on keeping the upper hand; the ranks are wiser about these things than most young officers; they do not act forward or presumptuous simply because they see an

officer talking and acting like a human being. But they aren't Whiz Kids. Informal conversation between officer and man is a two-way street. The ball has to be batted back and forth across the net or there isn't any game.

It is unfortunately the case that many young officers assume that getting acquainted with their men is a kind of interrogation process, like handling an immigrant knocking for admission to the United States. They want to know everything, but they stand on what they think is their right to tell a man nothing. That kind of attitude doesn't do. In fact, the chief value of give-and-take conversation is that it permits the junior to see his superior as a person rather than as a boss.

An officer should never speak ironically or sarcastically to an enlisted member, since the latter doesn't have a fair chance to answer back. The use of profanity and epithets comes under the same heading. The best argument for a person to keep his temper is that nobody else wants it; and when he voluntarily throws it away, he loses a main prop to his own position.

Meeting an enlisted member of his own unit in a public place, the officer who does not greet that person personally and warmly, in addition to observing the formal courtesies between people in service, has sacrificed a main chance to win that individual's abiding esteem. If it is a man with his family, a little extra graciousness will go a long way, and even if it didn't, it would be the right thing.

In any informal dealing by an officer with a group from his own unit, it is good judgment to pay a little additional attention to the youngest or greenest member of the group instead of permitting him to be shaded by older and more experienced members. They will not resent it, and the newcomer's confidence will be helped.

It should go without saying that an officer does not customarily drink with his enlisted people, though if he is a guest at an organizational party where punch or liquor is being served, it would be a boorish act for him to decline a glass simply because of this proscription. Sometimes in a public cocktail bar an officer will have the puzzling experience of being approached by a strange but lonely enlisted man who, being a little high, may have got it into his head that it is very important to buy an officer a drink. What one does about that depends upon all of the surrounding circumstances. It is better to go through with it than create a scene that will give everyone a low opinion of the Service. Irrespective of rules, there are always situations to be resolved only by good judgment.

Visiting unit members in a hospital is a duty that no officer should neglect. Not only does it please the person and members of his family; but it also is one of the few wide open portals to enhancing loyalty. It is strange but true that the ill person never forgets the officer who was thoughtful enough to visit when he or she was down. And the effect of it goes far beyond the person alone. Others in the unit are told about it;

other patients in the ward see it and note with satisfaction that the officer takes his responsibilities to heart. If the person is too ill to take care of such matters as family notification, the officer should insure that these things are taken care of and, when a unit member goes on sick call, the officer's responsibility does not end at the point where a doctor takes over. The officer's interest is to see that the person is made well if possible. If the officer has reason to think that the treatment being given falls short of the best possible, it is within his or her charge to raise the question.

By the same rule, if in combat a junior suspects that one of his men is breaking under the strain and feels that affording him some temporary relief might help him rebound to normal spiritual and physical vigor, it is his duty to seek medical consultation and help to that end. The staff psychiatrist is usually in a position somewhat remote from the average line officer, but he is there to help, and the wastage of good men can be averted if officers in immediate command of men make full and prompt use of his power to assist them.

A birthday is a big day in anyone's life. So is a wedding, or the birth of a child. By checking the roster and records, and by keeping an ear to the ground for news of what is happening in the unit, an officer can follow these events. Calling the person in for a handshake and a word of congratulation, or writing a note home, takes very little time and is worth every moment of it. Likewise, if a unit member has won some distinction, such as a promotion, a letter of appreciation to the parents or spouse will compound the value of telling the individual that his or her officer is proud of the accomplishment.

A young Air Force captain stationed at a remote base in Greenland wrote personal letters to the parents of every man in his squadron. To spread the workload, he sent the letter one week before each airman's birthday. He wrote about the Greenland weather, the food, the group activities; but always there was some meaningful comment about the airman, his adjustment, how he was doing his job, and so forth. The man didn't know about the letter until he got word from home. Can it be doubted that the parents, the son, and the captain got a lift from it.

Nothing is more pleasing or ingratiating to any junior than to be asked by a superior for an opinion on any matter—provided it is given a respectful hearing. Being consulted and asked for an opinion builds that person up.

There is absolutely no point in visiting kitchens or quarters and asking of the atmosphere if everything is alright. Enlisted people seldom complain and they are loath to stick their necks out when there are others within hearing. It is the task of the officer to see that all is right, and to take the trouble necessary to make certain of it. If he is doubtful about the mess, a mere pecky sampling of the food will do no good. Either he will live with it for a few meals, or he won't find the "bugs" in it.

An officer should not ask: "Would you like to do such-and-such a task?" when he has already made up his mind to assign a subordinate to a certain line of duty. Orders hesitatingly given are doubtfully received. But the right way to do it is to instill the idea of collaboration. There is something irresistibly appealing about such an approach as: "I need your help. Here's what we have to do."

An officer is not expected to appear all-wise to those who serve under him. Bluffing one's way through a question when ignorant of the answer is foolhardy business. "I'm sorry, but I don't know," is just as appropriate from an officer's lips as from any other. And it helps more than a little to add, "But I'll find out."

Rank should be used to serve one's subordinates. It should never be flaunted or used to get the upper hand of a subordinate in any situation save where the latter has already discredited himself in an unusually ugly or unseemly manner.

When suggestions from any subordinate are adopted, the credit should be given publicly.

When a subordinate has made a mistake, but not from any lack of good will, it is common sense to take the rap for him rather than make him suffer doubly for his error.

An officer should not issue orders that he cannot enforce.

He should be as good as his word, at all times and in any circumstance.

He should promise nothing that he cannot make stick.

An officer should not work looking over his people's shoulder, checking on every detail of what they are doing, and calling them to account at every step. This prissy attitude corrodes confidence and destroys initiative.

On the other hand, contact is necessary at all times. Particularly when people are doing long-term work or are operating in detachment at a remote point, they will become discouraged and will lose their sense of direction unless their superior looks in on them periodically, asks whether he can be of any help, and, so doing, gets them to open up and discuss the problem.

The Navy says, "It isn't courtesy to change the set of the sail within 30 minutes after relief of the watch." Applied to a command job, this means that it is a mistake for an officer, on taking a new post, to order sweeping changes affecting others in the belief that this will give him a reputation for action and firmness. The studying of the situation is the overture to the steadying of it. The story is told of General Curtis E. LeMay of the Air Force. Taking over the 21st Bomber Command in the Marianas during World War II, he faced the worried staff officers of his predecessor and said quietly, "You're all staying put. I assume you know your jobs or you wouldn't be here."

The identity of the officer as a lady or gentleman should persist in relations with people of all degree. In the routine of daily direction and

disposition, and even in moments of exhortation, the officer had best bring courtesy to firmness. The finest officers are not occasional ladies or gentlemen, but in every circumstance—in commissioned company and, more importantly, in contact with those who have no defense against arrogance—exhibit courteous behavior.

The traditional wisdom of addressing Judy O'Grady with the same politeness as one would the Colonel's Lady applies equally in all situations in life where one is at an arbitrary advantage in dealing with another. To press this unnecessarily is to sacrifice something of one's quality in the eyes of the onlooker. Besides there is always the better way.

If throughout this writing there has seemed to persist a nigh ungentlemanly, almost exclusive use of the masculine gender, it was done with all deference to women in Service, officer and enlisted. There is a deficiency in the language, and the overusage of "he or she" clutters up discourse.

What we know is that woman's role in the Armed Services will continue to expand, and what is to be expected is that theirs will be a gentling influence, heightening Service efficiency. The difference in sex changes nothing as to the requirement of obedience or the authority to insist that it be given, whosoever is commanded. That may call for some adjustments by misogynists in uniform who hold that the military should be exclusively a male province. But the policy is clear beyond mistake: the woman in service must have equal opportunity, which means no less that she must be held equally accountable. Further, the United States Supreme Court ruled in May, 1973, that the "Uniformed Services" must deal with men and women on an equal footing, as to fringe benefits and all else.

It's the law of the land. It's official policy. It's common sense.

Chapter 21

MORAL AND PHYSICAL WELFARE

To put it in a nutshell, the moral of this chapter is that when people are moral, the moral power that binds them together and fits them for high action is given its main chance for success.

There should, therefore, be no confusion about how the word is being used. We are speaking both of training in morals for every day living, and of moral training that will harden the will of a fighting body. One moment's reflection will show why they need not be considered separately, and why we can leave it to Webster to do the hairsplitting.

It is the doctrine of the Armed Forces of the United States that when Americans lead personal lives based on high moral standards, and when their aim is equally high as to physical fitness and toughness under training conditions, they will mature those qualities that are most likely to produce inspired leading and stout following within the forces.

There is nothing panty-waist about this doctrine. It was not pronounced to gratify the clergy or to reassure parents that their sons and daughters would be in good hands, even though these things, too, are important.

The doctrine comes of the experiences of the Nation in war, and of what the Services learned by measuring their own forces. But it happens, also, that the facts are consistent with a common sense reckoning of the case.

Let's figure it out. To be temperate in all things, to be continent, and to refrain from loose living of any sort, are acts of the will. They require self-denial and a foregoing of what may be more attractive in favor of the things that should be done. Granted that there are a few individuals who are so thin-blooded that they never feel tempted to digress morally, the majority are not like that. What they renounce in the name of self-discipline, at the cost of a considerable inner stress, they endeavor to compensate for by their gains in personal character. Making that grade isn't easy; but no one who is anyone has yet said that it isn't worthwhile. In the Armed Forces there is an old saying that an officer without character is more useless than a ship with no bottom.

In the summing up, the strength of will that enables a person to lead a clean life is no different from the strength of purpose that fits

him to follow a hard line of duty. There are exceptions to every rule. Many a lovable rounder has proved himself to be a first-class fighter. But even though he had an unconquerable weakness for drink and women, his resolution had to become steeled along some other line or he would have been no good when the pay-off came.

Putting aside for the moment the question of the vices, and regarding only the gain in moral power that comes of bodily exercise and physical conditioning, it should be self-evident that the process that builds the muscle must also train and alert the mind. How could it be otherwise? Every physical act must have as its origin a mental impulse, conscious or unconscious. Thus in training a man to master his muscles we also help him to master his brain. He comes out of physical training not only better conditioned to move but better prepared to think about how and why he is moving, which is true mobility.

