

Nov-Dec-1970/JAN-FEB MAR-APRIL 1971

LAMSON
719

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

83010

IN REPLY REFER TO

DAAG-PAP-A (M) (9 Dec 71)

DAFNOTE 71-1

6 January 1972

SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 101st Airborne
Division (Airmobile) ~~Paratrooper~~ (U)

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101st Avn Group/Airmobile

Green NVA uniforms

p108

"Success of
LS 719"
p10-D

Flame Drop
date
p 16

Fougasse-i
Issued

B-5 Front
Rockpile 22
Ground Sentries
p27

Weather p 29
426th Supply series 3th
Company B Ruggles
284 A aircraft rigged

Psyops 44
Pilot Fatigue grounding p52

Regraded unclassified when separated
from classified Inclosure.

Paintfinder
Not used

JAN 03 1972

Road Construction 53

Amfield Const. 54

12 Feb. Rendezvous
p 55

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1	2	3
4	5	6
7	8	9
10	11	12
13	14	15
16	17	18
19	20	21
22	23	24
25	26	27
28	29	30
31	32	33
34	35	36
37	38	39
40	41	42
43	44	45
46	47	48
49	50	51
52	53	54
55	56	57
58	59	60
61	62	63
64	65	66
67	68	69
70	71	72
73	74	75
76	77	78
79	80	81
82	83	84
85	86	87
88	89	90
91	92	93
94	95	96
97	98	99
100	101	102

2

CONFIDENTIAL

3

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HEADQUARTERS 101ST AIRBORNE DIVISION (AIRMOSILE)
Office of the Chief of Staff
APO 96383

AVDG-CS

24 May 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division
(Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RLS: CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

Commanding General
XXIV Corps
ATTN: AVII-GCT
APO 96349

(U) The Inclosed Operation Report - Lessons Learned is forwarded in compliance with USAKV Supplemental 1 to AR 525-15 and XXIV Corps Regulation 525-2.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division
(Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971 (U)

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ACofS, G4, 101st Abn Div (Asbl) w/incl
ACofS, G5, 101st Abn Div (Asbl) w/incl

Table of Contents

1. Operations: Significant Activities	Page
a. Operations	1
b. Training	9
c. Chemical	10
d. Intelligence	11
e. Personnel	25
f. Logistics	27
g. Civil Affairs	30
h. Psychological Operations	37
i. Medical	43
j. Signal	47
k. Army Aviation	48
l. Engineer	49
m. Air Cavalry Operations	62
n. Artillery	73
o. Information	77
 2. Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations.	
a. Personnel	79
b. Intelligence	79
c. Operations	79
d. Organization	82
e. Training	82
f. Logistics	83
g. Communications	85
h. Material	86
i. Other	87

Inclusions

1. Operations Narrative/Significant Activities

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AVIC-CC

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971. LCN 03F04-65 (23) (U)

1. (C) Operational Report

a. Operations.

(1) During the reporting period, the division continued close coordination and cooperation with the 1st Infantry Division (ARVN) and THUA THIEN Province and District officials. This close coordination has contributed greatly to the progress of Vietnamization. During this period, numerous combined operations were conducted with the ARVN. The largest operation combining ARVN, division and nondivisional assets was LAMSON 719 in QUANG TRI Province and LAOS. JEFFERSON GLEN/MONSOON PLAN 70 operations continued throughout the reporting period.

(2) The primary objective of JEFFERSON GLEN/MONSOON PLAN 70 is to provide a protective shield for the populated lowlands of THUA THIEN Province, to locate and destroy enemy forces, staging areas and forward cache sites, to protect vital lines of communications and to assist GVN officials to meet their pacification and development goals for 1970. The operation continues the concept of a complete integration of efforts of all agencies within the division area of operation to improve territorial security, protect the people against terrorism, improve the People's Self Defense Force (PSDF), develop local self management in administrative, economic and financial affairs, develop a greater national unity, improve the life of war victims, establish an information system to educate and motivate the people to participate in local development, and continue to build toward prosperity for all.

(3) To accomplish this mission during the northeast monsoon season, division units were repositioned in the piedmont and eastern mountain regions from their dry season dispositions deep in the canopied areas to the west. This repositioning permitted resupply operations by road which were necessary during extended periods of inclement weather. The division carried operations back into the canopy, conducting artillery raids and search and attack operations, as weather conditions improved beginning in January.

(4) Enemy losses inflicted by the division during Operation JEFFERSON GLEN/MONSOON PLAN 70 as of 30 April 1971:

Killed in Action (confirmed)	888	DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS; DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS. DOD DIR 5200.10
Detainees	41	
Prisoners of War	38	
Detainees	2	
Individual Weapons Captured	434	
Individual Weapons Destroyed	9	
Crew Served Weapons Captured	33	
Crew Served Weapons Destroyed	43	

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8

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division
(Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R) (U)

(5) Division Task Organization for the end of the reporting period
for Operation JEFFERSON GLEN/MONSOON PLAN 70 Page 41 (LAMSON 720
continuing).

1st Edg

1st Bn (Aml), 327th Inf
2nd Bn (Aml), 502nd Inf
2nd Bn (Aml), 320th Arty (DS)
Co A, 326th Engr Bn (DS)
42nd Inf Plat (Set Dog) (DS)
1/265th RRC
TACP 20 TASS (USAF)
1st PSSE (DS)
FSE/A/501st Sig Bn (Aml) (DS)
1/101st MP Co (Aml)
TM 101st MI Co (Div) (DS)

2nd Edg

2nd Bn (Aml), 501st Inf
1st Bn (Aml), 501st Inf
3rd Bn (Aml), 506th Inf
1st Bn (Aml), 502nd Inf
Co C, 326th Engr Bn (DS)
47th Inf Plat (Set Dog) (DS)
2TM, 101st MI Co (Div) (DS)
1/265th RRC
TACP 20 TASS (USAF)
FSE/A/501st Sig Bn (Aml) (DS)
2nd PSSE (DS)
2/101st MP Co (Aml)
34th PI Det (Field Service)
CP & Weather TM, 5th Weather TM
4 TMs, 4th PSYOP Det (DS)
1st Bn (Aml), 321st Arty (DS)

3rd Edg

1st Bn (Aml), 506th Inf
2nd Bn (Aml), 506th Inf
3rd Bn (Aml), 187th Inf
2nd Bn (Aml), 327th Inf
2nd Bn (Aml), 319th Arty (DS)
Co B, 326th Engr Bn (DS)
58th Inf Plat (Set Dog) (DS)
TM, 101st MI Co (Div) (DS)
3/265th RRC

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Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division
(Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS COMR-65 (R3) (U)

TACP 20 TASS (DEAF)
FSE/A/501st Sig Bn (Ambl) (DS)
3rd PSSE (DS)
3/101st MP Co (Ambl)
25th FI Egt (Field Service)
CB1 Weather TM, 5th Weather TM
2 TMs, 4th PSIGS Det (DS)

101st Div Arty (Ambl)

HMB (Ambl)
2nd Bn (Ambl), 11th Arm
4th Bn (Aerial Arty), 77th Arty
Btry A (Avn), 377th Arty (Ambl)
266th FA Det (Surv Radar)

101st Avn Gp (CMT) (Ambl)

101st Avn Bn (AH) (Ambl)
158th Avn Bn (AH) (Ambl)
159th Avn Bn (ASH) (Ambl)
163rd Avn Co (CS) (Ambl)

101st Div Spt Cwd (Ambl)

HHC & Band (Ambl)
5th Trans Bn (Ambl)
326th Med Bn (Ambl)
426th S&S Bn (Ambl)
801st Maint Bn (Ambl)
101st Admin Co (Ambl)

Division Troops

501st Sig Bn
326th Engr Bn
2nd Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav
101st MP Co
101st MI Co

(6) LAMSON 719

(a) Operation LAMSON 719 was initiated on 30 January 1971 as a PRAGO
of JEFFERSON GLEN/MONSOON PLAN 70. The mission of the division was

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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division
(Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFTR-65 (R3) (U)

to continue JEFFERSON GLEN and provide support to the combined XXIV Corps/I
Corps Operation LAMSON 719 in western QUANG TRI Province.

(b) The concept of the operation called for the 1st Bde, 5th Infantry Division (Mech) with one battalion from the 101st Airborne Division (Amb) OPCON to attack to clear and secure Route 9 to the LAOTIAN border; secure Fire Passes VANDERGRIFT and KHE SANH; and to cover and protect the deployment of US artillery to western QUANG TRI. On order, the 1st Bde, 101st Airborne Division (Amb) was to assume OPCON Task Force 1-61 from 1st Bde 5th Infantry (Mech) and conduct a coordinated defense of the central and eastern DMZ. An engineer Task Force was placed OPCON to the 45th Engineer Group for the initial combat engineer work in opening QL-9 and construction of the assault air strip at KHE SANH. Engineer elements from the 101st were to release engineer equipment on order to ARVN engineer units once the air strip at KHE SANH was completed. The ARVN objective of LAMSON 719 was to attack into IACS toward the NVA Base Area 604 to inflict maximum damage to enemy forces and supplies along the eastern BO CHI MINH TRAIL.

(c) The 101st Airborne Division (Amb) provided an infantry battalion to the 1st Bde, 5th Infantry Division (Mech) in QUANG TRI at the onset of the operation. In addition, the division assumed the operational and security responsibilities of units of the 1st Infantry Division (ARVN) in THUA THIEN and QUANG TRI Provinces, thus permitting their deployment into IACS. The Division opened Route 547 into the A SHAU VALLEY and conducted artillery raids as a diversion during Phase I of the operation. The 3rd Bde and four infantry battalions deployed to QUANG TRI Province. In March the 101st Airborne Division (Amb) assumed operational control of all United States Army tactical units in QUANG TRI and THUA THIEN Provinces and lines of communication supporting LAMSON 719. The Division's assets and resources were the reservoir from which LAMSON 719 was supported. The division closed KHE SANH and secured the movement out of western QUANG TRI of RVNAF and US units during the closing stages of the operation.

(d) LAMSON 719 proved to be a successful allied operation both in terms of achieving its objectives, and in demonstrating the ability of ARVN to conduct large scale operations. Direct assessment of destruction and damage produced by the 101st Airborne Division (Amb) across the VIETNAMESE/LAOTIAN border was limited to that attained by aerial observation. Most of the results were gathered by the ARVN and reported to I Corps.

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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Parol Landing 30 April 1971, HCS CSFCH-65 (R3) (U)

(e) The following are confirmed US totals for QUANG TRI Province in support of LAMSON 719 (30 Jan - 7 Apr)

Enemy Personnel

	<u>Killed</u>	<u>PW</u>
1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech)	78	1
11th Bde, 23rd Inf Div	120	0
101st Abn Div (Ambl)	122	5
TOTAL	320	6

Equipment Destroyed or Captured

	<u>IF</u>	<u>CSW</u>	<u>Mortar or Rocket FDS</u>	<u>Brakers</u>
1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech)	39	14	134	184
11th Bde, 23rd Inf Div	25	6	65	55
101st Abn Div (Ambl)	34	6	126	209
TOTAL	158	26	325	448

(f) Total killed by Helicopter (confirmed) for LAMSON 719.

2-17th Cav, 101st Abn Div (Ambl)	634
4-77th Arty, 101st Abn Div (Ambl)	1163
101st Avn Gp, 101st Abn Div (Ambl)	137

(g) Maneuver units and aviation assets arranged under parent organizations that participated in LAMSON 719.

101st Abn Div (Ambl)

HHC (-) 101st Abn Div (Ambl)
HHC 3rd Bde
1st Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf
2nd Bn (Ambl), 502nd Inf
1st Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf (-C & D Co)
2nd Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf
3rd Bn (Ambl), 187th Inf
2nd Bn (Ambl), 319th Arty
2nd Bn (Ambl), 11th Arty
4th Bn (Aerial Arty), 77th Arty (Ambl)
Co E, 326th Hqgr Bn (Ambl)
2nd Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav
101st Avn Gp

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12

Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division
(Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

101st Avn Bn (AH) (Amb1)
158th Avn Bn (AH) (Amb1)
159th Avn Bn (ASH) (Amb1)
571st Med (67th Med GP)
463rd Sqdn (CH-53 III MAF)

1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech)

1st Bn, 11th Inf (Mech)
1st Bn, 77th Arm
3rd Sqdn, 5th Cav
5th Bn, 4th Arty
Co A, 7th Engr
1st Bn, 61st Inf (Mech)

2nd Inf Div

HHC, 11th Bde
2nd Bn, 1st Inf (Mech)
4th Bn, 3rd Inf (Mech)
6th Bn, 11th Arty
Btry C, 1st Bn, 82nd Arty
Btry A, 3rd Bn, 82nd Arty
Co C, 26th Engr Bn
14th Avn Co (AH)
71st Avn Co (AH)
174th Avn Co (AH)
Trp F, 8th Cav
Trp H, 17th Cav
132nd (ASH) Co

1st Avn Bde (WEARY)

Trp B, 7th Sqdn, 1st Cav
Trp C, 7th Sqdn, 17th Cav
223rd Avn Bn HHC
172nd Avn Co
48th Avn Co
179th Avn Co
235th Avn Co (Aerial Wpn)

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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division
(Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFDR-65 (83) (U)

1st Cav Div (Amb)

Co D (Aerial Wpu), 227th Avn Bn

(7) LAMSON 720.

(a) On 14 April 1971 the 101st Airborne Division (Amb) initiated Operation LAMSON 720 under FRAGO 41 to JEFFERSON GLEN/MOONCON PLAN 70. The order called for a combined airmobile operation with the 1st Infantry Division (ARVN) (Reinf) conducting operations into the DA HONG/K SEAU VALLEY areas to destroy enemy supply bases in forward logistical areas. The operation called for the 1st Bde, 101st Airborne Division (Amb) to conduct airmobile assaults into the DA HONG River/A SEAU VALLEY area, utilizing the airmobile raid and fire support shell techniques, to destroy enemy supplies in enemy Base Area 129. The 3rd Bde employed similar techniques to achieve their objectives and destroy cache sites.

(b) Enemy losses inflicted by the division during Operation LAMSON 720 (14 April 1971 - continuing).

Killed in Action	130
Detainees	0
Prisoners of War	0
Individual Weapons Captured	6
Individual Weapons Destroyed	1
Crew Served Weapons Captured	1
Crew Served Weapons Destroyed	5

(8) G3 Air Activities. During the period Nov 70 - Apr 71 the following Air assets were expended in support of the 101st Airborne Division (Amb):

(a) FAC Directed Air Strikes (in sorties):	NOV	32
	DEC	139
	JAN	206
	FEB	181
	MAR	279
	APR	957
	TOTAL	1794

(b) Combat Skyspots/Beacons (in sorties):	NOV	391
	DEC	476
	JAN	285
	FEB	250
	MAR	357
	APR	358
	TOTAL	2117

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14

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division
(Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, MCS CSPCR-65 (R3) (U)

(c) USAF Gunships (in sorties):

NOV	00
DEC	00
JAN	00
FEB	02
MAR	00
APR	12
TOTAL	14

(d) USMC Fleaships (in sorties):

NOV	00
DEC	00
JAN	00
FEB	00
MAR	00
APR	02
TOTAL	02

(e) Ordnance Expended:

MONTH	HE (TONS)	M&PALM (TONS)	20mm Cannon (rds)	CHEMICAL AGENT (lbs)
NOV	1068.75	1.75	1500	0.0
DEC	1386.13	21.00	17670	- 0.0
JAN	1152.75	9.50	18310	3500.0
FEB	1019.00	4.00	12490	0.0
MAR	1592.25	36.00	56670	1400.0
APR	2533.75	161.00	70708	9600.0
TOTAL	8752.63	213.25	179528	14500.0

7.62mm (rds) CBU Canisters Air-ground Rockets

NOV	00	008	000
DEC	00	014	000
JAN	5900	044	033
FEB	2400	000	040
MAR	7600	012	069
APR	6200	200	000
TOTAL	22200	278	142

(f) ARC LIGHT Strikes in the 101st Airborne Division (Ambl) A.O.:

NOV	00
DEC	00
JAN	02
FEB	00
MAR	01
APR	23
TOTAL	26

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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division
(Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, PCS CSFAR-65 (R3) (U)

(g) Cumulative friendly casualties from 1 November 1970 to 30 April 1971.

UNIT	KIA	MIA	MIA	MWD	NFI	TOTALS
HHC/DIV	0	0	0	0	0	0
HHC/1BDE	2	0	0	0	1	12
HHC/2BDE	1	3	0	0	0	4
HHC/3BDE	4	10	0	0	6	20
3/187 INF	19	113	0	5	15	158
1/327 INF	5	13	0	15	26	59
2/327 INF	6	41	0	2	40	89
1/501 INF	16	91	0	4	21	132
2/501 INF	12	94	3	2	23	134
1/502 INF	7	44	0	1	20	72
2/502 INF	5	41	0	3	28	75
1/506 INF	5	57	0	4	24	90
2/506 INF	11	65	0	6	17	99
3/506 INF	6	33	0	0	28	67
DIV ARTY	5	37	0	4	19	65
101 AVE GP	22	62	13	8	29	134
SPT CORD	10	25	0	4	11	50
2/17 CAV	17	85	10	8	11	131
L/75 RANGERS	9	20	2	3	4	38
326 ENGR	3	10	0	1	18	32
501 SIG	0	0	0	0	2	2
101 MP	0	0	0	1	1	2
TOTAL	165	858	28	71	343	1465

As Of 30 April 1971

b. Training.

(1) Training for divisional and non-divisional personnel continued at the Screaming Eagle Replacement Training School (SERTS). Five courses of instruction were conducted, to include:

(a) Replacement training for all new in-country personnel assigned to division except for enlisted personnel in the grade E-9 and officers in the grade of O-4 and above.

(b) Combat Commanders Course (CCC) for all company grade and combat support officers assigned to the division. The POI familiarizes the student with concepts and tactics used in the division.

(c) Combat Leaders Course for junior noncommissioned officers and potential noncommissioned officers. The POI includes instruction in selected general subjects, as well as weapons, tactics, and fire support.

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16

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division
(Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFTR-15 (R3) (U)

(d) Live Lucag 66 Program. This course trains scouts to work with infantry units within the division. A US trooper is selected as the scout's "Buddy" and trains with the scout, assisting him to learn the duties of a scout.

(e) Advanced Marksmanship Program. Selected personnel from infantry battalions are pretrained in advanced marksmanship procedures with the M-16 Rifle.

(f) Sniper School. This is an eighteen day course designed to provide commanders with highly skilled marksmen. Personnel train with the M-21 weapon system to make kills consistently at ranges up to 900 meters during daylight hours and 400 meters during the hours of darkness.

(2) On 27 March 1971 the division discontinued replacement training for infusion personnel. This action was taken because in-country transfer personnel are generally familiar with airmobile operations and have already received mandatory, in-country training.

(3) Battalion refresher training continued with very few changes. The battalions modified their lesson plans in appropriate subject areas to cover problems that might be experienced during the southwest monsoon dry season. In addition, emphasis was placed on training in the following areas: mines and booby traps, field hygiene, small unit tactics, equipment maintenance, and prevention of heat injuries.

(4) Training assistance to RVNAF has now been reduced to one mobile training team. This MTT, composed of men of the Screaming Eagle Band, offers training assistance in music to the THUA THIEN Sector and 1st ARVN Division Bands on a twice-a-week basis.

c. Chemical. During the period 1 November 1970 through 30 April 1971 the Division Chemical Section with the 10th Chemical Platoon (DG) and the 20th Chemical Detachment (under its operational control) continued to provide combat and combat service support to the units of the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile).

During the reporting period chemical personnel performed the following missions in support of LAMSON 719, LAMSON 720, and other operations:

<u>TYPE MISSION</u>	<u>MISSIONS</u>	<u>SCOUTS</u>	<u>AMOUNT</u>
Airborne Personnel Detector (sniffer)	54	54	122 source locations
PMIS Slurry, Retroreflective	3	6	260 gallons
Flame Drop	153	716	6268 55-gallon drums (112 secondary explosions)
Bulk CS2 (Persistent)	6	16	448 drums
	5	8	24 BLU-52 A/B Bombs

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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division
(Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (43) (U)

<u>TIME MISSION</u>	<u>MISSIONS</u>	<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>AMOUNT</u>
Bunker Seeding Operations	5	1A	85 JERSPOs
Tactical CS (Non-persistent) Defoliation:	22	25	243 E-158 Canisters
Herbicide, Agent Blue	3	4	300 gallons Agent Blue
E-8 CS Inchr Issued	1A	1A	68
Teams Inspect/Install	57	1A	806/23
Fougasse Issued	1A	1A	586 Drums
Teams Inspect/Install	40	1A	1673/231
Hush Flares Inspect/Install	16	1A	586/127
Maintenance Teams	72	1A	1A
Protective Masks Inspected	1A	1A	8821 Masks
Repair/Evac	1A	1A	1822/815 Masks
FFTs Inspect/Evac	5	1A	13/12 Flamethrowers

New Techniques. Padding for Flame Nets. Flame drops are conducted by releasing 55-gallon drums of 4% thickened fuel from cargo nets slung beneath CH-47 helicopters. The metal clasps and rings of the cargo net are padded with fibre padding and tape to prevent aircraft skin damage when one end of the net is released. During LAMCON 719 the large number of flame drop missions created a shortage of fibre padding and tape due to deterioration after successive drops. In order to continue flame drop missions a technique was developed in which sections of rubber inner tubes were wrapped around the fibre padding and tied in place with rubber laces, also cut from inner tubes. This produced a more effective and permanent padding since the rubber covering is more durable and flexible than the tape, which tore easily.

d. Intelligence.

(1) Enemy Situation.

(a) At the beginning of the reporting period, enemy units were located as follows:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
HQ MRTTH	BA 611
4th Regt HQ	YC9781
K4B Inf Bn	ZC1897
K4C Inf Bn	ZC0193
5th Regt HQ	YC6382
804th Inf Bn	YC9398
810th Inf Bn	YD5715
K32 Rkt Arty Bn	YC7294
Chi Thua I Sapper Bn	YC8195

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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division
(Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RPT 0 FM-65 (A3) (U)

UNIT	ORIGIN
Ch1 Thwa II Sapper Bn	YD0014
439th Inf Bn	YD0019
6th Regt HQ	YD0018
800th Inf Bn	YD0015
802nd Inf Bn	YD0019
806th Inf Bn	YD0024
K35 Rkt Arty Bn	YD0020
K12 Sapper Bn	YD0018
7th Front	YD0130
808th Inf Bn	YD0339
814th Inf Bn	YD0840
K34 Rkt Arty Bn	YD0630
K10 Sapper Bn	YD0504
K11 Sapper Bn	YD0546
K12 Trans Bn	YD0327
3243 Div HQ	YD0717
803rd Regt HQ	YD0415
1st Inf Bn	YD0314
2nd Inf Bn	YD0408
3rd Inf Bn	YD0310
U/I Trans Bn	YD0914
812th Regt HQ	YD0025
4th Inf Bn	YD0834
5th Inf Bn	YD0421
6th Inf Bn	YD0730
K19 Sapper Bn/304th Div	YD0520
29th Regt HQ	YD0317
7th Inf Bn	YD0823
8th Inf Bn	YD0018
9th Inf Bn	YD0319
675th Arty Regt	SA 601
K3 Sapper Bn	YD0913
11A Recon Bn	YD0298
Hq B5 Front	YD0082
12th AT Bn	DMS
13th Arty Bn	DMS
14th AA Bn	DMS
15th Engr Bn	Unlocated
16th Sig Bn	DMS
17th Trans Bn	DMS
19th Med Bn	DMS
33rd Sapper Bn	YD0439
75th AA Bn (12.7 mm)	YD0561

CONFIDENTIAL

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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division
(Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RGS COMR-65 (03) (U)

UNIT	LOCATION
304th Div HQ	Unlocated
FE 304th Div	XD9542
29th Sapper Bn	YD1020
9th Inf Regt HQ	YD0945
1st Inf Bn	YD0925
2nd Inf Bn	YD1731
3rd Inf Bn	YD2938
24B Inf Regt	Unlocated
66th Inf Regt HQ	XD9533
7th Inf Bn	XD9836
8th Inf Bn	YD0637
9th Inf Bn	YD0530
320th Div HQ	Unlocated
48th Inf Regt	Unlocated
52nd Inf Regt	Unlocated
64th Inf Regt	Unlocated
308th Div HQ	Unlocated
36th Inf Regt	Unlocated
88th Inf Regt	Unlocated
102nd Inf Regt	Unlocated
27th Inf Regt (Indep)	XD9254
1st Inf Bn	YD0563
2nd Inf Bn	XD9255
3rd Inf Bn	YD0459
31st Local Force Gp	YD1185
27th Inf Bn	YD1144
138th Inf Regt (Indep)	Unlocated
246th Inf Regt (Indep) HQ	XD9262
1st Inf Bn	XD0708
2nd Inf Bn	XD8326
3rd Inf Bn	XD0461
270th Inf Regt (Indep)	YD1936
126th Naval Sapper Regt	YD2189
84th Rkt Arty Regt	XD3269
164th Arty Regt	XD0694
2nd Arty Bn	YD0755
240th Arty Regt	Unlocated

(b) November 1970.

1. MRTH. During November, activity by MRTH units was generally at a lower level than previous months. The 4th Regt directed attacks against the HUE-DA NANG RR, traffic on QL-1, and bridges in THU LOC (D), their traditional AO. The 5th Regt activity was concentrated primarily in the Fire Base BRICK (YC335994) and Fire Base FATHSVN (YD476111) areas.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

20

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RS 03F R-65 (R3) (5)

The 6th Regt operations consisted mostly of attacks by fire in the vicinity of Camp Evans. The 7th Front was the one MRLB unit which was responsible for a higher level of activity in November than the previous month. Contacts were made with elements of the 44th Inf Bn, 48th Inf Bn, and the K10 Sapper Bn of the 7th Front as they were conducting the moonson campaign at HAI LANG (D) and HAI PHU BANG (D). The 324B Division continued its logistical and security role in western QUANG TRI (P) and THUA THIEN (P), its traditional AO.

2 B5 Front. Activity in the B5 Front was light during November. Activity was characterized by attacks by fire, mining incidents, and ground contacts with small size enemy forces, primarily in the eastern and central DMZ areas. Activity in the western QUANG TRI area was limited to sensor indications and bunker and trail activity. The most significant incidents occurred in the eastern and central DMZ areas. On 8 November at XD9985, 3/3/2 ARVN received 125 x 82mm mortar rounds resulting in one KIA and one WIA. Of the 14 attacks by fire in the central DMZ area, Fire Base TAN LAM BAC (YD019593) received seven.

3 VC/VOI. The number of VC/VOI incidents increased from 19 in October to 28 in November. Of the total incidents, 61 percent were acts of terrorism and 32 percent were rice/tax collections. A significant increase was noted in kidnapping and sabotage incidents; however, propaganda incidents decreased from October's total. The significant increase in activity in November can be attributed to the efforts of the 4th Regt in support of VC/VOI units in and around PHU LOC (D). The PHU LOC Special Action Unit (PLSAU) in conjunction with the 621st Bn/5th Regt, increased activity in PHU LOC (D) to its highest level since the 101st Airborne Division began operating in THUA THIEN (P).

(c) December 1970.

1 MRTTH. OB analysis indicated that the 4th Regt disbanded the K4C Bn and used those personnel to reinforce the K4B Bn. The 5th Regt continued its relatively low level of activity in the Fire Base ERICK (IC835994) and Fire Base KATHRYN (YD476111) areas. Elements of the 6th Regt continued to infiltrate PHONG DIEN (D) to conduct harassment of Allied installations. A rallier from the Medical Section of MRTTH stated that the K11 Sapper Bn/7th Front had been disbanded and its personnel assigned to the K10 Sapper Bn/7th Front. The 324B Division continued to provide logistical support throughout the month.

2 B5 Front. Activity in the B5 Front was light during December. Activity was characterized by attacks by fire occurring primarily in the eastern DMZ area and ground contacts with small size enemy forces. Mining incidents were concentrated primarily in the central DMZ area.

CONFIDENTIAL

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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 191st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RGS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

The most significant incidents were in the eastern DMZ area where, on 16 December at YD1875, 1/4/2 ARVN contacted an unknown size and received 150 rounds of 81mm and 60mm mortar fire; on 27 December Popular Force Units 95, 98, 100, 164, and 170, with assistance from 3-17th Cav, engaged an enemy platoon with SAF resulting in 17 NVA KIA and one NVA PW from the 126 Naval Sapper Regt.

3 VC/VCI. The number of VC/VCI related incidents increased from 28 in November to 38 in December. Of the total incidents, 64 percent were terror oriented; and 29 percent were rice/tax collections and propaganda incidents. MHU 100 (D) again maintained its high level of VC/VCI activity with 47 percent of the total incidents. VC/VCI activity also increased in PHONG DIEN and HUONG TRIA Districts. The month of December gave indications of efforts by the enemy to increase his activity in the lowlands.

(d) January 1971.

1 MRTTH. During January the 4th Regt failed to mount any coordinated attacks against US/ARVN installations. The 5th Regt continued to be active in the Fire Base BRICK (Y0835994) vicinity and was using the area between Fire Base BRICK (Y0835994) and Fire Base LA SON (Y0931008) to infiltrate into the lowlands. The 6th Regt continued its harassment of of PHONG DIEN (D) and the CAMP EVANS area, working closely with the local VC in these areas. Activity in the 7th Front decreased sharply with all reported incidents being EBTs. Reports indicated that the 803rd and 29th Regts/324B Division were assuming logistical support and security roles for base areas, cache sites, and infiltration routes in the A SHAU VALLEY and eastern Base Area 611 areas.

2 B5 Front. Activity in the B5 Front during January increased considerably over that reported in December as witnessed by attacks by fire, mining incidents, and ground contacts. These occurred primarily in the eastern and central DMZ area. Activity in western QUANG TRI was limited primarily to that detected by ground sensors and visual reconnaissance. The most significant incidents occurred in the western DMZ area, where on 2 January at YD353807, the 2-11th Cav and the 1/3/2 ARVN received three 122mm rockets, three 105mm arty rounds, and 694 x 82mm mortar rounds resulting in seven WIA. In addition, on 2 January at YD246774, a recon team from 1/3/2 ARVN received 130 x 82mm mortar rounds but suffered no casualties; and on 15 January at YD123728 B/L-61 engaged an unknown size enemy force with organic weapons fire resulting in 17 enemy KIA. Eight US personnel were wounded in this action.

2 VC/VCI. The number of VC/VCI related incidents decreased from 38 in December to 29 in January. There was a proportionate decrease in terror oriented incidents, and rice/tax collections were 50 percent

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

22

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division
(Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RGS CSFAC-45 (R3) (U)

less than those in the previous month. However, sabotage and assassinations increased slightly during January. PHU LOC (D) maintained its high level of activity, while HUNG DIEN (D) and PHU THA (D) were second in total incidents for the month. A 525 MIAC report stated that VC cadre had been instructed to establish communication and to guide NVA regulars into the lowlands.

(e) February 1971.

1 MTH. The enemy's activity in the 4th Regt AO consisted primarily of mining incidents on or near the RUE-DA VANG RD. The level of activity in the 5th Regt generally decreased, but continued to be moderate in the Fire Base BRICK (YC835994) area, while the Regt showed a renewed interest in Route 547. Contact with the 6th Regt decreased in February and activity continued to be of a harassing nature. Reported incidents from the 7th Front remained at a low level consisting of sporadic activity throughout the AO. Units of the 324B Division continued their logistical support role, while the 31st Regt/324B Division left RVN to oppose Operation LAMSON 719.

2 B5 Front. Activity in the B5 Front increased to a high level during February; the increase being attributable to Operation LAMSON 719. Activity in the form of ground contacts and attacks by fire was reported in western QUANG TRI for the first time since October. Areas of concentrated activity were the eastern DMZ vicinity Fire Bases A-1 (YD270734) and A-2 (YD213734), the Rock Pile area, and central and western QUANG TRI, vicinity Route QL-9. Fire Base A-1 received 11 attacks by fire and Fire Base A-2 received 12 attacks by fire. Most of the activity in the ROCK PILE area was centered in the vicinity of Fire Base SCOTCH (XD912563). On 13 February at XD912550, a company sized enemy element was engaged with artillery fire resulting in 30 NVA KIA. On 3 February at XD9025, gunships attacked an ammunition storage area resulting in a total of 44 secondary explosions. The bulk of activity in western QUANG TRI occurred along the LAOTIAN border areas of QL-9 and was in the form of ambushes by indirect fire and SAF.

3 VC/VCI. The number of VC/VCI related incidents decreased from 29 in January to 27 in February. Decreases were noted in rice/tax collections and propaganda activity. Acts of terror increased slightly, while intelligence collections and kidnappings remained at the same level. There was a significant increase in sabotage incidents during the month of February, due primarily to the greater number of mining incidents along the RUE-DA VANG RD in PHU LOC (D). There were 14 mining incidents along the railroad in February compared to 7 in January.

