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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters, 101st Aviation Battalion (Aslt Hel)
APO San Francisco 96383

AVDG-AVA-E

4 April 1970

SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report, Operation Randolph Glen

Commanding Officer
101st Aviation Group
101st Airborne Division (AMBL)
ATTN: S-3
APO San Francisco 96383

1. Name of Operation: Randolph Glen
2. Dates of Operation: 150001 Feb 70 - 312400 Mar 70
3. Location: 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), area of operations;
(Maps: Vietnam 1:100,000 series 1607, sheets 6342, 6442, 6441, 6341
6541, 6641, Vietnam 1:50,000 series 17014, sheets 6541 II, 6541 III, 6441 III).
4. Command Headquarters: 101st Aviation Battalion (Aslt Hel).
5. Reporting Officer: LTC Thomas R. Meadows
6. Task Organization: The 101st Avn Bn with a total authorized allowance of 75 aircraft was in support of operation Randolph Glen with the following units:
 - a. Company A: See para 6e.
 - b. Company B: 20 - UH-1H Lift Helicopters
 - c. Company C: 20 - UH-1H Lift Helicopters
 - d. Company D: 11 - AH-1G Cobra Helicopter Gunships
 - e. F Troop, 2nd Squadron 17th Cavalry (Prov) was placed on stand down from operational missions on 12 March 1970 for reconversion to A Company, 101st Aviation Battalion (AH). Reconversion was completed on 27 March 1970 with Company A having 18 UH-1H aircraft assigned. By the end of the reporting period they had 19 of their 20 authorized UH-1H aircraft.
(Average assigned strength (Less Co A) of 51 aircraft)

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SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO YEAR
INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED ON: 31 DECEMBER 1976

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DOWNGRADED AT 10 YEAR INTERVALS
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7. Supporting Forces:

- a. 4/77 Aerial Rocket Artillery with pre-strikes on landing zones.
- b. 158th Assault Helicopter Battalion in combat operations.
- c. 159th Assault Helicopter Battalion in combat operations and extraction of downed aircraft.
- d. Vietnamese Air Force in combat operations.
- e. US Air Force with pre-strikes on landing zones.
- f. Pathfinders supported this Battalion in both pick-up and landing zone operations.
- g. 2/17 Cavalry Squadron with reconnaissance, screening and on specific occasions recovery of downed aircraft and downed aircraft security.
- h. 326th Medical Battalion with medical evacuation helicopters.

8. Intelligence:

- a. Enemy anti-aircraft activity remained high throughout February and March. The most numerous instances involved enemy small arms, however, 12.7 mm, RPG and 51 caliber incidents were also reported.
- b. The enemy continued to disengage from significant contact with US ground troops and offered little if any resistance. The enemy continued to stockpile rice, and ammunition along routes to Hue and Quang Tri. Enemy activity in the A Shau Valley showed a significant increase along supply routes. Constant friendly sweeps and patrol operations has limited the effectiveness of the enemies stockpiling efforts and greatly countered enemy offensive plans.

9. Mission:

The primary mission of the 101st Aviation Battalion during operation Randolph Glen (OPORD 13 - 19), was to provide tactical mobility for combat troops, supplies and equipment of the 101st Airborne Division during the conduct of combat and airmobile operations. Specifically, primary missions included:

- (1) Command Control console aircraft for battalion commanders and staff officers.
- (2) Armed Helicopter escort.
- (3) Troop carrier.
- (4) Convoy cover.

