

Annex D (5th ARVN Division) to After-Action Report, BINH LONG Campaign

1. (U) PURPOSE:

The purpose of this annex is to provide the best available information as to the activities of the 5th ARVN Division immediately prior to and during the battle of Loc Ninh, and what may be known as one of the most historically significant battles in the Republic of South Vietnam or in Southeast Asia - the battle of An Loc. The information contained herein covers a wide spectrum of source material to include information contained in official Advisory Team 70 and 5th ARVN Division journals and by personal interviews with active participants. The period addressed in this annex is from 4 April - 25 June 1972.

2. (C) INTRODUCTION:

a. From November 1971 to April 1972, the 5th ARVN Division conducted operations in the Tri-Province areas of Binh Long, Phuoc Long, and Binh Duong, concentrating their effort, during November 1971 - January 1972, on cross-border operations into eastern Cambodia. The incursions into Cambodia were limited in depth, being within 105mm howitzer range from fire support bases (FSB) located along the border from the Fish Hook (XT 5990) to the northern-most tip of the Flat Iron (XU 5423). No significant contacts were made or caches uncovered in spite of existing intelligence, indicating that there was considerable enemy activity in the area. The period late January to mid-March 1972 was characterized by scattered contacts with the enemy, particularly along the Song Be River corridor by the 8th Regiment in late January, and to the north, northeast, and west of FSB "A" (XU 714172) by the 7th Regiment. Also in January 1972, two new enemy regiments were identified within striking range of Military Region III. These were the 271st Independent Infantry Regiment which infiltrated from North Vietnam and the 24th Independent Infantry Regiment from Military Region II. At the end of February and the beginning of March, two prisoners were captured by the 7th Regiment north and northeast of FSB "A". These POWs were members of recon elements of the 69th VC Artillery Command. Their mission was to recon in areas west and north of Loc Ninh. They identified the 42d Artillery Regiment which had a 105mm howitzer capability, and the 271st AA Artillery Regiment, both of which were new to current OB holdings.

b. In February and early March, the 9th VC Division returned to the CHUP Plantation in Cambodia, after a four-month campaign against the Cambodian (FANK) forces west of the Mekong River. At the end of March, five regiments representing all three divisions (5th and 9th VC Divisions and the 7th NVA Division) were concentrated within 15 kms of Memot. The E-6, 209th, and 141st were west of Memot; the 95C Regiment to the east and the 174th Regiment to the northeast. It was not known whether these units would deploy south into Tay Ninh Province or east into Binh Long Province. During this period, JGS was broadcasting alarm to all Border Ranger Camps and feared a possible general offensive in the Central Highlands area. The 5th ARVN Division associated the increase in reconnaissance to a probable limited attack on FSB "A", with a full-scale attack on Loc Ninh a remote possibility. Little or no consideration was given to the enemy mounting an offensive of the magnitude which later developed.

c. In late March, documents captured by the 25th Division in the vicinity of FSB PACE (XT 075877) indicated that the 9th VC Division was preparing to attack An Loc. The 272d Regiment was to advance east from the "Fish Hook". The division was also said to be training in street fighting. This information was also confirmed by a PW captured in Base Areas 354, west of Tay Ninh Province.

d. On 11 March 1972, the 9th Regiment, 5th ARVN Division, replaced the 7th Regiment at Loc Ninh. The 1st Battalion, 9th Regiment, remained assigned in the district town of Bo Duc (XU 955248) in Phuoc Long Province. The regiment, however, was augmented by the 1st Cavalry Regiment (minus one squadron) of the 5th ARVN Division, and assumed OPCON of the 74th Border Ranger Battalion, the tenant at FSB "A".

e. In addition to providing security at Loc Ninh, the 9th Regiment also protected the vital Cam Le Bridge (XT 722973) on the QL13 supply artery north of An Loc, and FSB "A". The 7th Regiment, after a brief respite in its rear base at Phuoc Vinh, returned to occupy FSB 1 (XT 694927) for operations west and northwest of An Loc to the Cambodian border. The 8th Regiment at this time was conducting operations near the district town of Tri Tam in Binh Duong Province. Also,

to preclude the vulnerable FSB "A" from being subjected to an attack, the 5th ARVN Division Commander ordered the 9th Regiment to place the 1st Cavalry Regimental Task Force in a mobile posture.

f. On 21 March, the III Corps Commander directed the movement of the 52d Regiment (-) of the 18th ARVN Division to An Loc to be placed under the operational control of the 5th ARVN Division. This unit consisted of the Regimental Headquarters, two infantry battalions, and a battery of 105mm howitzers. Initially the regiment was given the mission of securing the 5th Division CP, but due to the intensity of the intelligence buildup, it was ordered to Fire Base "Hung Tam" (XT 715995) to conduct operations in that area.

g. On 1 April, the 24th and 271st Independent Infantry Regiments opened what is believed to be a diversionary attack on FSB "Pace" and other 25th Division firebases in northwestern Tay Ninh Province. On 3 April, the E-6 Regiment was identified 10 kms west of Loc Ninh, and inside the border of South Vietnam. Two companies of the 3d Battalion, 9th Regiment, were dispatched to verify this report and made contact with the enemy forces on the afternoon of 4 April. The Commanding General, 5th ARVN Division, ordered the 1st Cavalry, which was conducting a search mission across the border at QL13, to return immediately to FSB "A", evacuate the base, and close into Loc Ninh as soon as possible. The 1st Cavalry closed on FSB "A" in the late afternoon on 4 April; however, contrary to orders, elected not to begin the evacuation of FSB "A" until early in the morning of 5 April. Thus the stage was set for the battle of Loc Ninh and the ensuing engagement at An Loc. A complete task organization for the 5th ARVN Division as of 4 April is shown at Appendix 1 and a map depicting their locations is shown at Figure D-1.

### 3. (C) DISCUSSION:

#### a. Summary of Operations:

##### (1) 5-7 April - The Battle of Loc Ninh:

(a) On 050650 April 1972, enemy forces initiated a sustained indirect fire attack against the 9th Regiment Headquarters and the subsector compound at Loc Ninh. A sketch map of the Loc Ninh area is shown at Figure D-2. Possibly as a diversion for the primary attack at Loc Ninh, the enemy also initiated indirect fire attacks at Quan Loi (XT 8291), Phuoc Vinh (XT 9649), Song Be (YU 1407), Lai Khe (XT 7638), and Bo Duc (XU 955248). By 0730 hours, it became apparent to the defenders at Loc Ninh that they were facing an enemy force of at least regimental size supported by a large artillery unit. The enemy initially probed from the west with infantry and tanks, but was repelled by the ARVN defenders. One enemy tank was destroyed by direct fire from the artillery. Many other armored vehicles were heard maneuvering for the position. The 1st Cavalry Task Force located approximately 6 km north of Loc Ninh was ordered to attack the enemy and to link up with the 9th Regiment Headquarters. The lead elements of this 1st Cavalry force encountered the enemy at the swimming pool immediately north of Loc Ninh village (XU 735102). (See Figure D-3). They were unable to proceed further. Radio contact with the task force was broken early in the afternoon of 5 April and it must be assumed that the entire task force was routed by the enemy. Enemy artillery continued to pound friendly installations throughout the day and into the night. Extensive use of US tactical air strikes countered. After a frantic first day, the situation appeared to stabilize on 6 April. Two companies of the 3d Battalion, 9th Regiment, which had been conducting operations west of Loc Ninh, managed to close within supporting distance of the 9th Regiment Command Post. Also, two M113 APCs organic to the 1st Cavalry Regiment joined the defenders at Loc Ninh. These vehicles were reportedly manned by personnel from the 74th Ranger Battalion and the 2d Battalion, 9th Regiment. Elsewhere in the 5th Division area, the enemy conducted attacks at Quan Loi and Bu Dop. Elements of the 52d Regiment operating south of Loc Ninh also had three contacts with the enemy and Fire Base "Hung Tam" received a heavy indirect fire attack during the early morning hours. More significant, however, was an enemy road block established between Chon Thanh (XT 7662) and An Loc on QL13. This road block effectively eliminated ARVN surface transportation capability into An Loc from all points south.

(b) Friendly positions at Loc Ninh continued to receive artillery attacks throughout the night of 6 April. On the morning of 7 April, the enemy launched an intensive ground attack with

tanks and infantry. What happened exactly at Loc Ninh on that day remains almost as much of a mystery to personnel of Advisory Team 70 as does the defeat of the 1st Cavalry Task Force, which lost radio communication with the 5th Division early on 5 April. Final contact with the 9th Regimental Advisory Team was made at 1900 hours, 7 April, by the supporting FAC. Earlier in the day, however, one FAC coordinating tactical air support reported that the 9th Regiment put up a white surrender flag. There was also much discussion concerning ARVN and US personnel evacuating defensive positions and moving to the east side of the runway, southwest of the town. One account, furnished by an ARVN artilleryman who was captured and later escaped from an NVA PW camp, indicated that the artillery base was evacuated at 0700 hours. This man reported that the infantrymen protecting the artillery base withdrew to the east as enemy tanks attacked from the west. All the artillerymen followed suit and most of them proceeded north toward the district compound. Upon reaching the compound, this soldier reported that friendly forces were still resisting the enemy, but that a PF platoon fled from the compound north toward Loc Ninh Village. This man followed the PF platoon and reported that he believed the entire friendly force to have been totally routed by 0730 hours. The true story may be revealed when and if the large numbers of ARVN prisoners who were captured by the NVA are finally released. This artilleryman also reported that approximately 1,000 ARVN and district forces were located in his PW camp. This report is corroborated by an NLF post-battle radio broadcast which indicated that 1300 ARVN were taken prisoner during the battle. Statistics maintained by the 5th ARVN Division reflect significant personnel and equipment losses. Although figures for the period 5-7 April are unavailable, personnel losses for the period 4 April - 17 July are shown at Appendix 2 and equipment losses are shown at Appendix 3. Equipment losses are current through 30 June.

(c) With Loc Ninh apparently lost, the 5th Division Commander ordered the 52d Regiment at Fire Base "Hung Tam" (XT 715995) and the ARVN forces at Cam Le Bridge (XT 722973) to withdraw south to An Loc. The 52d Regiment evacuated "Hung Tam" shortly before noon on 7 April. All trucks and artillery departed the fire base and the convoy was ambushed by enemy forces along QL 13 almost immediately upon entering the highway. What happened during this encounter was described by LTC Ginger, Senior Advisor to the 52d Regiment (See Appendix 4). Friendly forces at the Cam Le Bridge destroyed their artillery and the men (approximately 150 infantry and artillerymen) proceeded to An Loc. The city of An Loc, meanwhile, received its first rounds of enemy artillery, and elements of the 3rd Ranger Group, which had been sent to bolster the defenses at An Loc on 6 April, made contact with enemy forces approximately 4 km northeast of the city. It was apparent this time that An Loc was the enemy's prime target. US CH-47 helicopters were tasked with delivering much-needed ammunition and rations, and refugees and wounded soldiers were evacuated on the return flights.

(d) Elsewhere in the general area, enemy forces continued to attack ARVN forces located in Quan Loi, Chon Thanh, and various other locations. It was also reported that the enemy had placed obstacles on HML 1A which connects Bo Duc with Phuoc Long City.

(2) 8-12 April (Preparation for the Defense of An Loc):

(a) The period 8-12 April was characterized by an intensive effort on the part of the ARVN to strengthen not only beleaguered An Loc, but friendly elements throughout Military Region III as well. The 21st ARVN Division was ordered to Lai Khe to assume a security mission along QL13 (see Annex F, 21st ARVN Division). The 1st Brigade, 1st Airborne Division (ARVN) preceded the 21st Division and was given the mission of spearheading the drive to open QL13 (see Annex H, 1st Airborne Brigade). Lead elements of the 21st Division arrived at Lai Khe on 10 April. The 1st Airborne Brigade moved its command post to Chon Thanh on 11 April where its battalions had already deployed.

(b) Intelligence sources provided daily information concerning a definite build-up of major enemy units around the An Loc area. B-52 strikes were employed extensively against these targets (see Appendix 6, ARCLIGHT Missions, to Annex C, Third Regional Assistance Command). Enemy artillery fire continued to increase, and intensified during the night of 12 April. Civilian refugees reported numerous concentrations of enemy troops, particularly to the east and southwest of the city. Observation aircraft sighted numerous enemy tanks and vehicles. Tactical air strikes were used against these targets. Evacuees from Loc Ninh area dribbled into the city. A highlight

was the return of 50 men on 11 April from the 2d Battalion, 9th Regiment. Also returning on separate occasions were the District Chief of Loc Ninh Subsector and his American Senior Advisor, Major Davidson.

(c) Elements of the 7th Regiment at Quan Loi were ordered to return to An Loc on 7 April. These elements successfully destroyed their artillery and evaded enemy forces for approximately 36 hours before arriving in An Loc late on 9 April. US helicopters from the 1st Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division, continued to support the 5th Division by airmobiling the 8th Regiment (-) from Tri Tam to the city on 11 and 12 April. Additionally, the 1st Brigade provided CH-47 helicopters to transport supplies and evacuate wounded and civilian personnel, and flew reconnaissance and troop support missions with their "Cobra" gunships (see Annex K).

(d) Also intensifying during this period was enemy anti-aircraft fire. Due to these fires and the enemy artillery, pilots were forced to use An Loc soccer field as a landing zone rather than the airstrip located to the north of the city. Preceeding the 8th Regiment (-) to An Loc was the 5th Reconnaissance Company which was airmobiled from Lai Khe on 9 April.

(e) Contact with enemy forces also intensified, particularly northeast and southwest of the city. ARVN soldiers and civilians submitted numerous reports that the enemy was preceeding his advance toward the city with cattle and civilians to activate the mines and automatic ambushes implaced by defenders. Numerous reports from civilians also confirmed a large number of enemy tanks throughout the area. The Commanding General, Third Regional Assistance Command, reported on 10 April that he observed approximately 200 enemy soldiers which had been killed by a CBU strike vicinity coordinates XT 7581. Civilians also reported seeing many enemy which had been killed by air strikes.

(f) Troop dispositions for the defense of An Loc as of 12 April are shown at Figure D-4. Strength figures for the same date are indicated at Appendix 5. The stage was set for the first enemy attack.

### (3) 13-16 April The First Major Attack :

(a) First indications of an enemy attack were reported at 0115 on 13 April when security forces located to the west and southwest of the city reported movement of sizeable enemy forces. At approximately 0400 hours, tanks and vehicles were reported moving generally to the west, northwest, and north of the city. At 0435 hours, a C-130 Spectre aircraft engaged and destroyed 4 trucks which were moving toward the city from the west. At 0535, the enemy artillery intensified and the ammunition dump and POL dump located in the vicinity of the airstrip were destroyed. At 0550, trip flares and claymores located 500 meters east of the city were set off and additional tank sightings were reported. By 0600 a heavy contact had developed to the west and Spectre was diverted from attacking a tank to provide close troop support for the 7th Regiment. At 0630, a "Sundog" FAC reported 20 tanks located in Tan Loi village (XT 7989). The main attack is believed to have been launched at 0600 hours, 13 April. The enemy struck at the city from the north, northwest, west, southwest, and south. The primary thrust came from the north and friendly forces defending in that sector quickly withdrew in the face of the enemy tanks and APCs. "Cobras" were given authority to engage armored vehicles on sight, and tactical air continued to strike targets which were located at a safe distance from friendly forces. The enemy failed to follow up his armor thrust with an infantry assault and the enemy armor became isolated inside ARVN defenses. Although inflicting heavy casualties upon friendly forces, the armor vehicles were soon sought out and destroyed by "Cobras", M-72's, and artillery direct fire. One T54 tank drove completely through the city from north to south on QL13, exited the south gate, and was finally destroyed by M-72 at that point.

(b) When the dust had cleared on 16 April, the ARVN defenders had yielded the entire northern half of the city. The line of defense was quickly readjusted and is depicted on map at Figure D-5. The most significant result of this attack is that ARVN forces held and that the enemy's objectives were not fully realized. Loss of the artillery ammunition dump and the northern portion of An Loc, however, later proved to be highly significant. The stage was now set for the intensification of enemy artillery shelling and use of highly sophisticated anti-aircraft weapons to thwart attempts of aerial resupply of much needed food, ammunition, and medical supplies, and to evacuate wounded and provide troop replacement. An Loc was firmly besieged.

(4) 17 April - 10 May (The Shelling Phase):

(a) Enemy armor losses during the first attack totaled 23 vehicles. Most were Soviet T54 and PT76 tanks. (See Figures D-6 through B-17). On 14 April, the Senior Advisor, 5th ARVN Division, reported that reinforcements were badly needed and that the situation remained critical. Failing to achieve a complete tactical victory 13-16 April, the enemy tactic at this point was to compress ARVN defenders into as small an area as possible, restrict movement, preclude resupply and medical evacuation and inflict maximum casualties and destruction. Artillery was their weapon. Appendix 6 provides a day-by-day account of the number of incoming artillery at An Loc from 5 April to 25 June.

(b) In response to a 5th Division request for reinforcements, III Corps directed that lead elements of the 1st Airborne Brigade be airmobiled southeast of An Loc vicinity coordinates XT 804864. These elements remained under control of the Brigade, which continued to work directly under III Corps. An artillery battery, consisting of six 105mm howitzers, was also inserted with the Brigade Headquarters at Hill 169, XT 790860. On the 17th of April, the 5th Division Senior Advisor made the following report to CG, TRAC:

Four days ago the enemy moved into An Loc with tanks. As a result, his forces now hold half of the city. The division is unable to retake lost ground. Yesterday, the northern 2-3 blocks of the city were destroyed by tactical air-strikes. Last night the enemy reinforced his defenses in north An Loc and is now firmly entrenched with mortars and anti-aircraft artillery. Believe the enemy will get stronger in the northern part of town. The 81st Airborne Battalion (sent to reinforce) has not yet arrived and the city is now heavily ringed on 3 sides with anti-aircraft guns. Believe that the enemy will use strangulation and starvation tactics - - - then attack in force. Enemy has made several infantry probes - all have been stopped by tactical airstrikes. The enemy has an abundance of mixed mortar and artillery with no apparent ASR. The division is tired and worn out; supplies minimal - - casualties continue to mount - - medical supplies and coverage is low. Wounded a major problem - mass burials for military and civilian - - morale at a low ebb. In spite of incurring heavy losses from US airstrikes, the enemy continues to persist.

(c) By 18 April, the 8th Airborne Battalion was in position to the south of An Loc. The 1st Airborne Brigade command post with supporting artillery along with the 5th and 6th Airborne Battalions were still located to the southeast, vicinity of Hill 169. A map at Figure D-5 indicates all friendly locations as of 18 April. It should be noted that 1st Airborne Brigade had not been placed under the OPCON of the 5th Division at this time.

(d) Intelligence reports indicated the presence of 5 regimental-sized enemy units around An Loc. Casualties continued to mount; only token supplies were recovered from air drops (this subject will be addressed separately under "Logistics"); friendly artillery was nearly all destroyed; and evacuation of wounded was next to impossible since VNAF helicopters refused to touch down and often sustained heavy losses when they did approach An Loc.

(e) On 22 April, the enemy succeeded in completely scuttling the 6th Airborne Battalion operating to the southeast. The 1st Brigade CP and the 8th and 5th Battalions had closed on positions to the south of An Loc the previous day. The airborne artillery battery had been completely destroyed in place by enemy attackers. The enemy had succeeded in isolating the battlefield. Enemy forces now occupied the critical hills to the southwest and US fighter aircraft began striking those positions. The military situation at An Loc on 22 April is best described by the remarks of the Senior Advisor, 5th ARVN Division, in his memorandum to the CG, TRAC:

The last 24 hours the enemy increased his indirect fire almost to the point of bombardment. There is currently no change in the situation in the northern part of the city. The northeast corner is heavily fortified - unable to breach. 81st Rangers can move in the northwest and scored well yesterday with Spectre equipped with 105mm gun.

AAA is still very active. Airborne elements caused to divert resources to save remnants. 5th Airborne and 8th Airborne had solid contact south of An Loc at approximately 1800 hours yesterday. Southwest and west side of city was probed by enemy on two occasions. Indirect fire increased at 0400 hours this AM and still falls. Enemy enjoys observing no resupply - enemy enjoys lack of helicopters landing at this location. Come hell or high water, both should be accomplished. Logistics situation remains the same.

- a. Enemy has definite advantage with respect to observation capability.
- b. Enemy has us out-gunned with direct fire weapons.
- c. Want priority on Spectre with 105mm.

(f) Intelligence reports indicated that the enemy was dispersing his units into anti-B52 posture. Friendly elements were conducting short patrols and confirming that enemy soldiers were being killed by airstrikes. On 5 May, the 81st Airborne Battalion exchanged defensive positions with the 8th Regiment and was instructed to attempt to push north.

(g) The tactical situation remained essentially the same until 10 May - neither side making significant gains nor sustaining losses sufficient in magnitude to necessitate capitulation. VNAF helicopters flew some successful troop replacement missions, but their losses in terms of men and equipment were heavy. Some wounded were also evacuated, but only the most able-bodied were capable of boarding the VNAF helicopters which, in most instances, refused to do more than hover momentarily. By consistently probing on the west side of the perimeter, the enemy managed to secure a small portion of a city block vicinity of where Highway 246 intersects with the perimeter road. The enemy persisted in that area and eventually secured a full block (see sketch map at Figure D-18).

(h) Enemy weapons continued to shell the city in moderate quantities. Positive identification was made for the following types of projectiles:

57mm Recoiless	100mm gun (tank)
60mm Mortar	105mm Howitzer
61mm Mortar	107mm Rocket
75mm Recoiless	120mm Mortar
81mm Mortar	122mm Rocket
82mm Mortar	155mm Howitzer

(i) Although positive identification has not been made, it is also possible that the NVA used 130mm artillery and 106mm mortars. Projectiles were fuzed with quick, delay, and time fuzes. On three separate occasions, CS or tear gas projectiles were fired in the vicinity of the 5th Division CP.

(j) A summary written by the Senior Advisor, 5th ARVN Division, on 8 May, has since proven highly accurate. This summary is quoted in part as follows:

Enemy continues to shell An Loc with mortars and artillery. Mortar fire on the upswing; artillery possibly being reduced. Enemy mortars targeted heavily against troop concentrations while artillery fire is directed primarily against the Division CP. Both mortar and artillery fire freely during resupply drops. Pleaseed to note that 23mm and 37mm anti-aircraft fire is almost nil. Enemy is resupplying most of his elements east of Route 13 from the north, Song Be basin and MRC-20 area. Forces west of An Loc resupplied from the north and through routes from the 'Fish Hook.' Enemy repairs bridges overnight. Technique of resupply has improved considerably. Internal problem exists here, however; uncontrolled distribution of canned goods due to limited available quantities and many hungry people (dog-eat-dog). Overall, rice is presently adequate. Water supply

is an ever-increasing problem. Most vehicles knocked out, hampers recovery, distribution, and storage of supplies. Overall, can't figure the enemy at this time. If he is gone, he left a hell of an indirect covering force. If he's utilizing an economy of force role, it is working well for him. I still give him the capability to attack if he so elects.

(k) On 9 May at 0145 hours, the defenders of An Loc got their first clue that Surface-to-Air Missiles had been integrated into the enemy's arsenal (see Figure D-19). Following is the journal entry concerning this observation:

"FAC reported seeing a SAM. Stinger said he thought it might be a meteorite. Airborne and Spectre reported that it was observed falling while the 7th Regiment said it was rising. Note: Possibly a surface-to-surface rocket or incoming artillery round.

(l) The foregoing comment described the general situation at An Loc prior to the second major attack which occurred on 11 May. The defensive posture of friendly elements is shown at Figure D-18 and troop strength at Appendix 12.

(5) 11-15 May The Second Major Attack:

(a) The second attack began on 11 May with indirect fire which at 0030 hours had intensified to the bombardment stage. This artillery fire remained at a high tempo until 0500. The city was then attacked by enemy forces with primary efforts made in the west and northeast. This attack differed from the first in the following ways:

- 1 Enemy artillery preparation was longer and more intense.
- 2 The enemy attacked with both tanks and infantry forces.
- 3 SAMs were employed by the enemy.

4 Most ARVN soldiers stood their ground in the face of enemy tanks and destroyed them with M72 LAW. (Enemy tank employment was again amateurish.)

(b) The result of this attack was that the enemy established salients into ARVN defenses in both the northeast and western portions of the perimeter. Figure D-20 graphically portrays these salients. The NVA tactic during this attack was to continue driving tanks and troops into the penetrated defenses in an attempt to expand their salients and eventually link up near the center of town, thereby separating the defenders into two enclaves. The 5th Division Commander responded to this threat by moving the 5th Airborne Battalion from its location south of the city and assigned it a new mission of blocking the enemy in both the west and northeast. This shift of forces served to stop the enemy in place. The western salient was then methodically attacked by VNAF A-1E Skyraiders using 250 lb bombs and the Spectre gunship using both 105mm and 40mm guns. Due to the close proximity of friendly troops in the narrow salient to the northeast, A-1E aircraft were rarely able to attack that location, although a misplaced LORAN strike provided some unexpectedly close and effective support on one occasion. The Spectre, however, was highly effective and served to contain the northeast penetration while inflicting heavy casualties by its 40mm and 105 HE into the bunkered positions. Spectre also forced VC into the open where they ran into mechanical ambush sites or were taken under fire by M16s and M79s.

(6) 16-25 May The Stalemate Period : Enemy commanders had apparently realized by this time that if their objective at An Loc was to be taken, they must counter the threat posed by the ARVN forces advancing from the south along QL13. Accordingly, troop contacts in An Loc during this period were significantly reduced. On the other hand, artillery fire as well as AAA fire remained heavy. Although the enemy activity within the two salients dwindled, ARVN forces were still unable to recapture these areas. The VC fought stubbornly from bunkered positions. ARVN patrols were initiated all around the secured area and reports of many enemy soldiers killed by air strikes began to flow in. The western salient was flanked successfully by elements of the

8th Regiment. On one patrol, an element of the 36th Ranger Battalion destroyed and captured a twin 57mm anti-aircraft gun mounted on a T54 tank chassis (probably a ZSU-57/2) (see figure D-21 and D-22). US and VNAF tactical aircraft as well as B-52 strikes were targeted primarily against artillery and anti-aircraft sites. Air resupply was effective in general although a critical shortage of medical supplies continued. Care of wounded remained a major problem.

(7) 26 May - 14 June ARVN Takes the Initiative :

(a) Enemy artillery attacks continued but at a reduced level. Correspondingly, friendly casualties were also reduced. The 15th Regiment operating south of An Loc remained under heavy pressure and air assets were diverted from the city in order to provide better coverage to the south. Patrolling during the early part of this period confirmed many dead enemy soldiers. Enemy dead in ever-increasing numbers were also reported by civilians. Clearing operations were initiated in the northern part of the city as ARVN forces picked up an offensive spirit. Two 4.2" mortars and ammunition were successfully air-dropped into An Loc on 2 June and put into operation, greatly increasing friendly firepower.

(b) On 8 June, the 6th Airborne Battalion, moving from the south, linked up with its sister 8th Battalion. The following day, elements of the 15th Regiment did likewise and a significant milestone had been achieved. Also, on 8 June, the 1st Battalion, 48th Regiment, successfully eliminated enemy forces from the northeast salient, taking only minor casualties while claiming 61 enemy KIA. That same day, a medevac mission was also successfully accomplished with great psychological advantage occurring to the defenders. A few SAMs were fired by the enemy, but each was an isolated, apparently uncoordinated incident. On 12 June, the 7th Regiment was successful in driving enemy forces from the western salient. The attack was sharply executed and cost the lives of several junior officers and NCOs. As with the 1st Battalion, 48th Regiment, friendly casualties were relatively low while the enemy suffered 31 KIA and an additional 120 dead, from previous action, were counted. Refugees were leaving An Loc by the thousands and all but a few passed successfully through enemy lines south along QL13. On 13 and 14 June, a total of 1500 fresh troops were airmobiled to the city by US helicopters. Many of these men were replacements for units already in An Loc but the majority were assigned to the 18th ARVN Division. The posture of the An Loc garrison on 14 June is illustrated at Figure D-23. The task organization and troop strength is reflected at Appendix 8.

(8) 15 June - 25 June The Offensive Phase : Incoming artillery continued to diminish during this period and on many days dropped well below 100 rounds. ARVN elements initiated offensive operations by pushing out in all directions. The 48th Regiment occupied Hill 169 on 17 June and quickly observed several concentrations of enemy troops. Tactical air was used effectively against these troops and the enemy continued to sustain large numbers of casualties. Small contacts ensued all around the city as friendly elements mopped up enemy bunkers and captured large amounts of equipment. On 18 June, control of the 1st Airborne Brigade reverted to III Corps and on 19 June that unit was ordered to proceed south by foot, to vicinity of Tan Khai fire base (XT 766773) for further evacuation by air. Newsmen from ARVN and a major US TV network visited the city and doctors were sent to assess medical conditions. Rallier and PW reports from both the An Loc and Tan Khai areas indicated that the enemy had taken large losses and that many more were prepared to rally. On 24 June, the 81st Ranger Battalion was airmobiled from An Loc as fresh troops from the remaining units were inserted. This action concluded the significant events occurring during this period. Unit locations and task organization with appropriate strengths as of 25 June are indicated at Appendix 9. A map illustrating unit locations is at Figure D-24. A summary of major movements of ARVN forces to and from An Loc during the period 4 April - 25 June is shown at Appendix 10.

(9) For additional information pertaining to the An Loc Battles, see Annexes E, H, I, J and K.

b. Air Support Operations

(1) Loc Ninh - The suddenness of the attack on Loc Ninh precluded comprehensive advanced planning regarding use of air assets. Beginning the night of 4 April 1972, FAC coverage (US) was continuous until 8 April, with as many as three FACs on station over Loc Ninh during peak,

periods. US air assets were used most exclusively. Some VNAF air was employed in outlying areas such as Hung Tam, Quan Loi, and An Loc; however, this was not in direct support of the Loc Ninh battle.

(a) Control of air was coordinated by 9th Regimental Combat Assistance Team located in the 9th Regiment Compound by the southwest end of the runway. It is assumed that targeting information was passed to the advisors from ARVN sources and then passed to the FAC. Most available air was coordinated by the 9th RCAT. On the 7th of April, the two man advisory team located in the district compound at the northwest edge of the runway coordinated many close-in strikes and, during a particularly critical period (approximately 1200 hours, 7 April), strikes were called in directly on top of their compound. Spectre, Stinger, and Cobra gunships support was used effectively. The integration and coordination of airspace was left largely to the FAC. The FACs performed admirably. All types of ordnance were employed, ranging from CHU-25 to MK82 bombs. All aircraft over the Loc Ninh area were subjected to intense ground to air fire. This fire ranged from AK47 to 23mm. The primary and most deadly ground fire was received from 51 caliber weapons.

(b) US B-52 strikes were employed late on 6 April, primarily west of Loc Ninh and not as close-in defensive fires around the three fire bases. The sometimes vague disposition of friendly troops outside the fire bases precluded precise close-in targeting. The precise effects of the US air effort are not known; however, from monitoring BDAs from the ground advisory team, severe personnel and material losses were apparently sustained by the attacking forces.

(2) An Loc:

(a) Targeting: Targeting for all air assets used in support of An Loc was accomplished primarily in the 5th Division TOC. Intelligence to facilitate targeting was received from a variety of sources including: evacuees from Loc Ninh, local civilians moving into An Loc from outlying areas, US helicopter reconnaissance "pink" teams, flash and sound ranging of enemy indirect fire, on-the-ground and airborne observation of AA fire, crater analyses, Spectre and Stinger electronic capabilities, "URS" reports, and continual battlefield surveillance by airborne forward air controllers. The above were also the source material for recommending B-52 strikes. This targeting information was posted to the war operations map by the Commanding General and assigned a priority which was constantly updated based upon assets available and the fluid tactical situation. The war map was staffed by two US advisors and the Commanding General, 5th Infantry Division.

(b) Clearance of Fires: On 9 April 1972, the Province Chief, Binh Long, relinquished to the Commander, An Loc forces (CG, 5th Inf Div) the authority to coordinate and approve clearance for air strikes. However, coordination was still maintained with province officials to minimize the danger to local civilians. All ensuing air strikes, without exception, were cleared with the Commanding General, and in the case of targets in close proximity to friendly troops, also by the commander in that zone.

(c) Fire Control Lines: Fire control lines (FCL) separating VNAF and US air were assigned by III Corps. Initially, all areas lying to the north of the 76 E-W grid line were US air space. Changes to the FCL were made periodically based on movement of relief forces from the south or to integrate VNAF air into An Loc air space for specific periods of time. An Loc forces coordinated all air strikes north of the 76 grid to the Cambodian border.

(d) Coordination with VNAF:

Coordination with VNAF aircraft, specifically their strike aircraft, posed no particular problems. Periodically, VNAF air was allocated grid areas north of the XT 76 line. The air liaison officer, present in the 5th Division TOC, usually had communication with supporting VNAF FACs and strike aircraft. Frequently, during periods of reduced US air assets, VNAF was allowed to strike targets in US air space. This coordination was accomplished speedily and effectively by the US advisor through the US FACs. Further, US FACs frequently controlled VNAF ALE strikes by communicating on either US or VNAF frequencies. The work of the VNAF fighter pilots was superb. During periods of intense AA fire, they continued to perform their mission and as a result took their losses. Collectively, they are worthy of commendation.

2 Some problems occurred coordinating "VNAF only" grid areas for helicopter insertions and evacuations. Several VNAF missions were aborted by helicopter pilots because Tac Air was working or "visible" in that area. This was later rectified by working Tac Air (US or VNAF) at least 6 kms away from specified VNAF helicopter boxes. Normally, these boxes were for specified periods of time, usually not more than one hour in duration.

(e) Use of Forward Air Controllers (FACs): During critical periods as many as four FACs worked simultaneously over An Loc. They were used primarily to control US tactical air strikes, coordinate air space, perform visual reconnaissance, and coordinate aerial resupply delivery. In addition, they frequently controlled VNAF air strike aircraft, flights of Huey Cobras, and special aircraft such as Spectre, Stinger, and C-130 resupply ships. Routinely, most or all of the above missions were performed simultaneously, with excellent results. Considering the intensive AA fire directed frequently upon all aircraft over An Loc, these FACs accomplished virtually the impossible and should be leading contenders for the "most valuable player" award. Some problem areas, none a serious impairment for long, are mentioned below:

1 Assignment of Strike Aircraft Direct to FAC by DASC: Caused problems in striking priority targets. FACs might not report the aircraft on station to 5th Division TOC control station so that the ground commander could optimize employment. Providing one Command and Control FAC, in contact with the TOC, whose sole mission was to sort aircraft and assign it to a working FAC, proved effective during peak operations.

2 Establishment of Priorities Between FAC and DASC: Lack of Army communications with TRAC sometimes prompted apparently unilateral Air Force decisions regarding ground priorities. The FAC was not always adequately aware of the ground situation to enable him to allocate strike aircraft among ground commanders. The ground commander or his informed representative at higher headquarters must make this decision. The DASC must have a full time Army representative present, fully cognizant of the ground situation and the tactical priorities set by higher headquarters.

3 FAC Desertion of Ground Commander: On a few occasions, when an aircraft went down, all FACs in the area, by SOP, reverted to distress procedures and broke FM contact with ground stations. Recognizing fully the need for speedy reaction in rescuing downed airmen, immediate desertion of the ground commander by all FACs is not an acceptable solution. A more satisfactory solution to this problem was implemented during the latter part of the campaign.

(f) Use of Special Aircraft:

1 Spectre aircraft were found to be a tremendous asset in close support of troops, particularly in a built up area where the near vertical gun target line is needed for precise aiming. Spectre aircraft were responsible for breaking up numerous assaults before they got started. The aircraft's ability to destroy buildings and rout enemy forces within, frequently 10-20 meters in front of friendly troops, was especially advantageous. The 105mm gun was found to be much in demand and extremely effective and accurate. During the hours of darkness, Spectre aircraft were the only close-in effective aerial system. Every An Loc unit requested Spectre's services. Transponder beacons assisted materially in the local employment of this aircraft in marginal weather. Spectre should be developed further as a conventional part of the USAF limited-war weaponry, with light-weight beacons a part of WABTOC material.

2 Due to the relatively low working altitude requirements of Stinger aircraft, it was necessary to employ it almost entirely outside of the main battle area in an area reconnaissance-targets of opportunity role. They were effective in this role.

3 Targeting for B-52 strikes was accomplished by the 5th Division TOC daily and forwarded to Corps. The schedule of approved strikes was received generally by 1800 hours for the following 12 hours. Close-in B-52 strikes were the rule during the two major attacks in April and May. Some strikes were plotted a scant 800 meters from protected friendly troops. Though no immediate assessment could be made of their exact effectiveness, all indications are that the results were devastating. Only on one occasion was a B-52 aborted because of danger to ground troops. This

strike was planned on the FSB in the southwest corner of An Loc during a period when it was anticipated the FSB would be vacated. The strike was successfully aborted by US advisors through the FAC ten minutes prior to drop. The only recurring problem associated with B-52 strikes was the necessity to clear all aircraft from the area twenty minutes prior to drop. During peak B-52 drop periods, many sorties of TAC Air were lost because their on-station time was inadequate to permit employment after being diverted by the B-52 warning.

(g) Employment of Cobras: Cobras flew many effective missions against enemy armor and personnel. They were particularly noted for their accuracy in tight areas when working at normal altitudes. With the increase in the intensity of 37mm, 57mm and SA-7 anti-aircraft fire, the overall effectiveness of the Cobra diminished. When forced to work at an altitude in excess of 3200 feet, accuracy was poor. Because of the close-in nature of targets at An Loc, survivability versus results was weighed carefully. Limited use was made of Cobra gunships in May except in an escort role. It is felt that the role of the Cobra should be investigated further to determine its optimum employment in the highly sophisticated, mid-intensity type conflict which surrounded An Loc in late April and early May.

(h) Employment of Tactical Aircraft: The A1E and A37 aircraft were found extremely well-suited to the type targets at An Loc. The close-in nature of the target and the extreme accuracy of delivery of these aircraft were the prime determinants. The F4 aircraft were normally less suitable because of its relative inaccuracy, although certain crews were capable of working extremely accurately when weather and marking of friendly troops permitted. All types of air-delivered munitions available were used. Napalm and 250-lbs MK81 bombs were particularly effective in town, in bunkers, and in close quarters within the rubber plantations. CBU 55 was particularly effective against bunker complexes and troop concentrations. TAC Air has been credited with destruction of up to twelve tanks in An Loc. TAC Air was a major contributor to the successful defense of An Loc.

(i) Air/Arty Coordination: Artillery coordination with air proved no problem. The artillery FSC was located in the 5th Division TOC. Check fires to permit employment of air could be obtained in seconds. Interestingly, in spite of the multitude of enemy shells coming into An Loc, no aircraft damage was reported to be sustained from incoming artillery fire.

(j) Skyspot and LORAN Aerial Delivery: Skyspot and LORAN delivery of ordnance was beneficial during periods of reduced visibility. Target lists were prepared and submitted daily to III Corps through ARVN channels. During April and May there was not a routinely satisfactory method of informing forward elements in An Loc as to time and location of strikes. The result was frequent interference with working Spectre or Stinger aircraft, and some unnecessary duplication of strikes on targets. By the end of May, improved information was provided to the forward TOC. These mishaps occurred which reduced confidence in this period of employment: On 9 Jun, eight ARVN's were killed and twenty wounded from a misplaced LORAN strike. On 18 May, a LORAN-guided drop impacted at XT 760884, killing four and wounding eight ARVN's. (The Spectre on station also found he had a 1 km navigational error). Again on 27 May, a Skyspot planned for XT 760884 actually struck XT 756847, killing five and wounding twenty members of the 15th Regiment. Technical problems aside, better coordination of Skyspot and LORAN strikes with the ground commander would increase the effectiveness of this system.

(k) VNAF Helicopter Assets: Major criticisms have been voiced on the inability of VNAF to pull their share of the load, reluctance to land helicopters in order to pick up wounded, or seemingly deliberate landing on the LZs where no wounded waited. Some of this criticism is well-deserved, but at times the VNAF helicopters performed admirably. Part of the problem stemmed from inadequate control of the LZs by divisional or attached units. Personnel frequently mobbed helicopters, necessitating drastic action by crew members and in some cases disabling the aircraft. Greatly improved coordination between VNAF and ground commanders is needed.

(3) For statistics pertaining to TAC Air, ARCLIGHTS, see Annex C.

c. Artillery Operations:

(1) Initial Posture of Artillery Batteries: TAB A to Appendix 1 indicates locations of all 5th Division Artillery batteries immediately prior to the Loc Ninh battle. Referenced inclosure reveals that ARVN artillery initially was not in short supply. Following is a recapitulation of artillery assets located in the Loc Ninh and An Loc areas on 4 April:

An Loc	155mm	105mm	Loc Ninh	155mm	105mm
Fire Base 1	2	4	Loc Ninh	4	6
An Loc		4	Loi Tan (Mobile)		4
Quan Loi		2	Cam Le Bridge	2	4
TOTAL	2	10	Hung Tam	2	6
			TOTAL	8	20

(2) Ammunition Status: III Corps Artillery policy for approximately one month prior to the offensive was that all batteries were to maintain three basic loads of ammunition within position areas. This policy meant that each 105mm battery kept at least 3000 rounds and a 155mm battery 1500 rounds. This policy was strictly adhered to. In many cases, 105mm platoons were maintaining as much as 1500 rounds within their position areas. The number of rounds fired by 5th ARVN Division artillery during the period 5 April - 10 July are as follows:

105mm: 28,821; 155mm: 11,050; 4.2": 2,576

(3) Enemy Tactics Against ARVN Artillery:

(a) It became obvious very early that the NVA gave priority to the neutralization of ARVN artillery. At Loc Ninh, the artillery base was the first to fall and the ammunition storage area was destroyed very early. Prior to and immediately after the first attack at An Loc, ARVN artillery made significant contributions in support of friendly forces. In an effort to deceive the enemy, howitzers were frequently moved. Each move, however, was apparently detected by enemy observers and, while friendly artillery continued to fire, it received a major portion of the enemy's fire. Of the 105mm howitzers at An Loc, only one, positioned in a well constructed bunker with a parapet survived the bombardment. Many others were capable of firing direct fire but lacked ammunition. Much of the ammunition positioned with the howitzers was destroyed, often destroying the howitzer as well. In some instances, ammunition and howitzers were inadequately protected. Efforts to resupply artillery ammunition was discontinued in early May for two reasons:

1 Initially, only a small percentage of the resupply parachutes actually landed within the ARVN secured area and, in many cases, served to resupply the enemy.

2 There were no trucks operable within An Loc, and incoming artillery fire made collection and distribution physically impossible.

(b) In many cases the ammunition was quickly hit with enemy artillery and the ensuing sympathetic explosions served as an additional hazard to the troops charged with recovering other supply bundles. The few rounds of ammunition remaining in early May were conserved for use by the one serviceable howitzer during emergency situations.

