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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division
(Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, ROS CDFOR-65 (R3) (U)

of the runway. During January 1971, HHC provided equipment support at CAMP EAGLE, Fire Bases JACK, KONG, LOS BAINS, BARTOCH, BIRMINGHAM, TOMAHAWK, BRICK, and ARSENAL, and at HUU THI Road, CAMP EVANS, and KHE SANH. HHC continued interior road maintenance at CAMP EAGLE. During January, 1,950 meters of ditch were improved, and 70 cubic yards of rock were placed, graded, and compacted. 23,000 gallons of penetrant were placed on the interior roads as a dust palliative. Additionally, the fly ways of the 2/17th Cav, 4/77th AAA, Corridor 1nd, Eagle Dustoff, and the 163rd Aviation were penetrant.

(4) On 27 January 1971, Task Force 326 was formed and assigned the mission of moving by air to KHE SANH to construct a C-130 assault airfield and repair the existing AM-2 airfield damaged during the January - March 1968 KHE SANH siege. Additionally, TF 326 was given the mission of opening a 16 kilometer section of Routes 21-9 and 608 from the vicinity of the RIVIERE DE QUANG Tri River Valley to the KHE SANH airfield. To perform these missions, the task force was configured from elements of a line company and a supervisory section of the Battalion Staff. The 45th Engineer Group reinforced this task force with a combat engineer platoon, aluminum cutting and welding equipment, and a survey section. Convoy movement to the staging area at MAI LOC was conducted from 27-29 January. Seven convoy serials were required due to limited transportation assets and the wide variety of engineer equipment making the move. On 30 January, simultaneous combat assaults were conducted by TF 326 via Bridge 34 (XD003395) and KHE SANH. Two engineer platoons, two dozers, four 3 1/4-ton trucks and a radio jeep were lifted into via Bridge 34 to effect the opening of Route 21-9. The by-pass at Bridge 33 (XD971419) was prepared for an Armored Vehicle Launched Bridge (AVLB) while the abutments at Bridge 34 were prepared for a 38-foot M-4 dry span bridge lifted in by CH-54 and CH-47s. To decrease the time required to open the section of road from Bridge 36 to KHE SANH, a third engineer platoon conducted linesweep operations from KHE SANH to Bridge 36. Additionally, a D-5 bulldozer removed the upper four inches of the old road surface, to increase the rate of mine clearing. Upon arrival at Bridge 36, it became apparent that the amount of earth work necessary to provide fill for the bridge abutments was beyond the capability of the airmobile bulldozers. Shaped and cratering charges were used throughout the night to blast rocky fill from the cliffs overhanging the bridge site. Due to the inaccessibility of the site to AVLB's, additional fill was required to build up the abutments for a 38-foot M-4 dry span. Traffic was passed at 1230 hours 31 January 1971. During the first two days of the engineer airmobile operations, a combination of 97 medium and heavy helicopter sorties were flown to KHE SANH in support of Task Force 326 by Army and Marine helicopters operating out of the forward staging area at MAI LOC. This impressive helicopter lift, which moved 225 tons of engineer equipment and supplies, may have been the most ambitious airlift of engineer equipment ever undertaken in Vietnam. It was accomplished without damage to a single item of equipment. From the

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time the first item of equipment was air landed at KHE SANH, combat engineer effort continued around the clock to construct a 3,200-foot C-130 airstrip. Dense fog, limiting ground visibility to a maximum of 20 feet, had a serious impact upon the ability to conduct the airfield survey, essential to efficient equipment utilization. Additionally, low-lying clouds increased the moisture content in the highly expansive clay soil compounding compaction and stabilization problems. In spite of numerous impediments, the assault airfield was completed by 1500 hours on 4 February 1971 and subsequently was accepted by the US Air Force Airfield Inspection Team. At 1555 hours, 5 February 1971, the first C-130 aircraft successfully landed and took off from the KHE SANH assault airfield, thus opening the facility to cargo aircraft for the first time in three years. During the entire construction period, the 366th Engineer Battalion (Ambl) experienced no major equipment deadlines. Additionally, no engineer equipment, vehicles or communication equipment failed during this period, an effective tribute to the care and maintenance prior, during, and subsequent to this airmobile operation. Additionally, TF 326 received excellent supplemental equipment support from the 27th Engineer Battalion (Combat), a non-divisional engineer unit. Construction continued around-the-clock to provide a 38-point (260,000-gallons) helicopter POL refuel/storage facility. The construction of this 56-acre facility was impeded by the heavy cloud banks and by extensive underground bunkers and defensive positions which were partially destroyed by the US Marines in 1968. As large numbers of Allied troops began arriving at the KHE SANH area, the base, once occupied and defended by Task Force 326 and one infantry company, was expanded. Large areas of unrecorded minefields were encountered. The mines had to be found and neutralized because of their proximity to friendly troops and to satisfy the requirement for additional area. Employing a combination of burning, visual sweeping, probing, blasting, and bulldozing, approximately thirteen acres of BBT minefields were cleared by the TF 326 combat engineers. Four D7E bulldozers were destroyed during the clearing, confirming the presence and hazards of mine-clearing operations. Subsequent to the completion of the C-130 assault airfield, T-419 matting was placed on the airfield to improve the runway bearing capacity and to insure sustained airfield operations over an extended period. Approximately 60 C-130 sorties were received daily. The completion of the aluminum mat overlay, provided a forward heavy cargo tactical facility in support of combined US-AVN operations in northwestern South Vietnam and in Laos. On 16 February 1971, a platoon from B Company was placed under operational control of the 27th Engineer Battalion (Combat) and continued construction of a 20' x 32' bunker for 2/17th Cav and a 40m x 100m helipad for the 101st Airborne Division Advance at KHE SANH. These tasks were completed without incident and the platoon

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was extracted on 22 February. During February, A Company (-) was in direct support of the 1st Brigade at Fire Bases BIRMINGHAM, BASTOGNE, VEGHEL, CANNON, ZON, NORMANDY, RENDEZVOUS, and CAMP EAGLE Combat Base. The new log helipad, the command helipad and the interior roads by the mess hall were penetrated in support of the 2/327th Infantry at Fire Base BIRMINGHAM. Improvements were also made on the sanitary fill and drainage ditches. Daily minesweeps were conducted on Route 547 from Fire Base BASTOGNE to Fire Base VEGHEL and from Fire Base BIRMINGHAM to Fire Base BASTOGNE with negative findings. An M-450 was employed on Fire Base ZON to cut gun pads and ammunition slots. An M-450 was employed on Fire Base NORMANDY to cut defilade positions and ammunition bunkers in support of 1/327th Infantry. Company A received the mission on 10 February 1971 of reconstructing Route QL-347 from Fire Base BLAZE to Fire Base RENDEZVOUS, a distance of 19 kilometers, in support of Operation SHAMPOCK. The task force organization for this mission included Company A, 326th Engineer Battalion, and a platoon of Company B, 27th Engineer Battalion (Cht). On 12 February a portion of the task force moved by road to Fire Base BLAZE and began working west along QL-547. The equipment with this element included a scoop loader, two D7E bulldozers, and several 5-ton dump trucks. On 12 February, another element air-assaulted into abandoned Fire Base RENDEZVOUS on the floor of the A SHAU VALLEY with two M-450 dozers and two 3/4-ton dump trucks. The element began working to the east. On 13 February two additional elements air assaulted to intermediate road locations. One element received three M-450 dozers plus two 3/4-ton dump trucks while the other element received a D-5 bulldozer and two 3/4-ton dump trucks. These two elements began working toward each other as this portion of the road was considered the most critical. By the evening of 14 February, the entire 19 kilometers of road was passable to all classes of wheeled and tracked vehicles. Improvement of the road continued from 17 February through 21 February. The entire road is now 15 feet wide. Forty-six culverts are now operational in the road system. 125,000 cubic yards of earth and rock were moved while fixing out slides and side hill cuts. Five ford sites were improved in the section of road from Fire Base BLAZE to Fire Base RENDEZVOUS. Turnouts were constructed every kilometer to facilitate passing and pullout of non-operational vehicles. Seven landing zones were constructed along the road to be used in future operations. Two LZs will accept CH-54 traffic, and five will accept two UH-1Hs simultaneously. There are four points of particular significance along this route. 1) At point 31 (YC449974) two streams converge on the road bed and had washed it out. Also the slope of the road approaching the streams, exceeded 50 degrees. Culverts were installed to divert the streams, the area was filled and compacted, and the slope was cut to less than 30 degrees. 2) At point 32 (YC454987) the slope of the road exceeded 60 degrees, and a stream crossed the road at the base of the slope. A ford was constructed across the stream.

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The entire hill mass was shaped into a turnaround. Both western approaches to the stream were cut to less than 30 degrees. This is the only portion of the road where lengthy convoys can pass each other or halt without blocking traffic. 3) At point 22 (YC457999) a stream and waterfall intersected the road. The configuration of the road was such that it was not possible to install a regular culvert. By use of demolitions, a "Trench culvert" was formed which has proven to be very satisfactory. 4) At point 1 (TD527022) a river crosses the road. A massive amount of rock was necessary to construct a ford capable of passing all traffic.

During February 1971, B Company (-) was in direct support of the 1st Brigade at Fire Base RAKASAN, Fire Base JACK, Fire Base A-2, CAMP CARROLL, MAI LOC and CAMP EVANS Combat Base. Daily mine sweeps were performed on access roads from CAMP CARROLL, MAI LOC, Fire Base A-2, and Fire Base RAKASAN with negative findings. C Company (-) was in direct support of the 2nd Brigade at Fire Bases ARSENAL, BRICK, TOMAHAWK, and LOS BANOS. C Company also continued improving the RHU BAI Combat Base perimeter roads. On Fire Base BRICK the defensive wire was installed, a 10' x 24' TOC bunker was rehabilitated and three 8' x 12' personnel bunkers were completed, numerous dud rounds were destroyed, earthwork was completed on the 155mm howitzer positions, and a trash sump was cut. On Fire Base ARSENAL, an 8' x 12' personnel bunker and a 16' x 16' mess personnel bunker were completed. On Fire Base TOMAHAWK, a 20' x 48' stand-down bunker and a 10' x 16' grease trap were completed; a helipad was graded and penprimed; a blivet rack was constructed; a D-7 dozer cut and shaped the access road to QL-1, cleared 25 meters of firing range, policed a trash sump, and cut a 25' x 75' slot for CONEX storage. On the RHU BAI "A" Sector Road 3,868 cubic yards of sand fill were hauled and spread on the road and two 24" culverts were installed. On 17 February a platoon of C Company began rehabilitation of Eagle Beach by repairing fire guard towers, the helipad, the tennis court and retaining wall, the 2nd floor, constructing a dressing room, a floor for the EM club, and extending the basketball court playing surface. D Company (Provisional) was activated under the provisions of 101st Airborne Division General Order 1681 on 27 February 1971 with the mission of providing combat support to the engineer battalion, airmobile division, by accomplishing general and special engineer tasks and to undertake and carry out infantry combat missions when required. On 28 February 1971, 3rd Platoon, Company B moved by air to KHE SANH to begin construction of a 20' x 32' combined corps TOC at the old KHE SANH POST.

(5) On 1 March 1971, the remaining elements of Company B, augmented by a platoon from Company D (Prov), conveyed to KHE SANH. Second Platoon, Company B began construction of a 20' x 64' TOC for 101st Airborne Division (Ambl) Advance Headquarters. Upon completion of the 20' x 64' TOC, 3rd Platoon, Company B constructed a 20' x 32' briefing room adjacent to the TOC. During the entire period, 1st Platoon, Company B provided

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equipment support to 101st forward units by cutting trenches for contacts, fighting positions, and bunkers. On 24 March, 1st Platoon, Company D moved by road convoy to CAMP EAGLE and the remaining elements (CP and 3rd Platoon, Company E) conveyed to CAMP WART on 26 March. During March 1971, HHC continued equipment support of the battalion and road maintenance within the CAMP EAGLE Combat Base. Approximately 27,000 gallons of penetrant were applied to various portions of the CAMP EAGLE road network as a dust palliative. During March, A Company (-) was in direct support of the 1st Brigade at Fire Bases BASTOGNE, BIRMINGHAM, SIEZAR and NORMANDY, Observation Post (OP) Destroyer, CAMP EAGLE Combat Base and supported the division forward at QUANG TRI. At Fire Base BASTOGNE, daily minesweeps were conducted east and west along Route 547 with negative findings. A four-man team from A Company supported A Company, 2/501st Infantry, in its operations to the north of Fire Base BASTOGNE by conducting sweeps of the area with the infantry. While in support of the 1/506th Infantry and the 1st Brigade Aerial Rifle Platoon, a reinforced engineer squad combat assaulted into several fire bases in the AO. These fire bases included CLADLIER, BIRMINGHAM, BIRCHESBOLDEN and LANCER. At Fire Base LANCER, the element received an undetermined amount of small arms fire from a nearby hill. At BIRCHESBOLDEN and LANCER, numerous booty traps were found, but only one was disarmed due to the short period of time to be spent in the area. At QUANG TRI, in support of division forward, general engineer maintenance was performed, NVA huts were repaired, two showers were constructed and the commanding general's briefing room was rehabilitated. At Fire Base BIRMINGHAM, in direct support of the 1/327th Infantry, daily minesweeps of Route 547 were conducted with negative findings. In direct support of the 1/506th Infantry at Fire Base SIEZAR, a combat assault and sweep of the hill was conducted, and shortly thereafter, an M-450 dozer was airlifted onto the hill. A sanitary fill, two ASP slots, and two TOC slots were excavated. In direct support of the 1/327th Infantry at OP DESTROYER, the original LZ was expanded, fields of fire were cleared, five 8' x 12' slots were excavated, five 8' x 12' native timber bunkers were constructed and triple concertina was emplaced around the OP. At Fire Base NORMANDY, a shower was constructed and numerous sleeping positions were sandbagged. On 16 March 1971, Company A received the mission of constructing a road network from Fire Base BASTOGNE to Fire Base BIRCHESBOLDEN. The purpose of constructing this road network was threefold: to deny the NVA the use of the base area south-east of Hill 246, to provide the ARVN with ready access to Fire Base BASTOGNE and BIRMINGHAM, and to open vast hardwood areas to the woodcutters of THUA THIEN Province. On 18 March 1971, the 3rd Platoon, Company A air-assaulted to Hill 246 with three M-450 bulldozers, two D-5 bulldozers, and a 3/4-ton truck. They immediately began construction working to the south. Simultaneously, Company E, 27th Engineer Battalion, began work from Route 547 in the vicinity of Fire Base BASTOGNE to the north. They employed four D-7 dozers and a scoop loader. This first

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phase of the road construction encompassed clearing 8 kilometers of double-canopy jungle, installing numerous culverts, and clearing fields of fire on both sides of the road. Work from Hill 246 proceeded more slowly than estimated. The combat engineers quickly found that the hill was a solid mass of high density rock and the slope of the hill was excessive. On 2 April the two construction forces met, thus completing the pioneered road to Hill 246. Company A then began constructing OP KING in Hill 246. A 10' x 24' bunker and nine 8' x 12' bunkers were airlifted from Fire Base BETHLEHEM to OP KING and emplaced in slots cut into the hill. On 10 April, the OP was turned over to AIFV and the Company A element returned to CAMP EAGLE. Company B, 27th Battalion continued construction of the road which will eventually connect Fire Base LION, Fire Base GEMINI, OP KING and Fire Base EAGLE. During March, B Company continued engineer operations in the support sector of Military Region I. B Company minus was in direct support of the 3rd Brigade at Fire Base THUNDERBIRD II, Fire Base VANDERGRIFT, CAMP CARROLL, MAI LOC, Fire Base JACK, Fire Base RAKESAN and CAMP EVANS and supported the Division Advance at KHE SANH. A daily minesweep was conducted from Fire Base RAKESAN to the TEXAS FORD with negative findings. General engineer support continued at Fire Base JACK until the fire base was closed on 17 March 1971. Revetments were constructed for the 27th AIFV and general engineer road maintenance continued at CAMP EVANS. At Fire Base VANDERGRIFT, daily minesweeps were conducted with one anti-personnel mine located and destroyed in place. The squad at Fire Base VANDERGRIFT also cleared one log pad, constructed an ammo storage bunker, an aid station, FDC bunker and other facilities. At MAI LOC, daily minesweeps were conducted to QL-9. On 14 March 1971, the minesweep vehicle detonated a mine resulting in three APVN KIA, one US KIA and four US MIA. Construction at MAI LOC consisted of blivet racks and a grease pit. Daily minesweeps were conducted from CAMP CARROLL with negative findings. Work at CAMP CARROLL consisted of construction of blivet racks, repairing roads and preparing areas for COMVX emplacement. At Fire Base THUNDERBIRD II, daily minesweeps were conducted with one anti-personnel mine found and destroyed in place. During March, C Company (-) was engaged in combat engineer support of Fire Bases ARSENAL, BRICK, TOMAHAWK, NZIO: upgrading of HHU BAI Roads, HHU THU Road, HUONG THU Road, Christie Memorial Baseball Field, and in general engineer support in the HHU BAI/CAMP EAGLE Combat Bases. On Fire Base BRICK, an old 10' x 24' TOC bunker was dismantled, the slot widened with an M-450 and a new 20' x 32' TOC constructed in its place. Numerous dud rounds and trees were blown around the hill, two blivet racks were completed and fields of fire around the 155mm howitzer area were cleared. In HHU BAI, 3,800 meters of interior roads were upgraded and 8,000 gallons of paraffin were applied as a dust palliative. At Fire Base BLIZZ, a minesweep was conducted with negative findings. A minesweep was conducted on Fire Base KATHRYN with one booby trap discovered and blown in place. On Fire Base ARSENAL, a 16' x 16' sleeping bunker was completed and 103 cubic yards of fill were hauled and spread with an M-450 dozer around

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existing bunkers. All work on the fire base ceased when it was closed on 25 Mar 71. At the FBU BAI Service Club, all carpenter work in the music room, work room, and kitchen was completed, old wiring replaced and two CONEXs emplaced to be used as sewage tanks. On HUONG THUY Road, 1,360 cubic yards of fill were hauled extending the road 200 meters. On the FBU THU Road, 90 cubic yards of fill were hauled and placed on bridge approaches, one culvert was repaired and one 16' long 24" diameter culvert was emplaced. Within the CAMP EAGLE Combat Base, the Division softball field, Christie Field, was completed and at Eagle International, shields were placed around the landing lights on the edges of the helipad. On Fire Base TOMAHAWK, an M-450 dozer leveled and cleared positions for six 105mm howitzers, dug a slot for a 6' x 30' ASP and ice house, and covered a trash sump. Additionally, a blast wall was completed around the stand-down bunker, an ice house and wash rack were completed, and culvert drainage structures around the mess hall were repaired. A 10' x 30' bunker on the barge at LANG CO BAY was dismantled and the materials flown to Fire Base ARSENAL and Fire Base BRICK for use in new construction. A 8' x 12' sleeping bunker at NUOC NGOT was dismantled and the materials taken to Fire Base TOMAHAWK and the water point at that location was moved to FBU LOC. Two minesweeps were conducted along the railroad tracks from LANG CO to Fire Base LOS RAMOS with negative findings. During March, D Company rendered equipment and personnel support to KHE SAMH, Fire Base SPEAR, Fire Base BASCOCKE, Fire Base BIRMINGHAM, Fire Base ARSENAL, CAMP CARROLL and QUANG TRI, CAMP EAGLE, and FBU BAI Combat Bases. On 2 March 1971, a reinforced platoon from D Company was attached to B Company and moved to KHE SAMH to furnish engineer support to XXIV Corps and 101st Airborne Division (Amb) (Advance). Upon returning to CAMP EAGLE, the first platoon constructed a new 60,000 gallon vehicle refuel point and began improving the EAGLE water point and F II sector of the CAMP EAGLE bunkerline. Equipment from D Company supported operations at Fire Base SPEAR, Fire Base BASCOCKE, Fire Base BIRMINGHAM, Hill 246 (CP KING), and Fire Base ARSENAL by clearing fields of fire, filling trash dumps, digging bunker slots, and building roads. An improved drainage system was installed in the CG's mess. D Company supplied two Boston Whalers to work for the 2/502nd Infantry at QUANG TRI and CAMP CARROLL. An air boat was sent to LANG CO BAY to aid in moving scout dog teams investigating suspected enemy movement along the FUE-BA NANG Railroad.

