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HEADQUARTERS 101ST AIRBORNE DIVISION (AIRMOBILE)
Office of the Chief of Staff
APO 96383

AVDG-CS

24 May 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division
(Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS: CSPOR-65 (R3) (U)

Commanding General
XXIV Corps
ATTN: AVII-GCT
APO 96349

(U) The inclosed Operation Report - Lessons Learned is forwarded in compliance with USARV Supplemental 1 to AR 525-15 and XXIV Corps Regulation 525-2.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Colonel, CS
Chief of Staff

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1. Operations Narrative/Significant Activities

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1. (C) Operational Report

a. Operations.

(1) During the reporting period, the Division continued close coordination and cooperation with the 1st Infantry Division (ARVN) and KHUA THIEN Province and District officials. This close coordination has contributed greatly to the progress of Vietnamization. During this period, numerous combined operations were conducted with the ARVN. The largest operation combining ARVN, division and nondivisional assets was LAMSON 719 in QUANG TRI Province and LAOS. JEFFERSON GLEN/MONSOON PLAN 70 operations continued throughout the reporting period.

(2) The primary objective of JEFFERSON GLEN/MONSOON PLAN 70 is to provide a protective shield for the populated lowlands of KHUA THIEN Province, to locate and destroy enemy forces, staging areas and forward cache sites, to protect vital lines of communications and to assist CVN officials to meet their pacification and development goals for 1970. The operation continues the concept of a complete integration of efforts of all agencies within the division area of operation to improve territorial security, protect the people against terrorism, improve the Peoples Self Defense Force (PSDF), develop local self management in administrative, economic and financial affairs, develop a greater national unity, improve the life of war victims, establish an informatics system to educate and motivate the people to participate in local development, and continue to build toward prosperity for all.

(3) To accomplish this mission during the northeast monsoon season, division units were repositioned in the piedmont and eastern mountain regions from their dry season dispositions deep in the canopied areas to the west. This repositioning permitted resupply operations by road which were necessary during extended periods of inclement weather. The division carried operations back into the canopy, conducting artillery raids and search and attack operations, as weather conditions improved beginning in January.

(4) Enemy losses inflicted by the division during Operation JEFFERSON GLEN/MONSOON PLAN 70 as of 30 April 1971:

Killed in Action (confirmed)	888
Detainees	41
Prisoners of War	38
Retainees	2
Individual Weapons Captured	434
Individual Weapons Destroyed	9
Crew Served Weapons Captured	33
Crew Served Weapons Destroyed	43

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(5) Division Task Organization for the end of the reporting period
for Operation JEFFERSON GLEN/MONSOON PLAN 70 Frago 41 (LANSOM 720
continuing).

1st Bde

1st Bn (Adbl), 327th Inf
2nd Bn (Adbl), 502nd Inf
2nd Bn (Adbl), 320th Arty (DS)
Co A, 326th Engr Bn (DS)
42nd Inf Plat (Set Dog) (DS)
1/265th RRC
TACP 20 TASS (USAF)
1st PSSE (DS)
FSE/A/501st Sig Bn (Adbl) (DS)
1/101st MP Co (Adbl)
TM 101st MI Co (Div) (DS)

2nd Bde

2nd Bn (Adbl), 501st Inf
1st Bn (Adbl), 501st Inf
3rd Bn (Adbl), 506th Inf
1st Bn (Adbl), 502nd Inf
Co C, 326th Engr Bn (DS)
47th Inf Plat (Set Dog) (DS)
2TM, 101st MI Co (Div) (DS)
1/265th RRC
TACP 20 TASS (USAF)
FSE/A/501st Sig Bn (Adbl) (DS)
2nd PSSE (DS)
2/101st MP Co (Adbl)
34th PI Det (Field Service)
CP & Weather TM, 5th Weather TM
4 TMs, 4th PSYOP Det (DS)
1st Bn (Adbl), 321st Arty (DS)

3rd Bde

1st Bn (Adbl), 506th Inf
2nd Bn (Adbl), 506th Inf
3rd Bn (Adbl), 187th Inf
2nd Bn (Adbl), 327th Inf
2nd Bn (Adbl), 319th Arty (DS)
Co B, 326th Engr Bn (DS)
58th Inf Plat (Set Dog) (DS)
TM, 101st MI Co (Div) (DS)
3/265th RRC

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TACP 20 TASS (USAF)
FSE/A/501st Sig Bn (Ambl) (DS)
3rd FSSE (DS)
3/101st MP Co (Ambl)
25th FI Bdt (Field Service)
CB1 Weather TM, 5th Weather TM
2 TMs, 4th PSIGS Det (DS)

101st Div Arty (Ambl)

HQB (Ambl)
2nd Bn (Ambl), 11th Arz
4th Bn (Aerial Arty), 77th Arty
Btry A (Avn), 377th Arty (Ambl)
266th FA Det (Surv Radar)

101st Avn Gp (CJT) (Ambl)

101st Avn Bn (AH) (Ambl)
158th Avn Bn (AH) (Ambl)
159th Avn Bn (ASH) (Ambl)
163rd Avn Co (CS) (Ambl)

101st Div Spt Cwd (Ambl)

HHC & Band (Ambl)
5th Trans Bn (Ambl)
326th Med Bn (Ambl)
426th S&S Bn (Ambl)
801st Maint Bn (Ambl)
101st Admin Co (Ambl)

Division Troops

501st Sig Bn
326th Engr Bn
2nd Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav
101st MP Co
101st MI Co

(6) LAMSON 719

(a) Operation LAMSON 719 was initiated on 30 January 1971 as a PRAGO
of JEFFERSON GLEN/MONSOON PLAN 70. The mission of the division was

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to continue JEFFERSON GLEN and provide support to the combined XXIV Corps/I Corps Operation LAMSON 719 in western QUANG TRI Province.

(b) The concept of the operation called for the 1st Bde, 5th Infantry Division (Mech) with one battalion from the 101st Airborne Division (Amb) OPCON to attack to clear and secure Route 9 to the LAOTIAN border; secure Fire Bases VANDERGRIFT and KHE SANH; and to cover and protect the deployment of US artillery to western QUANG TRI. On order, the 1st Bde, 101st Airborne Division (Amb) was to assume OPCON Task Force 1-61 from 1st Bde 5th Infantry (Mech) and conduct a coordinated defense of the central and eastern DMZ. An engineer Task Force was placed OPCON to the 45th Engineer Group for the initial combat engineer work in opening QL-9 and construction of the assault air strip at KHE SANH. Engineer elements from the 101st were to release engineer equipment on order to ARVN engineer units once the air strip at KHE SANH was completed. The ARVN objective of LAMSON 719 was to attack into IACS toward the NVA Base Area 604 to inflict maximum damage to enemy forces and supplies along the eastern HO CHI MINH TRAIL.

(c) The 101st Airborne Division (Amb) provided an infantry battalion to the 1st Bde, 5th Infantry Division (Mech) in QUANG TRI at the onset of the operation. In addition, the division assumed the operational and security responsibilities of units of the 1st Infantry Division (ARVN) in THUA THIEN and QUANG TRI Provinces, thus permitting their deployment into IACS. The Division opened Route 547 into the A SHAU VALLEY and conducted artillery raids as a diversion during Phase I of the operation. The 3rd Bde and four infantry battalions deployed to QUANG TRI Province. In March the 101st Airborne Division (Amb) assumed operational control of all United States Army tactical units in QUANG TRI and THUA THIEN Provinces and lines of communication supporting LAMSON 719. The Division's assets and resources were the reservoir from which LAMSON 719 was supported. The division closed KHE SANH and secured the movement out of western QUANG TRI of RVNAF and US units during the closing stages of the operation.

(d) LAMSON 719 proved to be a successful allied operation both in terms of achieving its objectives, and in demonstrating the ability of ARVN to conduct large scale operations. Direct assessment of destruction and damage produced by the 101st Airborne Division (Amb) across the VIETNAMESE/LAOTIAN border was limited to that attained by aerial observation. Most of the results were gathered by the ARVN and reported to I Corps.

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(e) The following are confirmed US totals for QUANG TRI Province in support of LAMSON 719 (30 Jan - 7 Apr)

Enemy Personnel

	<u>Killed</u>	<u>PW</u>
1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Msch)	78	1
11th Bde, 23rd Inf Div	120	0
101st Abn Div (Ambl)	<u>122</u>	<u>1</u>
TOTAL	350	6

Equipment Destroyed or Captured

	<u>TV</u>	<u>CSW</u>	<u>Mortar or Rocket PDS</u>	<u>Engines</u>
1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Msch)	39	14	134	184
11th Bde, 23rd Inf Div	25	6	65	55
101st Abn Div (Ambl)	<u>94</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>126</u>	<u>209</u>
TOTAL	158	26	325	448

(f) Total killed by Helicopter (confirmed) for LAMSON 719.

2-17th Cav, 101st Abn Div (Ambl)	634
4-77th Arty, 101st Abn Div (Ambl)	1163
101st Avn Co, 101st Abn Div (Ambl)	137

(g) Maneuver units and aviation assets arranged under parent organizations that participated in LAMSON 719.

101st Abn Div (Ambl)

HHC (-) 101st Abn Div (Ambl)
 HHC 3rd Bde
 1st Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf
 2nd Bn (Ambl), 502nd Inf
 1st Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf (-C & D Co)
 2nd Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf
 3rd Bn (Ambl), 187th Inf
 2nd Bn (Ambl), 319th Arty
 2nd Bn (Ambl), 11th Arty
 4th Bn (Aerial Arty), 77th Arty (Ambl)
 Co E, 326th Engr Bn (Ambl)
 2nd Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav
 101st Avn Co

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101st Avn Bn (AH) (Ambl)
158th Avn Bn (AH) (Ambl)
159th Avn Bn (ASH) (Ambl)
571st Med (67th Med GP)
463rd Sqdn (CH-53 III M&F)

1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech)

1st Bn, 11th Inf (Mech)
1st Bn, 77th Armd
3rd Sqdn, 5th Cav
5th Bn, 4th Arty
Co A, 7th Engr
1st Bn, 61st Inf (Mech)

2nd Inf Div

HHC, 11th Bde
2nd Bn, 1st Inf (Mech)
4th Bn, 3rd Inf (Mech)
6th Bn, 11th Arty
Btry C, 1st Bn, 82nd Arty
Btry A, 3rd Bn, 82nd Arty
Co C, 26th Engr Bn
14th Avn Co (AH)
71st Avn Co (AH)
174th Avn Co (AH)
Trp F, 8th Cav
Trp H, 17th Cav
132nd (ASH) Co

1st Avn Bde (SEARV)

Trp B, 7th Sqdn, 1st Cav
Trp C, 7th Sqdn, 17th Cav
223rd Avn Bn EHC
172nd Avn Co
48th Avn Co
179th Avn Co
235th Avn Co (Aerial Wpn)

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1st Cav Div (Aml)

Co D (Aerial Wpu), 227th Avn Bn

(7) LAMSON 720.

(a) On 14 April 1971 the 101st Airborne Division (Aml) initiated Operation LAMSON 720 under FRAGO 41 to JEFFERSON GLEN/MONSCON PLAN 70. The order called for a combined airmobile operation with the 1st Infantry Division (ARVN) (Reinf) conducting operations into the DA ERONG/A SEAU VALLEY areas to destroy enemy supply bases in forward logistical areas. The operation called for the 1st Bde, 101st Airborne Division (Aml) to conduct airmobile assaults into the DA ERONG River/A SEAU VALLEY area, utilizing the airmobile raid and fire support shelf technique, to destroy enemy supplies in enemy Base Area 129. The 3rd Bde employed similar techniques to achieve their objectives and destroy cache sites.

(b) Enemy losses inflicted by the division during Operation LAMSON 720 (14 April 1971 - continuing).

Killed in Action	130
Detainees	0
Prisoners of War	0
Individual Weapons Captured	6
Individual Weapons Destroyed	1
Crew Served Weapons Captured	1
Crew Served Weapons Destroyed	5

(8) G3 Air Activities. During the period Nov 70 - Apr 71 the following air assets were expended in support of the 101st Airborne Division (Aml):

(a) PAC Directed Air Strikes (in sorties):	NOV	32
	DEC	139
	JAN	206
	FEB	181
	MAR	279
	APR	957
	TOTAL	1794

(b) Combat Skyspots/Beacons (in sorties):	NOV	391
	DEC	476
	JAN	285
	FEB	250
	MAR	357
	APR	358
	TOTAL	2127

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(c) USAF Gunships (in sorties):	NOV	00
	DEC	00
	JAN	00
	FEB	02
	MAR	00
	APR	<u>12</u>
	TOTAL	14

(d) USMC Fleaships (in sorties):	NOV	00
	DEC	00
	JAN	00
	FEB	00
	MAR	00
	APR	<u>02</u>
TOTAL	02	

(e) Ordnance Expended:

MONTH	HE (TONS)	NA PALM (TONS)	20mm Cannon (rds)	CHEMICAL AGENT (lbs)
NOV	1068.75	1.75	1600	0.0
DEC	1386.13	21.00	17670	- 0.0
JAN	1152.75	9.50	18310	3500.0
FEB	1019.00	4.00	12490	0.0
MAR	1592.25	36.00	56670	1400.0
APR	<u>2533.75</u>	<u>161.00</u>	<u>70788</u>	<u>9600.0</u>
TOTAL	8752.63	213.25	179528	14500.0

	7.62mm (rds)	CBU Canisters	Air-ground Rockets
NOV	00	008	000
DEC	00	011	000
JAN	5900	044	033
FEB	2400	000	040
MAR	7600	012	069
APR	<u>6300</u>	<u>200</u>	<u>000</u>
TOTAL	22200	273	142

(f) ARC LIGHT Strikes in the 101st Airborne Division (Abl) A.O.:

NOV	00
DEC	00
JAN	02
FEB	00
MAR	01
APR	<u>23</u>
TOTAL	26

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(g) Cumulative friendly casualties from 1 November 1970 to 30 April 1971.

