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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division  
(Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

division forward at LA VANG during LAMSON 720 by constructing showers, latrines, mess facilities and conducting general engineer support. D Company was also responsible for supplying power to CAMP WILKINSON within CAMP MAGIE Combat Base by operating and maintaining the electric generators.

m. Air Cavalry Operations.

(1) A Troop.

(a) The mission of Troop A during November and December was to provide visual reconnaissance in the 2/17th Cavalry reconnaissance zones. It also provided reconnaissance and security for the 3rd Brigade of the 101st Airborne Division (Ambl) and its subordinate elements in the form of first and last light reconnaissance and reaction to contact missions. The Aero Rifle Platoon secured downed aircraft in the 101st Airborne Division's northern area of operations. On 6 November 1970 Troop A was given the mission to conduct a visual reconnaissance in the vicinity of Fire Bases KATY, RIFCORD, and BRADLEY. During the morning, the ARPs were inserted to secure a downed aircraft at coordinates XD928434. During a visual recon of Area 7 a UH-1H chase aircraft received 8-10 rounds of .51 caliber fire with negative hits. While engaging this area a total of 110-130 rounds of AK fire was received with negative hits. Numerous trails were spotted in the vicinity of coordinates YD241132 with recent activity in the past 24-48 hours. Footprints of 2 to 3 personnel at coordinates YD241144 were observed with recent activity in the last 24 hours. In a 2 grid square area around YD230120 three hootches and 16 bunkers with signs of recent activity in the past 12-24 hours were observed. On 14 November the missions for Troop A began with visual recons in recon zone 7. Two .51 caliber pits, 10 bunkers, 3 trails, and several hootches were observed at coordinates YD148063. At coordinates YD150070, 25 hootches were observed in a 100 meter square. While conducting reconnaissance of the area at coordinates YD151055 a light observation helicopter took 20 to 30 rounds of AK-47 fire. The pilot was hit in the hand and the aircraft was flown back to QUANG TRI. At coordinates XD862287 two big, reinforced bunkers, and numerous footprints were spotted. At coordinates YD151055 a gunship was fired at by both AK-47 and .51 caliber weapons. A FAC was on station to engage the target where the aircraft was fired on. Air strikes were placed on the target with unknown results. On 15 November a team from Troop A observed a 3/4-ton truck at coordinates YD305074. The truck was engaged and destroyed, and the aircraft received 10 rounds of .51 caliber fire with negative hits. Also at this location 5 to 7 bunkers were destroyed. An 8' x 8' bunker at coordinates XD923235 was observed and engaged with unknown results. AK-47 fire was received at coordinates YD125107 and XD923235 by light observation helicopter. On 26 November Troop A began

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a five day stand-down. During the stand-down period, time was allocated for proficiency check rides and instrument training. Major emphasis was placed on aircraft maintenance to insure maximum combat-ready aircraft at the termination of the stand-down. Final emphasis was placed on the maintenance of aircraft, the concluding of proficiency check rides, and police of the area.

(b) During December, A Troop provided visual reconnaissance in the 2/17th Cavalry reconnaissance zones. It also provided reconnaissance and security for the 3rd Brigade of the 101st Airborne Division (Amb1) and its subordinate elements in the form of first and last light reconnaissance and reaction to contact missions. Due to high winds and heavy rains, operations in the recon zones declined during the reporting period. Teams for L Company (Ranger) were sent to Troop A to be placed in the recon zones. Troop A supplied overflights, insertions, reaction forces, and extractions for the 101st Airborne Division's northern area of operations. Missions in support of ARVN located in the vicinity of Fire Base BARABARA were also performed by Troop A.

(c) During January Troop A participated in the JEFFE SON GIEN operations in general support of the 101st Airborne Division (Amb1). 1-2 January, inclement weather prevented combat operations in the AO. On 3 January, VR of RT 616 showed signs of heavy truck traffic. Gunships received 12.7mm antiaircraft fire at XD910243. One aircraft was hit and suffered minor damage. On 4-5 January, inclement weather prevented combat operations in the AO. On 9-16 January, Troop A performed visual reconnaissance in the AO with emphasis on Route 616. Active 12.7mm pits were observed and engaged. TAC AIR and Artillery were called in on bunkers. On 18-21 January, Troop A worked in close support with TAC AIR, ARA and Artillery to destroy bunkers, cache sites, tunnels and spider holes along Route 616. On 22-23 January, inclement weather prevented combat operations in the AO. On 25 January, several sensor strings were activated and were visually checked for activity. On 26-28 January, inclement weather prevented combat operations in the AO. On 30 January, Troop A performed mission of flank security for 1/5th Mech in KHE SANH area of operations. A downed LOH from F Troop 8th Cavalry was secured and rigged for extraction. On 31 January, Troop A provided security for units in KHE SANH and SHEPPARD areas of operations. BDA's of Arc Lights were completed with satisfactory results noted.