In military organizations, "setting-up" and other formation exercises are usually a drag and a bore. Men grumble about them, and even after they are toughened to them so that they feel no physical distress, they rarely relish them. The typical American male would much rather sit along the sidelines and watch someone else engage in contact sports. It's almost the national habit.

But no matter how great the inertia against it, there must be unremitting perseverance in the physical conditioning of military forces. For finally, it is killing men with kindness to relax at this point. If life is to be conserved, if men are to be given a fair chance to play their parts effectively, the physical standards during training cannot be less than will give them a maximum fitness for the extraordinary stresses of campaigning in war.

When troops lack the coordinated response that comes of long, varied, and rigorous exercise, their combat losses will be excessive, they will lack cohesion in their action against the enemy, and they will uselessly expend much of their initial velocity. In the United States military service, we are tending to forget, because of the effect of motorization, that the higher value of the discipline of the road march in other days wasn't that it hardened the muscles, but that, short of combat, it was the best method of separating the men from the boys. This is true today, despite all of the new conditions imposed by technological changes. A hard road march is the most satisfactory training test of the moral strength of the individual man.

At the same time, to senselessly overload men for road marching hurts them two ways. It weakens their faith in the sense of command, thereby impairing morale, and it breaks down their muscle and tendon. Enough is known about the average American male to provide a basic logistical figure. He stands about 5 feet 9 inches, and weighs about 156 pounds. The optimum load for a man is about one-third of body weight, the same as for a mule. That means that for a training march, approximately 45 pounds overall, including uniform, blankets and

everything, is the most that a man should be required to carry. If he gets so that he can handle that load easily, over, let us say, a 10-mile march, the thing to do further to build up his power is not to increase the weight he carries, but to lengthen the march. The military have known that this is the underlying principle for better than half a century. But the principle has not always been observed.

There is another not infrequent cause of breakdown—the leader who makes the mistake of thinking that everyone else's limit is the same as his own. Some come into the officer corps fresh from the stadia and cinderpaths of the colleges, in the pink of condition. They take charge of a group of men, some not yet seasoned, and others somewhat older and more windbroke than themselves. They shag them all over the lot at reveille or take them on a cross-country chase like a smart rabbit trying to outrun the hounds. The poor devils ultimately get back, some with their corks completely pulled, a few feeling too nauseated to eat their breakfast, and others feeling whipped because they couldn't keep up with the group.

When an officer does this kind of thing thoughtlessly, he shows himself to be an incompetent observer of men. When he does it to show off, he deserves to be court-martialed.

It is the steadiness and the continuity of exercise, not the working of men to the point of exhaustion and collapse, that keeps them upgrading until they are conditioned to the strain of whatever comes. To do it the other way around simply makes them hospital patients before their time, and fills them with resentment against the Service.

In the nature of things, the officer who has been an athlete can fit into this part of the program with little difficulty and with great credit, provided he acts with the moderation that is here suggested. By the same token, the officer who has shunned sports in school, either because he didn't have the size or the coordination or was more interested in something else, will frequently have an understandable hesitation about trying to play a lead hand in anything that he thinks will make him look bad. So it frequently happens that the officer who has no great knack at leading in exercise and recreation gets the mouse's share of it. And thereby the whole point is missed. For it should be perfectly clear that the man who has had the least active experience in this field is usually the one in greatest need of its strengthening effects. If he has not kept himself in good physical shape, his nerves will not be able to stand the strain of combat, to say nothing of his legs.

It can be said again and again: The highest form of physical training that an officer can undergo is the physical conditioning of his own troops. Nothing else can give him more faith in his own ability to stay the course and nothing else is likely to give him a firmer feeling of solidarity with his people. Study and an active thirst for wider professional knowledge have their place in an officer's scheme of things. But there is something about the experience of bodily competition, of

joining with, and leading men in strenuous physical exercise, which uniquely invigorates one's spirit with the confidence: "I can do this! I can lead! I can command!" Military men have recognized this fact since long before it was said that Waterloo was won on the playing fields of Eton. Bringing it down to the present, General Sir Archibald Wavell said: "The civil comparison to war must be that of a game, a very rough and dirty game, for which a robust body and mind are essential." Even more emphatic are the words of Coach Frank Leahy of Notre Dame, an officer in the United States Navy in World War II: "The ability to rise up and grasp an opportunity is something that a boy cannot learn in lecture rooms or from textbooks. It is on the athletic field primarily that Americans acquire the winning ways that play such an important part in the American way of life. The burning desire to emerge the victor that we see in our contact sports is the identical spirit that gave the United States Marines victory at Iwo Jima."

Men like to see their officers competing and "giving it a good college try" no matter how inept or clumsy they may be. But they take a pretty dim view of the leader who perennially acts as if he were afraid of a sweat or a broken thumb. In team sports developed around interorganization rivalry, the eligibility of an officer to participate with enlisted members is a matter of local ground rules or special regulations. There is nothing in the customs of the Services that prohibit it. To the contrary, it has been done many times and is considered to be altogether with an officer's dignity.

Need it be said that, in any event, going along with the team and taking an active interest in its ups-and-downs are not only a military officer's duty, but a rewarding privilege, if he is a real leader? In this respect, he has a singular relationship to any group that represents his unit. He becomes part of their force, and his presence is important not only to the team but to the gallery. It is not unusual to hear senior officers excuse themselves from an important social function by saying, "I'm sorry, but my team is playing tonight." That is a reason that everybody understands and accepts.

As for the ranks, even among those who have had no prior acquaintance with organized sports, there is a marked willingness to participate, if given just a little encouragement. This is one of the effects of getting into military uniform. As someone said about gunpowder, "it makes all men alike tall," and provides a welcome release from former inhibitions. The military company is much more tightly closed than any other. When men are thinking and working together in a binding association, they will seek an outlet for their excess spirits, and will join together in play, even under the most adverse circumstance. During World War I, it was common to see American troops playing such games as duck-on-the-rock, tag, and touch football with somebody's steel helmet in close proximity to the front. Because no other equip-

ment was available, they improvised. This happened again in Vietnam 50 years later. So it is that in any situation, the acme of leadership consists, not in screaming one's head off about shortages, but in using a little imagination about what can be done.

The really good thing about the gain in moral force deriving from all forms of physical training is that it is an unconscious gain. Will power, determination, mental poise, and muscle control all march hand-in-hand with the general health and well-being of the individual, with results not less decisive under training conditions than on the field of battle. A man who develops correct posture and begins to fill out his body so that he looks the part of a fighter will take greater pride in the wearing of the uniform. He will gain confidence as he acquires a confident and determined bearing. This same presence, and the physical strength that contributes to it, will help carry him through the hour of danger. Strength of will is partly of the mind and partly of the body. In combat, fatigue will beat men down as quickly as any other condition, for fatigue inevitably carries fear with it. Tired men are men afraid. There is no quicker way to lose a battle than to lose it on the road for lack of preliminary hardening of troops. Such a condition cannot be redeemed by the resolve of a commander who insists on driving troops an extra mile beyond their general level of physical endurance. Extremes of this sort make men rebellious and hateful of the command, and thus strike at tactical efficiency from two directions at once.

Looking after the welfare of men, however, does not connote simply getting them into open air and giving them a chance to kick the ball around. The Services are pretty well organized to provide their personnel with adequate sport and recreational facilities and to insure an active, balanced program in any but the most exceptional circumstances. Also, the provisions made for the creature comforts of ranks are ample, experience-tested, and well regulated.

It is not so much that a young officer needs to have book instruction about the detail of these things. Such is the system that they can hardly escape his notice, any more than he can escape knowing where to get his pay check and by which path he goes to the barbershop.

What counts mainly is that he should fully understand the prime importance of a personal caring for his men, so that they cannot fail of a better life if it is within his power and wisdom to lead them to it. And included in the personal caring for his men should be an officer's concern for their safety in work, play, combat, and while off duty.

Once the principle is grasped and accepted without any mental reservation, time and experience will educate him in the countless meetings of situations that call for its application.

There are times and situations that require that all personnel be treated identically, for the good of organization. There are also occasions when nothing else suffices but to give the most help, the most

encouragement, the most relief to those who are most in need. Service people understand that, and the officer, approaching every situation with the question in his mind: "What does reason say about what constitutes fair play in this condition?" cannot go far wrong in administering to the welfare of those who serve under him.

It is moral courage, combined with practice, that builds in one a delicate sense of the eternal fitness of things.

One example: Under normal training conditions, it would be fair play and the acceptable thing to rotate men and their junior leaders on such an onerous task as guard duty. But if a unit was "dead beat" after a hard march, and if an officer, pursuing his line of duty, walked among his men, inspecting their blistered feet and doing all he could to ease each man's physical discomfort, he would then be using excessively poor judgment if he did not pick out the men most physically fit to do whatever additional duty was required that night.

But much painstaking attention to the physical welfare of men is not more important than thoughtful attention to their spiritual wants and their moral needs. In fact, if we would give a little more priority to the latter, the former would be far more likely to come along all right.

The average American is quite young when he enters service, and because he is young, he is impressionable. He looks to his officer, even though the latter may be junior in years, because he believes that the man with rank is a little wiser, and he has faith that he will not be steered wrong.

Despite all the publicity given to venereal disease, American young people do not know a great deal about its reality. VD continues to be a main scourge to American forces, especially those based overseas.

If an officer talks straight on these subjects, and believes in what he says sufficiently to set a good example, he can convince his better men that the game isn't worth the candle, and can save even some of the more reckless spirits from a major derailment.

Chapter 22

KEEPING THE TROOPS INFORMED

Nobody ever told the South Sea savage about the nature of air in motion. He had never heard of wind and therefore could not imagine its effects. Thus when he heard strange noises in the treetops, and there was a howling around certain headlands while other headlands were silent, he could believe only that the spirits were at work. He would strain his ear to hear what they had to say to him, and never being able to understand, he would become all the more fearful.

It all sounds pretty silly. And yet civilization is a great deal like that. We pride ourselves today in saying, particularly in the Western nations, that men and women are better informed than ever before in the history of the world. What we really mean by that is that they are overburdened with more kinds of fragmentary information than any people of the past. They know just enough about many major questions of the day that either they are driven to the making of fearful guesses about the unknown, or they try to close their minds to the subject, vainly seeking consolation in the half-truth, "What I don't know can't hurt me."