UNIT	KIA	WIA	MIA	WED	NBI	TOTALS
HHC/DIV	0	0	0	0	0	0
HHC/1RDE	2	0	0	0	1	12
HHC/2RDE	1	3	0	0	0	4
HHC/3RDE	4	10	0	0	6	20
3/187 INF	19	118	0	5	15	158
1/327 INF	5	13	0	15	26	59
2/327 INF	6	41	0	2	40	89
1/501 INF	16	91	0	4	21	132
2/501 INF	12	94	3	2	23	134
1/502 INF	7	44	0	1	20	72
2/502 INF	5	41	0	3	25	75
1/506 INF	5	57	0	4	24	90
2/506 INF	11	65	0	6	17	99
3/506 INF	6	33	0	0	28	67
DIV ARTY	5	37	0	4	19	65
101 AVN GP	22	62	13	8	29	134
SPT COMD	10	25	0	4	11	50
2/17 CAV	17	85	10	8	11	131
1/75 RANGERS	9	20	2	3	4	38
326 ENGR	3	10	0	1	18	32
501 SIG	0	0	0	0	2	2
101 MP	0	0	0	1	1	2
TOTAL	165	858	28	71	343	1465

As Of 30 April 1971

b. Training.

(1) Training for divisional and non-divisional personnel continued at the Screaming Eagle Replacement Training School (SERTS). Five courses of instruction were conducted, to include:

(a) Replacement training for all new in-country personnel assigned to division except for enlisted personnel in the grade E-9 and officers in the grade of O-4 and above.

(b) Combat Commanders Course (CCC) for all company grade and combat support officers assigned to the division. The POI familiarizes the student with concepts and tactics used in the division.

(c) Combat Leaders Course for junior noncommissioned officers and potential noncommissioned officers. The POI includes instruction in selected general subjects, as well as weapons, tactics, and fire support.

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(d) Luec Luong 66 Program. This course trains scouts to work with infantry units within the division. A US trooper is selected as the scout's "Buddy" and trains with the scout, assisting him to learn the duties of a scout.

(e) Advanced Marksmanship Program. Selected personnel from infantry battalions are pretrained in advanced marksmanship procedures with the M-16 Rifle.

(f) Sniper School. This is an eighteen day course designed to provide commanders with highly skilled marksmen. Personnel train with the M-21 weapon system to make kills consistently at ranges up to 900 meters during daylight hours and 400 meters during the hours of darkness.

(2) On 27 March 1971 the division discontinued replacement training for infusion personnel. This action was taken because in-country transfer personnel are generally familiar with airmobile operations and have already received mandatory, in-country training.

(3) Battalion refresher training continued with very few changes. The battalions modified their lesson plans in appropriate subject areas to cover problems that might be experienced during the southwest monsoon dry season. In addition, emphasis was placed on training in the following areas: mines and booby traps, field hygiene, small unit tactics, equipment maintenance, and prevention of heat injuries.

(4) Training assistance to RVNAF has now been reduced to one mobile training team. This MTT, composed of men of the Screaming Eagle Band, offers training assistance in music to the THUA THIEM Sector and 1st ARVN Division Bands on a twice-a-week basis.

c. Chemical. During the period 1 November 1970 through 30 April 1971 the Division Chemical Section with the 10th Chemical Platoon (DG) and the 20th Chemical Detachment (under its operational control) continued to provide combat and combat service support to the units of the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile).

During the reporting period chemical personnel performed the following missions in support of LAMSON 719, LAMSON 720, and other operations:

<u>TYPE MISSION</u>	<u>MISSIONS</u>	<u>SERIES</u>	<u>AMOUNT</u>
Airborne Personnel Detector (sniffer)	54	54	122 source locations
FMS Slurry, Retroreflective	3	6	260 gallons
Flame Drop	153	716	6268 55-gallon drums (112 secondary explosions)
Bulk CS2 (Persistent)	6	16	448 drums
	5	8	24 BLU-52 A/B Bombs

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<u>TYPE MISSION</u>	<u>MISSIONS</u>	<u>SCORTIES</u>	<u>AMOUNT</u>
Bunker Seeding Operations	5	NA	85 JETPOs
Tactical CS (Non-persistent)	22	25	243 E-158 Canisters
Defoliation:			
Herbicide, Agent Blue	3	4	300 gallons Agent Blue
E-8 CS Lchr Issued	NA	NA	68
Teams Inspect/Install	57	NA	806/23
Fougasse Issued	NA	NA	586 Drums
Teams Inspect/Install	40	NA	1673/231
Hush Flares Inspect/Install	16	NA	586/127
Maintenance Teams	72	NA	NA
Protective Masks Inspected	NA	NA	8821 Masks
Repair/Evac	NA	NA	1822/815 Masks
PTIs Inspect/Evac	5	EA	13/12 Flame throwers

New Techniques. Padding for Flame Nets. Flame drops are conducted by releasing 55-gallon drums of 4% thickened fuel from cargo nets slung beneath CH-47 helicopters. The metal clasps and rings of the cargo net are padded with fibre padding and tape to prevent aircraft skin damage when one end of the net is released. During LAMSON 719 the large number of flame drop missions created a shortage of fibre padding and tape due to deterioration after successive drops. In order to continue flame drop missions a technique was developed in which sections of rubber inner tubes were wrapped around the fibre padding and tied in place with rubber laces, also cut from inner tubes. This produced a more effective and permanent padding since the rubber covering is more durable and flexible than the tape, which tore easily.

d. Intelligence.

(1) Enemy Situation.

(a) At the beginning of the reporting period, enemy units were located as follows:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
HQ MRTTH	BA 611
4th Regt HQ	YC9781
K4B Inf Bn	ZC1897
K4C Inf Bn	ZC0193
5th Regt HQ	YC6382
804th Inf Bn	YC9398
810th Inf Bn	YD5715
K32 Rkt Arty Bn	YC7294
Chi Thua I Sapper Bn	YC8195

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
Ch1 Team II Sapper Bn	YD0004
439th Inf Bn	YD0009
6th Regt HQ	YD0018
800th Inf Bn	YD0015
802nd Inf Bn	YD0019
806th Inf Bn	YD0024
K35 Rkt Arty Bn	YD0020
K12 Sapper Bn	YD0018
7th Front	YD0130
808th Inf Bn	YD0339
814th Inf Bn	YD0840
K34 Rkt Arty Bn	YD0630
K10 Sapper Bn	YD0534
K11 Sapper Bn	YD0576
K12 Trans Bn	YD1027
1243 Div HQ	YD0717
803rd Regt HQ	YD0415
1st Inf Bn	YD0214
2nd Inf Bn	YD0402
3rd Inf Bn	YD0310
U/I Trans Bn	YD0914
812th Regt HQ	YD0025
4th Inf Bn	YD0834
5th Inf Bn	YD0421
6th Inf Bn	YD0730
K19 Sapper Bn/304th Div	YD0520
29th Regt HQ	YD0317
7th Inf Bn	YD0823
8th Inf Bn	YD0018
9th Inf Bn	YD0319
675th Arty Regt	EA 011
K3 Sapper Bn	YD0613
11A Recon Bn	YD0298
HQ B5 Front	YD0002
12th AT Bn	DMS
13th Arty Bn	DMS
14th AA Bn	DMS
15th Engr Bn	Unlocated
16th Sig Bn	DMS
17th Trans Bn	DMS
19th Med Bn	DMS
33rd Sapper Bn	YD0339
75th AA Bn (12.7 mm)	YD0561

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UNIT	LOCATION
304th Div HQ	Unlocated
FZ 304th Div	XD9222
29th Sapper Bn	YD1010
9th Inf Regt HQ	YD0985
1st Inf Bn	YD0925
2nd Inf Bn	YD1731
3rd Inf Bn	YD2938
24B Inf Regt	Unlocated
66th Inf Regt HQ	XD9533
7th Inf Bn	XD9836
8th Inf Bn	YD2637
9th Inf Bn	YD0530
320th Div HQ	Unlocated
48th Inf Regt	Unlocated
52nd Inf Regt	Unlocated
64th Inf Regt	Unlocated
308th Div HQ	Unlocated
36th Inf Regt	Unlocated
68th Inf Regt	Unlocated
102nd Inf Regt	Unlocated
27th Inf Regt (Indep)	XD9254
1st Inf Bn	YD0563
2nd Inf Bn	XD9255
3rd Inf Bn	YD0459
31st Local Force Gp	YD1185
27th Inf Bn	YD1144
138th Inf Regt (Indep)	Unlocated
246th Inf Regt (Indep) HQ	XD9269
1st Inf Bn	XD6783
2nd Inf Bn	XD8336
3rd Inf Bn	XD9461
270th Inf Regt (Indep)	YD1236
126th Naval Sapper Regt	YD2189
84th Rkt Arty Regt	XD9269
164th Arty Regt	XD6624
2nd Arty Bn	YD0755
240th Arty Regt	Unlocated

(b) November 1970.

1 MRTTH. During November, activity by MRTTH units was generally at a lower level than previous months. The 4th Regt directed attacks against the HUE-DA NANG RR, traffic on QL-1, and bridges in THE LOC (D), their traditional AO. The 5th Regt activity was concentrated primarily in the Fire Base BRICK (YC335994) and Fire Base KATHLYN (YD476111) areas.

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(Aircraft), Period ending 30 April 1971, RGS CSF W-65 (R3) (U)

The 6th Regt operations consisted mostly of attacks by fire in the vicinity of Camp Evans. The 7th Front was the one MRTH unit which was responsible for a higher level of activity in November than the previous month. Contacts were made with elements of the 804th Inf Bn, 808th Inf Bn, and the K10 Sapper Bn of the 7th Front as they were conducting the moonson campaign at HAI LANG (D) and HANG HUNG (D). The 324B Division continued its logistical and security role in western QUANG TRI (P) and THUA THIEN (P), its traditional AO.

2 B5 Front. Activity in the B5 Front was light during November. Activity was characterized by attacks by fire, mining incidents, and ground contacts with small size enemy forces, primarily in the eastern and central DMZ areas. Activity in the western QUANG TRI area was limited to sensor indications and bunker and trail activity. The most significant incidents occurred in the eastern and central DMZ areas. On 8 November at XD9985, 3/3/2 ARVN received 105 x 82mm mortar rounds resulting in one KIA and one WIA. Of the 14 attacks by fire in the central DMZ area, Fire Base TAN LAM BAC (YD019593) received seven.

3 VC/VC1. The number of VC/VC1 incidents increased from 19 in October to 28 in November. Of the total incidents, 61 percent were acts of terrorism and 32 percent were rice/tax collections. A significant increase was noted in kidnapping and sabotage incidents; however, propaganda incidents decreased from October's total. The significant increase in activity in November can be attributed to the efforts of the 4th Regt in support of VC/VC1 units in and around PHU LOC (D). The PHU LC Special Action Unit (PLSAU) in conjunction with the 804th Bn/5th Regt, increased activity in PHU LOC (D) to its highest level since the 101st Airborne Division began operating in THUA THIEN (P).

(c) December 1970.

1 MRTH. OB analysis indicated that the 4th Regt disbanded the K4C Bn and used those personnel to reinforce the K4B Bn. The 5th Regt continued its relatively low level of activity in the Fire Base ERICK (YCS35994) and Fire Base KATHRYN (YD476111) areas. Elements of the 6th Regt continued to infiltrate PHONG DIEN (D) to conduct harassment of Allied installations. A rallier from the Medical Section of MRTH stated that the K11 Sapper Bn/7th Front had been disbanded and its personnel assigned to the K10 Sapper Bn/7th Front. The 324B Division continued to provide logistical support throughout the month.

2 B5 Front. Activity in the B5 Front was light during December. Activity was characterized by attacks by fire occurring primarily in the eastern DMZ area and ground contacts with small size enemy forces. Mining incidents were concentrated primarily in the central DMZ area.

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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RGS CSSR-65 (R3) (U)

The most significant incidents were in the eastern DMZ area where, on 16 December at YD1875, 1/4/2 ARVN contacted an unknown size and received 150 rounds of 81mm and 60mm mortar fire; on 27 December Popular Force Units 95, 98, 100, 164, and 170, with assistance from 3-17th Cav, engaged an enemy platoon with SAF resulting in 17 NVA KIA and one NVA PW from the 126 Naval Sapper Regt.

2 VC/VCI. The number of VC/VCI related incidents increased from 28 in November to 38 in December. Of the total incidents, 64 percent were terror oriented; and 29 percent were rice/tax collections and propaganda incidents. MHU LOC (D) again maintained its high level of VC/VCI activity with 47 percent of the total incidents. VC/VCI activity also increased in PHONG DIEN and HUONG TRÁ Districts. The month of December gave indications of efforts by the enemy to increase his activity in the lowlands.

(d) January 1971.

1 MRTTH. During January the 4th Regt failed to mount any coordinated attacks against US/ARVN installations. The 5th Regt continued to be active in the Fire Base BRICK (YC835994) vicinity and was using the area between Fire Base BRICK (YC835994) and Fire Base LA SON (YD931068) to infiltrate into the lowlands. The 6th Regt continued its harassment of of PHONG DIEN (D) and the CAMP EVANS area, working closely with the local VC in these areas. Activity in the 7th Front decreased sharply with all reported incidents being BBTs. Reports indicated that the 803rd and 29th Regts/324B Division were assuming logistical support and security roles for base areas, cache sites, and infiltration routes in the A SNAU VALLEY and eastern Base Area 611 areas.