(4) Use of Mortars: The 60mm and 82mm mortars proved to be the mainstay of ARVN ground fire support throughout the seige. A well implaced mortar frequently survived. As with the artillery, ammunition resupply was a major problem and, for this reason, mortars were fired only when absolutely necessary. Initially, a large percentage of the mortar ammunition dropped for ARVN forces fell into enemy hands. Sometimes pallets of mortar ammunition detonated upon impact when parachutes malfunctioned which resulted in hyper-velocity landings. Distribution of the lighter mortar ammunition was considerably easier than for the artillery ammunition.

(5) Reestablishment of Artillery Capability: In order to reestablish a token artillery

capability, the following steps were taken:

(a) On 11 May, two 155mm howitzers were air-lifted to Ton Le Chon (XT 619632). These weapons were secured in an existing ranger camp. Range of the weapons permitted coverage for the western portion of the city (see map, Figure D-25).

(b) On 18 May, the 21st ARVN Division established FSB Tan Khai (XT 776772) and the 155mm artillery at that location was also capable of ranging the city. (See map, D-25). Again, only limited support fire was available since priority of fire was to elements of the 21st ARVN Division.

(c) On 2 June, two 4.2" mortars previously air-dropped into the city became operational. These two weapons added considerable punch to the fire support, but due to resupply limitations, less than 100 rounds per day were usually available.

(d) Later in June, after the volume of incoming artillery decreased, and with air drop accuracies and packaging greatly improved, 105mm ammunition was again introduced and the stockpile of 81mm and 4.2" was increased.

(e) On 26 June, an additional 105mm Howitzer was brought into the city by VNAF CH-47 helicopter.

(6) Problem Areas:

(a) Without attempting to oversimplify, the biggest problem faced by the artillery was the enemy's ability to directly observe his fire while much of the friendly fire was either unobserved or directed at area targets. To further complicate the problem of locating his artillery, the enemy adopted the following techniques:

- 1 Organized his artillery support in depth.
- 2 Maintained mortars in reserve to replace those destroyed by B-52 and tactical air strikes.
- 3 Constantly moved his artillery, frequently employing single pieces.
- 4 Utilized well-camouflaged firing positions.
- 5 Fired majority of rounds during daylight hours when muzzle flashes could not be observed.

6 Fired from close-in mortar positions when the noise of tactical jet aircraft tended to obscure the noise of the mortar's muzzle blast.

7 Positioned weapons on reverse slopes so as to deny friendly forces the capability of observing muzzle flashes and smoke.

8 Refrained from firing when observation aircraft were operating in the immediate vicinity of the firing positions.

9 Maintained such a heavy volume of fire that crater analysis was extremely dangerous during the early phase of the campaign.

(b) Lack of a Countermortar System: The AN/MPQ-4 radar would not have provided a satisfactory solution at An Loc. It is too large and, had one been located there, it is probable that it would have been destroyed in the early stages of the battle. Inability to locate enemy mortars and artillery was the most important tactical and technical deficiency in the ground capability of the forces in An Loc.

d. Personnel Functions:

(1) Casualty Statistics:

(a) Enemy: Because of the 5th ARVN Division's method of maintaining records, casualty statistics are available only for the period 5 April-6 July. (See Appendix 11.)

(b) Friendly: Information concerning friendly casualties was made available for the period 4 April - 17 July. Although this time frame exceeds the Division's stay in An Loc by 7 days, casualties during the period 12-17 July are negligible and the figures presented represent the Division's losses during the Binh Long Campaign (see appendix 2). Note that these statistics are pertinent only to organic 5th Division units.

(2) Replacement and Desertion Statistics During the period 4 April - 13 July, the 5th Division reported the following :

(a) Desertions - 1,711

(b) Replacements - 6,042

(3) 5th Division Unit Commanders: (see Appendix 12).

(4) 5th DCAT Personnel Who Participated in the Binh Long Campaign in the city of An Loc:

<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>SSAN</u>	<u>Entered An Loc</u>	<u>Departed An Loc</u>	<u>No of Days</u>
Miller, William E.	COL	426 28 5669	4 April 72	10 May 72	37
Ulmer, Walter F. Jr	COL	007 20 4378	10 May 72	12 July 72	64
Benedict, Edward B.	LTC	149 22 1185	4 April 72	20 May 72	47
Gunderson, Raymond E.	LTC	215 38 9212	16 June 72	12 July 72	27
Borstorff, Allan R.	MAJ	176 30 8687	4 April 72	1 May 72	28
Ingram, Kenneth A.	MAJ	236 58 6309	1 May 72	31 May 72	31
Ruiz, Enrique N.	MAJ	478 30 2316	1 May 72	5 June 72	36
Skarupa, Ronald A.	MAJ	040 32 2682	20 May 72	11 July 72	57
Davis, Richard N.	CPT	466 58 5202	31 May 72	16 June 72	17

9th RCAT Personnel (Loc Ninh):

Schott, Richard S.	LTC	064 26 1510	MIA 7 April 72
Carlson, Albert E.	MAJ	555 54 4006	MIA 7 April 72
Smith, Mark A.	CPT	545 66 3270	MIA 8 April 72
Iull, Howard B. Jr	SFC	498 32 7314	MIA 7 April 72
Wallingford, Ken	SGT	261 90 3488	MIA 7 April 72

(5) Morale: Morale among ARVN personnel was as variable as was the tactical situation. The extremely heavy shelling and the inability to evacuate wounded until early June were the major detrimental factors. The inability to adequately care for and evacuate the wounded sometimes severely inhibited offensive operations. All commanders and troops were fully aware that a seriously wounded soldier who might normally recover might die in An Loc. An additional debilitating factor early in the campaign was lack of adequate supplies: fruit and meat, medicine, ammunition, and barrier materials. Fortunately, the resupply situation improved considerably in early May.

(6) Medical Problems, Disease, and Sanitation: With hospital facilities destroyed, medical evacuation limited, lack of facilities in which to house wounded, and a shortage of medical supplies, medical problems were enormous. Adding to the casualties suffered at the hands of the enemy were numerous cases of sickness and disease in varying origin. Lack of water posed a serious problem until the rains came in early June. Personnel were therefore, unable to maintain even minimal standards of cleanliness. At times the intensity of artillery fire caused personnel to urinate and defecate inside or at the entrance of shelters. The ensuing accumulation of filth created a haven for flies and other insects. Food was prepared in proximity to filth. Lime and DDT were air dropped and provided considerable relief for these problems. Disposal of the dead was another serious problem. It was necessary to resort to mass burials in relatively shallow graves.

e. Logistics: There was no logistical resupply by the 5th Division to its elements involved in the battle of Loc Ninh (5 April to 7 April) nor was there any evidence of logistical shortcomings during that battle. All facts and figures in this portion of the report relate to the GVN forces and civilian personnel in the city of An Loc proper during the period 7 April to 25 June 1972. During that 80-day period, all resupply to An Loc was by air. Roads were cut by enemy forces; no other LOC was available. During the period, 4,130 short tons of supplies were delivered, mostly by parachute; 3,31<sup>1/4</sup> tons were received and 816 tons were lost, damaged, or destroyed, mostly during the period 15 April to 4 May due to problems with low-level paradrops (see Figure D-26). More than 93% of the supplies delivered were transported by US aviation assets, primarily USAF C-130 cargo aircraft employing a variety of parachute delivery techniques. Although there were some extended periods when certain items were in short supply, logistical support for the battle of An Loc was satisfactory.

(1) Organization for Logistical Support: Logistical requirements for the 5th ARVN Division and attack units were consolidated at the division CP in An Loc and passed to the III Corps forward command post at Lai Khe daily through G-4 channels. Binh Long Sector and elements of the 1st Brigade of the Airborne Division (during the time it was stationed in the city) similarly collected and passed their respective requirements to the III Corps G-4 at Lai Khe. These three separate requests were then consolidated and passed on to the Central Logistics Command (CLC) in Saigon through ARVN channels. Supplies were made available from ARVN depot stocks and transported to Tan Son Nhut AFB. Through coordination with MACV J-4 airlift, USAF C-130 assets were programmed on a daily basis. Cargo manifests were telephoned through US channels to the TRAC G-4 coordinator at Bien Hoa, and in turn, to the III Corps G-4 and the 5th Division G-4 Advisor at Lai Khe. Manifests, mission numbers, and TOTs (encoded) were then passed forward to the 5th Division G-4 at An Loc through US advisor channels. The 5th Division G-4 at An Loc was advised by the III Corps G-4 of the requests made by Binh Long Sector and 1st Airborne Brigade. Upon delivery, it became the responsibility of the 5th Division G-4 to break down these supplies for all units. This cycle, from request to delivery, took three days: on day one, requests were passed and orders issued by CLC; on day two, supplies were delivered to the loading point, cargo rigged for air drop, and loaded on the aircraft; on day three, resupply missions were flown.

(2) Supply and Demand: Personnel strength figures used for logistical planning purposes were initially established as follows: 8,000 ARVN troops, 2,000 RV/FF troops (Binh Long Sector) and 10,000 civilians for a total of 20,000 people. Although a resupply objective of 200 tons per day was established, it was rarely if ever met and proved to be excessive, once experience factors were established. Actual daily deliveries over the 80-day period averaged 51 tons per day, with an average of 41 tons per day being received and 10 tons per day being lost, damaged, or destroyed. Specific items requested were generally delivered. This was verified by detailed statistical studies made over two separate one-week periods during the operation.

(a) During the period 18-24 May, the total tonnage requested by all three major headquarters in An Loc was approximately 547 tons; during the same period approximately 544 tons were delivered. There was particular disparity, however, between first priority items; 85 tons of specific items were requested compared with 38 tons delivered.

1 The study revealed that there was an extra delay of up to four days in the resupply of certain items, specifically sandbags, OE 30, smoke grenades, and lime.

2 More than 70 tons of unwanted small arms ammunition was delivered during the period.

SUMMARY LOGISTICAL RESUPPLY TO AN LOC 7 APRIL - 25 JUNE 72

	<u>DATES</u>	<u>AGENCY</u>	<u>A/C</u>	<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>TONS DELIVERED</u>	<u>TONS RECEIVED</u>	<u>PROBABLE LOSS</u>
PHASE I	7-12Apr	US ARMY & VNAF	CH47	42	147	147	
	8-22Apr	VNAF	HU-1B	11	5	5	
	7-18Apr	VNAF	C-123	<u>39</u> 92	<u>195</u> 301	<u>195</u> 301	
	SUBTOTALS						
PHASE II	15Apr-4May	USAF	C-130	65	845	<u>47</u> (Confirmed receipt) <u>231</u> (Possible recovery) 278	567
PHASE III	4-14May	USAF	C-130	82	622	515	107
	15-27May	USAF	C-130	58	922	898	24
	28May-25Jun	USAF	C-130	<u>90</u> 230	<u>1440</u> 2984	<u>1322</u> 2735	<u>118</u> 249
	SUB TOTAL						
	GRAND TOTAL 7 Apr-25 Jun			477	4130	3314T	816T

Figure D-26 (Summary, Logistical Resupply to An Loc, 7 April-25 June)

(b) During the period 4 June to 11 June, a similar study revealed 422 tons were requested and 463 tons were delivered. Again, however, there was a disparity in first priority items: 168 tons requested vs 56.5 tons delivered. Lime and sandbags were among the items not delivered in sufficient quantities during this period, due to shortages in depot stocks. There were shortages in other items as a result of damaged goods. This problem is addressed in paragraph (4) below.

(3) Delivery. The history of the aerial delivery effort into An Loc breaks down into three generally distinct phases which evolved more by accident than by design. (See Figure D-27)




Figure D-27 Aerial Resupply phases.

(a) Phase I began on 7 April and was characterized by CH-47 airlift, low level C-123 paradrops, and a few HU-1B sorties. This was a joint US Army and VNAF operation. The Chinook effort totaled 42 sorties at approximately 3.5T each. Three US Chinooks sustained minor damage from exploding mortars in the LZ and one VNAF Chinook was destroyed by enemy fire on 12 April. There were no further CH-47 missions until after the siege was lifted. Between 11 April and 18 April VNAF flew a total of 39 C-123 resupply missions to An Loc, dropping approximately 195 tons of supplies using low level paradrops techniques. C-123 low level effort by VNAF was terminated at 1700 hours on 19 April when, on the 40th sortie, the aircraft was shot down by enemy ground fire and crashed 3 km southwest of An Loc. Phase I of the resupply effort ended concurrently. No other VNAF low level drops were attempted throughout the balance of the period covered by this report.

(b) Phase II ran from 16 April to 4 May. During this period, 65 sorties were flown by the 7th Air Force (US) employing C-130 aircraft making low level parachute drops, both day and night. The technique called for a long (20 mile) approach over a variety of air routes at treetop level. About three miles from the DZ, the aircraft would climb to drop altitude (about 500 feet) eject the load over the DZ, and drop back down to treetop level to make an escape. This technique proved to be extremely hazardous, woefully ineffective, utterly frustrating, and counterproductive.

1 Enemy anti-aircraft fire was encountered with ever increasing volume and intensity. More than 60% of all aircraft flying the An Loc low level missions sustained hits from enemy ground fire.

2 Eight hundred forty five tons of supplies were dropped, but 67% missed the DZ completely and could not be recovered. Attempts were made to destroy unrecoverable supplies and munitions, but a considerable portion fell into enemy hands. Intelligence reports confirmed that the enemy was recovering supplies which missed the DZ, were within their reach, and were not destroyed by friendly air.

3 The average daily rate of supplies into An Loc which were within the DZ and positively re-

coverable, dropped to an average of 2.3 tons per day. Possible recovery averaged an additional 11.5 tons per day, wholly inadequate to sustain the GVN forces and civilian personnel in the city.

4 The Airborne Brigade, in an effort to relieve their supply shortages, began requesting VNAF C-123 sorties independently of the on going effort. At least five such missions were flown in which supplies were dropped from 5,000 feet. Almost all bundles drifted into enemy controlled territory. These missions by VNAF were terminated after it became evident that they were not successful.

5 Meanwhile the US C-130 low level effort continued without much improvement. Two different drop zones were used (See Figures D-28 and D-29). At night they were lit with fires and, later, with strobe lights and bean bag lights. Some nights they could be seen by the FAC, other nights they were obscured. Coordination between US advisors on the ground and the FACs controlling the C-130s was difficult. Initially, all close air support was terminated so the C130 resupply ship could make its run, irrespective of the tactical situation on the ground. Even after the priorities were properly set, the FACs were reluctant to discuss any aspect of the resupply runs for reasons of security. Codewords were used with increasing reluctance by FACs as their meaning became obvious. Moreover, the codewords were not always effective. The warnings either came too early and the spotters, who were posted to locate falling bundles at night, would tire of their vigil, or came at the last minute without sufficient warning. The low level drops were finally terminated on 4 May 1972. During the 20 days of Phase II, 567 tons of supplies were lost and presumed in enemy hands, three US C-130 resupply aircraft were shot down and several others were damaged. Thirteen airforce crewmen were killed and at least one was wounded in this heroic but unsatisfactory effort.

(c) Phase III began on 4 May and continued through the remainder of the reporting period. During this phase, the C-130 aircraft made highlevel drops from an altitude of approximately 9,000 feet employing the Ground Radar Air Delivery System (GRADS). Using the DZ indicated on Figure D-28, a computed air release point (CARP) was determined based upon the aerodynamic characteristics of the payload and the particular parachute configurations being employed. All parachute deliveries in this phase were either high velocity (HV) or high altitude low opening (HALO) using a time fuse derafeing device, or a barometric (FIB) system.

1 High velocity proved the most accurate delivery means employed in An Loc; 98 percent of all supplies dropped landed in the DZ, compared with 91 percent using the HALO techniques and 33 percent using low level. On a good drop, the high velocity technique resulted in a linear dispersion of 16 bundles on the ground within an area of approximately 150 meters x 50 meters. In some cases the area was as small as 75 x 50 meters. Occasionally, one or two of the bundles drifted outside the 150 x 50 meter area, usually when some of the load was late in exiting the aircraft.

2 The accuracy of the drops and the tight dispersion patterns combined to give an added bonus of allowing pin-point distribution within the DZ, thereby simplifying distribution problems on the ground. Following the initial drop, a correction in meters was passed to the pilot through the FAC, for example, NORTH 100, WEST 200. Skilled pilots and navigators were able to incorporate these corrections allowing the point of impact to be moved with each pass as desired. Best accuracy was obtained with drops consecutively at 10 to 15 minute intervals. Long delays between drops tied up air space unnecessarily and lead to inaccuracy due to atmospheric changes.

3 The adjustment of successive passes into different locations within the DZ depended upon advanced notification of delivery times and cargo manifests. Advanced notice is essential for the prompt recovery of specific items, and allows recovery crews and spotters to be forewarned. The system of advanced notification and adjustments of TOTs used worked well. Greater details on cargo manifests might have assisted in planning recovery and distribution.

4 Parachute malfunctions are less frequent using high velocity drops than with HALO. Seven percent of all high velocity drops end with a malfunction of some sort as compared with 59 percent using timed fuse HALO, and 49 percent using the FIB system. Single parachute high velocity drops result in fewer malfunctions than when two parachutes are involved. Statistics on a day-to-day basis, for HALO and high velocity drops, are in Appendices 13, 14, 15 and 16. Since the high velocity parachutes deploy immediately after the load exits the aircraft, and since 16 bundles were dropped in rapid succession, one malfunction sometimes lead to another as the faster falling load careened downward through the rest of the loads, tearing up parachutes of striking other bundles on the way down. There were 24 instances of loads disintegrating while in descent which are partly attributed

to this problem of the fast-falling malfunction. This problem might have been lessened if the spacing between bundles exiting the aircraft were somehow increased. Theoretically, if eight bundles were dropped on a single pass, the spacing could be doubled without changing the dispersion pattern on the ground.

(4) Survivability of Cargo: The following items showed good survivability:

(a) Rice in bags survived a partial malfunction although much was lost to spillage because bags burst on impact. Instant rice packed in cardboard containers survived without damage.

(b) M-16 and M-60 ammunition. The top two-thirds of a bundle survived a partial malfunction.

(c) Although 81mm and 105mm artillery ammunition survived well when both chutes functioned properly and a normal landing was achieved, there were six occasions between 12 May and 25 June when 81mm mortar ammunition exploded on impact resulting in sympathetic detonations lasting for periods up to four or five hours. The explosion resulted when one or both parachutes failed to deploy. It is proved desirable that special attention be given to rigging high explosive and that a single aircraft not be completely loaded with HE. High explosive ammunition should be divided among several flights so as to reduce losses due to sympathetic detonations.

(5) Recovery:

(a) During Phase II, recovery was extremely difficult due to night drops, enemy fire and hoarding of scarce items. The 5th Division G-4 supervised the recovery of all items during most of Phase II and maintained listing of those items picked up by each unit's recovery team. Recovery operations were severely hampered by incoming artillery which the enemy timed to begin falling ten to fifteen minutes after the supply drops were complete. As incoming artillery diminished, control of the recovery process was enhanced.

(b) Parachutes, A-22 bags, and clevises were not collected until Phase III when they were consolidated in a designated location. Recovery of serviceable A-22 bags however was very low. The force of loads expending against the sides of the bag upon impact tightened the strap so securely that it was cut in order to release the load. Parachute recovery was also low. Many parachutes were torn on buildings, barbed wire and other obstacles. Others disappeared, later to emerge as clothing, hammocks, and other articles.

(c) Control of the recovery process, however, improved considerably after 24 May due to increased command emphasis, the physical presence of the G-4 on the drop zone, and the reduced volume of indirect fire.

(6) Distribution: Practically all the vehicles at An Loc were rendered unserviceable by incoming artillery (in the case of at least one vehicle, by a ton of canned peaches). Because of the lack of vehicle transportation, distribution was extremely difficult. Because of the artillery environment, it was also dangerous. For these reasons large corrections were often requested in the computed aerial release point in order to effect the pin-point distribution described earlier. By dropping cargo closer to the intended recipient, the labor and hazards involved in the distribution process were reduced. This process would have been far more effective, however, if the aircraft were loaded so that each carried a representative load of the tactical supplies delivered, rather than being loaded completely with food or certain types of ammunition. This would have simplified distribution while at the same time reducing the danger of sympathetic ammunition explosions.

(7) Summary of recommendations and unresolved problems:

(a) Improved packing is needed for water, batteries, medicine supplies, and M-72 LAWs. Rigging on all high explosive and POL should receive special attention.

(b) Aircraft should be manifested with cargo that is representative of the entire day's resupply to enhance distribution and reduce the likelihood of sympathetic detonations of high explosives.

(c) Unresolved problems:

1 How can the number of parachute malfunctions be reduced?

2 How can the A-22 bag be modified so as to facilitate opening following impact?

3 What can be done to improve the reliability of HALO systems?

(8) For further information pertaining to the resupply of An Loc, See Annex C.

f. Communications:

(1) US Advisors: The AN/PRC-77 radio provided the necessary means of communication for all advisors in An Loc. In the 5th Division TOC three radio nets were maintained; the war net for control of air, an alternate war net for splitting control of air during peak periods, and an administrative net to the rear TOC at Lai Khe for both tactical support and administrative traffic. The administrative net had a secure capability. However, there was insufficient power in this mode for communicating direct to Lai Khe. In mid April an airborne relay was established which enhanced US communication with Lai Khe base. Two VHF line (ARVN), were available between An Loc and Lai Khe. These lines were routed through a relay at Nui Ba Den mountain and except for periodic outages of short duration, satisfied all needs.

(b) No total interruptions to the war net were experienced. This is singularly amazing, in view of the intensive shelling experienced. When antennas were shot away or lead cables cut by shrapnel, there was always at least one radio still communicating. On one occasion when a particularly accurate shell severed both advisor antennas, the Commanding General 5th Division made his command radio available until necessary repairs were made. Other unit advisors used either AN/PRC - 25 or 77 radios for air control and coordination with the TOC.

(2) ARVN communications: No serious difficulties were experienced in communications. Long-Haul communications functioned almost continually. The power furnished by one 5 KW generator was threatened on many occasions, by enemy indirect fire and on others by shortage of fuel; however, it managed to continue functioning. Significant radio losses were experienced by ARVN units due to the intensive shelling. It seemed that these losses did not impact to a great degree on operations because of the tight perimeter, thereby reducing the need for internal radio communications. Wire augmented radio to all command posts. Everything considered, ARVN communications systems were outstanding.

(3) Communications Security: Both ARVN and US advisors frequently violated communications security procedures. A portion of the difficulty was the lack of a mutually understood code between air and ground. The KAC 803 (Whiz wheel) available to ground advisors was not available to USAF FAC's until late in the campaign.

(4) The III Corps communications system is discussed in detail in Annex C.

g. Psychological Operation: It is difficult to comment on this subject at Division Level. It appeared to the US advisors at An Loc that there were unused opportunities to employ psychological operations locally. Unable to listen to or understand Vietnamese radio broadcasts or to secure copies of leaflets which apparently were dropped from VNAF aircraft into the general area, the US advisors could not evaluate psychological warfare efforts. It was rare when the 5th Division CG commented on the subject. It is interesting to note that members of the 5th Division staff religiously listened to broadcasts originating from the National Liberation Front as from a British sponsored broadcast of unknown origin (possibly BBC short wave news). Both good and bad news and countless rumors passed quickly among the ARVN troops.

h. Civil Affairs/Civic Action:

(1) Civil Affairs: It was estimated that over 12,000 civilians were present in An Loc on 5 April. Some managed to leave by varying means until 13 April when it was estimated that 10,000 still remained. Groups of 200 or more repeatedly attempted unsuccessfully to reach Chon Thanh by way of QL 13, until approximately 7,000 completed the trip in mid June. Those remaining in An Loc sought shelter as was available, most often in pre-constructed bunkers in their homes. Soldiers and civilians shared food. The extent of civilian casualties is unknown. Existing control of the populace was exercised by province officials and is discussed in the report of the Province Advisory team (see Appendix 1, Binh Long Province, to Annex J, Corps MR3).

(2) Civic Action: Many incidents of inflationary prices for foodstuffs and luxuries were re-

ported. Cigarettes in early May were retailing for 2000 piasters per pack and later in May for 3000 piasters. Until some control and distribution of food to civilians was set up in late May, civilians sometimes fought with soldiers over air dropped supplies. Initially distribution was decided by proximity to bundles, strength, and fleetness of foot. Soldiers fought among soldiers, soldiers with civilians, and civilians among themselves. (On one occasion an American advisor transporting supplies was threatened at gun point.) For detailed coverage in this area consult Annex J, CORDS report.

i. Summary of Enemy Disposition:

(1) On 5 April the enemy initiated indirect fire attacks throughout the northern position of the 5th Division AO.

(2) Direct ground attacks were conducted against the following areas on 5 April:

(a) Lai Khe base camp by the D-13 Sapper Battalion.

(b) Quan Loi base camp by the 272d Regiment reinforced with sappers.

(c) Loc Ninh compounds by the 5th VC Division reinforced by armor, artillery and AA units.

(3) Road clearing operations on 6 April between An Loc and Lai Khe hit road blocks in two locations:

(a) The Binh Long RF forces at XT765727, probably by an element of the 7th NVA Division.

(b) The 5th Recon Company and 8th Regiment vic XT 7953 by the D-9 Sapper Battalion and the 101st Regiment.

(4) Between 5-7 April the 5th VC Division continued to attack Loc Ninh. The E-6 Regiment attacked from the west and the 174th Regiment from the south. The 275th Regiment was held in reserve.

(5) During the same time, enemy pressure was placed on the 52d Regiment west of Hung Tam and the 7th Regiment west of An Loc, probably by the 271st Regiment of the 5th VC Division.

(6) Also from 5-7 April steady enemy pressure was applied by the 272nd Regiment on 7th Regiment elements at Quan Loi.

(7) Between 10 April and 13 April two PWs were captured from the Signal Battalion, 9th VC Division and from the 272d Regiment. These PWs stated that the 9th VC Division would attack An Loc between the 13th and the 16th of April. If the attack failed the enemy was to encircle An Loc and destroy it with indirect fire.

(8) During this period (13-16 April) a 21st Division PW identified the 7th NVA Division as being located between Chon Thanh and An Loc, with the mission of preventing the relief of An Loc.

(9) From 13-16 April the 9th VC Division attacked An Loc, with the 272d Regiment attacking from the southwest, and the 95C Regiment from the west. The 9th VC Division was reinforced by two tank Battalions from the 203d Armor Regiment, elements of the 42d Artillery Regiment, the 271st Anti-aircraft Regiment, and possibly elements of the 208th Artillery Regiment.

(10) On 16 April the 1st Airborne Brigade positions on Hill 169 were attacked from the north by the 141st Regiment.

(11) From 21-30 April the 5th VC Division attacked Tri Tam district utilizing the 174th Regiment and the 101st Regiment with E-6 Regiment in reserve.

(12) During this period the 271st Regiment, possibly reinforced by elements of the 272d Regiment, attacked An Loc from the west and made a  $\frac{1}{2}$  block penetration of that side of the city.

(13) From 1-10 May the 5th VC Division moved from Tri Tam District to the Quan Loi area. A PW captured during this period indicated that the 9th VC Division Commander had been relieved for failure to capture An Loc and that the 5th VC Division had been given the mission.

(14) Between 11-15 May the 5th and 9th VC Division attacked An Loc. The 174th Regiment attacked from the NE the E6 Regiment from the east. The 271st Regiment attacked from the southwest, the 275th Regiment from the west. These attacks were supported by armor from the 203rd Regiment and elements of the 202d Regiment. Massive artillery support was provided by the 208th and 42d Artillery Regiments and the 271st Anti-aircraft Regiment.

(15) During this period from 16 May to 25 June, after failing to capture An Loc, the 5th Division and its regiments withdrew to Base Area 354 west of the "Dogs Head" to refit and then moved to north-eastern Military Region IV. The elements of the 9th VC Division withdrew from An Loc to refit. The 272d moved to the vicinity of Quan Lie, the 95C to the rubber area NW of An Loc, and the 271st to Base Area 354.

(16) Throughout this campaign the 7th NVA Division continued to interdict QL 13 between Chon Thanh and An Loc.

4. (U) Conclusions:

a. The intentions and capabilities of major NVA forces within striking range of Military Region III were largely unknown and severely underestimated prior to their attack of early April 1972.

b. Considering the forces available to the enemy in early April 1972, Loc Ninh was indefensible with available ARVN and US resources.

c. NVA forces were, with certain exceptions, well trained, properly equipped and highly disciplined. They were masterful in their use of indirect fire support, but their employment of tanks was amateurish.

d. NVA anti-aircraft weaponry constrained US and VNAF air operations, particularly helicopter operations.

e. The Battle at An Loc was fought with massed forces, intense firepower, and sophisticated equipment on both sides, representative of a mid-intensity conventional war situation.

f. Orders issued by the 5th Division Commander in An Loc were tactically sound and timely.

g. In general, ARVN forces fought extremely well under arduous conditions against a determined enemy during the An Loc phase of the battle.

h. ARVN 5th Division units in An Loc failed to construct and occupy suitable firing positions for artillery and failed to provide adequately protected artillery and mortar ammunition.

i. The inability to locate and accurately target enemy mortars and artillery was the single most important tactical and technical deficiency among friendly forces operating within and in support of An Loc.

j. US air support was the predominant factor in swaying the balance of power over a numerically superior, well-equipped enemy force in the Binh Long Campaign.

k. The arrival of the 15th Infantry Regiment, 9th ARVN Division, in the area immediately south of An Loc on 17 May diverted major NVA forces from continuing their pressure on An Loc, and represented a major turning point in the battle.

l. The Binh Long Campaign was a major disaster for the NVA.

5. (U) Lessons Learned:

a. Operations:

(1) Intelligence networks must be improved if they are to provide early warning of major troop movements through towns and on main highways in Cambodia.

(2) A high percentage of information furnished by prisoner interrogations proved to be valid.

(3) Personnel can usually survive and function during prolonged, intense artillery bombardments if they follow standard procedures for digging in and construction of overhead cover.

(4) Artillery and ammunition must be well protected against indirect fire weapons.

(5) The M72 LAW is highly effective against T-54 and PT-76 tanks when it is used properly.

b. Air Support:

(1) A mid-intensity air defense environment can degrade the effectiveness of the Cobra gunship in a close support role and can reduce significantly the effectiveness of airmobile operations.

(2) LORAN and SKYSPOT bombing techniques should not be used closer than 2000 meters from friendly troops.

(3) Differential experience levels among pilots and FACs result in significant differences in the effectiveness of tactical air weapons systems.

(4) Airspace coordination over an active battlefield can be effectively implemented by experienced FACs and ground commander working together and supported by reliable FM radio nets.

(5) The FAC must have detailed current knowledge of the ground situation for optimum effectiveness.

(6) Army and Air Force personnel at corps level must work closely together to insure that each element is knowledgeable of the other's situation, capabilities, and limitations.

(7) The STINGER aircraft is apparently quite vulnerable in a mid-intensity air defense environment.

(8) The B52 is a highly accurate and effective weapon delivery system, can be safely employed within 800 meters of protected and warned troops, and can be a key ingredient in the tactical fire-power scheme.

(9) The slower moving aircraft with "soft" ordnance are needed for close support of troops in contact with determined enemy when friendly artillery is limited.

(10) The C130 Spectre is a particularly reliable and effective weapons system for close support, pinpoint target missions.

c. Logistics:

(1) The HALO technique for air delivery of supplies resulted in a disproportionately high number of parachute streamers, and high altitude openers, as compared with normal parachute functioning. The High Velocity method proved to be the most reliable technique.

(2) Resupply sorties which follow at 10 to 15 minute intervals yield best results. The leading aircraft provides valuable wind data which succeeding navigators can use to correct release points if necessary.

(3) Mortar ammunition, M-72 LAWs, and medical supplies require special packing and careful delivery if they are to survive when air dropped.

(4) Detailed LZ planning, tight internal security, and firm discipline among ground elements are essential when air drops are used as the primary mode of resupply.

(5) Evacuation and treatment of wounded quickly becomes a prime consideration and a major tactical constraint during operations in relatively inaccessible or isolated areas.

6. Senior Advisor Evaluation:

a. General: The 5th Infantry Division and attached units fought well enough over a prolonged

period to repulse a determined enemy force. The Binh Long Campaign can be termed a major victory for the Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam, and certainly represented a major disaster for the North Vietnamese military and political structures. The 5th DCAT and other US advisory elements performed three important functions: (1) they provided expertise and communications capability necessary for effective use of USAF and US Army air support; (2) they provided through their presence a psychological backup for ARVN; and (3) they provided to the ARVN commanders and staff a source of relatively objective assessments of ongoing operations as well as periodic advice on tactical and administrative matters. The first function was the most important followed closely by the second, with the third having by far the least impact on the outcome of the battle. The presence of the US advisory team was probably essential to the successful battle at An Loc during April and May.

b. Caveat Regarding Generalization: Observations made and lessons learned in the Binh Long Campaign may or may not be pertinent to other ARVN operations. Great care should be taken in generalizing from this campaign to any overall assessment. All factors in this particular battlefield and strategic environment should be reviewed before making future plans or policies based primarily on the Loc Ninh-An Loc experience.

c. 5th Division Strengths and Weaknesses:

(1) The chain of command worked well. The CG's tactical orders were sound and timely. The soldiers performed amazingly well while under extreme enemy pressure for an extended period of time. The CG was his own staff in initiating concepts and plans but his staff performed coordinating functions well. Battlefield intelligence was processed well and usually passed promptly to interested units and agencies. US air support was intelligently employed. Cooperation with subordinate and adjacent units was excellent, to include voluntarily sharing air assets with the regiment operating to the south. New techniques such as using the experimental transponder beacons with Spectre aircraft were quickly assimilated. The CG listened to his subordinate commanders. Small unit operations were usually well conceived. Tank-Killing operations with M72 and XM2C2 were great, and 60 and 82mm mortars were usually effectively employed. When artillery was available it was employed with care and precision. The CG was appropriately concerned with troop safety, personally approved all air and artillery missions, and coordinated with provincial authority when friendly civilians might be a factor. The CG passed relevant information to the US advisory team and worked closely with them. Radio communications within the division and to higher headquarters were continuously outstanding. Restitution of divisional units was accomplished effectively after the campaign.

(2) The Division cavalry unit faded away from unknown causes. The Division Artillery was careless in protecting its guns and ammunition. Troops were initially somewhat neglectful in providing themselves with all available over-head cover. Initially the receipt, protection, and distribution of supplies was chaotic. Recovery of air items was admittedly difficult but never was aggressively implemented. Control of personnel on helicopter landing zones varied from totally unsatisfactory to excellent, and improved with time but never should have been neglected. Firm command supervision of air dropped supply recovery and landing zone activities was late starting. There should have been greater personal, physical leadership and on the spot supervision on the part of several senior commanders and staff officers. ARVN chain of command arrangements and unit responsibilities, not through any particular fault of the Division CG, were sometimes ambiguous and not clearly defined as they easily could have been in the An Loc area. Many simple personal sanitation techniques were long neglected. Psychological operations were not aggressively implemented. Radio communications security was seemingly often unsatisfactory, I say "seemingly" because of our extremely limited familiarity with the Vietnamese language. Coordination between ARVN and VNAF was usually tenuous and frequently non-existent.

d. US Support: Support provided by the US Army and USAF was consistently outstanding. Individuals were aggressive, technically competent, cooperative, and intensely dedicated to their tasks.

e. Impact on Future Operational Capabilities: The Division acted promptly in integrating replacements and distributing material. Most major items of equipment lost during the campaign have been replaced. Many tools, repair parts, and accessories, some unimportant, but some such as antenna parts and fire control devices quite important have not yet been received. Generally the material readiness appears satisfactory. The more enduring detraction from optimum combat effectiveness is the loss of experienced junior officers and NCOs through death and wounds. It will be at least a few months until unit cohesiveness is entirely restored. Division self-confidence is high and the successful campaign gave the Division and probably the entire ARVN an important psychological

bonus. The Cavalry Squadron and the 9th Regiment remain relatively unknown quantities.

7. RECOMMENDATIONS:

- a. The comprehensive report of the Binh Long Campaign should receive wide distribution.
- b. Development of a system for locating enemy mortars and artillery pieces should receive high priority.
- c. The first priority for future US advisory efforts with the ARVN should be the personnel system, the selection, development, and utilization of officer leaders.

Appendix 4 (Task Force 52) to Annex D (5th ARVN Division) to After-Action Report, Binh Long Campaign.

(1)

1. (U) PURPOSE: To provide an accurate account concerning the withdrawal of Task Force 52 and subsequent extraction of three US advisors.

2. (C) DISCUSSION:

a. Background:

(1) On 21 March 1972, Task Force 52 moved from Xuan Loc, Long Khanh Province, with an initial mission of providing security for 5th Division Headquarters (Forward) at An Loc, Binh Long Province. The Task Force moved again on 28 March with the mission of conducting operations four kilometers north and south of Hwy LTL 17 and west of Hwy QL13 while occupying two old Fire Support Bases (FSB) (North: XT 707997 and South: XT 716994) (Figure 4-D-1).

(2) The Task Force consisted of the following:

UNITS	APPROXIMATE STRENGTH
Hq, 52d Rgt (-)	78
2-52	309
1-48	420
I&R Co, 52d Rgt	60
C Bty, 182d Arty, 18th Div	115
155 Plt, 5th Arty Div	45
Engr Det (D-6 Bulldozer), 18th Div	3
Sig Det, 18th Div	9
TOTAL	1039

(3) Other unit dispositions included the 9th Regiment to the north (Loc Ninh) and the 7th Regiment, 5th Division to the south. Respective AOs were not adjacent to that of the Task Force. Security of Hwy QL13 remained the responsibility of Binh Long Sector.

(4) Task Force Commanders were as follows:

TF52: LTC THINH  
2-52: MAJ NGUYEN  
1-48: MAJ NGHIEM  
I&R Co: 1LT HAI  
HHC, 52d Rgt: CPT NGOC  
C Bty, 182d Arty: MAJ KHAI (?)

(5) Task Force US Advisors were as follows:

SA: LTC GINGER  
DSA: CPT ZUMWALT  
OP SPEC: SFC WINLAND

b. OPERATIONS:

(1) There were no significant contacts made with enemy forces from 24 March to 4 April. Operations were conducted in the AO by rotating the 2-52 and 1-48 from FSB protection to operational areas (Figure 4-D-2). The I&R Co conducted continuous operations outside the two FSBs. Noticeable physical improvements were made on the bases to include strengthening of perimeter berms, revetments for arty tubes, and overhead cover for key bunkers and individual positions. On 2 April, CPT Zumwalt and SFC Winland visited the 9th RCAT at Loc Ninh and DCAT at An Loc and noted nothing unusual along the route.

(2) During the early morning hours of 5 April an unknown NVA element walked into a 1-48 mechanical ambush three kilometers NW of FSB North. Results of engagement were two friendly WIA and 15 enemy KIA, equipment and documents (five pounds) captured.

(3) Later that morning both FSB began receiving 82mm mortar fire. Majority of the

rounds landed east of FSB North. Approximately 100 rounds of indirect fire were received during daylight hours; however, firing stopped at dark.

(4) A previously dispatched water truck returned to the FSB. The driver indicated he could not proceed south at Cau Cam Le bridge (XT 723973) since Hwy QL13 had been cut further to the south. A subsequent ARVN report indicated that a PF post between Loc Ninh and the FSB had been overrun. The 9th RCAT reported Loc Ninh under attack.

(5) The tempo of activity increased on 6 April with both 1-48 and 2-52 making contact while the FSB received an increase in indirect fire.

(a) Early in the morning 5th Division directed TF 52 to reinforce Loc Ninh with one battalion. The 2-52 was designated. While enroute 2-52 made contact vic of RF LTL 17 and QL 13 (XT 723994). Six hundred rounds of arty and mortar fire failed to dislodge the enemy. There was no response to Vietnamese and US request for air support. Although friendly casualties were light (two KIA), 2-52 returned to FSB when no air support was provided. Also during early morning 1st Co, 1-48, made contact with unknown size NVA force in vic of XT 665007. The company sustained two WIA while killing four NVA and capturing two AK rifles and a Chinese Telephone.

(b) From early light until 2000 hours more than 150 rounds of indirect fire consisting of 82mm, 105mm howitzer and 122mm rocket were directed at the FSB. Counterbattery fire was used in all instances. The 82mm and 122mm fire came from the south while the 105mm came from the NW. Gunships and a C&C came up on our frequency along with two gunships. Targets and direction of approach were provided the pilot. The C&C received small arms fire from the SW and had to gain altitude. The pilot stated the Cobras needed POC and all would return in approximately 45 minutes. However, the fire team was diverted to Loc Ninh according to a 5th DCAT advisor at An Loc. A second request was forwarded for any type of aircraft with a VR capability. A US Air Force FAC worked in the AO for a few minutes but was diverted to Loc Ninh.

(c) A radio transmission received from TRAC Nui Ba Den relay stated that DANGER 79 (MG Hollingsworth) wanted a report from CORNISH (52d RCAT). He wanted to know "why in the hell can't I contact them". Knowing the CG was on the ZIPPO "push" (9th RCAT) we contacted him only to be told to remain off freq. Shortly thereafter the CG directed CORNISH to go to another frequency that was not so busy. CORNISH 81 (CPT Zumwalt) provided the CG a situation report to include the resupply problem. General Hollingsworth told us to check on the resupply again and he would do the same. Changing frequencies again, we heard the CG giving some harsh instructions concerning the type of air support wanted for ZIPPO (9th RCAT).

(d) When the 5th DCAT was contacted concerning the resupply, Major (name unk) stated that the problem was being examined. LTC Thinh was informed of the conversation with the CG and he indicated that a request for air resupply had been submitted. LTC Thinh also voiced concern about the enemy threat. He personally supervised the work of the bulldozer to include digging a large ditch outside of the perimeter for burying the dead. He did not envision their evacuation.

(e) The 5th DCAT was requested to provide an AC130 Spectre gunship for the night, they directed we coordinate with the 9th RCAT. This had been attempted the previous night but the situation at Loc Ninh precluded its use. The same was true for 6 April.

(f) At 2100 hours, COL Miller, SA, 5th DCAT, was apprised of the situation by LTC Ginger. Resupply was requested (155mm and 105mm ammo was less than 400 rounds). LTC Ginger asked COL Miller to discuss with his counterpart the possibility of TF52 moving to the north to reinforce Loc Ninh or withdraw to An Loc if Loc Ninh could not be reinforced. COL Miller was also informed that all requests for assistance appeared to fall on deaf ears. Additionally, some Vietnamese, in the 5th DIOC continued to tell LTC Thinh all air support was to be US, not VNAF. COL Miller assured him this was not the case and he would discuss with his counterpart resupply and movement of our force.

c. SUPPORT:

(1) The last supplies (Class I & V) were received by road on 2 April. On 4 April the Task Force had approximately 2,700 rounds of 105mm and 155mm ammo. The TF S4 requested Class I and V on 4, 5 and 6 April. LTC Thinh personally called on 6 April and subsequently phoned the 18th Div Cdr, COL Dao, that night. Follow-up was made by the advisors on each request and as previously indicated, the situation was brought to COL Miller's attention.