(f) March 1971.

1 MTH. March saw an increase of activity in the 4th Regt AO. Attacks were launched against RR bridges and there were incidents of

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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division
(Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RGS OPCR-65 (R2) (2)

vehicles receiving fire in the HAI VAN PAS area. The 5th Regt activity increased sharply throughout the AO. The centers of activity were in the vicinity of Fire Base LA SON (YD931048), Fire Base HAI SON (YD625095), and western Route 547. The 6th Regt decreased its level of activity to harassment and attacks by fire against COME EVANS. Two battalions of the 6th Regt were identified in the 5th Regt AO in the vicinity of Fire Base VIGUEL (YD549034). It is now believed that this represents a temporary extension of the 6th Regt's AO, brought about by the continued commitment of 324th Division forces in LAOS. Operations by the 7th Front increased and consisted of harassment and rice collection operations in the lowlands of HAI LANG (D). PW reports indicated that the 303rd Regt and the 624th Regt of the 324th Division were operating in eastern LAOS during Operation LAMSON 719. An agent also indicated that the 29th Regt participated in that operation.

- 2 B5 Front. Activity in the B5 Front continued at a high level and increased significantly over that reported in February. Activity was characterized by ground contacts with small size enemy forces, numerous incidents of attacks by fire, and mine detonations throughout the AO of the B5 Front. Concentrations of activity took the form of ambushes along QL-9 from the ROCK PILE area to the LAOTIAN border and large scale attacks by indirect fire centered on the KHE SANH Combat Base and its airfield. The central and western QUANG TRI areas were the scene of the most significant events during March. On 3 and 21 March, Fire Base VANDERBILT (YD002488) received sapper attacks that destroyed a total of 36,000 gallons of JP-4 fuel and 8,600 x 20mm rounds. There were 19 reported attacks by fire on KHE SANH (YD853418); KHE SANH received a sapper attack and 120-150 rounds of indirect fire on 23 March 1971. Results of the attack were 3 US KIA, 13 US WIA, one ARVN WIA, 2 NVA KIA, one NVA PW, two aircraft destroyed, four aircraft damaged, and two rear points damaged. On 25 March at YD813485, 1/5/1-1 Cav received SAP and RPG rounds from an unknown size enemy force. Aerial rocket artillery and FAC's were employed. Results of the contact were one US KIA, 4 US WIA, and 36 NVA KIA.

- 3 VC/VCI. The number of VC/VCI related incidents increased significantly from 27 in February to 82 in March. This was the highest total of VC/VCI incidents for a one month period since September of 1969. Sabotage incidents decreased slightly from 15 in February to 11 in March. Terrorism, kidnapping, rice/tax collections, and propaganda incidents all increased sharply during March. HAU LC (D) accounted for 50 percent of the total incidents. Agent reports received during the month attributed the sudden rise in activity to the VC cadre's attempt to draw allied attention to the lowlands, and relieve pressure on NVA units engaged in Operation LAMSON 719. With the conclusion of LAMSON 719, activity began to decrease to its normal level.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

24

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division
(Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS C/PDR-65 (R3) (U)

(g) April 1971.

1 MRTTH. During April, reported activity remained constant in the 4th Regt AO. Incidents were spread throughout the area and consisted primarily of BBTs and rice/tax collection incidents. The reported incidents from the 5th Regt were concentrated to the north and east of Fire Base BRICK. There was heavy contact in the area where elements of two 6th Regt Bns were identified in late March. This is the second month that the 6th Regt has extended beyond its normal AO. The 6th Regt continued combat sporadic harassment throughout the AO. A general increase in activity was noticed in the 7th Front AO. Most of this increase is associated with rice collection operations. A captured document referred to a "7th Front Spring Campaign" scheduled to begin after 15 April. Little information was reported concerning units of the 324B Division during April. According to PWs taken in late March, the 803rd and 812th Regts are moving back into their traditional areas of operation after LAMSON 719. An agent report indicated the 29th Regt is also returning. Other intelligence sources confirm the eastward movement of the 29th and 812th Regts. However, recent analysis indicates that the 803rd Regt remains in LACS south of QL-9. The continuing deployment of the 803rd Regt away from its normal AO is probably due in part to heavy casualties suffered by the unit during Operation LAMSON 719, and in part to the enemy's fear of additional Allied incursions into Base Areas 604 and 611.

2 B5 Front. The B5 Front AO experienced a sharp decrease in activity during April. Activity was characterized by sporadic contacts and attacks by fire. Mining incidents also decreased considerably. There were no significant events during the month. This lull in activity is attributed to the withdrawal of the ARVN troops from LACS. The enemy is believed to be resting and recuperating from the heavy fighting during Operation LAMSON 719.

3 VC/VCI. VC/VCI related activity declined significantly during early weeks of April, then increased again to a high level of activity by the end of the month. This is in contrast to the sharp increase of the previous month. In April, there were 49 reported incidents as compared to 62 for March. FHU LOC (D) continued to show the highest total of VC/VCI incidents with 28. Kidnapping, sabotage, and propaganda incidents declined during April, while terror-oriented and rice/tax collection incidents have shown a slight increase. This decrease in activity may be a result of logistical shortages caused by Operation LAMSON 719, but time will be required to confirm this.

(h) Comparison table of VC/VCI incidents for reporting period
Nov 70 - Apr 71.

CONFIDENTIAL

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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division
(Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RGS CEFOR-65 (R3) (U)

1 November, December, and January.

DISTRICT	TERROR	KID	SAB	ASAS	FIN/SCON	PROP	INTEL	TOTAL
Phong Dien	0/1/2	0/3/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/1/0	0/0/1	0/0/0	0/5/3
Quang Dien	1/0/0	1/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	2/0/0
Huong Dien	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0
Vinh Loc	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0
Phu Vang	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0
Phu Thu	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0
Phu Loc	0/3/2	4/4/2	6/5/7	1/1/2	6/2/2	0/2/2	1/0/0	18/17/17
Huong Tra	1/1/2	2/3/2	0/0/0	0/1/2	0/2/2	0/0/0	0/0/0	3/13/8
Huong Thuy	0/1/1	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	2/1/0	0/0/0	0/0/1	2/2/2
Nam Hoa	1/0/1	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	1/0/0	0/0/0	1/0/0	3/0/1
Hue City	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0
TOTAL	3/6/3	7/10/4	6/5/7	1/2/4	9/12/4	0/2/3	2/0/1	28/37/31

2 February, March, and April

DISTRICT	TERROR	KID	SAB	ASAS	FIN/SCON	PROP	INTEL	TOTAL
Phong Dien	2/4/6	1/1/0	1/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/3/0	0/0/0	4/8/6
Quang Dien	0/0/1	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/1	0/0/0	0/0/2
Huong Dien	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0
Vinh Loc	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0
Phu Vang	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0
Phu Thu	0/0/2	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/1
Phu Loc	1/6/3	1/6/2	14/13/8	0/0/0	1/4/11	0/5/4	0/0/0	17/34/28
Huong Tra	0/0/1	1/3/2	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/6/3	0/2/1	0/0/0	1/12/7
Huong Thuy	1/2/2	0/1/1	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	1/2/3
Nam Hoa	0/0/0	0/0/1	1/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/1/0	1/1/0	2/2/1
Hue City	1/1/1	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	1/1/1
TOTAL	5/12/15	3/11/5	16/13/8	0/0/0	2/19/14	0/12/6	1/1/0	26/59/49

(1) At the end of the reporting period enemy units were relocated as follows:

UNITS RELOCATED	NEW LOCATION	OLD LOCATION
Chi Thua I Sapper Bn/5th Indep Regt	YC7095	YC8195
800th Bn/6th Indep Regt	YD5101	YD3725
802nd Bn/6th Indep Regt	YD5202	YD2619
324B Div Hq	XD6020	YD2717
803rd Regt Hq	XD6010	YD3415
1st Inf Bn	XD6010	YD3212
2nd Inf Bn	XD6020	YD3608
3rd Inf Bn	XD6520	YD2310
812th Regt Hq	XD7431	YD2025
4th Inf Bn	YD7431	YD2834

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

26

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division
(Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, HCS GEFM-65 (R3) (U)

<u>UNITS RELOCATED</u>	<u>NEW LOCATION</u>	<u>OLD LOCATION</u>
5th Inf Bn	XD8434	YD8421
6th Inf Bn	YD8320	YD8730
29th Regt HQ	XD7416	YD3317
7th Inf Bn	XD8416	YD8223
8th Inf Bn	XD8815	YD8012
9th Inf Bn	YD8816	YD8019
3rd Sapper Bn/B5 Front HQ	Unlocated	YD8939
29th Sapper Bn/304th Div	Unlocated	YD1040
9th Inf Regt/304th Div	Unlocated	YD0925
1st Bn	Unlocated	YD1945
2nd Bn	Unlocated	YD1731
3rd Bn	Unlocated	YD2938
6th Inf Regt/304th Div	Unlocated	XD9533
7th Bn	Unlocated	XD9836
8th Bn	Unlocated	YD0637
9th Bn	Unlocated	YD0630

(j) Units not previously located.

<u>UNIT LOCATED</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>SOURCE</u>
15th Engr Bn/B5 Front HQ	XD9143	Documents/ Analysis, Mar 71
24B Inf Regt/304th Div	XD7037	Rallier, Mar 71
4th Bn	XD5640	Rallier, Mar 71
5th Bn	XD7037	Rallier, Mar 71
6th Bn	XD5039	Rallier, Mar 71
303th Div HQ	XD6871	FW, Mar 71
36th Inf Regt HQ	XD5750	FW, Mar 71
1st Bn	XD5749	FW, Mar 71
2nd Bn	XD5849	FW, Mar 71
3rd Bn	XD5450	FW, Mar 71
88th Inf Regt	XD5946	FW, Mar 71
102nd Inf Regt HQ	XD7240	Documents/ Analysis, Mar 71
7th Bn	XD6537	Rallier, Mar 71
64th Inf Regt/320th Div	XD4547	FW, Mar 71
7th Bn	XD5044	FW, Mar 71
4th Bn/270th Regt (Indep)	XD6652	Documents/ Analysis, Mar 71

(k) Units no longer carried. K11 Sapper Bn/7th Front disbanded:
personnel used to reinforce K10 Sapper Bn. K40 Inf Bn/5th Indep Regt
disbanded: personnel used to reinforce K4B Inf Bn. 439th Inf Bn/5th

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFGR-05 (P3) (U)

Indep Regt disbanded; personnel sapper trained, reassigned to 5th Regt. K19 Sapper Bn/304th Div is no longer SICON to 324th Division.

(1) Units not previously carried. The 70P Front, vicinity XD5762, is a corps level headquarters which directed NVA operations during LAMSON 719. As this was the first appearance of the 70P Front, it is not yet known whether this was a temporary task force HQ established to direct NVA operations during Operation LAMSON 719, or a permanent corps level HQ which will direct NVA operations in the northern VN-LAO border area.

(2) G2 Air Operations. During the period 1 November 1970 to 30 April 1971, 152 hand held photo missions were conducted by the Imagery Interpretation Section and the 226th PAC. 206 photo targets and 143 infrared targets were completed by the 131st SAC. Ninety-seven infrared and photo targets were flown for the 101st Airborne Division (Aml) by the 7th AF.

(3) G2 Ground Surveillance Operations.

(a) During this period Phase I sensors have been gradually replaced by Phase III sensors. As of 30 April there were 357 sensors employed in 93 sensor strings in the 101st Airborne Division (Aml) area of operations. All strings in the division reconnaissance zone are being monitored by Air Force aircraft. Activations are relayed from QUANG TRI (DART) to CAMP EAGLE by means of a direct telephone line.

(b) Each brigade has a BASS (Battle Area Surveillance System) employed at brigade headquarters with sensor relay equipment on OP CHECKMATE, Fire Base TOMAHAWK, and Fire Base KATHAYN. In addition, there are manual readout sites at OP HILTON, Fire Bases BRICK, TOMAPANK, RAKESAW, CAMP EVANS, and HUU GIA.

(c) Sensor strings are classified in one of three roles: intelligence, security, and target acquisition. Current percentages by classification are: 30% intelligence, 44% security, and 26% target acquisition.

(d) There are currently 197 PSID (Patrol Seismic Intrusion Detector) sets in use in the division. Personnel receive instruction in use and capabilities of PSIDs during SERTS training at CAMP EVANS.

(4) Counterintelligence Section.

(a) During the period 1 November 1970 to 30 April 1971, the CI Section, 101st Military Intelligence Company, 101st Airborne Division

CONFIDENTIAL

24

CONFIDENTIAL

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division
(Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RSC GCPOR-65 (R2) (U)

(A1b1) engaged in a variety of activities in support of its primary mission of safeguarding the 101st Airborne Division (A1b1) from enemy sabotage, espionage and subversion.

(b) IG and CI inspections of unit's personnel, document and physical security programs were conducted to detect and eliminate security violations and vulnerable areas subject to enemy exploitation.

(c) Personnel security investigations, complaint type investigations, and limited investigations were conducted to insure the validity of security clearances within the division. Clearances for 3404 replacements were validated, 1124 SECRET clearances were granted, local files checks for 8623 personnel were conducted, as were 1100 USAIRR checks and 612 CRYPTO ACCESS clearances.

(d) In order to assist the CI in the hiring of Post Exchange, Open Mess, and Club Custodian personnel, this office initiates a USAIRR check. In these cases, the individual's finance records and his 201 file are reviewed. Upon receipt of favorable results of the USAIRR checks, USARV Form 235-R (Request For Investigative Repository Check) is forwarded to the ACofS, G1. When USAIRR checks result in unfavorable information, USARV attaches an extract of the derogatory information to the Form 235-R. This is forwarded immediately to the ACofS, G1.

(e) Technical support in the form of fingerprinting, changing safe combination, recovery of lost combinations, and repair of security containers was continuously provided both from division and supporting CI teams.

(f) The CI Section maintained liaison with XXIV Corps Security Section, DA NANG; 525th MI Group, PHU BAI and QUANG TRI; The Pacification, Security, and Coordination Headquarters, HUE; Advisers for the National Police; National Police Field Force; Police Special Branch; Province Interrogation Center; Provincial Reconnaissance Unit; Chieu Hoi; and Revolutionary Cadre, JUE; the 517th MI Detachment, QUANG TRI; PICCC, CIOCC, and DIOCC in HUE; and the DIOCCs in THUA THIEN and QUANG TRI Provinces.

(5) Interrogation Section.

(a) During the period 1 January 1971 to 24 April 1971, the IFW Section, 101st Military Intelligence Company, 101st Airborne Division (A1b1), processed twelve (12) prisoners of war (12 NVA/PW, 0 VC/PW), three (3) NVA Hoi Chanhs, and one hundred and eighty-eight (188) batches of enemy documents captured by units of the 101st Airborne Division (A1b1).

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RUS CSFAR-65 (R3) (U)

(b) In addition, twenty-two (22) prisoners of war (21 NVA/HW, 1 VC/HW), seven (7) ralliers (7 NVA/HW, 0 VC/HW) and an unknown number of enemy document batches from ARVN units in the tactical area were processed.

(6) G2 Plans/Order of Battle Sections. The G2 Order of Battle Section continued to monitor, analyze, and report the enemy situation throughout Northern Military Region I. Continuing emphasis was placed on the timely analysis and dissemination of collected intelligence information to all consumers. During Operation LAMSON 719, the Order of Battle Section provided intelligence personnel for the Tactical Command Post at CAMP ROBERTS thus facilitating on-the-spot intelligence analysis at both CAMP EAGLE and CAMP ROBERTS.

(7) Weather.

(a) November 1970. The average rainfall over the coastal plain was 29.5 inches, which is about 7 inches more than that expected. Significant amounts of precipitation occurred on 18 days. No thunderstorms were observed over the coastal plains. Fog occurred in significant amounts on 16 days and was normally associated with light drizzle and rain. Ceilings of less than 1000 feet and/or visibility less than 3 miles occurred for 7 hours or more on 16 days, which was approximately twice the number of days expected for these conditions for the month. Ceilings greater than or equal to 5000 feet and visibility greater than or equal to 5 miles occurred on 5 days over the coastal plain. Maximum temperatures were 3 degrees lower than normal with average maximum temperatures of 75 degrees F. Average minimum temperatures were 1 degree lower than normal with an average minimum temperature of 68 degrees F.

(b) December 1970. The average rainfall over the coastal plain was 16.5 inches which is about 5 inches above normal. Significant amounts of precipitation occurred on 21 days. No thunderstorms were observed over the coastal plains. Fog occurred in significant amounts on 19 days and was normally associated with light rain and drizzle. Ceilings of less than 1000 feet and/or visibility less than 3 miles occurred for 7 hours or more on 17 days, which was approximately twice the number of days expected for this month. Ceilings greater than or equal to 5000 feet and/or visibility greater than or equal to 5 miles occurred on 7 days over the coastal plain. Maximum temperatures were about normal at 75°F along the coastal plain.

(c) January 1971. The average rainfall over the coastal plain was 4.5 inches, which is almost two inches less than the mean monthly

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

30

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division.
(Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RGS GCFR-65 (R3) (U)

precipitation for January. Significant amounts of precipitation occurred on 19 days. No thunderstorms were observed over the coastal plain. Fog was present in significant amounts on 13 days and was normally associated with light rain and drizzle. Ceilings less than 1000 feet and/or visibility less than 3 miles occurred for 7 hours or more on 9 days, which is one day less than the average for this month. Ceilings greater than or equal to 5000 feet and/or visibility greater than or equal to 5 miles occurred on 8 days. Maximum temperatures were 3 degrees lower than normal with an average maximum temperature of 70°F. Average minimum temperatures were 3 degrees lower than normal with an average minimum temperature of 68°F.

(d) February 1971. The average rainfall over the coastal plain was 3.17 inches which is just about one inch over the normal for February. Significant amounts of precipitation occurred on 7 days. One day with thunderstorms occurred over the coastal plains and 2 days over the mountains. Fog occurred in significant amounts on 16 days and was normally associated with light rain and drizzle. Ceilings less than 1000 feet and visibility less than 3 miles occurred for 7 hours on 10 days which is near normal for this month. Ceilings greater than or equal to 5000 feet and visibility greater than or equal to 5 miles occurred on 10 days over the coastal plain and on 8 days at KHE SANH. Maximum temperatures were near normal with an average maximum temperature of 74°F. Average minimum temperatures were 2 degrees below normal with an average minimum temperature of 62°F.

(e) March 1971. The average rainfall over the coastal plain was 1.95 inches which is about one half an inch less than normal for this month. Significant amounts of precipitation occurred on 6 days. Thunderstorms occurred on two days along the coastal plain. Fog occurred in significant amounts on 20 days in QUANG TRI Province and on 7 days in THUA THIEN Province, and was associated with both showers and light rain and drizzle. Ceilings less than 1000 feet and/or visibility less than 3 miles occurred for 7 hours or more in QUANG TRI Province on 8 days and on 3 days in THUA THIEN Province. Ceilings greater than or equal to 5000 feet and visibility greater than or equal to 5 miles occurred on 16 days over the coastal plain and on 5 days over the mountains. The average maximum temperatures were 3 degrees above normal at 83° along the coastal plain. Average minimum temperatures were 1 degree above normal at 68°F.

(f) April 1971. The average rainfall over the coastal plain was 0.31 inches which was over 2 inches below normal for this month. Significant amounts of precipitation occurred on 3 days. Thunderstorms

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 1st Airborne Division
(Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, MOS 15FR-65 (R3) (U)

occurred over the coastal plain on 3 days during the month. Ceilings less than 1000 feet and/or visibility less than 3 miles for 7 hours or more did not occur in April. Ceilings greater than or equal to 5000 feet and visibility greater than or equal to 5 miles occurred on 25 days over the coastal plain. The average maximum temperature was 90°F which was 3 degrees above normal for the month. Average minimum temperatures were near normal with an average minimum temperature of 73°F.

9. Personnel.

(1) During the reporting period, the division Adjutant General's office undertook a study to enhance replacement operations, controls, and division personnel accounting procedures. As a result of the study, procedures were implemented to gain physical control of replacements from their point of arrival in the division area of operations, until they were delivered to and accounted for by battalions and separate companies of assignment. Replacement assignment procedures were revised to insure company level assignments were made without delay at the time of administrative in-processing. These procedures permit commanders of units to participate in this assignment process to improve sound personnel management and individual job satisfaction. The scope of the study included the continuing features of unit monthly muster, accounting reconciliations, and physical and accounting controls over personnel rotating to separation or assignments out of the division. These new procedures were implemented with no particular difficulties.

(2) Chaplain. During the reporting period, chaplains throughout the division provided continuous support to all units and provided area coverage as needed. Battalion Chaplains accompanied their units on extended operations. A total of 5,869 services were conducted with an attendance of 112,840. During this period, several distinguished visitors conferred with the Commanding General. On 20 December 1970, the division was visited by Dr. Oswald J. Hoffmann (Pastor from The Lutheran Church - Missouri Synod), The Lutheran Hour Speaker, and Miss Suzanne Johnson (a former Miss Illinois). Dr. Hoffmann conducted services in the Division Memorial Chapel and on several fire bases. His visit to Vietnam was made at the invitation of General Creighton W. Abrams. On 22 December 1970, Cardinal Terence Cook, Military Vicar for The Armed Forces, visited the division. He met with all Catholic Chaplains, in the area. Cardinal Cook also visited troopers on several fire bases. His visit to Vietnam was made at the invitation of General Creighton W. Abrams. The Chief of Chaplains, MG Francis L. Sampson, visited the division on 8 January 1971. During his visit he conferred with all division and nondivision chaplains in the area. He also visited troopers on several fire bases. On 26 January 1971, four (4) Churchmen visited the division to confer with the

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

32

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division
(Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, AOS CSFGR-65 (R3) (U)

Commanding General, and to discuss moral and morale problems of the division with chaplains, and their ministry to the troops. The Churchmen also visited several fire bases. The Churchmen were: Dr. Edward Brubaker - Chairman, The General Commission on Chaplains and Armed Forces Personnel; Dr. Robert James Marshall - President, Lutheran Church in America; Dr. Robert Verelle Moss, Jr. - President, United Church of Christ; Dr. William Phelps Thompson - Stated Clerk, The United Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A. On 11 April 1971 an Ecumenical Easter Sunrise Service was held in the grassy area between Eagle International and Division Headquarters. The Division Band and Chorus provided special music. The participants were: Chaplain (LTC) Joseph J. Smolinski, Division Chaplain; Chaplain (LTC) John W. Wakefield, Deputy XXIV Corps Chaplain (Guest Speaker); Chaplain (MAJ) Arthur M. Webb, DIVARTY Chaplain; Chaplain (MAJ) Alfred Delcove, Jr., DTICOM Chaplain; Chaplain (CPT) Monroe Osburn, 2/17th Cavalry Chaplain. There were 300 personnel in attendance.

(3) Key personnel roster as of 30 April 1971 and changes in command and staff during the reporting period:

CG	MG T.M. Tarpley succeeded MG J.J. Hennessey, 1 Feb
ADC(D)	BG S.S. Perry
ADC(S)	BG O.E. Smith
CoFS	COL D.A. Seibert succeeded COL H.A. MacDonald, 1 Nov
CO, 1st Bde	COL P.F. Gorman
CO, 2nd Bde	COL J.E. Greene succeeded COL H.A. MacDonald, 2 Jan
CO, 3rd Bde	COL D.E. Grange, Jr. succeeded COL E.L. Harrison, 23 Dec
CO, DTICOM	COL D.Z. Rosenblum
CO, Div Arty	COL L.E. Surut
CO, 101st Avn Gp	COL E.A. Davis
ACoFS, G1	MAJ R.G. Kurtz succeeded COL C.H. Ferguson 8 Mar
ACoFS, G2	MAJ D.S. Johnson
ACoFS, G3	LTC J.C. Bard succeeded LTC R.J. Young 23 Nov
ACoFS, G4	LTC C.M. Kicklighter
ACoFS, G5	LTC J.H. Simpson, Jr., succeeded LTC H. Purcell 15 Dec
Chen Off	LTC J.C. Jackson
Div Surg	LTC R.E. Day
FM	LTC G.J. Lobodinski
IG	LTC T. Harvaez
SJA	LTC R.S. Hawley
Fin Off	LTC J. Trahan succeeded LTC W.J. Falconer 16 Apr
Chap	LTC J.F. Smolinski
AG	LTC J.M. Byrne succeeded LTC T.E. Minix 19 Feb
CO, 1st Bn (Amb1)	LTC D.C. Hilbert succeeded LTC G.H. Haroulsen 14 Dec
327th Inf	
CO, 2nd Bn (Amb1)	LTC J.M. Hamilton succeeded LTC J.J. Gerda 25 Jan
327th Inf	

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division
(Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS GSF X-65 (R3) (U)

CO, 2nd Bn (Acht)	LTC L.N. Cosby succeeded LTC C.J. Shay 12 Jan
502nd Inf	
CO, 1st Bn (Acht)	LTC J. Hampton succeeded LTC A.C. Dwyer 18 Mar
501st Inf	
CO, 2nd Bn (Acht)	LTC M.A. Roca
501st Inf	
CO, 1st Bn (Acht)	LTC W.N. Lang
502nd Inf	
CO, 1st Bn (Acht)	LTC K.A. Barlow succeeded LTC R.B. Porter 17 Jan
506th Inf	
CO, 2nd Bn (Acht)	LTC J.F. Hellechi succeeded LTC J.C. Ward 20 Nov
506th Inf	
CO, 3rd Bn (Acht)	LTC J.R. Stevenson succeeded LTC R.J. Sutton 17 Mar
137th Inf	
CO, 3rd Bn (Acht)	LTC G.J. Shalikaashvili succeeded LTC J.E. Martling 17 Dec
506th Inf	
CO, 2nd Bn (Acht)	LTC N.E. Qualtrough succeeded LTC R.J. Burke 14 Nov
11th Arty	
CO, 2nd Bn (Acht)	LTC E.S. Korpel
319th Arty	
CO, 2nd Bn (Acht)	MAJ H.H. Brandt
320th Arty	
CO, 1st Bn (Acht)	LTC J.L. Zorn
321st Arty	
CO, 4th Bn (ARA)	LTC W.L. Gallagher succeeded LTC C.L. Norwalk 23 Feb
77th Arty (Acht)	
CO, 2nd Bn (Acht)	LTC A.A. Rider succeeded LTC Molinelli 5 Mar
17th Cav	
CO, 101st Avn Bn	LTC B.B. Fernandez succeeded LTC W.N. Peachey 18 Dec
(Aslt Hel) (Acht)	
CO, 158th Avn Bn	LTC R.A. Phillips succeeded LTC R.J. Gerard 21 Mar
(Aslt Hel) (Acht)	
CO, 159th Avn Bn	LTC G.F. Newton
(Aslt Hel) (Acht)	
CO, 326th Med Bn	LTC R.E. Day
(Acht)	
CO, 5th Trans Bn	LTC H.B. Peasley succeeded LTC H.I. Small 25 Nov
(Acht)	
CO, 426th S&S Bn	LTC R.J. Cuthbertson succeeded LTC R.R. Jacobs 10 Feb
(Acht)	
CO, 301st Maint	LTC R.L. Wadover
Bn (Acht)	
CO, 501st Sig Bn	MAJ A.N. Bone succeeded LTC Jensen 26 Mar
(Acht)	

f. Logistics.

(1) 5th Transportation.

(a) As of 30 Apr 1971, the 5th Transportation Battalion (Aslt Maint & Sup) (Acht) had 32 officers, 23 warrant officers and 466 enlisted men

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

34

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, 905 25000-65 (101) (U)

assigned. On 25 November 1970 LTC Horace B. Bousley assumed command of the battalion from LTC Harold I. Small. During February and March the 335th Direct Support Maintenance Company was placed under operational control of the battalion for LAMSON 719. In addition, 20 civilian augmentation personnel were distributed between A and B Companies for the operation.

(b) From 1 November through 30 April 1971, 2,210 aircraft were work ordered (to the battalion) for repair. During LAMSON 719 (February and March), the 101st Airborne Division (A-1) was augmented by 10 aircraft. The battalion was responsible for providing overall direct support maintenance for these and the 101st division aircraft. The 335th Direct Support Company assisted in performing this mission. During this 60 day period, 1,133 aircraft were processed through the three direct support companies and returned operationally ready to the customer units. In addition, 7,982 job orders for aircraft avionics components and 1,610 work orders for armament repairs were completed.

(2) 426th Supply & Service Battalion.

(a) During this six month period the battalion continued to support the division. Highlighting the period was the support of Operation LAMSON 719. The battalion continued its participation in the DISCOM Civic Assistance Program. Additional support was provided to add a ward on the PHU HIEP Dispensary. Continued support is being given to ARVN AM/DSMC site in HUE. Company B externally along in excess of 1,000 sorties of Class I, II, III, IV and V to the division units and the 1st Infantry Division (ARVN).

(b) The following figures reflect the operations of the Truck Platoon of Headquarters, Headquarters Service Company.

Total Passengers hauled	1,653
Total Freight hauled	1,753 short tons
Total Ice hauled	1,120 short tons
Total Water hauled	1,171,200 gallons
Total Fuel hauled	611,000 gallons
Total Miles driven	91,025

(c) The following figures reflect the operations of the Battalion Maintenance section.

Maintenance Man Hours	12,537
Number of Vehicles repaired	1,439

(d) In support of Operation JEFFERSON GLEN/LAMSON PLAN 20, Company A sent 26 green tag teams to fire bases to inspect arm caches for safety.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division
(Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS COMBAT-65 (R3) (U)

and serviceability prior to backhaul. There were 793 ammunition resupply missions rigged and transported to fire bases from Philadelphia Hook Rd. There were 591 sorties flown from Corregidor Rd, consisting of 580 tons of water, 32.13 tons of Class I, 235.58 tons of Class III, 70.5 tons of Class IV, 11 tons of Class V and 111.45 tons of miscellaneous items. B Company continued to provide ringier support from five airlift pads within the three FSE's and Fire Base HARPASAN. Ringier training classes were reduced during the period primarily due to Operation LAMSON 719, and the critical shortage of ringier personnel.

(e) Company A established and operated JP-4 refuel pads at DONG HA, MAI LOC, FSA 2 and LANG CON (In support of LAMSON 719). During the operation these refuel points issued an average daily total of 223,500 gallons of JP-4. Rearm points were established and operated by Company A at DONG HA, MAI LOC, FSA 1, FSA 2, and LANG CON. An average of 83 tons of Class I was issued daily. Company B rigged a total of 1,937 sorties with a total weight of 24,038,500 pounds. Company B riggers participated in the evacuation of 284 aircraft during the operation. B Company provided air items valued at \$182,000, to ARVN units.

(f) In Class I operations, the following has been accomplished:

1 ASP 102 (CAMP EVANS) now submits a daily status list of critical ammunition. This provides the DAO a ready reference as to status of critical ammunition stocks on hand. It also aids in providing adequate stockage of those munitions most in demand.

2 Due to the shortage of transportation, aviation units were requested to order ATA ammunition in smaller quantities so that sufficient transportation can be provided.

3 An AN/PRC-25 radio set was installed at the DAO to monitor continuous communications with Philly Rd.

4 An ammunition material retrograde program was initiated to recover brass and critical ammunition packing materials required to retrograde Class V items.

(3) 801st Maintenance Battalion (Amb1).

(a) During the reporting period, the 801st Maintenance Battalion (Amb1) continued to maintain COMTEL, armament and automotive equipment well above the USARV deadline goal. A recapitulation of support maintenance activity is as follows:

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

36

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division
(Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, LOS CASPER-65 (R3) (U)

Jobs Completed During 1 NOV 70 to 30 APR 71

Signal	11,941
Armament	1,345
Engineer	1,342
Service	1,701
Automotive	1,668
Instrument	1,364
TOTAL	21,441

(b) The following is the operational ready percentage during 1 November 70 to 30 April 71 in major commodity areas:

<u>Commodity</u>	<u>Begin</u>	<u>End</u>	<u>Average</u>
Armament	99.8	99.9	99.8
Signal	97.6	98.9	97.6
Automotive	96.8	96.7	96.6

(c) On 28 January 1971 the 801st Maintenance Battalion (Ambl) received notification to prepare mobile maintenance teams to move on order in support of combat operations within Military Region I. Mobile Maintenance Teams were formed in each of the companies and on 6 February Company A's team moved from CAMP BACH by convey to FHE SANH. The move was made with no problems and the team was fully operational upon closing at FHE SANH. During JANUARY 71 maintenance teams were employed on all operational fire bases and within QUANG TRI. The operation terminated in early April with the 801st sustaining no losses of either personnel or equipment.

g. Civil Affairs.

(1) Operations: Significant Activities.