(d) On 2-3 February, Troop A conducted VR of Route 616, extracted two Ranger teams and inserted two others. Troop D was inserted to accomplish ground reconnaissance of Route 616. On 4 February, Troop A ARP was inserted into KHE SANH Combat Base, to secure the arrival of Troop D and Squadron HQ. On 4-7 February bad weather precluded normal operations. On 8 February, Troop A crossed the LAOTIAN border. Aircraft reported taking fire with three aircraft reporting hits (The aircraft were reported flyable). On 10 February, the troop worked the area west of KHE SANH utilizing FAC and ARA. A LOH and AH-1G were shot down. The crews were extracted. Seven NVA were KHH on that date. On 12-17 February, the troop supported ARVN ground elements operating in LAOS. Troop A worked with FAC controlled TAC AIR, ARA and its organic gunships to suppress enemy antiaircraft fire, while teams con-

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tinued their missions of VR for the ground forces. Approximately 16 NVA were KBH. On 18-25 February, Troop A was engaged in its assigned missions of VR and close screen to the ground forces. Weather during this period frequently delayed missions until 1100-1200 hours. On 26 February, Troop A had visual sightings of enemy armor. Two active tanks were sighted, and an AH-1G received 15 hits in the process of flying VR in the vicinity of LZ 31. On 27-28 February, Troop A alternated with Troop C and the Squadron Headquarters Company as C&C to recover an LOH that had been shot down Vic XD6225. Three 12.7mm anti-aircraft weapons were located in the area.

(e) On 1 March the troop employed airstrikes against known and suspected enemy locations. On 2-3 March, inclement weather prevented combat operations. On 4-6 March, A Troop supported ARVN bases at LZ SOPHIA and LZ VICTORY, and employed TAC AIR and Artillery on known positions. On 6 March, the Hac Bao was inserted to secure a downed crew at XD478409. On 7 March, the Hac Bao and the downed crew were extracted under heavy 12.7mm anti-aircraft fire from three weapons. One AH-1G received 4 hits and returned to base where it was determined to be non flyable. A truck (5 ton) was destroyed and a bulldozer was spotted. The area was marked for a FAC. On 8-10 March inclement weather prevented combat operations. On 11 March, Troop A conducted a VR of LZ ALOUI, LZ TRAVO, LZ ALPHA, and LZ FOIEL to determine conditions. Five 2½ ton trucks were sighted and marked for a FAC. On 12-13 March, Troop A's mission was to conduct VR and screen Vic LZ SOPHIA. On 14-15 March, inclement weather prevented combat operations. On 16-23 March, Troop A supported the 1st Infantry Division (ARVN) in the vicinity of LZ ERCHIN with heavy teams. Air strikes were employed and remaining targets were turned over to the FAC on station. During this period an AH-1G was shot down by small arms fire near XD439405. The crew was extracted. Tanks were sighted on 19 March and were marked for the FAC. On 24 March, A Troop continued support to 1st Infantry Division (ARVN) with heavy Cavalry teams. Marginal weather on 25 March prevented working in the AO until 1400 hours. Route recon of 616 revealed no significant spots and no traffic during the past three days. On 26-28 March, Troop A performed its visual recon role in the Laotian and Vietnamese Salient areas to spot possible targets of opportunity. Heavy small arms fire was received throughout the area of interest. On 29-30 March, Troop A supported insertions of ARVNs near XD6802 and performed VR in Laotian Salient.

(f) On 1-5 April, Troop A conducted visual reconnaissance in the Vietnamese and Laotian Salient areas. Emphasis was placed on Route 616 and by-passes. On 6 April, Troop A spent the early day in visual reconnaissance of routes of approach, departure, and planned LZ's for the insertion of the Hac Bao. TAC AIR was employed. Troop A screened ahead

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of the advancing ground forces after insertion. On 7-9 April, Troop A supported the 3rd Brigade in the Vic of VANDERGRIFT and MAI LOC. On 10-13 April, inclement weather caused mission delays. Troop A, however, worked in the Vic of Fire Base GLADIATOR, observing light trail traffic. In the Vic of Fire Base O'RIELLY Troop A observed light foot traffic. Gunships received heavy small arms fire. One AH-1G was downed, crashed-landed in a field. On 12 April inclement weather prevented combat operations in the AC. On 13-15 April, Troop A worked the recon zones with emphasis on Route 616 from Fire Base LEATHERNECK to Fire Base SHILOH. Small amounts of traffic were observed and teams continued to receive 12.7mm and small arms fire. On 16 April, Teams observed old bunkers and trails but no recent activity Vic YD128209. On 17-18 April, Teams were given the priority mission of screening the HUE Rocket Belt. On 19 April, Troop A supported the 258th Vietnamese Marines in their insertion near HOLCOMB. Throughout the area 12.7mm fire was received. On 22-23 April, Teams worked in support of the 258th VNMC in the Vic of Fire Base SHILOH and TUN TAVERN. Support was also rendered to the 54th ARVN Regiment Vic Fire Base BARNETT. A team observed 50-55 bunkers, two NVA, light foot traffic. On 24 April, Teams observed 3 bunkers under construction at YD005297 and 1 NVA was KCH. Bulldozers had been working on Route 616 by-passing bomb craters. Bunkers observed had a spacing of approximately 50 meters. On 25-26 April, Troop A worked with FAC and TAC AIR to support the Hac Bao raid. On 27-28 April, Teams returned to visual reconnaissance in the Division Recon Zone. TAC AIR was employed in the Vic YD095204 against a bunker complex. On 29-30 April, Troop A supported the HAC DAO raid and continued its visual reconnaissance responsibilities.