(2) US MEDEVAC support was exceptional. Requests were honored each day commencing 2 Apr. Commencing 5 Apr the PZ was changed each time to prevent the aircraft from being engaged by enemy fire. US MEDEVAC helicopters, painted a lustrous white, were nearly hit by indirect fire on 5 & 6 April.

(3) Reporting was a by-word for the 52d RCAT. However, no intelligence or related information was received from the 5th DCAT. The primary US source came from monitoring the 9th RCAT radio frequency and requesting information from the TRAC Nui Ba Den relay. Two requests were made for the evacuation of documents captured on 5 Apr. Neither was honored. The Task Force's Order of Battle books were not adequate for developing major organizations or unit designations from information contained in the documents. It was believed the documents indicated contact with D13/274 Regiment. A subsequent check showed they might have been sappers assigned to B6/5th VC Div. The early identification of the presence of the 5th VC Div in the battle area could have been important.

d. Evacuation of Fire Bases.

(1) At first light on 7 Apr the FSB began to receive a heavy volume of accurate indirect, automatic and small arms fire from the south and southwest. The 105mm howitzers were firing almost point-blank to the south while the 155mm howitzers and mortars were being used for counter-battery. Radio monitoring indicated the compounds occupied by the 9th RCAT and District personnel at Loc Ninh were surrounded, enemy tanks had advanced to the perimeter wire, and the ZIPPO operator was urgently requesting help.

(2) LTC Thinh stated that orders had been received from CG, 5th Div to move south. LTC Ginger requested US Cobras and a C&C from the 5th DCAT. The 5th DCAT confirmed the move and indicated the aircraft would be requested. At 0830 hours, the Task Force's vehicles, pulling artillery tubes and water trailers moved east on Hwy LTL 17. The same enemy position encountered on 6 Apr stopped the convoy before it reached the RJ of QL13 and LTL 17 (Figure 4-D-3). The three rear vehicles, with some troops, managed to return to the FSB South. It is not known why the lead vehicles moved forward knowing the enemy was entrenched east of the RJ nor why all of the vehicles were not included in the convoy if the intent was to break through.

(3) Shelling became more intense. A Vietnamese soldier wounded by fragmentation was blinded, bleeding heavily, and crawling aimlessly in a continually exposed position. Despite the heavy incoming fire, SFC Winland left a secure position and ran towards the soldier. An incoming mortar round knocked him down and slightly wounded him. Winland proceeded to the soldier, moved him to a bunker and administered first aid.

(4) At 0900 hours the order was given to CG, 5th Div to destroy equipment and move south on foot. The 2-52 continued to hold the FSB North and fire the mortars. The volume of enemy indirect and direct fire increased. At that time there were approximately 17 wounded men occupying the bunker. The doctor, who was previously in the convoy, started providing treatment. He also informed CPT Zumwalt that he had observed the enemy escaping to the north with three 105mm howitzers towed by trucks and had sighted a tank. After confirming the loss of the three artillery tubes, CPT Zumwalt reported it. The tank was never confirmed. LTC Thinh indicated a VMAF C&C was on the way for him to control withdrawal of his forces. The aircraft drew fire and departed. The US at An Loc confirmed orders to destroy equipment and to move by foot. FAC, fighters, C&C and Cobras were requested again. No reply was received.

(5) With individual weapons, extra water, two AN/FRC-25 and KY-38 the US advisors prepared to move east along Hwy LTL 17. Elements of the 1-48, returning to the north FSB from a southwesterly direction, were instructed to be the lead element followed by the Task Force Headquarters and the I&R Co. The 2-52 was to hold the FSB North and become the rear guard.

(6) Destruction of equipment was not complete. There was little artillery ammunition left that could be used by the enemy. Only four 105mm rounds were noted. Communications vans and other vehicles were pumped full of holes by small arms fire (Figure 4-D-4).

e. Withdrawal:

(1) The Task Force moved along Hwy LTL 17 departing the road approximately 800 meters from QL13, proceeding in a southeasterly direction. Enroute some of the previously mentioned vehicles were noted as not being destroyed. In limited time available the three advisors punctured the gas tanks and radiators of four vehicles. About 30 minutes later, while the majority of the Task

Force was in the jungle, the enemy could be seen crawling over these abandoned vehicles (See Figure 4-D-5).

Vehicles	58	Trailers	16
155mm Howitzer	02	105mm Howitzer	06
Mortars (81 & 60mm)	08	Other Crew Served Weapons	16
Individual weapons	374	Bayonets	475
Protective Masks	688	Binoculars	21
Radios	101	Field Phones	04
Switch Boards	04	Generators	07
Flack Vests	717	Tents	18
Individual rations	5,404	Rice	13,241 Kilos
Gasoline	11,450 (Gal)	M16 Ammunition	312,000 Rounds

NOTE: Not included are losses for Signal and Engineer Detachments and the Artillery Platoon, 5th Division.

Figure 4-D-4 Estimated Equipment Losses for 7 - 10 April 1972

(2) Once 2-52 closed on the lead elements of the Task Force, the troops began to bunch-up. LTC Dien, the Regimental XO, was requested by LTC Ginger to spread the force out. LTC Thinh indicated that LTC Dien and the Regimental S3 (Maj Khoi) would accompany the 1-48 and that the US Advisors and the TF Commander would go with the 2-52. 1-48 attempted to move south, but made contact and stalled. Troops began to bunch up again. LTC Dien was again informed that unless he maintained order, provided a lead element, flank security, and a rear guard the enemy would cut us to pieces. He attempted to get other officers to have their personnel spread out.

(3) The 5th RCAT (SNOWBALL 67-unk person) was contacted. He was apprised of the situation, air support was requested and finally, a few choice words for failure to provide support were tendered to him by the RCAT SA. Then, LTC Ginger switched freqs and contacted DANGER 79. A situation report was provided the CG as follows: "Failing some type of artillery or air support, I thought the troops would panic and the majority of the force would be lost." His reply "You hang in there son and I'll get some damn support up here." His subsequent transmission to either DYNAMITE 6 (BG McGiffert) or SNOWBALL 53 (COL Miller) was: "Call back to (unk station), get someone off their dead ass and get that boy some help up there. Get Redleg and some fighters."

(4) 1-48 attempted to move to SE and ran into a three-sided ambush astride QL13 (Figure 4-D-51). Forward elements panicked and started running to the rear. As a result soldiers from all units were intermingled. Some soldiers continued to refuse to hold their positions. SFC Winland and LTC Ginger yelled at them and the Regimental S3 fired his M16 over their heads. Indirect fire was falling to our rear. This came in as airbursts because of the trees. The 1-48 soldiers that had remained in the Rome Flow area were also taking a large volume of indirect fire.

(5) A few moments later, LTC Kotas, DSA, 18th DCAT, came up on our frequencies. COL Dao was with him. LTC Kotas wanted to know the advisor's status. He was instructed not to attempt a landing at the firebase since it had been evacuated. LTC Kotas acknowledged. CPT Zumwalt tried to talk to him again but there was no response. (Someone told him to clear the 5th DCAT Command net.)

(6) LTC Thinh asked again for a US C&C and Cobras. He was told the fire team had been requested. He stated that the situation was dangerous. Acknowledging his evaluation, LTC Ginger informed him that unless they managed some kind of organization and moved the unit would be destroyed. He asked which way to move. The SA's reply was: we should try to break through to the south since it provided some concealment from the ambush site astride Hwy, QL 13 and the 1-48 could fix the enemy. If this failed, an attempt should be made to attack through the 1-48 and

move to the SE. 2-52 was making contact in the south while the discussion was in progress.

(7) To the SE friendly arty was firing in the vicinity of the PF post at Cau Cam Le (XT 723 973). Some of the rounds were impacting on the southern edge of the ambush site. Observing the fire, LTC Thinh passed instructions to the 1-48 and I&R Co Commanders. Having given the order to move and noting some reluctance on the part of personnel in the 1-48 and I&R Co, LTC Thinh started walking SE through the Rome Flow area accompanied by the three Advisors. (Area was open with the exception of small undergrowth, fallen trees and tree stumps. It probably had been plowed eight or ten months prior.) As they approached a fallen tree, about 100 meters east of the near tree line, other men began to move forward.

(8) Immediately the area was engulfed by direct and indirect fire. Some of the indirect rounds contained a non-persistent tear agent. Two enemy soldiers ran forward placing aimed fire on the troops less than 75 meters from us. LTC Thinh, an excellent shot, killed one. A B-40 round exploded in the dead-fall. One friendly soldier was killed immediately. CPT Zumwalt was hit in the jaw, knocked to the ground, and was bleeding heavily. LTC Thinh and LTC Ginger received slight lacerations. LTC Dien had a head wound. LTC Ginger took the radio from CPT Zumwalt and told SFC Winland to administer first aid. Moments prior to being wounded CPT Zumwalt received either one or two transmissions from DYNAMITE 6. Zumwalt turned and inquired: "Who is DYNAMITE 6? Is he a FAC? This guy keeps asking detailed questions about us. Can't he see we are getting our ass kicked?" Zumwalt never used the radio again.

(9) DYNAMITE 6 inquired again about the advisors status. BG McGiffert requested to know if all advisors were in the same locale. When he was provided an affirmative answer, he stated a DUSTOFF was requested and all US Advisors would go aboard. When queried concerning my counterpart he stated that if LTC Thinh still had a fighting unit he should remain on the ground. BG McGiffert further stated the CG had directed the evacuation of all advisors. His last statement was "I'm going up north now but will be back". The SA asked him not to leave without providing some support. Later an affirmative answer was given to LTC Dien's query about the MEDEVAC being on the way. When LTC Thinh was informed all three US advisors must board the aircraft, he looked at LTC Ginger but said nothing.

(10) Two A-1E fighters began to bomb the tree line east of QL 13 and the Task Force Commander and the advisors moved forward to another fallen tree. To the south black smoke could be seen in the vic of the Cau Cam Le bridge (XT 722973). A subsequent radio message from a US FAC indicated the bridge was afire. Then, as if in a Ft Benning dress rehearsal, elements of the 1-48 began to use fire and maneuver to break through the ambush.

(11) While enroute to the next fallen tree the US advisors spotted the RCAT interpreter (SG Tong) who had disappeared early in the morning. He was with a small group of stragglers. Also nearby was the wounded XO of the 2-52 (CPT Phu). The interpreter was told that the MEDEVAC would take only wounded personnel and the remainder would have to get off their behinds and move forward. The advisors continued to move to another dead-fall about 25 meters from Hwy 13 (XT 719 983) (Figure 4-D-6). By this time, the majority of the troops had pushed through the ambush site.

f. Extraction Attempts:

(1) At approximately 1400 hours another radio message stated the MEDEVAC helicopter was on the way but it could not be located visually.

(a) SFC Winland called out for LTC Dien, but there was no response. (LTC Dien had been manning in the same group as the advisors until the latter stopped for CPT Phu.) It was later determined that LTC Dien's body was dropped on the north bank of the Suoi Tonie Trou (XT 723976). SFC Winland wanted to move immediately through the ambush less it block out withdrawal. He was informed all advisors were directed to remain in the area. If they did move into the tree line, the MEDEVAC Helicopter would probably have to be changed for one equipped with a jungle penetrator thus delaying the evacuation. SFC Winland turned his attention to assisting CPT Zumwalt who continued to bleed heavily. However, the pros and cons of moving remained surfaced and were frequently discussed.

(b) The surrounding area grew relatively silent and some of the stragglers began to move in the same direction as the main body. Several of the Vietnamese wounded began to cluster at the advisor's position. At this time it is estimated that the Task Force's KIA, WIA, & MIA exceeded 150. Exact enemy losses remained unk; however, numerous bodies were noted.

(c) A US FAC came on station with two fighters inbound. Two additional fighters appeared to the south and started bombing north of the Cau Cam Le bridge. The FAC stated the two extra were VNAF. Radio contact could not be established and the US fighters could not work until the others cleared the area. The FAC was informed that friendly troops were in the area and if possible, warn the VNAF fighters. (It was later determined that some personnel of the Task Force were injured and thereafter, the units broke up and E&E to An Loc in 10 to 12 men groups.)

(d) At 1430 hours the initial MEDEVAC helicopter attempted to land. The pilot never made radio contact with CORNISH element. During descent the aircraft received a heavy volume of fire from the tree lines and had to depart the area.

(2) During the ensuing hour, the area around the advisor's position continued to receive air-strikes. Between 1530 and 1600 hours, a second MEDEVAC attempt was made by DUSTOFF 111, piloted by LT William Johnson, 283d Med Det. This time the lustrous white aircraft (DUSTOFF 111) and Cobras were sighted to the north. The aircraft commander was given a situation report: "location; OSCAR three (CPT Zumwalt) is badly wounded and continues to bleed; there are several wounded Vietnamese with us and they will probably rush the aircraft when you land; our position is still surrounded; one 51 Cal MG is located in the NE and one in the SW; position will be marked by smoke; and believe the best approach would be from the north." When instructed to do so, the last smoke grenade was thrown. As DUSTOFF 111 descended, it was initially engaged by automatic fire from the north and east. Subsequently, it was engaged on all sides by a heavy volume of small arms fire when it reached our general vicinity it appeared the aircraft had been hit and would crash; however, gaining altitude, it passed over the 51 Cal MG position to the SW.

(a) DYNAMITE 6 asked another person on the net to switch "pushes". LTC Ginger gained only a part of the conversation but it sounded like he said it was too dangerous to attempt another extraction that afternoon. The FAC stated he hadn't monitored the conversation.

(b) Between airstrikes two Vietnamese stragglers attempted to move to the SE but were turned back by enemy fire. The enemy circle remained closed thus blocking the escape route.

(c) The Senior Advisor asked the FAC to contact SNOWBALL to determine if there would be another rescue attempt. In the interim the FAC continued to coordinate airstrikes while concentrating fire on those areas where rescue aircrafts had received heavy automatic fire, varied ordnance was used. It is difficult to believe that the NVA could exist after such bombardment.

(3) At 1700 hours the FAC indicated the area would continue to be softened-up and another MEDEVAC attempted. The surrounding area was burning in numerous places and the visibility was poor. An AC 130 Spectre Gunship came on station and placed accurate fire to the east and west of friendly position. Radio contact was made with DUSTOFF 107 (Piloted by CW2 Robert L. Horst, 283d Med Det) and the aircraft commander was informed of the situation on the ground. The pilot stated the approach would be over the tree line from the east. At 1730 hours a red pen flare was fired and DUSTOFF 107 approached from the east. LTC Ginger jumped up in the middle of the road waving his hands. Apparently not being seen by the aircraft crew, the helicopter continued in a westerly direction. At 200 meters east of the next tree line and 15 to 25 feet altitude it drew a heavy volume of fire. The aircraft appeared to stop in mid-air. It turned northwest and made its departure generally along the same route as the approach, and drew fire from the tree line to the east. When the aircraft departed, both SFC Winland and LTC Ginger jumped up and waved their arms. Again the aircraft crew apparently did not see them.

(a) Another helicopter was seen in the north. The Senior Advisor was unable to make contact having forgotten about switching the radio frequency to prevent compromise if extraction had been successful and the radio was left behind.

(b) Several minutes later the FAC indicated that the advisor's only hope was a Jolly Green Giant. He was asked to determine availability. A few minutes later he stated it would take two hours and forty-five minutes for one to get on station. After waiting another hour the FAC stated the request had been cancelled since the Jolly Green Giant could not be used at night.

g. Night:

(1) After learning the Jolly Green Giant was cancelled the advisors attention was focused on: anticipation of being overrun; utilization of air cover; an E&E plan; the wounded; and possibility of another extraction attempt.

(2) From 1700 hours, 7 Apr until 0830 hours, 8 Apr, alternating AC 130 Spectre Gunships provided cover. As each gunship approached the area the FAC released control to LTC Ginger for direction and pattern of fire. General location was provided and a strobe light used for homing purposes. Each Spectre pilot was cautioned to inform us immediately when a "fix" was obtained so the light could be extinguished. Normally the pilots would indicate when the infrared system had "locked-on". Only the 20mm and 40mm weapons systems were utilized with the latter being used more extensively, because of accuracy. Fire was adjusted in and out (25 to 1200 meters) around the position using a horseshoe initially and a circle later. The word "Bullseye", denoting danger was given once.

(3) At 2015 hours, COL Miller contacted the FAC and directed that he could not work south of Cau Cam Le bridge, because friendly troops were E&E and their specific locations was not known. Additionally, he inquired about the possibility of using the gunship on targets around An Loc and the abandoned fire base. The FAC said the RCAT situation was more precarious than An Loc and proposed the AC 130 continue to provide them assistance. LTC Ginger informed the FAC that if the situation permitted the Spectre could work on FSB.

(4) The friendly position started receiving small arms and indirect fire again. After the gunship worked-over the area both types subsided. Thereafter, only sporadic fire was heard until contact the next morning.

(5) Several radio transmissions were made concerning any future evacuation plans. At 2100 hours SNOWBALL 67 was queried and informed that two or three hours of darkness were needed if E&E was necessary and no future extractions were planned. He stated he would check; however, no reply was received. At 0100 hours, 8 Apr SNOWBALL 53A (LTC Benedict) was contacted. Relating the previous conversation with SNOWBALL 67 LTC Ginger asked why no reply had been received. He stated that SNOWBALL 67 was off duty. At 0200 hours, LTC Benedict stated the decision had not been made by TRAC to attempt a first light pick-up or one later in the morning. He was informed an early decision was essential. At this time LTC Benedict also provided: radio contact had been lost with ZIPPO; Quan Loi (XT 8190) was lost; a crewman on the second MEDEVAC attempt had been wounded, and the pilot had been killed on the third attempt. Three hours later LTC Benedict inquired as to why the advisors didn't E&E. He also indicated that there would be no first light pick-up and any attempt to be made would occur after 0900 hours. LTC Ginger chewed him out for not responding sooner. He apologized. He was asked if someone was afraid to wake up one of the Generals. He said he couldn't answer that question. LTC Benedict was apprised of the E&E plans, but not the direction. (This had been a frequent discussion topic with SFC Winland throughout the night to include means to destroy the codes and KY 38.) Events overcame any attempt to escape.

h. Enemy Movement:

(1) Prior to first light the advisors and friendly Vietnamese (approximately 15) moved about 25 meters west of the road to a large deadfall. There was sufficient room underneath the deadfall in which to slide CPT Zumwalt thus providing some overhead cover. However, there was not protection for the remaining personnel. Some protection would be afforded from small arms fire coming from the west but not the east.

(2) At 0530 hours one of the Vietnamese pointed to the north, said "VC", and jumped to the west side of the deadfall. Fifty to 60 men were moving south along Hwy 13. Everyone was told to keep quiet while about nine passed the position. SFC Winland prepared to fire. CPT Zumwalt raised up and pulled his .45 Cal pistol. He was pushed and told to "shut up". Whispering into the mike, the Senior Advisor informed the Spectre pilot of the situation and requested a heavy volume of fire on the road; the aircraft started his northern leg, and to deliver fire 50 meters east of the road. The fire was perfect. The enemy troops began to break both to the east and west of the road with about a dozen moving toward the advisors position. SFC Winland sprang to his feet, yelled "I'm not going to be taken alive - those bastards are heading for us" and attempted to fire. The weapon mis-fired. On the second attempt he killed seven to ten. Two of the Vietnamese

also fired. The majority of the enemy troops fled into the direct killing zone of the AC 130. An estimated 40 were killed by the gunship fire.

1. Successful Extraction:

(1) From 0630 until 1030 hours the surrounding area was subjected to intense bombing and strafing by friendly aircraft. Ordnance included heavy 500 pound and CBU bombs, napalm, 7.62 rockets, 20mm and 40mm cannon and MG fire. Twice cease fire had to be given because rocket and cannon fire was delivered on the end of the deadfall. These were the only instances of inaccuracy.

(2) At 0800 hours the FAC observed two yellow trucks loaded with personnel to the north of RJ QL 13 and LTL 17. He requested SNOWBALL's permission to fire since personnel had weapons. Political clearance was not given. These vehicles never ventured south of RJ during the next three hours.

(3) Instructions were received that THUNDER 6 (LTC Casey, 3d Bde, 1st Cav) would come up on our "push" and direct the extraction. When radio contact was made, he was requested to withhold instruction until 15 minutes prior to evacuation in the event radio transmissions were being monitored. LTC Casey stated a big "show" was in store and when finished all personnel would be lifted out of the area by two small and one large helicopter. In a subsequent conversation he was provided: location; how the position would be marked; the location of automatic weapons; and in the event all personnel lost consciousness from the non-toxic agent, the KY 38 had been marked for removal and SFC Winland's arm would be placed through the suspenders of the pack containing the set.

(4) Between 1000 hours and 1030 hours CBU's were dropped on both the tree lines to our east and west followed by a non-toxic anti-personnel agent being released in the Rome Flow area by A37. The agent panicked the friendly troops. Within 200 meters five NVA came out of their holes. Less than 30 meters an NVA soldier raised up and was killed. Prior to dropping the non-toxic agent LTC Ginger inquired if it would cause CPT Zumwalt to hemorrhage. Assurance was given that it would not. Although the agent burned the skin, eyes, and lungs, none lost consciousness.

(5) About 20 minutes later two Vietnamese in civilian clothes came down from the north on a Honda. They slowed up when friendly Vietnamese hollered at them. The first thought was to kill them. However, since no weapons were visible, they were allowed to pass.

(6) The extraction area would be considered a pilot's nightmare. All three tree lines were burning in addition to numerous spots in the Rome Flow area. Smoke lowered visibility. The pilots were required to use protective masks because of the anti-personnel agent. As subsequently learned, one 51 Cal MG to the SW had not been put out of action but opened fire. Further the LOH-6 combat configuration permits a maximum of two men, not nine.

(7) Although some difficulties developed over the Vietnamese talking, moving, and attempting to smoke during the night, their actions were one of helpfulness prior to the rescue. Between airstrikes, the two not wounded crawled around in the field to procure from the dead, water, ammunition and a medical kit. The meager findings were offered by the Vietnamese to the Americans prior to personal use or by fellow countrymen. An array of NVA weapons were also presented to the advisors. It was apparent they considered their survival hinged on the US efforts to evacuate the advisors. In spite of reassurance that sufficient aircrafts would be available to rescue everyone, disbelief was noted.

(8) It was equally difficult for the advisors to believe the next rescue attempt would be anymore successful than those on 7 April. SNOWBALL had been requested to drop water and ammunition if the attempt failed. The will to resist prevailed; however, tempers and anxiety surfaced. Each cursed the heat and the debris from the bomb and rocket blasts. CPT Zumwalt continued to ask "how much more time?" SFC Winland was angry because I refused to delay an airstrike while one of the Vietnamese searched for more water. Each man had lost sufficient body fluids to diminish noticeable perspiration. The SA could not visualize the NVA permitting us to remain there since it blocked their advance along Hwy QL 13.

(9) At approximately 1100 hours instructions were received to fire the pen flare and get ready. One LOH-6 followed by a second made a tree top approach from the east. Both aircraft were

engaged by enemy fire. The first LOH-6 twirled in the open field and again in the center of QL 13. SFC Winland carried the KY 38 and assisted CPT Zumwalt into the aircraft while LTC Ginger tried to destroy the AN/PRC-25. While running toward the first aircraft a second LOH-6 approached. The third aircraft was never observed. After loading CPT Zumwalt and the KY 38 SFC Winland moved to the other side of the helicopter and hopped in astride the gunners ammunition box. The aircraft was piloted by CPT John D. Whitehead and crewed by SG Raymond F. Waite, 3d Bde, 1st Cav Div. SG Waite pulled LTC Ginger toward the aircraft holding him by the suspenders. At this time the first LOH-6 was mobbed by friendly Vietnamese. SG Waite attempted to dislodge them from the aircraft while CPT Whitehead executed numerous pedal turns attempting to gain altitude. Eventually the aircraft managed to achieve about 60 to 80 feet in altitude.

a. The second LOH-6 (piloted by 1LT David E. Ripley, same unit) flying at an altitude of about 70 feet and on the east had Vietnamese in the aircraft and hanging on the skids. Subsequently the NVA's fire hit the three Vietnamese hanging onto the helicopter's skids and they fell.

b. In the vic of XT 723974 NVA troops standing in the middle of the road placed accurate fire through the floor of the passenger compartment. SFC Winland was seriously wounded by metal fragments and by AK 47 rounds. CPT Zumwalt pointed to his face and hands and then to SFC Winland indicating locations of latter's wounds. The slipstream was blowing Winland's blood and it could not be determined if the source was SFC or the pilot's. The aircraft continued at a very low altitude in an area known to be enemy held.

(c) Although the number of men clinging to the skids was unknown they continued to pull LTC Ginger's feet off the skids. After landing at Chon Thanh Airstrip (XT 7662) it was determined that four Vietnamese were hanging on to LTC Ginger and the aircraft skids. A Vietnamese ambulance was available for the estimated nine Vietnamese rescued. As for the three US advisors they were rushed to two other helicopters and flown to 3d Field Hospital via 3d Bde, 1st Aid Station.

### 3. (C) Problem Areas:

a. Problem: Limited dissemination of intelligence and intelligence related information from higher to lower headquarters.

Discussion: During the period 5-7 April, intelligence and related information was primarily obtained from monitoring the 9th RCAT radio frequency. TF 52/52d RCAT were never informed of the PF post at Cau Cam Le bridge being evacuated nor of the circumstances surrounding the withdrawal of the 7th Regiment on 5 April. The problem was compounded by the lack of interest in procuring the five pounds of documents captured on 5 April. A detailed readout could have produced valuable Order of Battle and possibly insight to future NVA plans.

Affected HQS: TRAC, III Corps, Division.

Recommendation: That higher headquarters utilize the spot reporting system to insure timeliness of information to supported units.

b. Problem: There is a lack of authorized rescue and recognition equipment issued to RCAT personnel.

Discussion: During period 7-8 April 1972, the following equipment was utilized for recognition and evacuation attempt: AN/PRC-25, smoke grenades, pin flares, strobe light, mirror and hammock (as a panel marker). With the exception of the radio and smoke grenade, all other items were obtained on a "scrounge" basis. Currently MACV issued survival kits do not contain the essentials. From a practical point, the small radio and marking panel issued pilots are equally suitable for advisory personnel. The strobe light was invaluable in providing FAC and AC 130 Spectre Gunships a specific location.

Affected HQS: TRAC & MACV

Recommendation: Emergency equipment issued advisors be examined for adequacy and ample type and amount be issued each advisor.

c. Problem: Lack of communication equipment at 5th DCAT (Fwd).

Discussion: Initially the 5th DCAT at An Loc had only the capability to monitor on frequency. Numerous messages were passed on 5 and 6 April via TRAC Nui Ba Den Relay to 5th DCAT (REAR) and then to An Loc. On 7 April the situation became more critical when numerous additional subscribers entered the Command Net for information and/or instructions. This was especially true when the alternating FAC and gunships were required to utilize the command frequency to contact the RCAT.

Affected HQS: Division

Recommendation: Provide sufficient communication equipment to maintain a minimum of two communication nets. Utilize a logistical net for subscribers passing non-operational traffic.

4. (U) Special Areas:

At one time or another during 5-8 April there were numerous impressionable events which warrant praise.

- a. The determination of MG Hollingsworth and BG McGiffert to provide air resources to insure interim survival until rescue could be accomplished.
- b. The sacrifice of CW2 Robert L. Horst. A man the three US advisors never knew, but gave his life to save theirs.
- c. The demonstrated professionalism and teamwork by the FAC, and pilots of the rescue aircrafts, fighters, AC130, Cobras, and C&C.
- d. The extreme accuracy and timeliness of the numerous aerial delivery systems.
- e. The will to resist, desire to live, and comradeship of CPT Zumwalt and SFC Winland.
- f. The leadership of LTC Thinh. On 7 April when all else failed, his movement forward in the Rome Flow area was the key factor in breaking through the ambush.

1. (U) PURPOSE:

To provide a historical account of the actions involving the 18th Infantry Division during the BINH LONG Campaign from 5 April 1972 through 25 June 1972. Information was derived from journals, reports, private conversations and interviews with numerous Vietnamese and U.S. military sources.

2. (C) INTRODUCTION:

a. In March 1972 intelligence reports indicated heavy enemy movement and massing of forces in Cambodia opposite Tay Ninh, Binh Long, and Phuoc Long Provinces. There were also indications the 274th and 33d NVA Regiments were moving elements toward Phuoc Tuy Province. On 1 April the 24th and 271st NVA Regiments (Independent) conducted a diversionary attack on FSB Pace (XT 075877), Tay Ninh Province. During the night of 4 April, Binh Long and Phuoc Long Provinces reported numerous harassing attacks. On 5 April elements of the 5th NVA Division attacked Loc Ninh (XU 725085).

b. The 18th Infantry Division, as a mobile reaction force, had previously been committed throughout Military Region III and Cambodia to conduct spoiling attacks and counter enemy threats. In late March elements of the 43d Regiment were positioned in Hau Nghia and Binh Duong, and the 52d Regiment had displaced to Binh Duong, Bien Hoa and Binh Long Provinces. The remainder of the divisional forces were employed in Long Khanh, Tay Ninh and Phuoc Tuy Provinces, and the Capital Military District (CMD) (Figure E-1).

3. (C) DISCUSSION:

To counter the enemy threat, III Corps directed numerous moves of 18th Division forces. The 43d Regiment (-), Corps reserve, was deployed to Cha Ray, Hau Nghia Province (XT 513257). The regiment subsequently dispatched 3-48 to Tri Tam District, Binh Duong Province (XT 489459). The 1-43 remained in CMD based on a long standing order for it to provide security for Saigon. The 48th Regiment deployed 2-48 to Saigon to partially fill the void of the departing Airborne Brigade. The 48th Regiment (-) remained at Long Giao, Long Khanh Province (YS 4396) to counter any threat from the 33d NVA Regiment. As a matter of interest the 48th Regiment was the only regiment in the division to convert to the three battalion concept directed for 30 March implementation by JGS. Like the 43d Regiment, the 52d Regiment had a battalion (1-52) attached to CMD. Subsequently, 4-52 was attached to the 8th Regiment, 5th Infantry Division at Tri Tam. With the 52d I&R Co, one organic battalion (2-52) and 1-48 plus artillery (C Battery, 182d Artillery Battalion) and engineer elements, TF52 commenced deployment to Hung Tam, Binh Long Province (XT 707997) via Lai Khe and An Loc on 21-22 March. See appendix I, Task Organization.

## a. Binh Long Province:

(1) Hung Tam (4-7 Apr): Task Force 52 consisting of 1031 Officers and enlisted men, occupied two FSB at Hung Tam on 28 March. The mission was to conduct operations north and south of Highway LTL 17 and West of Highway QL 13 (Figure E-2).

(a) There were no significant engagements until 5 April when 1-48 ambushed a NVA element (D13/274 Regiment) killing 15 enemy and capturing five pounds of documents. On the same day the FSB started receiving indirect fire from 122mm rockets and 82mm mortars. On 6 April 5th Division directed TF52 to reinforce Loc Ninh with one battalion (2-52). Enroute the 2-52 made contact in vicinity of RJ Highways LTL 17 and QL 13 (XT 722995). When artillery (600 of 2700 remaining artillery rounds) failed to dislodge the enemy and air support could not be obtained, the 2-52 returned to the FSB. Throughout the day the FSB received heavy indirect fire to include 105mm howitzer. Although casualties had been minimal until 6 April, resupply was critical; especially class I and class V (artillery and mortar). No surface resupply had been accomplished after 2 April and an airdrop was pending. To insure a water source, the 52d I&R Company secured a portion of the small stream to the west of the FSB.

(b) During the early morning of 7 April, the FSB was subjected to intense indirect fire followed by ground probes from the west, southwest and north by elements of the 209th, CT7 NVA Division. While the remaining artillery and mortar ammunition was being expended in counterbattery fire, the 5th Division directed the Task Force to move by vehicle to An Loc (XT 7588). The lead vehicles were engaged by the same elements that thwarted the 2-52 on 6 April, at the RJ of LTL 17

and QL 13. Being given a subsequent order to destroy equipment and move on foot, the Task Force's elements were engaged and surrounded upon approaching Highway QL 13 (XT 719983). After bitter fighting, the ambush was broken in the southeast and elements moved to the vicinity of the abandoned post at Cam Le Bridge (XT 725972). While reconnaissance elements moved forward, the main body was bombed and strafed by two VNAF aircraft. Neither the Task Force or U. S. FAC could make radio contact with the VNAF fighters. Task Force personnel were scattered and unit integrity gave way to small elements which moved east and subsequently south to An Loc. Three wounded U.S. advisors remained at the ambush site throughout the day while three valiant attempts were made to extract them and 15 wounded ARVN soldiers. On 8 April the three advisors and nine of 15 ARVN soldiers were successfully evacuated.

(c) The personnel and equipment losses for TF 52 are at Appendixes 2 and 3 respectively. There is no official count of enemy losses; however, they are assumed to be substantial at the ambush site because of the fierce fighting to break the ambush and subsequent air support rendered the U.S. advisors for the insuing 26 hours.

(d) The Senior Advisor's account of the above is contained at Appendix 4, Annex D.

(2) An Loc:

(a) 10-16 April: Following TF 52 withdrawal from Hung Tam, immediate efforts were devoted to reorganization, refitting, and establishment of a defensive sector within An Loc (Figure E-3). Elements of the 8th Regiment, 5th Division were airmobiled to An Loc on 11 and 12 April. Of the total 5538 military personnel in An Loc, the Task Force comprised 655. The 5th Division had little time to organize the heterogeneous forces before the first major battle for An Loc was fought. During the early morning hours of 13 April, the 9th VC Division reinforced by two tank battalions from the 203d NVA Armor Regiment and supported by elements of the 43d NVA Artillery Group, attacked An Loc from the north, northwest, west southwest, and south. The primary thrust came from the north. Elements of the 272d Regiment with tanks attacked the TF 52 positions, forcing withdrawal to new defense positions in the southern half of the city. The psychological effect of being confronted by T54 Russian tanks had considerable impact on Task Force personnel. Of equal surprise was the manner in which the tanks approached friendly lines. Apparently the enemy believed the city was previously captured and were not fully prepared for combat (see Figure D-8, Annex D). By 16 April the northern half of the city was in complete control of the NVA (Figure E-4). On the same day, the 1st Airborne Brigade occupying Hill 169 (XT 789859) since 11 April, was attacked by the 141st NVA Regiment. Fierce fighting ensued. In an attempt to reinforce An Loc, the 21st Infantry Division had moved from the Delta and was engaged in clearing operations along Highway QL13 in the vicinity of Chon Thanh (XT 7662) (see Annex F).

(b) 17 April - 10 May: Throughout this period the Task Force was subjected to a heavy volume of indirect fire from an assortment of captured U.S. and Communist weapons. It appeared the enemy's intentions were to compress the defenders into a smaller area while demoralizing personnel by restricting resupply and evacuation of the wounded by air. Also noticeable was the increased use and introduction of modern AA weapons. The first SA 7 in this area was suspected of being fired on 9 May. Intelligence indicated a shift of 5th VC Division's forces from Binh Duong to the Quang Loi area (XT 8190).

(c) 11-15 May: At 0500 hours, 11 May, following a heavy artillery preparation, An Loc was attacked on all sides by elements of both the 5th VC and 7th NVA Divisions. These two Divisions were reinforced by two battalions of the 203d Armor Regiment and supported by the 42d Artillery Group and the 271st AA Regiment. Elements of 271st Regiment, 9th VC Division, supported by T54 tanks attacked TF 52 positions (Figure E-5). Task Force personnel stood their ground. Three T54 tanks were engaged and destroyed by the M72 LAW. The overall result of the battle was the establishment of two large salients in the defensive lines (Figure E-6). When comparing this assault with the one on 13 April, the following differences were noted for 11 May: The artillery preparation was longer and more intense; Infantry accompanied the tanks; SAM were utilized; and The ARVN soldiers stood their ground while destroying enemy armor with the M72 LAW.

(d) 16 May - 12 June: For the next 10 days the volume of artillery and AA fire remained heavy. On the ground the An Loc forces were unable to force the enemy from the northeast and west salients. TAC air and B-52 air strikes were used extensively against artillery and AA positions. The major problems confronting TF 52 was evacuation of the wounded and procurement of adequate amounts of perishable food stuffs. However, there was significant progress made during the later days of this

period. During 16-17 May elements of 15th Regiment, 9th Infantry Division, were making progress in the south, vicinity of Tan Khai (XT 766772) thus reducing enemy pressure on An Loc. This was equally true of 21st Infantry Division and its stubborn determination to secure other portions of QL 13. On 8 June the 1-48 aggressively attacked enemy elements in their northern salient forcing their withdrawal. While sustaining minor casualties, 1-48 killed 61 NVA. On 12 June the 7th Regiment was successful in forcing the enemy to abandon their positions in the western salient.

(e) 13-25 June: The morale, spirit, and general conditions at An Loc continued to improve. Noteworthy was the progress made in evacuating the wounded. Initial steps were taken to systematically extract assigned and attached 5th ARVN Division units while inserting additional 18th Division units (Figure E-7). On 13-14 June elements of the 48th Regiment were moved from Lai Khe and airmobiled to An Loc. After initially being assigned an area in the southern sector of the city, the Regiment was directed to attack Hill 169. On 17 June 3-48 attacked to the east and secured the southern tip of the hill. The battalion killed 28 NVA and captured a large Chinese radio. On 21 June HQ TF 52 (70 men) was extracted along with the 1st Airborne Brigade. The 2d Battalion was made OPCON to Binh Long Sector and 1-48 reverted to parent control. During the next two days, HQ 43d Regiment, 2-43, 3-43, 4-43, 1-52, and 43d I&R Company were airmobiled to An Loc while elements of the 15th Regiment were extracted (Figure E-8). Like the friendly forces, the NVA made numerous changes in disposition. The 5th VC Division moved elements west to Base Area 354 and then west of the Dogs Face. The 9th VC Division withdrew to refit. It was believed that the 272d Regiment had moved to vicinity of Quang Loi, 95C Regiment was in the rubber area northwest of An Loc, and the 271st Regiment had occupied portions of Base Area 354. Elements of the 7th NVA Division continued to interdict Highway QL 13.

(f) Statistical data is contained in Appendix 4 (Personnel Status, An Loc, 25 Jun 72), Appendix 5 (Personnel Losses, 10 Apr - 25 Jun), and Appendix 6 (Enemy Losses 5 Apr - 26 Jun).

(g) For additional information pertaining to the An Loc Battles, see Annexes D, H, I, J, and K.

(3) Highway QL 13 (5 Apr - 25 Jun):

(a) Advance to TAU O Bridge: On the eve of the battle for Loc Ninh, 1st Squadron, 5th Cavalry Regiment, consisting of 82 men and equipped with 14 M-41 tanks moved to Lai Khe to become a part of the 5th Infantry Division Task Force which would attempt to reinforce An Loc. One day later the 1-5 and the 5th Airborne Battalion opened QL 13 from the XT line 40 to 50 with two minor engagements. On 9-10 April they continued the drive north to the XT line 60, vicinity Chon Thanh (XT 76 60). In the interim, HQ, 5th Cavalry Regiment moved from Xuan Loc to Lai Khe. The 2d and 3d Squadrons of the Regiment returned from Tay Ninh Province and became III Corps reserve in Bien Hoa Province. When the advance was initiated again on 11 April, 1-5 met stiff resistance in the vicinity of XT 767661. While controlling the action by air on 13 April, the Regimental Commander was killed. The following day 1-5 became OPCON to TF 31, 21st Infantry Division. In the ensuing four days, fierce fighting took place against well entrenched elements of the 165th NVA Regiment. In spite of B-52 strikes and 142 sorties of tactical air, the enemy continued to blunt success for TF 31. On 27 April 1-5 became OPCON to the 32d Regiment, 21st Infantry Division. During the next 17 days the combined efforts of elements of the 31st and 32d Regiments along with 1-5 increased pressure on the 165th NVA Regiment's positions. On 13 May these positions were overrun. From 14 May to 2 June the 1-5 would participate in clearing operations to open QL 13 to the vicinity of TAU O Bridge (XT 7672). The 1st Squadron's attempt to advance was thwarted by the 209th NVA Regiment and movement north was stopped at XT 766695. On 2 June the Squadron returned to Bien Hoa for refitting. A schematic of 1-5 movements is at Figure E-9. Battle losses for 5 April - 2 June are as follows:

FRIENDLY:

Personnel: 7 KIA 47 WIA

Equipment: 5 M-41, 1 M-113, and 1 M-132

ENEMY:

Personnel: 21 KIA 1 CIA

Equipment: 2 B-40, 6 AK-47

B-40 ammunition and documents

(b) Return to TAU O Bridge (22-25 Jun): Elements of the 18th Infantry Division would attempt once again to break the enemy's strangle hold on QL 13 in the vicinity of the TAU O Bridge. In mid June (19 June), as part of the III Corps overall plan to redeploy forces, HQ, 18th Infantry Division, 18th I&R Company, 2d Squadron and A Company, 5th Cavalry Regiment, moved from Cu Chi to Lai Khe. Upon arrival the Division assumed control of 1-5 (OPCON to 21st Infantry Division) and 46th Regiment, 25th Infantry Division. Lai Khe became the staging area for units being airmobiled to An Loc and the Division base for conducting operations along QL 13. The 46th Regiment and 5th Cavalry Regiment (-) assumed control of the 32d Regiment's AO and the three Ranger battalions (65th, 73d & 84th) and 1-18th Cavalry Squadron which were operating in the AO. The 46th Regiment and 5th Cavalry Regiment (-) were given the mission to relieve pressure on the TAU O Bridge area and clear QL 13 from the XT line 70 to 75. The 9th Regiment, 5th Infantry Division retained its previous assigned AO while securing QL 13 from the XT line 48 to 58 (Figure E-10). Intelligence information indicated the 209th NVA Regiment maintained base areas in vicinity of XT 7070 and manned the bunker complex blocking QL 13 with minimum personnel. The Division plan was to initiate an attack on 22 June. It included maximum use of preplanned air support following massive use of artillery. While the bunkers were being assaulted, other elements would operate to the west (XT North-South line 73) to try and prevent the 209th Regiment from reinforcing or resupplying the personnel occupying the bunkers. As of 25 June there was little progress made in clearing that portion of the QL 13 (Figure E-11). The enemy immediately commenced to attack FSB by indirect fire while ground contacts were being made. One may question why the enemy was able to thwart the affects of numerous units to overrun these bunkers or why TAC air and B-52 strikes could not destroy them. These bunkers were constructed with an average of two feet of overhead cover, mutually supporting, and had connecting trenches and land line communications. Maximum use was made of high ground and other terrain features for observation. The "hugging" techniques were employed to reduce casualties from air strikes. Logistical support and supporting fire was provided by elements located three to four kilometers to the west of the fortified positions. Battle losses for 22-25 June were as follows:

<u>FRIENDLY:</u>	<u>PERSONNEL</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>
46th Regt:	7 KIA 29 WIA	None
5th Cav Regt:	0 KIA 20 WIA	4 M-41 Tanks damaged
<u>ENEMY:</u>	<u>PERSONNEL</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>
	22 KIA	1 M-79 5 AK47 1 61mm Mortar

(c) For more information pertaining to the QL 13 battles, see Annex F.

b. Hau Nghia and Binh Duong:

(1) As the fighting increased in Binh Long Province, it was believed that the Saigon River corridor was to be used as a route for an attack on Saigon. If the enemy could secure this corridor and link-up with units on the west flank, Saigon would be in grave danger. Thus, the subsequent action in Hau Nghia and Binh Duong Provinces became critical for the GVN forces. Since early March the 43d Regiment, consisting of 2-43, 3-43, 4-43, and 43d I&R Co, had been conducting clearing operations in the Cha Ray (XT 515258) and Trung Lap (XT 589215) areas, Hau Nghia Province. The Regiment was acting as Corps reserve and was given the mission of preventing a build-up in that area. Operational strength of the Regiment at that time was 1,214.