(a) Pacification and development activities in THUA THIEN Province continued during the reporting period. During the past six months, 57 projects were completed, and at the end of the reporting period, 24 projects were currently in progress. The overall effort of the civil affairs section is directed toward the achievement of the national objectives outlined in the THUA THIEN Province Local Defense and Community Development Plan, 1971. Vietnamization of civil affairs programs has top priority. Increased coordination with Vietnamese officials is being effected to insure that Vietnamization is progressing. New civic action projects are not accepted unless a complete Vietnamese requisition, including a detailed description of required materials, is processed through province officials to CORDS and from CORDS to the 101st Civil Affairs Section.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division
(Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1961, RGS OFFOR-65 (R3) (U)

(b) After the October flooding, civic action initiated a survey to evaluate priorities, current status and estimated completion dates of civic action projects in progress. The survey indicated that continuous contact with district personnel was necessary for timely status reports to be accurately obtained. LTC Simpson, 101st Airborne Division (Amb1), G5, initiated a program of continuous liaison with district senior advisors. He visited each DSA explaining the program, followed by civil affairs officers who have continued weekly visits. Continuous liaison has contributed to the Vietnamization program through regular exchanges of ideas and immediate attention to problem areas. Personal contacts create improved working relationships with nondivisional organizations which increase the beneficial results of 101st civil-military activities.

(c) Community relations activities are being emphasized in THUA THIEN Province. As the Vietnamese assume more of a role in the civil affairs operations, community relations are finding new methods of expression other than civic action. During the reporting period, four major efforts towards community information were developed.

1 A civil-military operations fact sheet, "Vietnamese Civilians and You", developed by the civil affairs section of the 101st Airborne Division (Amb1), G5 illustrated how Vietnamese civilians assist our military operations. The fact sheet reported what local Vietnamese civilians have done to hinder the enemy and aid US/ARVN. Instances were described of NVA being turned away without food or information and of bunkers, weapons and booby traps being reported to US and ARVN units. The importance of treating the Vietnamese civilians respectfully was stressed; and it was pointed out that the resultant goodwill could further contribute significantly to US/CVN combat success. The fact sheet was distributed to the troops at platoon and squad level.

2 The 101st Airborne Division (Amb1) took positive action to reduce traffic accidents occurring on highway 551. The route is a major supply route and is traveled heavily by trucks supplying BSR 1. In coordination with the Province Chief and Province Senior Advisor, the 101st provided 15 bilingual traffic regulations and information signs which were posted by district personnel. A representative from the division provost marshal's office and the G5 traveled the route to check placement and determine the effect the signs had upon traffic patterns. Since the signs have been erected, there has been a noticeable reduction in speeding and accidents on Route 551. A concentrated effort by US military and province personnel in directing their attention towards reducing accidents has paid positive dividends in saving lives and building a better community relationship.

3 During the months of January, February, and March due to increased supply traffic for operation LAMCON 719 on Route 551 from TAN MY to HUP

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

38

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division
(Airmobila), Period Ending 30 April 1971, FCS CSFOM-65 (R3) (U)

City, the FNU VAM District Chief again requested aid in preventing traffic accidents. A ground loudspeaker team was employed from the 4th Det, 7th PSYOP Bn, to warn the civilian population of the increased traffic danger. The 101st Airborne Division (Amb1), G5 authorized broadcasts every morning, afternoon, and evening from 1-7 Feb 71. Coordination between district officials and the 101st Airborne Division (Amb1) on this traffic safety problem substantially reduced the number of accidents and incidents on Route 551.

4 The Province Chief and Province Senior Adviser, THUA THIEN Province, requested that the civilian population be informed of the dangers inherent in tapping the POL pipeline from TAN MY to CAM EVANS. Tapping of the line resulted in the death of six Vietnamese civilians. The 101st Airborne Division (Amb1) ground and aerial broadcasts advising of the danger of tapping the pipeline were conducted daily from 17 Dec to 31 Dec 70. The messages were effective and the number of incidents of tapping decreased from approximately one per day to less than one per week. Many breaks in the pipeline were reported by the people to district officials resulting in safe operations and better community relations between the 101st Airborne Division (Amb1) and the people of THUA THIEN Province. The POL program was broadcast again in February by a ground loudspeaker team from the 4th Det, 7th PSYOP Battalion.

5 A community relations regulation, Div Reg 360-2, was developed by the 101st Airborne Division (Amb1), G5. This program is designed to enhance the effectiveness of the 101st Airborne Division (Amb1) by developing mutual understanding and rapport through the active confrontation and participation of both US and VN personnel in as many mixed activities as possible. This program includes the organization of installation community relations councils including members from all battalions and separate companies on each installation and establishment of a friendship council in Vietnamese communities including members from the US community relations council and local Vietnamese offices. Other programs include a cultural exchange program, English language instruction, the reduction of traffic accidents and disciplinary incidents, joint sport programs, and an information program.

(d) The Montagnard resettlement hamlet, TA RAU VI in NAM HOA District, has been progressing satisfactorily during the winter months. In November 100 Montagnards were escorted by the 32nd River Assault Group (ARVN) to cut bamboo for siding on the homes they are constructing. They obtained sufficient bamboo to build an additional 35 houses. The 101st Airborne Division (Amb1) is providing the lumber for house frames and the CVN has supplied all the necessary tin roofing for 100 houses. The 4th Platoon, 29th CA Company, in direct support of the 101st, delivered 1,378 bd ft of scrap lumber and ammo boxes this reporting period. There are presently

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RGS COMBAT-67 (13) (U)

70 homes completed and 30 more houses with the frames and roofs complete, requiring only siding for completion. The houses were constructed in assembly line fashion. In addition, primary school classes are presently being taught to the children of TA RAU II in the hamlet chapel. The 5th Platoon, 29th CA Company, is teaching agriculture classes in vegetable cultivation, which resulted in several garden plots being planted during the spring months. The 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) warehouse supplied 300 lbs of fertilizer for demonstration purposes and will provide additional fertilizer as needed.

(e) An investigation of the types and locations of national monuments in THUA THIEN Province was completed by the 7th Platoon, 29th CA Company. The monument list was coordinated with province officials and compared with the official SAIGON listing. The members of the 7th Platoon, 29th CA Company, made visual identification of each monument and verified its coordinates. District, village and hamlet officials were extremely cooperative and appreciated this interest taken in their culture. An overlay showing the locations of all the monuments in THUA THIEN Province was prepared and provided to major tactical commands. A listing of national monuments was distributed to company level.

(f) A combined program of civic action and psychological operations was employed in PHU THU District. Civic action officers provided fertilizer to the district farmers while an HE (ground loudspeaker) team from the 4th Det, 7th PSYOP Battalion, provided a recorded tape explaining the proper application of the fertilizer. The tape stressed the importance of proper storage of the fertilizer prior to its application to the crops. The HE team was able to disseminate the message to the hamlets on the eastern borders of the district. The loudspeaker team enabled the farmers to understand the best method of application of the nutrients without resorting to detailed instructions. The program was extremely successful and neighboring hamlets requested to participate in the program. The 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), G5 delivered 4,000 lbs of fertilizer to two more hamlets in PHU THU District and 4,000 lbs to the Montagnard resettlement hamlet, TA RAU II, NAM HOA District. The instruction tape was also played at the supported hamlets.

(g) During the reporting period 570 MEDCAPs were held and 28,989 patients were examined.

(h) Major projects completed during the reporting period:

- 1 GIA LE CHANH school (YD807247), HUONG THUY.
- 2 The CHI DONG Hamlet road repair (YD641422), HUONG DIEN.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

40

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division
(Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFVW-65 (R3) (U)

- 3 The CHI TAY Hamlet road repair (YD615433), HONG DIEN.
- 4 PHU THU District road repair (YD895185), PHU THU.
- 5 PHU DA Village market construction (YD900103), PHU THU.
- 6 PHU HIEP Village Headquarters renovation (YD768246), HUE II.
- 7 HUE III Headquarters bunkers (YD765215), HUE III.
- 8 VINH TRINH Hamlet market (YD945185), PHU THU.
- 9 VINH TRINH Hamlet school (YD945185), PHU THU.
- 10 LA CHU Hamlet market (YD694240), HUONG TRA.
- 11 SMDSLC (Sector Management and Direct Support Logistics Center),
HUE II.
- 12 HUE City Recreation Association equipment (YD759226), HUE I.
- 13 PHU LUONG Village hospital (YD861161), HUONG THUY.
- 14 The MY C Hamlet school (YD639452), HUONG DIEN.
- 15 PHONG DIEN recreation equipment (YD529244), PHONG DIEN.
- 16 THUONG BANG Village meeting hall (YD763128), NAM HOA.

(i) During the reporting period 57 projects were completed. This number included three schools, three administrative projects, 29 wells, three washstands, three markets, three road repair projects, one hospital, and 12 miscellaneous projects.

(j) The civil affairs section currently has 24 civic action projects in progress. These include three wells, two dispensaries, three washstands, 11 schools, two road repairs, one pier, one water pipeline and one bridge.

(k) Commodities issued during the reporting period:

Cement (bags)	491
Tin (ea)	151
Lumber (bd ft)	56,737
Nails (kilo)	3
Paint (gals)	97
PSP (ea)	70
Auto boxes (ea)	1,735
Culvert (ea)	537
Reinforcing wire (rolls)	1
Barbed wire (rolls)	10

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division
(Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RGS CSFGR-85 (R3) (U)

Engineer stakes (ea)	73
Rebar 8' (ea)	4
Pier pilings (ea)	16
Tanks oxygen (ea)	4
Tanks acetylene (ea)	2
Tar paper (rolls)	52
Dirt fill (cu yd)	2,328
Sand (cu yd)	12
Gravel (cu yd)	112
Lime (bags)	2
Scrap GP medium tent (ea)	3
Sandbags	135
Chain link fence (rolls)	3
Food (lbs)	6,400
Clothing (lbs)	1,529
Health items (lbs)	1,099
Nightstands (ea)	60
Desk (ea)	24
Fertilizer (lbs)	8,280
Medical school kits (ea)	3
School kits (ea)	100
Athletic equipment (ea)	37
Basketballs (ea)	7
Hand tools (ea)	15
Sewing kits (ea)	10

(1) Significant events:

1 During the holiday season, units of the 101st Airborne Division (Aab1) gave clothing, candy, and parties to the Christian organizations which they regularly support. The 3/187th Infantry Battalion hosted approximately 50 children from TIN LAM Orphanage in QUANG TRI for a Christmas party. The 2/11th Artillery hosted 52 children and three Nuns from KIM LONG Orphanage in HUE for a party at CAMP EAGLE. The 101st Band donated 200 lbs of clothing to the KIM LONG Orphanage. The 163rd Avn Company brought 14 students from VINH LOC to their company area for Christmas dinner and entertainment. The 159th Avn Bn presented boxes of clothing, toys, candy and perishable food to the VINH LOC Orphanage. The 326th Engr Bn took gifts to the THIEN AN Orphanage and then brought the children back to CAMP EAGLE for lunch and a tour.

2 As a gesture of goodwill for the Christmas holidays the Province Chief of THUA THIEN Province presented a Vietnamese cultural song and dance program to the members of the 101st Airborne Division (Aab1) on 24 Dec 70 at CAMP EAGLE, CAMP EVANS, and the 85th Evacuation Hospital at THU BAI. Transportation for the performers was provided by two CH-47

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

42

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division
(Aircraft), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RGS GSNR-65 (R3) (U)

Chinooks from A Company, 159th Avn Bn, and sound equipment came from the 101st Sig Bn. The vocalists were from the LONG KHANH and QUANG High Schools in HUE City. Dancers from the National High School of Music and the Imperial Ballet performed traditional selections depicting the culture of Vietnam. Music was provided by a group of musicians from the Imperial Ballet. A highlight of the show was a dance commemorating the Trung Sisters. The performance afforded the members of the division an opportunity to observe customs and traditions of the Vietnamese people. A representative of the province council and the Chief of Internal Security presented traditional Vietnamese art to the senior US representative at the beginning of each show. The generosity of province officials was an example of good community relations between members of the division and the populace of THUA THIEN Province.

3 The Disaster Relief Coordination Center (DRCC) was activated twice during the reporting period. On 29 Oct 70 the DRCC was activated to assist the GVN emergency evacuation and resupply of approximately 20,000 flood victims in THUA THIEN Province. QUANG TRI Province was provided airlift support from 101st Airborne Division (Aml) assets. The 2nd and 3rd Brigades established DRCCs, and DISCOM and the division engineers reported assets available for relief operations. These assets were immediately put to use. The districts of PHUNG DIEN and QUANG DIEN were hardest hit. Flood waters crested at approximately 16 feet above normal, completely inundating the northern lowland area. Division aircraft and boats evacuated 6,768 of the 20,000 evacuees, delivered 142 tons of supplies, flew 488 helicopter sorties employing 27 CH-47s and 39 UH-1s. In THUA THIEN Province 31 deaths were attributed to flooding conditions. By 5 Nov 70, the emergency had subsided and most of the evacuees had returned home. Only isolated villagers continued to receive aerial resupply. Following the close of the 29 Oct - 5 Nov 70 DRCC an SOP for the 101st Airborne Division (Aml) was prepared and circulated among the divisions staff and subordinate SSGs. The SOP was finalized and printed and a test run of the DRCC was conducted from 29 Nov 70 to 1 Dec 70. Overall effectiveness of control and reporting during the test operation was credited to the new SOP. The final draft was approved, published and distributed.

4 The men of the 101st Airborne Division (Aml) contributed \$3,281.25 to the 101st Airborne Division (Aml) Tet Fund of 1971. The total proceeds were exchanged, at the rate of 276\$VN for each \$1 US, for a total of 1,067,400\$VN. The Board of Governors, composed of the SSGs from divisional units, voted to present equal amounts to the 1st Infantry Division (ARVN) and to THUA THIEN Sector military dependent children. BG Berry, acting CG, 101st Airborne Division (Aml), presented 533,700\$VN wrapped in red Tet paper to BG Pham Van Khu, CG, 1st Infantry Division (ARVN), and a duplicate package to COL Le Van Thien, THUA THIEN Province Chief. Additional Tet support was given to the following

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division
(Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, FM 101 AF 1-25 (M2) (U)

childrens organizations in THUA THIEN Province. The 1/500 Infantry Battalion delivered food to TU KHU Orphanage in HUU THU District; the 3/500 Infantry Battalion delivered food and candy to the AN HANG Orphanage in PHU LOU District; the 3/187 Infantry Battalion delivered food to the NAM ARTH Orphanage in HUE; The 2/500 Infantry Battalion delivered food to VAN TRITH child care center in HUE THIEN District; and the 2/11 Artillery gave two parties at CAMP BA LE for the LAM and KIM LON Orphanages of HUE.

5 On 17 March 1971, a 101st Airborne Division (Ambl) C-47 picked up a delegation of 12 NAM HOA District and village officials and their donation of 15 baskets (2,000 lbs) of rice cakes, candy, cigarettes and other sundry items and flew them to the 1st Infantry Division (ARVN) headquarters at KHE SANH where they presented their gifts to the 1st Infantry Division (ARVN) Chief of Staff. The gifts were distributed to ARVN troops working at KHE SANH and in LAOS. The donation represents a significant effort by the people in NAM HOA to demonstrate their appreciation to the government and continuing support for the armed forces of Vietnam. NAM HOA District is one of the poorest districts in THUA THIEN Province and the gift represents a real sacrifice for the people of the district.

5 Assistance to the PHU LUONG Hospital, HUONG NHUY District, was completed in March 1971 by the 101st Airborne Division (Ambl), G5. A total of 40 beds, 12 desks and benches, and 60 nightstands constructed by Vietnamese carpenters at the G5 warehouse were delivered to the hospital. Since the inception of this project, the hospital has improved its services. At the beginning of the project, the hospital was only a local dispensary. Presently, it has local inpatient services and rural nurse and midwife training programs. Training programs are from two to six months in duration, depending on the quality of the medical facilities at the trainee's hamlet. More intensive training is given nurses and midwives from the more rural hamlets since they are virtually on their own after the training program is completed.

h. Psychological Operations: Significant Activities.

(1) On 11 Nov 70 1st Brigade requested a quick reaction leaflet exploiting NVA KIA's. A leaflet naming Nguyen Dinh Tu killed in action was targeted against the K10 Bn, 5th NVA Regt with the expressed intent of creating both a "fear of death" in the audience and a "loss of confidence" in the efforts of the NVA to win the war. The leaflet was received from Combined Psychological Operations Center on 13 Nov 70 and disseminated by the 1st Bde on 14 Nov. Text of the leaflet read:

CONFIDENTIAL

44

CONFIDENTIAL

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division
(Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RGS COMBAT-65 (R3) (U)

(front)

"Men of the NVA, do not wait for death. Run away and answer the Chieu Hoi program or become a prisoner and go home in a short time after the war is over. Friends of Nguyen Dinh Tu, Long, Dinh and Tu, understand that you will suffer many more hardships and danger as well as a useless death if you continue to fight. Lay down your weapons and rally, we are waiting for your return."

(back)

"Nguyen Dinh Tu was one of your best soldiers who died because he continued to fight. The great titles of "Heroic American Killer" and "hero" did not protect him from death, hunger, or hardships."

(2) Division PSYOP initiated a PSYOP Campaign Training Program designed to instruct the Brigade PSYOP officers and senior NCO's on the methods of planning and implementing PSYOP campaigns.

(a) The training program was conducted in three phases. During the first phase, initial campaign plans were developed for each brigade. Initial plans demonstrated how PSYOP campaign plans insure an organized and effective psychological operation.

(b) During phase two, division PSYOP and each brigade PSYOP section combined efforts to develop a brigade PSYOP campaign. Campaigns implemented by the brigades served as a training tool for the brigade PSYOP sections.

(3) On 8 Dec 70 an NVA Lieutenant of the 614 Sapper Company, 4th NVA Regt rallied to the 224th Regional Force Company in PTU LOC District. The Hoi Chanh was exploited by division PSYOP in conjunction with 2nd Bde PSYOP, PTU LOC District Chief and MACV District Senior Advisor. Combined Psychological Operations Center developed and printed three different leaflets of the Hoi Chanh's statement utilizing hunger and monsoon hardships as themes. The Hoi Chanh also produced a recorded message targeted against his former unit.

(4) On 12 Dec 70 2nd Bde PSYOP conducted a "quick reaction" aerial broadcast mission in support of a contact made in NAM MCA District. Second Brigade utilized a General Chieu Hoi/Rally instruction theme to exploit a RF/PF victory against an unidentified VC unit. The contact resulted in 1 VC KIA, 1 VC PW/MIA and a VC escapee. Subsequently a Scout Dog and PSYOP ground loudspeaker team were employed during the search for the escaped VC.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS GCPH-35 (R3) (U)

(4) A VC village security chief of the QUANG DIEN Special Action Unit rallied to the 185th Popular Force Company in QUANG DIEN District on 24 Dec 70 and was exploited by 1st Bde PSYOP with tape leaflets and aerial broadcasts. The tape exploited his reasons for rallying, how he has been treated by the ARVN since rallying and encouraged his comrades to join him.

(6) On 31 Dec 4th Detachment, 7th RVNAF Bn moved from 2nd Bde and was headquartered at CAMP EAGLE in direct support of division PSYOP. The move resulted in improved coordination with division PSYOP and increased utilization of the audio visual and ground loudspeaker teams.

(7) Five AN/UH-6 1000 watt aerial loudspeaker sets were received from XXIV Corps. A 1000 watt system was given to each brigade and one aerial loudspeaker set is being utilized by division PSYOP. The other AN/UH-6 had to be turned into 801st Maintenance as unserviceable.

(8) On 24 Jan a combined operation was conducted by division PSYOP in cooperation with 1st ARVN Division to exploit the GVN repatriation of PWs to North Vietnam. Aerial broadcasts and leaflet drops over HUE and QUANG TRI City resulted in 100,000 leaflets disseminated and 2:30 broadcast hours.

(9) Operation "Cypress Garden", targeting the CP Company, HUU LOC Special Action Unit located in the VINH PHONG Mountain Region, began 25 Jan 71. The concept of the operation was to employ tactical firepower in support of psychological operations. The tactical phase of this campaign combined the support of gunships, artillery, flame drops, and District Regional and Popular Forces. Psychological operations to be employed exploiting the effects of allied firepower with fear and nostalgia tapes, leaflets, and scripts. The objective of the campaign was to force NVA and VC in the area of operation to either Chieu Hoi or move from their mountain sanctuary into GVN controlled territory.

(a) The technique employing tactical operations in support of PSYOP was relatively new to the division where previously PSYOP was generally employed in support of tactical operations. The techniques involved in this campaign called for progressive use of PSYOP and tactical firepower on an alternating and progressively concentrated basis. In the first five days of the campaign only aerial broadcasts, leaflet drops, and waterborne broadcasts exploiting Chieu Hoi and allied firepower themes were used in conjunction with the intermittent firing of 105mm propaganda rounds. This phase was to be followed by 3 days of tactical firepower using 105mm HE and Fz VT rounds, thickened fuel drops, and aerial and waterborne broadcasts using harassment scripts. This

CONFIDENTIAL

46

CONFIDENTIAL

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 100th Airborne Division
(Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, A-1 (MAC-65 004) (U)

action was to be followed by same through leaflet distribution, aerial broadcasts, and leaflet drops and finally by air assaults on the target area in the campaign. If, by this time, there had been no reaction from the target audience, fully armed gunships were to intensify their attack on the AT and expand their operations on suspected enemy targets. A second round of suggested and possible military actions would be carried out concurrently. By conducting PSYOP in this manner, it was believed that the objectives of the campaign would either be achieved or the capability of employing tactical firepower with psychological operations would be established. However, as a result of both independent action and tactical aircraft priority for LAWSAN 719, the planned second PSYOP and tactical firepower missions were cancelled.

(b) The campaign was initially structured under the command and control of the RVN 100 District Chief, who in turn would request support from US and ARVN assets. This concept was in keeping with supporting and encouraging increased Vietnamization of psychological operations. However, it should be noted that his command and control was not carried out, nor was any support requested by the District cadre. The following points probably account for the shortcomings of the campaign:

1. The District cadre did not feel that such a campaign would produce visible results or benefit the overall political and military goals within their district.

2. The District cadre did not feel that the campaign was in keeping with their concepts of tactical psychological operations.

3. The coordination required between District and Province level agencies was not effected to the degree required for such an operation to be carried out successfully.

(10) At the request of COMUS, division PSYOP conducted a loudspeaker broadcast along QL-1 and Route 551. This mission had two purposes: one, to warn indigenous personnel of the dangers of using the valuable aviation fuel leaking from the pipeline parallel to QL-1 and two, to warn indigenous personnel of the heavy convoy traffic on Route 551 during the initial phases of LAWSAN 719. Missions were conducted by 4th Detachment, 7th PSYOP Battalion in direct support of Division PSYOP. The broadcasts relating to aviation fuel were conducted for 20:30 hours contacting 4,500 people. The highway safety broadcasts ran 18 hours contacting 12,000 people.

(11) To further Vietnamization, division PSYOP conceived and conducted initial planning for a Riverine PSYOP/COMBAT Campaign. Targets were villages and hamlets along the ST and RUMU rivers, including their tributaries. The campaign was planned in three phases: Phase I

CONFIDENTIAL

(Day I - Day II) to prevent the spread of HPAI from ten provinces; Phase II (Day III - VI) aimed at preventing transmission and preventive medicine and control measures in Hanoi, Haidong, and PHONG NHA DUMES; Phase III (Day VII-continued) seeks to continue, while STOP epidemic III, for all, and HPAI in the country. The Riverine PIVOP/ Model diagnosis was initiated by December 1967 in the field and continues for 3 to 4 months depending on the initial number of the operation. Division PIVOP effected cooperation with District, Provincial, a Division MDAAL to do, but Interior Division (MIA), Government, and other river patrol Department (PIVOP) located as follows.

(U) Nguyen Son rallied to the 137th AF Company on 26 Feb 71. On 26 Feb 71, G5 RVNCF and 3rd Bde interviewed Nguyen Son and were able to complete a Rullier's Guide and photograph the doi Chua. Utilizing the 1st airmobile as etc, G5 RVNCF was able to process a quick reaction leaflet request with CTRC, A-1, that same day. On 27 Feb 71, 3rd Bde disseminated 100,000 quick reaction leaflets and firing the rallies.

(13) On 9 March 1971, at 1800H, Dang Xuan Lam rallied to the 2nd Battalion, 501st Infantry, 1st Bde, 101st Airborne Division (AAB1) in the vic of Fire Base BASTOGNE. The Ho1 Chanh was a member of the 3rd Platoon, C3 Company, A10 Bn, 5th NVA Rept. Initial PSYOP exploitation included a photograph and a narrative statement by the rallier. Combined efforts of 1st Bde, Division PSYOP and the 3th PSYOP Battalion in DA NANG, produced a quick reaction leaflet. As a result of the combined effort, an initial 100,000 leaflets were delivered by air to 1st Bde at 0700H 10 Mar 71, and 500,000 additional leaflets were received by air at 1800H 10 Mar 71. This combined effort represents an exceptional reaction by 7th PSYOP Battalion.

CONFIDENTIAL

48

CONFIDENTIAL

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division
(Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RSC CDM 2-65 (R3) (U)

(14) On Monday, 15 Mar 71, during LAMSON 719 division PSYOP reacted to a tactical PSYOP request from 1st Bn, 501st Infantry. An element of 1st Bn, 501st Infantry was in contact with an unknown size enemy force, located in several caves along QL-9, approximately 30 kilometers west of QUANG TRI Combat Base. A quick reaction aerial broadcast and leaflet drop was targeted against the enemy location using intense rally appeals and exploiting the Laotian situation. Firepower from tanks covering the enemy location was also directed against the target from the PSYOP aircraft. Firepower was immediately followed by another aerial broadcast exhorting the enemy force to rally and escape further allied firepower and destruction. Even though no Hoi Chanh were received as a result of the operation, it served as an excellent example of combining PSYOP in support of tactical operations situations.

(15) On 31 Mar 71, QUANG BIEN District Headquarters reported to the Division Tactical Operations Center that a Hoi Chanh was received at approximately 1000H by the 4th Infantry Force Platoon. Division PSYOP was informed at 1330H and was able to acquire a helicopter to exploit Tran Dich Van, a member of the QUANG BIEN Special Action Unit. Tran Dich Van was collecting rice in BO GIEN Hamlet, HONG BIEN District (ID612298), with other members of his unit, at the time of his escape. The Hoi Chanh traveled to the residence of his family QUANG BIEN District who persuaded him to return to the Government of Vietnam. At 1930, 31 Mar 65 PSYOP scheduled an aerial leaflet drop in the reported location of the QUANG BIEN Special Action Unit.

(16) Division PSYOP continues to actively exploit the Volunteer Informant Program utilizing the direct support of 4th Det, 7th PSYOP Battalion and the division aircraft assets. To enhance the effectiveness of the program, G5 PSYOP and 4th Det used reward funds from 101st MI Det class A Agent. On 30 Mar and 31 Mar 71 Vietnamese civilians in the vicinity of the AN LO Bridge (ID623302) led a ground PSYOP team of 4th Det to caches containing: one - 175mm artillery round, one - 155mm artillery round, two - 105mm artillery rounds, one - Mark 15 white phosphorous grenade, one - 60mm Chi Com mortar round, one - 2.75mm HE rocket warhead, two - 82mm Chi Com mortar rounds, one - B3 aerial bomblet, and four Chi Com grenades. All munitions were destroyed in place by a division EOD team. Rewards paid on the scene by the team for materials recovered totaled 8,000\$VN.

(17) Laotian Campaign: Operations in LAC6 were exploited in accordance with XXIV Corps INX, DTG: 01205572Z Feb 71. PSYOP officers within the division prepared or used assets to sustain the campaign in

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, HCS 23PCH-65 (H3) (U)

their respective areas of operations. During the operation division PSYOP conducted 7:30 aerial broadcast tours and disseminated 1,000,000 leaflets by utilizing the division's organic air assets. The 4th Det, 7th PSYOP Battalion also supported the Laction Campaign with audio visual and ground loudspeaker missions. A detailed listing of the districts covered follows:

<u>DISTRICT</u>	<u>BROADCAST HOURS</u>
THU THU	4:30
HUNG TA	9:00
HU LOC	5:30
HUNG DIEN	5:00
HUNG DIEN	6:00
HUNG THUY	27:00
HUNG DIEN	6:00
HU VANG	17:00
HU HUA	12:30
TOTAL	89:30

I. Medical.

(1) Preventive Medicine.

(a) A marked increase in the number of admissions for diarrheal diseases was manifested in November primarily because some unit mess halls unknowingly used non-potable water for drinking purposes. The office of the division surgeon as well as the division food service initiated tighter surveillance of the mess facilities in order to reduce the possibility of future contamination. Greater command emphasis to insure the use of iodine tablets in the field was made during this period as an adjunct to the prevention of diarrheal disease.

(b) With the onset of the wet monsoon season in October, the number of patients with skin disease became substantially greater and this trend continued in November, although to a lesser extent than October. Constant attention was devoted to this problem through dissemination of personal hygiene guidance to the maneuver battalions, the units most commonly afflicted with this disease.

(c) The division experienced a reduction in malaria incidence commensurate with colder weather and greater command emphasis on malaria prophylaxis as directed in a command letter of 29 Sep 70 titled Prevention of Malaria. More than half of the malaria cases occurring were of the

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

50

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division
(Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, HCS CMFGR-65 (R2) (U)

viva strain and as such were 97% preventable, pointing out the need for constant vigilance in the area of malaria prophylaxis with the Wilson-Edison test being the prime tool. This test was designed to reveal whether or not an individual had taken his required weekly chloroquine-primaquine tablet and was performed on selected individuals on a weekly basis by all battalion surgeons. Guidance to commanders on the use of this test was given in a command letter of January 70. As an adjunct to the malaria prevention program, aerial spray missions were undertaken to reduce the mosquito population. The efforts of the malaria prevention program were quite successful, as evidenced in the division malaria rate, lowest of all tactical units in Vietnam.

(d) The abundant availability of marijuana and hard narcotics with increasing troop free time due in part to Vietnamization greatly increased the drug abuse problem. During the report period, over one in ten admissions were due to drug abuse, principally involving heroin. The Drug Amnesty Program was reemphasized as a means to alleviate the impact of drugs on division troops. The drug amnesty program offers help to those patients who want to get off and stay off drugs. Their participation in the program is strictly voluntary as these are the patients most amenable to rehabilitation. The extent of drug use in the division can be measured only by subjective observation and therefore estimates are not statistically reliable. Those patients under the drug amnesty program have been quite successful in staying off drugs. A new Division Circular, 40-3, was written outlining the purpose and responsibilities under the Drug Amnesty Program.

(e) The division drug education team, under the supervision of the Division Psychiatrist, continued to give classes informing incoming personnel at SERTS of the inherent dangers of drug abuse.

(f) In the month of April a dog was diagnosed as a carrier of rabies, the first such case to be reported in a year. Further, an excessive number of dogs were being kept as pets by division personnel. The Provost Marshal began a campaign to apprehend all stray dogs and to more effectively enforce Division Regulation 40-17, which limits the number of dogs to one per company sized unit. Reducing the dog population and proper emphasis of other control measures are expected to abort a rabies outbreak.

(2) MEDCAP. During the reporting period division medical personnel entered a phase of the MEDCAP program during which they rendered technical guidance and supervision over their Vietnamese counterparts who performed

CONFIDENTIAL

9

CONFIDENTIAL

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division
(Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFG-65 (R3) (U)

the actual treatment and administration. In this way, it was anticipated that the Vietnamese would develop their own supply system as well as become technically proficient in the care and treatment of the people. A problem encountered has been that Vietnamese health workers, at times, have failed to be at the appointed place and time.

(3) Visits of USARV Consultants.

(a) On 23 November 1970, LTC Gould, USARV Preventive Medicine Officer; LTC Foley USARV Entomologist; and LTC Otis, USARV Sanitary Engineer visited the division to discuss various aspects of preventive medicine with the Division Surgeon, LTC Day; Division Preventive Medicine Officer, CPT Ellison; and Division Sanitarian, 1LT Chen.

(b) COL Baker, Psychiatric consultant to the Surgeon General; and COL Bowen, Psychiatric consultant to the USARV Surgeon visited the division on 10 Mar 71 to receive an orientation on mental hygiene service capabilities within the division. LTC Day, Division Surgeon, and MAJ Cushman, Division Psychiatrist were the contact personnel.

(4) Reporting.

(a) A new drug abuse feeder report with RCS MACV 0060.1 was initiated in December. From December through March, an average of 70 persons a month have been admitted with a drug abuse diagnosis. In over 90% of these cases, heroin was the principal drug abused.

(b) This office continues to monitor and report outpatient and morbidity statistics for the division. The use of Medical Company CO's as brigade surgeons has aided in obtaining more accurate and timely reporting.

(5) Aviation Medicine.