(6) During April 1971, HHC continued to furnish equipment support to the line companies of the battalion. HHC also continued maintenance of EAGLE roads by continuous scarifying and grading. 39,000 gallons of penepime were applied to the roads and heliports in the CAMP EAGLE area as a dust palliative. HHC constructed a motor park and applied 16,000 gallons of penepime as a dust palliative for the 1/1 Cav at FBU BAI. An ARA rearm point was constructed at Fire Base BIRMINGHAM and 16,000 gallons of penepime were applied as a dust palliative. The crater craters in the BIRMINGHAM airstrip were repaired. HHC also assumed responsibility for the HUONG THUY Road project and hauled and

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placed 2,100 cubic yards of select fill. A Company (-) was in direct support of the 1st Brigade at Fire Base BASILONE, Fire Base BIRMINGHAM, CP CHECK and OP KING in addition to performing combat and combat support missions in support of Operation LAMSON 720. At Fire Base BASILONE, daily minesweeps were conducted east toward Fire Base BIRMINGHAM and west toward Fire Base SEQUEL with negative findings. General engineer support of the fire base continued until 16 April 1971 when the engineer responsibility for the fire base was turned over to D Company. At Fire Base BIRMINGHAM, daily minesweeps were conducted west toward Fire Base BASILONE with negative findings. A total of 36 8' x 12' bunkers and three 10' x 24' bunkers were excavated and prepared for air movement to other locations. Five bunkers were moved and emplaced on the top of the hill and the sanitary fill was improved. On 16 April, engineer responsibility for the fire base was turned over to D Company. On 22 - 25 April, A Company supported the 1/327th Infantry staging area at the foot of Fire Base BIRMINGHAM by applying 4,800 gallons of petroleum to the access roads leading into their stand-down area. On 14 April, a squad of A Company conducted a combat assault and sweep of Fire Base FURY. During the sweep, 16 Chicom grenades, 2 baseball-type grenades and one 82mm mortar round booby traps were discovered, disarmed and destroyed. On 17 April, A Company sent a reinforced squad to LA VANG to construct a TOC/briefing room for the 101st Airborne Division (Ambl) forward operations during LAMSON 720. They completed this high priority task in less than 24 hours from the initial warning order. A Company constructed several LZs in the 1st Brigade AO during April and participated in several combat patrols in support of the 1/37th Infantry and 2/502nd Infantry. On these patrols in the A SHAU VALLEY antitank mines were emplaced at selected sites in an effort to harass the NVA using Route 548 as a resupply route. A Company supported the 1st Brigade headquarters at CAMP EAGLE by maintaining portions of the bunkerline, rehabilitating SEA nuts and constructing revetments. During the first week of April, B Company continued in support of the 3rd Brigade at MAI LOC, CAMP CARROLL, Fire Base THUNDERBIRD II and Fire Base VANDERSHIFT. Fortifications were constantly improved until all forces withdrew on 10 April. On 10 April, two squads were relieved at Fire Base GLADIATOR to provide engineer support for 1/506th Infantry operations and fire base maintenance. An M-450 and backhoe were employed to excavate four culvert bunkers and to clear a lower hill for a 155mm artillery battery. Also, on 10 April, E Company dispatched a squad to Fire Base KATHRYN to provide engineer support for 2/506th Infantry operations and fire base maintenance. An M-450 was employed to level an area for a 155mm artillery battery and the engineers assisted in bunker repair and installation of perimeter wire. F Company supported CAMP EVANS units with general engineer support and by maintaining the interior road network. B Company also supported 2/502nd Infantry operating

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out of Fire Base JACK by performing fire base maintenance and combat operations during LAMSON 720. During April, C Company (-) was in direct support of the 2nd Brigade at Fire Bases BRICK TOMAHAWK, ANKIE, NORMANDY, BRICK, RIFLE, and conducted combat support missions in the AO. In early April, the decision was reached to construct Fire Base RIFLE and abandon Fire Base BRICK. While support continued at Fire Base BRICK, plans were made to open Route QL-19 to Fire Base RIFLE and conduct deliberate construction of the fire base. On 10 April, Route QL-19 was opened and a platoon was inserted on Fire Base RIFLE. Simultaneously, these two construction forces began operations to clear and level the fire base and upgrade Route QL-19. Twenty-five culverts were installed, the road widened utilizing D-7 bulldozer blade and Rome plow dozers and grades lowered utilizing MFS-100 scrapers. At Fire Base RIFLE, the hill was leveled, artillery positions and bunker positions staked out and excavated. During April, C Company continued to improve the THU THU Road by hauling fill to improve bridge approaches. Prior to being relieved of responsibility for constructing the HUONG THUY Road on 10 April, C Company hauled 1,100 cubic yards of select fill to extend the road 80 meters. Upon change of units on Fire Base NORMANDY, new requirements were received and C Company employed an M-450 and a squad to excavate for ammunition dumps, trash dumps, for an alternate TOC bunker and for sleeping bunkers. The THU BAI interior and perimeter roads were continuously upgraded by C Company. Additionally, 11,000 gallons of petroleum/diesel mixture were applied to these roads as a dust palliative. Several LZs were constructed in the 2nd Brigade AO and one LZ (LZ TALON) was expanded to accommodate a battery of 105mm howitzers. On 5 April 1971 as KHE SANH was being vacated by American and ARVN units, a platoon (-) from Company C augmented with four M-450 dozers was airlifted into KHE SANH to assist in closing the base. Upon arriving at KHE SANH, the platoon began operations under the direction of Division Support Command. Non-salvageable equipment was buried, bunkers and munitions were destroyed. The entire force was extracted on 6 April 1971, thus terminating all 226th Engineer Battalion support at KHE SANH. During April, D Company (Provisional) furnished equipment support to the battalion and executed assigned projects at Fire Base BASTOGNE, Fire Base BIRMINGHAM, LANG CO BAY, CAMP EAGLE, THU BAI and LA VANG. D Company improved the CAMP EAGLE bunkerline by grading and shaping the perimeter road and constructing fighting positions. Extensive repairs were accomplished at the CAMP EAGLE water point by improving drainage and reshaping the entire truck park. The VII quarters at THU BAI were extensively renovated during April. D Company supplied air boats and Boston whalers to LANG CO BAY TO support the scout dog team utilized to secure the railroad in that area. A Boston whaler was employed at the POHL Bridge to patrol the Perfume River. On 16 April, D Company assumed fire base maintenance responsibility of Fire Base BASTOGNE and Fire Base BIRMINGHAM from A Company. D Company supported the

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Division forward at LA VANG during LAMSON 720 by constructing showers, latrines, mess facilities and conducting general engineer support. D Company was also responsible for supplying power to CAMP TITIVU within CAMP PAULE Combat Base by operating and maintaining the electric generators.

m. Air Cavalry Operations.

(1) A Troop.

(a) The mission of Troop A during November and December was to provide visual reconnaissance in the 2/17th Cavalry reconnaissance zones. It also provided reconnaissance and security for the 3rd Brigade of the 101st Airborne Division (Abn) and its subordinate elements in the form of first and last light reconnaissance and reaction to contact missions. The Aero Rifle Platoon secured downed aircraft in the 101st Airborne Division's northern area of operations. On 6 November 1970 Troop A was given the mission to conduct a visual reconnaissance in the vicinity of Fire Bases KATH, HUNTO, and RUDLEY. During the morning, the ARPs were inserted to secure a downed aircraft at coordinates XD928434. During a visual recon of Area 7 a UH-1H chopper aircraft received 8-10 rounds of .51 caliber fire with negative hits. While engaging this area a total of 110-130 rounds of AK fire was received with negative hits. Numerous trails were spotted in the vicinity of coordinates YD241132 with recent activity in the past 24-48 hours. Footprints of 2 to 3 personnel at coordinates YD241144 were observed with recent activity in the last 24 hours. In a 2 grid square area around YD230120 three hootches and 16 bunkers with signs of recent activity in the past 12-24 hours were observed. On 14 November the missions for Troop A began with visual recons in recon zone 7. Two .51 caliber hits, 10 bunkers, 3 trails, and several hootches were observed at coordinates YD148663. At coordinates YD150070, 25 hootches were observed in a 100 meter square. While conducting reconnaissance of the area at coordinates YD151055 a light observation helicopter took 20 to 30 rounds of AK-47 fire. The pilot was hit in the hand and the aircraft was flown back to KATH TRI. At coordinates XD862287 two big, reinforced bunkers, and numerous footprints were spotted. At coordinates YD151055 a gunship was fired at by both AK-47 and .51 caliber weapons. A FAC was on station to engage the target where the aircraft was fired on. Air strikes were placed on the target with unknown results. On 15 November a team from Troop A observed a 3/4-ton truck at coordinates YD205074. The truck was engaged and destroyed, and the aircraft received 10 rounds of .51 caliber fire with negative hits. Also at this location 5 to 7 bunkers were destroyed. An 8' x 8' bunker at coordinates XD923235 was observed and engaged with unknown results. AK-47 fire was received at coordinates YD15107 and XD923235 by light observation helicopter. On 26 November Troop A began

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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobiles), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RGS GFFOR-65 (R3) (U)

a five day stand-down. During the stand-down period, time was allocated for proficiency check rides and instrument training. Major emphasis was placed on aircraft maintenance to insure maximum combat-ready aircraft at the termination of the stand-down. Final emphasis was placed on the maintenance of aircraft, the conducting of proficiency check rides, and police of the area.

(b) During December, A Troop provided visual reconnaissance in the 2/17th Cavalry reconnaissance zones. It also provided reconnaissance and security for the 3rd Brigade of the 101st Airborne Division (Amb1) and its subordinate elements in the form of first and last light reconnaissance and reaction to contact missions. Due to high winds and heavy rains, operations in the recon zones declined during the reporting period. Teams for L Company (Ranger) were sent to Troop A to be placed in the recon zones. Troop A supplied overflights, insertions, reaction forces, and extractions for the 101st Airborne Division's northern area of operations. Missions in support of ARVN located in the vicinity of Fire Base BARABARA were also performed by Troop A.

(c) During January Troop A participated in the JEFFERSON GIEN operations in general support of the 101st Airborne Division (Amb1). 1-2 January, inclement weather prevented combat operations in the AO. On 3 January, VR of RT 616 showed signs of heavy truck traffic. Gunships received 12.7mm anti-aircraft fire at XD910243. One aircraft was hit and suffered minor damage. On 4-5 January, inclement weather prevented combat operations in the AO. On 9-16 January, Troop A performed visual reconnaissance in the AO with emphasis on Route 616. Active 12.7mm pits were observed and entered. TAC AIR and Artillery were called in on bunkers. On 16-21 January, Troop A worked in close support with TAC AIR, ARA and Artillery to destroy bunkers, cache sites, tunnels and spider holes along Route 616. On 22-23 January, inclement weather prevented combat operations in the AO. On 25 January, several sensor strings were activated and were visually checked for activity. On 26-28 January, inclement weather prevented combat operations in the AO. On 30 January, Troop A performed mission of flank security for 1/5th Mech in KHE SANH area of operations. A downed LCH from F Troop 8th Cavalry was secured and rigged for extraction. On 31 January, Troop A provided security for units in KHE SANH and SHEPPARD areas of operations. RDA's of Arc Lights were completed with satisfactory results noted.

(d) On 2-3 February, Troop A conducted VR of Route 616, extracted two Ranger teams and inserted two others. Troop D was inserted to accomplish ground reconnaissance of Route 616. On 4 February, Troop A ARP was inserted into KHE SANH Combat Base, to secure the arrival of Troop D and Squadron HQ. On 4-7 February bad weather precluded normal operations. On 8 February, Troop A crossed the LAOTIAN border. Aircraft reported taking fire with three aircraft reporting hits (The aircraft were reported flyable). On 10 February the troop worked the area west of KHE SANH utilizing FAC and ARA. A LCH and AR-16 were shot down. The crews were extracted. Seven MIA were KHF on that date. On 12-17 February, Troop A supported ARVN ground elements operating in LAOS. Troop A worked with FAC controlled TAC AIR, ARA and its organic gunships to suppress enemy anti-aircraft fire, while teams con-

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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division
(Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, HQS COMBAT-65 (R3) (U)

tinued their missions of VR for the ground forces. Approximately 16 NVA were KEB. On 18-25 February, Troop A was engaged in its assigned missions of VR and close screen to the ground forces. Weather during this period frequently delayed missions until 1100-1200 hours. On 26 February, Troop A had visual sightings of enemy armor. Two active tanks were sighted, and an AH-1G received 15 hits in the process of flying VR in the vicinity of LZ 31. On 27-28 February, Troop A alternated with Troop C and the Squadron Headquarters Company as CSC to recover an LCH that had been shot down Vic XD6225. Three 12.7mm anti-aircraft weapons were located in the area.

(e) On 1 March the troop employed airstrikes against known and suspected enemy locations. On 2-3 March, inclement weather prevented combat operations. On 4-6 March, A Troop supported ARVN bases at LZ SONIA and LZ VICTORY, and employed TAC AB and Artillery on known positions. On 6 March, the Mac Bao was inserted to secure a downed crew at XD478409. On 7 March, the Mac Bao and the downed crew were extracted under heavy 12.7mm anti-aircraft fire from three weapons. One AH-1G received 4 hits and returned to base where it was determined to be non flyable. A truck (5 ton) was destroyed and a bulldozer was spotted. The area was marked for a FAC. On 8-10 March inclement weather prevented combat operations. On 11 March, Troop A conducted a VR of LZ ALDOTI, LZ TRAWO, LZ ALHAI, and LZ FUMEL to determine conditions. Five 2 1/2 ton trucks were sighted and marked for a FAC. On 12-13 March, Troop A's mission was to conduct VR and screen Vic LZ SONIA. On 14-15 March, inclement weather prevented combat operations. On 16-22 March, Troop A supported the 1st Infantry Division (ARVN) in the vicinity of LZ ERUM with heavy teams. Air strikes were employed and remaining targets were turned over to the FAC on station. During this period an AH-1G was shot down by small arms fire near XD432405. The crew was extracted. Tanks were sighted on 19 March and were marked for the FAC. On 24 March, A Troop continued support to 1st Infantry Division (ARVN) with heavy Cavalry teams. Marginal weather on 25 March prevented working in the AO until 1200 hours. Route recon of 616 revealed no significant spots and no traffic during the past three days. On 26-28 March, Troop A performed its visual recon role in the Laotian and Vietnamese Salient areas to spot possible targets of opportunity. Heavy small arms fire was received throughout the area of interest. On 29-30 March, Troop A supported insertions of ARVN's near XD4302 and performed VR in Laotian Salient.