(2) In early April, pressure began to mount in the Tri Tam Subsector area, Binh Long Province. Elements of the 174th Regiment, 5th VC Division, began a build-up for an attack, while elements of the 101st Regiment (Independent), SRI, and the 429th Sapper Group commenced harassing, surrounding, and defeating RF/PF outposts south of Tri Tam along LTL 14. In view of this increased activity, the 43d Regiment was given an extended AO on 11 April 1972. This new AO included the Tri Tam Subsector (quadrangle XT 4845, XT 4849, XT 5249, XT 5245) and the Task Force was given control of 4-52 (operational strength: 397), 2d Troop, 1st Cav Squadron, and supporting artillery already in the Tri Tam CP area. The TF CP 4-43 and 43d I&R Co remained at Cha Ray and the 2-43 remained at Trung Lap (Figure E-12). 3-43 was dispatched to Tri Tam and the 43d Regt Executive Officer assumed command of the combined forces in the city with the mission of securing the city and clearing the surrounding areas. During 11-19 April, enemy activity increased throughout the AO. This period was characterized by frequent small contacts with the enemy. Also there was increase in the volume of indirect fire on

5245

all FSB. The primary focus of enemy action was around Trung Lap and Tri Tam. By 19 April, enemy activity in Tri Tam area had reached a high pitch. It was apparent the area was a target and the situation considered serious. The 18th Division CP was moved to Cu Chi to assume control of the GVN forces in Hau Nghia and Binh Duong. The 18th I&R Company, 2d and 3d Squadrons, 5th Cavalry Regiment Division Arty (-), and B Company, 18th Engineer Battalion, moved with the Headquarters. The Division was given the mission to clear Tri Tam - Ho Bo - Boi Loi areas and to block enemy infiltration into Saigon from the west. On 20 April, the 174th Regiment initiated an attack on Tri Tam from the north and east. 3-43 and 4-52 were in heavy contact with enemy forces supported by a heavy volume of indirect fire. The same day, Trung Lap came under attack from the 268th VC Bn supported by elements of the 89th Artillery Group and 429th Sapper Group. 2-43 repelled the initial attack from the southwest and began to pursue the enemy as they withdrew to the northwest.

(3) Meanwhile, the battle continued to rage at the eastern edge of Tri Tam. On 25 April, the 43d I&R Company was sent to reinforce, but the situation continued to deteriorate rapidly. The enemy attacked with such ferocity that the defenders were forced to gradually withdraw until the enemy held two-thirds of the city and its capture was imminent. On 27 April, the 43d Regt Commander moved a jump CP and 2-43 to an attack position west of the city (Figure E-13). 2-43 was ordered to pass through friendly lines and attack. Under the brave and able direction of the Battalion Commander, 2-43 went rapidly into the attack and assaulted the entrenched enemy. In less than four hours of intense close combat, they took over 1,000 meters of former enemy held territory. This attack turned the tide and the 2-43 and 4-52 began to drive enemy back. 3-43 was dispatched to replace 2-43 at Tung Lap. By 30 April, the friendly forces had driven the enemy out and secured the city. During the battle for the city, extensive use was made of supporting artillery and both US and VNAF air support. The results of the last four days of the battle were as follows: 150 enemy KIA, 5 POW, 31 individual and 11 crew served weapons captured. Friendly casualties included 10 KIA and 62 WIA.

(4) From 1 May to 7 June, TF 43 continued to work in the Tri Tam, Cha Ray, and Trung Lap areas. 2-43, 43d I&R Co, and 4-52 remained at Tri Tam. 3-43 remained at Trung Lap. TF CP and 4-43 returned to Cha Ray. These units were given the mission of clearing and consolidating their respective areas with special emphasis on blocking infiltration from the west toward Saigon. These operations were characterized by vigorous, aggressive company size patrols that produced sporadic contact with a fleeing enemy. The combined results of these operations were as follows: 66 enemy KIA, 3 POW, and 34 AK-47 and assorted weapons and munitions captured. Friendly casualties were 47 WIA and eight KIA.

(5) On 7 May, 2-48 participated in a one day combined operation with elements from the 27th River Assualt Group with the mission of moving north on the Saigon River and clearing back to the south along the river, vicinity XT 663265. The boat force consisted of 14 troop carriers and two gunboats. 2-48 boarded the boats at Phu Cuong (XT 805135) and proceeded upriver, the force received fire from vicinity of XT 685265. Friendly casualties were 5 Navy WIA, 2-48 1 KIA and 13 WIA. No further contact was made. Of interest during this period was a sapper attack sustained by TF CP and 4-43 at Cha Ray on 14 May. The attack was repelled by the alert defenders, with 31 sappers killed in the wire and 10 AK-47, 1 AK-50, 4 B-40, and numerous explosives captured. While TF 43 was busy in Tri Tam, Cha Ray, and Trung Lap, events in Phuoc Tuy Province pointed to a new offensive there. On 10 May, 18th Div moved a jump CP to Baria (XS 376613) and deployed the 48th Regiment. 18th Division continued to operate on a four province front with the Div CP.

(6) During early May, it was felt that the 5th VC Division elements moved from the Tri Tam area to Quang Loi, Binh Long Province. Elements of the 101st Regiment moved to staging areas in the Boi Loi and Ho Bo woods. The latter's mission was to attack south into the Trang Bang area (XT 488191), destroying outposts along the way, with the ultimate objective of seizing Trang Bang and cutting QL 1. On the night of 7 June 1972, enemy forces cut QL 1 at Suoi Sau (XT 544177) near Trang Bang and elements of the 101st Regiment seized parts of Trang Bang. 25th Div units supported by 18th Division Artillery proceeded to close with and force them from the city. To assist in relieving pressure on Trang Bang, on 8 June, 43d Regimental Commander was given orders to deploy 4-52 from Trung Lap and 2-5, and 3-5 from Cu Chi to clear area North of QL 1, vicinity of XT 557186. Elements of 101st Regt were blocking QL 1, from Cu Chi to Trang Bang. 4-52 moved down Highway TL 7A to lin-up with 2-5. Once the link-up was made, they moved west into the contested area. Contact was made immediately and little progress was made. The next day, 3-43 was moved southwest from Trung Lap and a coordinated three sided attack was made (Figure E-14). Using air and artillery support, the combined forces were able to push the enemy out of the area and secure that portion of QL 1. Results of this action were 31 enemy KIA and Friendly 9 KIA and 23 WIA. By 10 June, Trang

Bang had been cleared and QL 1 was open. The enemy forces were thought to have withdrawn to the north. 3-43 and 4-52 returned to Trung Lap, and 2-5 was redeployed along TL8A with the mission of road security. On 8 June, 18th Division jump CP and the 48th Regiment returned to Cu Chi from Phuoc Tuy Province, being assigned the mission of local security for Cu Chi Base. On 12 June, the 43d Regiment received orders to move to Cu Chi to replace the 48th Regiment which was moving to Lai Khe in preparation for being airmobiled to An Loc. The 48th Regiment remained at Cu Chi until 19 June when the 18th Div Headquarters moved to Lai Khe to prepare for movement to An Loc.

(7) The performance of the 18th Division troops at Tri Tam was instrumental in preventing the enemy from gaining a toehold in critically located Binh Duong Province. The lesser, but equally important battles fought in May and June in Hau Nghia and Binh Duong blocked any link-up of enemy units and denied their access to the Saigon River corridor.

(8) For more information pertaining to Hau Nghia and Binh Duong Provinces, see Annex J.

c. Phuoc Tuy:

(1) In early April enemy military activity was minor in Phuoc Tuy Province. The last major engagement was in March when TF52 engaged the 2d Battalion, 274th NVA Regiment in Xuyen Moc District; however, enemy propaganda had increased. On 26 April Duc Thanh District Headquarters (YS 4678) received heavy indirect fire and ground activity around Binh Ba Hamlet (YS 4474) forcing residents to flee to Baria (YS 4269). The initial reaction of deploying the 302d RF Bn failed to clear the Gallia Rubber Plantation (YS 4474) and Highway 2 remained cut thus isolating Duc Thanh District. RF forces suffered heavy casualties (18 KIA and 50 WIA) while the enemy losses remained unknown. In other Province areas, operations to clear Highway 23 met with failure and resulted in Xuyen Moc District (YS 6568) also being isolated by road when Cau Ech Bridge (YS 5963) was destroyed by sappers. Indications were that HQ, Baria SR, two battalions of the 274th NVA Regiment, 33d NVA Regiment, and 2d Battalion, 74th Artillery Regiment, would be able to capture both Duc Thanh and Xuyen Moc and moved toward isolating the town of Dat Do (YS 4159) and the city of Baria in turn. The situation deteriorated further when Highway 2 in the vicinity of the resettlement hamlet of Suoi Nghe (YS 4371) was cut on 6 May and Duc Thanh District town was attacked on 9 May.

(2) On 10 May the 48th Regiment (HQ, 3-48 and I&R Co) was deployed to Nui Dat (YS 4367) (Figure E-15). The Regiment's initial mission was to attack north toward Binh Ba. The advance met heavy resistance in vicinity of YS 448935 from a well entrenched 33d NVA Regimental force. Air support and artillery were used extensively; however, the enemy remained entrenched and Duc Thanh District isolated (Figure E-16). One of the first indications that elements of the 33d Regiment were involved was the standard type bunkers common to the regiment's operational areas in Long Khanh Province. In mid-May intelligence indicated that Dat Do would be attacked. On 20 May D 445 Battalion reinforced by the 2d Battalion, 274th NVA Regiment occupied Dat Do. Previous intelligence reports had indicated that D 445 Battalion was defunct and remaining personnel had been distributed to other enemy units. There was widespread alarm among the local populous and government officials that Baria city would be isolated from the north and overrun. The overall situation prompted changes in the Province command structure and the 18th Infantry Division Commander was given operational control of all GVN forces in Phuoc Tuy Province. Continuing to maintain a base in Xuan Loc, a forward command post in Cu Chi, the division stretched personnel and support further by establishing a third command post in Baria. The 5th Ranger Group, consisting of the 30th, 33d and 38th Battalions, Reconnaissance Company, Engineer Company and Transportation Company, moved to Phuoc Tuy Province from Cu Chi (Figure E-17). This Ranger Group had only recently returned from I Corps and the ranks were filled with new personnel lacking combat experience. On 24 May, the 30th and 38th Battalions were committed against enemy forces holding Dat Do (Figure E-18). Fighting was intense with artillery and close air support being utilized to the maximum. When this failed to dislodge the enemy, the 3-48 and 33d Ranger Battalion were committed to the Dat Do battle on 25 May. 2-48 was moved to Phuoc Tuy as a reserve. Heavy fighting continued and clearing operations entailed house to house fighting. By 1 June the enemy retained 40 percent of the town; however, all enemy were cleared by 8 June. Approximately 40 percent of the city was destroyed by 8 June. With Dat Do secure, the 5th Ranger Group conducted company size operations in the vicinity of Nui Dat, Long Kien and Dat Do. No major contacts were made.

(3) On 28 May TF48 was committed to clearing Hoa Long (YS 4163), Long Le District, where an estimated VC battalion was attempting to infiltrate. This was also the same date that U.S. Naval gunfire was utilized to engage suspected enemy location in vicinity of Xuyen Moc. On 8 June the 48th Regiment and HQ, 18th Division returned to Cu Chi. A small headquarters element and two U.S. Advisors remained in Baria to assist in ongoing operations.

(4) The 18th Division's operations were instrumental in thwarting the major objectives of HQ, Baria SR. Conditions in Phuoc Tuy were considered stabilized in spite of Highways 2 and 23 being blocked, and Duc Thanh's continued receipt of daily ABF. Statistical data on friendly and enemy losses are at Appendix 7. As of 25 June 18th Infantry Division forces were deployed as depicted in Figure E-19.

(5) For more information pertaining to Phuoc Tuy Province, see Annex J.

d. Fire Support:

(1) Artillery:

(a) The 18th Division Artillery consists of four firing battalions. Three are 105mm howitzer battalions (181st Bn, 182d Bn, and 183d Bn) and one 155mm howitzer battalion (180th Bn) with a total of 54 105mm and 18 155mm tubes respectively. Authorized strength is 1903 personnel (166 officers, 431 NCO, and 1306 enlisted men).

(b) At the beginning of the Campaign, artillery units were committed in eight provinces supporting the 18th, 25th, and 5th Infantry Divisions and territorial forces. A summary of operational commitments by date and unit is contained in Appendix 8. As noted, the extensive 18th Division operational Commitments negated the opportunity to take full advantage of organic artillery support.

(c) With the exception of six 105mm howitzers destroyed following the ambush of TF 52, no tubes were lost during the Campaign.

(d) Resupply of ammunition was accomplished by both surface and serial means. Surface transportation resupply was considered outstanding in spite of 5 ton truck shortages. Aerial resupply was required for TF 52 in An Loc and territorial forces OPCON to the Division in Duc Thanh and Xuyen Moc.

(e) During 4 April - 25 June the 105mm howitzer battalions expended 85,000 rounds while the 155mm howitzer battalion fired 42,000 rounds. It should be noted that these figures include support for non-divisional units.

(f) Areas requiring additional emphasis are counterbattery fire procedures and physical protection for ammunition storage. As to counterbattery fire procedures, it is not a matter of insufficient knowledge but rather a lack of urgency. This was especially true in obtaining information from crater analysis. Dispersion and construction of adequate storage facilities for ammunition is needed with the increased use of indirect fire weapons and the expertise displayed by the NVA crews.

(2) Naval gunfire: Fire support provided by four U.S. destroyers during operations in Phuoc Tuy was a welcome asset. Liaison was quickly established between ship to shore elements and target data were supplied based on "usually reliable source" information and intelligence derived from the Division Tactical Intelligence Center (TIC). A summary of U.S. Naval support is at Appendix 9.

(3) Air Support:

(a) VNAF:

1 An Air Liaison Section was part of the Division TOC and coordinated L-19, helicopter and TAC air support. Requests were approved at the Division FSE and forwarded to the Air Liaison Officer who forwarded the request to III Corps DASC or VNAF units.

2 FAC: The Division normally received four L-19 aircraft per day for VR and/or controlling TAC air. Although these pilots were proficient, the support rendered sometimes depended on personal desires. This was noticeable numerous times when requirements existed for first and last light VR and when providing support for ground elements during the lunch hour.

3 TAC air: Support was exceptional. Pilots delivered ordnance "on target" in spite of ground fire and/or bad weather. Of importance was the ability of U.S. FAC to control VNAF fighters during the battle at Tri Tam. Likewise, VNAF FAC controlling U.S. aircraft.

4 Helicopters: Difficulties were experienced when a specific time and location was important

to the tactical plan. Delays for no apparent reason and "turn backs" frequently occurred in low-intensity AA and/or medium cloud cover areas. The lack of response in evacuating the wounded was costly in terms of confidence in VNAF professionalism.

(b) US:

1 FAC: These dedicated men made a definite contribution to thwarting the enemy's attempt to gain and retain ground objectives. They flew in bad weather with the desire to find a break in the cloud cover which would permit an accurate strike by attack aircraft. When this was not possible, the FAC would conduct VR in cloud free areas to obtain acquisition on targets of opportunity.

2 TAC air: The "slow mover" aircraft with soft ordnance was the most effective for providing close support. On 8 April, A-37 assigned to the 8th SOS, Bien Hoa, delivered napalm within 100 meters of a friendly position without any undue hazards to friendly personnel. The various types of soft and hard ordnance in the USAF inventory has provided greater flexibility in utilizing air support against various targets. For detailed information on TAC Air, see Appendix 5, Annex C.

3 B-52: B-52 strikes were effective in destroying troop concentrations and hard targets; however, they are only as good as the target data provided. While operating in Hau Nghia and Binh Duong, the BDA results supported the contention that strikes were based on out-dated information.

4 AC-130 Spectre: The Spectre gunship is one of the most effective close support aircraft in the USAF inventory. The accuracy of the 40mm system makes the Spectre highly desirable for supporting ground troops engaged in close combat. On 8 April a C-130 Spectre provided fire within 25 meters of friendly elements having only a deadfall for protection. When the Spectre is used in conjunction with a ground transponder, support can be rendered without a visual sighting of friendly positions or target.

5 Cobra gunships: The Cobra is a highly effective aerial platform for providing cover for airmobile packages and in ground support roles. However, as the AA reached mid-intensity and better AA weapons such as the SA 7 were introduced, the Cobra's effectiveness diminished. Attempts to employ it at higher altitudes while supporting ground forces detracted from its accuracy.

6 Helicopters: The contributions made by the aviation elements of the 3d Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division, were monumental (see Annex K). The airmobile concept has won a well earned seat in countering insurgency in Vietnam, but like the Cobra, the helicopter experienced difficulty in surviving in mid-intensity AA environments. The NVA have had reasonable success in employing various types of AA weapons to thwart airmobile operations in contested areas. It appears that the airmobile concept in the mid-intensity AA Environments will require further evaluation.

7 Fire coordination: There were no major difficulties encountered in coordinating fire in support of ground operations. On the contrary, this area was highlighted during the battle for Tri Tam when artillery support was provided from outside the city (Suoi Ong Huong) and both VNAF and USAF air support was being used simultaneously. No fire lines were established for each support element and fires were centrally controlled by a joint U.S., Sector, and 43d Regiment FSE.

8 A total of 226 VNAF and 405 USAF sorties were flown in support of 18th Infantry Division operations. The above figures do not include sorties flown in support of U.S. Advisors at Hung Tam or divisional units in An Loc.

e. Personnel Functions:

(1) Casualty statistics: Appendix 10.

(2) Replacements: Appendix 11.

(3) Morale: Overall the morale of the Division was excellent. Probably the lowest ebb was found in TF 52 when wounded could not be evacuated and personnel continued to remain in the thick of fighting at the date of this report. The only exception to the latter was approximately 90 men from the TF HQ that were extracted on 21 June. One indicator of no appreciable loss in morale was 1176 desertions for the quarter as compared to 870 for the previous quarter. This was in spite of heavy operational commitments away from the soldier's home in Xuan Loc.

(4) Medical problems, diseases, and sanitation:

(a) The only prevalent medical problems were the evacuation of the wounded in inaccessible areas and proper treatment. Air evacuation was hampered by the inability to get helicopters into combat areas because of AA fire and bad weather. In An Loc several men died as a result of inadequate treatment facilities. The Task Force's doctor was killed in May and three weeks lapsed before a replacement could be inserted by helicopter.

(b) Disease: No prevalent epidemic.

(c) Sanitation: Existing problems were compounded by combat. Lime was obtained for An Loc to reduce sanitation problems.

(5) Awards: Appendix 12.

(6) Key 18th Infantry Division personnel: Appendix 13

(7) 18th DCAT (Advisory Team 87) personnel: Appendix 14

(8) Enemy personnel losses: Appendix 15.

f. Supply Functions:

(1) Coordination: Coordination through personnel liaison was one of the major contributing factors to providing maximum logistical support to 18th Division forces deployed throughout Military Region III. The G4, a professional soldier, made personal liaison visits to using units and III ALC. When a regimental size unit was attached to another division, a field grade officer fulfilled the responsibility of insuring support needs were being met.

(2) Surface Resupply: Surface transport was the primary means of resupplying using units. Supplies were received and delivered from depots in Bien Hoa and Saigon utilizing the "throughput" concept. Temporary shortages were experienced in mortar illumination rounds, 105mm HE, and 155mm HE; however, the pipeline was normally responsive. The Division also provided tactical units a mobile PX to supplement Class I rations. Perishable items were purchased on the local economy and distributed. The following quantities of supplies were received:

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>SHORT TONS</u>
Class I	200
Class III	320
Class IV	50
Class V	10,321

(3) Aerial Resupply:

(a) An Loc: TF 52 shared in the supplies air-delivered to the 5th Infantry Division. For a detailed discussion on the problem areas and delivery techniques utilized, see Annexes C and D. A summary of aerial resupply during 7 Apr - 25 Jun is as follows:

<u>DELIVERY AGENCIES</u>	<u>TYPE AIRCRAFT</u>	<u>SORTIES</u>
US Army	CH 47	477
USAF	HU 1B	
VNAF	C 123	
<u>SHORT TONS DELIVERED</u>	<u>SHORT TONS RECEIVED</u>	<u>SHORT TONS PROBABLE LOST</u>
4130	3314	816

(b) Duc Thanh and Xuyen Moc: When the enemy isolated these two district towns by blocking surface access, aerial resupply became necessary for both territorial forces and civilians. Also included were 8000 civilians in Binh Gia (YS 4977). A more detailed discussion on problem areas, tonnage and delivery techniques is contained in Annex C.

(4) Repair Parts Supply: Supply of repair parts was adequate. "Down time" on major end items especially tubes, tanks, and 2½ ton vehicles, received command emphasis. Tires were one of the most critical items for 2½ ton trucks. Mobile repair teams were used extensively and this offset "down time" on numerous major equipment items.

(5) A summary of equipment losses and replacements are contained in Appendix 16.

(6) Enemy equipment losses: Appendix 17.

g. Communications:

(1) ARVN: No serious communications problems were experienced. Considering the numerous moves and extended distances between divisional units, communications were outstanding; especially longhaul. After each move, communication installation received top priority and operators proved to be proficient in operating during peak periods. At small unit level, use of wire between positions needs additional emphasis.

(2) US: The AN/PRC-77, AN/PRC-25, and AN/VRC-46 proved adequate for advisor's use. However, when the Division established three headquarters in three different provinces, the parallel operations required by the 18th DCAT were limited by the quantity of equipment; especially the lack of RC 292 antennas.

(3) COMSEC: Both ARVN and US personnel were guilty of poor communication security. The primary contributing factor was priority demands for information from higher headquarters and/or superiors.

h. Psychological Functions: The Division Commander took an active role in PSYOP operations and looked for opportunities to employ both Division and III Corps assets. PSYOP included various delivery techniques and was directed toward civilians, soldiers and the enemy. Information received from prisoners and other intelligence sources was followed-up by PSYOP. A summary of PSYOP is at Appendix 18.

i. Civil Affairs and Civic Action:

(1) Civil Affairs: There was no known instance of local government officials relinquishing their responsibilities to commanders of the 18th Infantry Division. However, these appointed officials were encouraged to remain in the town to demonstrate government presence other than military.

(2) Civic Action: Overall the 18th Division personnel took a positive and helpful attitude toward assisting displaced civilians and soldiers' dependents. During the campaign 1677 civilians received medical care and 589 clothing, bedding and food. Medical evacuation was accomplished whenever transportation was available. In addition, 185 soldiers' families were visited and assisted in the Xuan Loc area. These overall acts of kindness contributed more to good civilian relations than can be evaluated.

j. Engineer: The 18th Engineer Battalion was primarily concerned with building and improving FSB and constructing bunkers at the numerous positions occupied by divisional elements. Engineer support at Hung Tam was used extensively in improving the road and existing two FSB. Likewise the artillery positions and FSB at Suoi Ong Hung, Hau Nghia Province and the 48th Regiment's position in Nui Dat, required considerable effort before protection was considered adequate.

4. (C) SENIOR ADVISOR'S EVALUATION:

a. Overall the 18th Infantry Division's performance was one of amazement. Combat forces and support were stretched to maximum. Yet the accomplishments were significant in six battles; Hung Tam and An Loc are self-explanatory. Trung Lap, Tri Tam and Cha Ray stopped the SR 1, 174th and 101st Regiments and elements of 429th Sapper Group, thus preventing the opening of the Saigon corridor and blocking link-up of NVA forces moving south along QL 13. Commitments in Phuoc Tuy, although lacking the glamour of Binh Long, prevented the HQ, Baria SR, 33d and 274th Regiments and

D 445 Battalion from isolating the Province town of Baria and maintaining any permanent strangle hold on Duc Thanh, Xuyen Moc and Dat Do.

b. Although the division fought well, areas requiring additional emphasis surfaced. Battle losses will require effort to replace qualified NCOs and junior officers. In the area of fire support, new and improved methods must be developed to counter balance the NVA expertise with indirect fire weapons. Armor use with Infantry must be examined and additional training implemented.

c. At the close of the Binh Long Campaign 1972, the 18th Infantry Division remains combat effective.

d. The advisory effort was highly commendable. Although the 18th DCAT capabilities were extended to support each regiment, a rear base, and two forward command posts, personnel met the challenge. The most significant contributions were providing expertise in fire support coordination and "Psychological" support for commanders and their staffs. Of lesser importance was the need to advise on tactics and utilization of personnel and logistical assets. The expertise demonstrated by advisors in coordinating fire support assets also had a bonus effect of providing "know how" to ARVN personnel. This area should be exploited to professionally equip small unit leaders in conducting air-ground operations.

5. (C) LESSONS LEARNED:

a. Administration and Logistics:

- (1) The ARVN replacement system must be more responsive in providing junior officers and qualified NCOs.
- (2) Small unit leaders require additional schooling in the psychological value of a commander's presence at the critical points of a battle.
- (3) Storage of ammunition reflected a lack of comprehension concerning the effects of a heavy volume indirect fire. Additional emphasis on preparing adequate bunkers and berms for storage sites and dispersion criteria is needed.
- (4) Evacuation of wounded is an important tactical and morale consideration when operating in an inaccessible area.

b. Operations and Intelligence:

- (1) The Tactical Intelligence Center concept is highly desirable to insure limited air and ground assets are utilized against the most profitable enemy targets.

(2) ARVN:

- (a) The mobility and fire power capability of the M41 tank and M 113 APC requires training emphasis. Additional combined arms training would be beneficial to instill confidence in the equipment and experience in tactical formations.
- (b) A homemade CS bomb, consisting of powdered CS and TNT all contained in a plastic bag was found to be the most economical and effective weapons against bunkers to preclude future occupation by enemy forces.

(3) US:

- (a) The C-130 Spectre gunship is an effective aerial weapons platform for close support missions.
- (b) Introduction of modern AA weapons degrade the AH-1G support capability and reduce the effectiveness of airmobile operations.

(4) NVA:

- (a) The NVA soldiers are disciplined and not susceptible to inadequate PSYOP themes.

(b) The NVA effectiveness and increased use of indirect fire weapons degraded the use of small FSB and necessitates increased emphasis on counterbattery fire and maneuver.

6. (C) CONCLUSIONS:

a. Tactical air support was the most decisive combat power available to ground forces at An Loc, Dat Do, Tri Tam and Trung Lap.

b. The 18th Division's forces were instrumental in thwarting the NVA offensive in Binh Long, Phuoc Tuy, Hau Nghia, and Binh Duong Provinces.

c. Training on air-ground and combined arms operations and counterbattery fire procedures needs command emphasis.

d. Battle attrition depleted units of experienced NCOs and junior officers.

e. The NVA are well trained and equipped. They excel in the use of indirect fire weapons, but their use of armor is poor.

7. (C) RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. The advisory effort place emphasis on the development of junior officers and NCOs.

b. Greater emphasis be placed on improving counterbattery procedures and combined arms training.

c. OJT for company and battalion commanders in air-ground operations receives command emphasis. As a minimum these commanders should be able to employ VNAF close air support assets.

d. The 18th DCAT (Advisory Team 87) be recommended for the Valorous Unit Citation.

e. The 18th Infantry Division be recommended for the United States Presidential Unit Citation.

ANNEX F (21ST INFANTRY DIVISION) TO AFTER ACTION REPORT, BINH LONG CAMPAIGN 1972

1. PURPOSE: To summarize operations of the 21st Infantry Division in support of the BINH LONG Campaign of 1972 during the period 4 April 1972 through 25 June 1972.

2. INTRODUCTION:

a. At the beginning of the BINH LONG Campaign of 1972 the 21st Infantry Division was engaged in clearing operations in the U MINH Forest of Military Region IV. The division was first alerted for movement to Military Region III on 7 April and dispatched its advance party to BIEN HOA and LAI KHE on 8 April. Despite heavy enemy resistance during disengagement from its fire bases in the U MINH, the division extracted itself rapidly and the 32nd Regiment closed into the LAI KHE area by air on 10 April. By 12 April the entire division had displaced from the southern Delta to the BINH LONG vicinity of Military Region III and was prepared for operations against the enemy in the LAI KHE - CHON THANH - AN LOC area.

b. Immediately upon arrival in LAI KHE, the 21st Infantry Division was tasked with stopping the North Vietnamese Army's NGUYEN HUE Campaign in the QL13 area of BINH LONG and BINH DUONG Provinces. The enemy deployed three divisions in Military Region III, the 5th, 7th, and 9th in an attempt to gain control of BINH LONG Province and overrun the province capital, AN LOC, preparatory to continuing the attack to SAIGON. Of the three enemy divisions, the 7th NVA Division was given the mission of interdicting QL13 and destroying forces attempting to open QL13 and thus became the major force opposing the 21st Division throughout the BINH LONG Campaign, 1972.

c. The 7th NVA Division is an infantry division of standard configuration, three regiments (141, 165, 209) with three infantry battalions in each. Early in April, the 101st NVA Regiment participated in a road block operation at the 52 grid line presumably in coordination with the 7th NVA Division, but it was not engaged again during the campaign. The 7th NVA Division headquarters remained mobile throughout the operation some distance west of QL13. A support base was formed in the MINH THANH vicinity (XT 6367) to avoid airstrikes and ARVN ground attack. MINH THANH is populated and sufficiently west of the major operational areas of the campaign to avoid surprise attack. Combat elements of the division have fought almost exclusively from well prepared fortified defensive positions, chosen during extensive terrain reconnaissance prior to the offensive. The 7th NVA Division has operated in the BINH LONG area for several years and it should be noted that the 165th Regiment interdicted QL13 in TET Offensive of 1968.

3. SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS:

a. Task Organization: Appendix 1

b. Conduct of Operations: Upon arrival in LAI KHE, the 21st Infantry Division was given the mission to secure QL13 north from LAI KHE to the vicinity of CHON THANH and secure the CHON THANH Base Camp in preparation for future offensive operations. To this end, division dispositions between 12 April and 23 April placed the 31st Regiment in the vicinity of SUOI TRE Hamlet (XT 712 426), the 32nd Regiment south of CHON THANH (XT 768 604), the 33rd Regiment north of LAI KHE (XT 719 560) and the 9th Armored Cavalry Regiment in LAI KHE (XT 765 376). Subsequent operations during the BINH LONG Campaign 1972 have been categorized into the following phases of major battles.

Battle of the Blue Bus (Road Block at XT 785 515), 24-29 April

Battle of Bench Mark 75 (Road Block at XT 766 680), 1-13 May

Battle of Tau O Bridge (NVA Strong Point at XT 765 715-730), 14 May - 22 June

Tan Khai Fire Support Base (XT 766 772), 16 May - On Going

Relief of An Loc, 18 May - 21 June

Although there is considerable overlap in terms of time-space and forces engaged, each of the above operations was sufficiently unique to warrant individual identity and analysis.

(1) Battle of the Blue Bus:

(a) The first major engagement took place at the 52 east west grid line astride QL 13. The 101st NVA Regiment, an independent regiment normally under regional control, was reinforced with the K-6 Battalion of the 165th Regiment, 7th NVA Division. The enemy had chosen

an excellent position from which to make a stand, in particular on the west side of the road, which was the last to fall. Their fighting positions and bunkers were well constructed, and utilized available high terrain. Weapons employed were primarily AK-47 and B-40 with mortar and rocket support, though not of the high volume which was to be employed north of CHON THANH. After the 101st Regiment withdrew to the west on 27 April 1972, the K-6 Battalion of the 165th Regiment remained in contact until driven from their positions on 29 April 1972. They also withdrew to the west and were declared by the 165th Regiment itself to be combat ineffective, having sustained over 200 casualties. A sketch of enemy positions is attached as Figure F-1.

(b) Although the 32nd Regiment initially deployed to the vicinity of CHON THANH by vehicle on 11 April without incident, enemy harassment along QL 13 between LAI KHE and CHON THANH continued to mount until on 18 April it was apparent that a major effort was under way to interdict the road between the two cities. On the morning of 22 April, a civilian refugee column moving south from CHON THANH was fired upon by the NVA in the vicinity of XT 782 520 and a blue civilian bus loaded with civilians was struck by an enemy B-40, killing four and wounding an estimated twenty innocent civilians. QL 13 had gained the landmark around which fighting was centered and for which the battle would be named. The road was then completely blocked to all traffic between CHON THANH and LAI KHE (Sketch Map, Figure F-1). On 24 April the 32nd and 33rd Regiments launched combined assaults from the north and south to destroy enemy forces blocking QL 13 between the 51 and 52 grid lines (Figure F-2), while the 31st Regiment was air assaulted from SUOI TRE north of CHON THANH (vicinity of XT 760 650) to secure CHON THANH and Highway 13 north to the 70 grid line. After five days of heavy fighting with the 101st NVA Regiment reinforced by one battalion of the 165th NVA Regiment, the 32nd and 33rd Regiments linked up on 28-29 April, opening QL 13 from LAI KHE to CHON THANH. The 101st NVA Regiment had been soundly defeated and was not combat effective again for three months.

Results of five days fighting were as follows:

CASUALTIES

<u>FRIENDLY</u>		<u>ENEMY</u>
32nd Regiment	21 KIA	27 WIA
33rd Regiment	11 KIA	22 WIA
TOTAL:	32 KIA	49 WIA
		TOTAL: 263 NVA KIA

WEAPONS CAPTURED

32nd Regiment:	9 Crew Served	21 Individual Weapons
33rd Regiment:	7 Crew Served	13 Individual Weapons
TOTAL:	16 Crew Served	34 Individual Weapons

(2) Battle of Bench Mark 75:

(a) This engagement was a determined defensive stand by the 165th Regiment (-). Later in the battle, the refitted K-6 Battalion was also employed, and in the last days elements of the 209th Regiment. Fighting from well prepared defensive positions connected with land line communications, the enemy employed "hugging" tactics, staying as close to 21st ARVN Division units as possible to reduce losses from air strikes. Indirect fire was employed by the enemy with great success. In most cases, division advances were stopped by high volume of observed 61 and 82mm mortar fire. The AT-3 "Sagger" Wire Guided AT Missile was employed with little success during this battle. Rockets were used extensively against the regimental CPs and fire bases just north of CHON THANH and were fired primarily from the west. When finally driven from their positions, the 165th Regiment withdrew to the west and the 209th Regiment to the northwest to take up new positions at the TAU O Bridge. A sketch of enemy positions is attached as Figure F-3.

(b) While heavy fighting was concentrated south of CHON THANH during the last week of April, the 31st Regiment was running into increasingly heavy resistance to the north. By 1 May it was obvious that the 165th NVA Regiment, reinforced, was occupying well prepared defensive

positions in the vicinity of Bench Mark 75 (XT 766 679) north of CHON THANH and intended to stay and fight (Figure F-3). From 1 to 6 May, the 31st Regiment, assisted by 8 B-52 strikes and 142 (71 VNAF and 71 USAF) sorties of tactical air as well as over 20,000 rounds of artillery, attempted to penetrate or envelope the strong point to the west without success. (On 4 May, the 165th NVA Regiment first employed Soviet AT-3 Wire Guided Missiles.) On 6 May, two battalions of the 32nd Regiment began envelopment of the enemy main defensive position to the east and on 8 May the 3d Bn, 31st Regiment was air lifted north of the main line of resistance to the vicinity of XT 776 728 (Figure F-4). During the next three days, pressure was maintained on the 165th NVA Regiment from the north and south along QL 13 and on 12 May responsibility for the entire operation was passed to the 32nd Regiment. (The 31st Regimental Commander had been seriously wounded on 9 May.) On 13 May, the position was finally overrun and control of QL 13 moved north to the 70 grid line. Results of two weeks operations in the area were as follows:

CASUALTIES

<u>FRIENDLY</u>			<u>ENEMY</u>
31st Regiment	46 KIA	130 WIA	148 NVA KIA
32nd Regiment	30 KIA	106 WIA	64 NVA KIA
TOTAL:	76 KIA	236 WIA	TOTAL: 212 NVA KIA

WEAPONS CAPTURED

31st Regiment	3 Crew Served	01 Individual Weapons
32nd Regiment	9 Crew Served	22 Individual Weapons
TOTAL:	12 Crew Served	23 Individual Weapons

(3) Battle of Tau O Bridge:

(a) After being forced out of defensive positions on the east side of QL 13 near Bench Mark 75, the 209th Regiment of the 7th NVA Division withdrew north to assume a defensive posture astride QL 13 at the 705 east west grid line. Their positions, which consisted of bunkers with an average of two feet of overhead cover, connecting trenches, and telephone communications, ran in depth to the north, using high ground and other terrain features to maximum advantage. Logistical support and regimental command elements were located to the west, approximately 3.5 to 4.5 kilometers from QL 13. The 209th tactics emphasized the full complement of indirect fire weapons, with minor probes launched primarily to fix 21st Division positions. In order to reduce casualties from air strikes, NVA forces stayed within 20 to 50 meters of ARVN lines. The 209th Regiment, avoiding major contact, was pushed north by ARVN forces to the 729 grid line, near the TAU O Bridge, where they continued to make a determined stand. A sketch of the fighting positions is shown at Figure F-5.

(b) Flush with a well earned victory, the 32nd Regiment was given the mission of clearing QL 13 north to the vicinity of TAU O Bridge (XT 765 729) on 14 May. It was a mission they could not complete. In 38 days of hard fighting against the 209th NVA Regiment (reinforced by a reconnaissance element of the 7th NVA Division, the 94th NVA Sapper Company, and the 41st NVA Anti-Tank Company) (Figure F-5), the 32nd Regiment was unable to drive north of the 728 grid line (Figure F-6). The 209th Regiment had prepared an extremely strong defensive network centered on the southern edge of the TAU O Stream (XT 765 729) between the 70 and 73 grid lines. Extensive bombardment by B-52s, tactical air, and artillery, could not dislodge them. On 21 June, the 32nd Regiment was replaced by the 46th Regiment of the 25th ARVN Infantry Division and on 22 June the regiment was attached to the 25th Division and redeployed to the HAU NGHIA area. During its unsuccessful effort to clear the enemy from the TAU O area, the 32nd Regiment suffered heavy casualties, but at high cost to the 209th NVA Regiment. Operational results:

<u>FRIENDLY:</u>	84 KIA	315 WIA	04 MIA
	02 M-41 Tanks and 03 M-113 APCs Destroyed		
<u>ENEMY:</u>	259 NVA KIA	12 Crew Served and 31 Individual Weapons captured.	

01 Tank and 05 Tons of Ammunition Destroyed.

(4) Tan Khai Fire Support Base:

(a) In reaction to the establishment of the 21st Division fire support base at TAN KHAII, North Vietnamese forces, primarily the 141st Regiment, attacked TAN KHAII by daylight ground assault for a three day period, 20-22 May 1972. Heavy losses were sustained by the enemy forces, primarily from tactical air strikes. Failing in their attempt to overrun the base, enemy tactics were shifted to destruction by fire and isolation from helicopter resupply. Attacks by fire were carried out in large volumes using mortar, rocket, recoilless rifle, and 105mm howitzers. The bulk of the weapons positions were located to the west of QL 13 in order to facilitate resupply of ammunition. Anti-aircraft weapons, primarily .51 cal AA machine guns, ringed TAN KHAII. The SA-7 Strela missile was utilized, primarily against Cobra helicopter gunships, and fired primarily from 2 kilometers northwest of TAN KHAII. Infantry remained dug in around TAN KHAII. Two battalions of the 141st NVA Regiment were used for the encirclement. However, movement north of TAN KHAII on QL 13 by 21st Division units was not significantly opposed. Sniper fire and indirect fire were primarily employed against units moving on or near the road. A sketch of enemy positions is shown at Figure F-7.