(a) During the reporting period 720 Class IA, II and III flight physicals were accomplished, an average of 120 a month. The monthly rate ranged from a low of 78 in Feb to 153 in both Dec 70 and March 71.

(b) Although authorized eight aviation medical officers, the division was assigned only four in November. At the end of the reporting period seven were assigned thus allowing excellent medical coverage of division aviation personnel.

(c) Through January only a few cases were noted where aviators accumulated flight time in excess of 110 hours per 30 day period.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

52

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division
(Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RGS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

However, in February, with the increased aviation requirements in support of CAMSON 719, a few aviators were examined who had approached 140 hours and large numbers exceeded 110 hours. During March "pilot fatigue" appeared as a significant factor in the division's operations. An unknown number of crewmembers were examined 757 times for having exceeded 140 hours and fatigue resulted in 121 recommendations for grounding (16%). However, at no time during the reporting period was "pilot fatigue" considered a problem because, with rare exception, these crewmembers recommended for grounding were in fact grounded.

Admission Statistics (rates/1000 men/year):

	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR
Hepatitis	2.2	0.5	3.2	1.1	1.1	0.6
Malaria	12.9	3.6	3.2	1.1	1.6	2.3
Diarrhea	99.0	79.1	64.6	26.4	44.2	44.2
Psychiatric Disorders	24.8	15.8	88.5	50.0	64.5	58.1
Respiratory	93.4	127.5	84.3	70.4	54.6	35.2
Skin Disease	144.0	180.7	139.4	94.6	71.7	59.6
Venereal Disease	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Fevers of undetermined origin (FUO)	66.4	97.9	43.9	36.9	38.0	24.6
Heat Injuries	0.0	0.5	0.0	0.6	0.5	1.7
Immersion Foot	34.6	27.0	3.7	0.6	0.0	0.0
EBI	52.9	57.6	60.4	47.3	31.2	30.0
ERHA	6.4	8.2	5.3	11.6	31.2	35.0

	A CO	B CO	C CO	SPT CO	TOTAL
Total patients seen at clearing station:	4,150	4,067	3,639	5,267	17,123
Total dental patients:	0	1,970	2,241	4,871	8,882
Total admissions:	275	280	527	541	1,623
Total transferred:	239	241	218	97	795
Recapitulation:					
ERHA	154	54	761	53	1,022
EBI	601	231	1,063	281	2,176
Medical Diseases:					
Malaria	0	1	16	9	26
FUO's	153	79	107	171	570
Diarrhea	101	123	78	111	413
Skin diseases	381	781	691	733	2,591
N/P	22	38	22	2,013	2,110
Gastroenteritis	53	102	64	207	426
Foot problems	52	212	146	189	579
Heat injuries	41	6	52	28	137
TD	239	373	106	389	1,107

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, MOS 0000R-66 (A3) (U)

J. Signal.

(1) The 501st Signal Battalion (A-21) continued to provide communications for the division in operation JEFFERSON GLIDEWAY across HAN 70 and LAMSON 719. Four channel VHF systems were installed from Fire Bases TOWHANK, LOS BANGS, FRICK, ALBERN, HARMONY, BASTINGS, JACK, GLADIATOR, RAYKADAN and OF CHODOWATE. Similar facilities were provided to units located at MAI LOC, ANNE, VANDEGRIFT and CARROLL to the respective brigades. On Thanksgiving Day, five radio operators and one radio repairman were processed and sent to LONG BINH for further deployment to PAKISTAN. These personnel participated in the flood relief operations.

(2) During the period 18-23 January, communications were established at EAGLE BEACH in support of a division tactical CP. All equipment and personnel were airlifted. Equipment and personnel from the 63rd Signal Battalion were utilized to provide a 12 channel system to CAMP EAGLE. No problems were encountered in effecting close coordination with nondivisional units. The exercise was beneficial in that it provided realistic training for new personnel in the battalion.

(3) During the period 26 January-3 April the battalion provided communications support for a division forward CP at QUANG TRI and a division advance CP at KHE SANH. Additionally, secure relay stations were established for XXIV Corps and I Corps (ARVN) at Fire Base SHEPHERD and for MACV at LANG VAI. Equipment and personnel for the QUANG TRI CP moved by road from CAMP EAGLE on 25 January. Secure FM voice stations were established in the Command, Intelligence and Forward Operations nets. Three ground relay stations were established at Fire Base KHE SANH. A four channel VHF system to CAMP EAGLE was installed until circuits could be engineered over the area systems. Radioteletype was employed until conventional commcenter teletype circuits could be established and then used to backup the primary means of communication. Equipment and personnel for the KHE SANH CP moved by road to MAI LOC and were airlifted to KHE SANH on 2 February. Secure FM voice stations were established in the Corps, Command, Intelligence and Forward Operations nets. Radioteletype was used as at QUANG TRI. A four channel VHF system was installed at QUANG TRI and was utilized during the entire operation because of difficulties on the area system.

(4) As a result of the long delays in obtaining critical circuits over the area system, the Division Signal Officer obtained three teams of equipment and personnel from USARV for two 12 channel systems. Two teams were attached to the signal battalion. The third team was used to establish a 12 channel system from CAMP ROBERTS, QUANG TRI, to CAMP EVANS when the forward CP moved on 1 March. The other two teams were employed in establishing 12 channel systems from Fire Base CARROLL to CAMP EVANS in support of the 3rd Brigade Forward CP and from CAMP EVANS to CAMP EAGLE to provide circuit routing to CAMP EAGLE. These systems and their associated circuits were estab-

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

54

Operational Report- Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-45 (R3) (U)

lished within 24 hours as opposed to the 3-5 days required to get circuits on the area systems (14 days from MEI SANI to QUANG TRI). In addition to the 12 channel system provided for the 3rd Brigade, four channel VHF systems were established from brigade to battalions located at MAI LOC, and Fire Bases ANNE and VANDEGRIFT.

(5) When the Division Signal Officer was alerted that the tactical CP at LA VANG would be required, two teams were again obtained to establish 12 channel systems. Personnel and equipment for the CP at LA VANG moved by road from CAMP EAGLE on 18 April. A 12 channel system was established to CAMP EAGLE. Secure FM voice stations were established in the Command, Operations and Intelligence nets utilizing 2 relay stations established at Fire Base BAKASAN. A station in the General Purpose RPT net was also established. Minimal delay was experienced in establishing all communications facilities since all personnel and equipment were under control of the signal battalion. On 30 April, the TTY facility in the DTOC was deactivated. It was replaced by a RPT van outside the DTOC. RPT stations were also established at each brigade TOC. The purpose of this RPT net is to provide quick response for TOC operational traffic.

k. Aviation.

(1) Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 101st Aviation Group (CBT) (Amol) continued to perform its mission to provide aviation support to the division and aviation staff personnel to the division special staff. During this reporting period this support was provided for Operations JEFFERSON GIEN/MONSOON PHAN 70, LAMSON 719, and LAMSON 720. The pathfinder platoon under the operational control of the 101st Aviation Group S-3, successfully completed the following missions:

US and ARVN LZ's/PZ's	32
US Arty moves	15
Opening FSB's	8
Closing FSB's	5
US Arty raids	3
ARVN CA's	8

The pathfinder platoon continued to furnish air traffic control on the division's fire bases. Daylight weather reports were furnished by these pathfinder teams hourly, conserving aircraft blade time and contributing to the area intelligence base. The pathfinder platoon conducted two pathfinder technique classes for 1st Infantry Division (ARVN) soldiers. Each class was four days in length and contributed greatly to ARVN 1st Infantry Division airmobile self-sufficiency for LAMSON 719.

CONFIDENTIAL

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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division
(Aircraft), Period Ending 30 April 1971, PCS CDFOR-65 (R3) (U)

(2) During the past six months PWC, 101st Aviation Group, was responsible for conducting 2 MEDCAPs per week, one at VINH LOC District. These were conducted to the maximum extent consistent with the weather and aircraft availability. During Operation LAMSON 719 (Feb - Mar), MEDCAPs were not held because the operation had first priority on aircraft. In 1971 there is increased emphasis on Vietnamization of civic action. The Group S-5 conducts the civic action program with this goal in mind. MEDCAPs are run with the aim of making the Vietnamese medics totally independent of US assistance. However, they still rely to a large extent on the US Army medical supply channels. While LAMSON 719 was in progress, the MACV Team, formerly located at VINH LOC, was relocated to PHU LOC District. The Group S-5 will make periodic visits to that team prior to resuming MEDCAPs in VINH LOC.

(3) Aviation Safety recorded the following breakdown of accident/incident experience in the 101st Aviation Group for the reporting period:

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Accidents	13
Incidents	31
Forced Landings	13
Precautionary Landings	59
Combat Damaged Aircraft	NA

(4) The Airborne School was conducted as follows:

<u>DATE</u>	<u>ATTENDANCE</u>
1 - 2 Nov	35
11 - 12 Dec	33
22 - 23 Jan	19
26 - 27 Apr	23
TOTAL	110

1. Engineers.

(1) During November 1970, A Company (-) was in direct support of the 1st Brigade at Fire Base BASTONE, Fire Base BIRMINGHAM, and CP TECHATE in addition to carrying out special missions in their area of operations. At Fire Base BASTONE, the rehabilitation program continued with the fireproofing of two mass bunkers and the continuous upgrading of interior and access roads. Extensive drainage work was accomplished by cutting ditches and placing culverts. At Fire Base BIRMINGHAM, five 10' x 24' and forty-one 8' x 12' bunkers and two observation towers were

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

56

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division
(Aircraft), Period Ending 30 April 1971, HCS CPCR-65 (R3) (U)

completed. The interior and access roads were upgraded to a minimum all-weather standard. At OP CHECKMATE, two one-strip LZs were cut. Minesweeps were conducted from Fire Base BIRMINGHAM to Fire Base BASTOGNE daily and west of Fire Base BASTOGNE to Fire Base VORDEL with negative findings. B Company (-) was in direct support of the 3rd Brigade at Fire Base PAKKASAN and at Fire Base JACK in addition to carrying out special missions in their area of operations. At Fire Base PAKKASAN, the mess bunker was fireproofed with asbestos and tin, the drainage system was continuously improved and two observation towers, a gate and a guard house on the PAKKASAN Road were constructed. Daily minesweeps, in conjunction with D/Lth Engineers, were conducted on the PAKKASAN Road with negative findings. In general support of the division, approximately 1,200 meters of the interior roads were upgraded and permeprined. In addition, six SEA huts were reconstructed for the 2/319th Artillery and for the 3/187th Infantry at CAMP EVANS. C Company (-) was in direct support of the 2nd Brigade at Fire Base ERICK, Fire Base ARSENAL, Fire Base TOMAHAWK, Fire Base LOS BANCOS, and Fire Base ANZIO. At Fire Base ERICK, the fireproofing of the kitchen bunker, the excavation for three ASP bunkers, the rehabilitation of two 8' x 12' bunkers, the installation of drainage in the mess bunker, the construction of two latrines and a shower facility, and the construction of revetment walls was accomplished. At Fire Base ARSENAL, excavation for one 16' x 16' kitchen bunker, one 20' x 64' mess bunker, and one 10' x 16' radar bunker was completed, and work commenced on the above mentioned bunkers. One 8' x 12' bunker was completed at Fire Base TOMAHAWK, a personnel bunker in the CP area was rehabilitated, fireproofing of the kitchen and mess bunkers was accomplished, and a blast wall in the POL area was constructed. At Fire Base LOS BANCOS, construction began on a 30' x 32' mess and 16' x 16' kitchen bunker. At Fire Base ANZIO, rehabilitation of an 8' x 48' personnel bunker was accomplished. Projects in general support of the division included the rehabilitation of an observation tower in FHU BAI at "B" sector, and the construction of an observation tower in the 2/17th Cav area. A daily minesweep was conducted from QL-1 to the GIA LE gate at CAMP EAGLE with negative findings. During the period 1 November through 30 November, Headquarters Company provided equipment support to engineer units at CAMP EVANS, CAMP CAMPBELL, Fire Bases JACK, ERICK, ARSENAL, BASTOGNE, BIRMINGHAM, TOMAHAWK, and LOS BANCOS. Additionally, the boat platoon supported infantry operations at LANG CO BAY, Fire Base BIRMINGHAM, and FOHL Bridge. On the CAMP EAGLE Roads during November, 900 cubic meters of fill were hauled, emplaced, and graded and 4,300 meters of ditches were improved. Various projects were accomplished by HHC in support of units stationed at CAMP EAGLE. The

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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division
(Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RGS GEFOR-65 (R3) (U)

majority of these projects consisted of either hauling, filling, ditching, or grading. Headquarters Company continued to work on perimeter defenses in the 8-11 sector by installing mines and clearing fields of fire. The upgrading of interior roads at Fire Base BIRMINGHAM was accomplished by the emplacing and grading of 1,700 cubic yards of fill and the emplacing of one 24" x 36" culvert. From 1 to 4 November 1970, flood rescue/resupply missions were conducted in INU THU and HUONG DIEN Districts. Four Boston whalers and eight rafts were utilized in these operations. A total of 77 Vietnamese were rescued in HUONG DIEN District, and tons of supplies were distributed by these water craft.

(2) During December, A Company (-) was in direct support of the 1st Bde at Fire Base PASCOE, Fire Base BIRMINGHAM, and OF CHIEF WAVE in addition to carrying out special missions in their area of operations. At Fire Base PASCOE, six 8' x 12' and one 10' x 24' bunkers were completed. In addition, seven flying buttresses were placed for support of the 20' x 104' mess hall. At Fire Base BIRMINGHAM, a total of nineteen 8' x 12' and one 10' x 24' bunkers were completed. A combat assault and minesweep of Fire Base MAUREEN was accomplished on 19 December with negative findings. At OF CHIEF WAVE, two one-ship L2s were cut, a radar/pathfinder tower was built, and two blivet racks were constructed. At CAMP EAGLE, a 15' x 32' SEA hut was constructed for use as a psychiatric ward for the 326th Medical Battalion. Also, extensive rehabilitation of EAGLE Bowl in preparation for the Bob Hope Show was completed. B Company (-) continued in direct support of the 3rd Brigade at Fire Base RAKKASAN and Fire Base JACK in addition to carrying out special missions in their area of operations. At Fire Base RAKKASAN, seven of eleven blivet racks were completed, 500 meters of defensive wire were placed around the perimeter, and extensive bunker rehabilitation was accomplished. At Fire Base JACK, two observation pathfinder towers and an 8' x 12' shower were built. Roads and drainage systems were continuously maintained at both Fire Base JACK and CAMP EVANS. Two 14' x 14' SEA huts were constructed and three 20' towers were erected for the AFVN television relay station. During December, C Company (-) was in direct support of the 2nd Brigade at Fire Base BRICK, ARSENAL, TOMAHAWK, and LOS BANOS. At Fire Base BRICK, the rehabilitation of bunkers 4 through 15 on the perimeter and the TIC was accomplished, and the construction of one 8' x 12' and one 12' x 12' bunker was completed. At Fire Base ARSENAL, the construction of one 20' x 64' mess bunker, one 16' x 16' kitchen bunker and one 10' x 16' radar bunker was completed. At Fire Base TOMAHAWK, work consisted of tearing down the old mess hall for a proposed stand-down area. At Fire Base LOS BANOS, one 20' x 32' mess bunker and one 16' x 16' kitchen bunker were completed and rehabilitation of the drainage system on the hill was completed. At Fire Base PISTOL on 18 December, a minesweep operation of Route 545 for three kilometers was conducted in conjunction with an artillery raid and positions for two 8" howitzers were constructed. On INU THU Road, 1,500 cubic yards of select fill were placed on the road and the elevation was raised one foot for approximately 2,000 meters. A daily mine sweep from

CONFIDENTIAL

58

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(3) During January 1971, A Company, (-) was in direct support of the 1st Brigade at Fire Base BAKKARAN, Fire Base JACK, CAMP EAGLE Combat Base, Fire Base VONGKOL, and CAMP EAGLE Combat Base. At Fire Base BAKKARAN, one 16' x 16' bunker was constructed and firewired with 12' x 12' wire and a 10' x 16' concrete message rack pad was placed. A 100-strand concertina fence was placed around Fire Base BAKKARAN. At Fire Base EASTONE, a blivet rack was constructed, and a 10' x 16' mess hall was completed. At CAMP EAGLE, 100' x 100' green were employed and the VIP lounge was completed. Daily minesweeps were conducted on Route 540 from Fire Base BAKKARAN to Fire Base VONGKOL and from Fire Base BAKKARAN to Fire Base EASTONE. In addition, minesweeps were conducted at Fire Base HON with negative findings. During January 1971, B Company (-) was in direct support of the 3rd Brigade at Fire Base BAKKARAN, Fire Base JACK, CAMP EAGLE Combat Base, HEB SANH, and other missions in the area of operations. At Fire Base BAKKARAN, the construction of eleven blivet racks, the improvement of shower facilities, and placing and repairing of defensive wire was accomplished. In addition, a daily minesweep in conjunction with elements of D/Lth Engineers was conducted with negative findings. At Fire Base JACK, the construction of a temporary ice house, a 10' x 16' mess hall, and two latrines was completed. At CAMP EAGLE Combat Base, a total of seven SPA huts were reconstructed or relocated, and upgrading and maintenance repair of the interior roads continued. C Company (-) was in direct support of the 2nd Brigade at Fire Base AMULAI, HEB LA, THAMKHY, HEB BANG, and in general support in the area of operations. At Fire Base KRESKAL, two 8' x 12' bunkers were completed, and a 10' x 16' shelter was constructed. At Fire Base BAKK, four 10' x 16' bunkers and one 10' x 16' FDC bunker were constructed, the FDC was rehabilitated, a 10' x 16' bunker was constructed for use as a MARS station, and FDC meters of defensive wire were employed. At Fire Base THAMKHY, general support was accomplished. At Fire Base HEB BANG, a 10' x 16' shelter was completed. On the HEB BAI perimeter roads, 1,000 cubic yards of select fill were placed and complete drainage with six culverts were installed. On HEB THU Road, 700 cubic yards of select fill were placed and twelve culverts and drainage ditches were constructed. At the HEB-HU BAI airfield, runway lights were installed on the east end

CONFIDENTIAL

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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division
(Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CDPOR-65 (R) (U)

of the runway. During January 1971, HHC provided equipment support at CAMP EAGLE, Fire Bases JACK, KON, LOS BAINES, BASTOON, BIRMINGHAM, TOMAHAWK, BRICK, and ARSENAL, and at PHU THO ROAD, CAMP EVANS, and KHE SANH. HHC continued interior road maintenance at CAMP EAGLE. During January, 1,950 meters of ditch were improved, and 70 cubic yards of rock were placed, graded, and compacted. 23,000 gallons of penetrant were placed on the interior roads as a dust palliative. Additionally, the fly ways of the 2/17th Cav, 4/77th AAA, Corridor Pad, Eagle Dustoff, and the 163rd Aviation were penetrant.

(4) On 27 January 1971, Task Force 326 was formed and assigned the mission of moving by air to KHE SANH to construct a C-130 assault airfield and repair the existing AM-2 airfield damaged during the January - March 1968 KHE SANH siege. Additionally, TF 326 was given the mission of opening a 16 kilometer section of Routes QL-9 and 608 from the vicinity of the RIVIERE DE QUANG TRI River Valley to the KHE SANH airfield. To perform these missions, the task force was configured from elements of a line company and a supervisory section of the Battalion Staff. The 45th Engineer Group reinforced this task force with a combat engineer platoon, aluminum cutting and welding equipment, and a survey section. Convoy movement to the staging area at MAI LOC was conducted from 27-29 January. Seven convoy serials were required due to limited transportation assets and the wide variety of engineer equipment making the move. On 30 January, simultaneous combat assaults were conducted by TF 326 via Bridge 34 (XD908395) and KHE SANH. Two engineer platoons, two dozers, four 3/4-ton trucks and a radio jeep were lifted into via Bridge 34 to effect the opening of Route QL-9. The by-pass at Bridge 33 (XD921119) was prepared for an Armored Vehicle Launched Bridge (AVLB) while the abutments at Bridge 34 were prepared for a 38-foot M-4 dry span bridge lifted in by CH-54 and CH-47s. To decrease the time required to open the section of road from Bridge 36 to KHE SANH, a third engineer platoon conducted minesweep operations from KHE SANH to Bridge 36. Additionally, a D-5 bulldozer removed the upper four inches of the old road surface, to increase the rate of mine clearing. Upon arrival at Bridge 36, it became apparent that the amount of earth work necessary to provide fill for the bridge abutments was beyond the capability of the airmobile bulldozers. Shaped and cratering charges were used throughout the night to blast rocky fill from the cliffs overhanging the bridge site. Due to the inaccessibility of the site to AVLB's, additional fill was required to build up the abutments for a 38-foot M-4 dry span. Traffic was passed at 1230 hours 31 January 1971. During the first two days of the engineer airmobile operations, a combination of 97 medium and heavy helicopter sorties were flown to KHE SANH in support of Task Force 326 by Army and Marine helicopters operating out of the forward staging area at MAI LOC. This impressive helicopter lift, which moved 225 tons of engineer equipment and supplies, may have been the most ambitious airlift of engineer equipment ever undertaken in Vietnam. It was accomplished without damage to a single item of equipment. From the

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1000

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

60

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division
(Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RGS CSFOT-55 (R3) (U)

time the first item of equipment was air landed at KHE SANH, combat engineer effort continued around the clock to construct a 3,200-foot C-130 airstrip. Dense fog, limiting ground visibility to a maximum of 20 feet, had a serious impact upon the ability to conduct the airfield survey, essential to efficient equipment utilization. Additionally, low-lying clouds increased the moisture content in the highly expansive clay soil compounding compaction and stabilization problems. In spite of numerous impediments, the assault airfield was completed by 1500 hours on 4 February 1971 and subsequently was accepted by the US Air Force Airfield Inspection Team. At 1555 hours, 5 February 1971, the first C-130 aircraft successfully landed and took off from the KHE SANH assault airfield, thus opening the facility to cargo aircraft for the first time in three years. During the entire construction period, the 36th Engineer Battalion (Amb) experienced no major equipment deadlines. Additionally, no engineer equipment, vehicles or communication equipment failed during this period, an effective tribute to the care and maintenance prior, during, and subsequent to this airmobile operation. Additionally, TF 326 received excellent supplemental equipment support from the 27th Engineer Battalion (Combat), a non-divisional engineer unit. Construction continued around-the-clock to provide a 36-point (260,000-gallons) helicopter POL refuel/storage facility. The construction of this 56-acre facility was impeded by the heavy cloud banks and by extensive underground bunkers and defensive positions which were partially destroyed by the US Marines in 1968. As large numbers of Allied troops began arriving at the KHE SANH area, the base, once occupied and defended by Task Force 326 and one infantry company, was expanded. Large areas of unrecorded minefields were encountered. The mines had to be found and neutralized because of their proximity to friendly troops and to satisfy the requirement for additional area. Employing a combination of burning, visual sweeping, probing, blasting, and bulldozing, approximately thirteen acres of BBT minefields were cleared by the TF 326 combat engineers. Four D7E bulldozers were destroyed during the clearing, confirming the presence and hazards of mine-clearing operations. Subsequent to the completion of the C-130 assault airfield, F-419 matting was placed on the airfield to improve the runway bearing capacity and to insure sustained airfield operations over an extended period. Approximately 60 C-130 sorties were received daily. The completion of the aluminum mat overlay, provided a forward heavy cargo tactical facility in support of combined US-AVN operations in northwestern South Vietnam and in Laos. On 16 February 1971, a platoon from E Company was placed under operational control of the 27th Engineer Battalion (Combat) and continued construction of a 20' x 32' bunker for 2/17th Cav and a 40' x 100' helipad for the 101st Airborne Division Advance at KHE SANH. These tasks were completed without incident and the platoon

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Operational Report - Lessons Learned 101st Airborne Division
(Airmobile). Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

was extracted on 22 February. During February, A Company (-) was in direct support of the 1st Brigade at Fire Bases BIRMINGHAM, BASTOGNE, VEGHEL, CANNON, ZON, NORMANDY, RENDEZVOUS, and CAMP EAGLE Combat Base. The new log helipad, the command helipad and the interior roads by the mess hall were penetrated in support of the 2/327th Infantry at Fire Base BIRMINGHAM. Improvements were also made on the sanitary fill and drainage ditches. Daily minesweeps were conducted on Route 547 from Fire Base BASTOGNE to Fire Base VEGHEL and from Fire Base BIRMINGHAM to Fire Base BASTOGNE with negative findings. An M-450 was employed on Fire Base ZON to cut gun pads and ammunition slots. An M-450 was employed on Fire Base NORMANDY to cut defilade positions and ammunition bunkers in support of 1/327th Infantry. Company A received the mission on 10 February 1971 of reconstructing Route QL-347 from Fire Base BLAZE to Fire Base RENDEZVOUS, a distance of 19 kilometers, in support of Operation SHAMROCK. The task force organization for this mission included Company A, 326th Engineer Battalion, and a platoon of Company B, 27th Engineer Battalion (Cht). On 12 February a portion of the task force moved by road to Fire Base BLAZE and began working west along QL-547. The equipment with this element included a scoop loader, two D7E bulldozers, and several 5-ton dump trucks. On 12 February, another element air-assaulted into abandoned Fire Base RENDEZVOUS on the floor of the A SHAU VALLEY with two M-450 dozers and two 3/4-ton dump trucks. The element began working to the east. On 13 February two additional elements air assaulted to intermediate road locations. One element received three M-450 dozers plus two 3/4-ton dump trucks while the other element received a D-5 bulldozer and two 3/4-ton dump trucks. These two elements began working toward each other as this portion of the road was considered the most critical. By the evening of 14 February, the entire 19 kilometers of road was passable to all classes of wheeled and tracked vehicles. Improvement of the road continued from 17 February through 21 February. The entire road is now 15 feet wide. Forty-six culverts are now operational in the road system. 125,000 cubic yards of earth and rock were moved while fixing out slides and side hill cuts. Five ford sites were improved in the section of road from Fire Base BLAZE to Fire Base RENDEZVOUS. Turnouts were constructed every kilometer to facilitate passing and pullout of non-operational vehicles. Seven landing zones were constructed along the road to be used in future operations. Two LZs will accept CH-54 traffic, and five will accept two UH-1Hs simultaneously. There are four points of particular significance along this route. 1) At point 31 (YC449974) two streams converge on the road bed and had washed it out. Also the slope of the road approaching the streams, exceeded 50 degrees. Culverts were installed to divert the streams, the area was filled and compacted, and the slope was cut to less than 30 degrees. 2) At point 32 (YC454987) the slope of the road exceeded 60 degrees, and a stream crossed the road at the base of the slope. A ford was constructed across the stream.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

62

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division
(Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

The entire hill mass was shaped into a turnaround. Both western approaches to the stream were cut to less than 30 degrees. This is the only portion of the road where lengthy convoys can pass each other or halt without blocking traffic. 3) At point 22 (YC457999) a stream and waterfall intersected the road. The configuration of the road was such that it was not possible to install a regular culvert. By use of demolitions, a "trench culvert" was formed which has proven to be very satisfactory. 4) At point 1 (TD527022) a river crosses the road. A massive amount of rock was necessary to construct a ford capable of passing all traffic.

During February 1971, B Company (-) was in direct support of the 1st Brigade at Fire Base BAKKASAN, Fire Base JACK, Fire Base A-2, CAMP CARROLL, MAI LOC and CAMP EVANS Combat Base. Daily mine sweeps were performed on access roads from CAMP CARROLL, MAI LOC, Fire Base A-2, and Fire Base BAKKASAN with negative findings. C Company (-) was in direct support of the 2nd Brigade at Fire Bases ARSEVAL, BRICK, TOMAHAWK, and LOS BANOS. C Company also continued improving the PHU BAI Combat Base perimeter roads. On Fire Base BRICK the defensive wire was installed, a 10' x 24' TOC bunker was rehabilitated and three 8' x 12' personnel bunkers were completed, numerous dud rounds were destroyed, earthwork was completed on the 155mm howitzer positions, and a trash dump was cut. On Fire Base ARSEVAL, an 8' x 12' personnel bunker and a 16' x 16' mess personnel bunker were completed. On Fire Base TOMAHAWK, a 20' x 48' stand-down bunker and a 10' x 16' grease trap were completed; a helipad was graded and penprimed; a blivet rack was constructed; a D-7 dozer cut and shaped the access road to QL-1, cleared 25 meters of firing range, polished a crash sump, and cut a 25' x 75' slot for COMEX storage. On the PHU BAI "A" Sector Road 3,638 cubic yards of sand fill were hauled and spread on the road and two 24" culverts were installed. On 17 February a platoon of C Company began rehabilitation of Eagle Beach by repairing five guard towers, the helipad, the tennis court and retaining wall, the 2nd floor, constructing a dressing room, a floor for the EM club, and extending the basketball court playing surface. D Company (Provisional) was activated under the provisions of 101st Airborne Division General Order 1681 on 27 February 1971 with the mission of providing combat support to the engineer battalion, airmobile division, by accomplishing general and special engineer tasks and to undertake and carry out infantry combat missions when required. On 28 February 1971, 3rd Platoon, Company B moved by air to KHE SANH to begin construction of a 20' x 32' combined corps TOC at the Old KHE SANH POST.