(f) On 1-5 April, Troop A conducted visual reconnaissance in the Vietnamese and Laotian Salient areas. Emphasis was placed on Route 616 and by-passes. On 6 April, Troop A spent the early day in visual reconnaissance of routes of approach, departure, and planned LZ's for the insertion of the Mac Bao. TAC AB was employed. Troop A screened ahead

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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division
(Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RGS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

of the advancing ground forces after insertion. On 7-9 April, Troop A supported the 3rd Brigade in the Vic of VAIDHAGHIFT and VAI LOC. On 10-13 April, inclement weather caused mission delays. Troop A, however, worked in the Vic of Fire Base GLADLAND, observing light trail traffic. In the Vic of Fire Base CURIELLY Troop A observed light foot traffic. Gunships received heavy small arms fire. One AH-1G was downed, crashed-landed in a field. On 12 April inclement weather prevented combat operations in the AC. On 13-15 April, Troop A worked the recon zones with emphasis on Route 616 from Fire Base LAMHETHECK to Fire Base SHILOH. Small amounts of traffic were observed and teams continued to receive 12.7mm and small arms fire. On 16 April, Teams observed old bunkers and trails but no recent activity Vic YD128219. On 17-18 April, Teams were given the priority mission of screening the HUE Rocket Belt. On 19 April, Troop A supported the 258th Vietnamese Marines in their insertion near HOLCOMB. Throughout the area 12.7mm fire was received. On 22-23 April, Teams worked in support of the 258th VMC in the Vic of Fire Base SHILOH and TUN TAVERN. Support was also rendered to the 54th ARVN Regiment Vic Fire Base BARNETT. A team observed 50-55 bunkers, two NVA, light foot traffic. On 24 April, Teams observed 3 bunkers under construction at YD005297 and 1 NVA was seen. Bulldozers had been working on Route 616 by-passing bomb craters. Bunkers observed had a spacing of approximately 50 meters. On 25-26 April, Troop A worked with TAC and TAC AER to support the Hoi Bao raid. On 27-28 April, Teams returned to visual reconnaissance in the Division Recon Zone. TAC AER was employed in the Vic YD095204 against a bunker complex. On 29-30 April, Troop A supported the FAC TAO raid and continued its visual reconnaissance responsibilities.

(2) B Troop.

(a) During November, B Troop was used in general support of the 101st Airborne Division (Amb) and worked closely with the 1st Brigade. Their primary mission was to gather intelligence through visual reconnaissance missions. Secondary missions included downed aircraft security in the division's area of operation, bomb damage assessments for B-52 strikes, sky spots, and artillery. On 1-7 November B Troop worked with elements of the 1st Brigade around the THREE FORNS area (YD5012). Their specific mission was to determine the size, location, and movement of enemy forces that made contact with friendly infantry units. On 8-14 November the poor flying weather hampered B Troop's attempts to support the Rangers. On the 13th, the weather lifted enough to insert team Billis. On 16 November Billis had contact with an unknown size enemy force. Two members of the team were wounded in the action. B Troop tried to extract the men but were driven off by enemy fire. In the action three UH-1H helicopters of B Troop received combat damage. From that time B Troop

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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division
(Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSICR-65 (R3) (U)

Troop B ARP was inserted on the site and the aircraft and crew were extracted. The second was shot down in the A SHAU VALLEY by 12.7mm antiaircraft fire. The aircraft was destroyed, and the crew are listed as MIA. From 11-14 February, Troop B worked the division reconnaissance zone detecting enemy truck traffic and destroying a truck and bulldozer. On 15 February, a UH-1H on a night Ranger extraction crashed resulting in seven US KIA. From 19-20 February, Troop B supported Ranger teams, and continued visual reconnaissance in the reconnaissance zone. On 21 February, an AH-1G in direct support of a Ranger contact fired too close to friendly troops, resulting in one KIA and two MIA. On 25 February, Troop B extracted a Ranger team with a POW Vic YD719901. From 26-27 February, Troop B secured the extraction of two aircraft in the vicinity of YD719901 and YD931132. On 28 February, Troop B conducted visual reconnaissance in the Division reconnaissance zone mapping enemy infiltration routes and directing air strikes in the A SHAU VALLEY.

(e) On 1-31 March, Troop B worked in the Division reconnaissance zone conducting visual reconnaissance, checking sensor activations and URS reports. During 5-6 March, Troop B ARP secured a downed AH-1G at YD865211 and a UH-1H at YD391261. On 13 March, an LCH received an unknown amount of 12.7mm antiaircraft and SAF in the Vic of YD189129. The aircraft crashed and burned resulting in two US KIA. During the period 14-17 March, Troop B ARP secured a downed UH-1H at YC127143, and an AH-1G at YD357472. On 22 March, Troop B ARP secured a downed AH-1G at YD961162. On 24 March, Troop B extracted Ranger teams 19s and 19w when the teams made contact. On 30 March, Troop B ARP was inserted at YD513031 to reinforce Ranger team 19s in the capture of 2 NVA POWs. During the entire reporting period, additional missions included FMA of airstrikes and Arc Lights and limited ground reconnaissance.

(f) On 1 April, B Troop ARP was inserted on Fire Base WOLHUL to secure and recover an AH-1G. Both the aircraft and the crew were recovered. On 2 April, B Troop extracted a Ranger team in contact. The team was then used to secure a B Troop LCH on Fire Base REMDEYVOUS. Both the aircraft and the crew were recovered. On 4 April, a B Troop UH-1H on medevac mission vicinity YD552017 received intense SAF resulting in one US KIA. On 6 April, a B Troop UH-1H carrying Rangers to attempt a body snatch vicinity YC451960 received intense SA and MG fire resulting in 1 US KIA and 3 MIA. On 10 April the ARP secured a B Troop UH-1H (CAC) on Fire Base REMDEYVOUS where it landed after receiving one 37mm hit west of Fire Base EPSVING, resulting in one US KIA. On 13 April, the ARP secured and recovered a B Troop LCH shot down vicinity of AT837928. For the remainder of the month, B Troop operated in the reconnaissance zones and provided support for Company L (Ranger), 75th Infantry. On 23 April, a B Troop UH-1H was shot down in the vicinity of YC479007 while attempting to reinforce a Ranger team in contact, resulting in 1 US KIA and 2 US MIA. The aircraft was not recovered.

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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division
(Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1968, LRS AFPM-65 (23) (7)

(3) C Troop.

(a) During November, Troop C supported the 101st Airborne Division in general support of the Division. This included aerial WIA, KIA, and reconnaissance and Ranger support. In addition, the ACP was on duty for downed aircraft in the Division area. Due to the weather at this season, there was little air and reconnaissance activity during the first portion of the reporting period. On 13 and 14 November, the ACP and a team of engineers were inserted to clear Mine Base MILLER, MILLER and VARNER. A number of 155mm rounds, fragmentation grenades and blasting caps were discovered and were destroyed. The ACP and elements of Delta Troop were inserted just south of Mine Base WARREN. The ACP, in an attempt to recover the Ranger KIA, received RIG and A1-47 fire resulting in six wounded and another Ranger KIA. Due to extremely poor weather conditions, the wounded were unable to be extracted that day. On the following day, 17 November, extraction of the critically wounded was aided by an LCH under heavy AK and 50 caliber fire. On 18 November, an unsuccessful attempt, due to weather restrictions, was made to extract the ground elements. In the rescue attempt one CAC, one COW, and one LCH received heavy AK fire, 50 caliber, and five RPG rounds. The next day, 19 November, the ACP and other ground elements started to move by foot towards Mine Base CANTON. In an attempt to make radio contact with the ground elements, one CAC took two RPG rounds and one LCH with pilot and crew member crashed into a mountain side killing both of them. On 20 November the element was able to be extracted, along with the remains of the LCH crew.

(b) During December, operations involving C Troop were significantly hampered by the northeast monsoon weather conditions. A short break in the weather allowed them to work in the northern end of the A SUAN VALLEY in the vicinity of Tiger Mountain. On 11 December, the ACP moved to on Mine Base WUSHEL while D Troop was inserted by MH-48 helicopters in the vicinity of ALUI airstrip. D Troop destroyed bridges that had been spotted earlier by LCH working in that area. During the next few days increasing enemy activity was noted in the northern valley and the surrounding areas. On frequent occasions observation aircraft came under enemy small arms fire, however, Hawk Teams worked the area with considerable success. Enemy bunkers, fighting positions, bridges, and huts were destroyed. A number of the enemy were WIA. On 16 December, a LCH on an AIA mission was shot down by enemy 50 caliber fire. The crew was uninjured and immediately picked up by the MH-48, chase aircraft. On the night of 19 December this same general area was worked by FLIP. Hitting a number of the enemy in the open, FLIP engaged and was credited with 17 enemy WIA. During this period FLIP was also utilized in the day-light hours, accompanying the regular missions. In the reporting period, FLIP accounted for a large percentage of the enemy KIA credited to the Troop.

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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division
(Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, MOS CSFGR-85 (R3) (U)

(c) During the 1-31 January reporting period, Troop C staged from PHU BAI Army Airfield, in general support of the 101st Airborne Division (Amb), with a primary mission of intelligence gathering through visual reconnaissance. From 1-10 January, monsoon weather prohibited extensive reconnaissance of the Division reconnaissance zone. The period from 11-30 January, was marked by improving weather which enabled Troop C to continue the visual reconnaissance of the division reconnaissance zone. A heavy increase in enemy activity was noted during this period around the ALBUH airstrip and west of Tiger Mountain. An estimated NVA Company was pinpointed. A "Cavalry Coltra" raid was launched and a BDA in the fifteen foot high elephant grass revealed 3 NVA KBH. It is felt that better results were obtained than those indicated by the BDA, as the team was able to silence rather intense fire in the area. During this period Troop C reacted with its Aero Rifle Platoon to five downed aircraft. Additionally Troop C supported three Ranger Teams in contact.

(d) From 1-4 February Troop C staged from PHU BAI Airfield. From 5-28 February, it staged from KHE SAMH Combat Base. On 8 February, 0743 hours the Troop C commander, MAJ James C. Newman led the first heavy Cavalry team into LAM in support of the Vietnamese Rangers. On 12 February, Troop C lost two AH-1Gs to hostile fire on the LAOTIAN border. One crew was listed as MIA. The second crew was extracted. The area of the contact was engaged by Artillery, TAC AIR, and one F-4D strike. The remainder of the month of February was devoted screening for extraction of Vietnamese Ranger fire bases and working fire bases 30 and 31.

(e) From 1-31 March, Troop C staged out of KHE SAMH Combat Base in general support of LAMSON 719. During this period Troop C ARP hunted a portion of the KHE SAMH perimeter. The movement of ARVN forces enabled the Troop to resume its full time job of visual recon. Troop C was assigned a reconnaissance zone that extended westward to COMBAT 12 and to the north of Highway 9. After the ground objectives had been reached and with rain began, Troop C began close support by screening LZs and reconnaissance of flight routes. The Troop also acted in a resupply capacity on occasion during this period.

(f) April saw the end of LAMSON 719, with Troop C performing missions in support of the final phases of the operation. Returning to PHU BAI, all efforts were again concentrated on the CHAU VALLEY and the infiltration routes along the LAOTIAN border. Heavy attack teams once again employed their organic fire power along with artillery and air support against suspected enemy locations in and around Base Area 611. Often forced to work without a LZ because of hostile fire, the effectiveness of the visual reconnaissance was greatly reduced. Support of Delta Troop operations in the Valley raised morale and gave the troops

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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 1st Airborne Division
(Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RGS OPR-65 (R3) (C)

a sense of accomplishment. Other daily missions included reconnaissance of the HUE-SHU BAI Rocket Belt, convey escorts, and support of the 1st Brigade.

(4) D Troop.

(a) During the last two months of 1970, Delta Troop provided ground reconnaissance, downed aircraft security, and reaction force for units in contact. Additionally, the troop provided ambushes and sweeps outside CAMP ENGLE and served as the base defense reaction force. During the period 1-28 January, Troop D performed its assigned missions of QUANG TRI Reaction Force, Perimeter Defense and acted as immediate reaction force with Troop (-) for all insertions of any Squadron Aero Rifle Platoon. From 1-4 January, overflights of the perimeter defenses were made to discover possible enemy routes of infiltration and possible ambush sites. Reports submitted covering this activity indicated areas of requiring improvement. On 28 January, a warning order for movement to QUANG TRI was issued. On 2 February, Troop D made a contact assault in the vicinity of XD854238, to conduct a ground bomb damage assessment (GBA) and a ground reconnaissance of the surrounding area that had been tentatively identified as a NVA headquarters complex. The Troop was extracted at 031500 hours at XD854238 and XD85430, with the PZs were given. On 4 February, Troop D moved to HUE SANH Combat Base in support of LAMSON 019; Headquarters (-) by convey and two platoons by air. From 5-14 February, Troop D hardened the perimeter defenses. Bunkers, fighting positions and overhead cover were given priority. On 15 February, Troop D was given the responsibility of security for the rearm/refuel point at DUE CON, XD34,368, and at this time assumed control of the aero rifle platoons of the assigned and HQ 1st Air Cavalry troops. Ambush and sweep operations in the squadron AO were accomplished as part of the perimeter defense plan through 14 March.

(b) On 15 March, the HUE SANH Combat Base began to receive daily artillery attacks by NVA 120mm field guns. On 23 March, at 0830 hours, Troop D repulsed a Sapper attack by the 2nd Company 15th NVA Engineer Battalion. The 40 man attack, supported by indirect fire, 60mm mortars and RPGs, penetrated the 3rd Platoon position in an attempt to reach the airfield PZ and rearm points. The enemy broke contact at 0945 hours. A first light check revealed 14 NVA KIA, 1 PZ, 9 AK-47s, 3 RPG launchers and one 9mm pistol captured along with numerous small arms ammunition and demolition equipment. US losses were 3 KIA, 5 NVA major, 13 NVA minor. On 27 March, Troop D was given the order to return to QUANG TRI. From 28 March until the end of the reporting period Troop D acted as the squadron reaction force for downed aircraft and crew security.

(c) During the month of April 1971, Delta Troop provided ground reconnaissance, downed aircraft security, reaction force for the division and a reaction force for units in contact. Additionally, Delta Troop

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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 1st Airborne Division
(Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971. HQ 100X-65 (H3) (U)

provided base security for A section on the KHE SAH perimeter. Delta Troop secured two downed aircraft in A SHAU VALLEY, reinforced a Ranger team in contact in A SHAU VALLEY, inserted and provided diversion for two Ranger platoon size ambushes in A SHAU VALLEY, conducted three days of ground reconnaissance in A SHAU VALLEY, twenty-nine days of base defense position force for CAMP EAGLE, and a sweep of the KHE SAH perimeter. After returning from KHE SAH on 2 April, Delta Troop began a week of stand-down training from 4-10 April. On 15 April the troop was inserted in the A SHAU VALLEY at coordinates YC451947. Delta Troop's mission was to provide security and diversion for a Ranger platoon stay behind ambush of Route 548. The troop also performed ground reconnaissance of 3 1/2 kilometers of Route 548. D Troop found signs of recent vehicular traffic on the road as well as six 6 x 8 ft. bunkers which faced the road. The troop was extracted late on the afternoon of the 15th at grid YC482898. On 20 April the troop was again inserted in the A SHAU VALLEY at grid YC456903. The mission of the troop was to insert a Ranger platoon stay behind ambush, provide a diversion for the Ranger platoon movement to their ambush site and to make ground reconnaissance of the western side of the A SHAU VALLEY between YC464908 and YC457900. The troop found very few signs of recent activity. There were 6 to 10 ft. in the area which had been used within 48 to 72 hours, but they revealed no clue as to what might have passed on them. A quantity of communication wire was found, but it had been previously cut in frequent intervals and showed no signs of repair. The troop was extracted from the ship LZ at YC462904. On 21 April the troop was once again inserted in the A SHAU VALLEY at YC484904 in response to a Ranger team in a contact and two downed helicopters, one of which was a medivac. The troop was inserted north of the downed aircraft and moved south to make the pick up. Approximately 150 to 200 meters from the air LZ the lead element of the troop came under enemy RPG, small arms fire and Chicom grenades. The platoon maneuvered to react to the threat and to pick up survivors of the Ranger team. The contact on the 21st lasted approximately six hours and resulted in 6 friendly KIA, 14 WIA, one unknown enemy KIA by small arms fire, 11 enemy KIA by aircraft and an unknown number of enemy WIA. After the extraction of three US from the downed medivac helicopters, the troops withdrew approximately 400 meters north to establish an ADP, medivac landed, and be reinforced by another company. The reinforcement was accomplished that night and in the morning the elements moved back to the contact point to attempt to extract the remaining US personnel. The WIA had withdrawn the majority of their forces during the night. The next morning fire was received from only one location. The enemy fire was eliminated but no WIA were found in the vicinity. The extraction of the troop was made at YC486914.

(5) Company L (Ranger), 75th Infantry.

(a) During the month of November a total of thirteen Ranger teams were deployed in the 1st Airborne Division (Airmobile) Area of Operations. Emphasis was on reconnaissance and Fire Forces LINDY and WATERS. No enemy contacts were initiated. The contact initiated on 16 November by Ranger Team "Bills" provided the needed intelligence for establishing the location of the 1st Battalion, 603rd NVA Regiment. Due to incident

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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 1st Airborne Division
(Airborne), Period Ending 30 April 1970, G-3, 11-11-70 (11)

(f) During the month of April, the Division employed a total of twenty-nine Ranger teams. From 1 April to 30 April, eight Ranger teams were employed in the SPUR Valley region for the mission of reconnaissance. One other enemy was killed. From 10-23 April emphasis was placed on the A-1 VALLEY region in the form of platoon and company raids to include ambushes. During the month, a well-used bridge.

n. Artillery.

(1) The 101st Airborne Division Artillery (A-101) provided close and continuous fire support to division maneuver units participating in Operations JEFFERSON GLEN/AMBOON PLAN 70, LA SON 719, and LA SON 720. The 2nd Battalion (A-101), 319th Artillery (105mm) provided direct support to the 3rd Brigade; the 2nd Battalion (A-101), 320th Artillery (105mm) provided direct support to the 1st Brigade; the 1st Battalion (A-101) 321st Artillery (105mm) provided direct support to the 2nd Brigade. In addition, the 3rd Battalion (A-101), 10th Artillery (155mm) and the 4th Battalion (Aerial Artillery), 77th Artillery provided general support to the division.

(2) During the months of November and December, Division Artillery units were positioned to support the JEFFERSON GLEN/AMBOON PLAN 70. The majority of the fire bases were accessible by road which insured an adequate stockpile of ammunition regardless of the weather. During November one unit more was conducted. One raid was conducted by moving to a forward fire base, expending on predetermined targets and extracting before dark. A total of 82,049 artillery rounds and 10,910 aerial artillery rockets were expended during the month of November. In November the 4 millionth round was fired supporting division forces since their arrival in Vietnam. During December two artillery raids were conducted and 95,965 artillery rounds and 15,145 rockets were expended.