(b) Heavy NVA pressure on AN LOC from 11 - 14 May made relief by ground forces essential to the beleaguered city. It was apparent that artillery support must be deployed north to a position capable of providing both close fire support to the troops maneuvering north and to the defenders within AN LOC itself. The hamlet of TAN KHAII (XT 766 772) was selected as the initial artillery position. On 12 May, the 15th Infantry Regiment, 9th Infantry Division from Military Region IV, was attached to the 21st Infantry Division and the regiment, reinforced by the 9th Armored Cavalry Regiment, was given the mission to secure and establish the fire base, (Figure F-8). On 15 May, Task Force 9th Cav, consisting of the 9th ACR and the 1st Battalion, 15th Regiment, reinforced by three tubes of 105mm artillery from the 93rd Artillery Battalion, attacked to the north from the vicinity of XT 765 685, bypassing enemy resistance to the east of QL 13, enveloping positions between the TAU O Bridge and TAN KHAII. The difficult terrain southeast of TAN KHAII slowed the task force to the degree that, despite the fact that no enemy resistance was encountered, they arrived at their objective on the evening of 18 May. Meanwhile, on 15 May, the 2nd Battalion, 15th Regiment, and the regimental command group, were air assaulted to XT 784 764, and on 16 May they secured TAN KHAII while three additional 105mm howitzers of the 93rd Artillery Battalion and one platoon of 155mm howitzers were airlifted into the village by VNAF Chinooks and a US Sky Crane. On 17 May, the 3rd Battalion, 14th Regiment, and the regimental light CP were also airlifted into the vicinity and the 33rd Regiment (-), which had moved overland the previous day also closed into TAN KHAII. When the Task Force 9th Cav arrived in TAN KHAII, the TAN KHAII area defense command was organized under the control of the Deputy Commander, 15th Regiment. The task force initially consisted of the 1st Battalion, 33rd Regiment, the 33rd Regiment Recon Company, and B Battery, 93rd Artillery Battalion, reinforced by one platoon of the 210th Artillery Battalion. On the same day, two battalions of the 15th Regiment, Task Force 9th Cav, and two battalions of the 33rd Regiment, attacked north from TAN KHAII to relieve AN LOC. During 15 - 19 May, enemy activity in the TAN KHAII vicinity was negligible. However, in the morning of 20 May, the 141st NVA Regiment, reinforced by three tanks, attacked the fire base. The attack was repulsed, but for three days the 141st NVA Regiment continued to assault the position from the south and west (Figure F-8). Despite the heavy ground attacks and increasing indirect fire, the fire base continued to be consolidated and to provide fire support to the units attacking to the north. On the morning of 24 May, Task Force 9th Cav, returned to TAN KHAII with the wounded of the 15th and 33rd Regiments. Eighteen APCs were lost enroute. The 9th Armored Cavalry Regiment operated from TAN KHAII the remainder of the campaign. On 30 May, the 1st Battalion, 15th Regiment, replaced the 1st Battalion, 33rd Regiment, in TAN KHAII. During the last week of May and the first two weeks of June, TAN KHAII served as a vital fire support base for the maneuver of troops north, and on several occasions, was the only secure area from which the wounded of the 15th and 33rd regiments could be evacuated by air. On 25 May, 201 WIA were extracted from TAN KHAII while the 1st Battalion, 31st Regiment, was air landed in the village. On 7 June, the 3rd Battalion of the 31st Regiment was airlifted into the TAN KHAII vicinity and on 8 June the 31st Regiment light CP was inserted and assumed command of the TAN KHAII area. By 18 June, enemy activity had again increased in the TAN KHAII area, but was concentrated on destruction and isolation by fire. Indirect fire on the village increased to an average of 200 or more rounds per day and some 32 anti-aircraft sites, to include several SA-7 heat seeking missiles, were located in a nearly complete circle around the area. As this report is written, the battle for TAN KHAII continues, but incomplete results of operations of the 31st and 33rd Regiments in the

TAN KHAI area are outlined below:

CASUALTIES

<u>FRIENDLY</u>				<u>ENEMY</u>
31st Regiment	25 KIA	139 WIA	11 MIA	295 NVA KIA
33rd Regiment	59 KIA	218 WIA	16 MIA	293 NVA KIA
Total:	84 KIA	357 WIA	27 MIA	Total: 588 NVA KIA

CAPTURED WEAPONS

31st Regiment	7 Crew Served	8 Individual
33rd Regiment	8 Crew Served	45 Individual
Total:	15 Crew Served	53 Individual

(5) Relief of An Loc:

(a) As 21st Division units moved north from TAN KHAI in the latter portion of May, enemy units once again defended from fortified positions with tactics identical to those used in the southern battles. At the southern edge of the rubber, in the vicinity of XT 7680, one battalion of the 141st Regiment and other unidentified elements of the 9th VC Division attempted to stop the movement to the north by relief forces. As in the past, the enemy employed large volumes of indirect fire of all types, including artillery. Tanks were briefly and unsuccessfully employed against the 15th and 33rd Regiments. The enemy also employed .51 cal, 23mm and 37mm anti-aircraft weapons from positions on both sides of QL 13. One road block was retained by the enemy at the southern edge of the rubber in the vicinity of XT 765 805, and remained in force until Mid-July. The 165th Regiment, destroyed earlier in the Bench Mark 75 battle, became combat effective again after refit in the MINH THANH area, on or about 20 June 1972 and was employed against the 33rd Regiment in the vicinity of XT 758 833. A sketch of enemy dispositions is shown at Figure F-9.

(b) On 18 May, the 15th Regiment (-), the 33rd Regiment (-), and Task Force 9th Cav attacked north from TAN KHAI (XT 765 772) to link up with the 5th Infantry Division in AN LOC, (Figure F-10). Enemy resistance was heavy, particularly against the 15th Regiment and Task Force 9th Cav (Figure F-9). By 23 May, attacking units had been unable to go further north than the vicinity of XT 750 845 and had sustained over 200 casualties. As the intensity of anti-aircraft fire precluded heliborne evacuation, it was decided to evacuate the wounded south to TAN KHAI by APCs on the night of 23-24 May. Task Force 9th Cav fought its way to the fire base and the wounded were evacuated the following day. By the 25th of May, the 15th Regiment (-) had been forced to consolidate its position in the vicinity of XT 750 845 and, while it had defended itself against several heavy assaults supported by tanks, the regiment was unable to move any further north. Meanwhile the 33rd Regiment (-) had been brought south out of the rubber to reorganize and stabilize the situation in the TAN KHAI sector in the vicinity of XT 760 798. On 31 May, the 33rd Regiment again began attacking north. By 1 June, the 15th Regiment (-) had been reduced to 239 effective troops and the 33rd Regiment was meeting heavy resistance, but was moving north along the east side of QL 13. On 4 June, in what turned out to be the decisive move of the battle, the 6th Airborne Battalion was attached to the 21st Division and was air assaulted to a LZ in the vicinity of XT 753 795. Two companies of replacement troops (300) for the 15th Regiment (-) moved with the 6th Airborne Battalion. By 6 June, the 6th Airborne Battalion had linked up with the 15th Regiment (-) in the vicinity of XT 760 845 and the 33rd Regiment had advanced north to XT 770 837. On 7 June the 33rd Regiment was able to secure a PZ for medevac and on the following day, the 15th Regiment (-) evacuated 149 WIA and the 6th Airborne Battalion linked up with the 8th Airborne Battalion (Attached to the 5th Division in AN LOC) in the vicinity of XT 759 868 and XT 756 866, east of highway 13. On 9 June, the 15th Regiment linked up with the 5th Airborne Battalion on the west of QL 13 and 21st Division troops now controlled QL 13 south from the 865 grid line to 810. On 13 June, the 2nd Battalion, 31st Regiment was detached from the division and air assaulted into AN LOC where it came under operational control of the 5th Infantry Division. On the following day, the 15th Regiment (-) and the 6th Airborne Battalion were also detached from the 21st Division and attached to the 5th Division in AN LOC. The 33rd Regiment continued to secure QL 13 between the 81

and 85 grid lines until 17 June when the 21st Division area of operations was lowered to the 83 grid line and the 33rd Regiment moved its northern elements south. On 18 June, the 1st Airborne Brigade was placed under operational control of the 21st Division while it moved south to TAN KHAI for extraction and return to SAIGON. Despite heavy enemy resistance on 19 June in the vicinity XT 765 796 and intense indirect fire on the PZ (XT 765 765), the extraction was completed on 21 June. The 15th Regiment was air lifted back to LAI KHE and returned to 9th Infantry Division control on 23 June. At the close of the reporting period the 33rd Regiment remains south of AN LOC (vicinity XT 762 820) and the 31st Regiment continues to secure the TAN KHAI area. The remarkable record of the 15th Regiment during the relief of AN LOC deserves special note. The regiment suffered 138 killed, 511 seriously wounded, and 57 missing. However, in this 35 day period, the 15th Regiment killed 328 NVA and captured 89 individual weapons, 42 crew served weapons to include a 20mm cannon, and destroyed 4 tanks and several tons of assorted ammunition.

#### CASUALTIES

##### FRIENDLY

15th Regiment	138 KIA	511 WIA	57 MIA
33rd Regiment	61 KIA	274 WIA	3 MIA
Total:	199 KIA	785 WIA	60 MIA

##### ENEMY

328 NVA KIA
356 NVA KIA
684 NVA KIA

#### CAPTURED WEAPONS

15th Regiment	42 Crew Served
33rd Regiment	14 Crew Served
Total:	56 Crew Served

89 Individual
48 Individual
137 Individual

(6) A recapitulation of total losses sustained by 21st Infantry Division units and enemy losses inflicted during the BINH LONG Campaign is at Appendix 2.

(1) Fire Support. The 21st Infantry Division Artillery consists of four firing battalions of which three are 105mm howitzer battalions and one is a 155mm howitzer battalion. The three 105mm howitzer battalions, the 211th, 212th, and 213th Battalions provide direct support to the 32nd, 33rd, and 31st Regiments, respectively. The 155mm howitzer battalion, the 210th, normally provides one firing battery to each of the 105mm battalions as reinforcing artillery. In all, the division has a total of fifty-four 105mm howitzers and eighteen 155mm howitzers. The authorized strength of the division artillery is 2,140 personnel, consisting of 216 officers, 502 noncommissioned officers, and 1,422 enlisted men.

(2) Concept of Operations.

(a) Field Artillery. Division artillery moved thirty 105mm howitzers and six 155mm howitzers complete with crews and equipment by C-130 aircraft from Military Region IV to support the BINH LONG Campaign. Twenty-four 105mm howitzers and twelve 155mm howitzers made a road march and closed at Lai Khe on 12 April 1972. 21st Division Artillery howitzer status during the campaign is summarized below:

	LAI KHE		MILITARY REGION IV	
DATE	105	155	105	155
12 April 1972	42 (1)	12	12	6
12 May 1972	48	12 (2)	12	6
18 May 1972	48	14 (3)	12	6
30 May 1972	48	12	12	6

	(4)		(4)	
18 June 1972	42	12	18	6
	(5)			
23 June 1972	36	12	18	6

- (1) One battery attached from 9th Division Artillery.
- (2) One platoon attached from 5th Division Artillery.
- (3) 5th Division Artillery platoon detached.
- (4) One battery diverted to Military Region IV.
- (5) 9th Division Artillery Battery detached.

1 During the Battle of the Blue Bus, the majority of the artillery fire support was provided from the south as shown at Figure F-11. This operation was characterized by the ability of the artillery to move in such a manner as to enable the Fire Support Coordination Center (FSCC) to mass multiple Fire Support Bases (FSB) on singular targets in the battle area. The artillery moved continuously to include the moving of 105mm howitzers up to the battle area in the direct fire role against bunkers and recoilless rifle positions.

2 On 29 April, with link up accomplished, several artillery units moved forward to Chon Thanh and reinforced division artillery units that had been displaced prior to the time of the blockade. FSB Rang Dong (XT 788 458) and FSB Hoa Binh (XT 785 515) were left with two platoons of 105mm howitzers each to provide road security. During this operation, the artillery fired 65,044 105mm and 28,814 155mm rounds. No howitzers were damaged but 4 105mm howitzers were destroyed.

3 During the Battle of Bench Mark 75, artillery was restricted to the general vicinity of the town of Chon Thanh and limited in its ability to maneuver. Several fire support bases were constructed as shown in Figure F-12. Deceptive measures such as dummy positions and frequent moves by the artillery were utilized to reduce the effectiveness of the enemy indirect fire. This operation was characterized by a tremendous increase in enemy indirect fire. Each artillery battalion maintained an active hostile fire target list. These target lists were utilized in firing counter mortar/counter rocket and on suspected enemy locations and proved to be generally successful. Initially in this operation, the 31st Regiment was the forward element with its direct support unit, the 213th Artillery Battalion (-), reinforced by one battery of the 210th Artillery Battalion. The 213th Artillery Battalion (-) was located with the 31st Regimental CP at FSB Hung Dung (XT 765 651) with twelve 105mm howitzers and the reinforcing battery of six 155m howitzers was at FSB Dong Tien (XT 767 648). The FSCC was established at the 31st Regiment CP and the fire support coordinator was the 213th Artillery battalion commander. As the operation progressed, the direct support unit of the 32nd Regiment, the 211th Artillery Battalion, reinforced by a battery (-) of the 210th Artillery Battalion, occupied mobile positions north and south of Chon Thanh and had a reinforcing mission. The FSCC at FSB Hung Dung coordinated fires of the 213th Artillery Battalion and the 211th Artillery Battalion and their reinforcing elements as well as fires of the airborne artillery, who were firing in support of airborne units to the north. When the 32nd Regiment replaced the 31st Regiment, the 211th Artillery Battalion moved forward to Hung Dung, and the 213th Artillery Battalion moved to FSB Chien Thang (XT 759 626) and FSB Binh Minh (XT 773 622), and the 211th Artillery Battalion commander assumed the duties of the fire support coordinator. Throughout this operation, resupply of ammunition was accomplished by truck. The artillery fired 65,279 rounds of 105mm and 10,689 rounds of 155mm in support of this operation. Two 105mm howitzers were damaged or destroyed.

4 The Battle of Tau O Bridge was characterized by static locations of artillery at FSB Hung Dung, FSB Dong Tien, FSB Chien Thang, and FSB Binh Minh, as shown in Figure F-13. Due to inadequate security forces, the artillery's ability to maneuver was virtually eliminated. The FSCC was relocated with the 32nd Regiment CP at FSB Hung Dung with the 211th Artillery battalion commander performing the duties of fire support coordinator. Due to the static situation, it was absolutely necessary to maintain complete active target lists and conduct aggressive counter mortar/counter rocket fires. Resupply of ammunition during this operation was accomplished by truck. Two 105mm howitzers were damaged and one destroyed. One 155mm howitzer was damaged and one destroyed.

5 The occupation and consolidation of TAN KHAI forced the artillery to construct two new FSBs to

the north of Hung Dung. These two FSBs were named FSB Ca Mau (XT 766 690) and FSB Quyet Tam (XT 794 697), as shown in Figure F-14. On 16 May 1972, three 105mm howitzers of the 93rd Artillery Battalion and one platoon of 155mm howitzers were moved to Tan Khai by air where FSB Long Phi (XT 766 773) was established. The remaining three howitzers of the 93rd Artillery Battalion moved over-land to Long Phi with the 9th Cavalry. The FSCC was established at Long Phi with the 212th Artillery battalion commander performing the duties of the fire support coordinator. Artillery at Long Phi fired both indirect and direct fire for its own defense. Artillery from FSB Ca Mau and FSB Quyet Tam fired extensive defensive and support fire around Long Phi. Large amounts of tactical air support were employed. All coordination of this fire support was accomplished at the FSCC in Long Phi. Long Phi artillery suffered extremely heavy personnel and equipment losses but continued to provide limited fire support for its defense and the operations to the north. FSB Ca Mau and FSB Quyet Tam provided fire support to all 21st Division elements north of their locations with coordination being accomplished in the FSCC at Long Phi. Resupply of ammunition to Long Phi was initially accomplished by CH-47 and later by parachute drop.

6. Relief of An Loc occurred simultaneously with the consolidation to Tan Khai. Due to heavy losses of personnel and equipment, failure to open QL 13 south of Tan Khai, and intense anti-aircraft fire, only limited fire support could be provided from FSB Long Phi. Long Phi continued to be shelled daily by intense mortar and howitzer fire. An additional platoon of 105mm howitzers was air lifted by CH-47 into Long Phi to replace destroyed howitzers. Shortly thereafter, one of these 105mm howitzers was also damaged by enemy indirect fire. For the majority of this operation only one 105mm howitzer and one 155mm howitzer were capable of firing from Long Phi. Only cannibalization of the remaining damaged or destroyed howitzers made this possible. The 15th and 33rd Regiments were out of range of 105mm howitzer support from FSB Ca Mau and Quyet Tam and, therefore, had to rely totally on the 155mm howitzers from FSB Ca Nau and FSB Quyet Tam. These 155mm howitzers fired at maximum range to support this operation and each howitzer had to be individually adjusted when firing close troop support. This greatly diminished the volume of fire that could be brought to bear on the enemy. Tactical air support became the primary means of fire support. The FSCC remained in FSB Long Phi with the 212th Artillery battalion commander as the fire support coordinator. Resupply of ammunition to Long Phi was still accomplished by parachute drop. During the Tan Khai and An Loc operation, six 105mm howitzers were damaged and seven destroyed. One 155mm howitzer was damaged and three destroyed. The artillery fired 180,951 rounds of 105mm and 29,994 rounds of 155mm during these operations.

(b) Air Support. Throughout this campaign, the 21st Infantry Division received both VNAF and USAF air support. VNAF maintained an Air Liaison Section in the Division Tactical Operations Center (DTOC), which was responsible for the coordination of VNAF L-19, helicopter, and tactical air support. Requests for VNAF tactical air support were approved at the Division Fire Support Element (FSE) and forwarded to the air liaison section, who then missioned VNAF units to provide the requested support. Preplanned airstrikes were planned by the division FSE and were requested from Military Region (MR) III Direct Air Support Center (DASC). III USAF/VNAF air coordination line was established on a daily basis. Skyspots were continuously requested, but none were received during the report period. There was a scarcity of VNAF L-19 aircraft for use in aerial observation, since the majority of L-19 usage was for Forward Air Controller (FAC) operations. Helicopter assets available were adequate. They were used for command and control helicopters during the first part of the campaign and later were used as lift packages. The amount of VNAF tactical air sorties was sufficient and was hindered only by bad weather. Slow moving aircraft with soft ordnance were the most effective due to the ability of providing close support to friendly troops. All U.S. tactical air support was coordinated by the DTOC advisor based on requests from ARVN commanders and U.S. advisors in the field. The DTOC advisor forwarded tactical air requests to the MR III forward CP. The infantry advisor in the field performed the mission of the Tactical Air Control Party (TACP), utilizing the USAF FAC. Immediate airstrikes were requested directly by the TACP through the FAC to the 7th Air Force DASC. The USAF FACs performed in a truly outstanding manner throughout the entire campaign. They flew in unworkable weather for long periods of time, hoping for a break in the clouds large enough to put in tactical air. They continually conducted visual reconnaissance missions when they were not controlling fighter aircraft and provided some excellent intelligence and acquired many targets of opportunity. The following is a summary of tactical air sorties flown during the report period.

Battle of the Blue Bus

VNAF	USAF
342	148

Battle of Bench Mark 75	139	289
Tau O, Tan Khai, and An Loc	<u>542</u>	<u>1708</u>
Total:	1023	2145

The 21st Infantry Division also received a considerable amount of B-52 air support. All B-52 bomb requests were submitted by the division G2 to the MR III forward CP based on confirmed intelligence. The Division G2 was responsible for requesting aerial photo reconnaissance missions from the MR III forward CP. Lack of emphasis from the division and an excessive time delay between request time and receipt time caused them to be marginally effective. For details pertaining to TAC Air, see Appendix 5, Annex C.

(3) SUMMARY. A total of 311,274 rounds of 105mm and 69,497 rounds of 155mm ammunition were fired and a total of 10 105mm howitzers and 2 155mm howitzers were damaged and 12 105mm howitzers and 4 155mm howitzers were destroyed.

Personnel losses were:

	WIA	KIA
OFFICERS	29	2
NCO	21	9
EM	<u>106</u>	<u>26</u>
Total:	156	37

A total of 9 fire support bases have been constructed. Three 105mm howitzer batteries and one 155mm howitzer battery were attached to Military Region IV which resulted in only six 105mm howitzer batteries and two 155mm howitzer batteries left to support the 21st Infantry Division.

d. Personnel Functions.

(1) Casualty Statistics. (Appendix 3, Tab A), Appendix 3 is a chart reflecting the number of commanders who became casualties.

(2) Replacements. Appendix 4.

(3) Morale. Throughout this period the morale of the division has been high. One indicator of the high morale was the number of desertions which were lower during this period than in the previous quarter. There were 1,443 desertions during this period compared with 1,697 in the quarter ending March 1972. This was despite the intense combat and operations away from the soldiers' homes in the Delta.

(4) Medical Problems, Disease and Sanitation.

(a) Medical Problems. Throughout the campaign the only prevalent medical problem was the evacuation of wounded personnel. This was true both of surface and air evacuations. Surface evacuations were hampered by a shortage of jeep ambulances caused by the loss of four ambulances in an NVA ambush south of Chon Thanh in early April. Air evacuations were hampered repeatedly by the inability to get evacuation helicopters into the 31st and 33rd Regiments at Tan Khai and north of Tan Khai, respectively, because of the intense enemy anti-aircraft fire in the area and bad weather during a large portion of the campaign.

(b) Disease. There were no significant problems with disease in the campaign. Persons identified as having malaria upon arrival in III Corps were evacuated for treatment. An effective anti-malaria program at battalion level precluded further problems. A potential problem of an outbreak of disease from the numerous NVA bodies spread along QL 13 was countered by spreading DDT powder over the bodies.

(5) Awards. Appendix 5

e. Supply Functions.

(1) Coordination. As the 21st Infantry Division arrived in LAI KHE, coordination for supply matters was provided directly from G4, MR III and III ALC. Motor transport was available at the BIEN HOA airfield to move the troops and materiel into staging areas in and around LAI KHE. Higher headquarters, ARVN, and advisory elements, visited the division to ascertain the immediate combat requirements and establish the logistic line of communication.

(2) Resupply. Ammunition was the priority item upon arrival, with rations the second priority. Supply of Class V and I was handled on the "through-put" concept of getting the supplies from the base depots in SAIGON as near to the user as possible. The general flow of Class V was excellent, even after the LAI KHE ammunition dump exploded on 16 April 1972 and all 735 short tons were destroyed. The III ALC responded rapidly and a steady flow of Class V continued into the LAI KHE ammunition dump. From time to time there were serious shortages, but generally the pipeline was responsive. When QL 13 was opened to CHON THANH on 29 May 1972, a forward Class V dump was opened and the "through-put" concept continued to that location. A three day supply of Class V was maintained in the LAI KHE ammunition dump to back-up the field units, but delivery was dependent on VNAF. The critical items of Class V throughout the campaign were the M72 LAW, M74 (XM 202), 105mm HE, and 155mm HE.

(3) Aerial Resupply. As division units approached AN LOC, air resources were required to resupply the isolated units in the field. On 22 May 1972, parachute drops were instituted to relieve shortages utilizing C-130 aircraft, of rations and ammunition. POL products for the 9th Cavalry Regiment were also air dropped to keep the APCs running in the TAN KHAI area. The maximum aircraft load for the C-130 was sixteen short tons with one short ton comprising one pallet. During the campaign, a total of 94 short tons of material was parachuted to isolated units of the division with a recoverability rate of 92%. The major problem in this area was inaccurate reporting of the drop zone coordinates. Wind variance and delivery malfunctions caused some bundles to be lost. Due to the intense hostile fire in the drop zone, all available helicopter transportation into these areas was utilized for medevac purposes, and aerial delivery items such as parachutes, even though in critically short supply, could not be adequately retrograded. For more details pertaining to aerial resupply, see Annex C.

(4) Repair Parts Supply. Repair parts supply was generally adequate. Maintenance Company, 21st Logistical Battalion, reacted well to the EPD requirements of division artillery. Critical repair parts were the same country-wide and artillery pieces were sometimes "down" longer than considered normal. As the campaign progressed, the supply line began to adjust to the increased requirements and such critical items as obturator spindles, recoil mechanisms, artillery tubes, and other miscellaneous but necessary parts, became available in limited quantities. Land transportation suffered due to the lack of fuel pumps, engines and tires for the 2½ ton truck, M35A2. Because of the difficulty in obtaining these repair parts, Corps transportation was heavily relied upon to convoy the bulk of ammunition and supply requirements from SAIGON.

(5) Replacement of combat losses. Replacement of combat losses was less than adequate. Appendix 6 provides a picture of the total combat losses in the 21st Division and the replacements supplied. In many instances the requirements are not yet filled (Tab A Appendix 6). During the first phase of the campaign the 21st Division did not receive a proportionate share of the combat loss replacements as evidenced in Tab B Appendix 6.

f. Communications. ARVN communications, both radio and telephone, posed no major problem to the 21st Division initially. The only problem to arise during the course of the campaign, was that of communications over long distances by field units. This was overcome by establishing a division light command post within communicating distance of field units in the vicinity of TAN KHAI (XL 766 772). US advisory nets followed the same system as ARVN. However, due to the shortage of US personnel on the DCAT, a light command post was not feasible. The problem was overcome by use of the established automatic retransmission station at NUI BA DEN, and when necessary, an automatic airborne retransmission station. The TRAC communications officer is to be commended for his assistance in all commo matters. For further details pertaining to communications, see Annex C.

g. Psychological Functions. The Political Warfare Program (POLWAR) and psychological operations of the division were employed to their fullest extent throughout the BINH LONG Campaign. Although formal POLWAR instruction was discontinued for the most part, the program was not entirely dissolved. Soldiers were continually advised of the situation and the efforts and aims of the

GVN. No attempt was made to subvert or color the news for the benefit of the soldiers. On 20 June, two Hoi Chanhs of the 209th NVA Regiment surrendered themselves to the 32nd Regiment. Interrogation revealed that some members of their unit were ready to defect to the GVN side. Acting on this information, leaflet drops were made and tape recordings were produced for loud speaker broadcasts into areas pinpointed by the Hoi Chanhs. Results to the division were negative.

h. Civil Actions and Civil Affairs. When the division initially deployed into the BINH LONG province area, there was a strong need for civic action in order to demonstrate to the people of the area that the GVN was providing security. To fulfill these objectives, a civic action team of the division was sent to CHON THANH on 15 April. The team not only treated the sick and wounded refugees streaming into CHON THANH from AN LOC, but it provided definite evidence to the people that the GVN was continuing its commitment. Prior to the battle of TAN KHAII during the period 17-19 May, approximately 3,000 civilians were transported from TAN KHAII to CHON THANH by CH-47 and UH-1Hs of VNAF. These "mercy" flights saved countless lives as the battle of TAN KHAII began in earnest on 20 May. On 13 June, over 10,000 refugees from AN LOC were fed, treated and provided transportation from CHON THANH. Throughout the entire campaign individual acts of kindness contributed much more to good civilian relationships than can be evaluated. Soldiers gave their food and water to the refugees; medics treated the sick and wounded; and whenever possible, vehicles moving south out of the contact areas were filled with refugees fleeing their homes.

i. Engineer Support. QL 13 was damaged after each battle to such an extent that engineer support was absolutely necessary to clear and repair the road. As in each subsequent battle, the battles of the Blue Bus and Bench Mark 75 were closely followed by road clearing operations conducted by the Engineer Battalion of the division. In both cases, numerous anti-tank and anti-vehicular mines were found. These mines, for the most part, had been emplaced in small crater holes and then camouflaged. Bomb craters and all other holes were filled without delay to allow heavy vehicular traffic to move along the highway. After the battles of the Blue Bus and Bench Mark 75, fire bases were constructed on the ground formerly held by NVA forces. The fire bases at XT 7852 and XT 7669 were constructed quickly and smoothly with engineer equipment on hand and good professional advice to the infantry commander. In addition, "ROME" plows were employed extensively between CHON THANH and LAI KHE to clear vast amounts of undergrowth away from the highway thus denying enemy units access to closely observe and interdict highway traffic.

j. Senior Advisor's Evaluation. The 21st Infantry Division has fought well and with great distinction during the entire BINH LONG Campaign. Some problems were encountered. Shortly after arrival in LAI KHE Major General NGUYEN VINH NGHI, and several of his key staff officers were reassigned to the Delta and numerous key leaders from company through regimental level were lost to enemy action. The intensity of fire and the tenacious tactics of enemy forces were far superior to that normally encountered by the division in Military Region IV. Employment of the division cavalry assets in MR IV was normally so dispersed that the 9th ACR found itself completely unprepared for conventional employment during the BINH LONG Campaign. Nevertheless, the 21st Infantry Division arrived in Military Region III prepared to fight, adjusted rapidly to the new environment, fought bravely, and achieved significant results. It was the only ARVN division in Vietnam that was continuously assigned an offensive mission throughout the NGUYEN HUE Campaign.

At the end of the BINH LONG Campaign 1972, the 21st Infantry Division remains a cohesive fighting force. With an opportunity to refit and conduct selected corrective training, it should prove to be more effective than it was prior to arrival in Military Region III. Without additional training or refitting, it is still rated combat effective, but less so than on 1 April. New NCO and company grade leaders remain to be developed to replace those lost in combat.

#### 4. CONCLUSIONS:

a. The 21st Infantry Division was instrumental in stopping the North Vietnamese drive on SAIGON in April and May 1972. When the 21st Division arrived in LAI KHE, leading elements of the attacking NVA force were deploying 10 Kilometers north of LAI KHE and all major maneuver forces of Military Region III were fully committed. In three major battles during April and the first two weeks of May, the 21st Infantry Division thwarted the NVA drive south, destroyed the 101st NVA Regiment, and drove the 7th NVA Division approximately 20 kilometers to the north where it was forced to concentrate in order to delay further advances of the 21st Division, the 7th NVA Division thus subjected itself to devastating attack by fire, eliminating any further capability

to attack to the south.

b. Although the 21st Division was unable to eliminate the road block of highway 13 in the vicinity of TAU O, division maneuvers should be credited for the relief of AN LOC. 21st Infantry Division troops were unable to penetrate the 7th NVA Division road block of QL 13 in the vicinity of the TAU O BRIDGE from 14 May - 22 June. However, the division did succeed in enveloping the enemy position and fought north to TAN KHAI and ultimately, AN LOC. When the 15th and 33rd Infantry Regiments first appeared north of TAN KHAI on 18 - 20 May, the 5th VC Division was forced to divert its attention from AN LOC and to disperse forces to meet the threat from the south. From that point forward, the AN LOC defenders were under ever-decreasing pressure as ground forces and indirect fire were redirected south to engage the 21st Infantry Division. Following link up of forces on 8 - 9 June, the only flight path and LZ possible for heliborne reinforcement and medevac was secured by the 33rd Infantry Regiment astride highway 13 south of AN LOC.

c. The BINH LONG Campaign 1972 has frustrated North Vietnam's intention of seizing all or a part of the SAIGON - BIEN HOA - LONG BINH complex, has destroyed a significant portion of the enemy's regular forces, and has lessened the NVA bargaining position at PARIS.

#### 5. LESSONS LEARNED:

##### a. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS.

(1) Personnel. The ARVN replacement system was surprisingly capable of providing enlisted replacements. However, it proved inadequate with respect to NCO's and junior officers. A more responsive system of officer and NCO replacements is urgently required if the ARVN is to field anything more than a leaderless mass. It should be noted that the individual soldier is of good quality and is most receptive and willing to follow good leaders.

(2) Leadership. Regimental and higher level leadership was not tactically or psychologically prepared for a battle of the duration and intensity of the BINH LONG Campaign. Company and battalion level leaders lacked preparation for the close coordination necessary between fire and maneuver elements. At all levels above battalion, the value of personal presence of the commander at the critical point and time was badly overlooked.

(3) Supply Economy. Conservation of supplies and basic supply economy was not satisfactory. Ammunition, particularly small arms of the individual soldier, was discarded, mistreated, and shamefully wasted.

(4) Ammunition Storage. Ammunition storage facilities were not properly constructed for the high intensity indirect fire encountered during the campaign. They were too easily destroyed by rockets and mortars. Berms must be higher, individual dumps smaller, and dispersion increased.

##### b. OPERATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE.

(1) Combat Intelligence. Although it excelled in counterinsurgency operations, the 21st Infantry Division was not organized, trained, or otherwise prepared to obtain effective combat intelligence required for conventional warfare. The failure to use combat patrols or to properly analyze the effects of terrain on operations were prime examples of this inadequacy.

(2) NVA Tactics. Several isolated comments are appropriate.

(a) Attack. Without adequate opportunity (time) for methodical preparation, NVA ground attacks did not present serious problems to well prepared troops. As a rule, the attacks were violent, of short duration, and poorly coordinated. The best defense against attack of NVA units was fire-power and frequent movement.

(b) Use of Armor. NVA use of armor was very poor. Tanks were not properly supported by infantry and, on several occasions, were committed in the attack, without firing their weapons. After the shock of the first encounter with NVA armor, troops of the 21st Infantry Division had little trouble destroying tanks. For the most part, NVA tanks were committed piece-meal and never in groups larger than five.

(c) Indirect Fire. NVA employment of mortars, rockets, and artillery was highly

effective. Ninety percent of friendly casualties came from indirect fire. One of the most effective countermeasures employed was frequent troop movement. The accuracy of the NVA indirect fire was the result of skillful use of observer parties which closely followed the friendly troops and adjusted fires. Use of VT fuzes in close proximity to friendly positions, combat patrols, and interdiction of the NVA observer's wire communication lines proved moderately successful in suppressing this fire. NVA Units have clearly proven their ability to infiltrate large quantities of heavy ammunition far exceeds previous expectations.

(3) ARVN Operations.

(a) Armor. Division utilization of armor and cavalry assets was ineffective. ARVN armor has been so poorly utilized for so long that a major retraining program is essential from top to bottom. The most notable deficiencies of all were a complete lack of aggressiveness and leadership at any level and an inability to work with the infantry.

(b) Use of Fire and Maneuver. While massive firepower was employed by divisional units during the BINH LONG Campaign, overall results were not commensurate with the effort, largely because maneuver was not properly coordinated with the fire support. Infantry assault techniques were weak and fire coordination at the company and battalion levels was poor. Company and battalion size units did not employ all their organic weapons, particularly mortars and recoilless rifles. In many cases, these weapons were not even taken to the field. The concept of maneuver unit firepower must be stressed further in the future.

(c) Artillery. While massive artillery support was available to the ground commanders, there was a definite lack of fire support coordination at all levels of command. Commanders did not fully employ the techniques of fire planning and fire support coordination, particularly in regard to daily fire planning and the massing of fires. Battalion commanders generally ignored their forward observer parties and adjusted their own artillery.

(d) B-52 Strikes and Tactical Air Support. As the campaign progressed there was an increasing dependency on B-52 strikes and tactical air support by ARVN commanders. Battalion and regimental commanders would not move to contact until air support was utilized. Subsequent maneuvers were generally not aggressive and units were committed piecemeal. B-52 strikes were effective for coverage of large areas and to attack massed enemy troops. However, because of troop safety requirements, the enemy directly opposed to friendly lines was not endangered. Thus, while B-52's spelled the difference in the defense of AN LOC, they were not as effective during offensive operations of the 21st Division. During the initial battle of TAN KHAI and the relief of AN LOC, tactical air support was the most effective combat power available. The accuracy, devastation, and responsiveness of US tactical air meant the difference between victory and defeat.

(e) VNAF Air Support.

1. Helicopter Support. VNAF helicopter assets were disappointing: Pilots were reluctant to fly into high intensity areas despite the need for medevac and resupply and often would not land to pick up the wounded once they did get to the PZ; pilots were not dependable; ground-to-air coordination was, at times, nonexistent; and most importantly, ground commanders and troops alike, had no confidence in VNAF helicopter crews.

2. Tactical Air. VNAF tactical air strikes were for the most part comparable with US tactical air although VNAF assets were not employed with the frequency of US assets. As with US tactical air, maneuver to capitalize on the benefits of the strikes was sorely lacking.

(f) RVNAF Supply System. The RVNAF supply system reacted well under the stress of the combat situation in providing the basic necessities; however, the amount of depot stocks was not large enough to satisfy all the demands placed on the system. The shortages evident during this period were the same as those experienced during more normal times, i.e., ammunition, and artillery parts with high usage factors.

6. RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. That all action possible be expeditiously taken to correct deficiencies noted during the conduct of BINH LONG operations, particularly in the fields of leadership, armor tactics, and

combined arms operations.

b. That the 21st Infantry Division be considered for award of the United States Distinguished Unit Citation for its vital part in this campaign.

c. That the 21st Division Combat Assistance Team (MACV Advisory Team 51) be recommended for award of the Valorous Unit Citation for its heroic actions during the BINH LONG Campaign 1972. During the campaign, the 21st DCAT and its attached unit, the 15th Regimental Combat Assistance Team, had four members killed and 18 others wounded in action, including seven advisors medically evacuated from the Republic of Vietnam. The heroic actions of the 35 members of these two teams resulted in the award of 46 valor awards; one Distinguished Service Cross, 21 Silver Stars, one Distinguished Flying Cross, 3 Soldiers Medals, 14 Bronze Star Medals "V", one Air Medal "V", and 5 Army Commendation Medals "V". Nine additional awards for valor are still pending to include an additional Distinguished Service Cross. Few units have compiled such a commendable record.

d. That consideration be given to the extension of the BINH LONG Campaign 1972 time frame to include the period 25 June - 8 July. It was during this time that the enemy made his last determined attacks against the 33rd Regiment south of AN LOC. This battle should be included as a part of the BINH LONG Campaign.

*YES:*  
**Appendices:**

**Appendix 1** Task Organization

**Appendix 2** Operational Summary

**Appendix 3** Casualties

**Appendix 4** Replacements

**Appendix 5** Awards

**Appendix 6** Combat Losses

**Appendix 7** Chronological Outline

Appendix 1 (Task Organization) to Annex E (21st Infantry Division) to After-Action Report, BINH  
LONG Campaign 1972.

21ST INFANTRY DIVISION

10 APRIL - 25 JUNE 1972

31st Infantry Regiment  
32nd Infantry Regiment  
33rd Infantry Regiment  
9th Cavalry Regiment

Division Artillery:

211th Arty Bn (-): DS 32nd Inf Regt  
212th Arty Bn (-): DS 33rd Inf Regt  
213th Arty Bn: DS 31st Inf Regt  
A Btry (-), 210th Arty Bn: Reinf 211th Arty Bn  
C Btry (-), 210th Arty Bn: Reinf 213th Arty Bn  
3A and 3C, 210th Arty Bn: Reinf 212th Arty Bn

21st Medical Battalion

21st Signal Battalion

21st Engineer Battalion

21st Logistical Battalion

21st Transportation Company

21st Reconnaissance Company

1st Airborne Brigade Atch: 21st Div Eff 10 April - 15 April 1972 and 18 June - 21 June 1972

6th Airborne Battalion Atch: 21st Div Eff 3 May - 10 June 1972

15th Infantry Regiment Atch: 21st Div Eff 12 May - 14 June 1972

5th Cavalry Regiment Atch: 32nd Inf Regt, 21st Div Eff 11 May - 12 June 1972

1st Squadron, 5th Armored Regiment Atch: 32nd Inf Regt, 21st Div Eff 11 May - 12 June 1972

1st Squadron, 2d Cavalry Regiment Atch: 32nd Inf Regt, 21st Div Eff 12 May - 2 June 1972

65th Ranger Battalion Atch: 32nd Inf Regt, 21st Div Eff 18 May - 22 June 1972

3rd Battalion, 46th Infantry Regiment Atch: 31st Inf Regt, 21st Inf Div Eff 23 May - 10 June 1972

1st Squadron, 18th Cavalry Regiment Atch: 32nd Inf Regt, 21st Inf Div Eff 24 May - 14 June 1972

73rd Ranger Battalion Atch: 32nd Inf Regt, 21st Div Eff 10 June - 22 June 1972

84th Ranger Battalion Atch: 32nd Inf Regt, 21st Div Eff 12 June - 22 June 1972

9th Cavalry Regiment Atch: 32nd Inf Regt, 21st Div Eff 1 May - 15 May 1972

9th Cavalry Regiment Atch: 15th Inf Regt, 9th Div Atch to 21st Div Eff 15 May - 25 May and 8 June 1972

9th Cavalry Regiment Atch: 31st Inf Regt, 21st Div Eff 8 June 1972

32nd Infantry Regiment Atch: 25th Inf Div Eff 22 June 1972

B Btry, 213th Arty Bn Atch: Military Region IV Eff 18 June 1972

A Btry, 211th Arty Bn Atch: 25th Inf Div Eff 22 June 1972

BATTLE OF THE BLUE BUS (12 APRIL - 28 APRIL 1972)

31st Infantry Regiment  
32nd Infantry Regiment  
33rd Infantry Regiment  
9th Cavalry Regiment

Division Artillery:

211th Arty Bn (-): DS 32nd Regt  
212th Arty Bn (-): DS 33rd Regt  
213th Arty Bn: DS 31st Regt  
A Btry (-), 210th Arty Bn: Reinf 211th Arty Bn  
C Btry (-), 210th Arty Bn: Reinf 213th Arty Bn  
3A and 3C, 210th Arty Bn: Reinf 212th Arty Bn

21st Medical Battalion

21st Signal Battalion  
21st Engineer Battalion  
21st Logistical Battalion  
21st Transportation Company  
21st Reconnaissance Company  
1st Airborne Brigade Atch: 21st Div Eff 10 April - 15 April 1972

BENCH MARK 75 ROAD BLOCK (1 MAY - 13 MAY 1972)

31st Infantry Regiment  
32nd Infantry Regiment  
33rd Infantry Regiment  
9th Cavalry Regiment

Division Artillery:

211th Arty Bn (-): DS 32nd Regt  
212th Arty Bn (-): DS 33rd Regt  
213th Arty Bn: DS 31st Regt  
A Btry (-), 210th Arty Bn: Reinf 211th Arty Bn  
C Btry (-), 210th Arty Bn: Reinf 213th Arty Bn  
3A and 3C, 210th Arty Bn: Reinf 212th Arty Bn

21st Medical Battalion  
21st Signal Battalion  
21st Engineer Battalion  
21st Logistical Battalion  
21st Transportation Company  
21st Reconnaissance Company  
6th Airborne Battalion Atch: 21st Div Eff 3 May - 10 June 1972  
15th Infantry Regiment Atch: 21st Div Eff 12 May - 14 June 1972  
5th Cavalry Regiment Atch: 32nd Inf Regt, 21st Div Eff 11 May - 12 June 1972  
1st Squadron, 5th Armored Regiment Atch: 32nd Inf Regt, 21st Div Eff 11 May - 12 June 1972  
1st Squadron, 2nd Cavalry Regiment Atch: 32nd Inf Regt, 21st Div Eff 12 May - 2 June 1972

TAU O BRIDGE (18 MAY - 22 JUNE 1972)

31st Infantry Regiment  
32nd Infantry Regiment  
33rd Infantry Regiment  
9th Cavalry Regiment

Division Artillery:

211th Arty Bn (-): DS 32nd Regt  
212th Arty Bn (-): DS 33rd Regt  
213th Arty Bn: DS 31st Regt  
A Btry (-), 210th Arty Bn: Reinf 211th Arty Bn  
C Btry (-), 210th Arty Bn: Reinf 213th Arty Bn  
3A and 3C, 210th Arty Bn: Reinf 212th Arty Bn

21st Medical Battalion  
21st Signal Battalion  
21st Engineer Battalion  
21st Logistical Battalion  
21st Transportation Company  
21st Reconnaissance Company  
65th Ranger Battalion Atch: 32nd Inf Regt, 21st Div Eff 18 May - 22 June 1972  
3rd Battalion, 46th Infantry Regiment Atch: 31st Inf Regt, 21st Div Eff 23 May - 10 June 1972  
1st Squadron, 18th Cavalry Regiment Atch: 32nd Inf Regt, 21st Div Eff 24 May - 14 June 1972  
73rd Ranger Battalion Atch: 32nd Inf Regt, 21st Div Eff 10 June - 22 June 1972  
84th Ranger Battalion Atch: 32nd Inf Regt, 21st Div Eff 12 June - 22 June 1972  
1st Battalion, 31st Regiment Atch: 33rd Inf Regt, 21st Div Eff 22 May 1972

1-F-2

2nd Battalion, 31st Regiment Atch: 5th Div Eff 13 June - 29 June 1972  
9th Cavalry Regiment Atch: 15th Inf Regt, 9th Div Atch to 21st Div Eff 25 May - 8 June 1972  
9th Cavalry Regiment Atch: 31st Inf Regt, 21st Div Eff 8 June 1972

TAN KHAI AND RELIEF OF AN LOC (16 MAY - 25 JUNE 1972)

31st Infantry Regiment (-)

32nd Infantry Regiment

33rd Infantry Regiment

9th Cavalry Regiment

Division Artillery:

211th Arty Bn (-): DS 32nd Regt

212th Arty Bn (-): DS 33rd Regt

213th Arty Bn: DS 31st Regt

A Btry (-), 210th Arty Bn: Reinf 211th Arty Bn

C Btry (-), 210th Arty Bn: Reinf 213th Arty Bn

3A and 3C, 210th Arty Bn: Reinf 212th Arty Bn

21st Medical Battalion

21st Signal Battalion

21st Engineer Battalion

21st Logistical Battalion

21st Transportation Company

21st Reconnaissance Company

1st Airborne Brigade Atch: 21st Div Eff 18 June - 21 June 1972

6th Airborne Battalion Atch: 21st Div Eff 3 May - 10 June 1972

15th Infantry Regiment Atch: 21st Div Eff 12 May - 14 June 1972

5th Cavalry Regiment Atch: 32nd Inf Regt, 21st Div Eff 11 May - 12 June 1972

1st Squadron, 5th Armored Regiment Atch: 32nd Inf Regt, 21st Div Eff 11 May - 12 June 1972

1st Squadron, 2nd Cavalry Regiment Atch: 32nd Inf Regt, 21st Div Eff 12 May - 2 June 1972

65th Ranger Battalion Atch: 32nd Inf Regt, 21st Div Eff 18 May - 22 June 1972

3rd Battalion, 46th Infantry Regiment Atch: 31st Inf Regt, 21st Div Eff 23 May - 10 June 1972

1st Squadron, 18th Cavalry Regiment Atch: 32nd Inf Regt, 21st Div Eff 24 May - 14 June 1972

73rd Ranger Battalion Atch: 32nd Inf Regt, 21st Div Eff 10 June - 22 June 1972

84th Ranger Battalion Atch: 32nd Inf Regt, 21st Div Eff 12 June - 22 June 1972

9th Cavalry Regiment Atch: 32nd Inf Regt, 21st Div Eff 1 May - 15 May 1972

9th Cavalry Regiment Atch: 15th Inf Regt, 9th Div Atch to 21st Div Eff 25 May - 8 June 1972

9th Cavalry Regiment Atch: 31st Inf Regt, 21st Div Eff 8 June 1972

32nd Infantry Regiment Dtch: 25th Div Eff 22 June 1972

B Btry, 211th Arty Bn Dtch: Military Region IV Eff 18 June 1972

A Btry, 211th Arty Bn Dtch: 25th Div Eff 22 June 1972

1-F-3

Appendix 5 (Awards) to Annex F (21st Infantry Division) to After-Action Report, BINH LONG Campaign 1972

1 UNIT	Army Level Gallantry Cross with Palm	Corps Level Gallantry Cross with Golden Star	Divisional Level Gallantry Cross with Silver Star	Brigade Level Gallantry Cross with Bronze Star	Regimental Level Gallantry Cross with Bronze Star	TOTAL
21st Recon	0	3	10	10	0	23
31st Regt	16	48	199	100	16	379
32nd Regt	22	52	260	20	15	369
33rd Regt	16	41	121	50	18	246
9th Cav	6	6	62	22	8	104
Div Arty	0	4	13	0	0	17
Other	2	7	32	0	0	41
15th Regt	5	15	50	50	50	170
TOTALS: 2	67	176	747	252	107	1349

1. During this same period personnel of the 21st Division Combat Assistance Team were awarded the following valor awards for actions in the campaign:

Distinguished Service Cross, Silver Star 17, Distinguished Flying Cross 1, Soldiers Medal 3, Bronze Star Medal w/V 13, Air Medal w/V 1, Army Commendation Medal w/V 5.