## (2) B Troop.

(a) During November, B Troop was used in general support of the 101st Airborne Division (Ambl) and worked closely with the 1st Brigade. Their primary mission was to gather intelligence through visual reconnaissance missions. Secondary missions included downed aircraft security in the division's area of operation, bomb damage assessments for B-52 strikes, sky spots, and artillery. On 1-7 November B Troop worked with elements of the 1st Brigade around the THREE FORKS area (YD5012). Their specific mission was to determine the size, location, and movement of enemy forces that made contact with friendly infantry units. On 8-14 November the poor flying weather hampered B Troop's attempts to support the Rangers. On the 13th, the weather lifted enough to insert team Bills. On 16 November Bills had contact with an unknown size enemy force. Two members of the team were wounded in the action. B Troop tried to extract the men but were driven off by enemy fire. In the action three UH-1H helicopters of B Troop received combat damage. From that time B Troop

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has worked directly with the 1st Brigade in an effort to destroy any logistical build-up in the area and to limit the THREE FORKS area as an enemy avenue of advance to the lowlands.

(b) On 1-11 December 1970, poor flying weather did not permit extensive reconnaissance. On 12-17 December 1970, Troop B worked with the 1st Brigade around THREE FORKS YD5012 to conduct bomb damage assessments and locate targets for artillery and airstrikes. On 17 December 1970, Troop B ARP was inserted on a downed aircraft YD496115. The aircraft was down for 31 days prior to the recovery attempt. The aircraft was recovered without incident. On 18-22 December, Troop B was worked around EAGLE's Nest YD4105. A NVA base camp was found by a Troop B pink team. The mission was to determine size, location, and disposition of the enemy force. Secondary missions included CS drops, bomb damage assessments, and relief for Brigade Command and Control personnel. Also on 18 December 1970, a pink team from Troop B, while working in the southern part of the A CHAU VALLEY, was engaged by two 12.7mm antiaircraft machineguns and an undertermined number of small arms. The team leader contacted FAC and marked the area for an airstrike. The bomb damage assessment revealed both active 12.7's and undertermined number of small arms and fighting positions destroyed by Air Force. On 19-31 December, Troop B worked the Squadron reconnaissance zones and screened CAMP EAGLE on 22 December for Operation HOLLY (Bob Hope).

(c) During January and February Troop B participated in the JEFFERSON GLEN operations in general support of the 101st Airborne Division (Ambl). With a primary mission of intelligence gathering through visual reconnaissance. On 1-11 January 1971, Troop B was able to accomplish only limited visual reconnaissance due to low ceilings and inclement weather. On 6 January a detailed search was made for a missing AH-1G from Troop C 2/17th Cavalry. During this search an AH-1G, listed as missing since 1969, was found near Fire Base VECHEL. The Aero Rifle Platoon of Troop B was later inserted on this crash site to recover the remains of the crew. On 14 January, an LOH was shot down at YD385001 Vic ALOUI airstrip. The aircraft and crew were secured. On 16 January, the Troop B ARP secured a downed aircraft Vic YC830889. Additionally, an LOH was shot down by 12.7mm antiaircraft fire Vic YC558794. The crew was recovered, but the aircraft was lost due to fire. On 17 January, the Troop B ARP was again inserted to secure a downed FLIR aircraft YC870985. On 19 January, Troop B ARP was inserted on a suspected enemy location in the Vic of Fire Base MOKET. From 20-27 January, Troop B worked in the area of the RUONG RUONG VALLEY YC8584 supporting Company L (Ranger), 75th Infantry. On 30 January, Troop B operations moved to QUANG TRI to support Operation JEMMY CANYON II vicinity KIE SANH.

(d) On 9 February, Troop B inserted five Ranger teams. On 10 February, Troop B lost 2 LOH aircrafts while on convoy cover in the HAI VAN PASS.

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Troop B ARP was inserted on the site and the aircraft and crew were extracted. The second was shot down in the A SHAU VALLEY by 12.7mm antiaircraft fire. The aircraft was destroyed, and the crew are listed as MIA. From 11-14 February, Troop B worked the division reconnaissance zone detecting enemy truck traffic and destroying a truck and bulldozer. On 15 February, a UH-1H on a night Ranger extraction crashed resulting in seven US KIA. From 19-20 February, Troop B supported Ranger teams, and continued visual reconnaissance in the reconnaissance zone. On 21 February, an AH-1G in direct support of a Ranger contact fired too close to friendly troops, resulting in one KIA and two WIA. On 25 February, Troop B extracted a Ranger team with a POW Vic YD719901. From 26-27 February, Troop B secured the extraction of two aircraft in the vicinity of YD719901 and YD531132. On 28 February, Troop B conducted visual reconnaissance in the Division reconnaissance zone mapping enemy infiltration routes and directing air strikes in the A SHAU VALLEY.