In World War I, the men who had the least fear of the effects of gas warfare were the gas officers who understood their subject right down to the last detail of the decontamination process and the formula for dichlorethylsulphide (mustard gas). The man to whom the dangers of submarine warfare seem least fearsome is the submariner. Of all hands along the battle line, the first-aid man has the greatest calm and confidence in the face of fire, largely because he has seen the miracles worked by modern medicine in the restoring of grievously wounded men. The general or admiral who is most familiar with the mettle of his subordinate commands will also have the most relaxed mind under battle pressure.

It is wrong, dead wrong, to try to persuade men to do the right thing by dwelling on the awful consequence of doing the wrong thing. Confidence, not fear, is the keynote of a strong, convincing doctrine.

In war, in the absence of information, man's natural promptings alternate between unreasoning fears that the worst is likely to happen, and the wishful thought that all danger is remote. Either impulse is a barrier to the growth of that alert confidence that comes from a

realization of one's own strength and a reasonably clear concept of the general situation.

Man is a peculiar animal. He is no more prone to think about himself as the central figure amid general disaster than he is to dwell morbidly upon thoughts of his own death. In the dark, he will get a certain comfort out of that darkness, at the same time that it clouds his mind and freezes his action. Disturbed by bad dreams about what might happen, he nonetheless will not plan an effective use of his own resources against that which is very likely to happen. Only when he is given a clear view of the horizon, and is animated by the general purpose in all that moves around him, does he understand the direction in which he should march, and, taking hold, begin to do the required thing.

It is almost gratuitous to state this. No high commander would think of moving deliberately into the fog of war if he was without knowledge of either the enemy or friendly situation. Even to imagine such a contingency is dismaying. But in their nervous and spiritual substance, admirals and generals are no different from the green recruits who have come most recently to their forces. They cannot stand alone any more than can the recruit. They draw their moral strength and their ability to contend against adverse circumstance largely from what is told them by their staffs. They could not command themselves if they were deprived of all information.

Toward the assuring of competent, collected action, the first step is to remove the mystery. This is a process that must be mastered in peacetime if it is to stand the multiplied strains of war. What mystery? Let it be said that it surrounds the average man on every hand, even though the average junior officer does not realize it, while at the same time he himself is completely mystified by much that transpires above him. For example, we all like to throw big words about, to air our professional erudition; and we do not understand that to the uninitiated who does not know their meaning, the effect is as a blackout that makes even the simplest object seem formidable. To illustrate, we can take the word "bivouac," common enough in military parlance, but rare in civilian speech. When green troops are told, "We are going into bivouac," and they are not sufficiently grounded in military terms to know that this means simply going into camp for the night without shelter, their instinctive first thought is, "This is another complex military process that will probably catch me short." Similarly, if told that they are detailed "on a reconnaissance mission along the line of communications with a liaison function," they could not fail to be confused. And if then instructed to "take a LAW up to the MLR and follow SOP in covering a simulated LRRP party," they would be justified if they blew their tops.

These are exaggerated examples, put forward only to illuminate a fairly simple point. Every man in military service should be accorded the right to work and to think in the clear, whenever possible.

He should be told the why and the wherefore of whatever he is expected to do, as well as the what and the how. His efficiency, his confidence, and his enthusiasm are bound to wax strong in almost the precise measure that his superior imparts to him everything he knows about a duty that can be of possible benefit to the individual. Furthermore, this is a two-way current. Any officer who believes in the importance of giving full information in a straight-forward manner, and continues to act on that principle, will over the long run get back more than he gives. But the misfit who incontinently brushes off his subordinates because he thinks his time is too valuable to spend any great part of it putting them on the right track dooms himself to work in a vacuum. He is soon spotted for what he is, and if his superiors can't set him straight, they will shrug him aside.

But the "need to know" principle should not be too heavily emphasized. At no working level should people be overloaded with information unessential to their part in the performance of the task, in particular when the spreading of information endangers security. There is but one rule of safety that may be followed with impunity: the military person must pass upward everything he sees, hears, or feels that seems to be in the general interest of the command, and he must be schooled to believe that this is a primary obligation, even though he risks seeming tiresome or stupid to his superiors. But before passing any vital information downward, he must first be sure of the affirmative answer to two questions: "Will it help? If so, is it in the best interest of the command?"

Cdr. William R. Anderson, USN, in one of the most inspiring ventures in American history, put the atomic submarine, Nautilus, across the North Pole under the Arctic icecap. For good reason, higher authority made it a secret mission. Anderson told only his executive, Lt. Cdr. Frank Adams, what was afoot. There the secret rested until June 9, 1958, when Nautilus cast off on her odyssey. At that time all others who shared the risk were told. That's how it should work in such matters from the top down.

There is also a negative example of the terrible failures that come when lower levels are not schooled to carry the word and stay mute in the worst possible hour. When the front of the Eighth Army was first breached in late November, 1950, a lone American machinegunner saw a Chinese Communist brigade in column racing down a stream bed toward his position. Being a brave man, he fired until his weapon jammed. Then he ran for the company perimeter and made it. But he told no one what he had seen. So no one tried to get the message back. That one brigade surprised and destroyed his company, cracked the regimental front, forced the division to withdraw, and created the irreparable breach that compelled the Eighth Army's retreat from North Korea. The story might have had a different ending had this one man opened his mouth at the right time.

The lesson has been drilled into American officers for many years. It might seem that almost any one of them would by rote do his best to keep his men oriented, particularly under stress conditions. No sir, it does not happen. In May, 1962, some American support units were already ashore in South Vietnam. A Department of Defense team was sent there to determine how well forces were being kept informed. It found that though some of the units had been in-country for six weeks, in none of them was there a going information program suited to the new situation. In some units, the men had seen no maps and did not know their geographical location. They had been told little or nothing about the Vietnamese people or why they had been sent to help them and in consequence, were demoralized. At the same time, civilian visitors to the U. S. Embassy in Saigon were being handed booklets filled with the essential information. Not one officer had applied for booklets for his own men. These units had arrived by ocean transport. On landing, many of the men still did not know that they were in Vietnam. One cannot think of a more shocking example of officers neglecting a fundamental responsibility.

Great commanders of the past have reflected that knowledge is the source of the simplifying and joining of all action and have pondered how better to resolve the problem. But it is only in our time that this great principle of military doctrine has become rooted deep enough to stay, because the technological complexity of modern war is such as to permit of no other course.

It is folly to attempt to oversimplify that which is of its nature complex. War cannot be made less intricate by conjuring everyone to return to kindergarten and henceforth use only one-syllable words. No such counsel is here intended. The one thought worth keeping is that the military system, as we know it, will prove far more workable, and its members will each become a stronger link in the chain of force, if all hands work a little more carefully toward the growth of a common awareness of all terminology, all process, and all purpose.

Once pronounced, the object also requires to be seen in due proportion. The principle does not entail that a corporal must know everything that concerns his captain about the operation of a company to be happy and efficient in his own job. But it does set forth that he is entitled to have all information relating to his personal situation, his prospects, and his action that is within his captain's power to give him. A coxswain is not interchangeable with a fleet admiral. To make available complete details of a total plan on an operation would perhaps produce no better or worse effect than a slight headache. But if he is at sea—in both senses of that term—with no knowledge of where he is going or of his chances of pulling through, and having been told what will be expected of him personally at the target area, he still has no picture of the support that will be grouped around him, he is apt to be as thoroughly miserable and demoralized as were the sailors

under Columbus, when, sailing on and on, they came to fear that they would override the horizon and go tumbling into space.

Lt. Gen. Sir Frederick Morgan wrote of the policy applied at his COSSAC planning headquarters during World War II: "Right down to the cook, they were told what had happened, what was happening, along with their part in it, and what it was proposed to do next."

Paraphrasing Montaigne, President Roosevelt told the American people during a great national crisis that the main thing they need fear was fear itself. But we all have to learn to live with fears of one kind or another. In matters great and small, the fears of men arise chiefly from those matters they have not been given to understand. Fear can be checked, whipped, and driven from the field when men are kept informed.

The dynamics of the information principle lie in this simple truth. We look at the object through the wrong end of the telescope when in the military service we think of information only as instruction in the cause of country, the virtues of the free society, and the record of our arms, in the hope that by doing so we will make strong converts. These are among the things that every American needs to know; of themselves they will not turn an average American male into an intelligent, aggressive fighter. Invigorated action is the product of the free and well-informed mind. The "will to do" comes of the confidence that one's knowledge of what requires doing is equal to that of any other man present.

This is the controlling idea, and all constructive planning and work in the field of information is shaped around it. In proceeding, however, one needs understand some of the limiting factors. The intelligence of the audience, or more accurately, its readiness to procure the information, even when it is readily available in printed form, should not be overrated.

Though the great majority of people entering service has finished high school, and a fair portion has done college work, or graduated, its average individual is not a scholar. In fact, a current Army-wide evaluation of the reading ability of its people in this category reveals that they average out at tenth-grade level. Translated, this means that, irrespective of grades and IQs, they are that far behind in desire to read, development of vocabulary and ability to express themselves cogently. While this is an indictment of the educational system rather than a criticism of the military or of the volunteers who choose its way of life, the trainer must still take it into account. Either he makes the extra try out of his understanding of the problem, or a lot of people will lose out, possibly including himself. The times demand more than mediocrity.

Chapter 23

COUNSELING YOUR PEOPLE

Among the ever-pressing problems of the commander, and equally of the young officer schooling himself to the ways of military service, is the seeking of means to break down the natural timidity and reticence of the great majority of people.

This he can never do unless he is sufficient master of himself to come out of his own shell and give them a chance to understand him as a human being rather than as an autocrat giving orders. Nothing more unfortunate can happen to an officer than to come to be regarded by his subordinates as unapproachable, for such a reputation isolates him from the main problems of command responsibility as well as its chief rewards. He will never be able to see his people in their true light, and will either have to exercise snap judgment upon the main problems within his own sphere, or take the word of others as to the factors on which promotions, rewards, and punishments are based within the unit.

When the block is due to an officer's own reticence, mistaken ideas about the requirements of his position, or feelings of strangeness toward his fellows, the only cure for him is to dive head-first into the cold, clear water like a boy at the old swimming hole in the early spring.

If an officer is senior and is still somewhat on the bashful side, by watching the manner of his own seniors when he gets counsel, and thawing toward his immediate juniors thereby increasing his receptiveness toward them, he can start a chain reaction that reaches to the bottom level.