The following awards are pending: Silver Star 2, Bronze Star Medal w/V 2, Air Medal w/V 1.

The personnel of the 15th RCAT were awarded the following awards for actions during the period of their attachment: Silver Star 4, Bronze Star Medal 1.

The following awards for personnel of the 15th RCAT are pending: Distinguished Service Cross 1, Bronze Star Medal w/V 3.

2. Awards approved for presentation.

Appendix 6 (Combat Losses) to Annex F (21st Infantry Division) to After-Action Report, BINH  
LONG Campaign 1972

The purpose of this annex is to provide a numerical picture of the combat losses experienced by the 21st Infantry Division and the status of replacement items as of 31 June 1972.

TYPE	31ST REGT	32ND REGT	33RD REGT	9TH CAV	210TH ARTY	211TH ARTY	212TH ARTY	213TH ARTY	TOTAL
Pistol .45	6	11	4	18	05		05		49
Rifle M16	67	109	47	150	25	05	10		413
Machinegun	5	6	3		1		1		16
Grenade Launcher M79	6	10	6	20	1				43
57mm Recoilless	1		1						2
60mm Mortar	1		1						2
Bayonet M7	545	673	48			1	24	6	1267
Bayonet Cover M8A1	4	83					10		97
Aiming Circle XI					5	1	2		8
Compass M2		2	2		5	1	3		13
Gunner's Quadrant M1							3		3
Panoramic Telescope					4		4		8
Btry Commanders (M65)							2		2
Zero Reader M4	1		3						4
Zero Reader M109	2								2
GFT M82							2	3	5
GFT M83									2
GFT M84							2		2
GFT M64					9				9
GFT M67					10				10
GFT M70					10				10
Telescope Sight M86F	2								2
Display Board M17							1		1
Display Board					10				10
Graphic Firing FT 10516						1			1
Fuze Setter M18						1			1
Fuze Setter M28						1			1
Lantern						2			2
Service Gas Mask	522	514	245	135	78	23	122	15	2084
Tool Box	1						1		2
Truck $\frac{1}{4}$ Ton		1	1		7	1			10
Truck $\frac{3}{4}$ Ton		1							1
Truck $\frac{2}{3}$ ton	1				3				4
Truck 5 Ton					1				1
Trailer $\frac{1}{4}$ Ton					2				2
Binoculars 6X30	7	8	2		8	3	5		33
Telescope 57mm	2								2
AN/PRC 25	9	13	8	16	7	2	4		59
AN/VRC 46				4		4	5		13
AN/GRC 125				3		2	2		7
AN/VRC 47				4		1			5
AN/PVS 2						3			3
AN/GSS 9	1								1
Tel Central Ofc SB993		2							2
Tel Central Ofc SB 32							1		1
AN/VRC 54					10				10
AN/VRC 53					15				15
Set Telescope Sight					5				5
Net					4				4
Guideline					4				4
Wire Net Anti B40					42				42

TYPE	31ST REGT	32ND REGT	33RD REGT	9TH CAV	210TH ARTY	211TH ARTY	212TH ARTY	213TH ARTY	TOTAL
Antenna RC 292						2		2	
Tel Central Ofc TA 312	1	1	2		1	4	4	1	14
Tel Central Ofc DS 99B						4	15	2	21
Generator Kit	1								1
WD1/IT/DR8	1								1
WD I/MX 306						6	7		13
WD I/RC 159						4	5		9
Flashlight TL 112	47	74	44		2	4	6	5	182
Compass	48	56	44		24	6	10	5	193
Chair 7/6 Feet				1		1			2
Generator 10 KW				1					1
Generator 3 KW				1					1
Generator 1½ KW					1				1
Extinguisher							1		1
Flak Jacket	85		162	158	70	80	34	12	601
M79 Ammo Jacket						23			23
M60 Ammo Jacket				4		17			21
Axe 37/8	14								14
Axe 3/38	50	23							73
Hammer			4						4
Axe 1/38	16								16
Typewriter				4			2		6
Hammer 5 lbs	8	10					18		36
Cooking Pot 90	8	5	5				1		19
Cooking Pot 70	3								3
Field Stove			2						2
Skillet	36								36
Basin			5						5
Jack ½ Ton		2							2
Jack 8 Ton	1								1
Field Knife		20							20
Individual Tent		3			7	3	2	2	17
Water Can 20 Gal	55	70	13			40		8	186
Water Can 10 Gal			29						29
Water Can 5 Gal			17						17
Field Foot Locker							1		1
Shovel D Handle	20	50				18	23		111
Machine Gun 50 Cal				30					30
Machine Gun 30 Cal				32					32
Mortar 81				1					1
106 Recoilless				1					1
ML13 APC			22						22
Capstan Kit			6						6
Shield 50 Cal MG			26						26
Shield 30 Cal MG			32						32
Fuel Can 5 Gal			175						175
Fuel Tank 20 Gal			15						15
Fuel Pump 12 GPM			10						10
Tool Kit 101/G			4						4
Barber Kit			2						2
Ammo Jacket			12						12

ITEM	COMBAT LOSS	AMOUNT	REPLACEMENT	SHORTAGE	ISSUE	OUTSTANDING REQUESTS
		OF ISSUE	IN COMPARISON W/LOSSES			
AN/URM105 Magnetic Tape Rec	1		1		1	
RL39 Reel Dispenser	3	2	1		1	
WD1/TT/DR8 Wire	20		20		20	
RL159 Wire WD-1	8	3	5		5	
MK-306 Wire WD-1	14	5	9		9	
SB993/PT Switchboard	4	1	3		3	
TA312/PT Telephone	32	5	27		27	
PP-68/U Transformer	1		1		1	
H161/U Headphone	80		80		80	
SB-22/PT Monocord Swbd	2	1	1		1	
Electronic Compass	203	6	197		197	
TL122 Flashlight	193	16	177	100	77	
Aid Kit	36		36		36	
Mine Detector	2		2		2	
Chain 7/6 Feet	2		2		2	
3KW Generator	1		1		1	
1OKW Generator	1		1		1	
1.5 KW Generator	1		1		1	
HV Multimeter	1		1		1	
25 Lights Light Set	1		1		1	
4 Liter Fire Extinguisher	1		1		1	
200 Liter Drum Empty	175		175			
20 Liter Gas Can (5Gal)	215		215			
20 Liter Water Can	373		373		373	
12 GPM Fuel Pump	10		10	5	5	
Nozzle	25		25	25		
Barrel Cap Opener Wrench	3		3		3	
Vehicle Tool Box	17		17		17	
Gun Tool Box	2		2		2	
TE-33 Spair Set	28		28		28	
TK-101/G Tool Kit	4		4	2	2	
Haircut Set	8		8		8	
Portable Typewriter	7		7		7	
Mimeograph Machine	1		1		1	
Armor Vest	601		516		516	
Obstruction Light	13		13		13	
Ammo Pouch	12		12			
12X12 Grill	26		26		26	
20 Feet Nylon Rope	34		34		34	
12 Feet Nylon Rope	2		2		2	
19 Feet Nylon Rope	2		2		2	
9 Feet Nylon Rope	4		4		4	
3 Feet Nylon Rope	14		14		14	
Clevis Ring	16		16		16	
Safe File	3		3		3	
Axe	4		4	4		
M79 Ammo Jacket	23		23		23	
60mm Mortar Ammo Jacket	21		21		21	
3/38 Axe	76		76		76	
1/38 Axe	16		16		16	
Field Table	1		1	1		
5 LB Hammer	36		36		36	
90 Cent Cooking Pot	19		19		19	
70 Cent Cooking Pot	3		3		3	
Field Stove	2		2		2	
Frying Pan	36		36		36	
Basin w/Handles	5		5	5		

ITEM	AMOUNT OF COMBAT LOSS	REPLACEMENT ISSUE	SHORTAGE IN COMPARISON W/LOSSES	ISSUE	OUTSTANDING REQUESTS
1/4 Ton Jack	2		2	2	
Field Knife	144		144	144	
Nylon Ring	6		6	6	
U Clevis Hook	6		6	6	
A22 Bag	16		16	16	
Wire Cutter	30		30	30	
Fly Tent	22		22	22	
Nol Carpenter Tool Box	3		3	3	
GP Tent	4		4	4	
Small Type Typewriter	2		2	2	
Medium Type Typewriter	2		2	2	
Cooking Pot Cover 70 Cmtr	2		2	2	
Axe (4 lbs)	115		115	115	
80 Liter Water Tank	29		29	29	
Field Wall Locker	1		1	1	
Vehicle Tool Box	6		6	6	
"D" Handle Shovel	111		111	111	
Food Tray	50		50	50	

TAB A (Status of Combat Loss Replacements) to Appendix 6 (Combat Losses) to Annex F (21st Infantry Division) to After-Action Report, BINH LONG Campaign 1972

Status of combat loss replacements, 10 April to 31 June 1972.

ITEM	AMOUNT OF COMBAT LOSS	REPLACEMENT ISSUE	SHORTAGE IN COMPARISON W/LOSSES	OUTSTANDING REQUESTS
APC M113	22	20	2	20
Tank M125	1		1	1
BILL M113	5		5	5
BILL M125	1		1	1
Capstan Kit	6	6		
Capstan Kit Anchor	6		6	6
Jeep $\frac{1}{4}$ Ton	10	3	7	7
Truck 3/4 Ton	1		1	1
Truck 2 $\frac{1}{4}$ Ton	.5	1	4	4
Truck 5 Ton	1	1		
Trailer, $\frac{1}{4}$ Ton	2		2	2
Colt Pistol 45	50	22	28	28
M16 Rifle	447	173	274	274
M79 Launcher	44	20	24	24
30 Cal MG	32		32	
50 Cal MG	30		30	15
81mm Mortar	3		3	3
106mm Recoilless	1		1	1
50 Cal MG Shield	26		26	26
30 Cal MG Shield	32		32	32
M60 MG	18		16	18
57mm Recoilless	2	2	2	
60mm Mortar	3		3	3
M7 Bayonet	1267		1267	1267
M8A1 Bayonet Cover	97		97	97
M1 Aiming Circle	11	3	8	8
M2 Compass	14		14	14
M1 Gunner Quadrant & Cover	3		3	3
M12A7 Panoramic Telescope	8		8	8
M65 Battery CO Scope	2		2	2
M16A1-D Stereoscope	3		3	3
M86F Telescope Sight	2		2	2
Service Gas Mask	2084	153	1931	1931
M4 Zero Reader	4		4	4
M82 Graphic Firing Table	5		5	5
M83 Graphic Firing Table	2		2	2
M84 Graphic Firing Table	6		6	6
M109 Zero Reader	2		2	2
M64 Graphic Firing Table	9		9	9
M67 Graphic Firing Table	10		10	10
M70 Graphic Firing Table	10		10	10
M17 Elevation Table	11		11	11
FT105 Graphic Firing Table	1		1	1
M18 Fuze Setter	1		1	1
M28 Fuze Setter	1		1	1
M14 Sight Base	2		2	14
Thermo Meter	4		4	4
Elevation Tracking Scope	1		1	1
57mm Zero Reader	2		2	2
6X30 Field Glasses	33		33	33
Light Weapon Tool Kit	2		2	2
105mm M101 Howitzer	20	9	11	11

ITEM	AMOUNT OF COMBAT LOSS	REPLACEMENT ISSUE	SHORTAGE IN COMPARISON W/LOSSES	ISSUE	OUTSTANDING REQUESTS
155mm M114 Howitzer	2	2			
AN/GRC39/B Remote Control	5		5		5
AN/VIC-1					
AN/PVS-2 Astigmatizer	5	2	3		3
PIQ5 Public Address Set	3	2	1		1

TAB B (Combat Loss Comparison) to Appendix 6 (Combat Losses) to Annex F (21st Infantry Division)  
to After-Action Report, BINH LONG Campaign 1972

Comparison of combat loss replacement by division serviced by III ALC (as of 13 June 1972).

ITEM	5TH DIV		18TH DIV		25TH DIV		21ST DIV		ABN DIV	
	L	R	L	R	L	R	L	R	L	R
Rifle M16	1504	1342	314	314	167	167	259	23	471	409
M79 40mm	148	1	35	0	21	0	35	0	73	59
MG M60	70	20	14	0	10	1	4	0	43	0
Pistol Cal 45	192	65	33	33	29	29	35	4	27	22
How 105mm	18	6	6	4	3	3	6	5	16	16
How 155mm	11	2			4	4	1	0		
106mm RR	2	0					1	0		
MG 30 Cal	50	50	1	1	12	12	41	0		
57mm RR	3	3	2	1			1	0	2	0
Mortar 60mm	11	11	4	4	1	0	1	0	1	1
Mortar 81mm	5	4	4	2	1	1	1	0	2	0
Truck Amb $\frac{1}{4}$ T			2	2			1	0	1	0
Truck Wrecker	2	0					1	0	1	0
Truck Cargo 5T	19	3	1	0	14	0	2	0		
Truck Cargo 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ T	53	14	17	3	1	1	4	0	13	0
Truck Util $\frac{1}{4}$ T	39	3	18	0	9	1	8	0	5	0
Truck Cargo 3/4T	32	32	9	9	2	2	6	0	3	0
Carr SP M125A1	2	1			1	0	1	0		
APC M113	20	10			6	3	32	0		
Trlr Cargo 1 $\frac{1}{2}$ T	15	0	1	0			4	0		
Trlr $\frac{1}{4}$ & 1T	43	0	15	0	8	0	1	0		
AN/VRC 47 Radio	38	4	2	1	2	0	21	0		
AN/VRC 46 Radio	26	9	8	3	5	1	24	0		
AN/VRC 53	13	6	6	0			18	0		
RC 292 Ant	40	23	36	3			19	0	23	2
AN/VRC 3 $\frac{1}{2}$ Radio	15	6	14	2	3	1	14	0		
AN/PRC 25 Radio	12 $\frac{1}{2}$	17	75	16	51	8	42	4	77	0
AN/PVS 2	17	17	2	2	5	5	4	0	8	6
RLT 59	21	0	1	0			8	0	4	0
AN/GSS 9	40	23	11	11	6	6	4	0	2	0
Swbd, SB22	8	1	33	20	2	0	5	0	1	0
TA 312	180	33	59	5	62	3	61	0	23	5
Mask Prot M17A1	1792	0	706	706	703	0	907	53	1057	0
Mine Det, MMU	20	0	4	0	9	0	1	0	4	0
Vest, Armd	580	0	738	0	512	0	305	0	234	133
Binoculars, All	58	0	21	0	14	0	13	0	21	0
Compass, Lensatic	112	2	95	0	40	0	8	0	90	20
Gen 1.5 KW	9	0	4	1	5	0	1	0	4	0
Flashlight	198	2	114	0	58	0	24	0	99	37

NOTES: 1. "L" column denotes loss, "R" column denotes replacement

2. Period covered through approximately 13 June 1972 from incomplete but best available data from III ALC files.

E-6-F-1

Appendix 7 (Chronological Outline) to Annex F (21st Infantry Division) to After-Action Report,  
BINH LONG Campaign 1972

DATE      UNIT AND ACTION

APRIL

10 - 12 21st Division closed into Lai Khe (XT 7638).  
10 1st Airborne Brigade attached to 21st Division.  
11 32nd Regiment moved north along QL 13 to XT 768604 where CP was established. Received 10-15 rounds of 107mm rocket fire.  
12 32nd CP received sporadic incoming fire.  
13 31st Regiment moved north from Lai Khe along QL 13 to vicinity of XT 766632. 8th Bn, 1st ABN BDE in contact with platoon at XT 773729. 5th Armored Cavalry Regiment in contact with company at XT 766640. 6 tanks from 5th ACR attached to 31st Regt. 32nd Regt in contact at XT 735645. 5th Bn, 1st ABN BDE ammo dump blown up. 33rd Regt CP located at XT 791460, 1st Bn, XT 770380, 2nd Bn, XT 795541, 3rd Bn, XT 791460, Recon Co, XT 791460. 2nd Bn, 32nd Regt in contact with battalion at XT 752630 - XT 749639.  
14 3rd Bn, 33rd Regt in light contact at XT 780500 - XT 788500. 2nd Bn, 33rd Regt attached to 32nd Regt. 6th Bn, 1st ABN BDE in heavy contact at XT 780715.  
15 3rd Bn, 33rd Regt in light contact at 785510. 8th Bn, 1st ABN BDE inserted, PZ location XT 768590, LZ location, XT 799860. 6th Bn, 1st ABN BDE inserted same LZ and PZ. 6th and 8th Bns operational control to 5th Division. 1st Bn, 33rd Regt maneuvering with 9th Cavalry in support of 3rd Bn, 33rd Regt contact. 1st Bn, 33rd Regt, 5th ACR (-), 3rd Bn, 33rd Regt (B), Recon Co, 33rd Regt at XT 781512 in contact with estimated 100 NVA. CP, 33rd Regiment, 3rd Bn, 33rd (-), 2nd Bn, 33rd at XT 770380.  
16 33rd Regt in contact at XT 781512.  
17 3rd Bn, 33rd Regt in contact at XT 786517. SFC Vargas WIA with 31st Regt medevac required.  
18 1st and 3rd Bns, 33rd Regt in contact at XT 785513. Withdrew to 784500. 1st Bn, 32nd Regt in heavy contact at XT 780530.  
19 2nd Bn, 33rd Regt in contact at XT 778496. 1st Bn, 32nd Regt in contact at XT 786524.  
2nd Bn, 33rd Regt in contact at XT 780503.  
20 1st Bn, 31st Regt inserted PZ XT 768645; LZ XT 700423. 1st Bn, 33rd Regt in contact at XT 786494.  
21 Bunker complex at XT 683664.  
22 3rd Bn, 32nd Regt in contact at XT 743650 with estimated battalion. Civilian refugees attacked by NVA at XT 787520.  
23 Negative activity.  
24 3rd Bn, 33rd Regt in contact at XT 792520. 2nd and 3rd Bns, 33rd Regt in contact at XT 788520. 1st Bn, 31st Regt in contact at XT 758657. 3rd Bn, 32nd Regt in contact at XT 766658.  
3rd Bn, 31st Regt inserted LZ XT 745670. 1LT George WIA with 32nd Regt, medevac not required.  
25 2nd Bn, 32nd Regt in contact at XT 787524. 2nd Bn, 31st Regt in contact at XT 786672.  
2nd Bn, 32nd Regt in contact at XT 794517. 1st and 2nd Bns, 31st Regt in contact at XT 755690.  
1st and 2nd Bns, 31st Regt withdrew south. 3rd Bn, 32nd Regt in contact at XT 788517.  
26 2nd Bn, 32nd Regt in contact at XT 756678. 2nd Bn, 33rd Regt in contact at XT 785510.  
27 2nd Bn, 32nd Regt in contact at XT 786520. 33rd and 32nd Regts link up on east side of QL 13 at XT 787515.  
28 1st Bn, 32nd Regt and 2nd Bn, 33rd Regt linked up at XT 792517. 2nd Bn, 32nd Regt and 3rd Bn, 33rd Regt in contact at XT 786513. 3rd Bn, 31st Regt in contact at XT 763665. Convoy attempted to go through road block. First vehicle (armored car) hit by mine, but convoy moved east under fire and reached Chon Thanh.  
29 2nd Bn, 31st Regt in contact at XT 760665. 1st Bn, 32nd Regt in contact at XT 765515. First convoy goes to Chon Thanh without enemy fire. Road open from Lai Khe to Chon Thanh.  
30 Negative activity.

MAY

1 32nd Regt CP moved to XT 778570.  
2 2nd Bn, 33rd Regt (B) in contact at XT 783480 with company. 3rd Bn, 31st Regt in contact at XT 763667. MAJ Noake WIA with 32nd Regt, medevac required.  
3 2nd Bn, 31st Regt moving north from XT 766682. 3rd Bn, 31st Regt in contact at XT 763671. 2nd Bn, 31st Regt in contact at XT 764672 with estimated company. 3rd Bn, 32nd Regt moving north from XT 769680. 1st Bn, 31st Regt in contact at XT 782679. 33rd Regt CP at XT 790520. 2nd and 3rd Bns, 31st Regt taking heavy incoming fire.

DATE      UNIT AND ACTION

4      1st Bn, 31st Regt and 3rd Bn, 32nd Regt moving north from XT 782675 and XT 769675. Wire guided missile used first time. All elements of 31st Regt and 3rd Bn, 32nd Regt in sporadic contact. BG Hau assumed command of the 21st Division. MG Nghi assumed command of Military Region IV.

5      3rd Bn, 31st Regt in contact at XT 772667. 3rd Bn, 31st Regt in contact at XT 762675. 3rd Bn, 32nd Regt located at XT 785675. 1st Bn, 3rd Bn, and Recon Co, 31st Regt in heavy contact at XT 762675. 31st Regt CP at XT 765653.

6      Road open from Lai Khe to 666 grid line. 31st Regt on the west side of QL 13 conducting supporting attack and 32nd Regt conducting main attack from the east. 31st Regt reached 671 grid line on west. 32nd Regt reached 644 grid line on east.

7      Attack by 31st and 32nd Regts continues. 32nd Regt advanced to XT 773700 and XT 775694. Contact was sporadic for the 1st and 2nd Bns, 31st Regt and 1st and 2nd Bns, 32nd Regt. 32nd Regt has the 2/9th Cav attached.

8      Attack continues. 1st and 2nd Bns, 32nd Regt reach QL 13 at 69 grid line from the east. 3rd Bn, 31st Regt airlifted to XT 776728. 3rd Bn, 31st Regt in contact at XT 776723. 1st Bn, 31st Regt in heavy contact at XT 767673.

9      Truck hit mine at 51 grid line. This was the first incident since road was opened to Chon Thanh. 1st and 2nd Bns, 31st Regt in sporadic contact which remained static at XT 767670. 3rd Bn, 31st Regt maneuvered from 724 to 714 grid line with sporadic contact. 1st and 2nd Bns, 32nd Regt moved to west side of QL 13 between XT 765705 and XT 765685. Enemy force intrenched at 7668.

10     3rd Bn, 31st Regt in sporadic contact at XT 765715. No attempt to maneuver by any unit due to heavy incoming fire on all battalions.

11     Operational control of QL 13 from XT 765680 north assumed by 32nd Regt. 1st and 2nd Bns, 31st Regt in blocking positions at XT 763670 - XT 767675. Attack launched by 1st and 2nd Bns, 32nd Regt and 3rd Bn (B), 32nd Regt from XT 765680. 3d Bn, 32nd Regt had 9th Cav attached. 1st and 2d Bns, 32d Regt attacked across QL 13 from east to west at XT 765680. Both Bns of the 32nd Regt moved back east but the 2nd Bn left its "B" element on the west side of QL 13. "B" element of 2nd Bn, 32nd Regt position overran by estimated battalion. CPT Faldermeyer KIA with 32nd Regt. CPT Olver WIA with 31st Regt, medevac required.

12     32nd Regt now responsible for 31st Regt AO. 31st Regt has responsibility for 32nd Regt AO. 15th Regt, 9th Inf Div, operational control to 21st Div. Assigned 33rd Regt AO. 32nd Regt mission to clear road from 670 to 730 grid line. 2nd Bn, 32nd Regt and 2nd Bn, 9th Cav along with 3rd Bn, 32nd Regt and 1st and 3rd Bns, 9th Cav attacks were launched. 3rd Bn, 32nd Regt controlled 681 grid line, in first line of trenches.

13     33rd Regt operational control to 3rd Airborne Brigade. 2nd and 3rd Bns, 32nd Regt and 9th Cav overran positions at 68 grid line and controlled QL 13 to the 700 grid line. Engineers moved forward to clear road. 160 men for 1st Bn, 33rd Regt airlifted into XT 755750. MAJ Lucas WIA with 32nd Regt, medevac not required.

14     1st Bn (-), 2nd and 3rd Bns, 33rd Regt moved north by truck to XT 765660. Elements then moved overland to XT 765680.

15     1st Bn (-), 2nd Bn, 3rd Bn, and Task Force 9 (1st Bn, 15th Regt and 9th Cav) moved east of QL 13 approximately 1.5 KM from XT 765685 to XT 785728. 2nd Bn, 15th Regt air assaulted to XT 784764.

16     2nd Bn, 15th Regt secured town of Tan Khai. Three 105mm and two 155mm howitzers air lifted to Tan Khai. 3rd Bn, 15th Regt inserted at XT 755805. Recon Co, 15th Regt inserted at XT 732796.

17     1st Bn (-), 2nd Bn, 3rd Bn, and LCP, 33rd Regt closed Tan Khai. 9th Cav still at XT 785730. 2nd and 3rd Bns, 33rd Regt moved west to XT 735765. 3rd Bn and Recon Co, 15th Regt moved north to XT 755820.

18     2nd and 3rd Bns, 32nd Regt in contact at XT 764710 and XT 766710. 2nd and 3rd Bns, 33rd Regt moved to XT 748780. 2nd Bn, 15th Regt moved from Tan Khai and joined 3rd Bn and Recon Co, 15th Regt at XT 755820, then moved to XT 755830. Task Force 9 arrived Tan Khai, then moved to XT 765800.

19     2nd and 3rd Bns, 32nd Regt advanced to XT 765730. 2nd and 3rd Bns, 33rd Regt in contact at XT 735820. Task Force 9, 2nd Bn, 3rd Bn, and Recon Co, 15th Regt in contact at XT 755825.

20     Tan Khai attacked by regiment (-) (reinforced by 3 tanks) from the south, two battalions from the west, and one battalion from the north. 2nd and 3rd Bns, 33rd Regt moved to XT 735820.

1st Bn, 2nd Bn, and Recon Co, 15th Regt attacked by reinforced (10-20 tanks) regiment at XT 755825. 6 tanks destroyed. 2nd Bn and 3rd Bn, 15th Regt moved from XT 755825 to XT 757840. SGT Centrell WIA with 15th Regt, medevac required.

DATE      UNIT AND ACTION

21      1st Bn, 32nd Regt replaced 2nd Bn, 32nd Regt at XT 765720. 1st Bn, 33rd Regt (Tan Khai) attacked by regimental size force from south, southwest, and east. 2nd and 3rd Bns, 33rd Regt in sporadic contact at XT 735820. 2nd and 3rd Bns and Recon Co, 15th Regt attacked in morning. 2nd and 3rd Bns and Recon Co, 15th Regt moved to XT 750850. Secured LZ and received 8 slick loads of resupply. 32nd Regt negative progress. CPT Tiberi WIA with 15th Regt, medevac required.

22      1st Bn, 31st Regt airlift to XT 782762 and moved to XT 767760. 32nd Regt negative progress. 1st Bn, 33rd Regt (Tan Khai) attacked by 200 NVA from west. 2nd and 3rd Bns, 33rd Regt 15th Regt, and 9th Cav in contact all day. 15th Regt at XT 750850. 33rd Regt and 9th Cav at 735820. Two C-130 drops to 15th and 33rd Regts. These were first air drops.

23      15th Regt CP at XT 750850 attacked by two battalions with tanks. Three tanks destroyed by Spectre. 2nd and 3rd Bns, 15th Regt in contact at XT 750842. Four slicks into Tan Khai with resupply.

24      15th Regt attacked at XT 750845. 2nd and 3rd Bns, 33rd Regt and 9th Cav attacked at XT 735820. Two US wounded, PZ at XT 755844. Cobra shot down by SA-7 in medevac attempt. 9th Cav moved to Tan Khai during night. 32nd Regt attempted to move north from XT 765720 with tanks. Attempt was unsuccessful. 2nd and 3rd Bns, 33rd Regt moved south to XT 760785. SGT Cantrell and CPT Tiberi WIA with 15th Regt, medevac required. MAJ Lucas WIA with 32nd Regt, medevac not required. SFC Farley WIA with 21st Div, medevac not required.

25      1st and 3rd Bns, 32nd Regt moved north to XT 765722 under heavy indirect fire. 3rd Bn, 33rd Regt moved north and linked up with the 2nd Bn, 33rd Regt at XT 760785. 33rd Regt CP airlifted to Tan Khai. 201 WIA extracted from Tan Khai: 15th Regt in sporadic contact at XT 750845. MAJ Lucas WIA with 32nd Regt, medevac required. 22 slicks resupplied and inserted 33rd Regiment at Tan Khai.

26      1st Bn, 15th Regt in heavy contact at XT 750819. 2nd and 3rd Bns, 15th Regt in contact at XT 750845.

27      2nd Bn, 33rd Regt in sporadic contact at XT 760814. 15th Regt in sporadic contact at XT 750845. 32nd Regt negative progress. SGT Sodowski WIA with 33rd Regt, medevac required.

28      3rd Bn, 33rd Regt moved into Tan Khai. 1st Bn, 33rd Regt moved from Tan Khai to XT 760805. 2nd Bn, 33rd Regt and 1st Bn, 15th Regt relocated at XT 760814. 32nd Regt negative progress at XT 765715.

29      1st Bn and 2nd Bn, 15th Regt began to move south from XT 760814. Movement stopped at XT 760798. 1st Bn, 15th Regt moved south with 2nd Bn, 33rd Regt. 32nd Regt negative progress. MAJ Phuc, 3rd Bn, 32nd Regt WIA, medevac required.

30      33rd Regt massed at XT 767780 and moved to XT 764810. 1st Bn, Recon Co, and 1 Co, 2nd Bn, 15th Regt moved to Tan Khai to secure artillery. COL Biet relieved of command of the 32nd Regt. LTC Cu assumed command of 32nd Regt.

31      33rd Regt moved to XT 767785. 2nd Bn, 32nd Regt located a commo complex at XT 755715 and destroyed it. Indirect fire in 32nd Regt AO decreased. MAJ Mandeville WIA with 15th Regt, medevac not required.

JUNE

1      33rd Regt moved north to XT 768808. 15th Regt (-) conducted patrols vicinity XT 750845. 3rd Bn and 2nd Bn (-), 15th Regt down to 239 effective troops. MAJ Buu assumes command of 3rd Bn, 32nd Regt.

2      15th Regt (-) in sporadic contact at XT 750845 trying to recover bundles from C-130 drops. 4 hooks and 4 slicks went into Tan Khai.

3      2nd Bn, 33rd Regt in contact at XT 768806.

4      33rd Regt maneuvered to XT 770810. 6th Airborne Bn attached to 21st Div and inserted at XT 753795, then moved north to XT 753805. 15th Regt conducted patrols at XT 750845.

5      1st Bn, 31st Regt moved from Tan Khai to XY 768790. 33rd Regt maneuvered north to XT 770824. 15th Regt (-) conducted patrols vicinity XT 750845.

6      33rd Regt in contact during the morning at XT 770824, then moved north to XT 770837. 6th Airborne Bn (with 300 replacements) arrived at XT 760845. 300 replacements sent to 15th Regt.

7      3rd Bn, 31st Regt blocking force at XT 767745. 31st Regt CP relocated at XT 766690. 33d Regt secured PZ at XT 762837. 5 slicks in and out with medevac.

8      31st Regt LCP to Tan Khai. Medevac to 15th Regt (-) at XT 760842, 149 WIA were extracted. 6th ABN Bn linked up with 8th ABN Bn (An Loc) at XT 759868 and XT 756866. MAJ Henderson WIA with 32nd Regt, medevac not required. LTC Johnson WIA with 15th Regt, medevac required. MAJ Mandeville and SSG Futrell WIA with 15th Regt, medevac not required.

9      1st Bn, 31st Regt and 9th Cav conducted sweep of QL 13 from Tan Khai to XT 762810. Medevac slicks extracted WIA from 15th Regt (-), 33rd Regt An Loc, 6th ABN Bn, at XT 762842. This was the first WIA extraction for An Loc since seige commenced. Lai Khe had sapper attack. MAJ My WIA with 1st Bn, 31st Regt, medevac required.

<u>DATE</u>	<u>UNIT AND ACTION</u>
10	1st Bn, 33rd Regt in contact at XT 763845. CPT Lynch KIA with 15th Regt.
11	1st Bn, 31st Regt in contact (40 NVA) at XT 764787.
12	32nd Regt attacked north to XT 765712. 10,000 refugees left An Loc and reached XT 766680 traveling on QL 13.
13	1st Bn, 31st Regt in contact at XT 765800. 2nd Bn, 31st Regt (-) air assaulted to XT 757865 under the operational control of the 5th Div. Advisors pulled out of the 32nd Regt. 2nd Bn, 15th Regt (-) maneuvered to XT 745845, encountered sporadic contact.
14	One Co, 2nd Bn, 31st Regt air assaulted to XT 757865. 1st and 3rd Bns, 33rd Regt in contact at XT 765840. 15th Regt (-) operational control to 5th Div. 1st Bn, 15th Regt at Tan Khai still operational control to 21st Div.
15	1st Bn, 31st Regt attacked from north, west and east at XT 765800 by a battalion size force. 32nd advisors return to 32nd Regt. 33rd Regt maneuvered to XT 764838.
16	1st Bn, 31st Regt in contact at XT 762798. 33rd Regt moved to XT 764836.
17	1st Bn, 31st Regt in contact at XT 766802. 3rd Bn, 33rd Regt maneuvered to XT 765732. 32nd Regt attacked north to XT 765716. 33rd Regt maneuvered to XT 763821 and XT 767825 encountering sporadic contact.
18	1st Bn, 31st Regt in contact at XT 765800. 3rd Bn, 31st Regt in contact at XT 764726. 33rd Regt maneuvered on east of QL 13 to XT 768825. 1st ABN BDE operational control to 21st Div and maneuvered from An Loc to XT 765798. MAJ Buu, KIA with 3rd Bn, 32nd Regt.
19	5th and 6th ABN Bns in contact at XT 765796. CP of 1st ABN BDE located at XT 770782, 5th Bn at XT 767783, 6th Bn at XT 767790, and 8th Bn at XT 770782. LTC Willey KIA with 32nd Regt.
20	3rd Bn, 32nd Regt moved to Lai Khe. 1st ABN BDE moved to XT 765765 where 120 WIA were extracted. Further extraction for ABN units cancelled due to intense anti-aircraft fire.
21	46th Regt replaced the 32nd Regt. 32nd Regt returned to Lai Khe and operational control of the 25th Div. 3rd Bn, 33rd Regt in heavy contact at XT 764825. 1st ABN BDE extraction from Tan Khai completed. LTC Butler KIA with 31st Regt.
22	1st Bn, 31st Regt in contact at XT 770779. 3rd Bn, 31st Regt moved to XT 784764 to locate bodies from downed cobra.
23	31st Regt CP under sapper attack at Tan Khai, XT 764753. 32nd Regt CP located at XT 529037. 33rd Regt in contact at XT 760804.
24	1st Bn, 31st Regt in contact at XT 775792. 33rd Regt in light contact at XT 761831 and XT 763833 by estimated 100-150 NVA.
25	1st Bn, 31st Regt in contact at XT 770797. 33rd Regt in contact at XT 761821 and XT 766826.

7-7-4

Annex I (III Corps Ranger Command) to After-Action Report, Binh Long Campaign.

1. PURPOSE: The purpose of this annex is to outline the III Corps Ranger Command's activities in Military Region III with primary emphasis on Binh Long Province during the period 8 April through 25 June 1972.

2. DISCUSSION:

a. 3d Ranger Group

(1) The 3d Ranger Group Advisory Team was inserted into An Loc at approximately 1130 hours, 8 April 1972, where it joined the 3d Ranger Group at its CP location. The Group was attached to 5th ARVN Division and engaged in the defense of Binh Long Province. Some initial difficulty was expected in establishing a good working relationship with the headquarters since the previous team had been ordered to leave by the Senior Advisor, 5th Division and had not had the opportunity to explain its departure to the Group Commander. A good rapport was quickly established, largely because the advisors were able to provide a great deal of US aerial fire support which assisted the group in defensive operations. It must be noted that the Ranger Group was ordered to An Loc in an "airmobile light" configuration, without mortars, heavy machine guns or recoilless rifles, which in later combat proved to be a serious weakness for defensive operations. Troop dispositions on the 8th of April are shown at Figures I-1 and I-2. The 31st Battalion's position east of town and the 52d Battalion's two companies reinforcing the RF position on Hill 169, guarded three of the natural approaches to the town and were well planned. Unfortunately, the Advisors were not given the opportunity to visit any of these positions. At this time the 52d Battalion had no troops, as two of its companies were attached to Province on Hill 169, and the remaining companies were attached to 31st Battalion to man the eastern perimeter.

(2) The period 8-12 April was characterized by sporadic but increasing enemy indirect fire, mostly mortars and rockets. Enemy ground to air fire increased during this period so that helicopter transportation to and from the town became impossible. The 31st Battalion positions north of the town received small probes during this period, and 36th Battalion had several small contacts with enemy units moving on the east.

(3) The period 13-18 April encompassed the first attack on the city itself, it later being reported that the attack was conducted by the 5th VC Division. The attack began with pre-arranged fires, including artillery, and was led by tanks. The enemy succeeded in rolling up the northern part of the city with tanks with a new line being established roughly along Highway 303. The 31st Battalion's northern positions became untenable and the companies rejoined their parent unit being deployed along Highway 303. The group destroyed several tanks with LAWs but an accurate count is clouded because of multiple reporting. During this period the 36th Battalion was ordered to leave its position to the east and deploy along the new defense line along Highway 303. This move was accomplished with US TAC Air support. One company of the 52d Battalion returned to Group control from Province Control (Hill 169) during this period, and the 52d Battalion was reconstituted with its two companies from 31st Battalion and the company from Hill 169. Troop dispositions of 18 April are shown at Figures I-3 and I-4.

(4) The period 19 April - 9 May was characterized by heavy indirect fire bombardments, extremely heavy anti-aircraft fire, and limited NVA ground attacks. The enemy's tactics at this point were evidently to besiege the An Loc garrison until it starved or became so weakened from incoming fires that it would surrender or break. US Tactical airpower destroyed many tanks outside the perimeter (including some in the northeastern quadrant of the city), stopped several attacks, destroyed several enemy troop formations, and was employed against anti-aircraft weapons. Resupply was effected by air-drop, but many problems resulted because the 5th ARVN Division had no supply distribution system. Distribution was accomplished by the inherent scattering of paratroop. The remaining company of 52d Battalion was returned to Group control from Hill 169 during this period. The Group CP received a direct hit from a 122mm rocket on 21 April, destroying the command bunker and wounding or killing much of the CP Group. The Group CO and Senior Advisor were lightly wounded. The CP was moved, as shown at Figure I-5, into a house with a bunker built into it. CPT Moffett was lightly wounded by a mortar fragment shortly after the moving of the CP.

(5) The period 10-14 May encompassed the second major attack on An Loc. The attack was begun with an indirect fire bombardment which started approximately 1800 hours on the 10th,

mostly 105mm howitzer fire. During the night the fire increased in tempo and numbers of weapons employed to an almost unbelievable rate. Every type and caliber of enemy weapons was employed, including 60mm, 82mm, and 82mm mortar, 105mm artillery, 107mm and 122mm rockets and recoilless rifles. The attack was repulsed, although the enemy succeeded in driving a salient into 52d Battalion's position which the group was unable to reduce. The 52d Battalion's positions were penetrated by the VC with little resistance from the 52d Battalion which withdrew and broke contact without firing their rifles or machine guns. The 52d Battalion reorganized into two companies after this attack to improve organization. Aside from the 52d Battalion area, the bulk of the attack was born by elements in the south and west of the city. The B52 strikes conducted near the city during this period had an immediate effect in reducing incoming mortar and anti-aircraft fire to almost nothing until the enemy brought in new guns and crews.