(e) On 1-31 March, Troop B worked in the Division reconnaissance zone conducting visual reconnaissance, checking sensor activations and URS reports. During 5-6 March, Troop B ARP secured a downed AH-1G at YD865211 and a UH-1H at YD391361. On 13 March, an LOH received an unknown amount of 12.7mm antiaircraft and SAF in the Vic of YD199129. The aircraft crashed and burned resulting in two US MIA. During the period 14-17 March, Troop B ARP secured a downed UH-1H at YC727143, and an AH-1G at YD357472. On 22 March, Troop B ARP secured a downed AH-1G at YD961162. On 24 March, Troop B extracted Ranger teams 19s and 19w when the teams made contact. On 30 March, Troop B ARP was inserted at YD513031 to reinforce Ranger team 19h in the capture of 2 NVA POWs. During the entire reporting period, additional missions included BDA of airstrikes and Arc Lights and limited ground reconnaissance.

(f) On 1 April, B Troop ARP was inserted on Fire Base VEGHEL to secure and recover an AH-1G. Both the aircraft and the crew were recovered. On 2 April, B Troop extracted a Ranger team in contact. The team was then used to secure a B Troop LOH on Fire Base RENDEZVOUS. Both the aircraft and the crew were recovered. On 4 April, a B Troop UH-1H on medevac mission vicinity YD552017 received intense SAF resulting in one US WIA. On 6 April, a B Troop UH-1H carrying Rangers to attempt a body snatch vicinity YC451950 received intense SA and MG fire resulting in 1 US KIA and 3 WIA. On 10 April the ARP secured a B Troop UH-1H (C&C) on Fire Base RENDEZVOUS where it landed after receiving one 37mm hit west of Fire Base ERSKINE, resulting in one US KIA. On 13 April, the ARP secured and recovered a B Troop LOH shot down vicinity of AT837978. For the remainder of the month, B Troop operated in the reconnaissance zones and provided support for Company L (Ranger), 75th Infantry. On 23 April, a B Troop UH-1H was shot down in the vicinity of YC479927 while attempting to reinforce a Ranger team in contact, resulting in 1 US KIA and 2 US WIA. The aircraft was not recovered.

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## (3) C Troop.

(a) During November, Troop C staged from PHU BAI Army Airfield in general support of the Division. This included aerial VRs, BDAs, ground reconnaissance and Ranger support. In addition, the ARP was on standby for downed aircraft in the Division AO. Due to the northeast monsoon season, there was little air and reconnaissance activity during the first portion of the reporting period. On 13 and 14 November, the ARP and a team of engineers were inserted to clear Fire Bases KELLY, MAUREEN and KATHYRN. A number of 105mm rounds, fragmentation grenades and blasting caps were discovered and were destroyed. The ARP and elements of Delta Troop were inserted just south of Fire Base MAUREEN. The ARP, in an attempt to recover the Ranger KIA, received RPG and AK-47 fire resulting in six wounded and another Ranger KIA. Due to extremely poor weather conditions, the wounded were unable to be extracted that day. On the following day, 17 November, extraction of the critically wounded was made by an LOH under heavy AK and 50 caliber fire. On 18 November, an unsuccessful attempt, due to weather restrictions, was made to extract the ground elements. In the rescue attempt one C&C, one Cobra, and one LOH received heavy AK fire, 50 caliber, and five RPG rounds. The next day, 19 November, the ARP and other ground elements started to move by foot towards Fire Base CAMBON. In an attempt to make radio contact with the ground elements, one C&C took two RPG rounds and one LOH with pilot and crew member crashed into a mountain side killing both of them. On 20 November the element was able to be extracted, along with the remains of the LOH crew.

(b) During December, operations involving C Troop were significantly hampered by the northeast monsoon weather conditions. A short break in the weather allowed them to work in the northern end of the A SHAU VALLEY in the vicinity of Tiger Mountain. On 11 December, the ARP stood by on Fire Base VE FEL while D Troop was inserted by UH-1H helicopters in the vicinity of ALGUI airstrip. D Troop destroyed bridges that had been spotted earlier by LOH working in that area. During the next few days increasing enemy activity was noted in the northern valley and the surrounding areas. On frequent occasions observation aircraft came under enemy small arms fire, however, Pink Teams worked the area with considerable success. Enemy bunkers, fighting positions, bridges, and huts were destroyed. A number of the enemy were KBR. On 16 December, a LOH on an AAR mission was shot down by enemy 50 caliber fire. The crew was uninjured and immediately picked up by the UH-1H, chase aircraft. On the night of 19 December this same general area was worked by FLIR. Sighting a number of the enemy in the open, FLIR engaged and was credited with 10 enemy KBR. During this period FLIR was also utilized in the daylight hours, accompanying the regular VR missions. In the reporting period, FLIR accounted for a large percentage of the enemy KIA credited to the Troop.

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(c) During the 1-31 January reporting period, Troop C staged from PHU BAI Army Airfield, in general support of the 101st Airborne Division (Ambl), with a primary mission of intelligence gathering through visual reconnaissance. From 1-10 January, monsoon weather prohibited extensive reconnaissance of the Division reconnaissance zone. The period from 11-30 January, was marked by improving weather which enabled Troop C to continue the visual reconnaissance of the division reconnaissance zone. A heavy increase in enemy activity was noted during this period around the LAOTI airstrip and west of Tiger Mountain. An estimated NVA Company was pin pointed. A "Cavalry Cobra" raid was launched and a BDA in the fifteen foot high elephant grass revealed 3 NVA KBH. It is felt that better results were obtained than those indicated by the BDA, as the team was able to silence rather intense fire in the area. During this period Troop C reacted with its Aero Rifle Platoon to five downed aircraft. Additionally Troop C supported three Ranger Teams in contact.