The block, however, is not always in the mind and heart. No one can help his own face, but it can sometimes be a barrier to communication. One commander in the European Theater was told by his executive that his subordinates were fearful to approach him because of his perpetual scowl. He assembled his officers and said to them: "I have been told that my looks are forbidding. The mirror reminds me of that every morning. Years ago I was in a grenade explosion, and a consequent eye injury and strain have done to me what you have to see every time we get together. But if you cannot look beyond the face and judge my disposition by all else that you see of me in our work

together, you do not yet have the full perception that is commensurate with your responsibility."

The too-formal manner, the overrigid attitude, the disposition to deal with any human problem by-the-numbers as if it were only one more act in organizational routine can have precisely the same chilling effect upon others as came of this officer's scowl. Though no one may move wholly out of his own nature, a cheerfulness of manner in the doing of work is altogether within any individual's capabilities, and is the high-test lubricant of his human relationships.

As a further safeguard against making himself inaccessible, the officer needs to make an occasional check on the procedures that have been established by his immediate subordinates. At all levels of command it is the pet task of those "nearest the throne" to think up new ways to keep all hands from "bothering the old man." However positive an order to the contrary, they will not infrequently contrive to circumvent it, mistakenly believing that by this act they save him from himself. Many a compassionate commander leads an unwontedly lonely life because of the presumptuous solicitude of his staff in this regard and his own failure to discover what is happening. In this way the best of intentions may be thwarted. There is no sure cure for the evil but personal reconnaissance.

It is never a waste of time for the commander, or for any officer, to talk to his people about their personal problems. More times than not, the problem will seem small to him, but so long as it looms large to another, it cannot be dismissed with a wave of the hand. Ridicule, sarcasm, and the brush-off are equally inexcusable in any situation where one individual takes another into his confidence on any matter that does not involve bad faith on the part of the petitioner. Even then, if the petitioner imparts something that shows that his own conduct has been reprehensible or that he would enlist the support of his superior in some unworthy act, it is better to hear him through and then skin him, than to treat what he says in an offhand manner. An officer will grow in the esteem of his people only as he treats their affairs with respect. The policy of patience and good-will pays off tenfold because what happens to one is soon known to others.

In this particular there has been a radical change within the Services during the Twentieth Century, simply because of broader understanding of human relationships. In the old Army, the man could get through to his commander only if he could satisfy the first sergeant as to the nature of his business; this was a roadblock for the man who either was afraid of the first sergeant, or was loath to let the latter know about his affairs. Custom dies hard, and this one has not been entirely uprooted. But the distance we have traveled toward humanizing all command principles is best reflected by the words of General Eisenhower in *Crusade in Europe:* "During the war hundreds of broken-hearted fathers, mothers, and sweethearts wrote me personal letters

begging for some hope that a loved one might still be alive, or, at the very least for additional detail as to the manner of his death. Every one of these I answered."

It is not necessary that an officer wet-nurse his men in order to serve well in the role of counsel. His door should be open, but he does not play the part either of a father confessor or a hotel greeter. Neither great solemnity nor effusiveness are called for, but mainly serious attention to the problem, and then straightforward advice or decision, according to the nature of the case, and provided that from his own knowledge and experience he feels qualified to give it. If not, it is wiser to defer than to offer a half-baked opinion. To consider for a time and to seek light from others, whether higher authority or one's closer associates, are the sound alternatives when there is a great deal at stake for the man and the problem is too complex for its solution to be readily apparent. The spirit in which this work should be undertaken is nowhere more clearly indicated than in the words of Schuyler D. Hoslett who, in his book, *Human Factors in Management*, said this: "Counseling is advising an individual on his problem to the extent that an attempt is made to help him understand it so he may carry out a plan for its solution. It is a process which stimulates the individual's ability for self-direction."

When one weighs that definition, warnings against the danger of over-counseling would seem almost unnecessary, if it were not for the tendency in man to assume the superior position when possible and to moralize gratuitously. To overdo in this, as in other actions, is usually to undo; the maxim of the wise is to leave things before things leave them. Discretion consists in doing only that minimum of talking that will enable the other individual to air the whole problem and clear his emotions, leading to deeper reflection on his part.

Family affairs, frictions within the organization, personal entanglements that prey upon the mind, frustrations and anxieties of varying kind, the sense of failure, and other nameless fears that are rooted deep in the consciousness of nearly every individual are the more general subjects in counseling.

Whatever impairs the man that he wishes to take up with his officer becomes ipso facto the officer's rightful business. Equally so, on the positive side, when his only desire is to bring forward something that he believes would serve the interests of organization, he should be heard.

In either case, the perfecting of counsel develops around two controlling ideas, stated in the order of their importance: (1) what is in the best interests of the unit, and (2) what is for the good of the person. In this particular, the officer as counselor is rarely in the role of a disinterested party. He has to look beyond what is beneficial simply to the spiritual, mental and moral need of one individual. There is an abiding necessity to equate the personal problem with the whole

philosophy within which a command operates. To keep in mind that every individual has his breaking point is everlastingly important. But to remember that the unit is also made of brittle stuff is not less so.

When undue personal favors are granted, when precedents are set without weighing the possible effects upon all concerned, when men are incontinently urged or even sympathetically humored by their superiors toward the taking of a weak personal course, the ties of the organization are injured, tension within it mounts, and the ranks lose respect for their leaders.

All things are to be viewed in moderation and with compassion but with a fine balance toward the central purpose. Let us take one example. Within a given command at a particular time, leaves have been made so restricted, for command reasons, that there must be a showing of genuine urgency. One man comes forward and says that he is so sick for the sight of home that he can no longer take duty. As certainly as his superior tries to facilitate this man's purpose because of fear that he will break, the superior will be harassed by other requests with no better basis, and if they are not granted, there will be general discontent. On the other hand, suppose another man comes forward. A wire from home has informed him that his mother is dying. If the superior will not go to bat for such a case, he will win the deserved contempt of the same men who were ready to take advantage of the other opening, but in this instance would seek nothing for themselves.

To know the record, the character, and the measure of goodwill of the subject is all-important in counseling. It puts the matter in much too dim a light to say that after the call comes, the officer should check up on these points so that he can deal knowledgeably with the person. That is his first order of business within the unit—to learn all that he can about the main characteristics of his people. This general duty precedes the detail work of counseling.

What the individual says of himself in relation to the problem deserves always to be judged according to his own record. If he has proved himself utterly faithful, action can be taken on the basis of his word. If he is known to be a corner-cutter and a cheat, his case, though listened to with interest and sympathy, needs to be taken with a grain of salt, pending further investigation.

Many of the problems on which men seek advice of their officers are of a legal nature; unless an officer is versed in the law, the inquiry must be channeled to a qualified source. Other problems are of a kind that use should be made of the home services of such an organization as the Red Cross. A knowledge of the limits beyond which the help of a special officer or agency must be sought is therefore as important to the officer-consultant as an ability to give the man full information about the whereabouts and use of these facilities.

The Red Cross is usually an effective agent in checking the facts of a home situation and returning the data. But at the end of the line

where officer and man sit together, the man in need can draw strength and composure far more surely from a person he knows well than from a stranger.

There is this illustration. During our years of war in this century, many a man overseas got word that his home had been broken up. The counselor could talk the thing out with him, learn whether a reconciliation was the one most important thing, or whether the man was groping his way, looking for a friend who could help him see the matter in proportion, and weigh, among other things, his duty to himself. The Red Cross could check the facts of the home situation, sometimes a compassionate leave could be arranged so that he could try to right the situation. But the man's readjustment depended in the main on what was done or said by the individuals who were closest to him.

Sooner or later every commander has to deal with some reflection of this kind of problem. When it happens moralizing and generalizing about the weakness of human nature does no good whatever. To call the man a fool is as invidious as to waste indignation upon the cause of his misfortune. Likewise, any frontal approach to the problem, such as telling the man, "Here's what you should do," should be shunned or used most sparingly. The more effective attitude can be expressed in these words: "If it had happened to me instead of to you, and I were in your same situation, here are the things I would consider, and here are the points to which I would give greatest weight." To tell any subject to brace up and be a man is a plain implication that he is not one. To reflect with him on the things manhood requires is the gentle way toward stirring his self-respect. So doing, a counselor renews his own character. It is also worth remembering that in any one's dark hour, a pat on the back and an earnest handclasp may work a small miracle.

There is much counseling over the subject of transfer. Herein lies an exception to a general rule, for in this case the good of the individual takes precedence over the good of organization. No conscientious officer likes to see good people depart from his organization. Nevertheless, the Service is not in competition with itself, and it advances as a whole in the measure that all find the niche where they can serve most efficiently and with the greatest satisfaction. There are officers who hold to every able subordinate like grim death, seeing no better way to advance their personal fortunes. This is a sign of moral weakness, not of strength, and its inevitable fruit is discontent within the organization. The sign of superiority in any officer, at whatever level, is his confidence that he can make another good man to fill any vacancy. When it is self-evident that someone can better himself and profit the Service through transfer, it is contrary to all principle to deny him that right. This does not mean that the unit's exit door should be kept open, but only that it should be ready to yield upon a showing of competent proof. It is not unusual that when the pressure mounts and war danger rises, many a man develops a sudden conviction that he

would be more useful in a noncombat arm. The officer body itself is not unsusceptible to the same temptation. Unless the great majority are held to the line of duty they had accepted in less dangerous circumstances, the Armed Forces would soon cease to have fighting integrity. But it makes no point to keep men in a combat arm or Service who are quite obviously morally and physically unequipped for its rigor, and it is equally wasteful to deny some other arm or Service the use of a specialist whose skills fill a particular need. Some of our ablest commanders have abided by this rule: They never denied the man who had a legitimate reason for transfer, and they never shuffled off their lemons and goldbricks under a false label. Though seemingly idealistic, the rule is also practical. The time wasted in excessive worry over a discard is sometimes better spent by concentrating on the value of trumps.

Men tend to seek officer counsel when they feel discriminated against by lesser authority. When that happens, it is the duty of the officer to get the facts and act according to them. Complaints against any junior are always unpleasant to hear because of their air of intrigue. Tactlessly handled, without due weighing of the case from both sides, they turn one blunder into two. But no officer is well-advised if he believes that his duty automatically is to uphold a subordinate when the facts say that the latter is dead wrong. His duty is to reduce friction wherever it is caused by a misuse of power. This implies dealing discreetly with the offender instead of directly discountenancing him.

There are a few broad, common-sense rules which, when followed, will enable any officer to play his part more effectively in the counseling of men.

Privacy is requisite, and the interview should not be held at any hour when interruptions are likely.

A listless manner spoils everything, diminishes the force of reason, and discourages confidence.