(3) During January flying conditions improved and maneuver units operated deeper into the jungle canopy. To support these operations six artillery units were repositioned and 85,221 artillery rounds and 21,260 rockets were expended.

(4) During February and March the Division Artillery supported all phases of Operation LA SON 719 while continuing to support Operation JEFFERSON GLEN/AMBOON PLAN 70. In addition, the Division Artillery was responsible for fire support coordination in the defense of KHE SANH and LA SON 720 areas. The Division Artillery established a forward operations center at CAMP ROBERTS, QUANG TRI; an Air Warning Control Center at BONG BA Combat Base to assure the testing of artillery and air strike warning data for Eastern QUANG TRI Province, and Battery A, 4th Battalion (A-101), 77th Artillery established a forward location at KHE SANH. On 6 February 1971 the 2nd Battalion, 320th Artillery deployed a headquarters element to a position near the eastern DMZ area. An artillery battalion radio net was established as part of a deception operation. The element a

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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RGN CGFGR-65 (R3) (U)

deployed to CAMP EAGLE on 13 February. On 25 February the 2nd Battalion, 319th Artillery deployed to QUANG TRI Province to provide direct support to the 3rd Brigade. In addition, Battery C (-), 2nd Battalion, 11th Artillery was placed OCON to 2nd Battalion, 319th Artillery to provide 155mm artillery support. On 3 March the Division Artillery assumed operational control of the 5th Infantry Division (Mech); the 6th Battalion (-), 11th Artillery (two 155mm howitzer batteries), direct support artillery for the 11th Brigade, 23rd Infantry Division; and the 1st Battalion, 82nd Artillery (155mm), 23rd Division, general support artillery. Division Artillery units made seventeen moves during February and expended 104,716 artillery rounds. A total of fifteen unit moves were completed during March and 118,366 artillery rounds were expended in support of division maneuver units.

(5) The 4th Battalion (ARA), 77th Artillery provided extensive support to ARVN forces participating in LAMSON 719 while continuing to support all 101st Airborne Division (Amb) operations. During the months of February and March the unit flew 7,365 sorties, expended 69,975 rockets and were credited with 1,147 enemy KIA. The vast majority of the expenditures and enemy KIA's were as a result of direct support to ARVN forces operating in LACE.

(6) On 7 April the 6th Battalion (-), 11th Artillery and 1st Battalion, 82nd Artillery were released from their OCON status and redeployed to the 101st Airborne Division (Amb) area. The 5th Battalion, 4th Artillery returned to its parent organization on 8 April and at that time assumed responsibility for artillery fires in QUANG TRI Province. All 101st Airborne Division Artillery elements departed QUANG TRI Province and were repositioned in the division area of operations by 10 April. During the remainder of the month Division Artillery forces supported operation LAMSON 720 and continued to support operation JEFFERSON GLEN/ WENSON PLAN 70. During April, twenty-six artillery moves were completed and 105,756 artillery rounds and 21,837 rockets were expended.

(7) During the entire period the 1st Battalion, 83rd Artillery, 108th Artillery Group provided the division with 8 inch howitzer and 175mm gun artillery support. The battalion had a mission of general support - reinforcing the 101st Airborne Division Artillery.

(8) Division Artillery units were repositioned during the reporting period as listed below:

DATE	UNIT	FROM	TO
10 Nov	A/2-320	Veghel	Birmingham
4 Jan	B/2-320	Eagle	Birmingham
4 Jan	B/2-320	Birmingham	Eagle
8 Jan	A/2-319	Rakkasan	Evans
8 Jan	C/2-319	Evans	Rakkasan
28 Jan	B/2-320	Eagle	Veghel
30 Jan	B/2-11	Veghel	Zon
4 Feb	B(-)/2-11	Zon	Veghel

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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 1st Airborne Division
(Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, ACS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

DATE	UNIT	FROM	TO
8 Feb	B(-)/2-11	Voghel	Bastogne
8 Feb	C(-)/2-11	Brick	Arsenal
10 Feb	B(-)/2-11	Bastogne	Anzio
11 Feb	B(-)/2-11	Bastogne	Zon
12 Feb	A/2-320	Birmingham	Rendezvous
16 Feb	C(-)/2-11	Brick	Arsenal
22 Feb	A/2-320	Rendezvous	Normandy
23 Feb	B(-)/2-11	Zon	Normandy
24 Feb	B/2-320	Voghel	Eagle
25 Feb	A/2-319	Evans	Mai Loc
25 Feb	B(-)/2-11	Anzio	Bastogne
26 Feb	B/2-320	Eagle	Jack
26 Feb	B/2-319	Jack	Evans
27 Feb	B/2-319	Evans	A-2
28 Feb	C(-)/2-11	Eagle	Mai Loc
28 Feb	C(-)/2-11	Brick	Eagle
1 Mar	C/2-319	Rakkasan	Carroll
1 Mar	C(-)/1-321	Los Banos	Hu Bai
2 Mar	D/2-320	Birmingham	Rakkasan
2 Mar	C(-)/1-321	Hu Bai	Eagle
4 Mar	C(-)/2-11	Tomhawk	Brick
4 Mar	B/2-319	A-2	Anne
16 Mar	A/2-319	Mai Loc	YD742441
19 Mar	A(-)/2-320	Normandy	Spear
19 Mar	A/2-319	YD742441	Mai Loc
20 Mar	A(-)/2-11	Rakkasan	Evans
21 Mar	B(-)/2-11	Bastogne	Kathryn
21 Mar	A/2-319	Mai Loc	Serge
23 Mar	A(-)/2-320	Spear	Normandy
24 Mar	A/1-321	Arsenal	Eagle
27 Mar	A(-)/1-321	Eagle	Blitz
1 Apr	A(-)/2-11	Evans	Bastogne
2 Apr	A(-)/1-321	Blitz	Spear
3 Apr	A(-)/1-321	Eagle	Spear
8 Apr	D/2-320	Rakkasan	Eagle
8 Apr	B/2-319	Anne	Rakkasan
8 Apr	B/2-320	Evans	Jack
8 Apr	C/2-320	Carroll	Evans
9 Apr	D/2-320	Eagle	Bastogne
9 Apr	A/2-319	Serge	Evans
9 Apr	A/1-321	Spear	Hu Bai
10 Apr	C(-)/2-11	Mai Loc	Bastogne
10 Apr	A(-)/2-11	Bastogne	Evans
11 Apr	A/2-319	Evans	Gladiator
11 Apr	B(-)/2-11	Normandy	Kathryn

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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division
(Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, HQ GCMR-45 (R3) (U)

<u>DATE</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>TO</u>
17 Apr	A/1-321	Mac Bui	Tonkawk
18 Apr	C/1-321	Chandawk	Mac Bui
19 Apr	C/1-320	Baple	Birmingham
19 Apr	A/2-320	Hamady	Baple
21 Apr	C(-)/1-320	Birmingham	Bury
26 Apr	C/2-320	Bury	Birmingham
27 Apr	C/2-11	Baple	Mac Bui
28 Apr	A(-)/2-11	Baple	Chadwick
29 Apr	A(-)/2-11	Rakhaman	Baple
29 Apr	B/2-11	Baple	Mac Bui
29 Apr	A(-)/1-321	Chandawk	Mac Bui
30 Apr	A/2-320	Baple	Baple

(9) In addition to the tactical moves listed above, the Division Artillery conducted six artillery raids during the period to exploit current intelligence. The raids were conducted by units to forward fire base, expanding on predetermined targets and extending to forward base. Raids were conducted as indicated below:

<u>DATE</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>TO</u>
10 Nov	D/2-320	Baple	Yaphel
18 Dec	D/2-320	Baple	Baple
19 Dec	A/2-320	Birmingham	Mac Bui
21 Jan	B/2-11	Bastogne	Hamady
29 Jan	B/2-11	Bastogne	Baple
25 Mar	D/2-32-	Rakhaman	Chadwick

(10) Cannon Artillery Ammunition Expenditures:

November	92,043
December	92,915
January	85,321
February	101,214
March	118,346
April	121,267
TOTAL	600,006

(11) Aerial Rocket Artillery Expenditures:

	<u>Section</u>	<u>Rockets Expended</u>
November	2,122	10,918
December	2,214	13,145
January	3,444	21,260
February	2,756	35,364

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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division
(Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFDR-66 (R3) (U)

March	3,609	54,611
April	2,210	31,247
TOTAL	17,722	157,127

c. Information.

(1) Public Information:

- (a) Number of hometown news releases forwarded: 2,212
- (b) Number of individual news/feature stories released to public and military media: 374
- (c) Number of individual photographic releases prepared for release to public and military media: 159
- (d) Number of correspondents provided support by the information office: 37
- (e) Coverage was prepared for 16 distinguished visitors to the division, including: Senator Ted Stevens, R-Alaska; LTC William J. McCaffrey, DCG, USAF; LTC Charles Concoran, CG, 10th ABN; Mr. James Harmond, Associate Director of Defense Systems, GAO; LTC Bong, CG, 1st ABVN Division; Miss U.S. Savings Bonds; and Stephanie Clark, Miss Black America.

(f) Special projects included command and public information support to the Miss Black America Show and a Department of the Army Special Photographic Team which visited the division to film a sequence using the 101st Airborne Division (Amb) Band as part of the DA film "The Army's Music Men".

(2) Command Information:

- (a) During the reporting period, six (6) issues of the division newspaper, "The Screaming Eagle", were published and distributed.
- (b) The initial issue of the Orientation Edition of "The Screaming Eagle" newspaper, a new yearly division command information publication, was distributed on 3 - 4 March.
- (c) An updated edition of the 101 History was distributed on 12 February.
- (d) Copy was prepared for the Winter-Spring 1971 issue of the "Pendezvous With Destiny" magazine.

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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airlobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, AOS GOF R-45 (R3) (E)

(e) Twelve taped reports were produced and released to AFVN, SAIGON, for use over AFVN radio.

(f) Color slides were taken of Infantry ROTC officers in the division and were forwarded to the Infantry School, Fort Benning, GA.

(g) Division input to "The Army Greenbook" was forwarded on 30 April 1971.

(h) The Information Office presented the Commanding General, 101st Airborne Division (Amb) with the 1st place award in the USARV Special Journalistic Achievement Awards, and the 2nd place award in the Department of the Army "Keith L. Ware Award" for special journalistic achievement. Both of these awards were for the "1969 Pictorial Review" prepared by the Information Office.

(i) Two command information fact sheets were published and distributed to division personnel:

"Heat Injuries Are Preventable" - - March 1971

"The GI Bill" - - April 1971

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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile),
Period Ending 30 April 1971, RUS: C-101-68(83)(3)

2. (C) Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluation and
Recommendations.

a. Personnel. None

b. Intelligence.

(1) Air Cavalry as Intelligence Source.

(a) Observation: During operations in Laos, the intelligence of most value was "where the enemy was not" rather than where they were. Flight routes, approach and departure lanes, flight altitudes, aircraft spacing, utilization of LiC Air and other supporting fires were determined primarily based on intelligence pertaining to antiaircraft locations rather than strictly on troop concentrations.

(b) Evaluation: Antiaircraft fire was likely to be encountered in almost any location after crossing the Laotian border. Consequently, the AHC had to plan supporting fire neutralization and suppression along the entire flight route, concentrating on the area where the lift aircraft were most vulnerable to the antiaircraft fire. The utilization of air cavalry to conduct reconnaissance of the IC/LI areas and approach/departure lanes to determine enemy troop concentrations proved extremely valuable in selecting the best avenues of approach. The timely information provided the most useful data in planning to avoid enemy concentrations during critical phases of flight.

(c) Recommendations: Employment of air cavalry for gathering current intelligence on specific areas in addition to screening of IC/LI sites is imperative during operations in a mid-intensity environment.

(2) Sensor Implant Techniques.

(a) Observation: Helicopter implant of sensors is a fast, yet accurate method of sensor implantation.

(b) Evaluation: For maximum effective use of sensors, implant points must be accurately plotted. The use of two spotters, one in the implant helicopter and one in a trail helicopter have provided greater accuracy as to the actual sensor implant point.

(c) Recommendation: That two spotters be used whenever sensors are implanted by helicopter.

c. Operations.

(1) FADAC vs Manual Computations.

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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile),
Period Ending 30 April 1971, HQ: CMAC-55(85)(U)

(a) Observation: When FADAC becomes non-operational, a great deal of difficulty has been experienced in checking FADAC data with manual equipment.

(b) Evaluation: In a "danger close" situation there is a requirement to check firing data for every round between the battery and battalion FDC, at the minimum and maximum range for a given charge. The FADAC will produce a more accurate solution than a manual solution can offer, especially when the ranges are not listed on the graphical equipment. When this situation occurs in a manual FDC, range is determined and applied to yield the solution. The FADAC will still compute the ballistic trajectory and apply all factors in determining its solution. This is impossible with the same accuracy in a manual FDC.

(c) Recommendations: When a firing element's FADAC is not operational, both the battery and battalion FDC should employ the manual solution, using all available corrections. The slight loss in accuracy is offset by elimination of delays.

(2) Detailed Planning for Future Operations.

(a) Observations: All operations, from resupply missions to multi-unit assaults, required thorough, detailed planning to be successful in the mid-intensity environment of LAMSON 719.

(b) Evaluation: With the high density and accuracy of heavy anti-aircraft fire encountered in the LAMSON 719 operation it became imperative that all flights over enemy territory be executed swiftly, precisely, and efficiently. Thorough consideration had to be given to all aspects including flight routes, approach/departure lanes, and LZ and PZ locations. All available assets were employed throughout each operation to provide adequate cover and suppression to the flight during the enroute portion, the approach and departure portion, and the loading/off-loading portion of their mission. The high risk of loss made by orbiting an LZ until it could be properly prepared was unacceptable. Returns and other methods of delaying PZ or LZ times were unacceptable due to the increased exposure time they entailed. The Air Mission Commander in all cases assessed the situation and made the final decision to go or not to go before the flight could enter the operational area. No hesitation in execution could be tolerated. Only through precise and timely execution could a mission be successfully accomplished. Detailed planning was the key to all success. All resources available were programmed and employed through each phase of all airmobile operations.

(c) Recommendations: Stress should be placed on the planning and utilization of all available assets on each and every operation in a mid-intensity environment. TAC Air, artillery, gunships and Air Force delivered screening smoke should be included and coordinated along all flight routes, PZ's and LZ's whenever possible. Thorough preparation must be demanded prior to initiating any operation in an environment such as that encountered during LAMSON 719.

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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Joint Airborne Division (Airborne),
Period Ending 30 April 1971, RGS: CMCUR-5(R3)(U)

(3) Planning for POL/Rearm points.

(a) Observation: The number of bladestrike incidents occurring at POL and Rearm areas increased considerably.

(b) Evaluation: Due to the increased tactical activity during the latter part of the reporting period, many new POL/Rearm sites had to be constructed. Although having the correct point to point distance for aircraft clearance, they lacked suitable hover areas for maneuverability. The approach and departure panels and lanes were also inadequate. The POL/Rearm points were unable to accommodate the large number of aircraft during peak periods.

(c) Recommendation: That POL/Rearm points be given priority planning before tactical operations begin to ensure adequate size and traffic control.

(4) Combat Assaults Conducted in Marginal Weather.

(a) Observation: Combat assaults conducted in marginal weather as opposed to fair weather require a far greater degree of flexibility plus considerable additional planning.

(b) Evaluation: To insure successful mission accomplishment of operations conducted in marginal weather conditions, the following areas must be emphasized:

(1) A thorough map and ground reconnaissance by the ALC, flight leads and other planning personnel is essential.

(2) Personnel and supplies should be transported by surface means as close to the LZ as possible. Maximum utilization of the aircraft can be effected with weather improvement for a short span of time.

(3) A complete, detailed air movement table will reduce briefing time and provide maximum flexibility.

(4) Continuous weather checks will insure prompt reaction to weather changes.

(c) Recommendation: Since complete planning in each of the above areas enhances the chances of a successful mission, sufficient time should be allowed to insure that detailed planning be properly formulated.

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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile),
Period Ending 30 April 1971, RGS: CDR-65(83)(U)

(5) Recovery of Downed Crews.

(a) Observation: Recovery of downed crews and aircraft must be accomplished in the most expeditious manner if they are to survive.

(b) Evaluation: It was found that the recovery of downed crews and aircraft became proportionally more difficult the longer they were on the ground. In several cases, what started as a "simple" extraction of a downed crew soon evolved into a large scale operation involving Army and Air Force assets. On large moves a separate AHC, capable of controlling the tactical situation itself, was designated as the Air Mission Commander of Recovery Assets. The rapidly developing and over-charging nature of operations in the mid-intensity environment required an individual who possessed experience, knowledge, and the ability to control a large scale operation to be in charge of the recovery forces.

(c) Recommendations: Recovery plans for downed crews and aircraft must be formulated and disseminated prior to initiating airmobile operations in a mid-intensity environment. All operations, whether single or multi-ship, should have chase or recovery assets available under the control of a qualified individual. These assets should include all the equipment necessary to extract crews and aircraft from a hostile environment.

d. Organization. None

e. Training.

(1) Aircraft Damage Training for Pilots.

(a) Observation: In certain instances, aviators indicated that they did not realize the seriousness of damage done to their aircraft by enemy fire.

(b) Evaluation: On one occasion an aircraft was hit by enemy fire and experienced a partial tail rotor failure over hostile territory. The aircraft's commander elected to turn back toward a secure area rather than make a precautionary landing. It is felt that the loss of tail rotor control set up a vibration pattern which eventually shook the tail boom loose and caused the aircraft to invert and crash with a tragic loss of lives. Had the pilot landed, even in a hostile area, rather than attempting to fly a severely disabled aircraft to a secure area, tragedy probably would have been averted. After this incident it became SOP to put aircraft on the ground as soon as possible after any major difficulties arose. Crewmembers' fears of getting down in hostile territory were alleviated by insuring they were knowledgeable in survival, escape, and evasion as well as the most expeditious methods of crew recovery.