(d) From 1-4 February Troop C staged from PHU BAI Airfield. From 5-28 February, it staged from KHE SANH Combat Base. On 8 February, 0743 hours the Troop C commander, MAJ James T. Newman led the first heavy Cavalry team into LAOS in support of the Vietnamese Rangers. On 12 February, Troop C lost two AH-1Gs to hostile fire on the LAOTIAN border. One crew was listed as MIA. The second crew was extracted. The area of the contact was engaged by Artillery, TAC AIR, and one B-52 strike. The remainder of the month of February was devoted screening for extraction of Vietnamese Ranger fire bases and working Fire Bases 30 and 31.

(e) From 1-31 March, Troop C staged out of KHE SANH Combat Base in general support of LAMSON 719. During this period Troop C ARP manned a portion of the KHE SANH perimeter. The movement of ARVN forces enabled the Troop to resume its full time job of reconnaissance. Troop C was assigned a reconnaissance zone that extended westward to TOHEPONE and to the north of Highway 9. After the ground objectives had been reached and withdrawal began, Troop C began close support by screening PZs and reconnaissance of flight routes. The Troop also acted in a resupply capacity on occasion during this period.

(f) April saw the end of LAMSON 719, with Troop C performing missions in support of the final phases of the operation. Returning to PHU BAI, all efforts were again concentrated on the A SHAU VALLEY and the infiltration routes along the LAOTIAN border. Heavy pink teams once again employed their organic fire power along with artillery and air support against suspected enemy locations in and around Base Area 611. Often forced to work without a LOH because of hostile fire, the effectiveness of the visual reconnaissance was greatly reduced. Support of Delta Troop operations in the Valley raised morale and gave the troops



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a sense of accomplishment. Other daily missions included reconnaissance of the HUE-PHU BAI Rocket Belt, convoy escorts, and support of the 2nd Brigade.

## (4) D Troop.

(a) During the last two months of 1970, Delta Troop provided ground reconnaissance, downed aircraft security, and reaction force for units in contact. Additionally, the troop provided ambushes and sweeps outside CAMP EAGLE and served as the base defense reaction force. During the period 1-28 January, Troop D performed its assigned missions of EAGLE Reaction Force, Perimeter Defense and acted as immediate reaction force with Troop (-) for all insertions of any Squadron Aero Rifle Platoon. From 1-4 January, overflights of the perimeter defenses were made to discover possible enemy routes of infiltration and possible ambush sites. Reports submitted covering this activity indicated areas of requiring improvement. On 28 January, a warning order for movement to QUANG TRI was issued. On 2 February, Troop D made a combat assault in the vicinity of XD854238, to conduct a ground bomb damage assessment (BDA) and a ground reconnaissance of the surrounding area that had been tentatively identified as a NVA headquarters complex. The Troop was extracted at 031500 hours at XD854238 and XD848236, with the PZs were green. On 4 February, Troop D moved to KHE SANH Combat Base in support of LAMSON 719; Headquarters (-) by convoy and two platoons by air. From 5-14 February, Troop D hardened the perimeter defenses. Bunkers, fighting positions and overhead cover were given priority. On 15 February, Troop D was given the responsibility of security for the rearm/refuel point at LANG CON, XD814368, and at this time assumed control of the aero rifle platoons of the assigned and OPCON air cavalry troops. Ambush and sweep operations in the squadron AO were accomplished as part of the perimeter defense plan through 14 March.

(b) On 15 March, the KHE SANH Combat Base began to receive daily artillery attacks by NVA 122mm field guns. On 23 March, at 0230 hours, Troop D repulsed a Sapper attack by the 2nd Company 15th NVA Engineer Battalion. The 40 man attack, supported by indirect fire, 60mm mortars and RPGs, penetrated the 3rd Platoon position in an attempt to reach the airfield POL and rearm points. The enemy broke contact at 0645 hours. A first light check revealed 14 NVA KIA, 1 POW, 9 AK-47s, 3 RPG launchers and one 9mm pistol captured along with numerous small arms ammunition and demolition equipment. US losses were 3 KIA, 5 WIA major, 13 WIA minor. On 27 March, Troop D was given the order to return to QUANG TRI. From 28 March until the end of the reporting period Troop D acted as the squadron reaction force for downed aircraft and crew security.