2 B5 Front. Activity in the B5 Front during January increased considerably over that reported in December as witnessed by attacks by fire, mining incidents, and ground contacts. These occurred primarily in the eastern and central DMZ area. Activity in western QUANG TRI was limited primarily to that detected by ground sensors and visual reconnaissance. The most significant incidents occurred in the western DMZ area, where on 2 January at YD253807, the 2-11th Cav and the 1/3/2 ARVN received three 122mm rockets, three 105mm arty rounds, and 694 x 82mm mortar rounds resulting in seven WIA. In addition, on 2 January at YD246774, a recon team from 1/3/2 ARVN received 130 x 82mm mortar rounds but suffered no casualties; and on 15 January at YD123728 B/L-61 engaged an unknown size enemy force with organic weapons fire resulting in 17 enemy KIA. Eight US personnel were wounded in this action.

2 VC/VCI. The number of VC/VCI related incidents decreased from 38 in December to 29 in January. There was a proportionate decrease in terror oriented incidents, and rice/tax collections were 50 percent

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less than those in the previous month. However, sabotage and assassinations increased slightly during January. PHU LOC (D) maintained its high level of activity, while HUNG DIEN (D) and HUNG THA (L) were second in total incidents for the month. A 545 MI of operations report stated that VC cadre had been instructed to establish communication and to guide NVA regulars into the lowlands.

(e) February 1971.

1 MRTTH. The enemy's activity in the 4th Regt AO consisted primarily of mining incidents on or near the HUE-DA NANG RR. The level of activity in the 5th Regt generally decreased, but continued to be moderate in the Fire Base BLACK (Y0835994) area, while the Regt showed a renewed interest in Route 547. Contact with the 6th Regt decreased in February and activity continued to be of a harassing nature. Reported incidents from the 7th Front remained at a low level consisting of sporadic activity throughout the AO. Units of the 324B Division continued their logistical support role, while the 81st Regt/324B Division left RVN to oppose Operation LAMSON 719.

2 B5 Front. Activity in the B5 Front increased to a high level during February; the increase being attributable to Operation LAMSON 719. Activity in the form of ground contacts and attacks by fire was reported in western QUANG TRI for the first time since October. Areas of concentrated activity were the eastern DMZ vicinity Fire Bases A-1 (YD270734) and A-2 (YD213734), the Rock Pile area, and central and western QUANG TRI, vicinity Route QL-9. Fire Base A-1 received 11 attacks by fire and Fire Base A-2 received 12 attacks by fire. Most of the activity in the ROCK PILE area was centered in the vicinity of Fire Base SCOTCH (XD912563). On 13 February at XD914550, a company sized enemy element was engaged with artillery fire resulting in 30 NVA KIA. On 3 February at XD9025, gunships attacked an ammunition storage area resulting in a total of 24 secondary explosions. The bulk of activity in western QUANG TRI occurred along the LAOTIAN border areas of QL-9 and was in the form of ambushes by indirect fire and SAF.

3 VC/VCI. The number of VC/VCI related incidents decreased from 29 in January to 27 in February. Decreases were noted in rice/tax collections and propaganda activity. Acts of terror increased slightly, while intelligence collections and kidnappings remained at the same level. There was a significant increase in sabotage incidents during the month of February, due primarily to the greater number of mining incidents along the HUE-DA NANG RR in PHU LOC (D). There were 14 mining incidents along the railroad in February compared to 7 in January.

(f) March 1971.

1 MRTTH. March saw an increase of activity in the 4th Regt AO. Attacks were launched against RR bridges and there were incidents of

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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division
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vehicles receiving fire in the HAI VAN PAS area. The 5th Regt activity increased sharply throughout the AO. The centers of activity were in the vicinity of Fire Base LA SON (YD931008), Fire Base BASTONNE (YD625095), and western Route 547. The 6th Regt decreased its level of activity to harassment and attacks by fire against CAMP EVANS. Two battalions of the 6th Regt were identified in the 5th Regt AO in the vicinity of Fire Base VOGUEL (YD549034). It is now believed that this represents a temporary extension of the 6th Regt's AO, brought about by the continued commitment of 324th Division forces in LAOS. Operations by the 7th Front increased and consisted of harassment and rice collection operations in the lowlands of HAI LANG (D). PW reports indicated that the 903rd Regt and the 512th Regt of the 374th Division were operating in eastern LAOS during Operation LAMSON 719. An agent also indicated that the 29th Regt participated in that operation.

2 B5 Front. Activity in the B5 Front continued at a high level and increased significantly over that reported in February. Activity was characterized by ground contacts with small size enemy forces, numerous incidents of attacks by fire, and mine detonations throughout the AO of the B5 Front. Concentrations of activity took the form of ambushes along JL-9 from the ROCK PILE area to the LAOTIAN border and large scale attacks by indirect fire centered on the KHE SANH Combat Base and its airfield. The central and western QUANG TRI areas were the scene of the most significant events during March. On 3 and 21 March, Fire Base VANDERCRIFT (YD002438) received sapper attacks that destroyed a total of 36,000 gallons of JP-4 fuel and 8,600 x 20 mm rounds. There were 19 reported attacks by fire on KHE SANH (XD853418); KHE SANH received a sapper attack and 120-150 rounds of indirect fire on 23 March 1971. Results of the attack were 3 US KIA, 13 US MIA, one ARVN MIA, 14 NVA KIA, one NVA PW, two aircraft destroyed, four aircraft damaged, and two rear points damaged. On 25 March at XD813485, 1/5/1-1 Cav received SAF and RPG rounds from an unknown size enemy force. Aerial rocket artillery and FAC's were employed. Results of the contact were one US KIA, 4 US MIA, and 36 NVA KIA.

3 VC/VCI. The number of VC/VCI related incidents increased significantly from 27 in February to 62 in March. This was the highest total of VC/VCI incidents for a one month period since September of 1969. Sabotage incidents decreased slightly from 16 in February to 11 in March. Terrorism, kidnapping, rice/tax collections, and propaganda incidents all increased sharply during March. HAU LIC (D) accounted for 80 percent of the total incidents. Agent reports received during the month attributed the sudden rise in activity to the VC cadre's attempt to draw allied attention to the lowlands, and relieve pressure on NVA units engaged in Operation LAMSON 719. With the conclusion of LAMSON 719, activity began to decrease to its normal level.

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(g) April 1971.

1 MRTTH. During April, reported activity remained constant in the 4th Regt AO. Incidents were spread throughout the area and consisted primarily of BBTs and rice/tax collection incidents. The reported incidents from the 5th Regt were concentrated to the north and east of Fire Base BRICK. There was heavy contact in the area where elements of two 6th Regt Bns were identified in late March. This is the second month that the 6th Regt has extended beyond its normal AO. The 6th Regt continued combat sporadic harassment throughout the AO. A general increase in activity was noticed in the 7th Front AO. Most of this increase is associated with rice collection operations. A captured document referred to a "7th Front Spring Campaign" scheduled to begin after 15 April. Little information was reported concerning units of the 324B Division during April. According to PWs taken in late March, the 803rd and 812th Regts are moving back into their traditional areas of operation after LAMSON 719. An agent report indicated the 29th Regt is also returning. Other intelligence sources confirm the eastward movement of the 29th and 812th Regts. However, recent analysis indicates that the 803rd Regt remains in LAOS south of QL-9. The continuing deployment of the 803rd Regt away from its normal AO is probably due in part to heavy casualties suffered by the unit during Operation LAMSON 719, and in part to the enemy's fear of additional Allied incursions into Base Areas 604 and 611.

2 B5 Front. The B5 Front AO experienced a sharp decrease in activity during April. Activity was characterized by sporadic contacts and attacks by fire. Mining incidents also decreased considerably. There were no significant events during the month. This lull in activity is attributed to the withdrawal of the ARVN troops from LAOS. The enemy is believed to be resting and recuperating from the heavy fighting during Operation LAMSON 719.

3 VC/VCI. VC/VCI related activity declined significantly during early weeks of April, then increased again to a high level of activity by the end of the month. This is in contrast to the sharp increase of the previous month. In April, there were 49 reported incidents as compared to 62 for March. FNU LOC (D) continued to show the highest total of VC/VCI incidents with 28. Kidnapping, sabotage, and propaganda incidents declined during April, while terror-oriented and rice/tax collection incidents have shown a slight increase. This decrease in activity may be a result of logistical shortages caused by Operation LAMSON 719, but time will be required to confirm this.

(h) Comparison table of VC/VCI incidents for reporting period
Nov 70 - Apr 71.

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1 November, December, and January.

DISTRICT	TERROR	KID	SAB	ASAS	FIN/ECON	PROP	INTEL	TOTAL
Phong Dien	0/1/2	0/3/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/1/0	0/0/1	0/0/0	0/5/3
Quang Dien	1/0/0	1/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	2/0/0
Huong Dien	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0
Vinh Loc	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0
Phu Yang	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0
Phu Thu	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0
Phu Loc	0/3/2	4/4/2	6/5/7	1/1/2	6/2/2	0/2/2	1/0/0	18/17/17
Huong Tra	1/1/2	2/3/2	0/0/0	0/1/2	0/8/2	0/0/0	0/0/0	3/13/8
Huong Thuy	0/1/1	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	2/1/0	0/0/0	0/0/1	2/2/2
Nam Hoa	1/0/1	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	1/0/0	0/0/0	1/0/0	3/0/1
Hue City	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0
TOTAL	3/6/8	7/10/4	6/ 5/7	1/2/2	9/12/4	0/2/3	2/0/1	28/37/31

2 February, March, and April

DISTRICT	TERROR	KID	SAB	AS AS	FIN/ECON	PROP	INTEL	TOTAL
Phong Dien	2/4/6	3/1/0	1/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/3/0	0/0/0	4/8/6
Quang Dien	0/0/1	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/1	0/0/0	0/0/2
Huong Dien	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0
Vinh Loc	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0
Phu Yang	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0
Phu Thu	0/0/2	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/1
Phu Loc	1/6/3	1/6/2	14/13/8	0/0/0	1/4/11	0/5/4	0/0/0	17/34/28
Huong Tra	0/0/1	1/3/2	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/6/3	0/9/1	0/0/0	1/22/7
Huong Thuy	1/2/2	0/1/1	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	1/2/3
Nam Hoa	0/0/0	0/0/1	1/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/1/0	1/1/0	2/2/1
Hue City	1/1/1	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	1/1/1
TOTAL	5/12/15	3/11/5	16/13/8	0/0/0	2/19/14	0/12/6	1/1/0	26/59/49

(1) At the end of the reporting period enemy units were relocated as follows:

UNITS RELOCATED	NEW LOCATION	OLD LOCATION
Chi Thua I Sapper Bn/5th Indep Regt	YC7095	YCS195
800th Bn/6th Indep Regt	YD5101	YD3725
802nd Bn/6th Infep Regt	YD5202	YD2619
324B Div HQ	XD6020	YD2717
803rd Regt HQ	XD6010	YD3415
1st Inf Bn	XD6010	YD3212
2nd Inf Bn	XD6020	YD3608
3rd Inf Bn	XD6520	YD3310
812th Regt HQ	XD7431	YD2025
4th Inf Bn	YD7431	YD2834

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<u>UNITS RELOCATED</u>	<u>NEW LOCATION</u>	<u>OLD LOCATION</u>
5th Inf Bn	XD2434	YD0421
6th Inf Bn	YD0320	YD0730
29th Regt HQ	XD7416	YD3317
7th Inf Bn	XD7416	YD2823
8th Inf Bn	XD4815	XD3018
9th Inf Bn	XD7816	YD3319
3rd Sapper Bn/B5 Front HQ	Unlocated	YD9939
29th Sapper Bn/304th Div	Unlocated	Y-1040
9th Inf Regt/304th Div	Unlocated	YD0925
1st Bn	Unlocated	YD0925
2nd Bn	Unlocated	YD1731
3rd Bn	Unlocated	YD2938
6th Inf Regt/304th Div	Unlocated	XD9533
7th Bn	Unlocated	XD9836
8th Bn	Unlocated	YD0637
9th Bn	Unlocated	YD0530

(j) Units not previously located.

<u>UNIT LOCATED</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>SOURCE</u>
15th Engr Bn/B5 Front HQ	XD9143	Documents/ Analysis, Mar 71
24B Inf Regt/304th Div	XD7037	Rallier, Mar 71
4th Bn	XD5640	Rallier, Mar 71
5th Bn	XD7037	Rallier, Mar 71
6th Bn	XD5039	Rallier, Mar 71
303th Div HQ	XD6871	FW, Mar 71
36th Inf Regt HQ	XD5750	FW, Mar 71
1st Bn	XD5749	FW, Mar 71
2nd Bn	XD5649	FW, Mar 71
3rd Bn	XD5450	FW, Mar 71
88th Inf Regt	XD5846	FW, Mar 71
102nd Inf Regt HQ	XD7240	Documents/ Analysis, Mar 71
7th Bn	XD6537	Rallier, Mar 71
64th Inf Regt/320th Div	XD4547	FW, Mar 71
7th Bn	XD5044	FW, Mar 71
4th Bn/270th Regt (Indep)	XD0652	Documents/ Analysis, Mar 71

(k) Units no longer carried. K11 Sapper Bn/7th Front disbanded:
personnel used to reinforce K10 Sapper Bn. K4C Inf Bn/5th Indep Regt
disbanded: personnel used to reinforce K4B Inf Bn. 439th Inf Bn/5th

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Indep Regt disbanded; personnel sapper trained, reassigned to 5th Regt. K19 Sapper Bn/304th Div is no longer SICOM to 324B Division.