To put the man at ease immediately by some personal gesture is more important than observing forms.

Thereafter the situation is best served by relaxation of bearing rather than by tension.

All excess of expression is a failing, and above all in the person to whom another looks for guidance.

To listen well is the prelude toward pondering carefully and speaking wisely.

No counsel is worthy that has any lower aim than one's own ideals of self-respect.

Early enough is well; quickly done can be quickly undone.

To refuse with kindness is more winning than to acquiesce ungraciously.

To note another man's mood and to become congenial to it is the surest way to engage his confidence.

Decisions that are wholly of the heart and not of the mind will ultimately do hurt to both places.

No person will talk freely and at length if met by silence, but an intelligent question encourages frankness above all else.

When one man loses possession of himself, it is the more reason that the other should tighten his reserve.

Affectation in one's own manner gives the lie to one's own credit and destroys it with others.

To express pity for a man does not serve to restore him and put him above pity.

When a man is so burdened by a personal problem that it shuts out all else, he must be led to something else.

Imprudent tactics can undo the wisest strategy.

While these rules have particular value in relation to the counseling of one's subordinates, they also have some application to any situation in which people work and commune together. Men at any level do not mistake the touch of sincerity, nor fail to mark as unworthy of trust the supervisor who pays only a superficial regard to a matter which they deem important.

For the officer already burdened with other duties, counseling may seem like a waste of time and an activity that more properly belongs to the chaplain. The wise and understanding "padre" may sometimes counsel men on their material problems and thereby assist the officer who is over them. But so doing, he is committing a trespass unless he acts with the commander's knowledge and consent. The commander is the foster father of the men in his organization. When he renounces this role, he neglects a trust.

That neglect cuts the fighting efficiency of any unit at its root. Counseling, like all else in military life, has a combat purpose. Other things being equal, the tactical unity of men working together in combat will be in ratio to their knowledge and sympathetic understanding of each other. Whatever the cause, aloofness on the part of the officer can only produce a further withdrawal on the part of the man. Finally, the cost comes high. In battle and out of it, failure to act and to communicate is more often due to timidity in the individual than to fear of physical danger.

Described in cold type, the counseling process probably appears a little sticky. Actually, it is nothing of the sort. It has been going on ever since man became civilized. It is a force in all organized human relationships, beginning in infancy and lasting through old age. Because of the nature of a military group, and particularly because of the deriving of united strength from well-being in each of the component parts, there is much more need to regularize it and to qualify all hands in a knowledge of those things that will enable them to assist a fellow in need of help. Moreover, in the military society, far more than in civil life, confidence is a two-way street. It would be almost impossible to express

the collective gratitude of tens of thousands of lieutenants and ensigns who in times past have learned to rely on the friendly counsel of a veteran sergeant or petty officer, and have usually gotten it straight from the shoulder, but with respect. The breaking-in of most young officers, and the acclimating of them to their role in a command system, is due, in large measure, to support from this source. Nor are senior commanders reluctant to receive moral comfort of this same kind in periods of crisis.

When the planes of the first Tokyo raid under Col. James H. Doolittle crashed among the mountains and along the seacoast of Eastern China, after one of the most valiant strokes in our military annals, their commander was among the few who had the added misfortune of coming to earth within the Japanese lines. By fate's mercy, he just happened to escape by walking between the enemy outposts. Farther along, he saw the wreck of another of his planes. Then he came to a third; it was smashed beyond hope. But its crew had already heard from several other parties. They too had lost their B-25's to the fog, the night, and the crag. Doolittle realized then that everything was gone, most lives saved, yes, but otherwise the expedition was a total ruin.

The commander sat for a long time in the cockpit of a wrecked plane, terribly depressed, thinking only of how totally he had failed.

At last one of the younger men, Sgt. Paul Leonard walked up to him and said: "What's the matter, Colonel?"

Doolittle said: "It couldn't be worse. We've lost everything. We've let the country down."

The kid said: "Why, Colonel, you've got this all wrong. You have no idea how this looks to the United States. Don't you realize that right now they're getting ready to make you a general? Why, I'll make you a bet they give you the Congressional Medal."

Doolittle thanked him. He thought it was a nice thing for the boy to say. That kind of loyalty was worth having in a bad hour. The boy started to walk away; he could tell that Doolittle didn't believe a word of it. Then suddenly he turned and came on back.

"Colonel," he said, "I'd like to make a deal with you. Suppose I'm right about it and you're wrong. So they give you a star and the Congressional Medal. If that happens, will you agree to take me with you wherever you go?"

Doolittle made him a solemn promise. Fresh courage came to him out of the boy's tremendous earnestness.

And of course the boy was right, and the contract was kept, and all things went well until, by a cruel irony, Sergeant Leonard was killed in the last German raid against Doolittle's headquarters in Europe shortly before the war ended.

Chapter 24

REWARD AND PUNISHMENT

Though until late years it could have been said without reservation that the American military officer has potentially a dual capacity, being both an administrator and a magistrate, half of that title is clouded by modern developments.

The military's right to sit in judgment on its own offenders is under determined challenge by several national libertarian organizations. A number of key decisions, some by the Supreme Court of the United States, have overturned almost 200 years of precedent. An investigative panel, appointed by the Department of Defense, furthermore, has directly questioned whether summary punishments are being applied with equal fairness to all concerned, untinged by racial bias or other prejudices.

That the attack continues irrespective of any showing that there is firmer, surer justice in civilian tribunals speaks for itself. But since the end of it cannot be foreseen, logic affords no alternative other than to discuss the subject according to what has been rather than to speculate about what may be.

So to begin, the military officer is dealing with men who are submitted to him in a binding relationship which by its nature is very compelling and intimate. Almost as much as the parent in the home, and far more than the teacher in the school or the executive in business, he is directed to center his effort primarily on the building of good character in other individuals.

One need only compare a few points of advantage and disadvantage to see why a better balanced sense of justice and fair play is required of the military officer than of his brother in civil life, and why the aim would be too low if the fighting Services did not strive for higher standards of personnel direction than are common in the management of American business. Here are the points:

If any subordinate in the civilian sphere feels that he is getting a bad deal from his boss, and has become the object of unfair discrimination it is his American privilege to quit on the spot, be he a policeman, a government worker, or a hod carrier. He can then maintain himself by carrying his skill into a new shop. But an enlisted member of the Armed

Forces cannot quit summarily, and finally, if his commander is just wrong-headed and arbitrary, it can be made almost impossible for him to transfer out. However bad his fortune, he is stuck with it.

The military establishment has its own body of law. Therein, too, it differs from any civilian autonomy except the state itself. The Uniform Code of Military Justice provides one standard of treatment to all individuals in the regulating of all interior affairs. The code is not rigid; its provisions are not absolute. It specifies the general nature of offenses against society and special offenses against the good of the military service. But, except for the more serious offenses, particularly those that by their nature also violate the civil code, it does not flatly prescribe trial and punishment. Military law, in this respect, has more latitude than criminal law covering minor offenders. Rarely arbitrary in its workings, it premises the use of corrective good judgment at all times. It regards force as an instrument only to be used for conserving the general good of the establishment. The essential power behind the force is spiritual—the will and conscience of the great majority, expressing itself through the action of one or several of their number. Its major object is not punishment of the wrongdoer but protection of the interests of the dutiful. This view of military law is four-square with the basic principle of all action within the Armed Forces—that in all cases the best policy is one that depends for its workings on the sense of duty in men toward each other, and thereby strengthens that sense through its operations.

Put in these terms, the attitude of the Armed Forces toward the problem of correction as a means of promoting the welfare of the general establishment obviously reposes a large trust in the justice and goodwill of the average officer. It would be foolish to blink the fact. But there is this to be said unalterably in favor of the military system's way of handling things: If the organization of the whole human family into orderly relations with each other is ever to be made possible, it will be done only because many persons, of all ages and working at many different levels, develop this faculty for passing critical, impartial judgment on the conduct and deserts of those whom they lead, instead of regarding it as a special kind of wisdom given only to the few anointed. Nor is that all. Not only the knowledge but the sense of duty in men is imperfect. In every society there are men who will not obey the law of their own accord. Unless the authority that receives and interprets the law will also impose it, by force if necessary, the reign of law soon ceases. Whether an ordered society is to exist thus depends upon whether there are citizens enough, fixed with a sense of duty, to obey the law and to enforce it.

At first glance, the responsibility seems extraordinarily heavy and difficult. But with broadening experience, it becomes almost second nature to an officer quickly to set a course by which to judge individuals in relation to the affairs of organization, provided that he has steered all along according to a few elementary principles.

There are, however, a number of important considerations. There is first the thought that when any reward, such as a promotion, a commendation, or a particularly choice assignment is given another instead of the one who deserves it on sheer merit, someone is robbed and the ties of organization are weakened.

As to the awarding of individual decorations, while they are not to be "handed out with the rations," lest they be devalued wholly, being overly-stringent with them is no less wrong. The regulations are sufficiently clear about what acts merit recognition and what the award should be. In marginal cases, however, it is best to do as in umpiring baseball and "decide in favor of the runner."

Next, there is this proposition: If, in the dispensing of punishment, undue leniency is extended to an individual whose record shows that he merits no special consideration, in the next round a bum rap will be given some lesser offender who is morally deserving of a real chance. The Italians have an epigram: "The first time a dog bites a man, it's the dog's fault; the second time, it's the man's fault."

According to Thomas Carlyle, these things have the strength of a natural law. Nor is it necessary to take his word for it. Any wise and experienced military administrator will say approximately the same thing and will tell of some of the bad examples he has met along the way... The commander who was afraid to punish anybody and by his indecision punished everybody... The lieutenant who had such a bad conscience about his own weak handling of a grave case of infraction of discipline that he threw the book at the next offender and thereby spoiled a good man and gained the ill will of the company... The old-timer who smarted under excessive punishment for a trivial offense, broke under it, got into worse trouble, and became a felon... The officer who promoted his pets instead of his good people and at last found that there were no good people left... The skipper who condoned a small case of insolence until it swelled into a near mutiny... The fool who handled every case alike, instead of recognizing differences in human character... and so on ad infinitum. It is a long and sorry list, but the overwhelming majority of dutiful executives in the Armed Services avoid these stupid blunders by following a Golden Rule policy toward their subordinates.