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- (5) Visual Reconnaissance.
- (6) Night Hawk system.
- (7) Logistical resupply.
- (8) Night Observation Device (NOD).
- (9) Flare Illumination.
- (10) Medical evacuation.
- (11) Psychological Operations - loudspeaker and leaflet-drop missions.
- (12) Chemical spray - insecticide and defoliation.
- (13) CS riot control agent drops.
- (14) Flame drops.
- (15) Armed helicopter close fire support.

b. Secondary missions include:

1. Aircraft maintenance supply missions for each of the companies.
2. VIP missions and escort.
3. ARVN support.

10. Concept of Operations:

a. The overall mission of Randolph Glen is the conduct of offensive operations in selected areas of operation in coordination with 1st ARVN Division to locate and destroy enemy forces, base areas and cache sites.

b. Additional aviation assets were directed to Psychological Operations. Various means of communications with the local populace were used; namely leaflet drops and voice persuasion by loudspeakers mounted on helicopters. These methods were used extensively in Thau Thien province during the hours of darkness. After a broadcast is completed, two cobra gunships place ordnance on the desired area.

c. "Operation Lifesaver" continued to receive emphasis during this reporting period. This operation better known as "LZ Expansion" is conducted by this Battalion in conjunction with the 101st Aviation Group Pathfinders, the 326 Engineers and an aerial rifle squad from the 2/17 Cavalry. During the operation many small landing zones were improved and new landing zones were built.

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11. Execution:

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a. Disposition of forces: The 101st Aviation Battalion Headquarters Company along with Company A, (F Troop OPCON 2/17 Cav), Company B and support units are based at the 101st Airborne Division base, Camp Eagle (YD 8016). Company C and Company D are located at the Hue/Thu Bai airfield (YD 8813).

b. All aircraft were habitually based with their units. Staging aircraft at other locations for extensive periods of time was not required. The only exception to this was occasional general support requirements for the 1/5th Mech involving Co. D.

c. A 24 hour Battalion Operations Center (BOC) was maintained which received all general support missions from the 101st Aviation Group. Missions were allocated to subordinate companies by the Battalion, and performance of all flights were monitored and controlled by the Battalion.

d. Each day during the hours of darkness this Battalion maintained aircraft on various standby missions. Two light fire teams from Company D were on standby with five and thirty minute reaction times. For emergency illumination two UH-1H flare ships are maintained on thirty minute standby and one UH-1H helicopter with firefly illumination system is maintained on sixty minute standby.

e. During operation Randolph Glen the 101st Aviation Battalion committed Company B to direct support of the 1st Bde and Company C to direct support of 2nd Bde. This allows the brigades the flexibility of direct control over their aviation assets which has proven to be a highly successful method of support.

12. Results:

a. It is felt that the desired objectives of operation Randolph Glen during the period of this report have been met. Through the use of aviation assets the operation has been highly successful. The increased mobility and maneuverability afforded to each Infantry Brigade through the use of aviation assets allowed rapid repositioning of combat troops throughout the AO.

b. Enemy losses, catagorized as follows:

- (1) KIA 0
- (2) KBAA 0
- (3) KBA 0
- (4) Captured 0

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c. Friendly losses: None.

d. Ground fire incidents by aircraft type and mission:

| MISSION | UH-1H | AH-1G |
|---------------------|-------|-------|
| Combat Assault | 4 | 0 |
| Logistical Resupply | 2 | 0 |
| Other (Training) | 1 | 0 |

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e. Aircraft losses by aircraft type and general circumstances:

| CIRCUMSTANCE | MAINTENANCE | DAMAGED | DESTROYED | TOTAL |
|--------------|-------------|---------|-----------|-------|
| Combat | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Non-Combat | 4 | 1 | 2 | 7 |
| Total | 4 | 1 | 2 | 7 |

f. Statistical data for each type aircraft

| TYPE A/C | HOURS FLOWN | SORTIES | PAX | CARGO (TONS) |
|----------|-------------|---------|--------|--------------|
| AH-1G | 1295 | 1,421 | N/A | N/A |
| UH-1H | 5,041 | 19,429 | 24,353 | 623 |