(6) The period 15-20 May was characterized by sporadic and diminishing indirect fire and almost no sightings of enemy. Several tanks were spotted, but it is uncertain if they were left over from the preceding attack or if they were new arrivals. No significant attacks were made, much of the enemy's attention and effort apparently was diverted to the relief column approaching from the south. Figure I-5 shows dispositions on 15 May 1972. The Group Senior Advisor was extracted on 20 May, on order of the Senior Advisor, 5th ARVN Division, with the concurrence of the Senior Advisor, III Corps Ranger Command, for rest and medical attention.

(7) During the time period of 31 May through 25 June, the 3d Ranger Group participated in two major operations while at An Loc. The first operation from 31 May through 13 June was a search and clear operation to secure the northeast portion of the city, while the second operation from 15 June through 25 June was designed to clear an area of operations six to eight kilometers northeast and east of the city.

(8) From 31 May to 13 June, the 3d Ranger Group's perimeter received very light to moderate incoming fire, most of which was 105mm howitzer fire from the northwest. All three Ranger Battalions had begun to aggressively patrol and search on a house to house, block to block basis to clear the northeastern sector of An Loc for any remaining NVA, stored ammunition, or weapons. Numerous small contacts resulted each day, however, these contacts always resulted in favor of the Rangers. Numerous weapons were captured along with amounts of B-40, 75RR, 82mm, and 61mm rounds. By 13 June the 36th Battalion cleared the forward northern block and had reached the air-strip to the north of the city. A South Vietnamese flag was ceremoniously planted on Hill 100 just to the east of the airstrip.

(9) From 15 June to 25 June the 3d Ranger Group was assigned an area of operations northeast of the city. Total strength was approximately 529 personnel for this phase. The initial plan called for leaving one battalion to secure the portion of the An Loc perimeter that the group was responsible for and putting two battalions into field locations so that they could conduct extensive search and clear operations that would eventually clear their assigned AO (see Figure I-6). The 31st Battalion stayed in the city itself furnishing the required perimeter security while the 52d Battalion and the 36th Battalion moved north and northeast respectively to field locations. Good initial progress was reported by both field battalions, however, on the 20th of June all forward progress in their areas of operations halted. There were several reasons for this however, the main one is that the NVA were dug in very deeply in well constructed, camouflaged bunkers. An air strike had to score a direct hit on these bunkers in order to destroy any one of them. By 26 June both battalions had only reached OBJECTIVE 1 in their respective AO's (see Figure I-6).

(10) Senior Advisor's Evaluation.

(a) Ranger Group Tactics

1 Initially there was a deep-seated reluctance to engage the enemy in 3d Ranger Group, even when the group strength was high and the troops occupied prepared defensive positions. This characteristic can be related most directly to the lack of personal leadership. This comment is not universally true as acts of bravery and willingness to stand and fight did occur but the initial overall tendency was to avoid hard contact with the enemy.

2 Withdrawals: The 36th Battalion's withdrawal from the east into town was well planned, executed, and coordinated. The withdrawal of the 31st Battalion's two companies was complicated by the mixture of NVA and 8th ARVN Regiment occurring behind them, as well as by the rapid withdrawal of the 8th Regiment. Additionally no clear statement of the withdrawal was ever obtained by the advisors. The 52nd Battalion's withdrawals from Hill 169 were relatively without inci-

dent for the unit since the first was accomplished without contact and the second under cover of the 3d Airborne Brigade. The 52d Battalion's withdrawal from defensive positions south of Highway 303 during the development of the salient was uncontrolled, without order, and it was reported to the advisors by the Group Staff that the troops "fell back" without using their weapons, covering their withdrawal with hand grenades.

3 Coordination: Although the Group's right and left flank units did "tie-in" with adjacent units, little coordination was effected for such things as mutually supporting fires, avenues of approach and exchange of intelligence. This lack of coordination not only doubles the unit's work, but could potentially create serious problems.

4 Planning: The order causing the 3d Group to deploy to An Loc without heavy weapons is a good illustration of poor thinking through of operational plans. The presence of heavy weapons would have made a marked difference in the Group's defensive ability.

5 Clearing the City: Basically all three battalions appeared to be using sound tactics to clear their assigned blocks of the city. Small teams of 2 to 6 troops were organized with maximum firepower consisting of M16's, M79's, LAW's and hand grenades. One 2 man team would set up security outside the house, one 2 man team would search it, and the third 2 man team would cover the search team. In support of these 6 man clearing teams would be a 60mm mortar closely covering any enemy moving from the area. It was a slow process, but valuable experience was gained by all those who participated in this type of clearing operation. It was during this phase of the operation that morale rose significantly, for the Rangers realized that the NVA were trapped and merely to make contact with them was enough to beat them. This was not to be the case, however, during Phase II which began on 15 June.

6 Clearing Objectives in Assigned Areas of Operation: The 3d Ranger Group received the mission to move two of its three Ranger Battalions out to the field locations away from the An Loc perimeter. This is not what was done in reality. The 52d Battalion and the 36th Battalion split the Ranger Group's AO as shown in Figure I-6. The 36th Battalion kept the same CP location and moved two companies out to man a defensive perimeter just east of the CP. These companies were to be there for 48 hours and then rotate with the two companies who were placed in the field Northeast of that defensive perimeter. So in effect the 36th Battalion had only two understrength companies actually out in its assigned AO at any one time conducting operations. These two companies were employed side by side, each trying to secure different objective. The results of using such a tactical setup were not satisfactory for after the initial 48 hours progress came to a halt. Surprisingly the 52d Battalion used exactly the same tactics for their AO except that the battalion CP was secured by two companies. Instead of having two Ranger Battalions in the field locations conducting battalion operations to secure objectives the force was a mere four understrength rifle companies each with a mission of securing different objectives. When these understrength companies made contact with NVA in well prepared bunkers they simply stopped in their tracks and waited until US Air support could soften up the area. On several occasions because air was not available the troops simply refused to move forward.

7 Detection of Enemy Artillery Positions: Personnel on the ground could hear plainly the muzzle report of enemy artillery and could determine a "sound azimuth" quite accurately. If a table or chart could be provided that would give rangings based on muzzle report to impact times, a reasonably accurate polar coordinate could be derived from azimuth and range which could serve as a minimum, as a center of search. The detection of enemy artillery positions should be given high priority since it was probably the biggest single killer at An Loc.

(b) US Tactical Air Support: The continuous presence of US Tactical Air support made the defense of An Loc possible; without it the garrison would have fallen during the first attack. The bravery and constant presence of the Forward Air Controllers was commendable. This group of men made significant contribution and sacrifice to the battle for An Loc. Serious consideration should be given to award of the Presidential Unit Citation to the FAC unit. Particularly effective in support of 3d Group were the A-37's carrying "soft" ordinance, such as CBU-49 which pinned down the enemy while other fires could be brought to bear; napalm which gets into hardened enemy positions and mark 47 (WP) bombs which are nearly effective as napalm, which can be brought very close to friendly positions, and which mask the enemy's observation extremely well for 20-30 minutes after use. B52 strikes were very effective in destroying formations, and, as noted above, when employed close to An Loc virtually eliminated mortar and anti-aircraft fires until the enemy moved up replacements. The Ranger Group became too reliant on TAC Air as they began pushing out from the city. The problem is that on numerous occasions TAC Air was requested for suspected enemy locations when none of our elements were actually in contact. They wanted to use TAC Air

as a prep for an area in which they had no firm intelligence that the enemy was there. With a lessened priority of air the units would stop if no air was available. In some instances targets were greater than 1000m from their positions. It was suggested on numerous occasions, by the advisors, that perhaps if requested, Division could prep and support with the 4.2 mortars. The advisors were told that Division would not use their 4.2 mortars to support operation, and the subject was subsequently dropped. Their growing reliance on TAC Air has tended to cloud the other options open to them. Spectre (AC130) gunships were very effective in the town, particularly when equipped with 105mm guns which destroyed bunkers and hard positions as well as tanks. The provision of transponders would have enabled Spectre to be more effective, since these items enable the ships to fire even when they cannot see the ground, which frequently occurred. The Spectre ships themselves frequently asked the advisors to use beacons if they had them to assist them in firing. One problem encountered by the advisors in the use of Tactical Air is the "over concern" of FACs for safety limits. If the ground commander is willing to accept the risks and desires the ordnance placed on a certain target, it should be placed there. The 3d Group adjusted 500 pound bombs (Mark 82) within 70 meters of warned, protected troops without incident, considerably closer than established minimum safe distances allow, and with excellent effect against the enemy. The ground commander must have the freedom to place supporting fires where he wants them.

(c) US Helicopter Gunship Support: The heavy anti-aircraft fire made Cobra support useless. One attempt at employing the Cobras at 6000 feet nearly ended in disaster as the rockets they fired scattered badly off target and very nearly into friendly troops 200 meters away. The Cobras were effective when employed at normal altitudes without ground fire, but heavy ground fire drove them from the scene.

(d) Helicopter DX Missions: Although all the DX missions were successful, a pattern was noted. All DX missions utilize the same VIP helipad in the southeast part of the city. This particular helipad is plagued daily by a stream of ARVN/Civilian whose main goal is to board the helicopters when they arrive. This causes mild out breaks ranging from controlled panic to sheer chaos on the helipad during insertions and extractions. Although tight security is maintained on exact times for these missions, arrival of US personnel at the helipad indicates a mission is close at hand, and people begin to congregate near the helipad. This can be observed by the enemy and gives him additional time to prepare. Varying the LZ or feinting a landing at the VIP Pad and at the last minute touching down somewhere else in the city may preclude some of the hazzle on the LZ, and also confuse the enemy as to the true landing zone. Another pattern noted was that the Cobra's circle over the LZ, in a tight pattern. A wider circle over the city might preclude revealing the specific LZ being used within the city. These missions inevitably drew enemy artillery fire. Although the guns have been difficult to locate, the general area that they fire from is known. During these missions, the FAC's should fly over the suspected artillery areas and thereby lessen the amount of artillery fire received. In the past enemy artillery has ceased firing when a FAC was overhead in order to avoid detection.

(e) VNAF Support:

1. Tactical Air: ALE support was truly outstanding in that the pilots delivered their ordnance "on target" despite ground fire and bad weather. Advisory opinion was that VNAF ALE support was the equal of US TAC Air..

2. Helicopter: The helicopter support necessary to medically evacuate the wounded from the 3d Ranger Group was totally unsatisfactory. On all occasions the ships refused to land inside the An Loc perimeter at a predesignated agreed upon PZ to get the serious wounded. This necessitated moving seriously wounded over 800 meters south outside of the perimeter in order to have VNAF land to pick them up. This placed the wounded in a very dangerous location since the NVA artillery could easily adjust to meet the helicopter touchdown.

(f) Leadership: This necessary quality continues to plague the 3d Ranger Group. The CO, XO and S3 of the Group simply did not do enough to pull the Group through the difficult situation at An Loc. The CO of the 3d Ranger Group, Trung-Ta Biet displayed very little personal leadership in an effort to motivate his troops. This condition still existed after the level of incoming became relatively light and the threat of any type of ground attack was virtually gone. This same lack of personal leadership was witnessed in the 52d Battalion. Thieu-Ta Dau had collocated his CP with the Group CO and had left the battalion to the direction of his XO. The Battalion XO did what he could to get the 52d troops active in clearing some of the northern blocks of the city and was fairly successful in getting them to patrol away from their defensive positions.

When the 52d Battalion received the mission to move up to Hill 100 just east of the An Loc airstrip, Thieu-Ta Dau again turned the battalion over to his XC and told him to get them secured away in the AC. Thieu-Ta Dau, however, did not join his battalion on the 15th of June but waited until 18 June. There was no excuse for such a gross lack of leadership on the part of this Battalion Commander. He should have been relieved in order to prevent further damage to the unit.

(g) Aerial Resupply: There were 2 methods of air drop observed, the high velocity drop and high drop, low open. The high velocity drop using 2 small parachutes was extremely accurate, due to its vertical descent with relatively no drift, when released over specified drop zone. On a few occasions the loads were released late, in which case landed in and around the 3d Ranger Group area. The normal flight pattern was from southwest - northeast. The free-fall/low-opening drops were extremely inaccurate. There were numerous malfunctions and chutes were observed deploying anywhere from 8000 ft to 10 ft, or not at all. The high openers were at the mercy of the air currents which on numerous occasions carried the loads some distance from the DZ and the city. Many times drops were made during hours of darkness (0600 hrs), which proved to be a safety hazard to friendly troops on the ground. During these drops there was little or no prior warning and loads that missed the DZ did cause some friendly casualties. Usually the casualties were caused from bundles that streaked or disintegrated in the air. Supply distribution improved once the USAF started dropping the loads in the vicinity of the soccer field. It then could be distributed by the 5th ARVN Division on a priority basis. However, when loads landed on the northern, western or eastern extremes of the city there was no distribution system in effect, except on a "shoot and grab" basis by the troops involved. The Vietnamese troops actually shot at the area around supply bundles to keep other troops away. The responsible command must provide sufficient control to collect all incoming supplies and issue them on a priority of need basis.

(h) NVA Tactics:

1 Use of Tanks: They consistently failed to maximize their advantage over defending forces in tanks, never realizing a coordinated tank-infantry assault. Monitored radio transmissions and ground observation indicate the NVA plans were for tanks and infantry to leave assembly areas simultaneously and to meet at a predetermined point (attack position) just short of the assault line. The superior speed of the tanks placed them at the rendezvous point several hours before the infantry. There they were detected and destroyed prior to the arrival of other attacking elements. The tank action which captured the north part of town on 13-14 April was conducted with nearly no NVA infantry support, and for that reason alone was stopped. Had infantry been with the tanks that attack would probably have been successful. Additionally, the NVA tank crew did not appear to have been well trained in assault procedures. For instance, they did not assault rapidly all guns firing, but with slow, stop and start moves and relatively little shooting, not taking advantage of the "shock action" inherent in armor. The crews also were readily disoriented in town as if not well briefed; frequently seemed to be without organized direction; and were easily stopped by determined resistance from troops firing LAWs from concealed positions. It was reported that the crew were drugged and that crew compartments were littered with "pills" but there is no first hand report available from US advisors.

2 Use of Artillery: NVA employment of artillery was from relatively short range and appeared to be controlled by forward observers (i.e. the fire was adjusted onto a target which was then given a fire for effect of 3-10 rounds). Artillery was employed mostly on interior targets (CPs, the resupply drop zone and buildings) while mortars were used on the perimeter. The artillery would usually fire 2-3 rounds using superquick fusing, followed by 1-2 rounds of delay fusing. The delay fuse on 105/155mm artillery was devastating against bunkers and dug-in positions, although it must hit the bunker directly since the rounds effects are quite confined in delay fusing.

3 Areas of Enemy Activities: At Figure I-7 are some particular areas of NVA activity noted as to type.

(i) For further details pertaining to the An Loc Battles, see Annexes D, E, H, J and K.

b. 5th Ranger Group

(1) During the period 5-7 May the 5th Ranger Group continued to assemble its stragglers at Phu Bai in preparation for return to III Corps. On 7 May the Group was airlifted from Phu Bai to Tan Son Nhut and moved by truck to Cu Chi. Personnel who returned to Cu Chi consisted of the following (see Appendix 1):

OFFICERS	NCO	EM
69	117	825
		TOTAL
		1011

(2) On return to Cu Chi personnel were authorized leave through 15 May. Significant activities after return to Cu Chi consisted of receipt of some equipment to partially replace that lost at Quang Tri, reception of 429 filler personnel, and limited specialist training in medical and signal subjects conducted by 5th Group Headquarters.

(3) Range training was requested by the group in coordination with 25th Infantry Division for the period 20-27 May and Ranger High Command developed the retraining plan for 5th Group. CO, 5th Group requested a one to two month retraining period at Duc My, but his request was denied. The 5th Group then received orders to deploy to Phuoc Tuy Province to conduct operations under the operational control of the 18th ARVN Division on 24 May 72.

(4) Significant problem areas at this time include personnel shortages, due largely to the number of missing still carried as assigned (416 total) and a high AWOL rate (295 total); the lack of initiative in locally developing a comprehensive and stringent retraining program including squad, platoon, and company tactical training; and critical shortages of certain items of equipment, particularly weapons and communications. These shortages include: 300 M16 rifles, 39 M60 machine guns, 136 M79 grenade launchers, 4 82mm and 10 60mm mortars, 6 57mm and 4 90mm recoilless rifles, 3 AN/GRC 74, 1 CRG 106, 83 AN/FRC 25 radios, and 10 RC 292 antennas. An additional problem has been that the lack of firm guidance and direction by JGS in not prescribing a time goal for retaining and future employment for 5th Ranger Group which had a negative effect on the group's leadership.

(5) Personnel status as of 19 May 1972:

Unit	Authorized			Assigned			Pres for Duty					
	Off	NCO	EM	Total	Off	NCO	EM	Total	Off	NCO	EM	Total
HQ	17	51	56	124	19	48	66	133	18	7	13	28
Engr	6	16	100	122	6	12	78	96	3	7	25	35
Trans	6	23	95	124	6	22	93	121	4	12	48	64
Recon	9	25	77	111	5	22	132	159	3	10	79	92
30th Bn	31	90	562	683	27	94	486	607	14	57	238	309
33d Bn	31	90	562	683	31	80	412	523	21	53	226	300
38th Bn	31	90	562	683	37	96	459	592	20	57	217	287
Total	131	385	2014	2530	131	374	1726	2231	73	196	846	1115

(6) From 24 May to 4 June the 5th Ranger Group conducted local security operations in Phuoc Tuy Province and familiarized themselves with the new area of operations. The following paragraphs summarize the troop status and results of the 5th Ranger Group's operations in Phuoc Tuy Province.

(a) Troop strengths as of 2 June 72:

PRESENT FOR OPERATIONS IN THE FIELD

HO	58
Recon Co	100
Engineer Co	35
Trans Co	50
30th Bn	345
33d Bn	338
<u>38th Bn</u>	<u>329</u>
Total	1265

(b) Friendly-Enemy Results

<u>FRIENDLY</u>			<u>ENEMY</u>		
<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>WPNs MIA</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>CIA</u>	<u>WPNs CIA</u>
30 Bn 05	71	0	17	0	8 AK47 1 61mm Mortar 20 VC claymore
33 Bn 04	07	0	18	03	8 AK47 3 B40 1 B41 1 M79 50 sand bags
38 Bn 16	67	5 M16 1 M79	56	0	8 AK47

(7) The operations for the period 4-12 June can be broken into two phases. In the first phase the Group's primary mission was to secure the town of Dat Do. This period commenced on 4 June, when the 5th Group's sector of town was secured by the 33d Battalion and RECON Company and ended on 8 June. Company size operations took place around the three major 5th Group locations: Dat Do, Nui Dat, and Long Kien. No major contacts took place. On 8 June, the Group CP moved from Nui Dat to a fire base (YS 428608) north of Long Dien. At this time the 48th Regiment and 18th Division CP moved back to the Cu Chi area, and a light CP remained behind with Colonel Long of the 18th Division in charge of the 18th Division in charge of province and 5th Ranger Group. The 5th Group thus became the only regular force unit in the Province. The Group was situated as follows: 5th Group CP and 30th Bn north of Long Dien, 38th Bn at Nui Dat, and 33d Bn and RECON Co at Dat Do. From 18 June to 11 June 1972, the Group conducted a six company reconnaissance in force operation to Hill 51 (YS 504672) and vicinity. Two small contacts were made with squad sized enemy forces with negative results. The operation lasted to 12 June when all elements returned to their base areas. Results: Small enemy forces were contacted, but no major troop concentrations were located.

(8) Extensive use was made of artillery during the period, and it was very responsive and accurate. As for TAC Air, only three sorties were available to support 5th Group's operations. Preplanned requests were not filled because the priority for air support was to Xuyen Moc District which had several sizeable contacts.

(9) Results for the period 4-12 June are as follows:

<u>FRIENDLY</u>		<u>ENEMY</u>		
<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>CIA</u>	<u>WPNs</u>
30th Bn	0	0	0	0
33d Bn	0	0	12*	3
38th Bn	0	0	0	0
RECON	0	0	0	0

\* Denotes TAC Air

(10) Foxhole strength as of 12 June 1972 is as follows:

Group Headquarters	57
RECON Company	115
Engineer Company	34
Transportation Company	50
30th Battalion	398
33d Battalion	397
38th Battalion	423

(11) During the period 14-30 June 1972, operations continued in Phoc Tuy Province under the control of Province Headquarters until 27 June, when the Group moves to Lai Khe to begin operations under the control of the 18th Division.

(12) Company sized recon in force operations were conducted from Nui Dat and Dat Do with only light and scattered contacts during the period 13-14 June. On 15 June, while the 38th Battalion continued recon in force operations east of Suoi Nghe, the 30th and 33d Battalions began

a major operation east of Dat Do to clear Highway 23 to Nui Nhon. Upon completion of the operation, Phuoc Tuy Province planned to reestablish a fire base for support of Xuyen Moc District. The 33d Battalion made only light contact and located numerous vacated bunkers which were seeded with CS powder to deny them to the enemy. The 30th Battalion, however, located an estimated enemy battalion north of Highway 23 which it remained in contact from 15-18 June. Largely through the application of US Tactical Air and helicopter gunship support, 30th Battalion succeeded in capturing the enemy's positions, resulting in the destruction of 52 enemy soldiers by Vietnamese body count. On 18 June Nui Nhon was secured and road security was established for movement of the artillery. Province failed to establish the fire base promptly, however, and during the period 21-25 June two Ranger battalions remained committed to company sized operations to provide security for Nui Nhon and Highway 23.

(13) As the 30th Battalions were probed by enemy forces attempting to cut Highway 23 from the north and south, 38th Battalion continued operations north of Nui Dat to relieve pressure on Suoi Nghe which was defended by Regional Forces. Contacts were exploited heavily with air strikes and an operation was launched 23 June at Province direction to permit withdrawal of two artillery pieces from Suoi Nghe. The operation lasted two days, but after the area along the road to Suoi Nghe was cleared, the Province Chief elected not to reposition the artillery. This action was characteristic of the period as the province Chief did not clearly identify and pursue tangible objectives. Along Highway 23 delays in moving the artillery permitted the enemy to regain the initiative after 5th Ranger Group's initial thrust had thrown him off balance. Air support, however, continued to be used effectively, with a document captured by Province on 26 June indicating that 47 enemy soldiers were killed by an air strike in support of a single company's contact South of Highway 23. (Since unconfirmed, these kills are not included in the totals indicated in paragraph (15), below.)

(14) On 26 June, 33d Ranger Battalion was moved by truck to Lai Khe as the 5th-Group began leaving Phuoc Tuy Province to operate along Highway 13 toward An Loc. One battalion from the 18th Division's 52d Regiment came under the operational control of 5th Group for one day until forces could be readjusted. On 27 June, 52d Regiment assumed control of the AO, and 30th Battalion and Group Headquarters moved to Lai Khe to join 33d Battalion. The 38th Battalion remained at Nue Dat conducting company size operations until 28 June, when it also moved to Lai Khe. On 29 June 5th Ranger Group moved north to Chon Thanh and 33d Battalion replaced a battalion of the 46th Regiment which had been in contact with the enemy east of Highway 13. The 30th Battalion was located with Group Headquarters at Chon Thanh, while 38th Battalion remained at Lai Khe for one additional day. The 29th and 30th of June were marked by probing actions by the 33d Ranger Battalion to locate the enemy and assess the terrain and situation. Recon Company conducted operations to locate enemy indirect fire positions west of 46th Regiment, which was in contact along the western side of Highway 13.

(15) Total results for the period 14-30 June:

FRIENDLY		ENEMY		WEAPONS
KIA	WIA	KIA	CIA	
26	113	87	3 VC suspects	1 82mm tube 1 61mm mortar 4 B40 20 AK47 1 Carbine

(16) For further detail pertaining to operations in Phuoc Tuy Province, see Annexes E and J.

c. Senior Advisor's Evaluation:

(1) The III Corps Ranger Command Assistance Team experienced extreme personnel turbulence during the three month period of the Binh Long Campaign. Due to the necessity to maintain the Ranger Group Advisory Teams at full capability, utilizing in-house resources, created a "musical chairs" situation within the team.

(2) At the onset of the NVA offensive, the composition of the advisory team was as shown at Appendix 9. Even at that time, the headquarters element was split due to a requirement to

man a forward CP at Tay Ninh, consisting of the Operations/Intelligence Advisor, Major Scotnicki, and the Assistant G-2 Advisor, Captain Riccinto.

(3) The 5th and 6th Ranger Groups were airlifted to Quang Tri, I Corps, on 4 and 5 April, and on 6 April, the 3rd Ranger Group moved into the city of An Loc.

(4) The advisors to the 3rd Ranger Group were ordered to evacuate An Loc on 7 April, without informing their counterpart. A subsequent reversal of this decision required replacing the original advisors. The Assistant G-3 Advisor, Captain Everngam, and the G-4 Advisor, Captain Moffet, were inserted into An Loc on 8 April. The former Senior Advisor to 3rd Group, Major Kuester, was assigned as G-4 Advisor and the former Assistant Advisor, Lieutenant Nahay, was sent to Quang Tri to assist the 5th Group. The Operations/Intelligence NCO Advisor, SFC Schommer, was more or less on permanent TDY at this time, performing liaison between the headquarters and the I Corps. The resulting reconfiguration is as shown at Appendix 3.

(5) The 6th Group was redeployed to Kontum, in II Corps, on 22 April thereby spreading the team elements even further. On 2 May, the Assistant Advisor to 5th Group, Captain Berkson, was declared MIA when his helicopter was shot down, during an extraction from Quang Tri, after the team had been forced to apply escape and evasion techniques for nearly 14 hours in enemy held territory.

(6) The 5th Group was returned to III Corps on 7 May and was ordered into operations in Phuoc Tuy Province on 24 May. Due to experience gained during the previous month's operations, it was felt that it was essential to have three personnel with each Group: therefore, the Operations/Intelligence NCO Advisor, SFC Schommer, was attached to the 5th Group pending approval of a requested JTD change, which deleted three slots in the headquarters and added one NCO slot with each Group. The new authorization is shown at Appendix 4.

(7) The Senior Advisor to the 3rd Group in An Loc, Captain Everngam, was extracted for medical treatment on 20 May and the Assistant G2 Advisor, Captain Riccinto, and the Admin NCO, SFC Sherrill, (both slots subsequently deleted by the JTD Change), were inserted. Captain Everngam was MEDEVACED to Okinawa on 25 May. Captain Leach, who was assigned 22 May from in-country (4 months retainability) was assigned to the 6th Group on 27 May as a replacement for the Assistant Advisor, Captain Vannie, who was scheduled to DEROS in July (Cpt Vannie has subsequently had approved a 6 month extension). Captain Moffett, the second of the two original 3rd Group Advisors at An Loc, was extracted on 31 May and Major Scotnicki, the Operation/Intelligence Advisor (who had been TDY with TRAC G3 since approximately 6 May) was assigned as Senior Advisor. Captain Moffett was curtailed and departed on 8 June and the G4 Advisor, Major Kuester, departed 14 June. This left the headquarters element with the Senior Advisor, LTC McManus, the G1/G5/AG Advisor, CPT Cole, and the Clerk Typist, SP5 Corley (the logistics NCO Advisor, SFC Strange, was on 30 day emergency leave from 25 May - 28 June), to support the three Groups in the field. The organization as of 14 June is shown at Appendix 5.

(8) The Senior Advisor to the 3rd Group, MAJ Scotnicki, was MEDEVACED from An Loc on 26 June, due to severe dysentery, and was placed on 7 days bedrest. However, on 28 June, the Assistant Advisor, Captain Riccinto, was injured and was MEDEVACED on 29 June, requiring Major Scotnicki to return to An Loc on 30 June. The 5th Group had been redeployed on 29 June, from Phuoc Tuy Province to Chon Thanh (on Highway 13). On 1 July, the Senior Advisor to 5th Group, MAJ Teel, was replaced by CPT Evergram, who had returned from Okinawa approximately two weeks prior (on light duty). Major Teel departed for CONUS 5 July. The 3rd Group was redeployed from An Loc to Phuoc Tuy Province on 5 July, and on 10 July, the 5th Group was redeployed to An Loc. The 6th Group remains in II Corps, operating an AO that extends along Highway 14 from Pleiku to Kontum.

(9) A recapitulation of the assignments of members of this team, from 1 April to present is shown below:

LTC Richard J. McManus - 1 April to present, SA, III Corps Ranger Command, Bien Hoa.

MAJ James V. Givens - 1 April - 3 April, SA 6th Group, Tay Ninh  
4 April - 21 April, SA, 6th Group, Phu Bai, I Corps  
22 April - present, SA, 6th Group, Pleiku/Kontum II Corps.

MAJ Paul E. Kuester - 1 April - 7 April, SA, 3rd Group, Tay Ninh/An Loc  
8 April - 14 June, G4 Advisor, III Corps Rngr Cmd, Bien Hoa.

MAJ John P. Scotnicki - 1 April - 5 May, OPN/Intel Advisor III Corps Rngr Comd, Tay Ninh/Lai Khe  
6 May - 30 May, TRAC G3 TOC Duty Officer  
31 May - 4 July, SA, 3rd Group, An Loc  
5 July - present, SA 3rd Group, Phuoc Tuy.

MAJ Kenneth L. Teel - 1 April - 3 April, SA, 5th Group Tay Ninh  
4 April - 4 May, SA, 5th Group, Quang Tri, I Corps  
5 May - 23 May, SA, 5th Group, Cu Chi  
24 May - 28 June, SA, 5th Group, Phuoc Tuy  
29 June - 1 July, SA, 5th Group, Chon Thanh

CPT Joseph H. Berkson - 1 April - 4 April, Asst Adv, 5th Group, Tay Ninh  
4 April - 1 May, Asst Adv, 5th Group, Quang Tri, I Corps  
2 May - present, Missing in Action

CPT Robert D. Cole - 1 April - present, G1/G5/AG Advisor, III Corps Ranger Command, Bien Hoa.

CPT Michael H. Evergan - 1 April - 7 April, Asst G3 Adv, III Corps Rngr Comd, Bien Hoa  
8 April - 20 May, SA, 3rd Group, An Loc  
21 May - 30 June, patient/recuperating  
1 July - 9 July, SA, 5th Group, Chon Thanh  
10 July - present, SA, 5th Group, An Loc

CPT Daniel R. Leach - 22 May - present, Asst Adv, 6th Group, Pleiku/Kontum, II Corps.

CPT Harold Hoffett - 1 April - 7 April, G-4 Adv, III Corps Rngr Comd, Bien Hoa  
8 April - 30 May, Asst Adv, 3rd Group, An Loc  
31 May - 8 June, Duties unasg - DEROs

CPT Patrick J. Riccinto - 1 April - 19 May, Asst G2 Adv, III Corps Rngr Comd, Tay Ninh/Lai Khe  
20 May - 29 June, Asst Adv, 3rd Group, An Loc  
30 June - present, OPN/Intel Adv, III Corps Rngr Comd, Bien Hoa

CPT William H. Vannie - 1 April - 3 April, Asst Adv, 6th Group, Tay Ninh  
4 April - 21 April, Asst Adv, 6th Group, Phu Bai, I Corps  
22 April - present, Asst Adv, 6th Group, Pleiku/Kontum, II Corps

1LT Stephen A. Nahay - 1 April - 7 April, Asst Adv, 3rd Group, Tay Ninh/An Loc  
8 April - 4 May, Asst Adv, 5th Group, Quang Tri, I Corps  
5 May - 23 May, Asst Adv, 5th Group, Cu Chi  
24 May - 28 June, Asst Adv, 5th Group, Phuoc Tuy  
29 June - 9 July, Asst Adv, 5th Group, Chon Thanh  
10 July - present, Asst Adv, 5th Group, An Loc

SFC Don L. Schommer - 1 April - 23 May, OPN/Intel NCO Adv, III Corps Rngr Comd, Bien Hoa  
24 May - 28 June, OPN/Intel NCO Adv, 5th Group, Phuoc Tuy  
29 June - 9 July, OPN/Intel NCO Adv, 5th Group, Chon Thanh  
10 July - present, OPN/Intel NCO Adv, 5th Group, An Loc

SFC Charles A.M. Sherrill - 1 April - 19 May, Admin NCO, III Corps Rngr Comd, Bien Hoa  
20 May - 4 July, OPN/Intel NCO Adv, 3rd Group An Loc  
5 July - present, OPN/Intel NCO Adv, 3rd Group Phuoc Tuy

SFC Charles A. Strange - 1 April - present, Logistics NCO Adv, III Corps Rngr Comd, Bien Hoa

SP5 Alvin D. Corley - 1 April - present, Clerk /Typist, III Corps Rngr Comd, Bien Hoa.

(10) Throughout the period of the Binh Long Campaign, the maneuver units of III Corps Ranger Command were under operational control of other headquarters (See Appendix 6). Nevertheless, the basic administrative and logistical support role of the headquarters remained unchanged. With elements at Quang Tri, Kontum, and through HQ3, at the height of the campaign, the headquarters element proved itself capable of providing support far beyond that normally expected. The response given to the needs of the maneuver units was timely and as complete as possible, considering availability of resources.

(11) In the area of logistical support, the abilities of the headquarters were severely tested. Two of the three Ranger Groups suffered extremely heavy equipment losses (the 5th Group at Quang Tri and the 3rd Group at An Loc). These two units were nearly completely refitted while continuing their combat role. Aerial resupply, on a weekly basis, has been maintained to two of the border battalions and the remaining battalions have been resupplied by ground transport. In addition, equipment and weapons have been procured and supplied to new recruits being trained at Duc My Ranger Training Center, as replacements for the maneuver elements.

(12) In the administrative support areas, the headquarters was prompt and responsive. All three Ranger Groups suffered 50% or more casualties during the offensive (see appendix 7). The Headquarters produced nearly two thousand replacements, both recruits and former deserters returned to duty, in order to maintain combat effectiveness in the Groups. In addition, the headquarters expended much effort to keep abreast of strength accounting, casualty reporting/processing, and awards. Accurate and timely strength accounting proved difficult due to both the tactical situation and the dispersion of the Groups; however, all efforts were expended to obtain necessary data. The medical company dispensary worked at double to triple capacity, providing treatment for the numerous casualties.

(13) Command and control. While control of the maneuver elements of III Corps Ranger Command was completely removed from the headquarters, as mentioned previously, the Commander and his staff kept constantly abreast of all facets of operations and were always aware of the current status of each element. This required continuous coordination with the numerous headquarters to which the elements were OPCON. During the seige of An Loc, the headquarters maintained a liaison section, on the scene, to provide information and assist the 3d Ranger Group. The extent to which the command Group was able to function is quite evident in view of the success of the support role, as described above.

#### 4. CONCLUSIONS:

a. The best over all performance of the Group was from 4 June to 13 June when all three Ranger Battalions were in the process of clearing An Loc to the north and northwest. All of the units appeared to be doing well in their contacts with the NVA as evidenced by the numerous stockpiles of weapons and ammunitions which were captured or destroyed. It appeared that the 3d Ranger Group was in the process of setting back its old degree of confidence.

b. The 31st Battalion, on suggestion from the US Advisors, on 14 April used the LAW to destroy a tank on highway 303 so that it would block the bridge. This required the soldiers to watch the tank move toward them and wait until just the right moment to shoot. These soldiers did just that, a most commendable job.

c. The 36th Battalion displayed more aggressiveness in patrolling, establishing outposts, and carrying the battle to the enemy than nearly any other unit at An Loc. 36th Battalion is a truly outstanding example of a well led, capable Ranger Battalion.

d. VNAF TAC Air support was exemplary in most cases and VNAF FAC's flew much lower than the norm. They were able to place accurate close air support for the friendly ground troops and contributed considerably to the overall success of the ground operations..

Appendix 1 (Personnel Authorized to 5th Ranger Group) to Annex 1 (III Corps Ranger Command)  
to After-Action Report, Binh Long Campaign

1. Personnel authorized and present for duty as of 10 May 72. The on hand table does not include 16 officers, 9 NCO's or 202 EM, total 227 personnel who were on leave.

AUTHORIZED

<u>OFFICERS</u>	<u>NCO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Group HQ	17	51	124
Engr Co	6	16	122
Trans Co	6	23	124
Recon Co	9	25	111
30th Bn	31	90	683
33d Bn	31	90	683
38th Bn	31	90	683
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>131</u>	<u>385</u>	<u>2570</u>

ON HAND

Group HQ	8	7	12	27
Engr Co	3	3	19	25
Trans Co	6	23	95	124
Recon Co	1	4	42	47
30th Bn	9	34	192	235
33d Bn	17	26	196	239
38th Bn	11	24	122	157
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>53</u>	<u>108</u>	<u>623</u>	<u>784</u>

2. Percent of authorized on hand:

a. Officers	40.4%
b. NCO	28.0%
c. EM	31.0%
d. TOTAL	31.0%

3. Cumulative casualty figures:

KIA

Group HQ	0	0	0	0
Engr Co	0	0	0	0
Trans Co	0	0	0	0
Recon Co	0	1	3	4
39th Bn	0	3	13	16
33d Bn	0	2	11	13
38th Bn	0	2	13	16
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>40</u>	<u>49</u>

WIA

	<u>OFFICERS</u>	<u>NCO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Group HQ	0	2	0	2
Engr Co	0	0	0	0
Trans Co	0	0	2	0
Recon Co	2	2	9	13
30th Bn	4	21	82	107
33d Bn	3	11	78	92
38th Bn	4	17	108	129
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>13</u>	<u>53</u>	<u>270</u>	<u>345</u>

MIA

Group HQ	4	2	8	14
Engr Co	1	2	17	20
Trans Co	0	0	0	0
Recon Co	1	4	24	29
30th Bn	6	18	70	94
33d Bn	3	0	46	49
38th Bn	9	21	106	135
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>24</u>	<u>47</u>	<u>271</u>	<u>342</u>

Appendix 2 (III Corps Ranger Command Advisory Team 4 April 72) to Annex I (III Corps Ranger Command) to After-Action Report, Binh Long Campaign

III CORPS RANGER COMMAND ASSISTANCE TEAM

<u>POSITION</u>	<u>INCUMBENT</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
Senior Advisor	LTC McMANUS	
G1/G5/AG Advisor	CPT COLE	
OPN/Intel Advisor	MAJ SCOTNICKI	FWD CP - Tay Ninh
G4 Advisor	CPT MCFFETT	
Asst G2 Advisor	CPT RICCINTO	FWD CP - Tay Ninh
Asst G3 Advisor	CPT EVERNAN	
Log NCO Advisor	SFC STRANGE	
OPN/Intel NCO Advisor	SFC SCHOMMER	
Admin Supv	SFC SHERRILL	
Clerk/Typist	VACANT	
SA, 3rd GP Asst SA, 3rd Gp	MAJ KUESTER 1LT NAHAY	
SA, 5th Gp Asst SA, 5th Gp	MAJ TEEL CPT BERKSON	
SA, 6th Gp Asst SA, 6th Gp	MAJ GIVENS CPT VANNIE	

Appendix 3 (III Cor's Ranger Com and Advisory Team 8 April 72) to Annex I (III Ranger Command) to After-Action Report, Binh Long Campaign

III CORPS RANGER COMMAND ASSISTANCE TEAM

<u>POSITION</u>	<u>INCUMPT</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
Senior Advisor	LTC McMANUS	
G1/G5/AG Advisor	CPT COLE	
CPM/Intel Advisor	MAJ SCOTNICKI	FWD CP - Lai Khe
G4 Advisor	MAJ KUESTER	
Asst G2 Advisor	CPT RICCINTO	FWD CP - Lai Khe
Asst G3 Advisor	VACANT	
Log NCO Advisor	SFC STRANGE	
CPM/Intel NCO Advisor	SFC SCHOMMER	TDY, I Corps
Admin Supv	SFC SHERRILL	
Clerk/Typist	SP5 CORLEY	
SA, 3rd Gp	CPT EVERNGAM	An Loc
Asst SA, 3rd Gp	CPT MOFFETT	An Loc
SA, 5th Gp	MAJ TEEL	Quang Tri
Asst SA, 5th Gp	CPT BERKSON	Quang Tri
Attached	1LT NAHAY	Quang Tri
SA, 6th Gp	MAJ GIVENS	Hue/Phu Bai
Asst SA, 6th Gp	CPT VANNIE	Hue/Phu Bai

Appendix 4 (JTD Change) to Annex I (III Corps Ranger Command) to After-Action Report, Binh Long Campaign.

III CORPS RANGER COMMAND ASSISTANCE TEAM

<u>TITLE</u>	<u>MOS</u>	<u>OR</u>	<u>BRANCH</u>	<u>AUTH</u>
Senior Advisor	G 1542	O5	IN	1
Gl/G5/AG Advisor	G 2269	O4	IN	1
OPN/Intel Advisor	G 2162	O4	IN	1
G4 Advisor	G 4010	O4	IN	1
Log NCO Advisor	76Z5K	E8	NC	1
OPN/Intel NCO Advisor	11F4H	E7	NC	1
Clerk/Typist	71B30	E4		1
SA, Rngr Gp	G 1542	O4	IN	3
Asst Adv, Rngr Gp	G 1542	O3	IN	3
OPN/Intel NCO Adv	11F4H	E7	NC	3

Appendix 5 (Organization as of 14 Jun 72) to Annex I (III Corps Ranger Command) to After-Action Report, Binh Long Campaign.

III CORPS RANGER COMMAND ASSISTANCE TEAM

<u>POSITION</u>	<u>INCUBENT</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
Senior Advisor	LTC McMANUS	
Gl/G5/AG Advisor	CPT COLE	
OPN/Intel Advisor	VACANT	
G4 Advisor	VACANT	
Log NCO Advisor	SFC STRANGE	30 Day Emergency Leave
OPN/Intel NCO Advisor	VACANT	
Clerk/Typist	SP5 CORLEY	

SA, 3rd Gp Asst SA, 3rd Gp OPN/Inttel NCO Adv	MAJ SCOTNICH CPT RICCINTO SFC SHERRIL	An Loc An Loc An Loc
SA, 5th Gp Asst SA, 5th Gp OPN/Intel NCO Adv	MAJ TEEL 1LT NAHAY SFC SCHOMMER	Phuoc Tuy Phuoc Tuy Phuoc Tuy
SA, 6th Gp Asst SA, 6th Gp OPN/Intel NCO Adv	MAJ GIVENS CPT VANNIE VACANT	Pleiku/Kontum Pleiku/Kontum

112011  
RANGER DEPLOYMENTS

At the start of the Nguyen Hue offensive, the III Corps Ranger Command had established a light CP at Tay Ninh in order to command the 65th - 73rd - 84th and 92nd Border Ranger Bns. (OPCON 25th ARVN Div.)

The following is a chronological sequence of events during April, May and June 72 for the Ranger Groups and Border Bns.