If lack of obedience (which must be distinguished from the far graver charge of refusal to obey a lawful order) is the most frequent cause of service people being brought on the carpet, then as obedience is a moral quality, so should punishment be employed as a moral act, its prime purpose being to nourish and foster obedience. Before meting punishment, it is necessary to judge a person, and judgment means to think over, to compare, to weigh probable effects on the person and on the command, and to give the offender the benefit of any reasonable doubt. Before any punishment is given, the question must be faced: "What good will it achieve?" If the answer is "none," punishment is not in order. Punishment of a vindictive nature is a crime; when it is given

uselessly or handed out in a strictly routine manner, it is an immoral act.

But when punishment is necessary, the case must be handled promptly and its issue must be stated positively, so that there is no room for doubt that the officer is certain about his judgments. People know when they are in the wrong, and even when it works to their disadvantage, they will feel increased respect for the officer who knows what should be done and states it without hemming and hawing. The showing of firmness is the first requirement in this kind of action. It is as foolish to go back on a punishment as to threaten it and not follow through. The officer who is always running around threatening to court-martial his subordinates is merely avowing his own weakness and crying that he has lost all of his moral means. Even the dullest men do not mistake vehemence and abuse for signs of strength.

To punish a body of men for offenses committed by two or three of their number, even though the offense is obnoxious and it is impossible to put the finger on the culprits, is the act of a sadist, and is no more excusable within military organization than in civilian society. Any officer who resorts to this stupid practice will forfeit the loyalty of the best men in his command. He is in fact asking for punishment.

As a general rule, it is a serious error to reprimand a subordinate in the presence of another person because of the unnecessary hurt to his pride. But circumstances moderate the rule. If the offense for which he is being reprimanded involves injury of any sort to some other person or persons, it may be wholly proper to apply the treatment in their presence. For example, the bully or the smart aleck who wantonly humiliates his subordinates is not entitled to have his own feelings spared. However, in the presence of his superior, an officer is always ill-advised to administer oral punishment to one of his own juniors, since the effect is to destroy confidence both up and down the line.

It is always the duty of an officer to intervene for the protection of his people against any manifest injustice, whatever its source. In fact, this trust is so implicit that he should be ready to risk his professional reputation upon it when he is convinced beyond doubt that one of his people is being unfairly assailed, or that due process is not being followed. Both higher authority and civil authority occasionally overreach; an officer stands as a shield protecting his people against unfair treatment from any quarter. But it is decidedly not his duty to attempt to cheat the law or thwart justice for the sake of any one of them.

Finally, the best policy on punishment is to eliminate the frictions that are the cause of most transgressions. When a ship is happy, men do their duty. Scarcely anything will cross them up more quickly than to see rewards given with an uneven hand. Even the stinker who has no impulse except to duck work can recognize a deserving person and will resent it if that person is bypassed in favor of a bootlicker or some other lightweight.

Nothing is more vain than to give a promotion or any reward in the hope or on the promise that the character who receives it will suddenly reform.

Duty is the only sure proving ground. Men, like motors, should be judged on their all-around performance. There is no other way to generate the steady pull over the long grind.

This discussion is no substitute for a working knowledge of the Uniform Code of Military Justice or the Manual for Courts-Martial. But its philosophy throughout is consistent with the spirit and letter of these documents. In this instance, knowing the philosophy is not enough by more than half. More officer hours are wasted annually because of fundamental error in administering punishments, putting the offender before the wrong court, improperly charging him, and so forth, than from any other cause. Officer ignorance of the code itself is one of the besetting weaknesses of our military system. Once that is understood, it behooves every officer to do his part toward correction.

Chapter 25

FITTING PEOPLE TO JOBS

In civilian society, what amounts to a school of thought has developed around the idea that the average person has a natural bent for some particular job or profession, which if thwarted will fill him with frustrations that are the cause of most of the mental and moral disorders of mankind. In line with this thesis, social scientists deplore the stultifying effect to our culture and the degradation to the individual resulting from the monotonous drudgery of the motor assembly line where women work alongside of men and there is a continuing interchange of tasks. No one frets less about this social "problem" than the people who do the work and draw the pay.

Yet there is this persistent illusion that if all individuals could become rightly placed, motivation would become universal and we would have Utopia tomorrow. That notion of what humanity mainly cries for is perforce rejected by the Armed Services for practical as well as ideal reasons. It discounts man, his plastic and impressionable nature, his response to all that goes on around him and his marked ability to adjust to any environment. He is not like a bolt fitted into a hole by a riveter, nor merely clay in the hands of the potter. Further, the theory does not meet the needs of the situation, since in the Services, as elsewhere, periodically there are not enough of certain jobs to take care of all those who are qualified to fill them.

But the last and main reason why the theory is no good is that it doesn't square with human experience. A narrow classification system invites the danger of overspecialization and lessens the team play so indispensable to all military enterprise. It is possible for the machine to break down totally from lack of interchangeability in its parts.

We learn much from war, but some of the most obvious lessons are disregarded. One of the lessons that it should teach us is the tremendous adaptability of the average intelligent person, his readiness to take hold of work altogether remote from any prior experience, master it, and find satisfaction in it, provided he is given help and encouragement by those who already know.

This is the great phenomenon of war. Former bookkeepers emerge as demolitions men. Divinity students become pharmacist mates. School

teachers operate tanks. Writing men turn into navigators. Woodsmen become lecturers. Longshoremen specialize in tactics. And all goes well.

Consider the Special Forces soldier in Vietnam. That one man could function as a paramedic, sanitary engineer, interpreter, communications operator and tactical commander. Yet it was not only in these highly skilled types that we found versatility. If during combat an RTO, aid man or platoon leader became suddenly lost, someone from the line, not specially trained for the role, filled his place. In the fight at Dong Tre, June, 1966 (Operation Nathan Hale), the outstanding individuals were two privates, never before in battle. During two days of battle, in which the unit took the heaviest losses of any rifle company during the war, both men performed spectacularly in a half dozen roles.

Yet when it is all over, and everyone gets back in his well-worn groove, the "experts" explain that these miracles occurred because under the stimulus of the great fear and excitement attending a period of emergency, individuals will sublimate their main drives and adjust temporarily to what would otherwise be an onerous personal difficulty. Sheer poppycock! Normal men do not feel pressed by fear simply because a state of war exists; their chief emotions change scarcely at all. These transformations occur only because the man had the potential all along, and with someone backing him and giving him the feeling of success, his incentives become equal, at least, to anything he had known in his peacetime occupation.

That is the long-and-short of it. If our average man couldn't become a jack of many trades and a master of several, the United States would never be able to meet a major war emergency.

For these reasons, Service concepts of how men should be fitted to jobs do not develop around the simple notion that it is all a matter of putting a square peg in a square hole—which is the one best way to deny the peg any room for expansion. The doctrine is that men are many-sided, that they learn their own powers and likes through experiment, that they are entitled to find what is best for them, and that having found it, their satisfactions will still derive mainly from intelligent and interested treatment by their superiors.

Every officer arrives sooner or later at the point where he has a direct hand in the placement of people. By way of preparation for that responsibility he should do two things mainly—learn all that he can from his superiors about its technical aspects, and in his own study and reflection concentrate on principles to the exclusion of detail.

The fundamental purpose of all training today is to develop the natural faculties and stimulate the brain of the individual rather than to treat him as a cog that has to be fitted into a great machine.

The aim of all rules covering the conduct of warfare, as of all regulations pertaining to the conduct of its individuals, is to bring about order in the fighting machine rather than to weary and confuse the mind of the person who reads them.

Thus in the assignment of individuals to work in any military organization, no amount of perfection in the analysis of skills and aptitudes can compensate for carelessness in their subsequent administration. The uniformed ranks are not primarily mechanics, storekeepers, and clerks, but fighting men. This makes a difference. The optimum overall results do not come from the care exercised in seeing that everyone is placed at exactly the right job but from the concern taken that in whatever job he fills, he will feel that he is supported and that his efforts are appreciated. There is scarcely a good man who has served long in the military profession without filling a half-dozen roles requiring vastly different skills. And looking back, what would the average one say about it? Not that he was happiest where the nature of the task best suited his hand, but happiest where his relations with his superiors gave him the greatest sense of accomplishment.

That is the human nature of the equation. We can let the economist argue that what a man puts into a job is largely dependent on what he takes out of it. And we can let the philosopher answer him that the fault in his proposition is that he has turned it the wrong way around. Regardless of which man has put the cart before the horse, there are two basic truths that outweigh the merits of the argument.

First, all human progress has come of the willingness of a certain individual at a particular time to undertake a job no one had ever done before.

Second, the main reward of any job is the knowledge that worthwhile work has been accomplished.

Despite all of the present-day emphasis on pay-check security as the mainspring of human action, the far stronger force that moves man as a social being is his desire for a secure place in the respect and affections of his associates, including his chief or his employer. Gary Cooper, playing in "The Cowboy and the Lady," used the line, "I aims, ma'm, to be high regarded." The same idea is put more grandly in the words of Victor de Mirabeau: "I am devoured by ambition but in a strange manner; it is not for honors that I am ambitious, nor for money, nor for favors, but for a name and to be somebody." Except for the few wrong-headed people, he was speaking for the whole human family. The man who can get along without wanting or needing approval from others is fit only for a cell by himself, either padded or barred.

Loyalty in the masses of men and women waxes strong in the degree that they are made to believe that real importance is attached to their work and to their ability to think about their work. It weakens at every point where they consider that there is no respect for their intelligence. The dignity of any work is not inherent in the job itself but in the attitude of others toward it. Cabinet ministers, college presidents, and industrial magnates will quit their jobs when they feel they no longer have the confidence of those to whom they are responsible. That experience is as demoralizing to great persons as to the mine-run. Equally, the

feeling of compensation that comes with any token of recognition is one of those touches of human nature that make all men akin. If men and women of genius and good works did not find Nobel prizes and honorary college degrees highly gratifying, these customs would have faded long ago. It is as rewarding to them to be called good at their job as it was to the New Jersey street sweeper who pushed his broom so diligently that he swept halfway into the next town before discovering his mistake.

The ultimate implications of these things should be reasonably clear to every officer of the fighting establishment. It makes little difference whether a man is digging a ditch or is working up a loading table for an invasion; what he thinks about his work will depend in large measure upon the attitude of his superiors. He will develop no great conviction about what he is doing except as it is transmitted to him. The fundamental cause of any breakdown of morale and discipline within the Armed Forces usually comes of this—that a commander or his subordinates transgress by treating men as if they were children or serfs instead of showing respect for their adulthood.