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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobiles),
Period Ending 30 April 1971, RGS: OCSOR-65 (R3) (U)

(c) Recommendation: Training of aviators should at some point include an orientation of the handling characteristics and altered flight envelope of an aircraft resulting from various types of combat damage. Fear of setting down in hostile territory must be alleviated through proper training.

(2) Indirect Fire Adjustment.

(a) Observation: All infantrymen should be qualified to adjust mortar and artillery fires.

(b) Evaluation: It has been found that allowing all members of an infantry platoon to adjust defensive fires on a rotating basis teaches the men skills of adjusting indirect fires.

(c) Recommendation: The procedure of allowing members of a rifle platoon (with proper supervision) to adjust fires during slack periods should be introduced and adopted as a standard training policy.

f. Logistics.

(1) Hydraulic Failures on the AH1G and UH1H Aircraft.

(a) Observation: During the reporting period there have been hydraulic failures on AH1G and UH1H aircraft. A number were caused as a result of chaffing lines. Others were caused as a result of a hydraulic servo and a lateral servo failure.

(b) Evaluation: The hydraulic systems on both the AH1G and UH1H require frequent detailed inspections and chaffing lines separated or rerouted. Servos that are found to be seeping excessively or leaking should be replaced.

(c) Recommendation:

1 That more detailed inspections of the hydraulic system be performed daily to detect trouble spots and prevent chaffing lines.

2 That crewchiefs keep servos wiped clean and promptly report any abnormal seeping or leaks to maintenance for replacement.

(2) Aircraft Engine Failures.

(a) Observation: There have been a number of engine failures in the division. One of these resulted in incident damage to an AH1G on a FMP test flight with the weapons systems armed.

(b) Evaluation: The fourth stage compressor continues to be a factor in engine failures and this should be eliminated with the engines being replaced with T53LL3B engines.

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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile),
Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS: USFOR-65 (R3) (C)

(c) Recommendations:

(1) That a continued emphasis be placed on FOD (Foreign Object Damage) checks and adherence to policies concerning DMR (Daily Engine Recording) checks.

(2) That a form be placed in the log book keeping a daily record of the DMR checks so that pilots can compare current engine performance with past performances.

(3) That functional test flights be completed prior to the arming of AH-1G aircraft.

(3) Augmentation of Maintenance Facilities.

(a) Observation: Sustained aircraft operational readiness requires a full scale 24 hours maintenance effort during extended periods of heavy combat engagements.

(b) Evaluation: During periods of increased tactical activity such as experienced during LZDON 719, unscheduled maintenance demands for sheet metal, prop and rotor, electronics and avionics repairs significantly increased. To preclude any aircraft from being grounded for extensive periods of time, work must be initiated immediately. This must be forecast in advance and necessary augmentation programmed for the allied shops.

(c) Recommendation: OJT and/or augmentation from back-up ESU elements be programmed for units anticipating prolonged combat engagement.

(4) Quick Change Assemblies:

(a) Observation: A sharp increase in damage to major components was observed with increased operations in a higher intensity environment.

(b) Evaluation: Serviceable components on retrograde aircraft were removed and increased use of previously prepared quick change assemblies for placement on aircraft with like damaged items was employed. This was, in part, controlled cannibalization and considerably reduced the in-country demands on the supply system. It further conserved on skilled labor consumption by reducing component buildup time.

(c) Recommendation: That direct support units stock quick change assembly units such as transmissions, hubs, rotor head assemblies, tail booms, and engines. This would permit a marked decrease in the turn around time for aircraft at the direct support level.

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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile),
 Period Ending: 30 April 1971, RCS. CSUR-65 (R3) (U)

g. Communications.

(1) Secure Communications in Aircraft.

(a) Observation: Secure radio capabilities are inadequate in the current aircraft inventory.

(b) Evaluation: In many cases during this reporting period, AMC's and flight leads have had to pass valuable information over non-secure radio because of the rapidly changing, intensely hostile situation and because their gunship escorts did not have a secure capability. Information passed in this manner almost certainly was monitored by the enemy and enabled him to engage our flights by direct and indirect fire. In an environment such as encountered in LAMSON 719, secure voice communication is considered essential to operational success.

(c) Recommendation: The AMIG communication system should be modified to include a secure capability. Every effort must be made to insure all secure radios are functional prior to launching on a mission. If possible, secure capabilities should be expanded to include UHF and VHF radios.

(2) Maintenance of Comm Equipment.

(a) Observation: During artillery raids, communications over extended distances were a continuous problem. Many locations required the use of AN/VRC-45 radios to provide the necessary range.

(b) Evaluation: The problem of range was alleviated to a certain extent by placing emphasis on properly adjusted radios prior to a move. Antennas were checked to insure that the proper elements were used, thus insuring an increase in range. Adjustments were made only by qualified radio mechanics. As a result even AN/VRC-25 and AN/VRC-77 radios yielded reliable long range communications.

(c) Recommendation: That all radios be checked, and the appropriate adjustments made prior to any move. That care be taken to check all antennas for completeness and that maximum use of AN/VRC-25 and AN/VRC-77 radios be made to reduce loads during moves.

(3) SOI Implementation.

(a) Observation: With few exceptions, the implementation of a new SOI occurs at 2400 hours.

(b) Evaluation: Elements in the field must observe strict light and noise discipline during the hours of darkness. To implement an SOI change during the hours of darkness requires this discipline to be broken to some

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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile),
Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS: CSNWR-65 (R3) (U)

extent. Difficulties have been encountered which made it impossible to communicate until the following morning when the problem could be solved. Loss of communication during the hours of darkness causes justifiable concern.

(c) Recommendations: The SOT change should occur during daylight hours. This would facilitate the change by providing enough natural light to actually make the change. Also if difficulties arise, solutions may more easily be implemented without regard to noise or light discipline. The preferable time would be at first light, prior to planned operations.

h. Material.

(1) M102 Howitzer Recoil Mechanisms.

(a) Observation: Recoil mechanism failure in the M102 howitzer is one of the principal causes of equipment breakdown.

(b) Evaluation: Recoil leaks have developed due to overfull recoil reservoirs. The reservoir indicator will show that recoil oil is required when, in fact, a sufficient amount is already in the reservoir. During the heat of the afternoon, the indicator will reflect a more accurate reading.

(c) Recommendation: That the recoil oil reservoir indicator be checked during the afternoon when the recoil oil is at maximum expansion.

(2) Reinforced 16 ton Airmobile Trailers.

(a) Observation: 16-ton airmobile trailers Model OT-32A are damaged with prolonged hauling of D-5A dozers on unpaved roads.

(b) Evaluation: The 16-ton airmobile trailer is insufficiently reinforced for heavy hauls over rough roads. The frame in front of the dual tires has bent and cracked following repetitive hauling of a D-5A dozer over rough roads.

(c) Recommendation: The 16-ton airmobile trailer should be reinforced by welding angle steel to the frame assembly in front of the dual tires.

(3) Proper Mounting of Machinegun Mounts on 4-ton Trucks.

(a) Observation: Truck floors and rear frames were being damaged from vibrations of machinegun mounts.

(b) Evaluation: Anchoring an M-30 machinegun mount to the floor results in body and frame damage due to the excessive vibration on rough roads. The 326th Engineer Battalion began welding the base plate to a 4-inch steel plate cut to fit the back floor of the 4-ton truck. The steel plate holds the machinegun rigid without being attached to the vehicle and thus prevents

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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile),
Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS: GCHRL-05 (R3) (U)

damage to the vehicle.

(4) Recommended fender support brackets for 5-ton dump trucks.

(a) Observation: The 320th Engineer Battalion presently is assigned 11 5-ton dump trucks. These trucks are utilized transporting engineer material, chiefly rock and laterite fill. The front fenders, particularly the right front fenders, have been bending and breaking on all of these trucks. The fenders are sturdily constructed of 10-gauge sheet metal and are properly mounted.

(b) Evaluation: The dump truck fenders are failing despite proper installation and durable construction. The weight of the air cleaner on the right fender of the truck contributes in part to the failure, but the main cause of fender failure appears to be excessive vibration on haul roads. This unit has fabricated brackets from flat steel stock, 1/2" thick by 1" wide. The brackets are welded or bolted from the front and rear of the fender to the cab. This modification of the fenders on new trucks has prevented the failure.

(c) Recommendations: 5-ton dump trucks should be equipped with fender supporting brackets either at general or direct support unit level.

(5) Field Expedient Covers for Hydraulic Couplings.

(a) Observation: Blowing dust and dirt presents a maintenance hazard to break-down engineer equipment during airmobile operations.

(b) Evaluation: Exposed hydraulic couplings are extremely susceptible to intrusion by blown dirt and dust caused by rotor wash during airmobiles.

(c) Recommendations: Each hydraulic coupling should be covered with a plastic bag (M-16 magazine plastic bags are an ideal covering) and sealed with tape immediately upon disconnection prior to airmobile.

1. Other. None.

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AVII-COT (24 May 71) 1st Ind 12 JUN 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, GOC: OSMR-65 (H3) (U)

more difficult and costly the longer the recovery takes. Having an individual designated and prepared to supervise the extraction of these assets quickly, will in the long run save additional assets that would have to be committed for recovery operations.

e. Reference item concerning "Aircraft Damage Training for Pilots," page 82, paragraph 2e(1): Concur. Recommend the training be given at unit level during each aviator's in-country orientation and repeated periodically as required.

f. Reference item concerning "Indirect Fire Adjustment," page 83, paragraph 2e(2): Concur. Direct Support Artillery Forward Observers should conduct familiarization and orientation training for infantrymen at every opportunity. All fire missions should be supervised by the forward observer to insure troop safety and compliance with the rules of engagement.

g. Reference item concerning "Hydraulic Failures on the AH-1G and UH-1H Aircraft," page 83, paragraph 2f(1): Concur. The hydraulic systems of the AH-1G and UH-1H are items required to be checked before each day's flight, and are part of the pilot's pre-flight inspection. The by-the-book checks by crew chiefs and pilots plus awareness of changes of fluid reservoir levels will indicate possible failures before they occur.

h. Reference item concerning "Aircraft Engine Failures," page 83, paragraph 2f(2): Concur. There have been a few T-531-13B engines with second or fourth stage compressor failures also. Recommend that before any maintenance other than daily routine maintenance is attempted, that armed helicopters be completely disarmed. This recommendation should be included in unit standing operating procedures.

i. Reference item concerning "Augmentation of Maintenance Facilities," page 84, paragraph 2f(3): Concur. Augmentation with skilled mechanics rather than OJT mechanics seems to be a far better solution for the increased maintenance work load inherent during periods of prolonged combat.

j. Reference item concerning "Quick Change Assemblies," page 84, paragraph 2f(4): Nonconcur. Prepositioned stockage of intensively managed, high dollar components would be too costly for the minimal time reduction in returning an aircraft to operational status.

k. Reference item concerning "Secure Communications in Aircraft," page 85, paragraph 2g(1): Concur. However, the physical security requirements for the radios themselves increase proportionately as the

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AVII-CCT (24 May 71) 1st Ind 12 55 1471
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division
(Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, ACR: 0510R-03 (43) (U)

number of aircraft with secure radios on board increased. Aircraft downed in hostile areas with secure radios aboard pose an additional problem for recovery forces. Recommend that sufficient secure radios be installed in AH-1Gs to provide one secure radio for each fire team, thereby allowing for a secure communications capability to be made available to each fire team.

m. Reference item concerning "Maintenance of Camo Equipment," page 85, paragraph 2g(2): Concur. However, the radio set AN/VRC-46 should always (when feasible) accompany a unit making an artillery raid due to the set's greater reliability and greater range capability. Secure gear, KY-8, employed with the AN/VRC-46 should also accompany the unit.

n. Reference item concerning "Maintenance of 16-ton Airmobile Trailers," page 86, paragraph 2h(2): Concur. The unit has been advised to submit an Equipment Improvement Recommendation.

o. Reference item concerning "Proper Mounting of Machinegun Mounts on $\frac{1}{4}$ -ton Trucks," page 86, paragraph 2h(3): Concur. The following recommendation is submitted: That M-16 machinegun mounts on $\frac{1}{4}$ -ton trucks be welded to $\frac{1}{4}$ inch steel plates fixed to the floor of the vehicles to avoid structural damage. The unit has been advised to submit an Equipment Improvement Recommendation.

p. Reference item concerning "Recommended Under support brackets for 5-ton dump trucks," page 87, paragraph 2h(4): Concur. The unit has been advised to submit an Equipment Improvement Recommendation.

q. Reference item concerning "Field Expedient Connectors for Hydraulic Couplings," page 87, paragraph 2h(5): Concur. Field expedient seems practical and within the resources of users.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl
no

W. H. Smith
W. H. Smith
Captain AGC
Adjutant General

CF:
CG, 101st Abn Div (Aml), APO 96333

PRECEDENCE AND PRIORITY - NOT FILLED

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AVHDO-DO (24 May 71) 2nd Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division
(Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, HQ: CIPOR-05 (H3) (U)

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96370 24 AUG 1971

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOB-PT
APO 96358

This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the period ending 30 April 1971 from Headquarters, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) and concurs with comments from indorsing Headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


L.H. HONSOWETZ
CIT. AGC.
Major General

Cy Turn:
101st Airborne Division
XXIV Corps

GPOP-FD (24 May 71) 3d Div
SUBJECT: Operational Report, 1st Airborne Division, 1st Airborne Division, 1st Airborne Division
30 April 1971, RUC 100000-00 (R) (1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO SF, San Francisco 96358 1 NOV 1971

TO: HQDA (DAFD-ZA), WASH DC 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as follows:

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:


L. J. GALT
CPT, AGC
MAY 71

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Inclosure (Operations Narrative/Significant Activities) to Operations Report - Lessons learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, Rpt. G-1 (13) (U).

1. (C) On 1 November 1970, the 101st Air Div (A-1) continued operation JEFFERSON GLAD/POISON HILL. In coordination with the 1st Air Div (A-1) and GVN officials of THUA THIEN Province, the division conducted operations designed to locate and destroy enemy forces, destroy areas and forward cache sites, to protect vital lines of communication and to assist GVN officials in meeting their humanitarian needs for 1970. Persisting low clouds, high winds and an extreme amount of rainfall prevailed during the last seven days of October resulting in wide spread flood conditions in the populated lowlands of the division area of operations. The division reacted to this natural disaster by establishing a disaster relief control center to assist GVN officials in evacuating and providing relief for victims. During the last seven days of October and 1 November, 9,452 people from the four districts of THUA THIEN Province and 4,000 people from HUE City were displaced from their homes. On 1 November, the flood water began to subside and 7,000 people returned to their homes. Division 101-11 aircraft flew 255 sorties delivering 7,000 loaves of bread and 3,900 meals. Total cargo transported on support of the disaster was 18.5 tons. All flood victims returned to their homes by 5 November and were assisted by GVN officials in re-establishing their homes. The 326th Engr Bn (A-1) continued assistance in rehabilitation of roads, bridges and culverts throughout the lowland area. Division aircraft assets also were provided to GVN corps civil affairs units to evacuate flood victims and distribute foodstuffs in the inland area.

2. (C) 1 November - 30 November 1970.

a. Operations summary. On 1 November the 1st Bn, with its CP at CAMP EAGLE, maintained liaison with the 1st Regt (A-1). The 1st Bn (A-1), 107th Inf continued to conduct search and attack operations in the Fire Base VEGHOL area with the battalion CP located at CP 101-11. The 1st Bn (A-1), 501st Inf moved by vehicle from Fire Base VEGHOL to Fire Base BIRCHINGHAM, while the 1st Bn (A-1), 101st Inf completed postwar training and moved from CAMP EAGLE to Fire Base VEGHOL. These battalions commenced search and attack operations in their respective areas of operation. The 3d Bn (A-1), 506th Inf moved by air, vehicle and on foot from the Fire Base BIRCHINGHAM area to the Fire Base VEGHOL area and returned to the operational control of the 2d Bn. The 1st Bn (A-1) remained at PHU BAI Combat Base and maintained liaison with the 1st Regt (A-1). GVN officials of THUA THIEN Province in the four districts north of the Perfume River. The 2d Bn (A-1), 502d Inf moved by air from CAMP EAGLE to Fire Base BIRCHINGHAM and conducted postwar training and search and attack operations. The 1st Bn (A-1), 502d Inf remained at Fire Base BIRCHINGHAM and conducted search and attack, and patrol and reconnaissance operations in the vicinity of the fire base. The 1st Bn (A-1), 501st Inf moved by air from the Fire Base BIRCHINGHAM area to PHU BAI Combat Base to conduct battalion postwar training and assume the mission of division ready force. The 3d Bn CP continued to direct operations from CAMP EAGLE and maintain liaison with GVN officials in the four districts north of the Perfume River. The 3d Bn (A-1),

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187th Inf secured Fire Base RAYMOND and conducted three company size search and attack operations south of the fire base. The 3d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf, with its CP at CAMP ALICE, conducted search and attack operations northwest of MEXICO.

On 4 November, Co C, 1st Bn (Ambl), 187th Inf moved by air from the vicinity of BIRMINGHAM to Fire Base JAMES and passed to the operational control of the 1st Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf. The company moved overland from VEGHEL to YD 5504 to conduct surveillance and ambush operations along Route 547 and the RIE A TO River.

On 5 November, Trp C, 1st Bn (Ambl), 17th Cav inserted the MAC BAC Company, three kilometers south of MEXICO to conduct reconnaissance in force operations. The 1st Plt, 1st Bn (Ambl), 17th Cav was inserted on Fire Base BLISS as a relay team for the MAC BAC Company. The company had no contact with the enemy and both elements were extracted the following day.