(5) On 1 March 1971, the remaining elements of Company B, augmented by a platoon from Company D (Prov), conveyed to KHE SANH. Second Platoon, Company D began construction of a 20' x 64' TOC for 101st Airborne Division (Amb) Advance Headquarters. Upon completion of the 20' x 64' TOC, 3rd Platoon, Company B constructed a 20' x 32' briefing room adjacent to the TOC. During the entire period, 1st Platoon, Company D provided

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

63
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division
(Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RGS CDPOL-65 (R2) (U)

equipment support to 101st forward units by cutting trenches for tentage, fighting positions, and bunkers. On 24 March, 1st Platoon, Company D moved by road convoy to CAMP EAGLE and the remaining elements (CP and 3rd Platoon, Company F) conveyed to CAMP WART on 26 March. During March 1971, HHC continued equipment support of the battalion and road maintenance within the CAMP EAGLE Combat Base. Approximately 37,000 gallons of penetrant were applied to various portions of the CAMP EAGLE road network as a dust palliative. During March, A Company (-) was in direct support of the 1st Brigade at Fire Bases EASTONE, BIRMINGHAM, SIDER and NORMANBY, Observation Post (OP) Destroyer, CAMP EAGLE Combat Base and supported the division forward at QUANG TRI. At Fire Base EASTONE, daily mine-sweeps were conducted east and west along Route 547 with negative findings. A four-man team from A Company supported A Company, 2/501st Infantry, in its operations to the north of Fire Base EASTONE by conducting sweeps of the area with the infantry. While in support of the 1/506th Infantry and the 1st Brigade Aerial Rifle Platoon, a reinforced engineer squad combat assaulted into several fire bases in the AO. These fire bases included CLADLIFT, BIRMINGHAM, BIRCHWOOD and LANCER. At Fire Base LANCER, the element received an undetermined amount of small arms fire from a nearby hill. At BIRCHWOOD and LANCER, numerous booby traps were found, but only one was disarmed due to the short period of time to be spent in the area. At QUANG TRI, in support of division forward, general engineer maintenance was performed, MIA huts were repaired, two showers were constructed and the commanding general's briefing room was rehabilitated. At Fire Base BIRMINGHAM, in direct support of the 1/327th Infantry, daily mine-sweeps of Route 547 were conducted with negative findings. In direct support of the 1/506th Infantry at Fire Base SIDER, a combat assault and sweep of the hill was conducted, and shortly thereafter, an M-450 dozer was airlifted onto the hill. A sanitary fill, two ASP slots, and two TOC slots were excavated. In direct support of the 1/327th Infantry at CP DESTROYER, the original LZ was expanded, fields of fire were cleared, five 8' x 12' slots were excavated, five 8' x 12' native timber bunkers were constructed and triple concertina was emplaced around the CP. At Fire Base NORMANBY, a shower was constructed and numerous sleeping positions were sandbagged. On 10 March 1971, Company A received the mission of constructing a road network from Fire Base EASTONE to Fire Base CHEROKEE. The purpose of constructing this road network was threefold: to deny the NVN the use of the base area south-east of Hill 246, to provide the ARVN with ready access to Fire Base EASTONE and BIRMINGHAM, and to open vast hardwood areas to the woodcutters of THUA THIEN Province. On 11 March 1971, the 3rd Platoon, Company A air-assaulted to Hill 246 with three M-450 bulldozers, two D-5 bulldozers, and a 3/4-ton truck. They immediately began construction working to the south. Simultaneously, Company B, 37th Engineer Battalion, began work from Route 547 in the vicinity of Fire Base EASTONE to the north. They employed four D-7 dozers and a scoop loader. This first

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

64

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division
(Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, PCS CSFQR-05 (R3) (U)

phase of the road construction encompassed clearing 8 kilometer double-canopy jungle, installing numerous culverts, and clearing fields of fire on both sides of the road. Work from Hill 246 proceeded more slowly than estimated. The combat engineers quickly found that the hill was a solid mass of high density rock and the slope of the hill was excessive. On 2 April the two construction forces met, thus completing the pioneered road to Hill 246. Company A then began constructing OP KING in Hill 246. A 10' x 24' bunker and nine 8' x 12' bunkers were airlifted from Fire Base BETHLEHEM to OP KING and emplaced in slots cut into the hill. On 10 April, the OP was turned over to A Company and the Company A element returned to CAMP EAGLE. Company B, 27th Infantry Battalion continued construction of the road which will eventually connect Fire Base LION, Fire Base GARDEN, OP KING and Fire Base EAGLE. During March, B Company continued engineer operations in the support sector of Military Region I. B Company minus was in direct support of the 3rd Brigade at Fire Base THUNDERBIRD II, Fire Base VANDERCRIFT, CAMP CARROLL, HAI LOC, Fire Base JACK, Fire Base RAKHASAN and CAMP EVANS and supported the Division Advance at KHE SANH. A daily minesweep was conducted from Fire Base RAKHASAN to the TEXAS FORD with negative findings. General engineer support continued at Fire Base JACK until the fire base was closed on 17 March 1971. Revetments were constructed for the 27th ABP and general engineer road maintenance continued at CAMP EVANS. At Fire Base VANDERCRIFT, daily minesweeps were conducted with one anti-personnel mine located and destroyed in place. The squad at Fire Base VANDERCRIFT also cleared one log pad, constructed an ammo storage bunker, an aid station, FOC bunker and other facilities. At HAI LOC, daily minesweeps were conducted to QL-9. On 14 March 1971, the minesweep vehicle detonated a mine resulting in three APVN KIA, one US KIA and four US MIA. Construction at HAI LOC consisted of blivet racks and a grease pit. Daily minesweeps were conducted from CAMP CARROLL with negative findings. Work at CAMP CARROLL consisted of construction of blivet racks, repairing roads and preparing areas for COMEX emplacement. At Fire Base THUNDERBIRD II, daily minesweeps were conducted with one anti-personnel mine found and destroyed in place. During March, C Company (-) was engaged in combat engineer support of Fire Bases ARSENAL, BRICK, TOMAHAWK, ANZIO: upgrading of HHU BAI Roads, HHU THU Road, HUONG THI Road, Christie Memorial Baseball Field, and in general engineer support in the HHU BAI/CAMP EAGLE Combat Areas. On Fire Base BRICK, an old 10' x 24' TOC bunker was dismantled, the slot widened with an M-450 and a new 20' x 32' TOC constructed in its place. Numerous dud rounds and trees were blown around the hill, two blivet racks were completed and fields of fire around the 155mm howitzer area were cleared. In HHU BAI, 3,800 meters of interior roads were upgraded and 8,000 gallons of penprize were applied as a dust palliative. At Fire Base BLITZ, a minesweep was conducted with negative findings. A minesweep was conducted on Fire Base KATHRYN with one booby trap discovered and blown in place. On Fire Base ARSENAL, a 16' x 16' sleeping bunker was completed and 108 cubic yards of fill were hauled and spread with an M-450 dozer around

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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division
(Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, HHC CSFOT-65 (R3) (D)

existing bunkers. All work on the fire base ceased when it was closed on 25 Mar 71. At the HHU BAI Service Club, all carpenter work in the music room, work room, and kitchen was completed, old wiring replaced and two CONEXs emplaced to be used as sewage tanks. On HUONG THUY Road, 1,360 cubic yards of fill were hauled extending the road 200 meters. On the HHU THU Road, 90 cubic yards of fill were hauled and placed on bridge approaches, one culvert was repaired and one 16' long 24" diameter culvert was emplaced. Within the CAMP EAGLE Combat Base, the Division softball field, Christie Field, was completed and at Eagle International, shields were placed around the landing lights on the edges of the helipad. On Fire Base TOMAHAWK, an M-450 dozer leveled and cleared positions for six 105mm howitzers, dug a slot for a 6' x 20' ASP and ice house, and covered a trash sump. Additionally, a blast wall was completed around the stand-down bunker, an ice house and wash rack were completed, and culvert drainage structures around the mess hall were repaired. A 10' x 30' bunker on the barge at LANG CO BAY was dismantled and the materials flown to Fire Base ARSENAL and Fire Base BRICK for use in new construction. A 8' x 12' sleeping bunker at NUOC NGOT was dismantled and the materials taken to Fire Base TOMAHAWK and the water point at that location was moved to HHU LOC. Two minesweeps were conducted along the railroad tracks from LANG CO to Fire Base LOS BANOS with negative findings. During March, D Company rendered equipment and personnel support to KHE SAMH, Fire Base SPEAR, Fire Base BASTOGNE, Fire Base BIRMINGHAM, Fire Base ARSENAL, CAMP CARROLL and QUANG TRI, CAMP EAGLE, and HHU BAI Combat Bases. On 2 March 1971, a reinforced platoon from D Company was attached to B Company and moved to KHE SAMH to furnish engineer support to XXIV Corps and 101st Airborne Division (Amb) (Advance). Upon returning to CAMP EAGLE, the first platoon constructed a new 60,000 gallon vehicle refuel point and began improving the EAGLE water point and F II sector of the CAMP EAGLE bunkerline. Equipment from D Company supported operations at Fire Base SPEAR, Fire Base BASTOGNE, Fire Base BIRMINGHAM, Hill 246 (CP KING), and Fire Base ARSENAL by clearing fields of fire, filling trash dumps, digging bunker slots, and building roads. An improved drainage system was installed in the CG's mess. D Company supplied two Boston Whalers to work for the 2/502nd Infantry at QUANG TRI and CAMP CARROLL. An air boat was sent to LANG CO BAY to aid in moving scout dog teams investigating suspected enemy movement along the FEE-BA NAMG Railroad.

(6) During April 1971, HHC continued to furnish equipment support to the line companies of the Battalion. HHC also continued maintenance of EAGLE roads by continuous scarifying and grading. 39,000 gallons of penepime were applied to the roads and heliports in the CAMP EAGLE area as a dust palliative. HHC constructed a motor park and applied 16,000 gallons of penepime as a dust palliative for the 1/1 Cav at HHU BAI. An ARA rear point was constructed at Fire Base BIRMINGHAM and 16,000 gallons of penepime were applied as a dust palliative. The mortar craters in the BIRMINGHAM airstrip were repaired. HHC also assumed responsibility for the HUONG THUY Road project and hauled and

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

66

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division
(Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971 (REF: 101-5 (1) (1))

placed 2,100 cubic yards of select fill. A Company (-) was in direct support of the 1st Brigade at Fire Base BASLOGNE, Fire Base BIRMINGHAM, CP CHECK and CP KING in addition to performing combat and combat support missions in support of Operation LAMSON 720. At Fire Base BASLOGNE, daily minesweeps were conducted east toward Fire Base BIRMINGHAM and west toward Fire Base NERBIL with negative findings. General engineer support of the fire base continued until 16 April 1971 when the engineer responsibility for the fire base was turned over to D Company. At Fire Base BIRMINGHAM, daily minesweeps were conducted west toward Fire Base BASLOGNE with negative findings. A total of 26 8' x 12' bunkers and three 10' x 24' bunkers were excavated and prepared for air movement to other locations. Five bunkers were moved and replaced on the top of the hill and the sanitary fill was improved. On 16 April, engineer responsibility for the fire base was turned over to D Company. On 22 - 25 April, A Company supported the 1/327th Infantry staging area at the foot of Fire Base BIRMINGHAM by applying 4,800 gallons of petroleum to the access roads leading into their stand-down area. On 14 April, a squad of A Company conducted a combat assault and sweep of Fire Base FURY. During the sweep, 16 Chicom grenades, 2 baseball-type grenades and one 82mm mortar round booby traps were discovered, disarmed and destroyed. On 17 April, A Company sent a reinforced squad to LA VANG to construct a TOC/briefing room for the 101st Airborne Division (Ambl) forward operations during LAMSON 720. They completed this high priority task in less than 24 hours from the initial warning order. A Company constructed several LZs in the 1st Brigade AO during April and participated in several combat patrols in support of the 1/37th Infantry and 2/502nd Infantry. On these patrols in the A SHAN VALLEY antitank mines were emplaced at selected sites in an effort to harass the NVA using Route 548 as a resupply route. A Company supported the 1st Brigade headquarters at CAMP EAGLE by maintaining portions of the bunkerline, rehabilitating SEA nuts and constructing revetments. During the first week of April, B Company continued in support of the 3rd Brigade at MAI LOC, CAMP CARROLL, Fire Base THUNDERBIRD II and Fire Base VANDERSRIFT. Fortifications were constantly improved until all forces withdrew on 10 April. On 10 April, two squads were airlifted to Fire Base GLADIATOR to provide engineer support for 1/506th Infantry operations and fire base maintenance. An M-450 and backhoe were employed to excavate four culvert bunkers and to clear a lower hill for a 155mm artillery battery. Also, on 10 April, D Company dispatched a squad to Fire Base KATHRYN to provide engineer support for 2/506th Infantry operations and fire base maintenance. An M-450 was employed to level an area for a 155mm artillery battery and the engineers assisted in bunker repair and installation of perimeter wire. B Company supported CAMP EVANS units with general engineer support and by maintaining the interior road network. B Company also supported 2/502nd Infantry operating

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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division
(Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, PCS CSPT-65 (R3) (U)

out of Fire Base JACK by performing fire base maintenance and combat operations during LAMSON 720. During April, C Company (-) was in direct support of the 2nd Brigade at Fire Bases BRICK, HOLAHAWK, ANGLE, NORMANDY, BRICK, RIFLE, and conducted combat support missions in the AO. In early April, the decision was reached to construct Fire Base RIFLE and abandon Fire Base BRICK. While support continued at Fire Base BRICK, plans were made to open Route QL-19 to Fire Base RIFLE and conduct deliberate construction of the fire base. On 10 April, Route QL-19 was opened and a platoon was inserted on Fire Base RIFLE. Simultaneously, these two construction forces began operations to clear and level the fire base and upgrade Route QL-19. Twenty-five culverts were installed, the road widened utilizing D-7 bulldozer blade and Rome plow dozers and grades lowered utilizing M5-100 scrapers. At Fire Base RIFLE, the hill was leveled, artillery positions and bunker positions staked out and excavated. During April, C Company continued to improve the PHU THU Road by hauling fill to improve bridge approaches. Prior to being relieved of responsibility for constructing the HUONG THUY Road on 10 April, C Company hauled 1,100 cubic yards of select fill to extend the road 80 meters. Upon change of units on Fire Base NORMANDY, new requirements were received and C Company employed an M-450 and a squad to excavate for ammunition dumps, trash dumps, for an alternate TOC bunker and for sleeping bunkers. The PHU BAI interior and perimeter roads were continuously upgraded by C Company. Additionally, 11,000 gallons of peooprime/diesel mixture were applied to those roads as a dust palliative. Several LZs were constructed in the 2nd Brigade AO and one LZ (LZ DALON) was expanded to accommodate a battery of 105mm howitzers. On 5 April 1971 as NHE SAH was being vacated by American and ARVN units, a platoon (-) from Company C augmented with four M-450 dozers was airlifted into NHE SAH to assist in closing the base. Upon arriving at NHE SAH, the platoon began operations under the direction of Division Support Command. Non-salvageable equipment was buried, bunkers and munitions were destroyed. The entire force was extracted on 6 April 1971, thus terminating all 226th Engineer Battalion support at NHE SAH. During April, D Company (Provisional) furnished equipment support to the battalion and executed assigned projects at Fire Base BASTOGNE, Fire Base BIRMINGHAM, LANG CO BAY, CAMP EAGLE, PHU BAI and LA VANG. D Company improved the CAMP EAGLE bunkerline by grading and shaping the perimeter road and constructing fighting positions. Extensive repairs were accomplished at the CAMP EAGLE water point by improving drainage and reshaping the entire truck park. The VII quarters at PHU BAI were extensively renovated during April. D Company supplied air boats and Boston whalers to LANG CO BAY TO support the scout dog teams utilized to secure the railroad in that area. A Boston whaler was employed at the PHU Bridge to patrol the Porfuso River. On 16 April, D Company assumed fire base maintenance responsibility of Fire Base BASTOGNE and Fire Base BIRMINGHAM from A Company. D Company supported the

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

68

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division
(Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RDS GDFOR-65 (R3) (U)

division forward at LA VANG during LAMSON 720 by constructing showers, latrines, mess facilities and conducting general engineer support. D Company was also responsible for supplying power to CAMP TILFITT within CAMP EAGLE Combat Base by operating and maintaining the electric generators.

m. Air Cavalry Operations.

(1) A Troop.

(a) The mission of Troop A during November and December was to provide visual reconnaissance in the 2/17th Cavalry reconnaissance zones. It also provided reconnaissance and security for the 3rd Brigade of the 101st Airborne Division (AAB) and its subordinate elements in the form of first and last light reconnaissance and reaction to contact missions. The Aero Rifle Platoon secured downed aircraft in the 101st Airborne Division's northern area of operations. On 6 November 1970 Troop A was given the mission to conduct a visual reconnaissance in the vicinity of Fire Bases KATH, HINDO, and FIDLEY. During the morning, the ARPs were inserted to secure a downed aircraft at coordinates YD928434. During a visual recon of Area 7 a UH-1H downed aircraft received 8-10 rounds of .51 caliber fire with negative hits. While enroute this area a total of 110-130 rounds of AK fire was received with negative hits. Numerous trails were spotted in the vicinity of coordinates YD241132 with recent activity in the past 24-48 hours. Footprints of 2 to 3 personnel at coordinates YD241144 were observed with recent activity in the last 24 hours. In a 2 grid square area around YD230120 three hootches and 16 bunkers with signs of recent activity in the past 12-24 hours were observed. On 14 November the mission for Troop A began with visual recon in recon zone 7. Two .51 caliber pits, 10 bunkers, 3 trails, and several hootches were observed at coordinates YD149063. At coordinates YD150070, 45 hootches were observed in a 100 meter square. While conducting reconnaissance of the area at coordinates YD151055 a light observation helicopter took 40 to 50 rounds of AK-47 fire. The pilot was hit in the hand and the aircraft was flown back to QUANG TRI. At coordinates YD862287 two big, reinforced bunkers, and numerous footprints were spotted. At coordinates YD151055 a gunship was fired at by both AK-47 and .51 caliber weapons. A FAC was on station to engage the target where the aircraft was fired on. Air strikes were placed on the target with unknown results. On 15 November a team from Troop A observed a 3/4-ton truck at coordinates YD095074. The truck was engaged and destroyed, and the aircraft received 10 rounds of .51 caliber fire with negative hits. Also at this location 5 to 7 bunkers were destroyed. An 8' x 8' bunker at coordinates YD923235 was observed and engaged with unknown results. AK-47 fire was received at coordinates YD125107 and YD923235 by light observation helicopter. On 26 November Troop A began

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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobiles), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCE GCFOR-65 (R3) (U)

a five day stand-down. During the stand-down period, time was allocated for proficiency check rides and instrument training. Major emphasis was placed on aircraft maintenance to insure maximum combat-ready aircraft at the termination of the stand-down. Final emphasis was placed on the maintenance of aircraft, the conducting of proficiency check rides, and police of the area.

(b) During December, A Troop provided visual reconnaissance in the 2/17th Cavalry reconnaissance zones. It also provided reconnaissance and security for the 3rd Brigade of the 101st Airborne Division (Ambl) and its subordinate elements in the form of first and last light reconnaissance and reaction to contact missions. Due to high winds and heavy rains, operations in the recon zones declined during the reporting period. Teams for L Company (Ranger) were sent to Troop A to be placed in the recon zones. Troop A supplied overflights, insertions, reaction forces, and extractions for the 101st Airborne Division's northern area of operations. Missions in support of ARVN located in the vicinity of Fire Base BARABARA were also performed by Troop A.

(c) During January Troop A participated in the JEFFERSON GIEN operations in general support of the 101st Airborne Division (Ambl). 1-2 January, inclement weather prevented combat operations in the AO. On 3 January, VR of RT 616 showed signs of heavy truck traffic. Gunship: received 12.7mm antiaircraft fire at XD910243. One aircraft was hit and suffered minor damage. On 4-5 January, inclement weather prevented combat operations in the AO. On 9-16 January, Troop A performed visual reconnaissance in the AO with emphasis on Route 616. Active 12.7mm pits were observed and engaged. TAC AIR and Artillery were called in on bunkers. On 16-21 January, Troop A worked in close support with TAC AIR, AAA and Artillery to destroy bunkers, cache sites, tunnels and spider holes along Route 616. On 22-23 January, inclement weather prevented combat operations in the AO. On 25 January, several sensor strings were activated and were visually checked for activity. On 26-28 January, inclement weather prevented combat operations in the AO. On 30 January, Troop A performed mission of flank security for 1/5th Mech in KHE SANH area of operations. A downed LCH from F Troop 8th Cavalry was secured and rigged for extraction. On 31 January, Troop A provided security for units in KHE SANH and SHEPPARD areas of operations. BDA's of Arc Lights were completed with satisfactory results noted.

(d) On 2-3 February, Troop A conducted VR of Route 616, extracted two Ranger teams and inserted two others. Troop D was inserted to accomplish ground reconnaissance of Route 616. On 4 February, Troop A ARP was inserted into KHE SANH Combat Base, to secure the arrival of Troop D and Squadron HQ. On 4-7 February bad weather precluded normal operations. On 8 February, Troop A crossed the LAOTIAN border. Aircraft reported taking fire with three aircraft reporting hits (The aircraft were reported flyable). On 10 February the troop worked the area west of KHE SANH utilizing FAC and AAA. A LCH and AR-16 were shot down. The crews were extracted. Seven MIA were KHP on that date. On 12-17 February, the troop supported ARVN ground elements operating in LAOS. Troop A worked with FAC controlled TAC AIR, AAA and its organic gunships to suppress enemy antiaircraft fire, while team con-

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

70

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division
(Airmobiles), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RMC GOFOT-65 (R3) (U)

tinued their missions of VR for the ground forces. Approximately 16 NVA were KEM. On 18-25 February, Troop A was engaged in its assigned missions of VR and close screen to the ground forces. Weather during this period frequently delayed missions until 1100-1200 hours. On 26 February, Troop A had visual sightings of enemy armor. Two active tanks were sighted, and an AH-1G received 15 hits in the process of flying VR in the vicinity of LZ 31. On 27-28 February, Troop A alternated with Troop C and the Squadron Headquarters Company as CSC to recover an LCH that had been shot down Vic XD6225. Three 12.7mm anti-aircraft weapons were located in the area.

(e) On 1 March the troop employed airstrikes against known and suspected enemy locations. On 2-3 March, inclement weather prevented combat operations. On 4-6 March, A Troop supported ARVN bases at LZ SONHIA and LZ VICTORY, and employed TAC AER and Artillery on known positions. On 6 March, the Mac Bao was inserted to secure a downed crew at XD478409. On 7 March, the Mac Bao and the downed crew were extracted under heavy 12.7mm anti-aircraft fire from three weapons. One AH-1G received 4 hits and returned to base where it was determined to be non flyable. A truck (5 ton) was destroyed and a bulldozer was spotted. The area was marked for a FAC. On 8-10 March inclement weather prevented combat operations. On 11 March, Troop A conducted a VR of LZ ALDHI, LZ TRAVO, LZ ALHAI, and LZ FOMEL to determine conditions. Five 2½ ton trucks were sighted and marked for a FAC. On 12-13 March, Troop A's mission was to conduct VR and screen Vic LZ SONHIA. On 14-15 March, inclement weather prevented combat operations. On 16-22 March, Troop A supported the 1st Infantry Division (ARVN) in the vicinity of LZ ERGON with heavy teams. Air strikes were employed and remaining targets were turned over to the FAC on station. During this period an AH-1G was shot down by small arms fire near XD439405. The crew was extracted. Tanks were sighted on 19 March and were marked for the FAC. On 24 March, A Troop continued support to 1st Infantry Division (ARVN) with heavy Cavalry teams. Marginal weather on 25 March prevented working in the AO until 1400 hours. Route recon of 616 revealed no significant spots and no traffic during the past three days. On 26-28 March, Troop A performed its visual recon role in the Laotian and Vietnamese Salient areas to spot possible targets of opportunity. Heavy small arms fire was received throughout the area of interest. On 29-30 March, Troop A supported insertions of ARVN's near XD6202 and performed VR in Laotian Salient.

(f) On 1-5 April, Troop A conducted visual reconnaissance in the Vietnamese and Laotian Salient areas. Emphasis was placed on Route 616 and by-passes. On 6 April, Troop A spent the early day in visual reconnaissance of routes of approach, departure, and planned LZ's for the insertion of the Mac Bao. TAC AER was employed. Troop A screened ahead

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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division
(Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RGS CSFGM-65 (R3) (U)

of the advancing ground forces after insertion. On 7-9 April, Troop A supported the 3rd Brigade in the Vic of VANHANGHET and VAI LOC. On 10-13 April, inclement weather caused mission delays. Troop A, however, worked in the Vic of Fire Base GLADLUM, observing light trail traffic. In the Vic of Fire Base CURELLY Troop A observed light foot traffic. Gunships received heavy small arms fire. One AH-1G was downed, crashed-landed in a field. On 12 April inclement weather prevented combat operations in the AC. On 13-15 April, Troop A worked the recon zones with emphasis on Route 616 from Fire Base THA HET HEC to Fire Base SHILOH. Small amounts of traffic were observed and teams continued to receive 12.7mm and small arms fire. On 16 April, Teams observed old bunkers and trails but no recent activity Vic YD125219. On 17-18 April, Teams were given the priority mission of screening the RGS Rocket Belt. On 19 April, Troop A supported the 258th Vietnamese Marines in their insertion near HOLCOMB. Throughout the area 12.7mm fire was received. On 22-23 April, Teams worked in support of the 258th VMC in the Vic of Fire Base SHILOH and TUN TAVERN. Support was also rendered to the 54th ARVN Regiment Vic Fire Base BARNETT. A team observed 50-55 bunkers, two NVA, light foot traffic. On 24 April, Teams observed 3 bunkers under construction at YD05297 and 1 NVA was KEN. Bulldozers had been working on Route 616 by-passing bomb craters. Bunkers observed had a spacing of approximately 50 meters. On 25-26 April, Troop A worked with FAC and TAC A/R to support the Baa Bao raid. On 27-28 April, Teams returned to visual reconnaissance in the Division Recon Zone. TAC A/R was employed in the Vic YD095204 against a bunker complex. On 29-30 April, Troop A supported the FAC TAO raid and continued its visual reconnaissance responsibilities.

(2) B Troop.

(a) During November, B Troop was used in general support of the 101st Airborne Division (Ambl) and worked closely with the 1st Brigade. Their primary mission was to gather intelligence through visual reconnaissance missions. Secondary missions included downed aircraft security in the division's area of operation, bomb damage assessments for B-52 strikes, sky spots, and artillery. On 1-7 November B Troop worked with elements of the 1st Brigade around the THREE FORKS area (YD5012). Their specific mission was to determine the size, location, and movement of enemy forces that made contact with friendly infantry units. On 8-14 November the poor flying weather hampered B Troop's attempts to support the Rangers. On the 13th, the weather lifted enough to insert team Bills. On 16 November Bills had contact with an unknown size enemy force. Two members of the team were wounded in the action. B Troop tried to extract the men but were driven off by enemy fire. In the action three UH-1H helicopters of B Troop received combat damage. From that time B Troop

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Operational Report -- Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division
(Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSYCR-83 (R3) (U)

Troop B ARP was inserted on the site and the aircraft and crew were extracted. The second was shot down in the A SFAU VALLEY by 12.7mm antiaircraft fire. The aircraft was destroyed, and the crew are listed as MIA. From 11-14 February, Troop B worked the division reconnaissance zone detecting enemy truck traffic and destroying a truck and bulldozer. On 15 February, a UH-1H on a night Ranger extraction crashed resulting in seven US KIA. From 19-20 February, Troop B supported Ranger teams, and continued visual reconnaissance in the reconnaissance zone. On 21 February, an AH-1G in direct support of a Ranger contact fired too close to friendly troops, resulting in one KIA and two MIA. On 25 February, Troop B extracted a Ranger team with a POW Vic YD719901. From 26-27 February, Troop B secured the extraction of two aircraft in the vicinity of YD719901 and YD831192. On 28 February, Troop B conducted visual reconnaissance in the Division reconnaissance zone mapping enemy infiltration routes and directing air strikes in the A SFAU VALLEY.

(e) On 1-31 March, Troop B worked in the Division reconnaissance zone conducting visual reconnaissance, checking sensor activations and URS reports. During 5-6 March, Troop B ARP secured a downed AH-1G at YD865211 and a UH-1H at YD391261. On 13 March, an LCH received an unknown amount of 12.7mm antiaircraft and SAF in the Vic of YD199129. The aircraft crashed and burned resulting in two US MIA. During the period 14-17 March, Troop B ARP secured a downed UH-1H at YC727143, and an AH-1G at YD357472. On 22 March, Troop B ARP secured a downed AH-1G at YD961162. On 24 March, Troop B extracted Ranger teams 19s and 19w when the teams made contact. On 30 March, Troop B ARP was inserted at YD513031 to reinforce Ranger team 19s in the capture of 2 NVA POWs. During the entire reporting period, additional missions included PDA of airstrikes and Arc Lights and limited ground reconnaissance.

(f) On 1 April, B Troop ARP was inserted on Fire Base VOSHEL to secure and recover an AH-1G. Both the aircraft and the crew were recovered. On 2 April, B Troop extracted a Ranger team in contact. The team was then used to secure a B Troop LCH on Fire Base REMBETVOUS. Both the aircraft and the crew were recovered. On 4 April, a B Troop UH-1H on medevac mission vicinity YD552017 received intense SAF resulting in one US MIA. On 6 April, a B Troop UH-1H carrying Rangers to attempt a body snatch vicinity YC451990 received intense SA and MG fire resulting in 1 US KIA and 3 MIA. On 10 April the ARP secured a B Troop UH-1H (CAC) on Fire Base REMBETVOUS where it landed after receiving one 37mm hit west of Fire Base EFSVNE, resulting in one US KIA. On 13 April, the ARP secured and recovered a B Troop LCH shot down vicinity of AT837978. For the remainder of the month, B Troop operated in the reconnaissance zones and provided support for Company L (Ranger), 75th Infantry. On 23 April, a B Troop UH-1H was shot down in the vicinity of YC479907 while attempting to reinforce a Ranger team in contact, resulting in 1 US KIA and 2 US MIA. The aircraft was not recovered.

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

74

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division
(Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, A. S. FORM-65 (13) (U)

(3) C Troop.

(a) During November, Troop C was based at the 101st Airborne Airfield in general support of the Division. This included a rifle platoon, scout and reconnaissance and Ranger support. In addition, the Airfield was busy for downed aircraft in the Division AOC. Due to the nature of monsoon season, there was little air and reconnaissance activity during the first portion of the reporting period. On 13 and 14 November, the 4th and 1st teams of engineers were inserted to clear Fire Base KHAM, KHAMPHAN and KHAMPHAN. A number of 105mm rounds, fragmentation grenades and blasting caps were discovered and were destroyed. The ACP and elements of Delta Troop were inserted just south of Fire Base KHAMPHAN. The ACP, in an attempt to recover the Ranger KIA, received RPG and 40-42 fire resulting in six wounded and another Ranger KIA. Due to extremely poor weather conditions, the wounded were unable to be extracted that day. On the following day, 17 November, extraction of the critically wounded was made by an LCH under heavy AK and 50 caliber fire. On 18 November, an unsuccessful attempt, due to weather restrictions, was made to extract the ground elements. In the rescue attempt one CAC, one CAC, and one LCH received heavy AK fire, 50 caliber, and five RPG rounds. The next day, 19 November, the ACP and other ground elements started to move by foot towards Fire Base CANTON. In an attempt to make radio contact with the ground elements, one CAC took two RPG rounds and one LCH with pilot and crew member crashed into a mountain side killing both of them. On 20 November the element was able to be extracted, along with the remains of the LCH crew.

(b) During December, operations involving C Troop were significantly hampered by the northeast monsoon weather conditions. A short break in the weather allowed them to work in the northern end of the A SPAN VALLEY in the vicinity of River Mountain. On 11 December, the ACP, led by one Fire Base KHAMPHAN while D Troop was inserted by MH-1H helicopters in the vicinity of ALBUH airstrip. D Troop destroyed bridges that had been spotted earlier by LCH working in that area. During the next few days increasing enemy activity was noted in the northern valley and the surrounding areas. On frequent occasions observation aircraft came under enemy small arms fire, however, Pink Teams worked the area with considerable success. Enemy bunkers, fighting positions, bridges, and huts were destroyed. A number of the enemy were KHR. On 16 December, a LCH on an AAA mission was shot down by enemy 50 caliber fire. The crew was uninjured and immediately picked up by the MH-1H, chase aircraft. On the night of 19 December this same general area was worked by FLIR. Fighting a number of the enemy in the open, FLIR engaged and was credited with 10 enemy KHR. During this period FLIR was also utilized in the day-light hours, accompanying the regular VA missions. In the reporting period, FLIR accounted for a large percentage of the enemy KIA credited to the Troop.

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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division
(Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, MOS CSFGR-65 (R3) (U)

(c) During the 1-31 January reporting period, Troop C staged from PHU BAI Army Airfield, in general support of the 101st Airborne Division (AABD), with a primary mission of intelligence gathering through visual reconnaissance. From 1-10 January, monsoon weather prohibited extensive reconnaissance of the Division reconnaissance zone. The period from 11-30 January, was marked by improving weather which enabled Troop C to continue the visual reconnaissance of the division reconnaissance zone. A heavy increase in enemy activity was noted during this period around the ALQUH airstrip and west of Tiger Mountain. An estimated NVA Company was pinpointed. A "Cavalry Cobra" raid was launched and a BDA in the fifteen foot high elephant grass revealed 3 NVA KM. It is felt that better results were obtained than those indicated by the BDA, as the team was able to silence rather intense fire in the area. During this period Troop C reacted with its Aero Rifle Platoon to five downed aircraft. Additionally Troop C supported three Ranger Teams in contact.

(d) From 1-4 February Troop C staged from PHU BAI Airfield. From 5-28 February, it staged from KHE SANH Combat Base. On 8 February, 0743 hours the Troop C commander, MAJ James T. Newman led the first heavy Cavalry team into LARS in support of the Vietnamese Rangers. On 12 February, Troop C lost two AH-1Gs to hostile fire on the LAOTIAN border. One crew was listed as MIA. The second crew was extracted. The area of the contact was engaged by Artillery, TAC AIR, and one B-52 strike. The remainder of the month of February was devoted screening for extraction of Vietnamese Ranger fire bases and working Fire Bases 30 and 31.

(e) From 1-31 March, Troop C staged out of KHE SANH Combat Base in general support of LAMSON 719. During this period Troop C ARP manned a portion of the KHE SANH perimeter. The movement of ARVN Forces enabled the Troop to resume its full time job of reconnaissance. Troop C was assigned a reconnaissance zone that extended westward to TONKIN and to the north of Highway 9. After the ground objectives had been reached and with rain began, Troop C began close support by screening FZs and reconnaissance of flight routes. The Troop also acted in a resupply capacity on occasion during this period.

(f) April saw the end of LAMSON 719, with Troop C performing missions in support of the final phases of the operation. Returning to PHU BAI, all efforts were again concentrated on the A SHAU VALLEY and the infiltration routes along the LAOTIAN border. Heavy pink teams once again employed their organic fire power along with artillery and air support against suspected enemy locations in and around Base Area 611. Often forced to work without a LOM because of hostile fire, the effectiveness of the visual reconnaissance was greatly reduced. Support of Delta Troop operations in the Valley raised morale and gave the troops

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

76

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division
(Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RDS C FRI-65 (R3) (C)

a sense of accomplishment. Other daily missions included reconnaissance of the NHE-NHU BAI Rocket Belt, convey escorts, and support of the 1st Brigade.

(4) D Troop.