(1) Units not previously carried. The 70P Front, vicinity YD5762, is a corps level headquarters which directed NVA operations during LAMSON 719. As this was the first appearance of the 70P Front, it is not yet known whether this was a temporary task force HQ established to direct NVA operations during Operation LAMSON 719, or a permanent corps level HQ which will direct NVA operations in the northern VN-LAOS border area.

(2) G2 Air Operations. During the period 1 November 1970 to 30 April 1971, 152 hand held photo missions were conducted by the Imagery Interpretation Section and the 220th PAC. 206 photo targets and 143 infrared targets were completed by the 131st SAC. Ninety-seven infrared and photo targets were flown for the 101st Airborne Division (Aml) by the 7th AF.

(3) G2 Ground Surveillance Operations.

(a) During this period Phase I sensors have been gradually replaced by Phase III sensors. As of 30 April there were 357 sensors employed in 93 sensor strings in the 101st Airborne Division (Aml) area of operations. All strings in the division reconnaissance zone are being monitored by Air Force aircraft. Activations are relayed from QUANG TRI (DART) to CAMP EAGLE by means of a direct telephone line.

(b) Each brigade has a BASS (Battle Area Surveillance System) employed at brigade headquarters with sensor relay equipment on OP CHECKMATE, Fire Base TOMAHAWK, and Fire Base KATHRYN. In addition, there are manual readout sites at OP PHANTOM, Fire Bases BRICK, TOM-AWAWK, RAKKASAW, CAMP EVANS, and PHU GIA.

(c) Sensor strings are classified in one of three roles: intelligence, security, and target acquisition. Current percentages by classification are: 30% intelligence, 44% security, and 26% target acquisition.

(d) There are currently 197 PSID (Patrol Seismic Intrusion Detector) sets in use in the division. Personnel receive instruction in use and capabilities of PSIDs during SERTS training at CAMP EVANS.

(4) Counterintelligence Section.

(a) During the period 1 November 1970 to 30 April 1971, the CI Section, 101st Military Intelligence Company, 101st Airborne Division

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(Aabl) engaged in a variety of activities in support of its primary mission of safeguarding the 101st Airborne Division (Aabl) from enemy sabotage, espionage and subversion.

(b) IG and CI inspections of unit's personnel, document and physical security programs were conducted to detect and eliminate security violations and vulnerable areas subject to enemy exploitation.

(c) Personnel security investigations, complaint type investigations, and limited investigations were conducted to insure the validity of security clearances within the division. Clearances for 3404 replacements were validated, 1124 SECRET clearances were granted, local files checks for 8623 personnel were conducted, as were 1100 USAIRR checks and 612 CRYPTO ACCESS clearances.

(d) In order to assist the GI in the hiring of Post Exchange, Open Mess, and Club Custodian personnel, this office initiates a USAIRR check. In these cases, the individual's finance records and his 201 file are reviewed. Upon receipt of favorable results of the USAIRR checks, USARV Form 235-R (Request For Investigative Repository Check) is forwarded to the ACofS, GI. When USAIRR checks result in unfavorable information, USARV attaches an extract of the derogatory information to the Form 235-R. This is forwarded immediately to the ACofS, GI.

(e) Technical support in the form of fingerprinting, changing safe combination, recovery of lost combinations, and repair of security containers was continuously provided both from division and supporting CI teams.

(f) The CI Section maintained liaison with XXIV Corps Security Section, DA NANG; 525th MI Group, PHU BAI and QUANG TRI; The Pacification, Security, and Coordination Headquarters, HUE; Advisers for the National Police; National Police Field Force; Police Special Branch; Province Interrogation Center; Provincial Reconnaissance Unit; Chieu Hoi; and Revolutionary Cadre, JUE; the 517th MI Detachment, QUANG TRI; PICCC, CIOCC, and DIOCC in HUE; and the DIOCCs in THUA THIEN and QUANG TRI Provinces.

(5) Interrogation Section.

(a) During the period 1 January 1971 to 24 April 1971, the JFW Section, 101st Military Intelligence Company, 101st Airborne Division (Aabl), processed twelve (12) prisoners of war (12 NVA/PW, 0 VC/PW), three (3) NVA Hoi Chanhs, and one hundred and eighty-eight (188) batches of enemy documents captured by units of the 101st Airborne Division (Aabl).

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(b) In addition, twenty-two (22) prisoners of war (21 NVA/RW, 1 VC/RW), seven (7) ralliers (7 NVA/HC, 0 VC/HC) and an unknown number of enemy document batches from ARVN units in the tactical area were processed.

(6) G2 Plans/Order of Battle Sections. The G2 Order of Battle Section continued to monitor, analyze, and report the enemy situation throughout Northern Military Region I. Continuing emphasis was placed on the timely analysis and dissemination of collected intelligence information to all consumers. During Operation LAMSON 719, the Order of Battle Section provided intelligence personnel for the Tactical Command Post at CAMP ROBERTS thus facilitating on-the-spot intelligence analysis at both CAMP EAGLE and CAMP ROBERTS.

(7) Weather.

(a) November 1970. The average rainfall over the coastal plain was 29.5 inches, which is about 7 inches more than that expected. Significant amounts of precipitation occurred on 18 days. No thunderstorms were observed over the coastal plains. Fog occurred in significant amounts on 16 days and was normally associated with light drizzle and rain. Ceilings of less than 1000 feet and/or visibility less than 3 miles occurred for 7 hours or more on 16 days, which was approximately twice the number of days expected for these conditions for the month. Ceilings greater than or equal to 5000 feet and visibility greater than or equal to 5 miles occurred on 5 days over the coastal plain. Maximum temperatures were 3 degrees lower than normal with average maximum temperatures of 75 degrees F. Average minimum temperatures were 1 degree lower than normal with an average minimum temperature of 68 degrees F.

(b) December 1970. The average rainfall over the coastal plain was 16.5 inches which is about 5 inches above normal. Significant amounts of precipitation occurred on 21 days. No thunderstorms were observed over the coastal plains. Fog occurred in significant amounts on 19 days and was normally associated with light rain and drizzle. Ceilings of less than 1000 feet and/or visibility less than 3 miles occurred for 7 hours or more on 17 days, which was approximately twice the number of days expected for this month. Ceilings greater than or equal to 5000 feet and/or visibility greater than or equal to 5 miles occurred on 7 days over the coastal plain. Maximum temperatures were about normal at 75°F along the coastal plain.

(c) January 1971. The average rainfall over the coastal plain was 4.5 inches, which is almost two inches less than the mean monthly

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precipitation for January. Significant amounts of precipitation occurred on 19 days. No thunderstorms were observed over the coastal plain. Fog was present in significant amounts on 13 days and was normally associated with light rain and drizzle. Ceilings less than 1000 feet and/or visibility less than 3 miles occurred for 7 hours or more on 9 days, which is one day less than the average for this month. Ceilings greater than or equal to 5000 feet and/or visibility greater than or equal to 5 miles occurred on 8 days. Maximum temperatures were 3 degrees lower than normal with an average maximum temperature of 70°F. Average minimum temperatures were 3 degrees lower than normal with an average minimum temperature of 68°F.

(d) February 1971. The average rainfall over the coastal plain was 3.17 inches which is just about one inch over the normal for February. Significant amounts of precipitation occurred on 7 days. One day with thunderstorms occurred over the coastal plains and 2 days over the mountains. Fog occurred in significant amounts on 16 days and was normally associated with light rain and drizzle. Ceilings less than 1000 feet and visibility less than 3 miles occurred for 7 hours on 10 days which is near normal for this month. Ceilings greater than or equal to 5000 feet and visibility greater than or equal to 5 miles occurred on 10 days over the coastal plain and on 8 days at KHE SANH. Maximum temperatures were near normal with an average maximum temperature of 74°F. Average minimum temperatures were 2 degrees below normal with an average minimum temperature of 62°F.

(e) March 1971. The average rainfall over the coastal plain was 1.95 inches which is about one half an inch less than normal for this month. Significant amounts of precipitation occurred on 6 days. Thunderstorms occurred on two days along the coastal plain. Fog occurred in significant amounts on 20 days in QUANG TRI Province and on 7 days in THUA THIEN Province, and was associated with both showers and light rain and drizzle. Ceilings less than 1000 feet and/or visibility less than 3 miles occurred for 7 hours or more in QUANG TRI Province on 8 days and on 3 days in THUA THIEN Province. Ceilings greater than or equal to 5000 feet and visibility greater than or equal to 5 miles occurred on 16 days over the coastal plain and on 5 days over the mountains. The average maximum temperatures were 3 degrees above normal at 83° along the coastal plain. Average minimum temperatures were 1 degree above normal at 68°F.

(f) April 1971. The average rainfall over the coastal plain was 0.31 inches which was over 2 inches below normal for this month. Significant amounts of precipitation occurred on 3 days. Thunderstorms

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occurred over the coastal plain on 3 days during the month. Ceilings less than 1000 feet and/or visibility less than 3 miles for 7 hours or more did not occur in April. Ceilings greater than or equal to 5000 feet and visibility greater than or equal to 5 miles occurred on 25 days over the coastal plain. The average maximum temperature was 90°F which was 3 degrees above normal for the month. Average minimum temperatures were near normal with an average minimum temperature of 73°F.

e. Personnel.

(1) During the reporting period, the division Adjutant General's office undertook a study to enhance replacement operations, controls, and division personnel accounting procedures. As a result of the study, procedures were implemented to gain physical control of replacements from their point of arrival in the division area of operations, until they were delivered to and accounted for by battalions and separate companies of assignment. Replacement assignment procedures were revised to insure company level assignments were made without delay at the time of administrative in-processing. These procedures permit commanders of units to participate in this assignment process to improve sound personnel management and individual job satisfaction. The scope of the study included the continuing features of unit monthly muster, accounting reconciliations, and physical and accounting controls over personnel rotating to separation or assignments out of the division. These new procedures were implemented with no particular difficulties.

(2) Chaplain. During the reporting period, chaplains throughout the division provided continuous support to all units and provided area coverage as needed. Battalion Chaplains accompanied their units on extended operations. A total of 5,869 services were conducted with an attendance of 112,840. During this period, several distinguished visitors conferred with the Commanding General. On 20 December 1970, the division was visited by Dr. Oswald J. Hoffmann (Pastor from The Lutheran Church - Missouri Synod), The Lutheran Hour Speaker, and Miss Suzanne Johnson (a former Miss Illinois). Dr. Hoffmann conducted services in the Division Memorial Chapel and on several fire bases. His visit to Vietnam was made at the invitation of General Creighton W. Abrams. On 22 December 1970, Cardinal Terence Cook, Military Vicar for The Armed Forces, visited the division. He met with all Catholic Chaplains, in the area. Cardinal Cook also visited troopers on several fire bases. His visit to Vietnam was made at the invitation of General Creighton W. Abrams. The Chief of Chaplains, MG Francis L. Sampson, visited the division on 8 January 1971. During his visit he conferred with all division and nondivision chaplains in the area. He also visited troopers on several fire bases. On 26 January 1971, four (4) Churchmen visited the division to confer with the

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Commanding General, and to discuss moral and morale problems of the division with chaplains, and their ministry to the troops. The Churchmen also visited several fire bases. The Churchmen were: Dr. Edward Brubaker - Chairman, The General Commission on Chaplains and Armed Forces Personnel; Dr. Robert James Marshall - President, Lutheran Church in America; Dr. Robert Verelle Moss, Jr. - President, United Church of Christ; Dr. William Phelps Thompson - Stated Clerk, The United Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A. On 11 April 1971 an Ecumenical Easter Sunrise Service was held in the grassy area between Eagle International and Division Headquarters. The Division Band and Chorus provided special music. The participants were: Chaplain (LTC) Joseph J. Smolinski, Division Chaplain; Chaplain (LTC) John W. Wakefield, Deputy XXIV Corps Chaplain (Guest Speaker); Chaplain (MAJ) Arthur M. Webb, DTARTY Chaplain; Chaplain (MAJ) Alfred DeLoane, Jr., DTBOM Chaplain; Chaplain (CPT) Monroe Osburn, 2/17th Cavalry Chaplain. There were 300 personnel in attendance.