The 1st Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf completed refresher training on 7 November, moved by air and vehicle to Fire Base JACK and passed to the operational control of the 3d Bn. Co A secured the fire base while the remaining companies commenced search and attack operations in the area. The 3d Bn (Ambl), 187th Inf moved by vehicle and by air from the JACK area to CAMP EVANS, assumed the mission of division ready force and commenced refresher training.

On 13 November, the 3d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf was extracted from the MEXICO area and redeployed by air to the Fire Base RAYMOND area. The 3d Bn (Ambl), 187th Inf completed refresher training and prepared for deployment to the MEXICO area. Co B air assaulted from CAMP EVANS to YD 4018 (six kilometers south of MEXICO) and commenced ambush and surveillance operations in the vicinity of the landing zone. The 1st Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf moved by air from Fire Base JAMES to CAMP EVANS, assumed the mission of division ready force and prepared for refresher training.

Co C, 1st Bn (Ambl), 187th Inf closed Fire Base VEGHEL on 14 November, moved by air to Fire Base BLISS and then moved 1,000 meters northwest of the fire base to conduct ambush and surveillance operations. Elements from Trp D, 2d Bn (Ambl), 17th Cav, reinforced by a five man demolition team from the 326th Eng Bn (Ambl), were inserted into the A SHAC Valley to conduct road interdiction operations. The elements interdicted Route 548 from A LOU1 Airstrip, southeast to YD 45100, destroying one large bridge and causing extensive damage to four smaller bridges. There was no contact during the mission and the team was extracted and returned to CAMP EAGLE.

On 15 November, elements of Trp D, 2d Bn (Ambl), 17th Cav were inserted to interdict Route 922, vicinity YD 2520/2, and to recover a 37mm antiaircraft gun. The elements destroyed one log bridge covered with pierced steel plank, three 60mm bunkers, 20 to 30 57mm rounds, cratered Route 922, and recovered and evacuated the 37mm barrel and breach assembly to CAMP EAGLE. The element leader indicated that the area showed signs of recent enemy activity.

On 16 November, Ranger Team KILLS made contact with four enemy in the

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Inclosure (Operations Narrative/ Significant Activities) to Operations Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airborne), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RFS: COMBAT-65 (RQ) (U).

KATHRON CAMP area (ID 4605). The ranger team reported that there was evidence of more enemy elements in the area. Trip C, 1st Bde (Ambl), 17th Cav inserted their Aerial Rifle Platoon (ARL) to reinforce the ranger team. Later in the day, Trip D also was inserted into the area. The following day, attempts to resupply or extract the elements had to be aborted due to extremely poor weather conditions and heavy enemy fire in the area.

On 18 November, heavy rains and a low cloud ceiling again prohibited the use of division aircraft. Trip D and Trip B and Ranger Team BILLY moved overland towards a pickup zone, four kilometers southeast of the contact site.

On 19 November, the 1st Bn (Ambl), 502d Inf completed refresher training and deployed to the Fire Base JACK area. Company C secured the fire base while the remainder of the battalion commenced search and attack operations in the area. The 1st Bn (Ambl), 502d Inf moved by air from the JACK area to RAKHAB area, secured the fire base and commenced search and attack operations in the area, while the 2d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf moved by air from RAKHAB to JAMB SWAN, prepared for refresher training and assumed the mission of division ready force. At 0800 from Trip C, 2d Bde (Ambl), 17th Cav. while in armed aerial reconnaissance, received a heavy volume of unknown type ground fire six kilometers south of KATHRON. The aircraft crashed and was completely destroyed, resulting in two US missing in action. Trip D and Trip C and were resupplied and shuttled by UH1E from their field location (ID 4205) to within 1,800 meters of the downed aircraft (ID 47040).

On 20 November, Trip D and Trip C and, 2d Bde (Ambl), 17th Cav moved overland to the site of the downed B-1. The elements recovered the two US bodies from the wreckage and were extracted from the area at 1125 hours. In support of this operation, Co A, 1st Bn (Ambl), 302d Inf moved overland to WEDDIE and secured the fire base. Battery D, 1st Bn (Ambl), 302d Artillery was airlifted to Fire Base WEDDIE to conduct an artillery raid, commencing at 1115 hours. The battery fired seven observed missions, extending 307 105mm rounds, and a returned to CAMP JACK at 1215 hours. Additionally, the 155mm howitzer battery at Fire Base WEDDIE fired two observed missions, extending 109 rounds, while eight inch howitzers and 105mm guns fired a total of 80 rounds on 13 unobserved targets. There were eleven Skyspot sorties and four B-1 sorties flown against active 12.7mm machine gun positions and suspected enemy locations. Thirteen of these sorties were targeted in the KATHRON-JAMB SWAN area around the downed B-1. Also, one USAF C-130 aircraft dropped a M102 device clearing a two ship landing zone for the 1st Bde, seven kilometers east of KATHRON.

On 25 November, the 2d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf completed battalion refresher training and moved by air from CAMP SWAN to Fire Base RAKHAB, secured the fire base and commenced search and attack operations in the area. The 1st Bn (Ambl), 502d Inf moved by air from the Fire Base RAKHAB area to Fire Base ABHAB, turned to operational control of the 2d Bde from the 3d Bde, secured the fire base and commenced company and platoon search and attack operations. The 3d Bn (Ambl), 504th Inf moved by air and vehicle from Fire Base ABHAB to Fire Base COMBAT Base where

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they assumed the mission of division ready force and prepared to conduct refresher training.

On 26 November, the 1st Bn (Abn), 327th Inf conducted three ranger teams of Co L (Ranger), 7th Inf 1st Bn (Abn) to conduct a five day period. Ranger team BOHLENDERS reported the area in a vicinity of the NHE QUANG River (YD 8810) as a possible infiltration route and had observed moderate enemy activity. The remaining teams reported no major activity. The Cavalry also inserted ranger teams GATERS and GATERS to conduct reconnaissance of suspected infiltration routes in the RUONG RUONG Valley area. On 27 November, two dryspot missions were targeted against bunker complexes in the RUONG RUONG area, based on information obtained from Ranger Team BOHLENDERS.

During the period 25 to 27 November, all units operating in the field were abetted by air and vehicles or moved overland to a fire base or combat base for a full course turkey dinner to celebrate Thanksgiving and then returned to their respective field locations.

Ranger Teams GATERS and GATERS were extracted from the RUONG RUONG Valley area on 30 November and returned to GATERS BANG. Both teams reported there were no signs of recent enemy activity in the area.

Airmobile operations were restricted by prevailing weather at monsoon conditions throughout the month of November. The division took full advantage of short periods of acceptable flying weather to resupply units operating in the canopy regions and to conduct aerial reconnaissance in the western area of operation. Enemy combat was light throughout the period with 30% of US casualties (four KIA and 30 WIA) being caused by enemy booby traps. Ground troops discovered and destroyed 13 enemy booby traps during November, while division GATERS aircraft flew 13 flights, dropping 34,995 gallons of trucked fuel and 13 suspected booby trapped areas.

3. (C) 1 December - 31 December 1970.

During December the 1st Brigade continued operations in close cooperation with the 3d ARVN Regiment. The 1st Bn (Abn), 327th Inf was located at Fire Base BIRMINGAM, the 2nd Bn (Abn), 327th Inf was at Fire Base BASTARD and the 3rd Bn (Abn), 327th Inf was at Fire Base BASTARD. On 13 December the 2d Bn (Abn), 327th Inf passed control to the 1st Brigade and assumed responsibility for Fire Base BIRMINGAM. The brigade conducted extensive search and attack operations with emphasis along the SONG BO River and military raids into the RUONG RUONG Valley.

The 1st Brigade conducted search and attack patrols and security operations in cooperation with the 3d ARVN Regiment. The brigade was responsible for the security of LAKE HOANG, the 1st Bridge PALS pumping station and the navigational beacon on the SONG BO River. The 2d Bn (Abn), 327th Inf conducted search and attack operations in the canopy areas of RUONG RUONG. The 3rd Bn (Abn), 327th Inf provided security for Fire Bases BASTARD and BASTARD. On 7 December the 3rd Bn (Abn), 327th Inf was relieved of responsibility for the RUONG RUONG

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Inclosure (Operations Narrative/Insufficient Activities) to Operations Report - Lessons Learned, 1st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, 21st Airborne (AB) (U).

BAVON area and conducted battalion refresher training. On 1 December the battalion passed control to the 1st Bn and redeployed to Fire Base BIRMINGHAM. From 1-7 December the 1st Bn, 506th Inf conducted battalion refresher training in the vicinity of the 1st Bn. The battalion deployed to the Fire Base BIRMINGHAM area and assumed responsibility for the Fire Base and the surrounding area.

On 1 December the 1st Bn, 506th Inf moved by air to Fire Base BRICK area and relieved the 2d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf. The battalion conducted search and attack operations in the vicinity of BRICK. On 30 December the 1st Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf passed control to the 2d Bn at KUN RAI Combat Base and conducted battalion refresher training.

The 3d Bde continued to employ along the front of the enemy and maintained liaison with HUNG DINH, HUNG DINH, QUANG DINH, and HUNG TRA District officials. The 3d Bn (Ambl), 187th Inf conducted patrol, surveillance and ambush operations in the Fire Base HUNG DINH/QUANG DINH area. The battalion CP was located at Fire Base RACHMAN, moving to CAMP EVANS toward the end of the month.

The 1st Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf conducted operations in the Fire Base JACK area and provided liaison and assistance to HUNG DINH District. The 2d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf conducted operations in the vicinity of Fire Base RACHMAN. The 1-77th Armor, 187th Inf to the brigade, conducted operations west of CAMP EVANS in the vicinity of Fire Base HUNG DINH until 12 December when they passed control to the 3d Bde. The 1-77th Armor trains moved by vehicle from HUNG TRI to CAMP EVANS. The element passed control to the 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech) on 15 December and moved to QUANG TRI.

At 011230 December in the vicinity of RD 000000 (one and one-half kilometers northwest of Fire Base HUNG DINH) Company A, 3d Bn (Ambl), 187th Inf was engaged by an estimated 100 enemy. The enemy fired three RPG rounds and small arms. The US element returned organic weapons fire and the enemy broke contact, withdrawing to the south. A search of the area revealed one US soldier killed and one M16. The action resulted in one US wounded in action. At 1500 hours, A Company, 3d Bn (Ambl), 187th Inf discovered in the vicinity of RD 000000 (one kilometer northwest of Fire Base HUNG DINH) two bunkers 3x5 meters with 15' of overhead cover. An additional bunker 10x10 meters with the same type overhead cover was discovered containing one RPG launcher, one M16 booster, one M16A cartridge, and miscellaneous items. The unit indicated that enemy activity was present within the last 72 hours. Three quarters of an hour later, as A Company, 3d Bn (Ambl), 187th Inf continued its search of the area where the bunkers were discovered, two enemy soldiers in a 3x3 meter bunker to the west of their position fired two submachine guns and small arms at a range of 10 meters. One US soldier was wounded. The US element employed ARI and held their location for the night.

On 2 December, four kilometers northwest of CAMP EVANS Company, 1st Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf discovered two booby traps at 1500 hours. One consisted of a 100mm round, and the other was a 120mm mortar round. Both booby traps had had a pressure type trigger device. The US element reported evidence of enemy activity in the last 72 hours. The US unit destroyed both devices. At 0100 hours in the vicinity of coordinates

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YD 390244 (one kilometer north of Fire Base BASTOGE, 3d Ln (Amb)), 187th Inf discovered a bunker with 10' of overhead cover. The bunker contained 100 lbs of ammo, 100 lbs of food, six machine-guns, six hand-grenades, six machine-guns, one mortar, one entrenching tool, and miscellaneous other supplies and equipment. All of the items were evacuated. At 1250 hours (Company, 1st Ln (Amb)), 501st Inf, operating in the vicinity of 10 kilometers south of Fire Base BASTOGE, discovered a mortar position and captured 17 anti-aircraft mortar rounds, and the M-108. There was a lot of activity of recent enemy activity. The weapons were evacuated and the mortar was destroyed. Five kilometers north of Fire Base BASTOGE, 3d Ln, 3d Inf (AECN) engaged five enemy elements to their northeast with small arms fire and artillery. The element reported four enemy killed and two weapons captured; one AECN soldier was killed.

On 4 December at 1512 hours the 1st Lt, D Campbell, of BN (Inf.), 506th Inf was three kilometers to the northeast of Base BRICK when it received small arms fire from an unknown number of enemy soldiers. The element returned organic weapons fire and employed M4. A sweep of the area produced three rock dogs, one enemy skeleton, one hammock, eight to ten lbs of rice, one set of green fatigues, three M40 rounds and a bag of M44 ammunition.

On 6 December two bunkers located on the road by D Company, 3d Inf (Abn), 500th Inf in the vicinity of grid 17 (two and one-half kilo-meters northeast of Piro Khet) were destroyed. The bunkers contained three RPG rounds, two 120 millimeter, one 81 millimeter, fifty 4 lb blocks of explosive, 50 lbs of TNT and 10 lbs of RDX.

On 7 December at 1400 hours, a patrol consisting of 10 personnel from element of P Company, 2d Bn (AMB), 101st Airborne Division, was conducting a search for enemy. One M16 rifle and some ammunition and other equipment were found. The search was evacuated.

On 8 December at 1745 hours in the vicinity of PT 5300 (three kilometers northeast of Fire Base 5110) the 1st Bat, 6th Regt, 31st Inf (Ambl), 500th Inf discovered and destroyed enemy rice caches totaling 170 lbs. The rice was found in two small tin canisters. The 500th Inf destroyed the bunkers and evacuated the area. In the vicinity of PT 4200 (one kilometer west of Fire Base 5110) at 1900 hours the 3rd Regt, 31st Inf (Ambl), 187th Inf found five (5) enemy fighting positions containing seven submachine guns, one M16 machine gun, thirteen M16 rounds, two 60-mm grenades, thirty-seven (37) 60-mm charges, two M-16 magazines, four pairs of MVA binoculars, one MVA compass, one MVA protective mask, and one MVA poncho. The area was evacuated.

On 11 December at 0945 hours, the enemy (ARVN 6) (three kilometers southwest of Binh Hoa) fired mortar rounds, 100 Bn (Anbi), 5081 Inf disarmed one mortar round, eight mortar rounds, one M-61 grenade, two 100 mm mortar rounds, three non-electrical blasting caps, one set of 100 lb of TNT, and recovered the cooking utensils and C-rations. There was no significant enemy activity. The mortar and RPG rounds were destroyed and the remainder of the equipment was evacuated.

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Inclosure (Operations Summary and Significant Activities) to Operations Report - Lessons Learned, 1st Airborne Division (Airborne), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RMA 100-2-100 (Rev 10).

On 12 December in the vicinity of YD 64114, (five kilometers north-east of Fire Base HAMMILL) the 3rd Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf engaged enemy bunkers with organic weapons. The enemy retained small arms fire and withdrew to the southeast. Artillery and a Fire Team were engaged. A search of the area revealed six AK-47 rounds and fifteen mortar rounds. The AMBL reported ten NVA KIA, three M-16s, one M-16 launcher, fifty RPG rounds, one M-72 LAW, thirty sticks of dynamite, ten 150mm rounds of 120, thirty sets of knapsacks, and miscellaneous equipment.

On 131200 December in the vicinity of YD 73606 (three kilometers southwest of Fire Base HAMMILL) B Company, 1st Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf discovered one M-47, one C-400mm mortar, two M-47 mortars, eight blocks of an unknown type explosive, two 60mm mortar rounds, three RPG boosters, one NVA rucksack, one flashlight, and one NVA parachute. The cache was evacuated.

On 161310 December in the vicinity of YD 87502 (five kilometers east of Fire Base BRICK) the 1st Bn, B Company, 1st Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf employed organic weapons fire engaging one enemy soldier to the north of their position. The enemy soldier was killed and his M-47 was captured and evacuated. In later separate action, the 1st Bn, 17th Cav engaged enemy soldiers in their area. Later to be with good results. The Cavalry reported a total of nine NVA KIA in the action with no US casualties.

On 18 December a search of the area, located by the 1st Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf, killed five NVA soldiers in the vicinity of YD 64114 (three kilometers southeast of Fire Base HAMMILL). A search of the area revealed two M-47s, three rucksacks, and miscellaneous equipment. B Company, 1st Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf, while operating in the vicinity of YD 64114 (five kilometers southeast of Fire Base HAMMILL) discovered sixty-six 60mm mortar primers, eight 60mm rounds, one hundred and fifty 120mm and six hundred and fifty M-47 rounds. There was no evidence of recent enemy activity. 2d Bn conducted an artillery raid into the Hamlet Valley from Fire Base HAMMILL. A total of one hundred and twenty-five 81 rounds, one hundred 170mm rounds, one hundred and fifty-six 160mm rounds, one thousand three hundred and fifty-eight 105mm rounds were expended in this operation.

On 19 December (three kilometers east of Fire Base BRICK) B Company, 1st Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf received blast and fragments from three enemy detonated claymore mines at 1700 hours. The blast was followed by small arms fire and automatic weapons fire from four enemy positions to the north of their position. The enemy returned organic weapons fire and the enemy withdrew in the same direction. The enemy fusillade produced four US wounds. At 1700 hours the Fire Base HAMMILL area received thirty-five 60mm mortar rounds. Fifteen rounds impacted inside the fire base. Artillery fire was directed at enemy locations on suspected enemy locations. The 1st Bn reported 11 NVA KIA. The 1st Bn conducted an artillery raid into the Hamlet Valley expending 520 81 rounds into the HAMMILL River Valley.

On 211100 December a search of the area located in the vicinity of YD 87502 (one kilometer east of Fire Base BRICK) one NVA KIA and four enemy

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Inclosure (Operations Summary and Activities Report - Lessons Learned, 1st Airborne Division (Airborne), Period Ending 31 April 1971, Ref: C-100-100 (33) (U)).

soldiers were engaged by D Company, 3d Bn (AmB), 500th Inf. The 1st element employed organic weapons fire and artillery. A search of the area revealed buildings and a pair of enemy soldiers.