(a) During the last two months of 1970, Delta Troop provided ground reconnaissance, downed aircraft security, and reaction force for units in contact. Additionally, the troop provided ambushes and sweeps outside CAMP ENGLE and served as the base defense reaction force. During the period 1-28 January, Troop D performed its assigned missions of MAIE Reaction Force, Perimeter Defense and acted as immediate reaction force with Troop (-) for all insertions of any Squadron Aero Rifle Platoon. From 1-4 January, overflights of the perimeter defenses were made to discover possible enemy routes of infiltration and possible ambush sites. Reports submitted covering this activity indicated areas of requiring improvement. On 28 January, a warning order for movement to NHAU RI was issued. On 2 February, Troop D made a combat assault in the vicinity of XD854238, to conduct a ground bomb damage assessment (GDA) and a ground reconnaissance of the surrounding area that had been tentatively identified as a NVA headquarters complex. The Troop was extracted at 031500 hours at XD854238 and XD848036, with the PZs were green. On 4 February, Troop D moved to NHE SANN Combat Base in support of LAISON 719; Headquarters (-) by convey and two platoons by air. From 5-14 February, Troop D hardened the perimeter defenses. Bunkers, fighting positions and overhead cover were given priority. On 15 February, Troop D was given the responsibility of security for the rearm/refuel point at LANG CON, XD814368, and at this time assumed control of the aero rifle platoons of the assigned and OPC Main Cavalry Troops. Ambush and sweep operations in the squadron AO were accomplished as part of the perimeter defense plan through 14 March.

(b) On 15 March, the NHE SANN Combat Base began to receive daily artillery attacks by NVA 122mm field guns. On 23 March, at 0830 hours, Troop D repulsed a Sapper attack by the 2nd Company 15th NVA Engineer Battalion. The 40 man attack, supported by indirect fire, 60mm mortars and RPGs, penetrated the 3rd Platoon position in an attempt to reach the airfield POL and rearm points. The enemy broke contact at 0645 hours. A first light check revealed 14 NVA KIA, 1 POW, 9 AK-47s, 3 RPG launchers and one 9mm pistol captured along with numerous small arms ammunition and demolition equipment. US losses were 3 KIA, 5 WIA major, 23 WIA minor. On 27 March, Troop D was given the order to return to NHAU TRI. From 28 March until the end of the reporting period Troop D acted as the squadron reaction force for downed aircraft and crew security.

(c) During the month of April 1971, Delta Troop provided ground reconnaissance, downed aircraft security, reaction force for the division and a reaction force for units in contact. Additionally, Delta Troop

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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 1st Airborne Division
(Airborne), Period Ending 30 April 1971, MAC JNTR-65 (A3) (2)

provided base security for A sector on the AMBULANCE perimeter. Delta Troop secured two downed aircraft in A SHAU VALLEY, reinforced a Ranger team in contact in A SHAU VALLEY, inserted and provided diversion for two Ranger platoon size ambushes in A SHAU VALLEY, conducted three days of ground reconnaissance in A SHAU VALLEY, twenty-five days of static defense reaction force for CAMP EAGLE, and 5 sweeps of the AMBULANCE perimeter. After returning from KVE SAM on 2 April, Delta Troop began a week of stand-down training from 2-10 April. On 15 April the troop was inserted in the A SHAU VALLEY at coordinates YC451400. Delta Troop's mission was to provide security and diversion for a Ranger platoon stay behind ambush of Route 548. The troop also performed ground reconnaissance of 2 1/2 kilometers of Route 548. D Troop found signs of recent vehicular traffic on the road as well as six 6 x 8 ft. bunkers which faced the road. The troop was extracted late on the afternoon of the 15th at grid YC452008. On 20 April the troop was again inserted in the A SHAU VALLEY at grid YC456903. The mission of the troop was to insert a Ranger platoon stay behind ambush, provide a diversion for the Ranger platoon movement to their ambush site and to make ground reconnaissance of the western side of the A SHAU VALLEY between YC456903 and YC457000. The troop found very few signs of recent activity. There were 5 trails in the area which had been used within 48 to 72 hours, but they revealed no clue as to what might have passed on them. A quantity of communication wire was found, but it had been previously cut in frequent intervals and showed no signs of repair. The troop was extracted from the ship LZ at YC457000. On 24 April the troop was once again inserted in the A SHAU VALLEY at YC454904 in response to a Ranger team in contact and two downed helicopters, one of which was a medivac. The troop was inserted north of the downed aircraft and moved south to make the pick up. Approximately 150 to 200 meters from the ship LZ the lead element of the troop came under heavy RPG, small arms fire and Chicago grenades. The platoons maneuvered to react to the threat and to pick up survivors of the Ranger team. The contact on the 24th lasted approximately six hours and resulted in 5 friendly KIA, 14 MIA, one unknown enemy KIA by small arms fire, 11 enemy KIA by aircraft and an unknown number of enemy MIA. After the extraction of three US from the downed medivac helicopters, the troops withdrew approximately 400 meters north to establish an IDP, medivac wounded, and be reinforced by another company. The reinforcement was accomplished that night and in the morning the elements moved back to the contact point to attempt to extract the remaining US personnel. The MIA had withdrawn the majority of their forces during the night. The next morning fire was received from only one location. The enemy fire was eliminated but no MIA were found in the vicinity. The extraction of the troop was made at YC456914.

(5) Company L (Ranger), 75th Infantry.

(a) During the month of November a total of thirteen Ranger teams were deployed in the 1st Airborne Division (ABD) Area of Operations. Emphasis was on reconnaissance and Fire Bases HUNTER and HARTEN. No enemy contacts were initiated. The contact initiated on 16 November by Ranger Team "Bills" provided the needed intelligence for establishing the location of the 1st Battalion, 803rd NVA Regiment. Due to inclement

71 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

78

Earlier, the group took some pictures of the "100,000,000" area to the "100,000,000" (ALICE), to "100,000,000" (ALICE) and the "100,000,000" (ALICE) into the "100,000,000" (ALICE) area. No significant results were observed.

(c) Poor weather conditions caused by the winter season continued to hamper Ranger operations during the month of January. Many sightings, however, increased during this period. Sightings occurred in the BACH LA, UBAH, VALLEY, and BACH BONG VALLEY regions. Rangers were misled a false extraction in the SIEBH VALLEY, after the ranger team was compromised. Future false extractions are planned, to allow the ranger teams to continue their assigned mission.

(e) During the month of March, this unit deployed a total of twenty-one Ranger teams. Initially continuing to concentrate on reconaissance of the area surrounding abandoned Fire Base RIFORD, this unit shifted to the mission of monitoring and bushing along Route 547 from Fire Base REMEDON to Fire Base BLANT and along Route 548 in the A SHEAR VALLEY floor. Six contacts were initiated in these areas resulting in eight NVA KIA and two NVA POW. The information passed on by these POWs resulted in large troop movements by the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (Ambl) to counter a serious enemy threat to their fire bases. At the request of 2nd Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (Ambl), three Ranger teams were deployed to the SHEAR VALLEY area to determine similar enemy concentrations in their AO.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

79
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 1st Airborne Division
(Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, - COM 1st AD (A) (U)

(c) During the month of April, the 1st Airborne Division employed a total of twenty-nine Ranger teams. From 1 April to 30 April, eight Ranger teams were employed in the SPUR Valley region with the mission of reconnaissance. One night every 1000 meters of the valley. From 10-23 April emphasis was placed on the A-100 Valley region in the form of platoon and company raids to include ambushes. During the ambushes, the 1st Airborne Division employed a well-used bridge.

n. Artillery.

(1) The 101st Airborne Division Artillery (A-101) provided close and continuous fire support to division maneuver units participating in Operations JEFFERSON GLEN/AMSOON PLAN 70, LAMSON 719, and LAMSON 720. The 2nd Battalion (A-101), 319th Artillery (105mm) provided direct support to the 3rd Brigade; the 2nd Battalion (A-101), 320th Artillery (105mm) provided direct support to the 1st Brigade; the 1st Battalion (A-101) 321st Artillery (105mm) provided direct support to the 2nd Brigade. In addition, the 2nd Battalion (A-101), 11th Artillery (155mm) and the 4th Battalion (Aerial Artillery), 47th Artillery provided general support to the division.

(2) During the months of November and December, Division Artillery units were positioned to support the JEFFERSON GLEN/AMSOON PLAN 70. The majority of the fire bases were accessible by road which insured an adequate stockpile of ammunition regardless of the weather. During November one unit move was conducted. One raid was conducted by moving to a forward fire base, expending on predetermined targets and extracting before dark. A total of 82,049 artillery rounds and 10,910 aerial artillery rockets were expended during the month of November. In November the 4 millionth round was fired supporting division forces since their arrival in Vietnam. During December two artillery raids were conducted and 93,965 artillery rounds and 13,145 rockets were expended.

(3) During January flying conditions improved and maneuver units operated deeper into the jungle canopy. To support these operations six artillery units were repositioned and 25,221 artillery rounds and 21,260 rockets were expended.

(4) During February and March the Division Artillery supported all phases of Operation LAMSON 719 while continuing to support Operation JEFFERSON GLEN/AMSOON PLAN 70. In addition, the Division Artillery was responsible for fire support coordination in the defense of KHE SANH and VALDERBERT areas. The Division Artillery established a forward operations center at CAMP ROBERTS, QUANG TRI; an Air Warning Control Center at BONG HA Combat Base to assume the tasking of artillery and air strike warning data for Eastern QUANG TRI Province, and Battery A, 4th Battalion (ABA), 77th Artillery established a forward location at KHE SANH. On 6 February 1971 the 2nd Battalion, 320th Artillery deployed a headquarters element to a position near the eastern DMZ area. An artillery battalion radio net was established as part of a deception operation. The element a

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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80

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division
(Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RGS GSCRM-05 (R3) (U)

deployed to CAMP EAGLE on 13 February. On 20 February the 2nd Battalion, 319th Artillery deployed to QUANG TRI Province to provide direct support to the 3rd Brigade. In addition, Battery C (-), 2nd Battalion, 11th Artillery was placed OPCON to 2nd Battalion, 319th Artillery to provide 155mm artillery support. On 3 March the Division Artillery assumed operational control of the 5th Infantry Division (Pach); the 6th Battalion (-), 11th Artillery (two 155mm howitzer batteries), direct support artillery for the 11th Brigade, 33rd Infantry Division; and the 1st Battalion, 82nd Artillery (155mm), 23rd Division, general support artillery. Division Artillery units made seventeen moves during February and expended 104,716 artillery rounds. A total of fifteen unit moves were completed during March and 118,386 artillery rounds were expended in support of division maneuver units.

(5) The 4th Battalion (AAA), 27th Artillery provided extensive support to ARVN forces participating in LAMSON 719 while continuing to support all 101st Airborne Division (Ambl) operations. During the months of February and March the unit flew 7,365 sorties, expended 69,975 rockets and were credited with 1,147 enemy KIA. The vast majority of the expenditures and enemy KIA's were as a result of direct support to ARVN forces operating in LACS.

(6) On 7 April the 6th Battalion (-), 11th Artillery and 1st Battalion, 82nd Artillery were released from their OPCON status and redeployed to the 101st Airborne Division (Ambl) area. The 5th Battalion, 4th Artillery returned to its parent organization on 8 April and at that time assumed responsibility for artillery fires in QUANG TRI Province. All 101st Airborne Division Artillery elements departed QUANG TRI Province and were repositioned in the division area of operations by 10 April. During the remainder of the month Division Artillery forces supported operation LAMSON 720 and continued to support operation JEFFERSON GIEN/MENSCON PLAN 70. During April, twenty-six artillery moves were completed and 105,756 artillery rounds and 21,837 rockets were expended.

(7) During the entire period the 1st Battalion, 83rd Artillery, 108th Artillery Group provided the division with 8 inch howitzer and 175mm gun artillery support. The battalion had a mission of general support - reinforcing the 101st Airborne Division Artillery.

(8) Division Artillery units were repositioned during the reporting period as listed below:

<u>DATE</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>FROM</u>	<u>TO</u>
10 Nov	A/2-320	Veghel	Birmingham
4 Jan	D/2-320	Eagle	Birmingham
4 Jan	E/2-320	Birmingham	Eagle
8 Jan	A/2-319	Rakkasan	Evans
8 Jan	C/2-319	Evans	Rakkasan
28 Jan	B/2-320	Eagle	Veghel
30 Jan	B/2-11	Veghel	Zon
4 Feb	B(-)/2-11	Zon	Veghel

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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division
(Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RGS CSFGR-65 (R3) (U)

DATE	UNIT	FROM	TO
8 Feb	B(-)/2-11	Voghel	Bastogne
8 Feb	C(-)/2-11	Brick	Arsemal
10 Feb	B(-)/2-11	Bastogne	Anzio
11 Feb	B(-)/2-11	Bastogne	Zen
17 Feb	A/2-320	Birmingham	Herdezvous
16 Feb	C(-)/2-11	Brick	Arsemal
22 Feb	A/2-320	Herdezvous	Normandy
23 Feb	B(-)/2-11	Zen	Normandy
24 Feb	B/2-320	Voghel	Eagle
25 Feb	A/2-319	Evans	Mai Loc
25 Feb	B(-)/2-11	Anzio	Bastogne
26 Feb	B/2-320	Eagle	Jack
26 Feb	B/2-319	Jack	Evans
27 Feb	B/2-319	Evans	A-2
28 Feb	C(-)/2-11	Eagle	Mai Loc
28 Feb	C(-)/2-11	Brick	Eagle
1 Mar	C/2-319	Rakkasan	Carroll
1 Mar	C(-)/1-321	Los Banos	Phu Bai
2 Mar	D/2-320	Birmingham	Rakkasan
2 Mar	C(-)/1-321	Phu Bai	Eagle
4 Mar	C(-)/2-11	Tomahawk	Brick
4 Mar	B/2-319	A-2	Anne
16 Mar	A/2-319	Mai Loc	XD742441
18 Mar	A(-)/2-320	Normandy	Spear
19 Mar	A/2-319	XD742441	Mai Loc
20 Mar	A(-)/2-11	Rakkasan	Evans
21 Mar	B(-)/2-11	Bastogne	Kathryn
23 Mar	A/2-319	Mai Loc	Sarge
23 Mar	A(-)/2-320	Spear	Normandy
24 Mar	A/1-321	Arsemal	Eagle
27 Mar	A(-)/1-321	Eagle	Blitz
1 Apr	A(-)/2-11	Evans	Bastogne
2 Apr	A(-)/1-321	Blitz	Spear
3 Apr	A(-)/1-321	Eagle	Spear
8 Apr	D/2-320	Rakkasan	Eagle
8 Apr	B/2-319	Anne	Rakkasan
8 Apr	B/2-320	Evans	Jack
8 Apr	C/2-319	Carroll	Evans
9 Apr	D/2-320	Eagle	Bastogne
9 Apr	A/2-319	Sarge	Evans
9 Apr	A/1-321	Spear	Phu Bai
10 Apr	C(-)/2-11	Mai Loc	Bastogne
10 Apr	A(-)/2-11	Bastogne	Evans
11 Apr	A/2-319	Evans	Gladiator
11 Apr	B(-)/2-11	Normandy	Kathryn

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

82

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 161st Airborne Division
(Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, HQ 161AD (H3) (U)

<u>DATE</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AREA</u>	<u>TO</u>
17 Apr	A/1-321	St. Ives	Torshovk
18 Apr	C/1-321	St. Ives	St. Ives
19 Apr	C/2-320	St. Ives	Birmingham
13 Apr	A/2-320	St. Ives	St. Ives
14 Apr	C(-)/2-320	Birmingham	St. Ives
16 Apr	C/2-320	St. Ives	Birmingham
17 Apr	C/2-11	St. Ives	St. Ives
21 Apr	A(-)/2-11	St. Ives	St. Ives
26 Apr	A(-)/2-11	St. Ives	St. Ives
27 Apr	B/2-11	St. Ives	St. Ives
28 Apr	A(-)/1-321	St. Ives	St. Ives
30 Apr	A/2-320	St. Ives	St. Ives

(9) In addition to the tactical moves listed above, the Division Artillery conducted six artillery raids during the period to exploit current intelligence. The raids were conducted by units to forward fire base, expending on predetermined targets and extending before dark. Raids were conducted as indicated below:

<u>DATE</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AREA</u>	<u>TO</u>
20 Nov	D/2-320	St. Ives	Yaphel
18 Dec	D/2-320	St. Ives	St. Ives
19 Dec	A/2-320	Birmingham	St. Ives
24 Jan	B/2-11	St. Ives	St. Ives
29 Jan	B/2-11	St. Ives	St. Ives
25 Mar	D/2-32-	Rakhaman	St. Ives

(10) Cannon Artillery Ammunition Expenditures:

November	91,049
December	93,915
January	85,321
February	101,716
March	118,326
April	105,757
TOTAL	696,084

(11) Aerial Rocket Artillery Expenditures:

	<u>Sentinel</u>	<u>Rockets Expended</u>
November	2,122	10,910
December	2,217	13,145
January	3,022	21,260
February	2,756	35,364

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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division
(Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, MCS CSFEX-65 (R3) (U)

March	3,609	34,611
April	2,210	21,117
TOTAL	5,819	55,728

c. Information.

(1) Public Information:

(a) Number of hometown news releases forwarded: 2,713

(b) Number of individual news/feature stories released to public and military media: 374

(c) Number of individual photographic releases prepared for release to public and military media: 159

(d) Number of correspondents provided support by the information office: 37

(e) Coverage was prepared for 16 distinguished visitors to the division, including: Senator Ted Stevens, R-Alaska; LTC William J. McCaffrey, DCG, USARV; LTC Charles Concoran, CG, WDAFAC; Mr. James Hammond, Associate Director of Defense Systems, GAO; LTC Bong, CG, 1st ARVN Division; Miss U.S. Savings Bonds; and Stephanie Clark, Miss Black America.

(f) Special projects included command and public information support to the Miss Black America Show and a Department of the Army Special Photographic Team which visited the division to film a sequence using the 101st Airborne Division (Ambl) Band as part of the DA film "The Army's Music Men".

(2) Command Information:

(a) During the reporting period, six (6) issues of the division newspaper, "The Screaming Eagle", were published and distributed.

(b) The initial issue of the Orientation Edition of "The Screaming Eagle" newspaper, a new yearly division command information publication, was distributed on 3 - 4 March.

(c) An updated edition of the 101 History was distributed on 12 February.

(d) Copy was prepared for the Winter-Spring 1971 issue of the "Rendezvous With Destiny" magazine.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

84

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division
(Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, LOS CNY R-65 (R3) (U)

(e) Twelve taped reports were produced and release to AFVN, SAIGON,
for use over AFVN radio.

(f) Color slides were taken of Infantry ROTC officers in the division
and were forwarded to the Infantry School, Fort Benning, GA.

(g) Division input to "The Army Green Book" was forwarded on 30
April 1971.

(h) The Information Office presented the Commanding General,
101st Airborne Division (Amb) with the 1st place award in the USARV
Special Journalistic Achievement Awards, and the 2nd place award in the
Department of the Army "Reith L. Ware Award" for special journalistic
achievement. Both of these awards were for the "1969 Pictorial Review"
prepared by the Information Office.

(i) Two command information fact sheets were published and dis-
tributed to division personnel:

"Heat Injuries Are Preventable" - - March 1971

"The GI Bill" - - April 1971

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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile),
Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCD: C-112L6(43)(U)

2. (C) Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluation and
Recommendations.

a. Personnel. None

b. Intelligence.

(1) Air Cavalry as Intelligence Source.

(a) Observation: During operations in LAOS, the intelligence of most value was "where the enemy was not" rather than where they were. Flight routes, approach and departure lanes, flight altitudes, aircraft spacing, utilization of T&C Air and other supporting fires were determined primarily based on intelligence pertaining to antiaircraft locations rather than strictly on troop concentrations.

(b) Evaluation: Antiaircraft fire was likely to be encountered in almost any location after crossing the Laotian border. Consequently, the AHC had to plan supporting fire neutralization and suppression along the entire flight route, concentrating on the area where the lift aircraft were most vulnerable to the antiaircraft fire. The utilization of air cavalry to conduct reconnaissance of the FZ/LB areas and approach/departure lanes to determine enemy troop concentrations proved extremely valuable in selecting the best avenues of approach. The timely information provided the most useful data in planning to avoid enemy concentrations during critical phases of flight.

(c) Recommendations: Employment of air cavalry for gathering current intelligence on specific areas in addition to screening of FZ/LB sites is imperative during operations in a mid-intensity environment.

(2) Sensor Implant Techniques.

(a) Observation: Helicopter implant of sensors is a fast, yet accurate method of sensor implantation.

(b) Evaluation: For maximum effective use of sensors, implant points must be accurately plotted. The use of two spotters, one in the implant helicopter and one in a trail helicopter have provided greater accuracy as to the actual sensor implant point.

(c) Recommendation: That two spotters be used whenever sensors are implanted by helicopter.

c. Operations.

(1) FADAC vs Manual Computations.

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86

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile),
Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCR: 100-265(85/10)

(a) Observation: When FALAC becomes non-operational, a great deal of difficulty has been experienced in checking FALAC data with manual equipment.

(b) Evaluation: In a "danger close" situation there is a requirement to check firing data for every round between the battery and battalion FDC, at the minimum and maximum range for a given charge. The FALAC will produce a more accurate solution than a manual solution can offer, especially when the ranges are not listed on the graphical equipment. When this situation occurs in a manual FDC, range is determined and applied to yield the solution. The FALAC will still compute the ballistic trajectory and apply all factors in determining its solution. This is impossible with the same accuracy in a manual FDC.

(c) Recommendations: When a firing element's FALAC is not operational, both the battery and battalion FDC should employ the manual solution, using all available corrections. The slight loss in accuracy is offset by elimination of delays.

(2) Detailed Planning for Future Operations.

(a) Observations: All operations, from resupply missions to multi-unit assaults, required thorough, detailed planning to be successful in the mid-intensity environment of LAMSON 719.

(b) Evaluation: With the high density and accuracy of heavy anti-aircraft fire encountered in the Laction Operation it became imperative that all flights over enemy territory be executed swiftly, precisely, and efficiently. Thorough consideration had to be given to all aspects including flight routes, approach/departure lanes, and LZ and PZ locations. All available assets were employed throughout each operation to provide adequate cover and suppression to the flight during the enroute portion, the approach and departure portion, and the landing/off-loading portion of their mission. The high risk of loss made by orbiting an LZ until it could be properly prepared was unacceptable. S-turns and other methods of delaying PZ or LZ times were unacceptable due to the increased exposure time they entailed. The Air Mission Commander in all cases assessed the situation and made the final decision to go or not to go before the flight could enter the operational area. No hesitation in execution could be tolerated. Only through precise and timely execution could a mission be successfully accomplished. Detailed planning was the key to all success. All resources available were programmed and employed through each phase of all airmobile operations.

(c) Recommendation: Stress should be placed on the planning and utilization of all available assets on each and every operation in a mid-intensity environment. TAC Air, artillery, gunships and Air Force delivery screening smoke should be included and coordinated along all flight routes, PZ's and LZ's whenever possible. Thorough preparation must be demanded prior to initiating any operation in an environment such as that encountered during LAMSON 719.

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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Joint Airborne Division (Airmobile),
Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS: C3002-05(R3)(U)

(3) Planning for POL/Rearm Points.

(a) Observation: The number of bladestrike incidents occurring at POL and Rearm areas increased considerably.

(b) Evaluation: Due to the increased tactical activity during the latter part of the reporting period, many new POL/Rearm sites had to be constructed. Although having the correct point to point distance for aircraft clearance, they lacked suitable hover areas for maneuverability. The approach and departure panels and lanes were also inadequate. The POL/Rearm points were unable to accommodate the large number of aircraft during peak periods.

(c) Recommendation: That POL/Rearm points be given priority planning before tactical operations begin to ensure adequate size and traffic control.

(4) Combat Assaults Conducted in Marginal Weather.

(a) Observation: Combat assaults conducted in marginal weather as opposed to fair weather require a far greater degree of flexibility plus considerable additional planning.

(b) Evaluation: To insure successful mission accomplishment of operations conducted in marginal weather conditions, the following areas must be emphasized:

(1) A thorough map and ground reconnaissance by the AHC, flight leads and other planning personnel is essential.

(2) Personnel and supplies should be transported by surface means as close to the LZ as possible. Maximum utilization of the aircraft can be effected with weather improvement for a short span of time.

(3) A complete, detailed air movement table will reduce briefing time and provide maximum flexibility.

(4) Continuous weather checks will insure prompt reaction to weather changes.

(c) Recommendation: Since complete planning in each of the above areas enhances the chances of a successful mission, sufficient time should be allowed to insure that detailed planning be properly formulated.

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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile),
Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS: CSRU-65(83)(U)

(5) Recovery of Downed Crews.

(a) Observation: Recovery of downed crews and aircraft must be accomplished in the most expeditious manner if they are to survive.

(b) Evaluation: It was found that the recovery of downed crews and aircraft became proportionally more difficult the longer they were on the ground. In several cases, what started as a "simple" extraction of a downed crew soon evolved into a large scale operation involving Army and Air Force assets. On large moves a separate AHC, capable of controlling the tactical situation itself, was designated as the Air Mission Commander of Recovery Assets. The rapidly developing and ever-changing nature of operations in the mid-intensity environment required an individual who possessed experience, knowledge, and the ability to control a large scale operation to be in charge of the recovery forces.

(c) Recommendations: Recovery plans for downed crews and aircraft must be formulated and disseminated prior to initiating airmobile operations in a mid-intensity environment. All operations, whether single or multi-ship, should have chase or recovery assets available under the control of a qualified individual. These assets should include all the equipment necessary to extract crews and aircraft from a hostile environment.

d. Organization. None

e. Training.

(1) Aircraft Damage Training for Pilots.

(a) Observation: In certain instances, aviators indicated that they did not realize the seriousness of damage done to their aircraft by enemy fire.

(b) Evaluation: On one occasion an aircraft was hit by enemy fire and experienced a partial tail rotor failure over hostile territory. The aircraft commander elected to turn back toward a secure area rather than make a precautionary landing. It is felt that the loss of tail rotor control set up a vibration pattern which eventually shook the tail boom loose and caused the aircraft to invert and crash with a tragic loss of lives. Had the pilot landed, even in a hostile area, rather than attempting to fly a severely disabled aircraft to a secure area, tragedy probably would have been averted. After this incident it became SOP to put aircraft on the ground as soon as possible after any major difficulties arose. Crewmembers' fears of getting down in hostile territory were alleviated by insuring they were knowledgeable in survival, escape, and evasion as well as the most expeditious methods of crew recovery.

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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile),
Period Ending 30 April 1971, RGS: CGFOR-65 (R3) (U)

(c) Recommendation: Training of aviators should at some point include an orientation of the handling characteristics and altered flight envelope of an aircraft resulting from various types of combat damage. Fear of setting down in hostile territory must be alleviated through proper training.

(2) Indirect Fire Adjustment.

(a) Observation: All infantrymen should be qualified to adjust mortar and artillery fires.

(b) Evaluation: It has been found that allowing all members of an infantry platoon to adjust defensive fires on a rotating basis teaches the men skills of adjusting indirect fires.

(c) Recommendation: The procedure of allowing members of a rifle platoon (with proper supervision) to adjust fires during slack periods should be introduced and adopted as a standard training policy.

f. Logistics.

(1) Hydraulic Failures on the AH1G and UH1H Aircraft.

(a) Observation: During the reporting period there have been hydraulic failures on AH1G and UH1H aircraft. A number were caused as a result of chaffing lines. Others were caused as a result of a hydraulic servo and a lateral servo failure.

(b) Evaluation: The hydraulic systems on both the AH1G and UH1H require frequent detailed inspections and chaffing lines separated or rerouted. Servos that are found to be seeping excessively or leaking should be replaced.

(c) Recommendation:

1 That more detailed inspections of the hydraulic system be performed daily to detect trouble spots and prevent chaffing lines.

2 That crewchiefs keep servos wiped clean and promptly report any abnormal seeping or leaks to maintenance for replacement.

(2) Aircraft Engine Failures.

(a) Observation: There have been a number of engine failures in the division. One of these resulted in incident damage to an AH1G on a FWP test flight with the weapons systems armed.

(b) Evaluation: The fourth stage compressor continues to be a factor in engine failures and this should be eliminated with the engines being replaced with T53L13B engines.

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90

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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile),
Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS: USFOR-65 (R3) (C)

(c) Recommendations:

(1) That a continued emphasis be placed on FOD (Foreign Object Damage) checks and adherence to policies concerning DER (Daily Engine Recording) checks.

(2) That a form be placed in the log book keeping a daily record of the DER checks so that pilots can compare current engine performance with past performances.

(3) That functional test flights be completed prior to the arming of AH1Z aircraft.

(3) Augmentation of Maintenance Facilities.

(a) Observation: Sustained aircraft operational readiness requires a full scale 24 hours maintenance effort during extended periods of heavy combat engagements.

(b) Evaluation: During periods of increased tactical activity such as experienced during LAMCON 719, unscheduled maintenance demands for sheet metal, prop and rotor, electronics and avionics repairs significantly increased. To preclude any aircraft from being grounded for extensive periods of time, work must be initiated immediately. This must be forecast in advance and necessary augmentation programmed for the allied shops.

(c) Recommendation: OJT and/or augmentation from back-up BSU elements be programmed for units anticipating prolonged combat engagement.

(4) Quick Change Assemblies:

(a) Observation: A sharp increase in damage to major components was observed with increased operations in a higher intensity environment.

(b) Evaluation: Serviceable components on retrograde aircraft were removed and increased use of previously prepared quick change assemblies for placement on aircraft with like damaged items was employed. This was, in part, controlled cannibalization and considerably reduced the in-country demands on the supply system. It further conserved on skilled labor consumption by reducing component buildup time.

(c) Recommendation: That direct support units stock quick change assembly units such as transmissions, masts, rotor head assemblies, tail booms, and engines. This would permit a marked decrease in the turn around time for aircraft at the direct support level.

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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile),
Period Ending: 30 April 1971, RCS. CSICR-65 (R3) (U)

g. Communications.

(1) Secure Communications in Aircraft.

(a) Observation: Secure radio capabilities are inadequate in the current aircraft inventory.

(b) Evaluation: In many cases during this reporting period, AMO's and flight leads have had to pass valuable information over non-secure radio because of the rapidly changing, intensely hostile situation and because their gunship escorts did not have a secure capability. Information passed in this manner almost certainly was monitored by the enemy and enabled him to engage our flights by direct and indirect fire. In an environment such as encountered in LESSON 716, secure voice communication is considered essential to operational success.

(c) Recommendation: The AMIG communication system should be modified to include a secure capability. Every effort must be made to insure all secure radios are functional prior to launching on a mission. If possible, secure capabilities should be expanded to include UHF and VHF radios.

(2) Maintenance of Commo Equipment.

(a) Observation: During artillery raids, communications over extended distances were a continuous problem. Many locations required the use of AN/VRC-45 radios to provide the necessary range.

(b) Evaluation: The problem of range was alleviated to a certain extent by placing emphasis on properly adjusted radios prior to a move. Antennas were checked to insure that the proper elements were used, thus insuring an increase in range. Adjustments were made only by qualified radio mechanics. As a result even AN/VRC-25 and AN/VRC-77 radios yielded reliable long range communications.

(c) Recommendation: That all radios be checked, and the appropriate adjustments made prior to any move. That care be taken to check all antennas for completeness and that maximum use of AN/VRC-25 and AN/VRC-77 radios be made to reduce loads during moves.

(3) SOI Implementation.

(a) Observation: With few exceptions, the implementation of a new SOI occurs at 2400 hours.

(b) Evaluation: Elements in the field must observe strict light and noise discipline during the hours of darkness. To implement an SOI change during the hours of darkness requires this discipline to be broken to some

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

92

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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile),
Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS: CSMPR-65 (R3) (U)

extent. Difficulties have been encountered which made it impossible to communicate until the following morning when the problem could be solved. Loss of communication during the hours of darkness causes justifiable concern.

(c) Recommendations: The SOT change should occur during daylight hours. This would facilitate the change by providing enough natural light to actually make the change. Also if difficulties arise, solutions may more easily be implemented without regard to noise or light discipline. The preferable time would be at first light, prior to planned operations.

h. Material.

(1) M102 Howitzer Recoil Mechanisms.

(a) Observation: Recoil mechanism failure in the M102 howitzer is one of the principal causes of equipment breakdown.

(b) Evaluation: Recoil leaks have developed due to overfull recoil reservoirs. The reservoir indicator will show that recoil oil is required when, in fact, a sufficient amount is already in the reservoir. During the heat of the afternoon, the indicator will reflect a more accurate reading.

(c) Recommendation: That the recoil oil reservoir indicator be checked during the afternoon when the recoil oil is at maximum expansion.

(2) Reinforced 16 ton Airmobile Trailers.

(a) Observation: 16-ton airmobile trailers Model OT-32A are damaged with prolonged hauling of D-5A dozers on unpaved roads.

(b) Evaluation: The 16-ton airmobile trailer is insufficiently reinforced for heavy hauls over rough roads. The frame in front of the dual tires has bent and cracked following repetitive hauling of a D-5A dozer over rough roads.

(c) Recommendation: The 16-ton airmobile trailer should be reinforced by welding angle steel to the frame assembly in front of the dual tires.

(3) Proper Mounting of Machinegun Mounts on 4-ton Trucks.

(a) Observation: Back floors and rear frames were being damaged from vibrations of machinegun mounts.