(c) During the month of April 1971, Delta Troop provided ground reconnaissance, downed aircraft security, reaction force for the division and a reaction force for units in contact. Additionally, Delta Troop

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provided base security for A sector on the CAMP EAGLE perimeter. Delta Troop secured two downed aircraft in A SHAU VALLEY, reinforced a Ranger team in contact in A SHAU VALLEY, inserted and provided diversion for two Ranger platoon size ambushes in A SHAU VALLEY, conducted three days of ground reconnaissance in A SHAU VALLEY, twenty-nine days of base defense reaction force for CAMP EAGLE, and 5 sweeps of the EAGLE perimeter. After returning from KHE SANH on 2 April, Delta Troop began a week of stand-down training from 4-10 April. On 15 April the troop was inserted in the A SHAU VALLEY at coordinates YC451920. Delta Troops mission was to provide security and diversion for a Ranger Platoon stay behind ambush of Route 548. The troop also performed ground reconnaissance of 2 1/2 kilometers of Route 548. D Troop found signs of recent vehicular traffic on the road as well as six 6 x 8 ft. bunkers which faced the road. The troop was extracted late on the afternoon of the 15th at grid YC442938. On 20 April the troop was again inserted in the A SHAU VALLEY at grid YC456903. The mission of the troop was to insert a Ranger platoon stay behind ambush, provide a diversion for the Ranger platoons movement to their ambush sight and to make ground reconnaissance of the western side of the A SHAU VALLEY between YC456903 and YC457906. The troop found very few signs of recent activity. There were 5 trails in the area which had been used within 48 to 72 hours, but they revealed no clue as to what might have passed on them. A quantity of communication wire was found, but it had been previously cut in frequent intervals and showed no signs of repair. The troop was extracted from one ship PZ at YC457906. On 24 April the troop was once again inserted in the A SHAU VALLEY at YC484924 in response to a Ranger team in contact and two downed helicopters, one of which was a medivac. The troop was inserted north of the downed aircraft and moved south to make the pick up. Approximately 150 to 200 meters from the aircraft the lead element of the troop came under heavy RPG, small arms fire and Chicom grenades. The platoons maneuvered to react to the threat and to pick up survivors of the Ranger team. The contact on the 24th lasted approximately six hours and resulted in 5 friendly KIA, 14 WIA, one unknown enemy KIA by small arms fire, 11 enemy KIA by aircraft and an unknown number of enemy WIA. After the extraction of three US from the downed medivac helicopters, the troops withdrew approximately 400 meters north to establish an IDP, medivac wounded, and be reinforced by another company. The reinforcement was accomplished that night and in the morning the elements moved back to the contact point to attempt to extract the remaining US personnel. The NVA had withdrawn the majority of their forces during the night. The next morning fire was received from only one location. The enemy fire was eliminated but no NVA were found in the vicinity. The extraction of the troop was made at YC486914.

(5) Company L (Ranger), 75th Infantry.

(a) During the month of November a total of thirteen Ranger teams were deployed in the 101st Airborne Division (Ambl) Area of Operations. Emphasis was on reconnaissance around Fire Bases RIFORD and KATHRYN. Two enemy contacts were initiated. The contact initiated on 16 November by Ranger Team "Bills" provided the needed intelligence for establishing the location of the 1st Battalion, 803rd NVA Regiment. Due to inclement

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weather, Ranger teams were shifted from the RIFCORD/KATHERYN area to the RUONG RUONG VALLEY, to locate infiltration routes used by the NVA from LAOS into the lowlands of THUA THIEN Province. No significant sightings were observed.

(b) During the month of December, Ranger operations were hampered by poor weather conditions caused by the northeast monsoon. Company L deployed a total of ten operational teams. Six teams were deployed in the KHE SANH Plains and Vietnamese Salient regions, with the remaining four teams deployed in the general area along the eastern side of the A SHAU VALLEY. Deployment of operational teams to the KHE SANH and Vietnamese Salient area made it necessary for this company to locate a forward operating base at QUANG TRI, plus deploy a three man radio relay element at Signal Mountain to insure adequate communications with the operational elements. The only problem that arose was that of resupplying the forward operating base and the radio relay team.

(c) Poor weather conditions caused by the northeast monsoon continued to hamper Ranger operations during the month of January. Enemy sightings, however, increased during this period. Sightings occurred in the BACH MA, SPEAR VALLEY, and RUONG RUONG VALLEY regions. Rangers accomplished a false extraction in the SPEAR VALLEY, after the ranger team was compromised. Future false extractions are planned, to allow the ranger teams to continue their assigned mission.

(d) During the month of February, this unit deployed a total of seventeen Ranger teams. Poor weather hampered deployment until February 9th, at which time seven operational teams were deployed in the RUONG RUONG VALLEY region. The mission of the teams were to replace one US infantry battalion that deployed to the KHE SANH region. Emphasis during this time was placed on ambush techniques. Two minor enemy contacts were initiated during this period. After being relieved by a US infantry unit from the RUONG RUONG VALLEY region, Ranger teams began operating south and west of abandoned Fire Base RIFCORD, the remainder of the month. Emphasis was placed on reconnaissance of roads and trails through the area. Four enemy contacts were initiated in that region.

(e) During the month of March, this unit deployed a total of twenty-one Ranger teams. Initially continuing to concentrate on reconnaissance of the area surrounding abandoned Fire Base RIFCORD, this unit shifted to the mission of monitoring and ambushing along Route 547 from Fire Base RENDEZVOUS to Fire Base BIAZE and along Route 548 in the A SHAU VALLEY floor. Six contacts were initiated in these areas resulting in eight NVA KIA and two NVA POW. The information passed on by these POWs resulted in large troop movements by the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (Ambl) to counter a serious enemy threat to their fire bases. At the request of 2nd Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (Ambl), three Ranger teams were deployed to the SPEAR VALLEY area to determine similar enemy concentrations in their AO.