On 140000 December, the 1st Airborne Division conducted Operation SAWHILL (14-15-16 Dec), penetrating the area. There were 13 detainees for fraudulent civil status and 100 detainees. At 1045 hours, a Ho Chi Minh, who had rallied at 1000 hours, led a 1st Platoon Flight to four bunkers located 1 kilometer southwest of First Base (LUNA). The platoon discovered four M41 panthers, one M41A1 machine, three small bags of rice, and detainees. In preparation for current operations, there were 112 55-gallon drums of persistent liquid to neutralize a bunker complex southwest of the 100 Mile Valley area. There were also 18 F40 sorties flown in the division area of operations.

On 251500 December, 1 kilometer southwest of LUNA, elements of A Company, 1st Bn (AmB), 500th Inf discovered a grave containing one enemy soldier killed by artillery approximately 7 days earlier. Surrounding the grave were six bunkers and three huts. The huts contained miscellaneous cooking equipment, two M41 panthers, one M41A1 machine, and miscellaneous documents.

On 260000 December, 1 kilometer northwest of First Base (LUNA), elements of D Company, 3d Bn (AmB), 500th Inf were engaged in small arms fire and one hand grenade 15 meters from the front of the area. Three US soldiers. The element returned organic weapons fire and artillery. The enemy as they fled. A search of the area revealed no enemy assets. At 1457 hours, elements of D Company, 3d Bn (AmB), 500th Inf engaged an unknown size enemy force with small arms fire and artillery in the same area. A search of the area revealed one M41A1 and one M41A1 captured. At 1330 hours, elements of A Company, 1st Bn (AmB), 500th Inf discovered one M41 body wrapped in a poncho 5 kilometers west northwest of B-1000. Time and cause of death were undetermined.

A. (C) Operation SAWHILL (14-15-16 Dec) carried into LUNA containing the support of 1st Airborne Division and protection of the captured lowlands of THUA THIEN Province. The weather began to improve as the flow from the northeast season began to loose force. Security was marked periodically with periods of improved weather that continued into February, March and April. The 1st Air Div (AmB) capitalized on the good weather to conduct operations in the captured jungle areas of LUNA. Toward the end of January the division initiated Operation Loney Canyon II conducting artillery raid into the A CHAU Valley. This operation was Phase I of the XXIV Corps I Corps operation LUNA II. The combined Corps operation supported the 1st Airborne Division (AmB) Province and into LUNA. The 1st Airborne Division (AmB) conducted the LUNA II Trail. Combined US forces continued to the LUNYON Border and constructed a forward airfield at LUNYON. The 1st Airborne Division continued into LUNA, and the 1st Airborne Division, to accomplish their mission. With success in LUNA II completed, the 1st Air Div (AmB) joined with the 1st Airborne Division, to conduct a LUNA II 220 in April. The operation was to be conducted in a LUNA II 220 and

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Inclosure (Operations Narrative/Significant Activities) to Operations Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, HQ: CSF 2-45 (IG) (U).

and A SHAU Valley areas to destroy enemy supplies in forward logistical areas. This operation is a continuation of OPERATION LINE/MANSON PLAN 70 and is continuing into 1971.

5. (C) 1 January - 31 January 1971.

During January the 1st Brigade CP remained at FIVE BARS and continued to coordinate operations with the 3d Regt (ARVN) and GVN officials in NAM HOA District. On 1 January the brigade conducted an artillery raid from Fire Base BASTOGNE to Fire Base BENTLEY. Elements of the 3d Bn (Ambl), 327th Inf secured the fire base while 155mm howitzers from the 3d Bn (Ambl), 11th Army fired 150 155mm rounds on pre-designated targets in the Fire Base SPARK area. The artillery raid ended the same day. On 28 January the brigade deployed artillery to Fire Base WHEEL and GUN on the 29th. These actions were in support of Operation Dewey Canyon II. The 2d Bn (Ambl), 502d Inf CP moved from CAMP BUCK on 1 January to CP CLADIER. The battalion conducted search and attack operations throughout January in the surrounding AO. During the early part of January the 2d Bn (Ambl), 327th Inf conducted search and attack operations in the surrounding AO. On 5 January the battalion deployed elements in the Fire Base BENTLEY area in preparation for the artillery raid later in the month. The 1st Bn (Ambl), 327th Inf conducted operations in the Fire Base BASTOGNE area until 17 January. On 28 January the battalion displaced to Fire Base WHEEL and GUN. The area around GUN was secured and prepared for the receipt of artillery to conduct the final artillery raid in support of Dewey Canyon II.

The 2d Bde CP continued to direct operations from FIVE BARS Combat Base and maintained liaison with 14th Inf Regt (ARVN) and GVN officials. The 1st Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf conducted refresher training and provided troops for the Division Ready Force until 5 January. On 6 January the battalion passed CPCL to the 3d Bde. It remained in the 3d Bde area of operation around Fire Base BENTLEY until 16 January. On 17 January the battalion returned to CPCL of the 1st Bde and moved to the Fire Base ARDENAL area. The 2d Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf CP remained at Fire Base JACK with one platoon on Fire Base JACK until 9 January when the CP and elements displaced to Fire Base BRICK. On 15 January the battalion CP moved off the fire base to a field location to the west leaving one company to secure BRICK. The remainder of January was spent in similar operations in the BRICK AO. The 1st Bn (Ambl), 502d Inf maintained its CP on Fire Base ARDENAL until 17 January when it moved to FIVE BARS Combat Base. The battalion conducted refresher training and assumed the mission of Division Ready Force. The 2d Bn (Ambl), 502d Inf CP remained at Fire Base JACK until 12 January when they moved to CAMP BUCK and assumed the mission of Division Ready Force. The battalion conducted refresher training. On 12 January elements of the 1st Bde moved to CPCL with the CP moving to CLADIER. On 21 January the battalion moved to CAMP BUCK. Elements continued to move north from the 1st Bde area to the 2d Bde area. On 29 January the CP moved to Fire Base BENTLEY with companies operating to the west.

The 2d Bde continued its operation at CAMP BUCK with the 2d Bn

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Inclosure (Operations Narrative/Significant Activities) to Operations Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCO: C-70245 (R) (P).

(Amb), 187th Inf operating in the GLADIATOR/THICK area working west toward the Fire Base GUTHRIE area. On 20 January the battalion moved by air to CAMP EVANS to assume the mission of Division Ready Force and conducted refresher training. On 22 January the battalion went OCON to the 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech) in support of LIMA 719. The 1st Bn (Amb), 506th Inf continued operations in the Fire Base JACK/CAMP EVANS area until 12 January. The battalion moved to CAMP EVANS on the 12th and assumed the mission of Division Ready Force and conducted refresher training. On 20 January the CF moved to a field location southwest of Fire Base SWARD with elements working further south into the THICK/GLADIATOR area. The battalion continued south conducting search and attack operations. On 25 January the CF moved to CAMP EVANS. On 29 January the CF moved to Fire Base KILLBUCK. The maneuver companies were now operating in the KILLBUCK area of operation. The 2d Bn (Amb), 506th Inf remained at Fire Base KILLBUCK until 3 January when it moved to CAMP EVANS and assumed the mission of Division Ready Force and conducted refresher training. On 12 January the battalion CF moved to Fire Base JACK and conducted operations until 19 January. The next day the battalion moved to a location south west of Fire Base SWARD while one company continued to secure JACK. The CF returned to JACK on 23 January. On 25 January one company conducted joint operations with the 1st Inf Regt (ARVN). The battalion continued to operate in the JACK area throughout January.

On 031330 January, vicinity TD 645013 (five kilometers southwest of Fire Base EASTONS) C Company, 1st Bn (Amb), 327th Inf discovered 30 6'x4'x5' bunkers with 1' of overhead cover and a 1'x2' tunnel running between two of the bunkers. There were no indications of recent enemy activity. The bunkers were destroyed.

On 041315 January, vicinity TD 645036 (six kilometers northeast of Fire Base EASTONS) C Company, 1st Bn (Amb), 327th Inf discovered 45 10'x10'x5' bunkers with 1' of overhead cover. There were no indications of recent enemy activity. The bunkers were destroyed. At 1800 hours, vicinity TD 671011 (four kilometers northeast of Fire Base JACK) B Company, 3d Bn (Amb), 506th Inf employed organic weapons fire, engaging one enemy 10 meters to the east of their position. The enemy returned small arms fire. A search of the area revealed one NVA KIA, one AK-47, 4 lb of rice, one 8'x15'x5' hut and five 1'x2'x2' fighting positions containing four RPG rounds. The hut and fighting positions were destroyed.

On 051625 January, vicinity TD 645040 (two kilometers northeast of Fire Base JACK) A Company, 3d Bn (Amb), 506th Inf employed organic weapons fire, engaging five enemy 15 meters to the east of their position. The enemy returned small arms fire and one enemy was killed. Artillery was employed on the enemy position. A search of the area was conducted with one NVA KIA, one AK-47, and one rucksack found. At 1055 hours, vicinity TD 671011 (four kilometers east of Fire Base TIGER) D Company, 2d Bn (Amb), 506th Inf observed their mechanical ambush detonate 80 meters to the south of their position. A search under artillery illumination revealed two NVA KIA, one AK-47, and two rucksacks. The NVA KIA were wearing green uniforms and rucksacks. Enemy

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Inclosure (Operations Narratives/Significant Activities) to Operations Report - Lessons Learned, 10th Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, AFM 10-100 (R3) (C).

were moving north to south.

On 071150 January, vicinity XC 40230 (two kilometers north of Fire Base HILLEN) Recon Team C, 2d Bn (Abn), 17th Inf employed organic weapons fire engaging an estimated enemy 100 meters to the northwest of their position. The enemy did not return fire but withdrew in an unknown direction. A search of the area revealed one NVA KIA and one blood trail.

On 081443 January, vicinity XC 40270 (five kilometers east of Fire Base O'REILLY) C Company, 2d Bn (Abn), 17th Inf received small arms fire from five enemy 30 meters to the north of the position. The element returned organic weapons fire and the enemy withdrew to the northwest. A search of the area was conducted revealing one NVA KIA, one AK-47, one AK-47 magazine, one M160 rocket launcher, one pack of tobacco and a cut up newspaper.

On 11 January at 0830 hours, vicinity YD 92734 (four kilometers west of Fire Base HILLEN) Company B, 2d Bn (Abn), 17th Inf employed organic weapons fire on one enemy 25 meters to the east of their position. The enemy did not return fire. A search of the area was conducted revealing one NVA KIA, one AK-47 and a total two feet wide oriented northeast - south.

On 13 January at 1120 hours, vicinity XD 91030, Company A, 2d Bn (Abn), 17th Cavalry had an 1800 receive 12.7mm machine gun and small arms fire. The aircraft was hit four times and two US were wounded. The area was engaged by gunships resulting in one NVA KIA. There were two US KIA and one NVA KIA.

On 15 January A Troop, 2d Bn (Abn), 17th Cavalry, while on armed aerial reconnaissance, again engaged the enemy at 1730 hours in the vicinity of XD 92726. The assault killed three NVA soldiers and destroyed a 12.7mm crew served weapon. A 4.2 from A Troop, 2d Bn (Abn), 17th Cavalry spotted an active 12.7mm machine gun position at 1840 hours in the vicinity of XD 90234. An airstrike was immediately employed on the target, destroying the position.

On 16 January the 2d Bn (Abn), 17th Cavalry experienced a heavy day along the AO reconnaissance route. The day produced 11 contacts for a total of 20 NVA KIA.

On 17 January at 1810 hours in the vicinity of XD 92726 (four kilometers northwest of Fire Base HILLEN) C Company, 2d Bn (Abn), 17th Inf received small arms fire from three to five enemy in bands 50 meters to the west of their position. The element returned organic weapons fire and the enemy withdrew in an unknown direction. While conducting a search of the area the element engaged sixteen enemy to the west of their position. The unit employed a F4U, A-1H, and artillery. A search of the area revealed nine NVA KIA, one AK-47 and one blood trail. At 1840 hours in the vicinity of XC 40696, an 04A from B Troop, 2d Bn (Abn), 17th Cavalry while on armed aerial reconnaissance received 20 rounds of small arms fire. Gunships were employed resulting in one NVA KIA. At 1855 hours a F4U Team from A Troop, 2d Bn (Abn), 17th Cavalry, while conducting bomb damage assessment of an airstrike, observed and destroyed and killed one NVA.

On 20 January a F4U Team from B Troop, 2d Bn (Abn), 17th Cavalry, while on armed reconnaissance, at 1930 hours in the vicinity of XC 92677

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observed and engaged one NVA. An aerial search of the area revealed one NVA KIA. One half-hour later in the vicinity of YC 21746 a Pink Team from B Troop 2d Sqdn (Aml), 17th Cavalry observed, engaged and killed two NVA. Again at 1625 hours a B Troop Pink Team, while on armed aerial reconnaissance, observed, engaged and killed one NVA.

On 21 January D Company, 2d Bn (Aml), 501st Inf working in the vicinity of YC 864940 (four kilometers south of Fire Base 501) observed their mechanical ambush detonate 600 meters to the north of their position at 0708 hours. While searching the ambush area the element received small arms fire from 4-6 enemy 200 meters to the west of their position. The element returned organic weapons fire and the enemy withdrew to the west. A Pink Team was employed and successfully engaged three enemy soldiers, killing three, capturing three AK-47s, two rucksacks and containing miscellaneous documents. An OH64 from C Troop, 2d Sqdn (Aml), 17th Cavalry received small arms fire in the vicinity of YC 418363 at 1620 hours. The area was engaged by Cav resulting in three NVA KIA.

On 23 January, 1515 hours, the 3d Plt, Company A, 2d Bn (Aml), 501st Inf observed and engaged three enemy soldiers resulting in two NVA KIA and one AK-47 captured. At 1700 hours, YD 507215, the 2d Plt, Co A, 2d Bn (Aml), 501st Inf discovered a weapons cache containing 93 AK-47 rifles, 12 AK-47s, 2 M-2 carbines, 1 M-1 carbine, 3 unknown type submachine guns, and 4 unknown type rifles. At 1347 hours, YD 518205, Co C, 2d Sqdn (Aml), 17th Cav received small arms fire from two enemy 100 to 500 meters from their position. The element returned organic weapons fire resulting in two enemy KIA and one AK-47. At 1215 hours, YC 421930, Co C, 2d Bn (Aml), 17th Cav OH64, while conducting visual reconnaissance, received small arms fire. The area was engaged by gunships and Cav resulting in three NVA KIA and five NVA KIA.

6. (C) Chronology of 101st Abn Div (Aml) and 1st Bn 101st Abn Div (Aml) from 1500H 7:19.

a. 30 Jan - 31 Mar. On 30 Jan 71 the 2d Bn (Aml), 101st Inf moved CPOD to the 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Aml) (see 101st Inf Div (Aml) significant activities summary). On 30 February the 101st Abn Div (Aml) committed infantry units into QUANG TRI Province from the 3d Bde CP. CP passed CPOD to the 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Aml) moving to 101st Bde. On 24 February, the brigade CP returned to the 101st Bde CP. The 501st Inf moved to Strong Point A-2; and the 2d Bn (Aml), 501st Inf moved to MAI LOC passing CPOD to the 3d Bde CP. On 21 February the 2d Bn (Aml), 327th Inf moved north into QUANG TRI in the vicinity of Fire Base 501 and MAI LOC. On 1 March the 2d Bn (Aml), 327th Inf CP moved to MAI LOC. On 2 March the 11th Bde, 231st Inf moved CPOD to the 101st Abn Div (Aml) continuing its mission of operating along a main axis of the DMZ. The following day the 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Aml) moved CPOD to the 101st Abn Div (Aml) continuing its mission of securing lines of communication and QL-9 in QUANG TRI Province. On 5 March the CP of the 1st Bn (Aml), 501st Inf moved from 501st Bn to Fire Base 501. On 7 March Task Force 1-77 passed CPOD to the 3d Bde of the 101st with its CP at Fire Base VANHONGHUT. On the 8th the Task Force moved to

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Inclosure (Operations Narrative/Significant Activities) to Operations Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCL: GPFM-65 (R3) (U).

CA LU, moving back to VAMPOURIST on 18 March. On 19 March the 2d Bn (AAB1), 506th Inf moved north into QUANG TRI Province to Fire Base SAUC passing OPCON to the 3d Bde, 101st. The 1st Bn (AAB1), 506th Inf passed their A Company OPCON to the 3d Bn (AAB1), 506th Inf in preparation of commitment of the battalion north. On 19 March the 1st Bn (AAB1), 506th Inf CP and its B Company moved from Fire Base SAUC to Fire Base HUEI. CRIST. The 2d Bn (AAB1), 506th Inf moved to Fire Base SAUC to HUEI replacing the 1st Bn (AAB1), 506th Inf. The 1st Bn (AAB1), 506th Inf returned south to HUEI on 20 March. Also on 20 March Task Force 1-17 returned OPCON to the 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech).

b. 1-9 Apr (withdrawal). On 7 April the 1st Bn (AAB1), 506th Inf, after two months of operations with the 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech), returned OPCON to the 101st Abn Div (AAB1) moving to CHIE EVANS to prepare for future operations. The CP for the 1st Bn (AAB1), 506th Inf moved to Fire Base SAUC; the 2d Bn (AAB1), 506th Inf passed OPCON to the 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech); and the 11th Bde, 23d Inf returned OPCON to their parent organization of 7 March. On 9 March the 1st Bn (AAB1), 506th Inf returned OPCON to the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div (AAB1). The 1st Bn (AAB1), 506th Inf moved south to Fire Base GIADIANG and the 2d Bn (AAB1), 506th Inf moved south to Fire Base RUEIDAN. The 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech) reverted from OPCON to the 101st Abn Div (AAB1) ending the 1st Bde's control for LADD 719.

c. Significant Activities east of the DMZ April 1971 (continued from the AO of LADD 719).