(b) Evaluation: Anchoring an M-60 machinegun mount to the floor results in body and frame damage due to the excessive vibration on rough roads. The 326th Engineer Battalion began welding the base plate to a 4-inch steel plate cut to fit the back floor of the 4-ton truck. The steel plate holds the machinegun rigid without being attached to the vehicle and thus prevents

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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile),
Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS: COMUR-66 (R3) (U)

damage to the vehicle.

(4) Recommended fender support brackets for 5-ton dump trucks.

(a) Observation: The 326th Engineer Battalion presently is assigned 21 5-ton dump trucks. These trucks are utilized transporting engineer material, chiefly rock and laterite fill. The front fenders, particularly the right front fenders, have been bending and breaking on all of these trucks. The fenders are sturdily constructed of 16-gauge sheet metal and are properly mounted.

(b) Evaluation: The dump truck fenders are failing despite proper installation and durable construction. The weight of the air cleaner on the right fender of the truck contributes in part to the failure, but the main cause of fender failure appears to be excessive vibration on haul roads. This unit has fabricated brackets from flat steel stock, $\frac{1}{4}$ " thick by 1" wide. The brackets are welded or bolted from the front and rear of the fender to the cab. This modification of the fenders on new trucks has prevented the failure.

(c) Recommendations: 5-ton dump trucks should be equipped with fender supporting brackets either at general or direct support unit level.

(5) Field Expedient Covers for Hydraulic Couplings.

(a) Observation: Blowing dust and dirt presents a maintenance hazard to break-down engineer equipment during airmobile operations.

(b) Evaluation: Exposed hydraulic couplings are extremely susceptible to intrusion by flown dirt and dust caused by rotor wash during airlifts.

(c) Recommendations: Each hydraulic coupling should be covered with a plastic bag (M-16 magazine plastic bags are an ideal covering) and sealed with tape immediately upon disconnection prior to airlift.

1. Other. None.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

95

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AM11-001 (24 May 71) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned from 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, with: XR-65 (13) (U)

DA, Headquarters, XXIV Corps, APO 96349 12 JUN 1971

TO: Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, APO 96375

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the period ending 30 April 1971 from Headquarters, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) and concurs with the report except as indicated in paragraph 2 below.

2. (C) Comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning "Air Cavalry as Intelligence Source," page 79, paragraph 4b(1): The following clarifying remarks are added regarding this paragraph. It is inadvisable to devote all air cavalry assets to screen LZs and LZs while neglecting air cavalry capability to gather intelligence regarding enemy forces deployed along flight routes to and from the LZs and LZs. It is recommended that air cavalry be used in all their traditional reconnaissance roles and not solely for screening LZs and LZs.

b. Reference item concerning "FADAC vs Manual Computations," page 79, paragraph 2c(1): Concur.

(1) However, tolerances for manual FADAC check are outlined in XXIV Corps Tactical and Intelligence Standing Operating Procedures. Provided the data produced is within prescribed tolerances and the difference between the two data producing sources remains constant throughout conduct of the mission, there is no requirement to use only manually produced data in the situation described.

(2) The unit has been advised that there is no directive issued by this or higher headquarters, requiring the firing data check of each round for danger close missions referred to in the evaluation paragraph.

c. Reference item concerning "Planning for JOL/Rearm Points," page 81, paragraph 2c(3): Concur. Planning for JOL/rearm facilities must include suitable hover areas to provide the degree of maneuverability necessary to conduct safe refuel/rearm operations. A thorough survey of planned refueling/rearming facilities by aviation safety personnel will reduce potential operational hazards.

d. Reference item concerning "Recovery of Downed Crews," page 82, paragraph 2c(5): Concur. Successful recovery of downed assets becomes

88

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DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10

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96

AVII-CCT (24 May 71) 1st Ind 12 JUN 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division
(Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, WOC: CSFTR-65 (R3) (U)

more difficult and costly the longer the recovery takes. Having an individual designated and prepared to supervise the extraction of these assets quickly, will in the long run save additional assets that would have to be committed for recovery operations.

e. Reference item concerning "Aircraft Damage Training for Pilots," page 82, paragraph 2e(1): Concur. Recommend the training be given at unit level during each aviator's in-country orientation and repeated periodically as required.

f. Reference item concerning "Indirect Fire Adjustment," page 83, paragraph 2e(2): Concur. Direct Support Artillery Forward Observers should conduct familiarization and orientation training for infantrymen at every opportunity. All fire missions should be supervised by the forward observer to insure troop safety and compliance with the rules of engagement.

g. Reference item concerning "Hydraulic Failures on the AH-1G and UH-1H Aircraft," page 83, paragraph 2f(1): Concur. The hydraulic systems of the AH-1G and UH-1H are items required to be checked before each day's flight, and are part of the pilot's pre-flight inspection. The by-the-book checks by crew chiefs and pilots plus awareness of changes of fluid reservoir levels will indicate possible failures before they occur.

h. Reference item concerning "Aircraft Engine Failures," page 83, paragraph 2f(2): Concur. There have been a few T-53L-13B engines with second or fourth stage compressor failures also. Recommend that before any maintenance other than daily routine maintenance is attempted, that armed helicopters be completely disarmed. This recommendation should be included in unit standing operating procedures.

i. Reference item concerning "Augmentation of Maintenance Facilities," page 84, paragraph 2f(2): Concur. Augmentation with skilled mechanics rather than OJT mechanics seems to be a far better solution for the increased maintenance work load inherent during periods of prolonged combat.

j. Reference item concerning "Quick Change Assemblies," page 84, paragraph 2f(4): Nonconcur. Prepositioned stockpiles of intensively managed, high dollar components would be too costly for the minimal time reduction in returning an aircraft to operational status.

k. Reference item concerning "Secure Communications in Aircraft," page 85, paragraph 2g(1): Concur. However, the physical security requirements for the radios themselves increase proportionately as the

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AVII-CCT (24 May 71) 1st Ind 12 JUN 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, HQ: CSICR-65 (R3) (U)

number of aircraft with secure radios on board increases. Aircraft downed in hostile areas with secure radios aboard pose an additional problem for recovery forces. Recommend that sufficient secure radios be installed in AH-1Gs to provide one secure radio for each fire team, thereby allowing for a secure communications capability to be made available to each fire team.

m. Reference item concerning "Maintenance of Comm Equipment," page 85, paragraph 2g(2): Concur. However, the radio set AN/VRC-46 should always (when feasible) accompany a unit making an artillery raid due to the set's greater reliability and greater range capability. Secure gear, KY-8, employed with the AN/VRC-46 should also accompany the unit.

n. Reference item concerning "Reinforced 16 ton Airmobile Trailers," page 86, paragraph 2h(2): Concur. The unit has been advised to submit an Equipment Improvement Recommendation.

o. Reference item concerning "Proper Mounting of Machinegun Mounts on $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton Trucks," page 86, paragraph 2h(3): Concur. The following recommendation is submitted: That M-60 machinegun mounts on $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton trucks be welded to $\frac{1}{4}$ inch steel plates fitted to the floor of the vehicles to avoid structural damage. The unit has been advised to submit an Equipment Improvement Recommendation.

p. Reference item concerning "Recommended fender support brackets for 5-ton dump trucks," page 87, paragraph 2h(4): Concur. The unit has been advised to submit an Equipment Improvement Recommendation.

q. Reference item concerning "Field Expedient Covers for Hydraulic Couplings," page 87, paragraph 2h(5): Concur. Field expedient seems practical and within the resources of users.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl
nc

W. H. Smith
W. H. SMITH
Captain, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

CF:
CG, 101st Abn Div (Ambl), AFO 96363

99


AVHDO-DO (24 May 71) 2nd Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division
(Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RGS: GEFOR-65 (R3) (U)

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375 24 AUG 1971

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-PP
APO 96358

This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the period ending 30 April 1971 from Headquarters, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) and concurs with comments from indorsing headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


F.L. HONSOWETZ
CPT. AGC.
Adjutant General

Cy turn:
101st Airborne Division
XXIV Corps

100


GPOP-FD (24 May 71) 3d Ind. Co.
SUBJECT: Operational Report: Lessons Learned, HQ 101st
Airborne Division (Alamo), Period Ending
30 April 1971, RGS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96358 1 NOV 1971

TO: HQDA (DAFD-ZA), WASH DC 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:


L. M. GARY
CPT, AGJ
ACT 48

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Inclosure (Operations Narrative/Significant Activities) to Operations Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, R25: CDFOL-85 (R3) (U).

1. (C) On 1 November 1970, the 101st Air Div (Ambl) continued Operation JEFFERSON GLEN/MONSOON PLAN 70. In coordination with 1st Inf Div (AMVN) and GVN officials of THUA THIEN Province, the division conducted operations designed to locate and destroy enemy forces, establish areas and forward cache sites, to protect vital lines of communication and to assist GVN officials in meeting their pacification goals for 1970. Persisting low clouds, high winds and an extreme amount of rainfall prevailed during the last seven days of October resulting in wide spread flood conditions in the populated lowlands of the division area of operations. The division reacted to this natural disaster by establishing a disaster relief control center to assist GVN officials in evacuating and providing relief for victims. During the height of the flood disaster on 31 October and 1 November, 9,462 people from the ten districts of THUA THIEN Province and 4,000 people from HUE City were displaced from their homes. On 2 November, the flood waters began to subside and 3,300 people returned to their homes. Division UH-1H aircraft flew 255 sorties delivering 7,000 loaves of bread and 3,900 meals. Total cargo transported in support of the disaster was 18.5 tons. All flood victims returned to their homes by 5 November and were assisted by GVN officials in re-establishing their homes. The 326th Engr Bn (Ambl) commenced assistance in rehabilitation of roads, bridges and culverts throughout the lowland area. Division aircraft assets also were provided to XXIV Corps civil affairs units to evacuate flood victims and distribute foodstuffs in the DA NANG area.

2. (C) 1 November - 30 November 1970.

a. Operations summary. On 1 November the 1st Bde, with its CP at CAMP EAGLE, maintained liaison with the 3d Regt (AMVN). The 1st Bn (Ambl), 327th Inf continued to conduct search and attack operations in the Fire Base VEGHEL area with the battalion CP located at CP CHSCHMATE. The 1st Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf moved by vehicle from Fire Base EASTGORE to Fire Base BIRMINGHAM, while the 2d Bn (Ambl), 502d Inf completed refresher training and moved from CAMP EAGLE to Fire Base EASTGORE. Both battalions commenced search and attack operations in their respective areas of operation. The 3d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf moved by air, vehicle and overland from the Fire Base BIRMINGHAM area to the Fire Base ASENAL area and returned to the operational control of the 2d Bde. The 2d Bde CP remained at PHU BAI Combat Base and maintained liaison with the 54th Regt (AMVN), GVN officials of THUA THIEN Province and the six districts southeast of the Perfume River. The 2d Bn (Ambl), 327th Inf secured Fire Base TOANHANG and LAS BANGS and conducted patrol and ambush operations in the area. The 2d Bn (Ambl), 502d Inf remained at Fire Base BUCK and conducted search and attack, and patrol and ambush operations, in the vicinity of the fire base. The 1st Bn (Ambl), 502d Inf moved by air from the Fire Base ASENAL area to PHU BAI Combat Base to conduct battalion refresher training and assume the mission of division ready force. The 3d Bde CP continued to direct operations from CAMP EVANS and maintain liaison with GVN officials in the four districts north of the Perfume River. The 3d Bn (Ambl),

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102

Inclosure (Operations Narrative/Significant Activities) to Operations Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, HCS: CDFCL-35 (13) (U).

187th Inf secured Fire Base RAKHASAN and conducted three company size search and attack operations south of the fire base. The 3d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf, with its CP at CAMP EVANS, conducted search and attack operations northwest of MEXICO.

On 4 November, Co C, 1st Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf moved by air from the vicinity of BIRMINGHAM to Fire Base VEGHEL and passed to the operational control of the 1st Bn (Ambl), 527th Inf. The company moved overland from VEGHEL to YD 5504 to conduct surveillance and ambush operations along Route 547 and the KHE A SO River.

On 5 November, Trp C, 3d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav inserted the HAC BAO Company, three kilometers south of BLITEZ to conduct reconnaissance in force operations. The 3d Plt, Trp B, 3d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav was inserted on Fire Base BLITEZ as a radio relay team for the HAC BAO Company. The company had no contact with the enemy and both elements were extracted the following day.

The 1st Bn (Ambl), 502d Inf completed refresher training on 7 November, moved by air and vehicle to Fire Base JACK and passed to the operational control of the 3d Bde. Co A secured the fire base while the remaining companies commenced search and attack operations in the area. The 3d Bn (Ambl), 187th Inf moved by vehicle and by air from the JACK area to CAMP EVANS, assumed the mission of division ready force and commenced refresher training.

On 13 November, the 2d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf was extracted from the MEXICO area and redeployed by air to the Fire Base RAKHASAN area. The 3d Bn (Ambl), 187th Inf completed refresher training and prepared for deployment to the MEXICO area. Co B air assaulted from CAMP EVANS to YD 4018 (six kilometers south of MEXICO) and commenced ambush and surveillance operations in the vicinity of the landing zone. The 1st Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf moved by air from Fire Base RAKHASAN to CAMP EVANS, assumed the mission of division ready force and prepared for refresher training.

Co C, 1st Bn (Ambl), 527th Inf closed Fire Base VEGHEL on 14 November, moved by air to Fire Base BASTONE and then moved 1,000 meters northwest of the fire base to conduct ambush and surveillance operations. Elements from Trp D, 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav, reinforced by a five man demolition team from the 326th Engr Bn (Ambl), were inserted into the A SHAU Valley to conduct road interdiction operations. The elements interdicted Route 548 from A LOU1 Airstrip, southwest to IC 474390, destroying one large bridge and causing extensive damage to four smaller bridges. There was no contact during the mission and the team was extracted and returned to CAMP EAGLE.

On 15 November, elements of Trp D, 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav were inserted to interdict Route 922, vicinity YD 232012, and to recover a 37mm antiaircraft gun. The elements destroyed one log bridge covered with pierced steel plank, three 6'x10' bunkers, 20 to 30 57mm rounds, cratered Route 922, and recovered and evacuated the 37mm barrel and breach assembly to CAMP EAGLE. The element leader indicated that the area showed signs of recent enemy activity.

On 16 November, Ranger Team HILLS made contact with four enemy in the

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Inclosure (Operations Narrative/Significant Activities) to Operations Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RSC: CSFGR-65 (R3) (U).

KATHERN-CANNON area (ID 464089). The ranger team reported that there was evidence of more enemy elements in the area. Trp C, 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav inserted their Aerial Rifle Platoon (ARP) to reinforce the ranger team. Later in the day, Trp D also was inserted into the area. The following day, attempts to resupply or extract the elements had to be aborted due to extremely poor weather conditions and heavy enemy fire in the area.

On 18 November, heavy rains and a low cloud ceiling again prohibited the use of division aircraft. Trp C ARP, Trp D and Ranger Team BILLS moved overland towards a pickup zone, four kilometers southeast of the contact site.

On 19 November, the 1st Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf completed refresher training and deployed to the Fire Base JACK area. Company C secured the fire base while the remainder of the battalion commenced search and attack operations in the area. The 1st Bn (Ambl), 502d Inf moved by air from the JACK area to RAKHASAN, secured the fire base and commenced search and attack operations in the area, while the 2d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf moved by air from RAKHASAN to CAMP EVANS, prepared for refresher training and assumed the mission of division ready force. An CH6A from Trp C, 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav, while on armed aerial reconnaissance, received a heavy volume of unknown type ground fire six kilometers south of KATHERN. The aircraft crashed and was completely destroyed, resulting in two US missing in action. Trp D and Trp C ARP were resupplied and shuttled by UH1E from their field location (YD 4205) to within 1,800 meters of the downed aircraft (ID 476046).

On 20 November, Trp D and Trp C ARP, 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav moved overland to the site of the downed CH6A. The elements recovered the two US bodies from the wreckage and were extracted from the area at 1125 hours. In support of this operation, Co A, 1st Bn (Ambl), 327th Inf moved overland to VEGEEL and secured the fire base. Btry D, 2d Bn (Ambl), 320th Arty was airlifted to Fire Base VEGEEL to conduct an artillery raid, commencing at 1118 hours. The battery fired seven observed missions, expending 307 105mm rounds, and was returned to CAMP EAGLE at 1910 hours. Additionally, the 155mm howitzer battery at Fire Base BASTONE fired two observed missions, expending 199 rounds, while eight inch howitzers/175mm guns fired a total of 20 rounds on 13 unobserved targets. There were eleven Skyspot sorties and four Beacon sorties flown against active 12.7mm machine gun positions and suspected enemy locations. Thirteen of these sorties were targeted in the KATHERN-CANNON area around the downed CH6A. Also, one USAF C-130 aircraft dropped a BLU 82 device clearing a two ship landing zone for the 1st Bde, seven kilometers east of KATHERN.

On 25 November, the 2d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf completed battalion refresher training and moved by air from CAMP EVANS to Fire Base RAKHASAN, secured the fire base and commenced search and attack operations in the area. The 1st Bn (Ambl), 502d Inf moved by air from the Fire Base RAKHASAN area to Fire Base ARSERIAL, passed to operational control of the 2d Bde from the 3d Bde, secured the fire base and commenced company and platoon search and attack operations. The 3d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf moved by air and vehicle from Fire Base ARSERIAL to FNU BAI Combat Base where

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

104

Inclosure (Operations Narrative/Significant Activities) to Operations Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, Ref: CSFOL69 (R) (U).

they assumed the mission of division ready force and prepared to conduct refresher training.

On 26 November, the 2d Bn (Amb), 101st Div extracted three ranger teams of Co L (Ranger), 75th Inf from separate hideouts in the southwest of RIPOORD. The teams had conducted reconnaissance missions for a five day period. Ranger Team BOILERMAKERS reported the area in the vicinity of the NIE QUAN River (XD 3816) as a possible infiltration route and had observed moderate enemy activity. The remaining teams reported no major activity. The Cavalry also inserted ranger teams GATERS and GATERS COCKS to conduct reconnaissance of suspected infiltration routes in the ROUNG ROUNG Valley area. On 27 November, two Stryker missions were targeted against bunker complexes in the RIPOORD area, based on information obtained from Ranger Team BOILERMAKERS.

During the period 25 to 27 November, all units operating in the field were shuttled by air and vehicle or moved overland to a fire base or combat base for a full course turkey dinner to celebrate Thanksgiving and then returned to their respective field locations.

Ranger Teams GATERS and GATERS COCKS were extracted from the ROUNG ROUNG Valley area on 30 November and returned to CAMP EAGLE. Both teams reported there were no signs of recent enemy activity in the area.

Airmobile operations were restricted by prevailing northeast monsoon conditions throughout the month of November. The division took full advantage of short periods of acceptable flying weather to resupply units operating in the canopy regions and to conduct aerial reconnaissance in the western area of operation. Enemy contact was light throughout the period with 30% of US casualties (four KIA and 30 WIA) being caused by enemy booby traps. Ground troops discovered and destroyed 35 enemy booby traps during November, while division OH-47 aircraft flew 51 flame sorties, dropping 34,595 gallons of thickened fuel against 17 suspected booby trapped areas.

3. (C) 1 December - 31 December 1970.

During December the 1st Brigade continued operations in close cooperation with the 3d ARVN Regiment. The 1st Bn (Amb), 301st Inf CP was located at Fire Base BIRMINGHAM, the 1st Bn (Amb), 327th Inf CP was at Fire Base EASTONE and the 2d Bn (Amb), 302d Inf CP was at OP CHECKMATE. On 13 December the 2d Bn (Amb), 327th Inf passed GOCN to the 1st Brigade and assumed responsibility for Fire Base BIRMINGHAM. The brigade conducted extensive search and attack operations with emphasis along the SCNG BO River and artillery raids into the NAO LAO Valley.

The 2d Brigade conducted search and attack patrols and surveillance and security operations in cooperation with the 54th Inf Bgt (ARVN). The brigade was responsible for the security of EAGLE BEACH, the PHL Bridge PALE pumping station and the navigational beacon site (XD 999143). The 2d Bn (Amb), 327th Inf conducted search and attack operations in the canopied areas of PHU LOC District south of QL-1 and provided security for Fire Bases LOS BANGS and TONKHAM. On 7 December the 2d Bn (Amb), 327th Inf was relieved of responsibility for the TONKHAM/LOS

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Inclosure (Operations Narrative/Significant Activities) to Operations Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, R25: 000000 (H3) (U).

BAHOC area and conducted battalion refresher training. On 14 December the battalion passed OPOC to the 1st Brigade and redeployed to Fire Base BIRMINGHAM. From 1-7 December the 2d Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf conducted battalion refresher training. On the morning of the 9th the battalion deployed to the Fire Base BIRMINGHAM/BAHOC area and assumed responsibility for the Fire Base and the surrounding area.

On 1 December the 3d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf moved by air to Fire Base BRICK area and relieved the 2d Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf. The battalion conducted search and attack operations in the vicinity of BRICK. On 30 December the 1st Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf passed OPOC to the 2d Bde at KNU BAI Combat Base and conducted battalion refresher training.

The 3d Bde continued to employ along the fringe of the canopy and maintained liaison with HUONG DIEN, PHUNG DIEN, QUANG DIEN, and HUONG TRA District officials. The 3d Bn (Ambl), 187th Inf conducted patrol, surveillance and ambush operations in the Fire Base MEXICO/CLADIATER area. The battalion CP was located at Fire Base RAKKASAN, moving to CAMP EVANS toward the end of the month.

The 1st Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf conducted operations in the Fire Base JACK area and provided liaison and assistance to HUONG DIEN District. The 2d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf conducted operations in the vicinity of Fire Base RAKKASAN. The 1-77th Armor, OPOC to the brigade, conducted operations west of CAMP EVANS in the vicinity of Fire Base SWORD until 12 December when they passed OPOC to the 3d Bde. The 1-77th Armor Trains moved by vehicle from QUANG TRI to CAMP EVANS. The element passed OPOC to the 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech) on 15 December and moved to QUANG TRI.

At 011230 December in the vicinity of YD 392244 (one and one-half kilometers northwest of Fire Base MEXICO) Company A, 3d Bn (Ambl), 187th Inf was engaged by an estimated six enemy. The enemy fired three RPG rounds and small arms. The US element returned organic weapons fire and the enemy broke contact, withdrawing to the southeast. A search of the area revealed one US claymore mine and one RPG booster. The action resulted in one US wounded in action. At 1530 hours, A Company, 3d Bn (Ambl), 187th Inf discovered in the vicinity of YD 392243 (one kilometer northwest of Fire Base MEXICO) two bunkers 3'x5'x4' with 1 1/2" of overhead cover. An additional bunker 12'x4'x4' with the same type overhead cover was discovered containing one 81mm mortar, one RPG booster, one NVA canteen, and miscellaneous LBS. The unit indicated that enemy activity was present within the last 72 hours. Three quarters of an hour later, as A Company, 3d Bn (Ambl), 187th Inf continued its search of the area where the bunkers were discovered, two enemy soldiers in a 3'x4' bunker to the west of their position fired two RPG rounds and small arms at a range of 10 meters. One US soldier was wounded. The US element employed ARA and held their location for the night.

On 2 December, four kilometers northwest of CAMP EAGLE C Company, 1st Bn (Ambl), 502d Inf discovered two booby traps at 1530 hours. One consisted of a 105mm round, and the other was a 60mm mortar round. Both booby traps had had a pressure type firing device. The US element reported evidence of enemy activity in the last 12 hours. The US unit destroyed both devices. At 1625 hours in the vicinity of coordinates

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

106

Inclosure (Operations Narrative/Significant Activities) to Operations Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airborne), Period Ending 30 April 1971, HQ: COMUSMACV (R) (U).

YD 300244 (one kilometer northeast of Fire Base BRICK) A Company, 3d Bn (Ambl), 187th Inf discovered a bunker 2'x10' with 11' of overhead cover. The bunker contained four M16 rounds, two M16 magazines, six rucksacks, six hammocks, and one Chinese grenade, six blasting caps, one US entrenching tool, and miscellaneous medical supplies and documents. All of the items were evacuated. At 1415 hours A Company, 1st Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf, operating in the vicinity of YD 632032 (six kilometers south of Fire Base BASTONE), discovered one 60mm mortar tube and bipod, thirty-seven 60mm mortar rounds, and two M-16 laws. There were indications of recent enemy activity. The weapons were evacuated and the munitions were destroyed. Five kilometers north of Fire Base BASTONE, BNC, 1st Bn, 3d Inf (ARVN) engaged five enemy soldiers to their northeast with small arms fire and artillery. The element reported four enemy KIA and two weapons captured; one ARVN soldier was wounded.

On 4 December at 1512 hours the 1st Plt, D Company, 3d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf was three kilometers to the northeast of Fire Base BRICK when it received small arms fire from an unknown number of enemy soldiers. The element returned organic weapons fire and employed ARA. A sweep of the area produced three rucksacks, one enemy billfold, one hammock, eight to ten lbs of rice, one set of green fatigues, three B-40 rounds and a bag of AK-47 ammunition.

On 6 December two bunkers 7'x7'x11' were found by D Company, 3d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf in the vicinity of YD 470017 (two and one-half kilometers northeast of Fire Base BRICK) at 1115 hours. The bunkers contained three RPG rounds, two RPG launchers, eight RPG fuses, fifty 1/2 lb blocks of explosive, 50 lbs of rice and 15 lbs of salt.

On 7 December at 1500 hours in the vicinity of YD 583422 an element of B Company, 2d Bn (Ambl), 502d Inf discovered three unfinished bunkers. One CMR rifle and some miscellaneous cooking equipment were found. The weapon was evacuated.

On 8 December at 1745 hours in the vicinity of YD 663047 (three kilometers northeast of Fire Base BRICK) the 1st Plt, C Company, 3d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf discovered an enemy rice cache totaling 170 lbs. The rice was found in two 8'x10'x11' bunkers. The US element destroyed the bunkers and evacuated the rice. In the vicinity of YD 447240 (one kilometer west of Fire Base STELLA) at 1000 hours B Company, 3d Bn (Ambl), 187th Inf found five 5'x8'x12' fighting positions containing seven submachine guns, one RPG launcher, thirteen RPG rounds, two chi-com grenades, thirty-seven 1/2 lb anticharge, two AK-47 magazines, four pair of NVA binoculars, one NVA compass, one NVA protective mask, and one NVA poncho. The cache was evacuated.

On 11 December at 0945 hours in the vicinity of YD 731666 (three kilometers southwest of Fire Base ARREVAL) the 3d Plt, B Company, 1st Bn (Ambl), 502d Inf discovered eight RPG rounds, eight 60mm mortar rounds, one M-61 grenade, two loaded AK-47 magazines, twelve non-electrical blasting caps, one rap, 51 lbs of rice, and miscellaneous cooking utensils and C-rations. There were signs of recent enemy activity. The mortar and RPG rounds were destroyed and the remainder of the equipment was evacuated.

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Inclosure (Operations Narrative/Significant Activities) to Operations Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RPT: OPR-71-05 (R3) (U).

On 12 December in the vicinity of YD 64414, (five kilometers north-east of Fire Base MAUREEN) the 3/1st Inf (ABN) engaged enemy bunkers with organic weapons. The enemy returned small arms fire and withdrew to the southeast. Artillery and a Pink Team were employed. A search of the area revealed six AK-47 bunkers and fifteen pits. The ABN reported ten NVA KIA, three AK-47s, one RPG launcher, fifty RPG rounds, one M-72 LAW, thirty stick grenades, ten 1 lb blocks of TNT, thirty sets of knaps, and miscellaneous documents.

On 131200 December in the vicinity of YD 736065 (three kilometers southwest of Fire Base MAUREEN) B Company, 1st Bn (Abnl), 503d Inf discovered one AK-47, one ChiCom Sam pistol, two AK-47 magazines, eight blocks of an unknown type explosive, two 60mm mortar rounds, three RPG boosters, one NVA rucksack, one flashlight, and one NVA poncho. The cache was evacuated.

On 161310 December in the vicinity of YD 879007 (five kilometers east of Fire Base BRICK) the 1st Bn, D Company, 3d Bn (Abnl), 506th Inf employed organic weapons fire engaging one enemy soldier to the north of their position. The enemy soldier was killed and his AK-47 was captured and evacuated. In three separate actions, the 2d Sqdn, 17th Cav engaged enemy soldiers in their area of operations with good results. The Cavalry reported a total of nine NVA KIA in the actions with no US casualties.

On 18 December a mechanical ambush, placed by Recon Plt, 2d Bn (Abnl), 503d Inf, killed five NVA soldiers in the vicinity of YD 54411 (three kilometers southeast of Fire Base ZUIN). A search of the area revealed two AK-47s, three rucksacks, and miscellaneous documents. D Company, 2d Bn (Abnl), 503d Inf, while operating in the vicinity of YD 554109 (five kilometers southeast of Fire Base ZUIN) discovered sixty-six 82mm mortar primers, eight 82mm rounds, nine hundred powder charges and six hundred and fifty AK-47 rounds. There was no evidence of recent enemy activity. 2d Bde conducted an artillery raid into the Long Suong Valley from Fire Base FISCOL. A total of one hundred and twenty-five 8" rounds, one hundred 175mm rounds, two hundred and ninety-six 155mm rounds, one thousand three hundred and fifty-eight 105mm rounds were expended in this operation.

On 19 December (three kilometers east of Fire Base BRICK) D Company, 3d Bn (Abnl), 506th Inf received blast and fragments from three command detonated claymore mines at 1450 hours. The blasts were followed by small arms fire and automatic weapons fire from four enemy 30 meters to the north of their position. The element returned organic weapons fire and the enemy withdrew in an unknown direction. The enemy fusillade produced four US wounded. At 1815 hours the Fire Base LAO BANOS area received thirty-five 82mm mortar rounds. Fifteen rounds impacted inside the fire base. Artillery, AAA, and a Pink Team were employed on suspected enemy locations. Two US casualties were reported. The 1st Bde conducted an artillery raid from Fire Base MAUREEN expending 320 HE rounds into the RAO LAO River Valley.

On 211400 December one US soldier was wounded in the vicinity of YD 575995 (one kilometer northeast of Fire Base RIFLE) when four enemy

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

108

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Inclosure (Operations Narrative/3), Title at Activities to Operations Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airborne), Period Ending 31 April 1971, R4: C 30229 (R3) (U).

soldiers were engaged by D Company, 3d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf. The US element employed organic weapons fire and artillery. A search of the area revealed buildings and a pair of enemy soldiers.

On 240000 December, Thai Thien Province Regional Forces conducted Operation SAITHU (L-101) No 2, processing 150 persons. There were 13 detainees for fraudulent civil status and one VC detainee. At 1045 hours, a Hoi Chanh, who had rallied at 0900 hours, led a 1P Eagle Flight to four bunkers located 3 kilometers southeast of Fire Base QUANA. The platoon discovered four NVA ponchos, one AK-47 magazine, three small bars of rice, and detained four VC. In pre-truce deterrent operations, there were 112 55-gallon drums of persistent B dropped to neutralize a bunker complex southwest of the KAO LAG Valley area. There were also 16 FIC sorties flown in the division area of operations.

On 251500 December, 4 kilometers southeast of KAO, elements of A Company, 1st Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf discovered a grave containing one enemy soldier killed by artillery approximately 7 days earlier. Surrounding the grave were six bunkers and three huts. The huts contained miscellaneous cooking equipment, two RPG rounds, one AK-47 magazine, and miscellaneous documents.

On 260000 December, 4 kilometers northeast of Fire Base BRICK, elements of D Company, 3d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf were engaged by small arms fire and one hand grenade 15 meters from their position, wounding three US soldiers. The element returned organic weapons fire and employed artillery on the enemy as they fled. A search of the area revealed no enemy assessment. At 1457 hours, elements of D Company, 3d Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf engaged an unknown size enemy force with small arms fire and artillery in the same area. A search of the area revealed one NVA MIA and one AK-47 captured. At 1330 hours, elements of A Company, 1st Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf discovered one NVA body wrapped in a poncho 5 kilometers west northwest of BA TOGEE. Time and cause of death were undetermined.

4. (C) Operation JIFFWOGG GLEN/HUMBOGG 1120 TO carried into 1971 continuing the support of JAI program and protection of the populated lowlands of THUA THIEN Province. The weather began to improve as the flow from the northeast monsoon began to lose force. January was marked periodically with periods of improved weather that continued into February, March and April. The 101st Abn Div (Ambl) capitalized on the good weather to conduct operations in the conopied jungle areas of LR-1. Toward the end of January the division initiated operation Dewey Canyon II conducting artillery raids into the A CHAU Valley. This operation was Phase I of the XXIV Corps/I Corps operation LAUAG 719. The combined Corps operation supported an ARVN drive thru western QUANG TRI Province and into LAUAG striking the NVA base area 604 along the eastern HO CHI MINH Trail. Combined US forces secured Route 9 to the LAOTIAN Border and constructed a forward support base and air strip at BEE SANH. The ARVN continued into LAUAG, with massive US air assistance, to accomplish their mission. With success during LAUAG 719 complete, the 101st Abn Div (Ambl) joined with the 1st Inf Div (ARVN) to conduct operation LAUAG 720 in April. The operation is designed to strike into the DA KANG and

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Inclosure (Operations Narrative/Significant Activities) to Operations Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RM: CSF02-65 (R) (U).

and A SHAU Valley areas to destroy enemy supplies in forward logistical areas. This operation is a continuation of OPERATION AMB/MONSOON PLAN 70 and is continuing into May.