(3) Key personnel roster as of 30 April 1971 and changes in command and staff during the reporting period:

CG	MG T.M. Tarpley succeeded MG J.J. Hennessey, 1 Feb
ADC(1)	BG S.B. Perry
ADC(3)	BG O.E. Smith
CofS	COL D.A. Seibert succeeded COL H.A. MacDonald, 1 Nov
CO, 1st Bde	COL P.F. Gorman
CO, 2nd Bde	COL J.E. Greene succeeded COL H.A. MacDonald, 2 Jan
CO, 3rd Bde	COL D.E. Grange, Jr. succeeded COL B.L. Harrison, 23 Dec
CO, JESCOM	COL D.E. Rosenblum
CO, Div Arty	COL L.E. Surut
CO, 101st Avn Gp	COL F.A. Davis
ACofS, G1	MAJ R.G. Kurtz succeeded COL C.H. Ferguson 8 Mar
ACofS, G2	MAJ D.S. Johnson
ACofS, G3	LTC J.C. Bard succeeded LTC R.J. Young 23 Nov
ACofS, G4	LTC C.M. Kicklighter
ACofS, G5	LTC J.H. Simpson, Jr., succeeded LTC H. Purcell 15 Dec
Ches Off	LTC J.C. Jackson
Div Surg	LTC R.E. Day
FM	LTC S.J. Lobodinski
IG	LTC T. Harvaz
SJA	LTC R.S. Hawley
Pin Off	LTC J. Trahan succeeded LTC W.J. Falconer 16 Apr
Chap	LTC J.F. Smolinski
AG	LTC J.M. Byrne succeeded LTC T.E. Minix 19 Feb
CO, 1st Bn (Amb1)	LTC D.C. Hilbert succeeded LTC G.H. Haroutsoz 19 Dec
327th Inf	
CO, 2nd Bn (Amb1)	
327th Inf	LTC J.M. Hamilton succeeded LTC J.J. Gorda 25 Jan

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CO, 2nd Bn (Acht)	LTC L.N. Cooby succeeded LTC C.J. Shay 12 Jan
501st Inf	
CO, 1st Bn (Acht)	LTC J. Hampton succeeded LTC A.C. Diater 18 Mar
501st Inf	
CO, 2nd Bn (Acht)	LTC M.A. Boce
501st Inf	
CO, 1st Bn (Acht)	LTC M.N. Lang
501st Inf	
CO, 1st Bn (Acht)	LTC K.A. Barlow succeeded LTC B.B. Porter 17 Jan
501st Inf	
CO, 2nd Bn (Acht)	LTC J.F. Bellocchi succeeded LTC J.C. Purd 20 Nov
506th Inf	
CO, 3rd Bn (Acht)	LTC J.R. Stevenson succeeded LTC R.J. Sutton 17 Mar
147th Inf	
CO, 3rd Bn (Acht)	LTC O.J. Shalikhvili succeeded LTC J.F. Martling 17 Dec
506th Inf	
CO, 2nd Bn (Acht)	LTC N.E. Qualtrough succeeded LTC R.J. Purks 14 Nov
11th Arty	
CO, 2nd Bn (Acht)	LTC E.S. Korpel
319th Arty	
CO, 2nd Bn (Acht)	MAJ H.H. Brandt
320th Arty	
CO, 1st Bn (Acht)	LTC J.L. Zorn
321st Arty	
CO, 4th Bn (ARA)	LTC W.L. Gallagher succeeded LTC C.L. Newalk 23 Feb
77th Arty (Acht)	
CO, 2nd Sqdn (Acht)	LTC A.A. Rider succeeded LTC Molinski 9 Mar
17th Cav	
CO, 101st Avn Bn (Aslt Hel) (Acht)	LTC B.B. Fernander succeeded LTC W.N. Peachey 18 Dec
CO, 158th Avn Bn (Aslt Hel) (Acht)	LTC R.A. Phillips succeeded LTC R.J. Gerard 21 Mar
CO, 159th Avn Bn (Aslt Hel) (Acht)	LTC G.F. Newton
CO, 326th Med Bn (Acht)	LTC R.E. Day
CO, 5th Trans Bn (Acht)	LTC H.B. Peasley succeeded LTC H.I. Small 25 Nov
CO, 426th S&S Bn (Acht)	LTC R.J. Cuthbertson succeeded LTC R.R. Jacobs 10 Feb
CO, 301st Maint Bn (Acht)	LTC P.L. Nidaver
CO, 501st Sig Bn (Acht)	MAJ A.N. Bone succeeded LTC Jensen 26 Mar

f. Logistics.

(1) 5th Transportation.

(a) As of 30 Apr 1971, the 5th Transportation Battalion (Aslt Maint & Sup) (Acht) had 32 officers, 23 warrant officers and 486 enlisted men

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assigned. On 25 November 1970 LTC Horace B. Beasley assumed command of the battalion from LTC Harold I. Small. During February and March the 335th Direct Support Maintenance Company was placed under operational control of the battalion for IAMEDN 719. In addition, 20 civilian augmentation personnel were distributed between A and B Companies for the operation.

(b) From 1 November through 30 April 1971, 2,210 aircraft were work ordered (to the battalion) for repair. During IAMEDN 719 (February and March), the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) was augmented by 10 aircraft. The battalion was responsible for providing overall direct support maintenance for these and the 335th divisional aircraft. The 335th Direct Support Company assisted in performing this mission. During this 60 day period, 1,133 aircraft were processed through the three direct support companies and returned operationally ready to the customer units. In addition, 7,582 job orders for aircraft avionics components and 1,610 work orders for armament repairs were completed.

(2) 426th Supply & Service Battalion.

(a) During this six month period the battalion continued to support the division. Highlighting the period was the support of Operation IAMEDN 719. The battalion continued its participation in the DISCOM Civic Assistance Program. Additional cement was provided to add a ward on the HUU HIEP Dispensary. Continued support is being given to ARVN AM/DSMIC site in HUS. Company B externally slung in excess of 1,000 sorties of Class I, II, III, IV and V to the division units and the 1st Infantry Division (ARVN).

(b) The following figures reflect the operations of the Truck Platoon of Headquarters, Headquarters Service Company.

Total Passengers hauled	1,633
Total Freight hauled	1,768 short tons
Total Ice hauled	1,380 short tons
Total Water hauled	1,171,800 gallons
Total Fuel hauled	611,000 gallons
Total Miles driven	91,025

(c) The following figures reflect the operations of the battalion maintenance section.

Maintenance Man Hours	12,537
Number of Vehicles repaired	1,439

(d) In support of Operation JEFFERSON GIEN/MUNDOON PLAN 70, Company A sent 26 green tag teams to fire bases to inspect and advise for safety

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and serviceability prior to backhaul. There were 793 ammunition resupply missions rigged and transported to fire bases from Philadelphia Hook Rd. There were 591 sorties flown from Corregidor Rd, consisting of 840 tons of water, 32.13 tons of Class I, 335.58 tons of Class III, 76.8 tons of Class IV, 11 tons of Class V and 111.45 tons of miscellaneous items. B Company continued to provide rigger support from five airlift pads within the three FSE's and Fire Base BAKFASAN. Rigger training classes were reduced during the period primarily due to Operation LAMSON 719, and the critical shortage of rigger personnel.

(e) Company A established and operated JP-4 refuel pads at DONG HA, MAI LOC, FSA 2 and LANG CON (In support of LAMSON 719). During the operation these refuel points issued an average daily total of 225,500 gallons of JP-4. Rearm points were established and operated by Company A at DONG HA, MAI LOC, FSA 1, FSA 2, and LANG CON. An average of 83 tons of Class I was issued daily. Company B rigged a total of 1,937 sorties with a total weight of 24,038,500 pounds. Company B riggers participated in the evacuation of 284 aircraft during the operation. B Company provided air items valued at \$182,000, to ARVN units.

(f) In Class I operations, the following has been accomplished:

1 ASP 102 (CAMP EVANS) now submits a daily status list of critical ammunition. This provides the DAO a ready reference as to status of critical ammunition stocks on hand. It also aids in providing adequate stockage of those munitions most in demand.

2 Due to the shortage of transportation, aviation units were requested to order AAA ammunition in smaller quantities so that sufficient transportation can be provided.

3 An AN/FRC-25 radio set was installed at the DAO to monitor continuous communications with Philly Rd.

4 An ammunition material retrograde program was initiated to recover brass and critical ammunition packing materials required to retrograde Class V items.

(3) 801st Maintenance Battalion (A&M).

(a) During the reporting period, the 801st Maintenance Battalion (A&M) continued to maintain COMEL, armament and automotive equipment well above the USARV deadline goal. A recapitulation of support maintenance activity is as follows:

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Jobs Completed During 1 NOV 70 to 30 APR 71

Signal	11,941
Armament	3,545
Engineer	1,312
Service	1,701
Automotive	1,668
Instrument	<u>1,264</u>
TOTAL	21,441

(b) The following is the operational ready percentage during 1 November 70 to 30 April 71 in major commodity areas:

<u>Commodity</u>	<u>Begin</u>	<u>End</u>	<u>Average</u>
Armament	99.8	99.9	99.8
Signal	97.6	98.9	97.6
Automotive	96.8	96.7	96.6

(c) On 28 January 1971 the 801st Maintenance Battalion (Ambl) received notification to prepare mobile maintenance teams to move on order in support of combat operations within Military Region I. Mobile Maintenance Teams were formed in each of the companies and on 6 February Company A's team moved from CAMP BAGIE by convoy to FHE SANH. The move was made with no problems and the team was fully operational upon closing at FHE SANH. During LAMSON 719 maintenance teams were employed on all operational fire bases and within QUANG TRI. The operation terminated in early April with the 801st sustaining no losses of either personnel or equipment.

g. Civil Affairs.

(1) Operations: Significant Activities.

(a) Pacification and development activities in THUA THIEN Province continued during the reporting period. During the past six months, 57 projects were completed, and at the end of the reporting period, 24 projects were currently in progress. The overall effort of the civil affairs section is directed toward the achievement of the national objectives outlined in the THUA THIEN Province Local Defense and Community Development Plan, 1971. Vietnamization of civil affairs programs has top priority. Increased coordination with Vietnamese officials is being effected to insure that Vietnamization is progressing. New civic action projects are not accepted unless a complete Vietnamese requisition, including a detailed description of required materials, is processed through province officials to CORDS and from CORDS to the 101st Civil Affairs Section.

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(b) After the October flooding, civic action initiated a survey to evaluate priorities, current status and estimated completion dates of civic action projects in progress. The survey indicated that continuous contact with district personnel was necessary for timely status reports to be accurately obtained. LTC Simpson, 101st Airborne Division (A-1), G5, initiated a program of continuous liaison with district senior advisors. He visited each DSA explaining the program, followed by civil affairs officers who have continued weekly visits. Continuous liaison has contributed to the Vietnamization program through regular exchanges of ideas and immediate attention to problem areas. Personal contacts create improved working relationships with nondivisional organizations which increase the beneficial results of 101st civil-military activities.

(c) Community relations activities are being emphasized in THUA THIEN Province. As the Vietnamese assume more of a role in the civil affairs operations, community relations are finding new methods of expression other than civic action. During the reporting period, four major efforts towards community information were developed.

1 A civil-military operations fact sheet, "Vietnamese Civilians and You", developed by the civil affairs section of the 101st Airborne Division (A-1), G5 illustrated how Vietnamese civilians assist our military operations. The fact sheet reported what local Vietnamese civilians have done to hinder the enemy and aid US/TFMAF. Instances were described of NVA being turned away without food or information and of bunkers, weapons and booby traps being reported to US and ARVN units. The importance of treating the Vietnamese civilians respectfully was stressed; and it was pointed out that the resultant goodwill could further contribute significantly to US/CVN combat success. The fact sheet was distributed to the troops at platoon and squad level.

2 The 101st Airborne Division (A-1) took positive action to reduce traffic accidents occurring on Highway 551. The route is a major supply route and is traveled heavily by trucks supplying RER 1. In coordination with the Province Chief and Province Senior Advisor, the 101st provided 15 bilingual traffic regulations and information signs which were posted by district personnel. A representative from the division provost marshal's office and the G5 traveled the route to check placement and determine the effect the signs had upon traffic patterns. Since the signs have been erected, there has been a noticeable reduction in speeding and accidents on Route 551. A concentrated effort by US military and province personnel in directing their attention towards reducing accidents has paid positive dividends in saving lives and building a better community relationship.

3 During the months of January, February, and March due to increased supply traffic for operation LAMSON 719 on Route 551 from TAN MY to HUF

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City, the PHU VANH District Chief again requested aid in preventing traffic accidents. A ground loudspeaker team was employed from the 4th Det, 7th PSYOP Bn, to warn the civilian population of the increased traffic danger. The 101st Airborne Division (Aml), G5 authorized broadcasts every morning, afternoon, and evening from 1-7 Feb 71. Coordination between district officials and the 101st Airborne Division (Aml) on this traffic safety problem substantially reduced the number of accidents and incidents on Route 551.

4 The Province Chief and Province Senior Advisor, THEA THIEN Province, requested that the civilian population be informed of the dangers inherent in tapping the POL pipeline from TAN MY to CAMP EVANS. Tapping of the line resulted in the death of six Vietnamese civilians. The 101st Airborne Division (Aml) ground and aerial broadcasts advising of the danger of tapping the pipeline were conducted daily from 17 Dec to 31 Dec 70. The messages were effective and the number of incidents of tapping decreased from approximately one per day to less than one per week. Many breaks in the pipeline were reported by the people to district officials resulting in safe operations and better community relations between the 101st Airborne Division (Aml) and the people of THEA THIEN Province. The POL program was broadcast again in February by a ground loudspeaker team from the 4th Det, 7th PSYOP Battalion.

5 A community relations regulation, Div Reg 360-2, was developed by the 101st Airborne Division (Aml), G5. This program is designed to enhance the effectiveness of the 101st Airborne Division (Aml) by developing mutual understanding and rapport through the active confrontation and participation of both US and VN personnel in as many mixed activities as possible. This program includes the organization of installation community relations councils including members from all battalions and separate companies on each installation and establishment of a friendship council in Vietnamese communities including members from the US community relations council and local Vietnamese offices. Other programs include a cultural exchange program, English language instruction, the reduction of traffic accidents and disciplinary incidents, joint sport programs, and an information program.