(1) 031405 March in the vicinity of YD 16 000 A-1H 1st Bn (AAB1), 506th Inf received small arms fire and RPG fire from an estimated enemy force resulting in 7 US KIA (E), and 1 NVA KIA.

(2) 051415 March the Recon-377th, 1st Bn (AAB1), 506th Inf, covered a grave with one NVA.

(3) 101635 March 1/4-11 Inf, in the vicinity of YD 5 000, covered 7 graves containing NVA killed by enemy fire resulting in 7 US KIA.

(4) 090900 March F/4-8 Cav, in the vicinity of YD 23 000, covered a campsite resulting in one detainee.

(5) 120750 March 2/B/2-1 Inf, in the vicinity of YD 10000, covered an unknown size enemy force resulting in 1 US KIA and 1 A-47 captured.

(6) 191745 March the security patrol team, in the vicinity of YD 07500, engaged an unknown size enemy force resulting in 1 US KIA and 1 A-47 captured.

(7) 201420 March 3/B/2-502 Inf, in the vicinity of YD 05000, received small arms fire from an unknown size enemy force resulting in 1 NVA KIA and 1 A-47 captured.

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Enclosure (Operations Narrative/Significant Activity) to Operations Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airborne), Period Ending: 30 April 1971, and: (30) (31).

(8) 231412 March 1971-1st Ind in the vicinity of YD 057104, received small arms fire from 2 or 3 enemy soldiers. 1st Ind returned organic weapons fire resulting in 1 MVA KIA and 1 AH-47 captured.

(9) 231805 March Recon/2-1 Ind in the vicinity of YD 060455, engaged 3 enemy soldiers, resulting in 3 MVA KIA.

(10) 231715 March Recon/2-1 Ind in the vicinity of YD 077141, engaged 3 MVA with organic weapons fire resulting in 1 MVA KIA and 1 AH-47 captured.

(11) 231300 March the Recon and security platoon from the 3d Bde, in the vicinity of YD 078503, engaged 2 or 3 enemy soldiers resulting in 3 MVA KIA and 3 AH-47 captured.

(12) 021240 April 3/0/2-101 Ind, in the vicinity of YD 072603, received small arms fire from 2 or 3 enemy soldiers. 1st Ind returned organic weapons fire resulting in 1 MVA KIA, 1 MVA KIA, 1 AH-47 captured and one rucksack.

(13) 052010 April Recon/1-101 Ind, in the vicinity of YD 300409, engaged suspected enemy position resulting in 3 MVA KIA and 2 AH-47s captured.

3. Significant activities west of the DMZ on grid lines.

(1) 101100 March 1/1/2-101 Ind received small arms fire and engaged organic weapons fire from 2 or 3 enemy soldiers in the vicinity of YD 010007 resulting in 1 MVA KIA.

(2) 131100 March 3/0/2-101 Ind received small arms fire from an estimated enemy platoon 200 meters to their north resulting in 1 MVA KIA, 1 MVA KIA, 1 AH-47 and one rucksack captured.

(3) 131720 March 3/5/1-101 Ind observed their mechanical ambush detector 300 meters north of their position resulting in 1 MVA KIA and 1 AH-47 captured.

(4) 141917 March 1/1/2-101 Ind, in the vicinity of YD 041603, engaged an enemy element 50 meters west of their position resulting in 3 MVA KIA.

(5) 141500 March 1/1/2-101 Ind, in the vicinity of YD 042103, engaged an enemy element 100 meters west of their position resulting in 1 MVA KIA and 1 AH-47.

(6) 141715 March 1/1/2-101 Ind, in the vicinity of YD 005500, engaged 5 enemy 75 meters east of their position resulting in 2 MVA KIA.

(7) 141920 March 2/0/2-101 Ind observed their mechanical ambush detector in the vicinity of YD 041603, resulting in 1 MVA KIA and 1 AH-47.

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Inclosure (Operations Narrative Significant Activities) to Operations Report - Lessons Learned, 1st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RSO: 3-100-2-1 (89) (1).

captured. There were several NVA 47s hiding in the area.

(8) 161435 March 1/G/1-501 Ind, in the vicinity of XD 947605, received small arms fire from an unknown size enemy force 100 meters from their position resulting in 1 NVA KIA (M), 2 NVA KIA, 1 RIF, 1 RIF and 1 AK-47 captured.

(9) 161710 March 1/E/2-307 Ind, in the vicinity of YD 000581, discovered twenty-three 82mm mortar rounds and 3 cases of 12.7 mm machine gun ammunition.

(10) 190845 March on CL-3, in the vicinity of XD 902495, 2 vehicles received 2 RPG rounds, small arms fire, and fragmentation grenades from an unknown size enemy force resulting in 1 US 5-ton truck moderately damaged, 1 ARVN 7 ton truck lightly damaged, 2 US KIA (M) and 2 ARVN KIA (M). 1-77 engaged NVA fleeing west resulting in 1 NVA KIA.

(11) 210425 March sappers attacked the rear/rear point at Fire Base VANDERGRIFT resulting in two 100mm mortar SP-4 blowers destroyed and 1 NVA KIA.

(12) 240925 March 1/E/2-307 Ind, in the vicinity of XD 901916, engaged an unknown size enemy force resulting in 1 NVA KIA and 1 AK-47 captured.

(13) 240925 March 2/G/2-101 Ind, in the vicinity of YD 000770, engaged 3 to 4 enemy 100 meters north of their position resulting in 1 NVA KIA and 1 AK-47 captured.

(14) 241430 March 1/G/1-501 Ind, in the vicinity of XD 945977, engaged 8 NVA north of their position with 82mm and mortars resulting in 2 NVA KIA.

(15) 250918 March 2/G/2-101 Ind, in the vicinity of XD 006004, engaged an unknown size enemy force with organic weapons fire 100 meters north of their position resulting in 1 NVA KIA, and discovered 20 bundles bags of food and earth which were later destroyed.

(16) 251815 March 2/A/1-500 Ind, in the vicinity of XD 959503, engaged 4 to 6 enemy with organic weapons fire resulting in 2 NVA KIA.

(17) 261055 March 2/E/1-500 Ind, in the vicinity of XD 946553, discovered 3 graves containing 3 NVA KIA.

(18) 272230 March 1/A/2-150 Ind, in the vicinity of XD 005508, engaged an unknown size enemy force with organic weapons resulting in 6 NVA KIA, 1 NVA PW, 14 rucksacks, 1 R5A pistol, 6 AK-47s and 1 RPG launcher captured.

(19) 282155 March Fire Base VANDERGRIFT was attacked by sappers resulting in 2 NVA KIA and 2 AK-47s captured.

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(10) During March 27/28, 1961, in the vicinity of the dam, a large number of dead fish were observed, resulting in a fish kill. A check of the water quality report for the same period shows a high level of dissolved oxygen, which is not consistent with the observed fish kill.

(U) [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

(U) APRIL 27, 1968 - [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible]

1. The attack on the ship was carried out by a group of men, some of whom were identified as being members of the Japanese Imperial Navy. The attack was carried out on the night of 12/12/41, and the ship was sunk. The attack was carried out by a group of men, some of whom were identified as being members of the Japanese Imperial Navy. The attack was carried out on the night of 12/12/41, and the ship was sunk.

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Inclosure (Operations Narrative, Significant Activities to Operations Report - Lessons Learned, Joint A Change Division (JACD), Period Ending: 30 April 1971, RAN: 000005 (10) (1).

and 31 on 8 February. On 9 February all air attacks were cancelled due to adverse weather. The armored task force moved forward 2 kilometers. On the 10th of February, the 1st Arm Div inserted a battalion into objective ALQVI, the armored task force linked up with the battalion at 1535 hours and the 1st Inf Div landed a battalion on ALQVI. The initial objective had been seized.

11-13 Feb. During the period the armored Task Force consolidated its position around objective ALQVI. The 1st Regt, 1st Inf Div (ABN) inserted two battalions on ALQVI and on ALQVI I. A rubber battalion was air assaulted to RANGLER North Hill. Additional forces, artillery and supplies were air lifted into objective ALQVI and other established LAs. An airborne battalion was inserted north of objective 21 on 13 February as the forces flanking the armor were moved forward of objective ALQVI.

14-18 Feb. With the armor consolidated, no further progress to the west, the 1st Inf Div (ABN) turned north expending its search for enemy supplies and facilities. Elements of the 1st Regt, 1st Inf Div (ABN) and accompanying artillery moved to KHEL I and KHEL II. Attempts to insert a battalion on KHEL were cancelled because of intense enemy fire. Forces in the vicinity of KHEL were increasing contact with the enemy.

19-22 Feb. The northern flank of the armor was under heavy attack with the enemy success in penetrating their forces in the RANGLER IIA and airborne objectives. In an effort to secure positions was limited by intense enemy fire on the LAs. On 19 February the 1st Airborne Battalion positions of RANGLER NGHT were penetrated by the enemy. Elements of the battalion were able to reach KHEL I and the next day. RANGLER SOUTH and objective 31 came under increasing enemy pressure.

23 Feb - 2 Mar. During this period, preparations were made to regain the initiative and continue the drive west. 1st Inf Div elements were repositioned north and west. 1st Regt units were moved from KHEL II to KHEL I and from KHEL I to KHEL II. On 25 February, the rubber battalions were extracted. Objective 31 came under heavy attack which enabled the use of tanks by the armor. The 1st Armored Task Force attacked north to relieve the airborne position on objective 21. 1st Inf Div (ABN) forces on the extreme southern flank continued to be under heavy pressure until withdrawn on 1 March. An airborne battalion was inserted on KHEL ALMA to secure Route 9 and hold back the I Corps penetration into KHEL.

1. Attack to RANGLER IIA and Consolidation.

26 Mar. The drive to KHEL IIA was accomplished in a series of airborne assaults by the 1st Inf Div (ABN) eastward along the escarpment north overlooking Route 9. 1st Regt units were released for this operation by inserting two battalions on KHEL IIA (ABN); one in the vicinity of Fire Base KHEL IIA and the second Fire Base KHEL IIA. Additionally, the 1st Regt was released from KHEL IIA. From eastern KHEL IIA Province (including the 1st Regt, 1st Arm Div (ABN) and the 1st Div, 1st Inf Div). The 1st Inf Div (ABN) units air assaulted successively into KHEL IIA, KHEL IIA I, and KHEL IIA II. By 3 March, the 1st Regt and occupied KHEL IIA I and KHEL IIA II. The 1st Regt was conducting operations in the vicinity of KHEL IIA I and KHEL IIA II. The 1st Regt was conducting

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Inclosure (Operations Narratives) Additional to Operations Report - Lessons Learned, 10th Air Division (Airborne), Period Ending: 30 April 1971, RGN: 1-200000-100-100.

Landings at SCNHA EAST and west of the westward along the beachfront. On 6 March two battalions were landed into SCNHA, north of TCHSPUE. These units then attacked east and west, occupying the beach. During this period the Airborne Division and the 1st Air Task Force operated north and east of Objective AKUI, and the 1st Air Task Force followed by the Airborne Division.

7-10 Mar. Again, this period was characterized by operations from SCNHA into TCHSPUE, leading to the capture of the south of the beachfront. Adverse weather conditions and the lack of coordination of the enemy pressure be in to build in the beachfront. All friendly elements withdrew south of SCNHA and began to move back to SCNHA. At this point major additional forces were required to proceed with the original plan of seizing the beachfront and establishing an extended period in that area. In the face of the enemy's numerically superior enemy forces in the beachfront area, the 1st Air Task Force by the Commanding General of I Corps and the 1st Air Task Force.

c. Extraction.

11-14 Mar. The withdrawal of the 1st Air Task Force from the vicinity of TCHSPUE and SCNHA WEST was completed on the evening of 12 March. On 11 March, two battalions of the 1st Air Task Force were extracted to SCNHA EAST and the 1st Air Task Force with two additional battalions moving the next day to the vicinity of SCNHA. The 1st Air Task Force continued operations south and east of Fire Base SCNHA and the 1st Air Task Force continued southwest of Fire Base SCNHA I and SCNHA. The 1st Air Task Force conducted operations with two battalions in the area of SCNHA, Fire Base SCNHA, and Fire Base SCNHA. Because of the 1st Air Task Force was not able because of indirect and small arms fire on SCNHA.

15-18 Mar. Increased enemy pressure and unsuccessful attempts to resupply or conduct medical evacuation at Fire Base SCNHA forced the defenders to abandon the base and move over to the east. By the end of the week, the 1st Air Task Force, less one battalion, had been extracted from multiple locations around Fire Base SCNHA I and SCNHA WEST. The battalions had been in continuous contact for several days and were forced to move to new pick-up zones or several occasions in order to break contact with the enemy. Extractions were completed only after intensive tactical and artillery, and aerial rocket artillery preparation.

19-22 March. With the majority of the friendly forces off the enemy's west of Objective AKUI, the extraction of Objective AKUI and elements of the Airborne Division was completed. By the end of the week, the 1st Air Task Force had been completely withdrawn from SCNHA and the extraction by air of the 1st Air Task Force. As before, the 1st Air Task Force was not able to often at night, in order to break contact with the enemy. Elements of the Airborne Division were not able to move to the east. While, the 1st Air Task Force was not able to move to the east, the 1st Air Task Force. It initially moved to the east of SCNHA and SCNHA, with no difficulty, but ran into enemy resistance and was blocked east of Fire Base SCNHA. At this point the Commanding General of I Corps wanted the 1st Air Task Force to hold and act as a pivot for the 1st Air Task Force and the 1st Air Task Force salients to the east. The 1st Air Task Force was not able to move.

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Inclosure (Operation Narrative/Significant Activities) to Operations Report - Lessons Learned, 1st Airborne Division (Main Body), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS: GFCR-5 (1) (1).

On 607 April C Company, 1st Bn (Ambl), 3d Bn Inf, operating in the vicinity of YC 472690 ambushed an unknown size enemy force with small arms and mortar fire. A search of the area revealed 5 US KIA, one US MIA, 3 rucksacks and medical supplies. At 0800 hours, again on 607 April, a platoon from B Company, 3d Bn (Ambl), 167th Inf observed their M1 automatic mortar west of their position (YP 412302). A search of the area revealed 2 US KIA, 2 AF-47s, and 30 lbs of rice and rice cookers. On 608 April the 1st Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf completed reinforcement and moved into the Fire Base GLADIATOR in the 3d Bde area of operations with elements continuing to the south and east. The 3d Bn (Ambl), 167th Inf moved to the south to conduct refresher training. On 609 April, 1st Troop, 1st Bn, 11th Cavalry while conducting armed aerial reconnaissance over the area was hit by helicopter. At 0855 hours the action began from 21 April 1971, 167th Inf engaged one enemy north of their location (YC 557310) resulting in 1 US KIA with equipment killed. At 0915 hours, in the vicinity of YC 163229, C Troop, 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 11th Cavalry engaged and killed 1 US KIA. At 1540 hours, in the vicinity of YC 484920, a Ranger unit from Company 1 (Ambl), 167th Inf was engaged by an unknown size enemy force resulting in 1 US KIA. The unit attempted to extract the team in 1-1-1. The team was not recovered in 1 US KIA and 3 US MIA. Later, an individual Ranger from the team attempted to locate the downed aircraft and failed to return. B Company, 3d Bn (Ambl), 167th Inf was inserted into the area to assist in locating the downed aircraft. The company met with heavy enemy resistance and fire. The final results for the action on 23 and 24 April were 2 US KIA, 1 US MIA, 1 US KIA, 1 US MIA. On 25 April the 3d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf reinforced and A Co, 1st Bn (Ambl), 167th Inf was air assaulted to YC 472690 to provide support. The aircraft was located and extracted. All elements were extracted with no totals for the engagement: 10 US KIA, 2 US MIA, 1 US KIA, 1 US MIA.

In the 1st Bde area of operations, 1st Bn, 167th Inf (Ambl), 167th Inf continued operations in the vicinity of Fire Base GLADIATOR. The 3d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf continued operations in the vicinity of Fire Base GLADIATOR with elements also on Fire Base GLADIATOR. On 610 April, 1st Troop, 1st Bn, 11th Cavalry while conducting armed aerial reconnaissance over the area was hit by helicopter. At 0855 hours the action began from 21 April 1971, 167th Inf engaged one enemy north of their location (YC 557310) resulting in 1 US KIA with equipment killed. At 0915 hours, in the vicinity of YC 163229, C Troop, 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 11th Cavalry engaged and killed 1 US KIA. At 1540 hours, in the vicinity of YC 484920, a Ranger unit from Company 1 (Ambl), 167th Inf was engaged by an unknown size enemy force resulting in 1 US KIA. The unit attempted to extract the team in 1-1-1. The team was not recovered in 1 US KIA and 3 US MIA. Later, an individual Ranger from the team attempted to locate the downed aircraft and failed to return. B Company, 3d Bn (Ambl), 167th Inf was inserted into the area to assist in locating the downed aircraft. The company met with heavy enemy resistance and fire. The final results for the action on 23 and 24 April were 2 US KIA, 1 US MIA, 1 US KIA, 1 US MIA. On 25 April the 3d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf reinforced and A Co, 1st Bn (Ambl), 167th Inf was air assaulted to YC 472690 to provide support. The aircraft was located and extracted. All elements were extracted with no totals for the engagement: 10 US KIA, 2 US MIA, 1 US KIA, 1 US MIA.

The 3d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf continued operations in the vicinity of Fire Base GLADIATOR on the 26th, C Company, 1st Bn, 167th Inf continued operations in the vicinity of Fire Base GLADIATOR. D Company continued operations in the vicinity of Fire Base GLADIATOR. Team A, 1-1 Cavalry was elements of A Company, 1st Bn, 167th Inf conducted search and attack operations in the vicinity of Fire Base GLADIATOR. On 611 April, 3d Bn Inf continued operations in the vicinity of Fire Base GLADIATOR with elements securing BUCHER, BUCHER, and BUCHER. The 1st Bn (Ambl), 167th Inf continued operations in the vicinity of Fire Base GLADIATOR.

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