5. (C) 1 January - 31 January 1971.

During January the 1st Brigade CP remained at CAMP EAGLE and continued to coordinate operations with the 3d Regt (ARVN) and GVN officials in NAM HOA District. On 10 January the brigade conducted an artillery raid from Fire Base BASTOGNE to Fire Base NORMANDY. Elements of the 3d Bn (Ambl), 327th Inf secured the fire base while 155mm howitzers from the 2d Bn (Ambl), 11ty Arty fired 536 155 rounds on pre-designated targets in the Fire Base SPEAR area. The artillery raid ended the same day. On 28 January the brigade deployed artillery to Fire Base VEGHEL and SON on the 29th. These actions were in support of Operation Dewey Canyon II. The 2d Bn (Ambl), 502d Inf CP moved from CAMP EAGLE on 1 January to CP CHECKMATE. The battalion conducted search and attack operations throughout January in the surrounding AO. During the early days of January the 2d Bn (Ambl), 327th Inf conducted search and attack operations in the surrounding AO. On 5 January the battalion deployed elements in the Fire Base NORMANDY area in preparation for the artillery raid later in the month. The 1st Bn (Ambl), 327th Inf conducted operations in the Fire Base BASTOGNE area until 27 January. On 28 January the battalion displaced to Fire Base VEGHEL and SON. The area around SON was secured and prepared for the receipt of artillery to conduct the brigade artillery raid in support of Dewey Canyon II.

The 2d Bde CP continued to direct operations from FMU BAI Combat Base and maintained liaison with 54th Inf Regt (ARVN) and GVN officials. The 1st Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf conducted refresher training and provided troops for the Division Ready Force until 5 January. On 6 January the battalion passed OPCON to the 3d Bde. It remained in the 3d Bde area of operation around Fire Base RANGASAN until 26 January. On 27 January the battalion returned to OPCON of the 2d Bde and moved to the Fire Base ARSENAL area. The 2d Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf CP remained at Fire Base LOMA-HAWK with one platoon on Fire Base LOS BAYOS until 9 January when the CP and elements displaced to Fire Base BRICK. On 15 January the battalion CP moved off the fire base to a field location to the west leaving one company to secure BRICK. The remainder of January was spent in similar operations in the BRICK AO. The 1st Bn (Ambl), 502d Inf maintained its CP on Fire Base ARSENAL until 27 January when it moved to FMU BAI Combat Base. The battalion conducted refresher training and assumed the mission of Division Ready Force. The 3d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf CP remained at Fire Base JACK until 12 January when they moved to CAMP EVANS and assumed the mission of Division Ready Force and conducted refresher training. On 20 January elements moved by air southwest of SNOWD with the CP moving to GLADIATOR. On 24 January the CP returned to CAMP EVANS. Elements continued to move north operating west of the GLADIATOR/RELISSO area. On 29 January the CP moved to Fire Base RANGASAN with companies operating to the west.

The 3d Bde continued its operations at CAMP EVANS with the 3d Bn

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

110

Inclosure (Operations Narrative/Significant Activities) to Operations Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RGS: C-FCR-65 (RG) (E).

(Ambl), 187th Inf operating in the GLADIATOR/MEXICO area working west toward the Fire Base O'NEILLY area. On 20 January the battalion moved by air to CAMP EVANS to assume the mission of Division Ready Force and conducted refresher training. On 30 January the battalion went OICCN to the 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech) in support of LAMCON 719. The 1st Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf continued operations in the Fire Base JACK/CAMP EVANS area until 12 January. The battalion moved to CAMP EVANS on the 12th and assumed the mission of Division Ready Force and conducted refresher training. On 20 January the CP moved to a field location southwest of Fire Base SWARD with elements working further south into the MEXICO/GLADIATOR area. The battalion continued south conducting search and attack operations. On 25 January the CP moved to CAMP EVANS. On 29 January the CP moved to Fire Base RAKUSAN. The maneuver companies were now operating in the RAKUSAN area of operation. The 2d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf CP remained at Fire Base RAKUSAN until 6 January when it moved to CAMP EVANS and assumed the mission of Division Ready Force and conducted refresher training. On 12 January the battalion CP moved to Fire Base JACK and conducted operations until 19 January. The next day the battalion moved to a location southwest of Fire Base SWARD while one company continued to secure JACK. The CP returned to JACK on 23 January. On 25 January one company conducted joint operations with the 1st Inf Regt (ARVN). The battalion continued to operate in the JACK area throughout January.

On 031330 January, vicinity YD 615023 (five kilometers southwest of Fire Base BASTOQUE) C Company, 1st Bn (Ambl), 327th Inf discovered 30 6'x4'x5' bunkers with 1' of overhead cover and a 1'x2' tunnel running between two of the bunkers. There were no indications of recent enemy activity. The bunkers were destroyed.

On 041315 January, vicinity YD 613039 (six kilometers northeast of Fire Base BASTOQUE) C Company, 1st Bn (Ambl), 327th Inf discovered 65 10'x10'x5' bunkers with 1' of overhead cover. There were no indications of recent enemy activity. The bunkers were destroyed. At 1350 hours, vicinity YD 871011 (four kilometers northeast of Fire Base BRICK) B Company, 3d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf employed organic weapons fire, engaging one enemy 10 meters to the east of their position. The enemy returned small arms fire. A search of the area revealed one NVA KIA, one AK-47, 1/2 lb of rice, one 8'x15'x5' hut and five 2'x3'x2' fighting positions containing four RPG rounds. The hut and fighting positions were destroyed.

On 051625 January, vicinity YD 362010 (two kilometers northeast of Fire Base BRICK) A Company, 3d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf employed organic weapons fire, engaging five enemy 15 meters to the west of their position. The enemy returned small arms fire and withdrew in an unknown direction. Artillery was employed on a suspected enemy position and a search of the area was conducted with one NVA KIA, one AK-47, and one rucksack found. At 1855 hours, vicinity YD 167980 (seven kilometers east of Fire Base TOMAHAWK) D Company, 2d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf observed their mechanical ambush detonate 80 meters to the south of their position. A search under artillery illumination revealed two NVA KIA, one AK-47, and two rucksacks. The NVA KIAs were wearing green uniforms and rucksacks. Enemy

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Inclosure (Operations Narrative/Significant Activities) to Operations Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RUC: C.F. 101-63 (R3) (U).

were moving north to south.

On 071150 January, vicinity YD 914230 (two kilometers north of Fire Base IBIEN) Recon Team C, 1st Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf employed organic weapons fire engaging an estimated two enemy 100 meters to the northwest of their position. The enemy did not return but withdrew in an unknown direction. A search of the area revealed one NVA KIA and one blood trail.

On 081448 January, vicinity YD 936276 (five kilometers east of Fire Base CREILLY) C Company, 3d Bn (Ambl), 187th Inf received small arms fire from five enemy 30 meters to the north of their position. The element returned organic weapons fire and the enemy withdrew to the northwest. A search of the area was conducted revealing one NVA KIA, one AK-47, one AK-47 magazine, one cigarette lighter, one pouch of tobacco and a cut up newspaper.

On 11 January at 0935 hours, vicinity YD 957234 (four kilometers west of Fire Base IENHCO) Company B, 3d Bn (Ambl), 187th Inf employed organic weapons fire on one enemy 25 meters to the east of their position. The enemy did not return fire. A search of the area was conducted revealing one NVA KIA, one AK-47 and a trail two feet wide oriented northeast - southwest.

On 13 January at 1128 hours, vicinity XD 916230, Company A, 2d Sqn (Ambl), 17th Cavalry had an GWSA receive 12.7mm machine gun and small arms fire. The aircraft was hit four times and two US were wounded. The area was engaged by gunships resulting in one NVA KIA. There were two US KIA and one NVA KIA.

On 15 January A Troop, 2d Sqn (Ambl), 17th Cavalry, while on armed aerial reconnaissance, again engaged the enemy at 1720 hours in the vicinity of XD 927236. The assault killed three NVA soldiers and destroyed a 12.7mm crew served weapon. A M21 from A Troop, 2d Sqn (Ambl), 17th Cavalry spotted an active 12.7mm machine gun position at 1840 hours in the vicinity of XD 902234. An airstrike was immediately employed on the target, destroying the position.

On 16 January the 2d Sqn (Ambl), 17th Cavalry experienced a heavy day along the AO reconnaissance zone. The day produced 12 contacts for a total of 22 NVA KIA.

On 17 January at 1540 hours in the vicinity of YD 355236 (four kilometers northwest of Fire Base NIFCQED) C Company, 3d Bn (Ambl), 187th Inf received small arms fire from three to five enemy in bunkers 50 meters to the west of their position. The unit returned organic weapons fire and the enemy withdrew in an unknown direction. While conducting a search of the area the element engaged nineteen enemy to the west of their position. The unit employed a Pink Team, AAA, and artillery. A search of the area revealed nine NVA KIA, and numerous blood trails. At 1806 hours in the vicinity of YC 436996, an GWSA from B Troop 3d Sqn (Ambl), 17th Cavalry while on armed aerial reconnaissance received 20 rounds of small arms fire. Gunships were employed resulting in one NVA KIA. At 1655 hours a Pink Team from A Troop 2d Sqn (Ambl), 17th Cavalry, while conducting bomb damage assessment of an airstrike, observed and engaged and killed one NVA.

On 20 January a Pink Team from B Troop 2d Sqn (Ambl), 17th Cavalry, while on armed reconnaissance, at 1330 hours in the vicinity of YC 926777

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112

Inclosure (Operations Narrative/Significant Activities) to Operation Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RGS: CSFORL-65 (R3) (U).

observed and engaged one NVA. An aerial search of the area revealed one NVA KIA. One half-hour later in the vicinity of YC 407468 a Pink Team from B Troop 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cavalry observed, engaged and killed two NVA. Again at 1625 hours a B Troop Pink Team, while on armed aerial reconnaissance, observed, engaged and killed one NVA.

On 22 January D Company, 3d Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf working in the vicinity of YC 864940 (four kilometers south of Fire Base AMBL) observed their mechanical ambush detonate 600 meters to the north of their position at 0708 hours. While searching the ambush area the element received small arms fire from 4-6 enemy 200 meters to the west of their position. The element returned organic weapons fire and the enemy withdrew to the west. A Pink Team was employed and successfully engaged three enemy soldiers, killing three, capturing three AK-47s, two rucksacks and containing miscellaneous documents. An OH6A from C Troop, 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cavalry received small arms fire in the vicinity of YC 412963 at 1630 hours. The area was engaged by Cav resulting in three NVA KIA.

On 23 January, 1515 hours, the 3d Plt, Company A, 2d Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf observed and engaged three enemy soldiers resulting in two NVA KIA and one AK-47 captured. At 1100 hours, YD 507215, the 2d Plt, Co A, 1st Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf discovered a weapons cache containing 93 M16 rifles, 12 AK-47s, 2 M-2 carbines, 1 M-1 carbine, 3 unknown type submachine guns, and 4 unknown type rifles. At 1347 hours, YD 518205, Co C, 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav received small arms fire from two enemy 100 to 500 meters from their position. The element returned organic weapons fire resulting in two enemy KIA and one AK-47. At 1315 hours, YC 422936, Co C, 2d Bn (Ambl), 17th Cav OH6A, while conducting visual reconnaissance, received small arms fire. The area was engaged by gunships and AAA resulting in three NVA KIA and five NVA KB-ARA.

6. (C) Chronology of 101st Abn Div (Ambl) units in QUANG TRI Province from LANSCH 719.

a. 30 Jan - 31 Mar. On 30 Jan 71 the 2d Bn (Ambl), 137th Inf passed OPCON to the 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech) (see 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech) significant activities summary). On 20 February the 101st Abn Div (Ambl) committed infantry units into QUANG TRI Province when the 3d Bde forward CP passed OPCON to the 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech), moving to CAMP CHANGHOL. On 24 February, the brigade CP returned OPCON to the 101st Abn Div (Ambl), 1st Bn 501st Inf moved to Strong Point A-2; and the 2d Bn (Ambl), 502d Inf moved to MAI LOC passing OPCON to the 3d Bde CP. On 25 February the 2d Bn (Ambl), 327th Inf moved north into QUANG TRI in the vicinity of Fire Base SARGE and KES GIO. On 1 March the 2d Bn (Ambl), 327th Inf CP moved to KES GIO. On 2 March the 11th Bde, 23d Inf Div passed OPCON to the 101st Abn Div (Ambl) continuing its mission of operating along the eastern edge of the DMZ. The following day the 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech) was placed OPCON to the 101st Abn Div (Ambl) continuing its mission of security of lines of communication and QL-9 in QUANG TRI Province. On 5 March the CP of the 1st Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf moved from DUNG HA to Fire Base VANDERGRIFT. On 7 March Task Force 1-77 passed OPCON to the 3d Bde of the 101st with its CP at Fire Base VANDERGRIFT. On the 8th the Task Force moved to

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Inclosure (Operations Narrative/Significant Activities) to Operations Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RGS: GPFM-65 (R3) (U).

CA LU, moving back to VANDERGRIFT on 10 March. On 19 March the 2d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf moved north into QUANG TRI Province to Fire Base SAMKE passing OPCON to the 3d Bde, 101st. The 1st Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf passed their A Company OPCON to the 2d Bn (Ambl), 327th Inf in preparation of commitment of the battalion north. On 21 March the 1st Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf CP and its B Company moved from Fire Base BUNHONG to Fire Base VANDERGRIFT. The 2d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf had moved from Fire Base SAMKE to NHE GIO replacing the 2d Bn (Ambl), 327th Inf that returned south to CAMP EVANS on 20 March. Also on 20 March Task Force 1-77 returned OPCON to the 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech).

b. 1-9 Apr (withdrawal). On 7 April the 2d Bn (Ambl), 127th Inf, after two months of operations with the 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech), returned OPCON to the 101st Abn Div (Ambl) moving to CAMP EVANS to prepare for future operations. The CP for the 1st Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf moved to Fire Base SAMKE; the 2d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf passed OPCON to the 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech); and the 11th Bde, 23d Inf returned OPCON to their parent organization of 7 March. On 8 March the 2d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf returned OPCON to the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div (Ambl). The 1st Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf moved south to Fire Base GLADIATOR and the 2d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf moved south to Fire Base RAGULSAN. The 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech) reverted from OPCON to the 101st Abn Div (Ambl) ending the US Task Force for LANSAN 719.

c. Significant Activities east of the NS C2 grid line (which defined the AO of LANSAN 719).

(1) 031405 March in the vicinity of YD 160733 N/TF 1-61 received small arms fire and RPG fire from an estimated enemy squad resulting in 7 US WIA (E), and 1 NVA KIA.

(2) 051415 March the Recon/2-327th, in vicinity of YD 040135, discovered a grave with one NVA.

(3) 101635 March 1/4-11 Inf, in the vicinity of XD 756267, discovered 7 graves containing NVA killed by artillery resulting in 7 NVA KIA.

(4) 090900 March F/4-8 Cav, in the vicinity of YD 286461, forced a sampan ashore resulting in one detainee.

(5) 120750 March 2/B/2-1 Inf, in the vicinity of YD 280760, engaged an unknown size enemy force resulting in 1 NVA KIA and 1 AK-47 captured.

(6) 191745 March the security platoon 1-61 Mech, in the vicinity of YD 075641 engaged an unknown size enemy force resulting in 1 VC KIA and misc documents.

(7) 201420 March 3/D/2-502 Inf, in the vicinity of YD 051426, received small arms fire from an unknown size enemy force resulting in 1 NVA KIA and 1 AK-47 captured.

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114

Inclosure (Operations Narrative/Significant Activities) to Operations Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Air-Lift), Period Ending: 30 April 1971, AIA: 1000000 (R3) (U).

(8) 211412 March 2/D/2-502 Inf, in the vicinity of YD 050424, received small arms fire from an enemy platoon. The element returned fire resulting in 1 US KIA (U) and 1 enemy PW.

(9) 231805 March Recon and security platoon from 3d Bde, in the vicinity of YD 066455 discovered 3 bodies, 1 mortar, 3 enemy KIA.

(10) 251915 March Recon/2-1 Inf, in the vicinity of YD 277747, engaged 3 NVA with organic weapons fire resulting in 1 NVA KIA and 1 AK-47 captured.

(11) 281300 March the Recon and security platoon from the 3d Bde, in the vicinity of YD 078573, engaged 5 or 6 enemy resulting in 3 NVA KIA and 3 AK-47 captured.

(12) 021240 April 3/C/2-502 Inf, in the vicinity of YD 072603, received small arms fire from 2 or 3 enemy soldiers. The element returned organic weapons fire resulting in 1 NVA KIA, 1 NVA PW, 1 AK-47 captured and one rucksack.

(13) 052030 April Recon/2-502 Inf, in the vicinity of YD 323439, engaged suspected enemy positions resulting in 3 NVA KIA and 2 AK-47s captured.

3. Significant Activities west of the ND 02 grid line.

(1) 101100 March 2/B/2-1-501 Inf received small arms fire and employed organic weapons fire engaging 3 enemy in the vicinity of YD 932587 resulting in 1 NVA KIA.

(2) 131100 March 3/C/1-501 Inf received small arms fire from an estimated enemy platoon 200 meters to their northwest resulting in 1 US KIA, 1 NVA KIA, 1 AK-47 and misc equipment captured.

(3) 131720 March 3/B/1-501 Inf observed their mechanical ambush detonate 300 meters north of their position resulting in 1 NVA KIA and 1 AK-47 captured.

(4) 140917 March 1/C/1-501 Inf, in the vicinity of XD 943603, engaged an enemy element 50 meters west of their position resulting in 3 NVA KIA.

(5) 141500 March 1/C/1-501 Inf, in the vicinity of XD 943603, engaged an enemy element 100 meters west of their position resulting in 1 NVA KIA and 1 AK-47.

(6) 141715 March 1/V/2-327 Inf, in the vicinity of XD 925580, engaged 5 enemy 25 meters east of their position resulting in 2 NVA KIA.

(7) 141920 March 2/C/1-501 Inf observed their mechanical ambush detonate in the vicinity of XD 943604 resulting in 1 NVA KIA and 1 AK-47.

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Inclosure (Operations Narrative/Dispatch Activities) to Operations Report - Lessons Learned, Joint Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCB: CDP00003 (R3) (U).

captured. There were several blood trails leading from the area.

(8) 161435 March 1/C/1-501 Inf, in the vicinity of XD 947605, received small arms fire from an unknown size enemy force 100 meters from their position resulting in 1 US KIA (E), 2 NVA KIA, 1 RPD, 1 RPG and 1 AK-47 captured.

(9) 161710 March 1/H/2-327 Inf, in the vicinity of YD 000502, discovered twenty-three 82mm mortar rounds and 3 cases of 12.7 mm machine gun ammunition.

(10) 190045 March on QL-7, in the vicinity of XD 902495, 2 vehicles received 2 RPG rounds, small arms fire, and fragmentation grenades from an unknown size enemy force resulting in 1 US 5-ton truck moderately damaged, 1 ARVN $\frac{1}{2}$ ton truck lightly damaged, 2 US KIA (H) and 2 ARVN KIA (H). D/1-77 engaged NVA fleeing west resulting in 1 NVA KIA.

(11) 210425 March sappers attacked the rear/refuel point at Fire Base VANDERGRIFT resulting in two 10,000 gallon JP-4 blivets destroyed and 1 NVA KIA.

(12) 240925 March 1/E/2-506 Inf, in the vicinity of XD 001966, engaged an unknown size enemy force resulting in 9 NVA KIA and 5 AK-47s captured.

(13) 240925 March 2/C/2-506 Inf, in the vicinity of XD 007571, engaged 3 to 4 enemy 100 meters north of their position resulting in 1 NVA KIA and 1 AK-47 captured.

(14) 241430 March 1/C/1-501 Inf, in the vicinity of XD 945507, engaged 8 NVA north of their position with AAA and mortars resulting in 2 NVA KIA.

(15) 250918 March 2/C/2-506 Inf, in the vicinity of XD 006574, engaged an unknown size enemy force with organic weapons fire 100 meters north of their position resulting in 1 NVA KIA, and discovered 20 bunkers made of wood and earth which were later destroyed.

(16) 251815 March 2/A/1-506 Inf, in the vicinity of XD 958503, engaged 4 to 6 enemy with organic weapons fire resulting in 2 NVA KIA.

(17) 261055 March 2/H/1-501 Inf, in the vicinity of XD 946553, discovered 3 graves containing 3 NVA KIA.

(18) 272230 March 1/A/2-506 Inf, in the vicinity of XD 005568, engaged an unknown size enemy force with hand grenades resulting in 6 NVA KIA, 1 NVA PW, 14 rucksacks, 1 K54 pistol, 6 AK-47s and 1 RPG launcher captured.

(19) 282155 March Fire Base VANDERGRIFT was attacked by sappers resulting in 2 NVA KIA and 2 AK-47s captured.

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14

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(22) 291110 March 3/74-1 Int, in the vicinity of 2000 HIA, or had a enemy resulting in 2 KIA HIA, 1 MIA Launcher, 4 enemy wounded and also documents.

(1A) 011645 April 1-50% lat employed in studies of the 1947-48
sagebrush fire located in the vicinity of 10-13000 feet in 1948.
1949 and 1950 very dry.

(76) 020045 April 13/1-964 Inf, in the vicinity of 10-000, observed enemy resulting in 1 MVA, 1A, 1 RAG Launcher and 1 AG-44 captured.

(22) 061155 April 1/8/1-501 1-F, in the vicinity of H. 041502 R - received small arms fire from an unknown side enemy force. The unit returned organic weapons fire resulting in 2 MG KIA (B), and 4 MIA KIA.

3. Attack to AIGM and Consolidation.

2. The attack into Laos was initiated on 6 February. Two areas established on the KGS SAMH Plain. The 1st Armored Big Tank Force crossed the border at 1900 hours and 3 Yellow Team western along route 9 the first day. Three battalions of the 3d Regt, 1st Inf Div (ARVN) air assaulted into Laos south of Route 9 (1st Bn 1st and 2nd). North of Route 9, two battalions of the 1st Abn Div air assaulted to objectives 20 and 21, and one Ranger Battalion landed in the vicinity of BATHA (1st Bn). Additionally, 105mm howitzer batteries were in position 12 miles, objectives 20

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Inclosure (Operations Narrative/Significant Activities) to Operations Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending: 30 April 1971, REF: GCSH25 (A) (1).

and 31 on 8 February. On 9 February all air moves were cancelled due to adverse weather. The armored task force moved forward 2 kilometers. On the 10th of February, the 101st Airborne Division assaulted a battalion into objective ALOUI, the armored task force linked up with the battalion at 1555 hours and the 1st Inf Div landed a battalion on LZ DELTA. The initial objective had been seized.

11-13 Feb. During the period the Armored Task Force consolidated its position around objective ALOUI. The 1st Regt, 1st Inf Div (ARVN) inserted two battalions on LZ DON and one on LZ ALPHA I. A ranger battalion was air assaulted to RANGER NORTH LZ. Additional forces, artillery and supplies were air lifted into objective ALOUI and other established LZs. An airborne battalion was inserted north of objective 31 on 13 February as the forces flanking the armor drive moved ahead of objective ALOUI.

14-18 Feb. With the armor column making no further progress to the west, the 1st Inf Div (ARVN) turned north expanding its search for enemy supplies and facilities. Elements of the 1st Regt, 1st Inf Div (ARVN) and accompanying artillery moved to HONK II and LZ GREEN. Attempts to insert a battalion on LZ GREEN were broken off because of intense enemy fire. Forces in the vicinity of LZ GREEN made increasing contacts with the enemy.

19-22 Feb. The northern flank of the penetration came under heavy attack with the enemy successively concentrating their forces on the RANGER LZs and airborne objectives. Movement to these locations was limited by intense enemy fire on the LZs. On 20 February the 19th Ranger Battalion positions of RANGER NORTH were penetrated by the PVA. Elements of the battalion were able to reach RANGER SOUTH the next day. RANGER SOUTH and objective 31 came under increasing enemy pressure.

23 Feb - 2 Mar. During this period, preparations were made to regain the initiative and continue the drive west. 1st Inf Div elements were repositioned north and west. 1st Regt forces were moved from HONK II to DELTA I and from LZ GREEN to LZ BRON. On 25 February, the ranger battalions were extracted. Objective 31 came under heavy attack which included the use of tanks by the enemy. The 1st Armored Task Force attacked north to relieve the airborne positions on Objective 31. 1st Inf Div (ARVN) forces on the extreme southern flank continued to be under heavy pressure until withdrawn on 1 March. An airborne battalion was inserted at LZ ALPHA to secure Route 9 and hold open the I Corps penetration into LAOS.

b. Attack to TCHUPONE and Consolidation.

3-6 Mar. The drive to TCHUPONE was accomplished in a series of air-mobile assaults by the 1st Inf Div (ARVN) westward along the escarpment which overlooks Route 9. Division forces were released for this operation by inserting two brigades of the 1st Marine Div (ARVN); one in the vicinity of Fire Base HONK and the other around Fire Base DELTA. Additionally, the 2d Regt with 3 battalions was made available from eastern QUANG TRI Province (relieved by the 2d Regt, 101st Airborne Div (ARVN) and the 11th Bde, 2nd Inf Div). The 1st Inf Div (ARVN) units air assaulted successively into LZs LOLO, LON and SUMTA 1-2. By 5 March, the 2d Regt had occupied DELTA I and LZ BRON, and the 1st Regt was conducting operations in the vicinity of LZs LON, LONK and LONK. The 2d Regt was conducting

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118

Inclosure (Operations Narrative/Significant Activities) to Operations Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending: 30 April 1971, RCM: AFPC/LAS (US) (U).

Landings at SONHIA EAST and west and moving westward along the escarpment. On 6 March two battalions air assaulted into LZ HOPE, north of TCHEPONE. These units then attacked south and west occupying the town. During this period the Airborne Division and the armored task force operated north and east of Objective ALQOI, and Fire Base BRAVO was secured by the Airborne Division.

L2 Hope

7-10 Mar. During this period the armor which had been operating from LZ HOPE into TCHEPONE, linked up with elements to the south in the escarpment. Adverse weather precluded several days of operations. As enemy pressure began to build in the TCHEPONE area, all friendly elements withdrew south of QL-9 and began moving toward SONHIA WEST. At this point major additional forces would have been required to proceed with the original plan of seizing the TCHEPONE air field and operating for an extended period in that area. In the face of the build up of numerically superior enemy forces in the objective area, the decision was made by the Commanding General of I Corps to withdraw toward Objective ALQOI.

c. Extraction.

11-14 Mar. The withdrawal from forward positions in the vicinity of TCHEPONE and SONHIA WEST was accomplished overland to the vicinity of LZ LIZ. On 11 March, two battalions and the 2d Regt CR, 1st Inf Div were extracted to SONHIA EAST and subsequently to DELTA I with two additional battalions moving the next day to the vicinity of LZ BROWN. The 1st Regt continued operations south and west of Fire Base LALO and the 3d Regt continued southwest of Fire Base DELTA I and LZ BROWN. The Marine Division conducted operations with two brigades in the areas of LZ DAI, Fire Base DELTA, and Fire Base HOTEL. Resupply to all units was curtailed because of indirect and small arms fire on the LZs.

15-18 Mar. Increased enemy pressure and unsuccessful attempts to resupply or conduct medical evacuation at Fire Base LALO forced the defenders to abandon the base and move overland to the east. By the end of the 16th, the 3d Regt, less one battalion, had been extracted from multiple LZs around Fire Base DELTA I and SONHIA EAST. The battalions had been in continuous contact for several days and were forced to move to new pick-up zones on several occasions in order to break contact with the enemy. Extractions were completed only after intensive tactical air, artillery, and aerial rocket artillery preparation.

19-22 March. With the majority of the friendly forces off the escarpment west of Objective ALQOI, the evacuation of Objective ALQOI and elements of the Airborne Division commenced. By the end of the 21st, the 1st Inf Div had been completely withdrawn from LZQI with the extraction by air of the 2d Regt. As before, the units were forced to move overland, often at night, in order to break contact and make the extraction feasible. Elements of the Airborne Division were lifted out of LZQI under similar circumstances. Meanwhile, the armor column had run into resistance on its push toward TI BAT. It initially moved to Fire Base ALMA on 19 March with no difficulty, but ran into enemy resistance and road blocks east of Fire Base BRAVO. At this point the Commanding General of I Corps wanted the Marine Brigade to hold and act as a pivot for a drive across the Vietnamese and Laotian salients to the east. This drive did not materialize.

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120

Inclosure (Operation Narrative/Significant Activities) to Operations Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS: CSFOR-45 (H) (U).

On 21-22 April C Company, 1st Bn (Amb1), 327th Inf, operating in the vicinity of YC 473890 ambushed an unknown size enemy force with organic weapons and mortar fire. A search of the area revealed 5 NVA KIA, one flame mortar, 3 rucksacks and medical supplies. At 1830 hours, again on the 21st, a platoon from B Company, 3d Bn (Amb1), 187th Inf observed their MA detonate north-west of their position (YD 412892). A search of the area revealed 4 VC KIA, 2 AK-47s, and 30 lbs of rice and rock salt. On 22 April the 1st Bn (Amb1), 506th Inf completed refresher training and moved by air to Fire Base GLADIATOR in the 3d Bde area of operation with continued operations to the south and east. The 2d Bn (Amb1), 506th Inf moved to CAMP EVANS to conduct refresher training. On 230450 April C Troop, 2d Sqdn (Amb1), 174th Cavalry while conducting armed aerial reconnaissance engaged 4 NVA killing 2 by helicopter. At 0855 hours the Recon Team from 3d Bn (Amb1), 187th Inf engaged one enemy north of their location (YD 557210) resulting in 1 VC with equipment killed. At 0915 hours, in the vicinity of YD 170249, C Troop, 2d Sqdn (Amb1), 174th Cavalry engaged and killed 1 NVA. At 1540 hours, in the vicinity of YC 484925, a ranger team from Company L (Ranger), 75th Inf was engaged by an unknown size enemy force resulting in 1 US KIA. While attempting to extract the team a UH-1H was shot down resulting in 1 US KIA and 3 US MIA. Later, an individual ranger from the team attempted to locate the downed aircraft and failed to return. B Company, 2d Bn (Amb1), 502d Inf was inserted into the area to assist in locating the downed UH-1H. The company met with heavy enemy resistance and fire. The total results for the action on 23 and 24 April were 2 US KIA, 16 US MIA (E), 4 US KIA. On 25 April the 2d Bn (Amb1), 502d Inf reinforced and A Co, 1st Bn (Amb1), 327th Inf were air assaulted to YC 4839 to provide support. The aircraft was located and extracted. All elements were extracted with the totals for the engagement: 10 US KIA, 20 US MIA (E), and 3 US KIA.

In the 1st Bde area of operation for LAMSON 720, the 1st Bn (Amb1), 327th Inf continued operations in the vicinity of Fire Base BUNGWANG. The 2d Bn (Amb1), 502d Inf continued operations in the Fire Base JACK area, with elements also on OP CHECKMATE. In the 3d Bde area of operation for LAMSON 720, TF 3-187 maintained its CP at CAMP EVANS. A Company, 956 RF Company and 3d Platoon, A Company, 1-1 Cavalry conducted operations west of CAMP EVANS. Company B had the security mission for MAI LAC, Company C and the 956 RF Company conducted search and attack operations southwest of Fire Base JACK. D Company conducted operations in the vicinity of 10 332. Team A, 1-1 Cavalry and elements of A Company, 3d Bn (Amb1), 187th Inf conducted search and attack operations south of JACK. The 2d Bn (Amb1), 327th Inf continued operations at Fire Base RAKKAWAN with elements securing KATHLEEN, HELEN, and OP HANCON. The 1st Bn (Amb1), 506th Inf continued operations in the Fire Base GLADIATOR.

The 2d Bn (Amb1), 506th Inf continued refresher training. At 1049 hours on the 26th, C Company, TF 3-187 Inf engaged and killed 1 VC. On 29 April the 2d Bn (Amb1), 506th Inf completed refresher training and returned to Fire Base RAKKAWAN with elements moving to MAI LAC, RUMHON, and HANHON. Operation LAMSON 720 continued into May as an operation of the continuing JEFFERSON GLEN/MUNSON PLAN.

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