Thus, in the matter of sizing up people, judging their capacities, and trying to get them rightly placed, the need is not a formula, since no formula will work. It is only through keeping principles uppermost in our thoughts that the greatest measure of common sense will prevail in our actions. That is what is needed, rather than clairvoyant powers or a master's degree in psychology, if the military officer is to handle personnel efficiently. There are no great wizards in this field; there are only men and women who know more about the human nature of the problem than others because they have a zest for meeting humanity and have built a text out of what others have told them.

Right here, more should be said about woman's place in the Armed Services, now and future. In the Israeli military, women are trained for every line of work done by men (they must qualify with weapons) except combat leading. Under the all-volunteer policy, the American Armed Services will trend more and more in that direction. There have been women drill masters in our forces since World War II. There are women in command of all-male or mixed units now. Since there is no reason why a woman cannot qualify as an expert instructor in gunnery, camouflage, communications or maintenance, there are many reasons, foremostly the good of the Services, why the most hardy male should encourage them to diversify as widely as possible. It will make the company more congenial, and besides, the only alternatives to an agreeable and cooperative acceptance of their military versatility are a mealymouthed acquiescence or a cocksure pugnacity, neither of which attitudes becomes the male. Remember, too, how many earnestly held opinions and emotions we have outgrown with the passage of years. Only yesterday the news came as a shock that women were qualifying for the sea-going Navy, thus shattering a tradition that has endured

since the time of John Paul Jones. Given a little luck, plus a lively sense of our fellows, we may outgrow more hampering traditions tomorrow.

There is no room left for doubt. That American women in service can qualify for almost any job as readily as men has already been proved. During World War II, they worked as airplane mechanics, cryptographers, photo interpreters, meteorologists, gunnery instructors, Link trainer operators, test pilots, ferry pilots and air controllers, among other demanding duties. There were women couriers and pharmacist mates. As administrators, they served as commanders, exec officers and adjutants. That no woman made flag rank in that war, while today women get pinned with stars and hardly make the news columns, is some measure of the change.

This job of fitting people to jobs begins with the study of data about the person—all of the data obtainable. Let's suppose it's a female recruit. The next step is to sit with the subject for interview, getting her to talk freely about herself, what she has previously done, why she joined the Service, what she hopes to do with her life, whether she enlisted to make a career of it, in what school courses she majored or excelled and so forth.

Still, the information from all sources has to be balanced against one's impression of the outer person, not just what she says but how she talks, the degree of attentiveness, her bearing along with her eye and the measure of her self-control. The decision is made out of all such reckonings. This is common sense in action. The alternatives are to act upon a hunch or on purely emotional grounds. One might, with equal reason, determine another person's fate and fortune by the flip of a coin.

Now let's see briefly how the method works out in practice. If the record shows that the subject is a bad speller, careless about punctuation, not interested in writing, inexperienced at clerkship, and somewhat of a rough diamond by nature, she would be a bad bet for the administrative side or in supply work or in a communications role. With a little polishing, however, and provided she seems self-assured and is what we call "likeable," she might become a capital leader of a training group.

On the other hand, suppose it's a male recruit. When he says he has tried in vain to develop a manual skill but has always been clumsy with his hands, and his lament is supported by the data on his experience prior to enlistment, that does not necessarily exclude him from becoming a good weapons or demolitions man, if he seems strong in nerve and body, though he would hardly do for a mechanic's berth or as a radio repairman or even a carpenter's assistant. Weapons and demolitions require bodily vigor, due care and caution, horse sense and fortitude, rather than unusual manual dexterity. The coordination that is needed is to be found in the man who has been active in body contact sports. But former ballplayers rarely make competent computer programmers or machinists.

Take the man who is uncommunicative or morose or unusually shy. He may only be building a new dike to ward off his fear of failure. From the day he starts his service, his superiors should do their best to help him change his ways: these ingrown men are blocks to group cooperation. But if he does not pick up and become outgiving, he hasn't the stuff of a junior leader, and there is no sense wasting space by sending him to any school or course out of which it would be expected that duties as an instructor would devolve upon him.

However, there is one word of extreme caution on this point. For as long as six months after entering service, some men are under abnormal constraint because they are in a new element and feel a little frightened inside. Whether this is the case is to be judged best by getting full information on the man. If the record shows that he had led his class in college, managed an athletic team, headed a debating team in high school, been the main wheel in a boy's club or a Scout troop, or led any kind of group, this is to be taken as a sign that the potential is there and that he is a sleeper. The most common error made in the Services is that we are prone to underscore that a man was a lieutenant in a cadet company while taking no note of the man who had greater prestige in other activities because of his natural qualities as a leader.

The foregoing are only a few average samples of personnel handling, and of elementary reasoning. As Mother Goose might say, if the list had been longer, the case still wouldn't have been stronger. Far more profitably, we can dig a little deeper into the subject of principles.

In one respect, every decision as to the placing of people in the Armed Forces is a moral decision, and therein it differs from average civilian responsibility. What is best for the man has always to be measured against the ultimate security and fighting objectives of the establishment.

For example, it is dead wrong, even in time of peace, to commit tactical leadership to the hands of the man whose moral force clearly falls short of what is required on the field of war, no matter how congenial he may be. And it is just as wrong to let a blabbermouth work his way into security channels, even though the time is such that he can do no immediate harm.

What importance should be attached to a person's estimate of his own capabilities? It is always pertinent, but it is by no means decisive. This is so for two reasons, the first being that the majority tend to oversell themselves on the thing they like to do, and the second, that very few individuals know their own dimensions. Almost consciously, people resist the thing they do not know, due to premonitory fears of failure. When the Armored Force School was first organized in 1941, a private from a unit stationed in Georgia was arbitrarily assigned to take the radio course. He protested, saying that he did not like anything about the field and therefore had no talent for it. But his commander sent him along. Within one week after arriving at Fort Knox, he was operating

at a faster rate than any man in the history of the Army. In one of the most complex operations in the E. T. O., staffed by almost 300 officers and NCOs, it was discovered that a British female secretary had a sounder instinct for fitting people to the right jobs than any American officer present. So she was used as de facto G-1 of the shop until war's end. Every Service could tell stories of this kind: they are not miracles but regular features of the daily show.

Personnel work does require great self-control, for it must cope gently with the vagaries of the mind and with human obtuseness. Nothing tries the patience like stupidity, but nothing can be more stupid than impatience at the wrong time.

The man who volunteers for a particular line of duty—especially if it is a hard duty—already has one mark in his favor. The fact that he wants to do it is one-half of success. Before turning him down, there must be a substantially clear showing that he lacks the main qualifications. It must be a compelling reason rather than the overweening excuse that it is more convenient to keep him where he is. In any case, he should be thanked for coming forward, and earmarked as a good prospect for the next likely opening.

There is a slack saying in the Services that "the good man never volunteers." That is an outright canard. The best men still do.

In job placement, mistakes are inevitable. Any authority in this line of work will say so. Every experienced man who has had conspicuous success in picking the right men and in getting scores of individuals started up the right ladder will also shudder a little as he recalls his particularly atrocious blunders.

As to the making of mistakes, it is just not enough to comment that they have value, provided one has sufficient breadth to learn from hard experience. What is vastly more important is that the mistake, once made, will not be needlessly compounded. That is a normal, human temptation. The attitude, "I don't care if he is a chump, he's my chump," has nothing in its favor. Yet it becomes a point of pride in some people that they will not admit their judgments are fallible. Consequently, having chosen the wrong person for a given responsibility, they will sustain him there, come hell or high water, rather than acknowledge error.

With what result? Mainly this, that for the sake of the point, they win with it the contempt of their other subordinates. For there is something very childish about this form of weakness, though it is a failing not unknown in many men otherwise qualified for high responsibility. To put it plainly, no man has the moral right to inflict this upon any organization he is professing to serve.

The advice of one's subordinates as to the placement and promotion of men with whom they are in close contact is not to be followed undeviatingly. Men play favorites; they will sometimes back an individual for no better reason than that they "like the guy." Also, each small

group leader, even the best one, will work to advance the interests of his own men, because so doing becomes part of his own buildup. Unless decisions are made from a central point of view, the subordinate who talks the most convincingly will get an extra portion of favor for his men, and jealousies will rack the organization.

There is one last point. No officer can progress in fitting men into jobs except as he becomes better informed about job requirements. This is an essential part of his education. There is no administrative technique that is separate and apart from knowledge of how basic work is performed in the fields that have to be administered. A great many officers resist this truth, but it is nonetheless valid.

What is eternally surprising in the Armed Services is how the aggressive questing for knowledge continues to pay large dividends, and leads, in the average case, to a general forgiveness of one's little sins and vices.

Chapter 26

AMERICANS IN COMBAT

The command and control of men in combat can be mastered by the junior leaders of American forces short of actual experience under enemy fire.

It is altogether possible for a young officer in battle for the first time to be in total possession of his faculties and moving by instinct to do the right thing, provided he has made the most of his training opportunities.

Exercise in the maneuvering of men is only an elementary introduction to this educational process. The basic requirement is a continuing study, first of the nature of men, second of the techniques that produce unified action, and last, of the history of past operations, which are covered by an abundant literature.

Provided always that this collateral study is sedulously carried forward by the individual officer, at least 90 percent of all that is given him during the training period becomes applicable to his personal action and his power to lead other men when under fire.

Each Service has its separate character. The fighting problem of each differs in some measure from those of all others. In the nature of things, the task of successfully leading men in battle is partly conditioned by the unique character and mission of each Service.

It would therefore be gratuitous, and indeed impossible, to attempt to outline a doctrine that would be of general application, stipulating methods, techniques, and so forth, that would apply to all Americans in combat, no matter in what element they engaged.

There are, however, a few simple and fundamental propositions to which the Armed Forces subscribe in telling their officers what may be expected of the average man of the United States under the conditions of battle. Generally speaking, they have held true of Americans in times past from Lexington on April 19, 1775, to the withdrawal of the last brigade from Vietnam toward the end of 1972. The fighting establishment builds its discipline, training, code of conduct, and public policy around these ideas, believing that what served yesterday will also be the one best way tomorrow, and for so long as our traditions and our system of freedoms survive. These propositions are:

I

When led with courage and intelligence, an American will fight as willingly and as efficiently as any fighter in world history.

II

His keenness and endurance in war will be in proportion to the zeal and inspiration of his leadership.

III

He is resourceful and imaginative, and the best results will always flow from encouraging him to use his brain along with his spirit.