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(f) During the month of April, the Rangers deployed a total of twenty-nine Ranger teams. From 1 April to 10 April, eight Ranger teams were employed in the SPEAR VALLEY region with the mission of reconnaissance. One minor enemy contact was initiated. From 10-23 April emphasis was placed on the A SHAU VALLEY region in the form of platoon and company raids to include platoon size stay-behind ambushes. During the company raid Route 548 was interdicted by blowing a well-used bridge.

## n. Artillery.

(1) The 101st Airborne Division Artillery (Ambl) provided close and continuous fire support to division maneuver units participating in Operations JEFFERSON GLEN/MONSOON PLAN 70, LAMSON 719, and LAMSON 720. The 2nd Battalion (Ambl), 319th Artillery (105mm) provided direct support to the 3rd Brigade; the 2nd Battalion (Ambl), 320th Artillery (105mm) provided direct support to the 1st Brigade; the 1st Battalion (Ambl) 321st Artillery (105mm) provided direct support to the 2nd Brigade. In addition, the 2nd Battalion (Ambl), 11th Artillery (155mm) and the 4th Battalion (Aerial Artillery), 77th Artillery provided general support to the division.

(2) During the months of November and December, Division Artillery units were positioned to support the JEFFERSON GLEN/MONSOON PLAN 70. The majority of the fire bases were accessible by road which insured an adequate stockage of ammunition regardless of the weather. During November one unit move was conducted. One raid was conducted by moving to a forward fire base, expending on predetermined targets and extracting before dark. A total of 82,049 artillery rounds and 10,910 aerial artillery rockets were expended during the month of November. In November the 4 millionth round was fired supporting division forces since their arrival in Vietnam. During December two artillery raids were conducted and 93,965 artillery rounds and 13,145 rockets were expended.

(3) During January flying conditions improved and maneuver units operated deeper into the jungle canopy. To support these operations six artillery units were repositioned and 85,221 artillery rounds and 21,260 rockets were expended.

(4) During February and March the Division Artillery supported all phases of Operation LAMSON 719 while continuing to support Operation JEFFERSON GLEN/MONSOON PLAN 70. In addition, the Division Artillery was responsible for fire support coordination in the defense of KHE SANH and WANDERPRIFT areas. The Division Artillery established a forward operations center at CAMP ROBERTS, QUANG TRI; an Air Warning Control Center at DONG BA Combat Base to assume the posting of artillery and air strike warning data for Eastern QUANG TRI Province, and Battery A, 4th Battalion (APA), 77th Artillery established a forward location at KHE SANH. On 6 February 1971 the 2nd Battalion, 320th Artillery deployed a headquarters element to a position near the eastern DMZ area. An artillery battalion radio net was established as part of a deception operation. The element re-

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deployed to CAMP EAGLE on 13 February. On 25 February the 2nd Battalion, 319th Artillery deployed to QUANG TRI Province to provide direct support to the 3rd Brigade. In addition, Battery C (-), 2nd Battalion, 11th Artillery was placed OPCON to 2nd Battalion, 319th Artillery to provide 155mm artillery support. On 3 March the Division Artillery assumed operational control of the 5th Infantry Division (Mech); the 6th Battalion (-), 11th Artillery (two 105mm howitzer batteries), direct support artillery for the 11th Brigade, 23rd Infantry Division; and the 1st Battalion, 82nd Artillery (155mm), 23rd Division, general support artillery. Division Artillery units made seventeen moves during February and expended 104,716 artillery rounds. A total of fifteen unit moves were completed during March and 118,386 artillery rounds were expended in support of division maneuver units.

(5) The 4th Battalion (ARA), 77th Artillery provided extensive support to ARVN forces participating in LAMSON 719 while continuing to support all 101st Airborne Division (Ambl) operations. During the months of February and March the unit flew 7,365 sorties, expended 69,975 rockets and were credited with 1,147 enemy KIA. The vast majority of the expenditures and enemy KIA's were as a result of direct support to ARVN forces operating in LAOS.

(6) On 7 April the 6th Battalion (-), 11th Artillery and 1st Battalion, 82nd Artillery were released from their OPCON status and re-deployed to the 101st Airborne Division (Ambl) area. The 5th Battalion, 4th Artillery returned to its parent organization on 8 April and at that time assumed responsibility for artillery fires in QUANG TRI Province. All 101st Airborne Division Artillery elements departed QUANG TRI Province and were repositioned in the division area of operations by 10 April. During the remainder of the month Division Artillery forces supported operation LAMSON 720 and continued to support operation JEFFERSON GIEN/MONSOON PLAN 70. During April, twenty-six artillery moves were completed and 105,756 artillery rounds and 21,837 rockets were expended.

(7) During the entire period the 1st Battalion, 83rd Artillery, 108th Artillery Group provided the division with 8 inch howitzer and 175mm gun artillery support. The battalion had a mission of general support - reinforcing the 101st Airborne Division Artillery.