13. Administration:

a. Unit strength at the beginning of the operations:

| | OFF | WO | ENL | TOTAL |
|--------|-----|----|-----|-------|
| HHC | 16 | 5 | 105 | 126 |
| Co. A | 14 | 18 | 150 | 182 |
| Co. B | 14 | 24 | 143 | 181 |
| Co. C | 10 | 26 | 140 | 176 |
| Co. D | 10 | 17 | 109 | 136 |
| TOTALS | 64 | 90 | 647 | 801 |

b. Unit strength at the end of the operation:

| | OFF | WO | ENL | TOTAL |
|--------|-----|----|-----|-------|
| HHC | 15 | 6 | 84 | 105 |
| Co. A | 13 | 21 | 128 | 162 |
| Co. B | 11 | 18 | 136 | 165 |
| Co. C | 13 | 23 | 136 | 172 |
| Co. D | 9 | 18 | 117 | 144 |
| TOTALS | 61 | 86 | 601 | 748 |

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c. There was significant loss of OFF, WO, EM as indicated by the strength at the beginning of operation and at the end of the operation. However this did not effect the overall mission requirements. Personnel scheduled for R&R departed and did not effect mission requirements. Replacement personnel continued to arrive but at a slower pace than in the past months.

14. Logistics:

a. Concept of Support:

(1) External support from DSO 801st Maintenance and 5th Trans Battalion.

(2) Due to the mission of this battalion use of forward supply elements is not applicable.

b. Materials and Services:

(1) No problems were encountered in obtaining Class I, II, or IV supplies. Continuing shortage of 40 mm ammunition presented problems for Company D particularly in LZ preparation fires. This problem was critical until approximately 20 March when a larger allocation of 40 mm was established. At the end of the operation there was no shortage of 40 mm ammunition.

(2) Transportation requirements - N/A

15. Chemical:

a. The utilization of chemicals on specified missions has been used frequently. These missions, under the direct supervision of the Division Chemical Officer and his staff, have included the following types of agents: Flame drops, CS agents and defoliant.

(1) Flame drops have been utilized in the clearance of mines and booby traps and for clearing fields of fire at fire support bases. Flame drops are accomplished in various ways. One method is to release a drum of napalm from the cargo hook of the UH-1H aircraft. Another method is by utilizing a barrel release device in conjunction with a fuse, released from a CH-47. In the latter case armed helicopters from this battalion provide aerial escort.

(2) CS gas drops are employed from a utility helicopter into designated areas.

(3) Defoliation is primarily used to remove the natural concealment around fire support bases and along natural avenues of approaches to fire bases. Defoliation missions are accomplished by using the spray-bar and tank which have been adapted to the UH-1 series of aircraft.

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(4) These chemical missions are employed on a mission basis. Prior clearance is obtained from the ground commanders.

16. Civil Affairs:

During this reporting period two civic action projects were continued by the 101st Aviation Battalion.

a. The medcap mission in Vinh Xuan has been highly successful and is pursued in such a manner as to minimize the development of dependence on US aid and maximize the prestige and effectiveness of the Vietnamese health workers and doctors. During this period 315 patients have been treated and three new health workers trained.

b. Company D continued to help the Tou Mou Orphanage with limited food stuffs.

17. Psychological Operations: See Para 10 b

18. Communications: No comments

19. Engineer: No comments

20. Artillery: No comments

21. Army Aviation:

a. Mission: To provide tactical mobility for combat troops, supplies and equipment of the Division during the conduct of combat and airmobile operations.

b. Concept of Operations: The 101st Aviation Battalion provided the 1st and 2nd Brigades with one assault helicopter company each. After 27 March 1970 when Company A reverted to battalion control, one company was in general support of the Division. These companies furnished ten aircraft per day for each direct support brigade and ten for division general support missions.

c. Execution: The direct support aviation company established liaison with the supported infantry brigade and all missions were scheduled and coordinated at that level. When CA's required more than ten aircraft, the brigade requested additional aircraft from division. Under this arrangement an air mission commander (AMC) was available to the airmobile task force commander (AMTFC) to jointly plan the airmobile portions of any size operation.