(d) The Montagnard resettlement hamlet, TA RAU VI in NAM PHA District, has been progressing satisfactorily during the winter months. In November 100 Montagnards were escorted by the 32nd River Assault Group (ARVN) to cut bamboo for siding on the homes they are constructing. They obtained sufficient bamboo to build an additional 35 houses. The 101st Airborne Division (Aml) is providing the lumber for house frames and the CVN has supplied all the necessary tin roofing for 100 houses. The 4th Platoon, 29th CA Company, in direct support of the 101st, delivered 1,378 bd ft of scrap lumber and ammo boxes this reporting period. There are presently

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70 houses completed and 30 more houses with the frames and roofs complete, requiring only siding for completion. The houses were constructed in assembly line fashion. In addition, primary school classes are presently being taught to the children of TA RAU II in the hamlet chapel. The 5th Platoon, 27th CA Company, is teaching agriculture classes in vegetable cultivation, which resulted in several garden plots being planted during the spring months. The 101st Airborne Division (Aml) G5 warehouse supplied 300 lbs of fertilizer for demonstration purposes and will provide additional fertilizer as needed.

(e) An investigation of the types and locations of national monuments in THUA THIEN Province was completed by the 7th Platoon, 29th CA Company. The monument list was coordinated with province officials and compared with the official SAIGON listing. The members of the 7th Platoon, 29th CA Company, made visual identification of each monument and verified its coordinates. District, village and hamlet officials were extremely cooperative and appreciated this interest taken in their culture. An overlay showing the locations of all the monuments in THUA THIEN Province was prepared and provided to major tactical commands. A listing of national monuments was distributed to company level.

(f) A combined program of civic action and psychological operations was employed in PHU THU District. Civic action officers provided fertilizer to the district farmers while an HE (ground loudspeaker) team from the 4th Det, 7th PSYOP Battalion, provided a recorded tape explaining the proper application of the fertilizer. The tape stressed the importance of proper storage of the fertilizer prior to its application to the crops. The HE team was able to disseminate the message to the hamlets on the eastern borders of the district. The loudspeaker team enabled the farmers to understand the best method of application of the nutrients without resorting to detailed instructions. The program was extremely successful and neighboring hamlets requested to participate in the program. The 101st Airborne Division (Aml), G5 delivered 4,000 lbs of fertilizer to two more hamlets in PHU THU District and 4,000 lbs to the Montagnard resettlement hamlet, TA RAU II, NAM HCA District. The instruction tape was also played at the supported hamlets.

(g) During the reporting period 570 MEDCAPs were held and 28,989 patients were examined.

(h) Major projects completed during the reporting period:

- 1 GIA LE CHANH school (YD807247), HUONG HUY.
- 2 The CHI DONG Hamlet road repair (YD641422), HUONG DIEN.

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- 2 The CHI TAY Hamlet road repair (YD615433), HONG DIEN.
- 4 PHU THU District road repair (YD895185), PHU THU.
- 5 PHU DA Village market construction (YD900103), PHU THU.
- 6 PHU HIEP Village Headquarters renovation (YD763248), HUE II.
- 7 HUE III Headquarters bunkers (YD765215), HUE III.
- 8 VINH TRINH Hamlet market (YD945185), PHU THU.
- 9 VINH TRINH Hamlet school (YD945185), PHU THU.
- 10 LA CHU Hamlet market (YD695240), HUONG TRA.
- 11 S&MSIC (Sector Management and Direct Support Logistics Center), HUE II.
- 12 HUE City Recreation Association equipment (YD759226), HUE I.
- 13 PHU LUONG Village hospital (YD861161), HUONG THUY.
- 14 The MY C Hamlet school (YD639452), HUONG DIEM.
- 15 PHONG DIEN recreation equipment (YD529244), PHONG DIEN.
- 16 THUONG BANG Village meeting hall (YD753128), NAM HOA.

(i) During the reporting period 57 projects were completed. This number included three schools, three administrative projects, 29 wells, three washstands, three markets, three road repair projects, one hospital, and 12 miscellaneous projects.

(j) The civil affairs section currently has 24 civic action projects in progress. These include three wells, two dispensaries, three washstands, 11 schools, two road repairs, one pier, one water pipeline and one bridge.

(k) Commodities issued during the reporting period:

Cement (bags)	491
Tin (ea)	151
Lumber (bd ft)	56,737
Nails (kilo)	3
Paint (gals)	97
FSP (ea)	70
Ammo boxes (ea)	1,785
Culvert (ea)	537
Reinforcing wire (rolls)	1
Barbed wire (rolls)	10

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Engineer stakes (ea)	73
Rebar 8' (ea)	4
Pier pilings (ea)	16
Tanks oxygen (ea)	4
Tanks acetylene (ea)	2
Tar paper (rolls)	52
Dirt fill (cu yd)	2,328
Sand (cu yd)	12
Gravel (cu yd)	112
Lime (bags)	2
Scrap GP medium tent (ea)	3
Sandbags	135
Chain link fence (rolls)	3
Food (lbs)	6,400
Clothing (lbs)	1,529
Health items (lbs)	1,099
Nightstands (ea)	60
Desk (ea)	24
Fertilizer (lbs)	8,280
Medical school kits (ea)	3
School kits (ea)	100
Athletic equipment (ea)	37
Basketballs (ea)	7
Hand tools (ea)	15
Sewing kits (ea)	10

(1) Significant events:

1 During the holiday season, units of the 101st Airborne Division (Aml) gave clothing, candy, and parties to the Christian organizations which they regularly support. The 3/187th Infantry Battalion hosted approximately 50 children from TIN LAM Orphanage in QUANG TRI for a Christmas party. The 2/11th Artillery hosted 52 children and three nuns from KIM LONG Orphanage in HUE for a party at CAMP EAGLE. The 101st Band donated 200 lbs of clothing to the KIM LONG Orphanage. The 163rd Avn Company brought 14 students from VINH LOC to their company area for Christmas dinner and entertainment. The 159th Avn Bn presented boxes of clothing, toys, candy and perishable food to the VINH LOC Orphanage. The 326th Engr Bn took gifts to the THIEN AN Orphanage and then brought the children back to CAMP EAGLE for lunch and a tour.

2 As a gesture of goodwill for the Christmas holidays the Province Chief of THUA THIEN Province presented a Vietnamese cultural song and dance program to the members of the 101st Airborne Division (Aml) on 24 Dec 70 at CAMP EAGLE, CAMP EVANG, and the 85th Evacuation Hospital at HUU BAI. Transportation for the performers was provided by two CH-47

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Chinooks from A Company, 159th Avn Bn, and sound equipment came from the 101st Sig Bn. The vocalists were from the BONG KHANH and QUOC High Schools in HUE City. Dancers from the National High School of Music and the Imperial Ballet performed traditional selections depicting the culture of Vietnam. Music was provided by a group of musicians from the Imperial Ballet. A highlight of the show was a dance commemorating the Trung Sisters. The performance afforded the members of the division an opportunity to observe customs and traditions of the Vietnamese people. A representative of the province council and the Chief of Internal Security presented traditional Vietnamese art to the senior US representative at the beginning of each show. The generosity of province officials was an example of good community relations between members of the division and the populace of THUA THIEN Province.

3 The Disaster Relief Coordination Center (DRCC) was activated twice during the reporting period. On 29 Oct 70 the DRCC was activated to assist the CVN emergency evacuation and resupply of approximately 20,000 flood victims in THUA THIEN Province. QUANG TRI Province was provided airlift support from 101st Airborne Division (AAB1) assets. The 2nd and 3rd Brigades established DRCCs, and DISCOM and the division engineers reported assets available for relief operations. These assets were immediately put to use. The districts of PHONG DIEN and NAM DIEN were hardest hit. Flood waters crested at approximately 16-foot above normal, completely inundating the northern lowland area. Division aircraft and boats evacuated 6,768 of the 20,000 evacuees, delivered 142 tons of supplies, flew 482 helicopter sorties employing 27 CH-47s and 39 OH-13s. In THUA THIEN Province 31 deaths were attributed to flooding conditions. By 5 Nov 70, the emergency had subsided and most of the evacuees had returned home. Only isolated villagers continued to receive aerial resupply. Following the close of the 29 Oct - 5 Nov 70 DRCC an SOP for the 101st Airborne Division (AAB1) was prepared and circulated among the division staff and subordinate SAs. The SOP was finalized and printed and a test run of the DRCC was conducted from 29 Nov 70 to 1 Dec 70. Overall effectiveness of control and reporting during the test operation was credited to the new SOP. The final draft was approved, published and distributed.

4 The men of the 101st Airborne Division (AAB1) contributed \$1,351.25 to the 101st Airborne Division (AAB1) Tet Fund of 1971. The total proceeds were exchanged, at the rate of 2768VN for each \$1 US, for a total of 1,047,400VN. The Board of Governors, composed of the SAs from divisional units, voted to present equal amounts to the 1st Infantry Division (ARVN) and to THUA THIEN Sector military dependent children. BG Berry, acting CG, 101st Airborne Division (AAB1), presented 533,700VN wrapped in red Tet paper to BG Pham Van Khu, CG, 1st Infantry Division (ARVN), and a duplicate package to COL Le Van Thon, THUA THIEN Province Chief. Additional Tet support was given to the following

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childrens organizations in THUA THIEN Province. The 1/500 Infantry Battalion delivered food to TU KHU Orphanage in HUU THU District; the 3/500 Infantry Battalion delivered food and candy to the AN HANG Orphanage in PHU LOU District; the 3/187 Infantry Battalion delivered food to the NA ARTH Orphanage in HUE; The 2/500 Infantry Battalion delivered food to VAN TRINH child care center in PHONG BIEN District; and the 2/11 Artillery gave two parties at CAMP BATTLE for the KIM LAN and KIM LON Orphanages of HUE.

2 On 17 March 1971, a 101st Airborne Division (Amb1) C-119 picked up a delegation of 12 NAM HOA District and village officials and their donation of 15 baskets (2,000 lbs) of rice cakes, candy, cigarettes and other sundry items and flew them to the 1st Infantry Division (ARVN) headquarters at KHE SANH where they presented their gifts to the 1st Infantry Division (ARVN) Chief of Staff. The gifts were distributed to ARVN troops working at KHE SANH and in LAOS. The donation represents a significant effort by the people in NAM HOA to demonstrate their appreciation to the government and continuing support for the armed forces of Vietnam. NAM HOA District is one of the poorest districts in THUA THIEN Province and the gift represents a real sacrifice for the people of the district.

3 Assistance to the PHU LUONG Hospital, HUONG THUY District, was completed in March 1971 by the 101st Airborne Division (Amb1), G5. A total of 40 beds, 12 desks and benches, and 60 nightstands constructed by Vietnamese carpenters at the G5 warehouse were delivered to the hospital. Since the inception of this project, the hospital has improved its services. At the beginning of the project, the hospital was only a local dispensary. Presently, it has local inpatient services and rural nurse and midwife training programs. Training programs are from two to six months in duration, depending on the quality of the medical facilities at the trainee's hamlet. More intensive training is given nurses and midwives from the more rural hamlets since they are virtually on their own after the training program is completed.

h. Psychological Operations: Significant Activities.

(1) On 11 Nov 70 1st Brigade requested a quick reaction leaflet exploiting NVA KIA's. A leaflet naming Nguyen Dinh Tu killed in action was targeted against the K10 Bn, 5th NVA Regt with the expressed intent of creating both a "fear of death" in the audience and a "loss of confidence" in the efforts of the NVA to win the war. The leaflet was received from Combined Psychological Operations Center on 13 Nov 70 and disseminated by the 1st Ede on 14 Nov. Text of the leaflet read:

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(front)

"Men of the NVA, do not wait for death. Run away and answer the Chieu Hoi program or become a prisoner and go home in a short time after the war is over. Friends of Nguyen Dinh Tu, Long, Binh and Tu, understand that you will suffer many more hardships and danger as well as a useless death if you continue to fight. Lay down your weapons and rally, we are waiting for your return."

(back)

"Nguyen Dinh Tu was one of your best soldiers who died because he continued to fight. The great titles of "Heroic American Killer" and "hero" did not protect him from death, hunger, or hardships."

(2) Division PSYOP initiated a PSYOP Campaign Training Program designed to instruct the Brigade PSYOP officers and senior NCO's on the methods of planning and implementing PSYOP campaigns.

(a) The training program was conducted in three phases. During the first phase, initial campaign plans were developed for each brigade. Initial plans demonstrated how PSYOP campaign plans insure an organized and effective psychological operation.

(b) During phase two, division PSYOP and each brigade PSYOP section combined efforts to develop a brigade PSYOP campaign. Campaigns implemented by the brigades served as a training tool for the brigade PSYOP sections.

(3) On 8 Dec 70 an NVA lieutenant of the 014 Sapper Company, 4th NVA Regt rallied to the 224th Regional Force Company in NTU LOC District. The Hoi Chanh was exploited by division PSYOP in conjunction with 2nd Bde PSYOP, FNU LOC District Chief and MACV District Senior Advisor. Combined Psychological Operations Center developed and printed three different leaflets of the Hoi Chanh's statement utilizing hunger and soon hardships as themes. The Hoi Chanh also produced a recorded message targeted against his former unit.

(4) On 12 Dec 70 2nd Bde PSYOP conducted a "quick reaction" aerial broadcast mission in support of a contact made in NAM HOA District. Second Brigade utilized a general Chieu Hoi/Rally Instruction theme to exploit a RF/PF victory against an unidentified VC unit. The contact resulted in 1 VC KIA, 1 VC PW/WIA and a VC escapee. Subsequently a Scout Dog and PSYOP ground loudspeaker team were employed during the search for the escaped VC.

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(4) A VC village security chief of the QUANG BIEN Special Action Unit rallied to the 185th Popular Force Company in QUANG BIEN District on 24 Dec 70 and was exploited by 2nd Bde PSYOP with both leaflets and aerial broadcasts. The tape explained his reasons for rallying, how he has been treated by the GVN since rallying and encouraged his comrades to join him.