(8) Division Artillery units were repositioned during the reporting period as listed below:

<u>DATE</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>FROM</u>	<u>TO</u>
10 Nov	A/2-320	Veghel	Birmingham
4 Jan	D/2-320	Eagle	Birmingham
4 Jan	B/2-320	Birmingham	Eagle
8 Jan	A/2-319	Rakkasan	Evans
8 Jan	C/2-319	Evans	Rakkasan
28 Jan	B/2-320	Eagle	Veghel
30 Jan	B/2-11	Veghel	Zon
4 Feb	B(-)/2-11	Zon	Veghel

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<u>DATE</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>FROM</u>	<u>TO</u>
8 Feb	B(-)/2-11	Veghel	Bastogne
8 Feb	C(-)/2-11	Brick	Arsenal
10 Feb	B(-)/2-11	Bastogne	Anzio
11 Feb	B(-)/2-11	Bastogne	Zon
12 Feb	A/2-320	Birmingham	Rendezvous
16 Feb	C(-)/2-11	Brick	Arsenal
22 Feb	A/2-320	Rendezvous	Normandy
23 Feb	B(-)/2-11	Zon	Normandy
24 Feb	B/2-320	Veghel	Eagle
25 Feb	A/2-319	Evans	Mai Loc
25 Feb	B(-)/2-11	Anzio	Bastogne
26 Feb	B/2-320	Eagle	Jack
26 Feb	B/2-319	Jack	Evans
27 Feb	B/2-319	Evans	A-2
28 Feb	C(-)/2-11	Eagle	Mai Loc
28 Feb	C(-)/2-11	Brick	Eagle
1 Mar	C/2-319	Rakkasan	Carroll
1 Mar	C(-)/1-321	Los Banos	Phu Bai
2 Mar	D/2-320	Birmingham	Rakkasan
2 Mar	C(-)/1-321	Phu Bai	Eagle
4 Mar	C(-)/2-11	Tomahawk	Brick
4 Mar	B/2-319	A-2	Anne
16 Mar	A/2-319	Mai Loc	XD742441
18 Mar	A(-)/2-320	Normandy	Spear
19 Mar	A/2-319	XD742441	Mai Loc
20 Mar	A(-)/2-11	Rakkasan	Evans
21 Mar	B(-)/2-11	Bastogne	Kathryn
22 Mar	A/2-319	Mai Loc	Sarge
23 Mar	A(-)/2-320	Spear	Normandy
24 Mar	A/1-321	Arsenal	Eagle
27 Mar	A(-)/1-321	Eagle	Blitz
1 Apr	A(-)/2-11	Evans	Bastogne
2 Apr	A(-)/1-321	Blitz	Spear
3 Apr	A(-)/1-321	Eagle	Spear
8 Apr	D/2-320	Rakkasan	Eagle
8 Apr	B/2-319	Anne	Rakkasan
8 Apr	B/2-320	Evans	Jack
8 Apr	C/2-319	Carroll	Evans
9 Apr	D/2-320	Eagle	Bastogne
9 Apr	A/2-319	Sarge	Evans
9 Apr	A/1-321	Spear	Phu Bai
10 Apr	C(-)/2-11	Mai Loc	Bastogne
10 Apr	A(-)/2-11	Bastogne	Evans
11 Apr	A/2-319	Evans	Gladiator
11 Apr	B(-)/2-11	Normandy	Kathryn

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<u>DATE</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>FROM</u>	<u>TO</u>
12 Apr	A/1-321	Phu Bai	Tomahawk
12 Apr	C/1-321	Tomahawk	Phu Bai
12 Apr	C/2-320	Eagle	Birmingham
13 Apr	A/2-320	Normandy	Eagle
14 Apr	C(-)/2-320	Birmingham	Fury
16 Apr	C/2-320	Fury	Birmingham
17 Apr	C/2-11	Brick	Normandy
23 Apr	A(-)/2-11	Evans	Gladiator
26 Apr	A(-)/2-11	Rakkasan	Evans
27 Apr	B/2-11	Kathryn	Maureen
28 Apr	A(-)/1-321	Tomahawk	Lang Co
30 Apr	A/2-320	Eagle	Beach

(9) In addition to the tactical moves listed above, the Division Artillery conducted six artillery raids during the period to exploit current intelligence. The raids were conducted by moving to a forward fire base, expending on predetermined targets and extracting before dark. Raids were conducted as indicated below:

<u>DATE</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>FROM</u>	<u>TO</u>
20 Nov	D/2-320	Eagle	Veghel
12 Dec	D/2-320	Eagle	Pistol
19 Dec	A/2-320	Birmingham	Maureen
16 Jan	B/2-11	Bastogne	Normandy
29 Jan	B/2-11	Bastogne	Blaze
25 Mar	D/2-32-	Rakkasan	Gladiator

(10) Cannon Artillery Ammunition Expenditures:

November	82,049
December	93,965
January	85,221
February	104,716
March	118,386
April	<u>105,757</u>
TOTAL	590,094

(11) Aerial Rocket Artillery Expenditures:

	<u>Sorties</u>	<u>Rockets Expended</u>
November	2,188	10,910
December	2,215	13,145
January	3,044	21,260
February	3,756	35,364