IV

Under combat conditions, he will reserve his greatest loyalty for the officer who is most resourceful in the tactical employment of his forces and most careful to avoid unnecessary losses.

V

He is to a certain extent machine-bound because the nature of our civilization has made him so. In an emergency, he tends to look around for a motor car, a radio, or some other gadget that will facilitate his purpose, instead of thinking about using his muscle power toward the given end. In combat, this is a weakness which thwarts contact and limits communications. Therefore it needs to be anticipated and guarded against.

VI

War does not require that the American be brutalized or bullied in any measure whatever. His need is an alert mind and a toughened body. Hate and bloodlust are not the attributes of a sound training under the American system. To develop clearly a line of duty is sufficient to point Americans toward the doing of it.

VII

Except on a Hollywood lot, there is no such thing as an American fighter "type." Our best men come in all colors, shapes, and sizes. They appear from every section of the Nation.

VIII

Presupposing soundness in their officer leadership the majority of Americans in any group or unit can be depended upon to fight loyally and obediently and will give a good account of themselves.

IX

In battle, Americans do not tend to fluctuate between emotional extremes, in complete dejection one day and in exultation the next,

according to changes in the situation. They continue, on the whole, on a fairly even keel, when the going is tough and when things are breaking their way. Even when heavily shocked by battle losses, they tend to bound back quickly. Though their griping is incessant, their natural outlook is on the optimistic side, and they react unfavorably to the officer who looks eternally on the dark side.

X

During battle, American officers are not expected either to drive their men or to be forever in the van, as if praying to be shot. So long as they are with their men, taking the same chances as their men, and showing a firm grasp of the situation and of the line of action that should be followed, the men will go forward.

XI

In any situation of extreme pressure or moral exhaustion, where the men cannot otherwise be rallied and led forward, officers are expected to do the actual, physical act of leading, such as performing as first scout or point, even though this means taking over what normally would be an enlisted man's function.

XII

The normal, gregarious American is not at his best when playing a lone-handed or tactically isolated part in battle. He is not a kamikaze or a one-man torpedo. Consequently, the best tactical results obtain from those dispositions and methods that link the power of one man to that of another. Men who feel strange with their unit, having been carelessly received by it, and indifferently handled, will rarely, if ever, fight strongly and courageously. But if treated with common decency and respect, they will perform like men.

XIII

Within our school of military thought, higher authority does not consider itself infallible. Either in combat or out, in any situation where a majority of militarily trained Americans become undutiful, that is sufficient reason for higher authority to resurvey its own judgments, disciplines, and line of action.

XIV

To lie to American forces to cover up a blunder in combat never serves any valid purpose. They have a good sense of combat and an uncanny instinct for ferreting out the truth when anything goes wrong tactically. They will excuse mistakes, but they will not forgive being treated like children.

XV

When spit-and-polish are laid on so heavily that they become onerous, and the ranks cannot see any legitimate connection between the requirements and the development of an attitude that will serve a clear fighting purpose, it is to be questioned that the exactions serve any good object whatever.

XVI

On the other hand, because standards of discipline and courtesy are designed for the express purpose of furthering control under the extraordinary frictions and pressures of the battlefield, their maintenance under combat conditions is as necessary as during training. Smartness and respect are the marks of military alertness, no matter how trying the circumstances. But courtesy starts at the top in the dealing of any officer with his subordinates, and in his decent regard for their loyalty, intelligence, and manhood.

XVII

Though Americans enjoy a relatively bountiful, and even luxurious, standard of living in their home environment, they do not have to be pampered, spoon-fed, and surfeited with every comfort and convenience to keep them steadfast and devoted, once war comes. They are by nature rugged men, and in the field will respond most perfectly when called upon to play a rugged part. Soft handling will soften even the best men. But even the weak man will develop a new vigor and confidence in the face of necessary hardship, if moved by a leadership that is courageously making the best of a bad situation.

XVIII

Extravagance and wastefulness are somewhat rooted in the American character because of our mode of life. When our men enter military service, there is a strong holdover of their prodigal civilian habits. Even under fighting conditions, they tend to be wasteful of drinking water, food, munitions, and other vital supply. When such things are made too accessible, they tend to throw them away rather than conserve them in the general interest. This is a distinct weakness during combat, when conservation of all supply may be the touchstone of success. Regulation of supply and prevention of waste in any form is the prime obligation of every officer.

XIX

Under the conditions of battle, any extra work, exercise, maneuver, or marching that does not serve a clear and direct operational purpose is unjustifiable. The supreme object is to keep men

as physically fresh and mentally alert as possible. Tired men take fright and are half-whipped before the battle opens. Worn-out officers cannot make clear decisions. The conservation of men's powers, not the exhaustion thereof, is the way of successful operation.

XX

When forces are committed to combat, it is vital that not one unnecessary pound be put on any man's back. Lightness of foot is the key to speed of movement and the increase of firepower. In judging these things, every officer's thought should be on the optimistic side. It is better to take the chance that men will manage to get by on a little less than to overload them, through an overcautious reckoning of every possible contingency, thereby destroying their power to do anything effectively.

XXI

Even thorough training and long practice in weapons handling will not always insure that a majority of men will use their weapons freely and consistently when engaging the enemy. In youth they are taught that the taking of human life is wrong. This feeling is deep-rooted in their emotions. Many of them cannot shake it off when the hour comes that their own lives are in danger. They fail to fire though they do not know exactly why. In war, firing at an enemy target can be made a habit. Once required to make the start, because he is given personal and intelligent direction, any man will find it easier to fire the second and third time, and soon thereafter his response will become automatic in any tactical situation. When engaging the enemy, the most decisive task of all junior field force leaders is to make certain that all men along the line are employing their weapons, even if this means spending some time with each man and directing his fire. Reconnaissance and inspection toward this end, particularly in the early stages of initial engagement, are far more important than the employment of weapons by junior leaders themselves, since this tends to distract their attention from what the men are doing.

XXII

Unity of action develops from fullness of information. In combat, all ranks have to know what is being done, and why it is being done, if confusion is to be kept to a minimum. This holds true in all types of operation, whatever the Service. However, a surfeit of information clouds the mind and may sometimes depress the spirit. We can take one example. A commander might be confronted by a complex situation, and his solution may comprise a continuing operation in three distinct phases. It would be advisable

that all hands be told the complete detail of "phase A." But it might be equally sensible that only his subordinates who are closest to him be made fully informed about "phase B" and "phase C." Since all plans in combat are subject to modification as circumstances dictate, it is better not to muddle men by filling their minds with a seeming conflict in ideas. More important still, if the grand object seems too vast and formidable, even the first step toward it may appear doubly difficult. Fullness of information does not void the other principle that one thing at a time, carefully organized all down the line, is the surest way.

XXIII

There is no excuse for malingering or cowardice during battle. It is the task of leadership to stop it by whatever means would seem to be the surest cure, always making certain that in so doing it will not make a bad matter worse.

XXIV

The Armed Services recognize that there are occasional individuals whose nervous and spiritual makeup may be such that, though they erode rapidly and may suffer complete breakdown under combat conditions, they still may be wholly loyal and conscientious men, capable of doing high duty elsewhere. Men are not alike. In some, however willing the spirit, the flesh may still be weak. To punish, degrade, or in any way humiliate such men is not more cruel than ignorant. When the good faith of any individual has been repeatedly demonstrated in his earlier service, he deserves the benefit of the doubt from his superior, pending study of his case by medical authority. But if the man has been a bad actor consistently, his officer is warranted in proceeding on the assumption that his combat failure is just one more grave moral dereliction. To fail to take proper action against such a man can only work unusual hardship on the majority trying to do their duty.

XXV

The United States abides by the laws of war. Its Armed Forces, in their dealing with all other peoples, are expected to comply with the laws of war in the spirit and to the letter. In waging war, we do not terrorize helpless non-combatants if it is within our power to avoid so doing. Wanton killing, torture, cruelty, or the working of unusual and unnecessary hardship on enemy prisoners or populations is not justified in any circumstance. Likewise, respect for the reign of law, as that term is understood in the United States, is expected to follow the flag wherever it goes. Pillaging, looting, and other excesses are as immoral when Americans are

operating under military law as when they are living together under the civil code. Nonetheless, some men in the American forces will loot and destroy property unless they are restrained by fear of punishment. War looses violence and disorder; it inflames passions and makes it relatively easy for the individual to get away with unlawful actions. But it does not lessen the gravity of his offense or make it less necessary that constituted authority put him down. The main safeguard against lawlessness and hooliganism in any armed body is the integrity of its officers. When men know that their commander is absolutely opposed to such excesses and will take forceful action to repress any breach of discipline, they will conform. But when an officer winks at any depredation by his men, it is no different than if he had committed the act.

XXVI

On the field of sport, Americans always "talk it up" to keep nerves steady and to generate confidence. The need is even greater on the field of war, and the same treatment will have no less effect. When men are afraid, they go silent; silence of itself further intensifies their fear. The resumption of speech is the beginning of thoughtful, collected action, for two or more men cannot join strength and work intelligently together until they know one another's thoughts. Consequently, all training is an exercise in getting men to open up and become articulate even as it is a process in conditioning them physically to move strongly and together.

XXVII

Inspection is more important in the face of the enemy than during training because a fouled piece may mean a lost battle, an overlooked sick man may infect a fortress, and a mislaid message can cost a war. By virtue of his position, every junior leader is an inspector, and the obligation to make certain that his force at all times is inspection-proof is unremitting.

XXVIII

In battle crisis, a majority of Americans present will respond to any man who has the will and the brains to give them a clear, intelligent order. They will follow the lowest-ranking man present if he obviously knows what he is doing and is morally the master of the situation, but they will not obey a chuckle-head if he has nothing in his favor but his rank.

XXIX

Americans are uncommonly careless about security when in the combat field. They have always been so; it is part of their nature. Operations analysts reckoned, as to Vietnam, that this fault

in itself accounted for approximately one-third of our casualties. This weakness being chronic, there is no safeguard against it except super vigilance on the part of officers, and the habit is easiest formed by giving foremost attention to the problem during training exercises.

XXX

For all officers, due reflection on these points relating to the character of our men in war is not more important than a continuing study of how they may be applied to all aspects of training, toward the end that we may further strengthen our own system. That armed force is nearest perfect which best holds itself, at all times and at all levels, in a state of readiness to move against and destroy any declared enemy of the United States.

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