(6) On 31 Dec 4th Detachment, 7th RVAF Bn moved from 2nd Bde and was headquartered at CAMP EAGLE in direct support of division PSYOP. The move resulted in improved coordination with division PSYOP and increased utilization of the audio visual and ground loudspeaker teams.

(7) Five AN/UH-6 1000 watt aerial loudspeaker sets were received from XXIV Corps. A 1000 watt system was given to each brigade and one aerial loudspeaker set is being utilized by division PSYOP. The other AN/UH-6 had to be turned into 801st Maintenance as unserviceable.

(8) On 24 Jan a combined operation was conducted by division PSYOP in cooperation with 1st ARVN Division to exploit the GVN repatriation of PWs to North Vietnam. Aerial broadcasts and leaflet drops over HUE and QUANG TRI City resulted in 100,000 leaflets disseminated and 2:30 broadcast hours.

(9) Operation "Cypress Garden", targeting the CP Company, PHU LOC Special Action Unit located in the VINH PHONG Mountain Region, began 25 Jan 71. The concept of the operation was to employ tactical firepower in support of psychological operations. The tactical phase of this campaign combined the support of gunships, artillery, flame drops, and District Regional and Popular forces. Psychological operations to be employed exploiting the effects of allied firepower with fear and nostalgia tapes, leaflets, and scripts. The objective of the campaign was to force NVA and VC in the area of operation to either Chieu Hoi or move from their mountain sanctuary into GVN controlled territory.

(a) The technique employing tactical operations in support of PSYOP was relatively new to the division where previously PSYOP was generally employed in support of tactical operations. The techniques involved in this campaign called for progressive use of PSYOP and tactical firepower on an alternating and progressively concentrated basis. In the first five days of the campaign only aerial broadcasts, leaflet drops, and waterborne broadcasts exploiting Chieu Hoi and allied firepower themes were used in conjunction with the intermittent firing of 105mm propaganda rounds. This phase was to be followed by 3 days of tactical firepower using 105mm HE and Fz VT rounds, thickened fuel drops, and aerial and waterborne broadcasts using harassment scripts. This

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action was to be followed by more than one unaided fireteam, aerial broadcasts, and leaflet drops and on only 13 of reports received thus far in the campaign. If, by this time, there had been no reaction from the target audience, fully armed gunships were to arrive and station on the A-1 and expend their munitions on suspected enemy locations. A second round of suggested and possible rally points would be submitted continuously. By conducting PSYOP in this manner, it was believed that the objectives of the campaign would either be achieved or the capability of employing tactical firepower with psychological operations would be established. However, as a result of both inclement weather and tactical aircraft priority for LACOM 719 over unselected aerial PSYOP and tactical firepower missions were cancelled.

(b) The campaign was initially structured under the command and control of the RVN LOC District Chief, who in turn would request support from US and ARVN assets. This concept was in keeping with supporting and encouraging increased Vietnamization of psychological operations. However, it should be noted that his command and control, was not carried out, nor was any support requested by the district cadre. The following points probably account for the shortcomings of the campaign:

1 The district cadre did not feel that such a campaign would produce desirable results or benefit the overall political and tactical goals within their district.

2 The district cadre did not feel that the campaign was in keeping with their concepts of tactical psychological operations.

3 The coordination required between District and Province level agencies was not effected to the degree required for such an operation to be carried out successfully.

(10) At the request of C&AS, division PSYOP conducted a loudspeaker broadcast along QL-1 and Route 551. This mission had two purposes: one, to warn indigenous personnel of the dangers of using the vehicle aviation fuel leaking from the pipelining parallel to QL-1 and two, to warn indigenous personnel of the heavy convoy traffic on Route 551 during the initial phases of LACOM 719. Missions were conducted by 4th Detachment, 7th PSYOP Battalion in direct support of division PSYOP. The broadcasts relating to aviation fuel were conducted for 26:30 hours contacting 4,500 people. The highway safety broadcasts ran 18 hours contacting 12,000 people.

(11) To further Vietnamization, division PSYOP conceived and conducted initial planning for a Riverine PSYOP/EDCAF Campaign. Targets were villages and hamlets along the B and HONG Rivers, including their tributaries. The campaign was planned in three phases: Phase I

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(14) On Monday, 15 Mar 71, during LAMSON 719 division PSYOP reacted to a tactical PSYOP request from 1st Bn, 501st Infantry. An element of 1st Bn, 501st Infantry was in contact with an unknown size enemy force, located in several caves along QL-9, approximately 30 kilometers west of QUANG TRI Combat Base. A quick reaction aerial broadcast and leaflet drop was targeted against the enemy location using intense rally appeals and exploiting the Laotian situation. Firepower from tanks covering the enemy location was also directed against the target from the PSYOP aircraft. Firepower was immediately followed by another aerial broadcast exhorting the enemy force to rally and escape further allied firepower and destruction. Even though no Hoi Chanh were received as a result of the operation, it served as an excellent example of combining PSYOP in support of tactical operations situations.

(15) On 31 Mar 71, QUANG DIEN District Headquarters reported to the Division Tactical Operations Center that a Hoi Chanh was received at approximately 1000H by the 2nd Regular Force Platoon. Division PSYOP was informed at 1330H and was able to acquire a helicopter to exploit Tran Dich Van, a member of the QUANG DIEN Special Action Unit. Tran Dich Van was collecting rice in DO GIEN Hamlet, HONG DIEN District (YD612298), with other members of his unit, at the time of his escape. The Hoi Chanh traveled to the residence of his family QUANG DIEN District who persuaded him to return to the Government of Vietnam. At 1930, 31 Mar 65 PSYOP scheduled an aerial leaflet drop in the reported location of the QUANG DIEN Special Action Unit.

(16) Division PSYOP continues to actively exploit the Volunteer Informer Program utilizing the direct support of 4th Det, 7th PSYOP Battalion and the division aircraft assets. To enhance the effectiveness of the program, G5 PSYOP and 4th Det used reward funds from 101st MI Det class A Agent. On 30 Mar and 31 Mar 71 Vietnamese civilians in the vicinity of the AN LO Bridge (YD623302) led a ground PSYOP team of 4th Det to caches containing: one - 175mm artillery round, one - 155mm artillery round, two - 105mm artillery rounds, one - Mark 15 white phosphorus grenade, one - 60mm Chi Com mortar round, one - 2.75mm HE rocket warhead, two - 82mm Chi Com mortar rounds, one - B3 aerial bomblet, and four Chi Com grenades. All munitions were destroyed in place by a division EOD team. Rewards paid on the scene by the team for materials recovered totaled 8,000,000VN.

(17) Laotian Campaign: Operations in LACS were exploited in accordance with XXIV Corps INX, DTG: 01205572Z Feb 71. PSYOP officers within the division prepared or used assets to sustain the campaign in

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their respective areas of operations. During the operation division PSYOP conducted 7:30 aerial broadcast hours and disseminated 1,080,000 leaflets by utilizing the division's organic air assets. The 4th Det, 7th PSYOP Battalion also supported the Laotian Campaign with audio visual and ground loudspeaker missions. A detailed listing of the districts covered follows:

<u>DISTRICT</u>	<u>BROADCAST HOURS</u>
HU THU	4:30
HUONG TA	9:00
HU LOC	5:30
HUANG DIEN	5:00
HUONG DIEN	3:00
HUONG THUY	27:00
HUONG DIEN	6:00
HU VANH	17:00
HUANG	12:30
TOTAL	89:30

1. Medical.

(1) Preventive Medicine.

(a) A marked increase in the number of admissions for diarrheal diseases was manifested in November primarily because some unit mess halls unknowingly used non-potable water for drinking purposes. The office of the division surgeon as well as the division food service initiated tighter surveillance of the mess facilities in order to reduce the possibility of future contamination. Greater command emphasis to insure the use of iodine tablets in the field was made during this period as an adjunct to the prevention of diarrheal disease.

(b) With the onset of the wet monsoon season in October, the number of patients with skin disease became substantially greater and this trend continued in November, although to a lesser extent than October. Constant attention was devoted to this problem through dissemination of personal hygiene guidance to the maneuver battalions, the units most commonly afflicted with this disease.

(c) The division experienced a reduction in malaria incidence commensurate with colder weather and greater command emphasis on malaria prophylaxis as directed in a command letter of 29 Sep 70 titled Prevention of Malaria. More than half of the malaria cases occurring were of the

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viva strain and as such were 97% preventable, pointing out the need for constant vigilance in the area of malaria prophylaxis with the Wilson-Edison test being the prime tool. This test was designed to reveal whether or not an individual had taken his required weekly chloroquine-primaquine tablet and was performed on selected individuals on a weekly basis by all battalion surgeons. Guidance to commanders on the use of this test was given in a command letter of January 70. As an adjunct to the malaria prevention program, aerial spray missions were undertaken to reduce the mosquito population. The efforts of the malaria prevention program were quite successful, as evidenced in the division malaria rate, lowest of all tactical units in Vietnam.

(d) The abundant availability of marijuana and hard narcotics with increasing troop free time due in part to Vietnamization greatly increased the drug abuse problem. During the report period, over one in ten admissions were due to drug abuse, principally involving heroin. The Drug Amnesty Program was reemphasized as a means to alleviate the impact of drugs on division troops. The drug amnesty program offers help to those patients who want to get off and stay off drugs. Their participation in the program is strictly voluntary as these are the patients most amenable to rehabilitation. The extent of drug use in the division can be measured only by subjective observation and therefore estimates are not statistically reliable. Those patients under the drug amnesty program have been quite successful in staying off drugs. A new Division Circular, 40-3, was written outlining the purpose and responsibilities under the Drug Amnesty Program.

(e) The division drug education team, under the supervision of the Division Psychiatrist, continued to give classes informing incoming personnel at SERTS of the inherent dangers of drug abuse.

(f) In the month of April a dog was diagnosed as a carrier of rabies, the first such case to be reported in a year. Further, an excessive number of dogs were being kept as pets by division personnel. The Provost Marshal began a campaign to apprehend all stray dogs and to more effectively enforce Division Regulation 40-17, which limits the number of dogs to one per company sized unit. Reducing the dog population and proper emphasis of other control measures are expected to abort a rabies outbreak.

(2) MEDCAP. During the reporting period division medical personnel entered a phase of the MEDCAP program during which they rendered technical guidance and supervision over their Vietnamese counterparts who performed

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the actual treatment and administration. In this way, it was anticipated that the Vietnamese would develop their own supply system as well as become technically proficient in the care and treatment of the people. A problem encountered has been that Vietnamese health workers, at times, have failed to be at the appointed place and time.

(3) Visits of USARV Consultants.

(a) On 23 November 1970, LTC Gould, USARV Preventive Medicine Officer; LTC Foley USARV Entomologist; and LTC Otis, USARV Sanitary Engineer visited the division to discuss various aspects of preventive medicine with the Division Surgeon, LTC Day; Division Preventive Medicine Officer, CPT Ellison; and Division Sanitarian, 1LT Chen.

(b) COL Baker, Psychiatric consultant to the Surgeon General; and COL Bowen, Psychiatric consultant to the USARV Surgeon visited the division on 10 Mar 71 to receive an orientation on mental hygiene service capabilities within the division. LTC Day, Division Surgeon, and MAJ Cushman, Division Psychiatrist were the contact personnel.

(4) Reporting.

(a) A new drug abuse feeder report with RCS MACV 6260.1 was initiated in December. From December through March, an average of 70 persons a month have been admitted with a drug abuse diagnosis. In over 90% of these cases, heroin was the principal drug abused.

(b) This office continues to monitor and report outpatient and morbidity statistics for the division. The use of Medical Company CO's as brigade surgeons has aided in obtaining more accurate and timely reporting.

(5) Aviation Medicine.

(a) During the reporting period 720 Class IA, II and III flight physicals were accomplished, an average of 120 a month. The monthly rate ranged from a low of 78 in Feb to 153 in both Dec 70 and March 71.

(b) Although authorized eight aviation medical officers, the division was assigned only four in November. At the end of the reporting period seven were assigned thus allowing excellent medical coverage of division aviation personnel.

(c) Through January only a few cases were noted where aviators accumulated flight time in excess of 110 hours per 30 day period.

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However, in February, with the increased aviation requirements in support of CAMSON 719, a few aviators were examined who had approached 120 hours and large numbers exceeded 110 hours. During March "pilot fatigue" appeared as a significant factor in the division's operations. An unknown number of crewmembers were examined 757 times for having exceeded 120 hours and fatigue resulted in 121 recommendations for grounding (16%). However, at no time during the reporting period was "pilot fatigue" considered a problem because, with rare exception, those crewmembers recommended for grounding were in fact grounded.

Admission Statistics (rates/1000 men/year):

	<u>NOV</u>	<u>DEC</u>	<u>JAN</u>	<u>FEB</u>	<u>MAR</u>	<u>APR</u>
Hepatitis	2.2	0.5	3.2	1.1	1.1	0.6
Malaria	12.9	3.6	3.2	1.1	1.6	2.8
Diarrhea	99.0	79.1	64.6	26.4	44.2	44.2
Psychiatric Disorders	24.8	15.8	88.5	50.0	64.5	58.1
Respiratory	93.4	127.5	84.3	70.4	54.6	35.2
Skin Disease	144.0	180.7	139.4	94.6	71.7	59.6
Venereal Disease	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Fevers of undetermined origin (FUO)	66.4	97.9	43.9	36.9	38.0	24.6
Heat Injuries	0.0	0.5	0.0	0.6	0.5	1.7
Immersion Foot	34.6	27.0	3.7	0.6	0.0	0.0
EBI	52.9	57.6	60.4	47.3	31.2	30.0
ERHA	6.4	8.2	5.3	11.6	31.2	35.0

	<u>A CO</u>	<u>B CO</u>	<u>C CO</u>	<u>SPT CO</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>	
Total patients seen at clearing station:	4,150	4,067	3,689	5,267	17,173	
Total dental patients:	0	1,970	2,241	4,671	8,882	
Total admissions:	275	280	527	541	1,623	
Total transferred:		239	241	97	795	
<u>Recapitulation:</u>						
ERHA		154	54	761	53	1,022
EBI		601	231	1,063	281	2,176
<u>Medical Diseases:</u>						
Malaria		0	1	16	9	26
FUO's		153	79	107	171	570
Diarrhea		101	123	78	111	413
Skin diseases		381	781	691	733	2,591
N/P		22	38	22	2,012	2,110
Gastroenteritis		53	102	64	207	426
Foot problems		52	212	146	189	579
Heat injuries		41	6	52	28	137
TD		239	373	106	389	1,107

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j. Signal.