d. General support missions were relayed to this battalion from 101st Aviation Group and only coordination between the aircraft commander and the supported unit was initiated.

e. Analysis: In general the airmobile operations during the period were accomplished in a smooth and effective manner. The operations were

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well planned and executed showing outstanding preplanning. Occasionally the AMC was not notified or brought into the initial planning of an operation. This often caused a delay or change in the airmobile portion of the operation due to an oversight by the ground unit on some aviation matter. The importance of liaison between the AMC and AMTFC early in the planning stages and continuing throughout the conduct of the exercise cannot be over emphasized. The major problem encountered during the period of this report was weather conditions generally varying from marginal to unsafe. This caused the cancellation and postponement of many operations.

22. Special Equipment and Techniques: No comment.

23. Commander's Analysis:

a. Item:

(1) The large number of combat assaults in a given day made set H-hours difficult to plan and meet.

(2) A major area of difficulty was the artillery preparation fires.

b. Discussion:

(1) Due to the large number of combat assaults in a given day this unit found it difficult to meet set H-hours during this period. The many variables which caused this problem were: Aircraft refueling, gunship rearming, weather, ground troop disorganization, tactical situation, and maintenance difficulties. A method was employed to eliminate set time schedules and insure the lift ships went into landing zones with maximum indirect fire preparation. The Air Mission Commander requested that preparation fires be on call. This method made it possible for the AMC to determine when the lift ships would be in position for the assault and to initiate the artillery fires so that they could be used to their maximum.

(2) The Air Mission Commander has normally monitored the ground units FM frequency during combat assaults. During the period covered by this report, a method was initiated where by the AMC monitored the artillery control frequency until troops were on the ground, at which time he changed to the ground frequency. This technique has proven quite successful in that the AMC has immediate knowledge of any changes or problems that occur during the artillery preparation, and he can take immediate action in control of the air assets as required. Further, many artillery LNO's aboard the C&C aircraft lack experience and are unable to comprehend the overall concept of an airmobile assault. Hence, if problems do arise, they are unable to grasp what the effects will be and initiate appropriate alternatives or advise to the AMC in time so he may make changes based on the situation.

c. Solution:


(1) Use tube preparation fires on call from the Air Mission Commander.

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(2) Air Mission Commander listen to artillery FM frequency until troops are on the ground.

24. Recommendations: Ground Commanders should seek and utilize the advice available from the air mission commander. When mission planning time permits, the AMC or his representative should be consulted during the initial planning of the airmobile operation. This will afford the AMTFC the benefit of valuable experience in all facets of airmobile operation planning. Detailed planning is a must if the operation is to be completed successfully in the shortest possible time. The AMC or his selected representative will insure that each detail is correctly and satisfactorily planned prior to the operation target date. Contingency requirements will be planned in advance to preclude any delays resulting from the unexpected, such as combat loss, aircraft emergencies, and weather.


THOMAS R. MEADOWS
LTC, Infantry
Commanding


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REFERENCE OR OFFICE SYMBOL

SUBJECT

FEEDER REPORT - AAR
OPERATION RANDOLPH GLENN

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TO

COMMANDING OFFICER
101st AVN BN
ATTN: S-3

FROM

COMMANDING OFFICER
Co D, 101st AVN BN

DATE

2 Apr 70
CPT HAUCK/LC/HAWK 3

CMT 1

1. Reference: DF, 101st Avn Bn, AVDG-AVA-E, Subj: Combat Operations AAR for Operation RANDOLPH GLENN, dtd 13 Mar 70.
2. Attached as incl 1 is feeder report requested in above reference.

1 Inclosure
1 - Feeder Rpt - AAR
Operation Randolph Glenn

Richard L. Smith Capt
RONALD R. COWDEN
MAJ, FA
Commanding

CLASSIFIED BY: CPT, 101 AVN BN
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO YEAR
INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED ON: 31 DECEMBER 1976

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS:

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