(1) The 501st Signal Battalion (A21) continued to provide communications for the Division in operation JEFFERSON GLEN/AMBROSE PLAN 70 and LAMBSON 719. Four channel VHF systems were installed from Fire Bases TOMAHAWK, LOS BANGS, BRICK, ARSENAL, HERBERT, BASTOGNE, JACK, GLADIATOR, RAYKASAN and OF CHERMATE. Similar facilities were provided to units located at MAI LOC, ANNE, VANDEGRIFT and CARROLL to the respective brigades. On Thanksgiving Day, five radio operators and one radio repairman were processed and sent to LONG BINH for further deployment to PAKISTAN. These personnel participated in the flood relief operations.

(2) During the period 18-23 January, communications were established at EAGLE BEACH in support of a division tactical CP. All equipment and personnel were airlifted. Equipment and personnel from the 63rd Signal Battalion were utilized to provide a 12 channel system to CAMP EAGLE. No problems were encountered in effecting close coordination with nondivisional units. The exercise was beneficial in that it provided realistic training for new personnel in the battalion.

(3) During the period 26 January-8 April the battalion provided communications support for a division forward CP at QUANG TRI and a division advance CP at KHE SANH. Additionally, secure relay stations were established for XXIV Corps and I Corps (ARVN) at Fire Base SHEPHERD and for MACV at LANG VEI. Equipment and personnel for the QUANG TRI CP moved by road from CAMP EAGLE on 25 January. Secure FM voice stations were established in the Command, Intelligence and Forward Operations nets. Three ground relay stations were established at Fire Base KHE SANH. A four channel VHF system to CAMP EAGLE was installed until circuits could be engineered over the area systems. Radioteletype was employed until conventional commcenter teletype circuits could be established and then used to backup the primary means of communication. Equipment and personnel for the KHE SANH CP moved by road to MAI LOC and were airlifted to KHE SANH on 2 February. Secure FM voice stations were established in the Corps, Command, Intelligence and Forward Operations nets. Radioteletype was used as at QUANG TRI. A four channel VHF system was installed at QUANG TRI and was utilized during the entire operation because of difficulties on the area system.

(4) As a result of the long delays in obtaining critical circuits over the area system, the Division Signal Officer obtained three teams of equipment and personnel from MACV for two 12 channel systems. Two teams were attached to the signal battalion. The third team was used to establish a 12 channel system from CAMP ROBERTS, QUANG TRI, to CAMP EVANS when the forward CP moved on 1 March. The other two teams were employed in establishing 12 channel systems from Fire Base CARROLL to CAMP EVANS in support of the 3rd Brigade Forward CP and from CAMP EVANS to CAMP EAGLE to provide circuit routing to CAMP EAGLE. These systems and their associated circuits were estab-

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lished within 24 hours as opposed to the 3-5 days required to get circuits on the area systems (14 days from KHE SANH to QUANG TRI). In addition to the 12 channel system provided for the 3rd Brigade, four channel VHF systems were established from brigade to battalions located at MAI LOC, and Fire Bases ANNE and VANDEGRIFT.

(5) When the Division Signal Officer was alerted that the tactical CP at LA VANG would be required, two teams were again obtained to establish 12 channel systems. Personnel and equipment for the CP at LA VANG moved by road from CAMP EAGLE on 18 April. A 12 channel system was established to CAMP EAGLE. Secure FM voice stations were established in the Command, Operations and Intelligence nets utilizing 2 relay stations established at Fire Base PAKESAN. A station in the General Purpose RPT net was also established. Minimum delay was experienced in establishing all communications facilities since all personnel and equipment were under control of the signal battalion. On 30 April, the TTY facility in the DTOC was deactivated. It was replaced by a RRT van outside the DTOC. RRT stations were also established at each brigade TOC. The purpose of this RRT net is to provide quick response for TOC operational traffic.

k. Aviation.

(1) Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 101st Aviation Group (CBT) (Ambl) continued to perform its mission to provide aviation support to the division and aviation staff personnel to the division special staff. During this reporting period this support was provided for Operations JEFFERSON GIEN/SONSON PIAN 70, LAMSON 719, and LAMSON 720. The pathfinder platoon under the operational control of the 101st Aviation Group S-3, successfully completed the following missions:

US and ARVN LZ's/PZ's	32
US Arty moves	15
Opening FSB's	8
Closing FSB's	5
US Arty raids	3
ARVN CA's	8

The pathfinder platoon continued to furnish air traffic control on the division's fire bases. Daylight weather reports were furnished by these pathfinder teams hourly, conserving aircraft blade time and contributing to the area intelligence base. The pathfinder platoon conducted two pathfinder technique classes for 1st Infantry Division (ARVN) soldiers. Each class was four days in length and contributed greatly to ARVN 1st Infantry Division airmobile self-sufficiency for LAMSON 719.

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(2) During the past six months HHC, 101st Aviation Group, was responsible for conducting 2 MEDCAPs per week, one at VINH LOC District. These were conducted to the maximum extent consistent with the weather and aircraft availability. During Operation LAMSON 719 (Feb - Mar), MEDCAPs were not held because the operation had first priority on aircraft. In 1971 there is increased emphasis on Vietnamization of civic action. The Group S-5 conducts the civic action program with this goal in mind. MEDCAPs are run with the aim of making the Vietnamese medics totally independent of US assistance. However, they still rely to a large extent on the US Army medical supply channels. While LAMSON 719 was in progress, the MACV Team, formerly located at VINH LOC, was relocated to PHU LOC District. The Group S-5 will make periodic visits to that team prior to resuming MEDCAPs in VINH LOC.

(3) Aviation Safety recorded the following breakdown of accident/incident experience in the 101st Aviation Group for the reporting period:

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Accidents	13
Incidents	31
Forced Landings	13
Precautionary Landings	59
Combat Damaged Aircraft	NA

(4) The Airmobility School was conducted as follows:

<u>DATE</u>	<u>ATTENDANCE</u>
1 - 2 Nov	35
11 - 12 Dec	33
22 - 23 Jan	19
26 - 27 Apr	23
TOTAL	110

1. Engineers.

(1) During November 1970, A Company (-) was in direct support of the 1st Brigade at Fire Base BASTOGNE, Fire Base BIRMINGHAM, and CP CECHEMTE in addition to carrying out special missions in their area of operations. At Fire Base BASTOGNE, the rehabilitation program continued with the fireproofing of two mess bunkers and the continuous upgrading of interior and access roads. Extensive drainage work was accomplished by cutting ditches and placing culverts. At Fire Base BIRMINGHAM, five 10' x 24' and forty-one 8' x 12' bunkers and two observation towers were

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completed. The interior and access roads were upgraded to a minimum all-weather standard. At OP CHECKMATE, two one-ship LZs were cut. Minesweeps were conducted from Fire Base BIRMINGHAM to Fire Base PASTOCHE daily and west of Fire Base PASTOCHE to Fire Base WEGHEL with negative findings. B Company (-) was in direct support of the 3rd Brigade at Fire Base PAKKASAN and at Fire Base JACK in addition to carrying out special missions in their area of operations. At Fire Base PAKKASAN, the mess bunker was fireproofed with asbestos and tin, the drainage system was continuously improved and two observation towers, a gate and a guard house on the PAKKASAN Road were constructed. Daily minesweeps, in conjunction with D/14th Engineers, were conducted on the PAKKASAN Road with negative findings. In general support of the division, approximately 1,200 meters of the interior roads were upgraded and permeprimed. In addition, six SEA huts were reconstructed for the 2/319th Artillery and for the 3/187th Infantry at CAMP EVANS. C Company (-) was in direct support of the 2nd Brigade at Fire Base ERICK, Fire Base ARSENAL, Fire Base TOMAHAWK, Fire Base LOS BANOS, and Fire Base ANZIO. At Fire Base ERICK, the fireproofing of the kitchen bunker, the excavation for three ASP bunkers, the rehabilitation of two 8' x 12' bunkers, the installation of drainage in the mess bunker, the construction of two latrines and a shower facility, and the construction of pavement walls was accomplished. At Fire Base ARSENAL, excavation for one 16' x 16' kitchen bunker, one 20' x 64' mess bunker, and one 10' x 16' radar bunker was completed, and work commenced on the above mentioned bunkers. One 8' x 12' bunker was completed at Fire Base TOMAHAWK, a personnel bunker in the CP area was rehabilitated, fireproofing of the kitchen and mess bunkers was accomplished, and a blast wall in the POL area was constructed. At Fire Base LOS BANOS, construction began on a 30' x 32' mess and 16' x 16' kitchen bunker. At Fire Base ANZIO, rehabilitation of an 8' x 48' personnel bunker was accomplished. Projects in general support of the division included the rehabilitation of an observation tower in FHU EAI at "B" sector, and the construction of an observation tower in the 2/17th Cav area. A daily minesweep was conducted from QL-1 to the CIA IE gate at CAMP EAGLE with negative findings. During the period 1 November through 30 November, Headquarters Company provided equipment support to engineer units at CAMP EVANS, CAMP CAMPBELL, Fire Bases JACK, ERICK, ARSENAL, PASTOCHE, BIRMINGHAM, TOMAHAWK, and LOS BANOS. Additionally, the boat platoon supported infantry operations at LANG CO BAY, Fire Base BIRMINGHAM, and FOHL Bridge. On the CAMP EAGLE Roads during November, 900 cubic meters of fill were hauled, emplaced, and graded and 4,300 meters of ditches were improved. Various projects were accomplished by HHC in support of units stationed at CAMP EAGLE. The

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majority of these projects consisted of either hauling, filling, ditching, or grading. Headquarters Company continued to work on perimeter defenses in the N II sector by installing lights and clearing fields of fire. The upgrading of interior defenses at Fire Base BIRMINGHAM was accomplished by the emplacing and grading of 200 cubic yards of fill and the emplacement of one 24" x 36" culvert. From 1 to 4 November 1970, flood rescue/resupply missions were conducted in THU THU and HU NG DIEN Districts. Four Boston whalers and eight rafts were utilized in these operations. A total of 777 Vietnamese were rescued in HU NG DIEN District, and tons of supplies were distributed by these water craft.

(2) During December, A Company (-) was in direct support of the 1st Bde at Fire Base BASCOCKE, Fire Base BIRMINGHAM, and OP CHECHMATE in addition to carrying out special missions in their area of operations. At Fire Base BASCOCKE, six 8' x 12' and one 10' x 24' bunkers were completed. In addition, seven flying buttresses were emplaced for support of the 20' x 104' mess hall. At Fire Base BIRMINGHAM, a total of nineteen 8' x 12' and one 10' x 24' bunkers were completed. A combat assault and minesweep of Fire Base MAUREEN was accomplished on 19 December with negative findings. At OP CHECHMATE, two one-ship LEs were cut, a radar/pathfinder tower was built, and two blivet racks were constructed. At CAMP EAGLE, a 15' x 32' SEA hut was constructed for use as a psychiatric ward for the 326th Medical Battalion. Also, extensive rehabilitation of EAGLE Bowl in preparation for the Bob Hope Show was completed. B Company (-) continued in direct support of the 3rd Brigade at Fire Base BAKKASAN and Fire Base JACK in addition to carrying out special missions in their area of operations. At Fire Base BAKKASAN, seven of eleven blivet racks were completed, 500 meters of defensive wire were placed around the perimeter, and extensive bunker rehabilitation was accomplished. At Fire Base JACK, two observation pathfinder towers and an 8' x 12' shower were built. Roads and drainage systems were continuously maintained at both Fire Base JACK and CAMP EVANS. Two 14' x 14' SEA huts were constructed and three 20' towers were erected for the AFWN television relay station. During December, C Company (-) was in direct support of the 2nd Brigade at Fire Bases BRICK, ARSENAL, TOMAHAWK, and LOS BANOS. At Fire Base BRICK, the rehabilitation of bunkers 4 through 15 on the perimeter and the TIC was accomplished, and the construction of one 8' x 12' and one 12' x 12' bunker was completed. At Fire Base ARSENAL, the construction of one 20' x 64' mess bunker, one 16' x 16' kitchen bunker and one 10' x 16' radar bunker was completed. At Fire Base TOMAHAWK, work consisted of tearing down the old mess hall for a proposed stand-down area. At Fire Base LOS BANOS, one 30' x 32' mess bunker and one 16' x 16' kitchen bunker were completed and rehabilitation of the drainage system on the hill was completed. At Fire Base PISTOL on 18 December, a minesweep operation of Route 525 for three kilometers was conducted in conjunction with an artillery raid and positions for two 8" howitzers were constructed. On THU THU Road, 1,500 cubic yards of select fill were placed on the road and the elevation was raised one foot for approximately 2,000 meters. A fully minesweep from

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