- a. The 92nd Bn remained in its Base at Tonle Chon to present, (OPCON 25th ARVN Div).
- b. The 74th Bn was ordered by 9 Regt, 5th ARVN Div on or about 1 April to withdraw from "A" Base and return to Loc Ninh. This Bn was disseminated during their withdrawal and is currently refitting at Duc My Ranger Training Center.
- c. The 5th and 6th Ranger Groups were moved to MR-1 on 4 April.
- d. On 6 April the 3rd Ranger Group was moved to reinforce An Loc under OPCON 5th ARVN Div and remained there until 5 July 72.
- e. The 65th Bn was ordered to withdraw from and destroy Quang Trung FSB (XT 501831) on 6 April and move to the Tay Ninh City Area. (OPCON 25th ARVN DIV.)
- f. On 7 April 72 the 84th Bn received the order to withdraw from Katum Base and move to a point northeast of Tay Ninh City. (OPCON 25th ARVN Div.)
- g. On 8 April the 73rd Bn was ordered to withdraw from and destroy Van Don FSB (XT 458720) and move to the Tay Ninh City Area. (OPCON 25th ARVN Div.)
- h. On 9 April 72 the 64th Ranger Bn was moved from Tra Cu and place under control of HQ CMD. A rear element remained in their Base at Tra Cu.
- i. On 12 April the 97th Bn was ordered to withdraw from and destroy Bu Gia Map Base and move to the Song Be area. (OPCON Phuoc Long Sector)
- j. On 17 April 72 the 65th and 73rd Bn moved from Tay Ninh City to Phu Loi along with the light CP, and assumed the mission of Corps Reserve Force. They remained there until 19 April when they moved to Lai Khe BC with the mission of Lai Khe defense under OPCON of the 5th ARVN Div rear.
- k. On 21 April the 6th Group was redeployed to the Pleiku/Kontum area and has remained there to present.
- l. On 9 May 72, the 5th Ranger Group returned to MR-3 and began refitting at Cu Chi.
- m. On 14 May the 84th Bn moved from Tay Ninh to Lai Khe for defense of Lai Khe until 22 May at which time it joined the 73rd Bn on Highway 13.
- n. The 73rd Bn, on 14 May, deployed from Lai Khe to (XT 489451) under operational control of 5th ARVN Div rear with the mission of security along QL 13.
- o. The 65th Bn was airmobiled from Lai Khe to Chon Thanh. They remained there until 29 May when they returned to Lai Khe. (OPCON 21st ARVN Div)
- p. On 24 May the 5th Ranger Group redeployed to the Dat Do area in Phuoc Tuy (F) (OPCON 18th ARVN DIV).
- q. On 25 June the 65th Bn moved from Chon Thanh to Bien Hoa (OPCON to Bien Hoa Sector).
- r. On 26 - 27 - 28 June the 5th Ranger Group moved from Phuoc Tuy (P) to Lai Khe and became OPCON to 18th ARVN Div, deploying along Highway 13.
- s. On 2 July the 65th Bn redeployed to the Song Be Area to secure the airfield at Phuoc Long (OPCON Phuoc Long Sector).

ix 6 (Status of Ranger Units) to Annex I (III Corps Ranger Command) to After-Action Report,  
gn.

BORDER DUPS	CAMP STATUS	BN/GROUP BASE OF OPERATION AS OF 25 June 72	OPCON	ADMIN/LOG SUPPORT
1	Residual Element	XS 660940 Along TL 10	Capital Mil - Dist	III Corps Ranger Command
1	Residual Element	Phuoc Binh YU 205163	Phuoc Long Sector	III Corps Ranger Command
Igon	EVACUATED 8 April 72	CA MAU FSB	18th In Div	III Corps Ranger Command
th	Evacuated	Duc My Ranger Training Center	NA	III Corps Ranger Command
	No Change	No Change	Hau Nghia Sector	III Corps Ranger Command
Chan	EVACUATED 7 April 72	Chon Thanh XT 757620	18th In Div	III Corps Ranger Command
Map	No Change	No Change	25th In Div	III Corps Ranger Command
	EVACUATED 16 April 72	Phuoc Binh YU 205163	Phuoc Long Sector	III Corps Ranger Command
p	Residual Element	Phuoc Tuy Prov XS 335618	Phuoc Tuy Sector	III Corps Ranger Command Monitors
rp	Residual Element	Binh Long XT 768633	18th In Div	III Corps Ranger Command Monitors
rp	Residual Element	II Corps Pleiku Vicinity	II Corps	III Corps Ranger Command When in III Corps

Appendix 7 (Friendly/Enemy Casualties) to Annex I (III Corps Ranger Command) to After-Action Report,  
Binh Long Campaign.

FRIENDLY/ENEMY CASUALTIES  
AND EQUIP LOSSES

MONTH	FRIENDLY					ENEMY				
	KIA	WIA	MIA	CREW SERVED	IND WPNS	KIA	CIA	HC	CREW SERVED	IND WPNS
APRIL	71	299	312	83	423	427	4	0	4	88
MAY	129	628	95	3	21	475	2	0	27	79
JUNE	135	510	15	0	7	314	15	1	64	93
TOTAL	335	1437	422	86	451	1216	21	1	95	260

7-1-1

Appendix 1 (Binh Long Province Report) to Annex J (CORDS MR III) to MACTR After-Action Report,  
Binh Long Campaign

1. PURPOSE: To provide a chronological sequence of events describing those activities of friendly and enemy units during the period 4 April - 25 June 1972.

2. INTRODUCTION: The following report represents a total description and analysis of friendly unit actions and deployments resulting from intelligence, operational and logistical movements.

3. DISCUSSION:

a. Summary of operations

(1) Although the actual seige of Binh Long Province began on 4 April 1972, overt symptoms of impending military action began to surface around late February. In March, a drastic increase in PSDF "accidents," resulting in some 30 PSDF KIA, reports of VC propagandizing hamlets in the Loc Ninh Area and a general increase in the number of enemy contacts involving sapper/recon units gave credence to the theory that large scale military operations against targets within Binh Long Province were imminent. In addition to the overt, covert signs such as an "unexplained" shift of locations of friendly agent sightings of enemy units from the west of QL 13 to the east of that highway led to the belief that perhaps enemy activity on the west side of the highway posed a danger to the agents that they were unwilling to accept. Further unofficial and unexplained reports were received that residents of isolated hamlets within the province were deserting their ancestral homes for the relative security of the district and province capitol cities. During the 15 to 30 March time frame, Territorial Forces captured the Commanding Officer of C-18, a sapper/recon company of 69th Artillery Command, who stated that his mission was to conduct a detailed reconnaissance of the Loc Ninh District, and to establish a land line communications system for use by units which his unit was to infiltrate into the district. Almost simultaneously with the capture of the CO of C-18, ARVN units operating in Tay Ninh Province captured documents assigning the 272d Regiment of the 9th VC Division the responsibility for conducting offensive military operations within the boundaries of Binh Long Province. The document further stated that if the operation was unsuccessful, the 272d Regiment would be designated the "Binh Long Regiment." This further reinforced the belief that a full scale operation in the Province by NVA troops was in the final planning stages.

(2) Finally, information was received from higher headquarters which confirmed the locations of several regimental and division-sized units positioned in the "Fishhook" area of Cambodia, which forms a portion of the northwestern border of Binh Long Province.

(3) The above information supported the conclusion that gave the communists the capability of conduction regimental and division-sized attacks against selected targets within Binh Long Province.

(4) On 3 April, all doubts as to the intentions of the NVA forces positioned along the northwestern border of Binh Long Province were dispelled. The 272d Regiment of the 9th VC Division opened the NVA offensive in the province with a mortar, rocket and sapper attack against the military base at Quan Loi. On 4 April all defenders were extracted from the base. This enabled the NVA to establish a staging area from which attacks on the surrounding areas could be conducted.

(5) On 4 April, elements of two NVA divisions spearheaded by the E-6 and 174th Regiments with supporting armor attacked the District compound at Loc Ninh, after overrunning all fire bases and outposts between the border and the district capitol. The battle for the district compound lasted until 7 April and was marked by human wave assaults, armored attacks, and heavy rocket and mortar bombardment. U.S. TAC AIR assets were pressed into action on 4 April and continued throughout the three days and nights of attacks. Considering the air assets available, the U.S. Air Force did a commendable job of providing the close air support required, and dealt a telling blow to the NVA forces attacking the compound. Only at a cost of both men and material that by U.S. standards would be considered unacceptable was the NVA able to achieve its "victory" at Loc Ninh.

(6) On 6 April, during the height of the battle for Loc Ninh, elements of the 7th NVA Division established themselves in what proved to be well fortified positions along QL-13 south of the city at about the 73 east-west grid line. The NVA successfully sealed the road, thus isolating the province capitol city of An Loc. See Annex F for details.

(7) Upon being notified that the MSR (QL13) had been blocked by communist forces, the

Province Chief directed two RF companies to proceed down the road and attempt to eliminate those forces. Under cover of organic artillery and with U.S. advisory support, the task force set out. Upon reaching the strong point they came under heavy B-40, small arms and indirect fire. Artillery was called in and an attempt was made to maneuver one of the RF companies to the eastern flank of the enemy force. However, the maneuver company was immediately taken under intense fire, which precluded any further movement. The U.S. TAC AIR was then called on the scene in an attempt to dislodge the enemy. This action met with little success and by late afternoon the task force was recalled to An Loc to aid in the preparation of defensive positions.

(8) The defensive positions included the construction of a defensive berm around the city, construction of RF/PF listening and observation posts (some of which were forward of the 5th Division's most advanced elements) shoring up of the province's organic artillery and mortar positions, and the strategic emplacement of all available troops and weapons along the defensive perimeter.

(9) On 6 April General Hung, CG of the 5th ARVN Division who was given the responsibility for the defense of An Loc, promptly ordered the remainder of his division to withdraw to the city and establish a "defensive posture," along the west and northwest portions of An Loc. He also recalled his remaining artillery assets and positioned them in the middle of the city where they could not be used in the defense of any portion of the perimeter. The "rapidly withdrawing" elements of the 5th Division were pursued by regimental size NVA Infantry and Artillery units to the outskirts of An Loc.

(10) The NVA established themselves on key terrain features surrounding the city, and established effective firing positions for their organic and newly acquired artillery/mortar pieces. Thus, on 7 April the Seige of An Loc began.

(11) Rocket and mortar rounds began falling on the city at about 0700 hours. It appeared as if the communist gunners were establishing reference points from which to adjust their pieces. Toward the afternoon hours the volume of incoming had increased substantially and appeared to be working its way toward the military area (south portion) of the city, close to where the 5th Division had emplaced its artillery. At this point the 5th Division Commanding General ordered his artillery pieces moved from their location on the soccer field at the south end of town to the north portion of town in the city park immediately adjacent to one of the most heavily populated sections of the city. The artillery pieces were not dug in or sandbagged. As communist gunners shifted their guns to the city park and the 5th Division's exposed artillery, civilian casualties began to mount. At 1500 hours on the 7th, the decision was made to extract those members of the Province Advisory Team not considered vital to the continuing mission of the team or the defense of An Loc. At 1610 the extraction was effected utilizing a CH-47 Chinook helicopter belonging to the 1st Air Cavalry Division. The CH-47 was escorted by a flight of two AH-1G Cobra Gunships. Immediately upon departure the Chinook began to take small arms and 51 caliber machine gun fire from communist positions at the northern tip of the Binh Long airstrip. A U.S. advisor was wounded in the action, and only an immediate response by the escort helicopters prevented the Chinook from being shot down with some 30 persons on board. The remaining members of the Province Advisory Team returned to the sector compound and TOC and began to provide the tactical and technical assistance required to support the sector forces. On the night of the 7th the requirement for massive and continuous Tactical Air Support became apparent. To this end requests for tactical air support were made by the province team and paralleled by the sector staff to the 5th Division. The first element of what was to be the massive air effort required to defend the city arrived on station later that evening in the form of SUNDOG 26, a USAF Forward Air Controller of the 21st Tactical Air Support Squadron based at Tan Son Nhut Airbase, Saigon, RVN.

(12) Simultaneous with the efforts to prepare for the defense of the city of An Loc, the District Capitol City of Loc Ninh was overrun. Attempts to extract the remaining U.S. advisors proved futile.

(13) The period 7 through 11 April was marked by an increase of incoming rocket, mortar, and artillery fire, repositioning and reinforcing the NVA units surrounding the city, refugees entering the city from remote hamlets, and increased though not yet continuous tactical air support. During the late evening hours of 11 April, Major Thomas A. Davidson, a member of the Province Advisory Team, who had been in Loc Ninh during the attacks there, arrived at a unit belonging to the 3rd Ranger Group on the northwestern perimeter of An Loc. Davidson successfully evaded large NVA units moving down QL 13 towards An Loc and reported a massive buildup of NVA infantry and artillery units along the approaches to the city.

(14) On 12 April, Major Davidson was extracted by Medevac to Bien Hoa. Throughout the day, heavy and continuous rocket/mortar and artillery fire fell on the city. A ground probe on the west side of the perimeter marked the start of the "ground war" in An Loc.

(15) The early hours of 13 April marked the first confirmed report of tanks in the An Loc vicinity. At approximately 0730, nine NVA tanks (T-54) drove into town from the north on QL 13. 5th ARVN Division soldiers abandoned their positions, allowing the tanks to drive unmolested into the interior of the city. Although equipped with light anti-tank weapons (LAW) there was no report of the 5th ARVN Division soldiers having engaged the advancing armored vehicles. The advancing tanks were not escorted by NVA infantry. Upon reaching the southern boundaries of the city, the tanks were taken under fire by that portion of the Territorial Forces who were defending the sector compound. Two T-54 tanks were destroyed by the Territorial Forces, using a total of 10 LAWs. Several other tanks were destroyed by the 3rd Ranger Group. The rest of the day was marked by coordinated NVA infantry and artillery attacks on the perimeter of the city, and what amounted to probes by armored vehicles. The majority of the probing armored vehicles were destroyed by the defenders of the city, using an inordinate amount of LAWs. Numerous B-52 strikes were requested and delivered on NVA troop concentration surrounding the city. Refugees reported that the B-52 strikes had inflicted heavy casualties on the entrenched NVA. Cluster Bomb Units (CBUs) were used for the first time in the area. Spectre and Stinger gunships working at night began reporting large concentrations of vehicles moving both toward and away from the city. By late afternoon the NVA had moved into the northern half of the city.

(16) On 14 April, after a coordinated and extremely accurate rocket bombardment of the city, the NVA conducted ground attacks on the northern, eastern, and southern sectors of the perimeter. Reports of tank movement and their destruction by tactical aircraft continued to be received. In the late afternoon, elements of the 1st ARVN Airborne Brigade were airlifted into an area approximately 3km southeast of An Loc.

(17) On 15 April, an NVA tank attack on the northern part of town resulted in the destruction of several more tanks. Again, the tanks came in unsupported by NVA infantry. B-52 strikes, skypots and tactical air support continued to be very effective. By 15 April, NVA elements were firmly entrenched within 50 feet of 5th ARVN positions. The 5th Division took no offensive action, but appeared to be content to accept the casualties inflicted on them by the nearby NVA. Attempts by the 5th ARVN Division Senior Advisor to goad the division commander into action met with negative results. The Province Chief dispatched his Intelligence and Reconnaissance Platoon and PRU in civilian clothing to recon the south and southeastern environs of the perimeter to determine specific locations of NVA troop concentration and mortar and artillery sites.

(18) On 16 April, the NVA launched a massive attack against elements of the 1st Abn Bde on Hill 169. The 1st Abn Bde withdrew to An Loc and established positions to the south of town, east and west of QL 13.

(19) During the heavy attacks of 13-16 April, U.S. tactical air support proved to be responsible for GVN retention of the southern portion of An Loc. Although often receiving devastating ground to air fire, the tactical air support continued to be superb. See Annex C for statistics of TAC AIR.

(20) The period from 17 April through 5 May was characterized by continued ground attacks against the defensive perimeter, the continued destruction of tanks by tactical air support and an improvement in air resupply methods. Incoming mortar, artillery and rocket fire ranged from 3,000 to 8,300 rounds per day. By the end of April the territorial forces had begun to probe forward from An Loc. In the case of the Sector units, the PRU and I&R platoons ranged as far as 5 km east and southeast of the perimeter. Sector recon units met only negligible resistance, but were prohibited, by the 5th ARVN Division CG, from establishing defensive lines outside the city. Sector units did, however, establish OPs and LPs approximately 1,000 meters east of the perimeter. The Province Chief requested permission to have his Territorial Forces operate forward of the 5th Division segment of the perimeter. This request was flatly denied by General Hung.

(21) From 6 May through 10 May, there was a notable shifting, reinforcement, and resupply of the larger NVA units around An Loc. Numerous tanks were reported moving south and west of the city. Incoming artillery, rocket and mortar fire increased to approximately 5,000 rounds per day. CS gas was shot into the city on two occasions. POWs indicated that units were being equipped and resupplied for an attack that was to come soon and was to last for three days.

(22) At 0330 hours on 11 May, the sector OPs reported large numbers of NVA moving toward

their positions. Using delaying tactics, they returned to the perimeter while tactical air support was called. At daylight, the southwest and western sides of the city were hit by armored vehicles (T-54s and PT-76s) followed by NVA Infantry. Three tanks were destroyed by Sector troops. In the 5th Division area, the perimeter immediately crumbled upon arrival of NVA Tanks. The NVA were virtually unopposed in capturing a two-block area of the 5th Division perimeter. The area contained the province jail and was only 100 meters from the 5th Division's TOC. Large numbers of NVA troops were observed moving toward the city. A tactical emergency was declared and the response included stacked up tactical air support and a reaction of the most massive concentration of B-52 strikes ever used in the Vietnam war. See Annex C for details. This massive force annihilated or disrupted most of the NVA units surrounding the city, allowing the perimeter to remain unchanged, with the exception of the penetration into the 5th Division area and a one-block penetration of the 3d Ranger Group area. 11 May marked the first confirmed use by NVA of heat-seeking missiles (SA-7s). The SA-7s inflicted heavy damage on tactical air that day, shooting down one AIE, one A-37, one O-2, and one Cobra gunship. Numerous other SA-7s were fired which were evaded by the fighter aircraft. An Loc was saved on 11 May by the timely response of tactical air support to the advance notice of the NVA attack provided by the Sector OPs.

(23) From 12 through 22 May, light ground probes by the NVA continued, but the amount of incoming gradually subsided. A general pattern of NVA troops moving south was reported. The accuracy of the NVA artillery was much improved, and the sector troops and civilians suffered numerous casualties from the incoming artillery. B-52 strikes, sky spots and tactical air support continued to be outstanding. Many NVA mass graves were discovered by the PRU on their sweeping recon operations.

(24) In the early morning hours of 23 May, a large NVA unit supported by tanks was preparing to attack ARVN forces at Tan Kai Hamlet, who were attempting to relieve An Loc by opening QL 13. A sky spot hit the center of the NVA troops who were massing for the attack, split the force and further separated the armor from the accompanying infantry. Eight of the tanks headed back north on QL 13 and, at high speed, ran into the defensive positions of the 5th Bn, 1st Airborne Brigade. Three of the armored vehicles were immediately destroyed by the 5th Bn, two were destroyed by tactical fighters using a new LASER guided bomb, and the remainder destroyed by Spectre gunships. One of the armored vehicles destroyed by the 5th Bn contained 22 NVA personnel. The vehicle was subsequently identified as a BTR-50PK and the personnel were identified as the command group of the 204th NVA Armored Cavalry Regiment. 23 May was the date of the last confirmed use of tanks by the NVA around An Loc.

(25) On 23 May information was received that Cpt George K. Wanat, Acting District Senior Advisor at Loc Minh, had been captured by the NVA on 6 May at Khanh Hung Hamlet.

(26) After 23 May, ground probes by the NVA dropped off gradually, and several reports were received concerning the withdrawal of units around An Loc. The units which withdrew apparently left behind a portion of the unit to prevent offensive action by GVN troops. While less intense volume, NVA artillery, mortar and artillery fire remained very accurate and continued to inflict numerous casualties on the Sector Troops.

(27) In late May, Sector troops began to again operate forward of the defensive perimeter. They occasionally had light contact with the NVA, but their primary purpose was to locate AAA positions and assess the effectiveness of B-52 strikes to the east and southeast of An Loc. Sector troops confirmed approximately 2,000 NVA killed east and southeast of town.

(28) From 6-14 June, approximately 13,000 civilian refugees left An Loc and walked south along QL 13 to Chon Thanh. From there they were transported to one of the refugee camps in Binh Duong.

(29) From 14-25 June, NVA troops remained in scattered positions in An Loc District, and NVA artillery and mortar fire continued to be fired on the city. GVN forces began taking offensive action and moving outward from the An Loc perimeter. Although there was scattered resistance by the NVA, the GVN forces moved virtually unopposed. Because of the primary mission of securing the city, there was a limited number of troops with which to conduct offensive action.

(30) From 14-25 June, sufficient medical supplies and food was brought into the city to properly care for both the military and civilian populace that remained.

b. Supply functions

(1) Resupply functions during the most critical phases of the Binh Long Campaign were made by air drop. During the first phases of the campaign, resupply efforts were marked by a lack of coordination on time and place of drop and a complete lack of accuracy. The first set of resupply drops were made utilizing VNAF C-123 aircraft at high altitude and at best were marginally successful. Attempts were then made utilizing VNAF C-123's at low altitude utilizing drag type drops. This action resulted in very little improvement over the previous method and resulted in the destruction of one of the C-123's by enemy AAA fire. The USAF then took over utilizing C-130 aircraft and low altitude drops. Only by sheer volume were these drops more successful than those of VNAF. The drops resulted in two C-130's being shot down. Those supplies landing within the friendly perimeter during the initial phases of the resupply effort were utilized by those units who were closest to the point of impact. Virtually no control was exercised on the distribution of resupply items. As a result, the Province Chief directed his forces that all items recovered by them would be brought to the Sector Compound and would be distributed according to need. The instructions were carried out - food, ammunition, and those items required by civilians, RF/FF, National Police and all other units attached to Sector was distributed.

(2) In an effort to increase the accuracy of resupply drops and in turn increase the amount of supplies getting in the USAF adopted a new method of delivery utilizing high velocity drops. This method was the best system utilized during the seige. However, a great deal of the parachutes failed to open and resulted in destroyed supplies and in some cases caused casualties. Regardless of the consequences, this type of resupply was by far the most successful method used and resulted in an abundance of supplies that grew ever larger as the perimeter expanded.

(3) VNAF helicopter resupply efforts can only be described as poorly executed, untimely and patterned. Pilots refused to land the helicopters either to discharge cargo or pick up badly wounded ARVN soldiers. In one instance whole blood was kicked off a helicopter that was flying at better than 30 knots and at 50 feet. The result was the loss of the entire shipment of badly needed blood. The trickle of supplies that VNAF brought in and the few "wounded" they removed from An Loc during the seige did not justify their existence, and surfaced many doubts as to the effectiveness of VNAF rotary winged support in III Corps. As a result of the total lack of response by VNAF Units supporting the Ground Commanders, VN commanders on the scene constantly requested U.S. rotary winged air assets to execute the missions that should have been flown by VNAF.

(4) For more details on aerial resupply at An Loc, see Annexes C and D.

c. Communications

(1) During the course of the siege communications available to the Province Team dwindled from Land Line, Quarter Pole AM, FM Command and secure communications, to 2 PRC 25's which the Province Team and the Airborne Brigade used to maintain commo with the 5th Division (for allocations of air assets), the various airborne battalions manning the southern portion of the city's perimeter, and to direct Tactical Air Strikes. From time to time a direct Land Line (WD-1) was established between the 5th Division and the Province Team on which sensitive information was sometimes passed.

(2) Details on the III Corps communications is at Annex C.

d. Morale

(1) Morale among all of the defenders of the city could be generally described as low, perhaps with the exception of RF/FF units, and the 1st Airborne Brigade. Their morale, although by no means high, was maintained at a satisfactory level by holding "The spirit of the offensive." The low morale of the 5th Division could possibly be attributed to their lack of activity. All units of the 5th Division remained on the perimeter berm during the entire seige. The division never mounted an offensive operation during the hostilities.

(2) The fighting spirit of the 18th Division Task Force initially was low due to the casualties they suffered during their withdrawal from positions northwest of An Loc. However, as the seige continued the commander of the task force was able to transform a totally demoralized fighting force into one that was at least semi-responsive to the tactical situation and the Province Chief's orders. See Annexes D and E for details on the 18th Division Task Force.

(3) In addition to the NVA, one major internal factor led to the deterioration of morale in general.

4. LESSONS LEARNED:

a. PROBLEM: FIELD SANITATION

(1) DISCUSSION: Toward the end of April the NVA offensive had started into its second month. In An Loc the constant barrage of artillery fire kept those persons in command bunkers pretty much confined to them. Various type of field sanitation facilities were built above ground only to be destroyed within hours. Persons living in underground bunkers naturally were reluctant to get out of the bunkers simply for the purpose of relieving themselves. Needless to say the sanitary conditions in the bunkers deteriorated rapidly. With the deterioration of sanitary conditions disease began to spread and several deaths attributable to cholera were diagnosed. Only quick action on the part of the Province Chief and medical personnel prevented a full scale epidemic.

(2) RECOMMENDATION: In order to prevent a recurrence of the problems experienced in An Loc, it is recommended that all improved bunkers be equipped with a chemical style latrine.

b. PROBLEM: WIRE ENTANGLEMENTS

DISCUSSION: One of the lessons learned in An Loc was the fact that the T-54 with its "Dead Tracks" is extremely vulnerable to wire entanglements such as concertina and other forms of barbed wire. The design and hinging of the track pinches wire between the track shoes and is carried to the drive sprocket to become hopelessly entangled in the sprocket and transmission drive shafts.

c. PROBLEM: VNAF HELICOPTER SUPPORT, MR III

(1) DISCUSSION:

(a) By and large VNAF helicopter support for the forces at An Loc can only be described as totally unsatisfactory. VNAF Resupply/Medevac missions were marked by extremely poor coordination with the ground commander, nervous door gunners who shot up friendly areas enroute to the "LZ" and a patterned method of operation which alerted the NVA gunners approximately 15 minutes in advance of a VNAF "MEDEVAC" or "Supply" mission. The advance warning given to the NVA was in the form of a flight of AIE's who would bomb an area about 3KM South of friendly lines about 15 minutes ahead of the helicopters. A typical VNAF mission started with the AIE's. The helicopters would then fly 1KM to the east of QL-13 Low Level. If the aircraft took fire on the way to An Loc the mission was usually aborted. If the helicopters made it to An Loc their arrival was announced by the door gunners on the helicopters serving as gun ships, who would consistently fire their mini and machine guns into friendly positions. The helicopter would then start to circle an LZ just south of General Tri Compound (Sector Hcs). As the helicopters stopped circling, all cargo and passengers were kicked off from 12' to 20' above the ground. The only persons evacuated were those healthy enough to jump for a helicopter which had momentarily lost altitude. After about 30-45 seconds the aircraft would depart having left the seriously wounded and the supplies (most of which had been damaged by a rather rough delivery technique) on an LZ which then became the focal point of all communist gunners in the area. The casualties created by the shelling of the LZ more than offset the very few "Casualties" evacuated by the helicopters.

(b) The demonstrated inability of VNAF to support the ground commander brought to light the following glaring deficiencies in their operations:

1. There is virtually no communication or coordination between the ground and air commanders.

2. VNAF helicopter operations are "patterned": LZ's, routes in and out of an LZ, and fire support, are seldom if ever changed.

3. VNAF statistics on supplies brought in and "wounded" removed are grossly inflated.

4. VNAF helicopter operations are rendered ineffective by marginal weather - e.g. low clouds, strong winds.

(2) RECOMMENDATION

(a) In order to remedy the communications and operational gap between Air Force and Army Commanders, RVNAF helicopter assets should be integrated into ARVN for utilization by the Army Commander as is the case with U.S. Army Helicopter Support.

(b) Additional training is required for VNAF helicopter crews. Pilots should receive training and check rides in marginal weather.

d. COMMENTS ON M-72 LIGHT ANTI-TANK WEAPON

The M-72 proved itself to be an effective close range, anti-tank weapon. However, at longer ranges the accuracy of the LAW coupled with its armor-defeating capabilities showed noticeable room for improvement. As such the LAW's first round kill capability at least against a T-54 is virtually non-existent. The XM 202 by its sheer volume of fire is a great improvement over the single shot M-72.

TAB A (Official Log) to Appendix 1 (Binh Long Province Report) to Annex J (CORDS MR III), to After-Action Report, Binh Long Campaign.

Tuesday, 4 April 1972

1. 0445 hrs Received 2 URS reports from III CORP TOC:
  - a. URS indicates that there was a regiment size enemy force within 1200 meters of XU 637096 as of late morning, 3 April 1972.
  - b. URS indicates there was an Unk size enemy force at XU 776203 during the late morning hours, 3 Apr 72.
2. 1523 hrs Received word from LN that 9th Regiment was having contact with suspected (above URS) unit. Arty being fired at time of report - 5 WIA.
3. 1500 hrs 212nd & 257th RF Co. - XT 845803. While searching an area directed to enter in reaction to a report of large number of VC proselyting - no contact made, but CIA 06 rounds B-41 & 500 kg of rice.
4. 1740 hrs 293rd RF and 196 RF in support XU 752093. 293 RF made contact with 1 NVA Company. Small arms fire exchanged - contact broken at 1900 hrs. VC withdrew to Northeast. 105 Arty fired in support. RESULTS: Many blood trails were found leading away from contact area - also 02 ruck sacks of documents CIA that indicated that the enemy unit was just arriving from Cambodia.
5. 2000 hrs XU 7317. Many people on bicycles crossed QL 13 heading South.
6. 2100 hrs 211 RF Co., XT 766 727, initiated ambush. Small arms fire exchanged; VC fled - 105 ILL fired in support. RESULTS: 03 VC KIA, 03 AK-47 CIA, 04 bags of rice CIA, 01 saw CIA, 01 shovel CIA.

Wednesday, 5 April 1972

1. 0125 hrs QL in contact with VC in wire. Request Gun & Flare ship support. Had VN put in the request to 5th Div - Forwarded request 920 - 30 VC sappers).
2. 0215 hrs VN TOC reported that contact had been broken at QL since 0150 hrs. RESULTS: 06 VC KIA, 1 B-40 and 2 AK-47 CIA. Friendly casualties: 2 KIA, 1 WIA.
3. 0300 hrs Received info that Lai Khe, Song Be, Tay Ninh, Binh Tuy, Phuoc Vinh all received enemy action at approximately the same time.
4. 0300 hrs PF 15 ambushed Unk size enemy force (XU 744 076). Contact broken 0301 - direction of withdrawal Unk. 105 ILL fired in support. RESULTS: 01 VC KIA, 01 AK-47 CIA.
5. 0330 hrs PF 29 set off ambush at XU 749076. RESULTS: 01 VC KIA, 01 AK-47 CIA.
6. 0400 hrs Phuoc Long Advisors Report: VC incoming attacking Phuoc Long and National Police Compound - burned supply office.
7. 0630 hrs LN Report: PF 29 searching at XU 749076 - 01 VC KIA, 01 VC CIA, 01 AK-47 CIA.
8. 0635 hrs 3/25 RF Co. Cmdr Reports: Received 82mm mortars in their compound.
9. 0640 hrs An Loc District - VC fired 04 rounds 82mm mortar at 721-817 from NW direction - No casualties.
10. 0630 hrs RF 26 road security force ambushed by VC at 762665. RESULTS: 02 PF KIA and SOI lost.
11. 0720 hrs 3/25 reported VC fired 06 rounds 82mm at 0640 at coord 645672 from NE direction -

Wednesday, 5 April 1972 (Continued)

No casualties.

12. 0725 hrs 211 RF Commander found 1 VC KIA, 1 AK-47 CIA (Location Unk).
13. 0810 hrs An Loc District reported that 211 RF Company on road clearing operation made contact with estimated VC Company at XT 764725. RESULTS: 01 RF KIA, 01 RF WIA - Neg enemy.
14. 0845 hrs LN reported VC fired 02 rounds 122mm rockets into 733105 from West.
15. 0850 hrs An Loc reported 211 RF Co made contact with an Unk size enemy force at XT 764725. RESULTS: 04 VC KIA, 04 AK-47 CIA. Negative friendly.
16. 0855 hrs VN received a report from LN Subsector as of 0800 hrs 5 Apr contacts throughout Loc Ninh had resulted in 40 VC KIA, 03 AK's CIA. Friendly 01 KIA, 05 WIA.
17. 0900 hrs From 66 at LN: Ammo dump on fire.
18. 0830 hrs Delayed Report - 256 RF Co. made contact with VC Co. at XT 735953. RESULTS: 01 RF MIA, Negative enemy.
19. 0912 hrs 66 Reports VC in wire and across air strip vicinity tail section of abandoned plane - being engaged with small arms fire, Requested gun ship support.
20. 0920 hrs QL personnel came in, requested assistance to secure ammo for QL defenders - they have ammo airborne but can't land at QL. CPT Delvin contacted - made arrangements to get ammo through QL/ S-4 BL/ SKDSL - ammo secured by 1030 hrs.
21. 0925 hrs From 02: Mrs. Rice and Mrs. Metcalf departed the area.
22. 0929 hrs 66 Reports: 95 RR and possible tank across from Loc Ninh Compound in rubber - 9th Regt being taken under fire by 75 RR.
23. 0930 hrs 987 RF Co. in contact with VC at 642683. RESULTS: 04 WIA (Friendly), 01 VC KIA.
24. 0945 hrs Report received from Loc Ninh thru VN channels (No US confirmation) 01 helicopter took tank under fire and destroyed it - (VC captured M 41 tank).
25. 1000 hrs From 18th Div: 2/52 came in contact with VC sniper at 723996, contact was in progress - 01 Friendly KIA, 03 Friendly WIA - Arty fired in support.
26. 1015 hrs VC ambush at 736953, no results, called in by 18th ARVN.
27. 1024 hrs From 66: Outpost overrun at XU 744065 - No additional info at this time.
28. 1030 hrs Situation Report from Loc Ninh: 03 KIA, 01 WIA at LN District HQ - casualties result of mortar attack.
29. 1040 hrs From An Loc: Contacts in An Loc as follows:
  - a. 255 & 214 RF Co. - VIC Minh Duc.
  - b. PF 3 & PF 5 in contact - VIC Tan Loi.
  - c. Heavy contact - VIC 855853 295th RF Co.
  - d. PF 11 & PF 34 in contact - VIC Tan Phuoc.
  - e. 251 RF Co. in contact - VIC Van Hinh.
  - f. PF 1 located along road northeast of Song Be in contact.
  - g. Request Gun Ships and priority on a C&C Ship - Attempt to contact Danger 79 to relay this info - Info passed to QPL 2 - couldn't contact Danger 79.

30. Delayed Report: 1035 hrs - talked with Danger 79 - he checked Cam Lai Bridge for us, informed us that was okay and no apparent activity in vicinity - stated he would be over Loc Ninh - and that VN Head man (Assume CG, 5th Div) had situation under control.

31. 1043 hrs Talked with CPT Davis at Lai Khe - No chance on ship - going to parallel with VN in attempt to get 2 or 3 guns and 1 C&C ship.

32. 1047 hrs From 73: At XU 747065 VC using Anti-Aircraft weapons to engage TAC Air - FAC notified.

33. 1052 hrs An Loc City received 2 or 3 rounds 122 - Reported as follows:

- 01 at hospital XT 755877
- 01 at air strip

RESULTS: 01 civilian KIA, 01 civilian WIA - both at hospital rocket site.

34. 1102 hrs Loc Ninh taking mortar rounds, fairly heavy - apparently attempting to hit ammo dump - airborne pilot says there is a fire also Fighter are on the way to put in strikes.

35. 1132 hrs 73 Reports going underground position as they are receiving rounds in and around the Team house.

36. 1140 hrs SGT Ferguson returned from S-1. Contacted 1 Air, Requested a WC to serve as a C&C Ship for An Loc to control RF/PF units.

37. 1147 hrs From 88: All RF/PF units in An Loc committed, none remaining in An Loc City - Lost contact with 295 RF Co.

38. 1158 hrs Report from VN TOC - Unknown force located vicinity HQ Air strip, also VC captured bus load of civilians vicinity 7888 - using bus for transportation. Notified FAC Chico 07 requested check out -

FAC said nothing at HQ air strip vicinity 7888 too thick to observe - going to Loc Ninh to put in air strikes.

39. 1208 hrs 02 contacted this station and given an up-date.

40. 1210 hrs VN AWCC has no contact with Loc Ninh Arty - VN TOC says everything okay, no more casualties - still can't contact 73 & 66 - Report from 34 airborne over LN situation stabilized - no incoming.

41. 1225 hrs Checked with VN Arty - all firebases in Loc Ninh still surrounded.

42. 1232 hrs Ozone Cornish 2/52 18th ARVN taking B-40 rounds at his location.

43. 1240 hrs COL Miller, 5th Div SA, arrived AL requested conference with 02 for update and exchange of info.

44. 1245 hrs 26 contacted 73 on VN net - situation tense - had to abandon above ground radio - one below can't contact us - says that there is a large VC force massing south end of runway - have someone aloft coordinating ships - VC in wire (I think) (commo was very poor due to other traffic on freq). Request ship to be on station over LN for entire night.

45. 1300 hrs C&C ship arrived.

46. 1310 hrs From MAJ Foltz Lai Khe - at one time VC were in LN District Compound - they were out of compound by 1230 - Loc Ninh still receiving heavy air support - no incoming.

47. 1315 hrs CPT Gaynor requested VN to put in early request for a flare ship and Spooky for Loc Ninh to be on station all night.

48. 1320 hrs Passed request to MAJ Foltz for Spooky and flare ship to be on station at Loc Ninh all night - we are paralleling VN request which will be sent shortly.

49. 1340 hrs MAJ Foltz informed us that Inferno 65 was enroute to our location - he is a Pink Team and will be in support Binh Long Province. Passed on to O2 Via Van Guard 6.

50. 1425 hrs Put out net call on Arty - must fly East of QL 13 - if fly west MSL is 6000 feet.

51. 1430 hrs 73 Contacted this station - still VC around place - air strikes going in - 73 returning to underground position.

52. 1432 hrs 99 returned to this station with instructions from his higher HQ to remove equipment from this area and return to home base.

53. 1439 34 called in from LN to inform this station he had monitored traffic stating US personnel at QL were being pulled out. QL is completely encircled - Jolly Green Giant will arrive to pull everyone out.

54. Delayed Entries: 1320 hrs VN requested flare ship and Spooky for LN for all night.

55. Delayed Entry: 1350 hrs 3/18 RF Cmd Group contact with NVA Company at 861848. RESULTS: 01 NVA CIA, 03 magazines and 01 watch CIA.

56. Delayed Entry: 1320 hrs - Report from CT, XT 750685, Unidentified unit made contact with VC. RESULTS: 07 Friendly KIA, 03 WIA, 07 VC KIA, 02 anti-aircraft weapons captured.

57. Delayed Report: 212 RF Co. made contact with 01 VC Company - vicinity 766725. RESULTS: 03 KIA, 03 WIA.

58. 1420 hrs BG McGiffert arrived this location - requesting information on personnel from QL and situation at QL - 19 took him to see personnel who were located in An Loc City.

59. 1421 hrs 34 called in stated was over QL with CAV unit - TAC Air and gun ships engaging VC.

60. 1415 hrs 02 VC Co. digging in just off road between QL and Tan Loi - see above entry.

61. 1425 hrs Binh Long Arty call freq 39.70.

62. 1415 hrs Report from AL - 01 NVA Company located at Ninh Duc Hamlet and French house vicinity of Minh Duc.

63. 1454 hrs Message relayed from Frosty Citizen by Ranger 6 - Request 02 contact Mighty Snow Ball 53 and set up a meeting this afternoon to include their counterparts - Frosty Citizen 42 will attend.

64. Delayed Entry: 1415 hrs 399 RF Co. in contact with unknown size NVA force located at XT 720825. RESULTS: 03 RF KIA, 03 RF WIA.

65. 1503 hrs 34 Contacted this station anticipate QL will be evacuated of all Americans in approximately 10 - 15 minutes.

66. MG Hollingsworth and BG McGiffert departed the Hon Quan area.

67. 1517 hrs Frosty Citizen 42 called inbound for south pad. 33 departed to meet him. 1520/1530 hrs COL Webb in TOC for up-date from Mr. Rice. 1530 hrs departed TOC.

68. 1533 hrs SSG Cox notified the TOC that all US members of the IG Team have departed this location.

69. 1534 hrs TRAC called by LL - Dust off for CT is 111.

70. 1541 hrs MAJ Graham from QL Sog came to TOC, informed us all personnel except 5th Div troop were departing Quan Loi.

71. 1543 hrs SSG Cox called 11T Boechler has departed the area.

72. 1547 hrs 73 called in, things remain about the same - air still working out on troops surrounding area - US bird downed AHIG (Cobra).

Wednesday, 5 April 1972 (Continued)

73. 1600 hrs Report from MAJ Neale: 100 VC inside Minh Duc - surrounded by 255 & 399 RF Co.
74. 1600 hrs MAJ Diem requested we made ammo resupply run to CT - Contacted CPT McCoy to see if he could take on the Medevac chopper.
75. 1615 hrs Lai Khe requested contact 1 Rgmt and inform them there is a US Medevac enroute to them - accomplished.
76. 1622 hrs Dust off 11 has 8 patients from Chon Thanh to Cong Hoa could not carry ammo to CT.
77. 1705 hrs Last of Quan Loi departed.
78. 1717 hrs Dust off chopper with load of supplies for CT - took mortar at CT - took off with supplies delivered supplies to Lai Khe.
79. 1720 hrs O2 departed for CT in Ranger 6 bird.
80. 1732 hrs From 5th Div: URS reports 272 Rgmt at XT 800930 late afternoon, 5 Apr 72.
81. 1740 hrs O2 departed AL for LN.
82. 1750 hrs COL Midgett called; cancelling visit of CG TRAC Friday.
83. 1900 hrs Commo check with 73 at LN thru VN radio - status still same - large number NVA a-round LN - recent report indicated that 6 trucks were spotted crossing border believe they are resupply vehicles.
84. 1901 hrs Checked with CPT Davis, Lai Khe, on status on Spooky. He informed us they have a Spectre ship - C-130 on station, will check call sign for us. Further informed us QL(5th Div) and Fire Base 1 is calling for gun ships and flare ship.
85. Delayed Report: 1730 hrs VC shot O1 round 107 rocket at XT 762893 (air strip).
86. SGT Ferguson called Lai Khe to get CH 47 with waterbag 2003 hrs.
87. 2004 hrs SGT Ferguson commo check with Quarter Pole 1; 5x5.
88. 2010 hrs Commo check with MAJ Neale; 5x5.
89. Delayed Report: 1800 hrs Bridge blown at XT 640705, damage 100%.
90. 2020 hrs Loc Ninh received incoming.
91. Requested Zippo attack 75mm position at Loc Ninh. A/F - Snowball informed this location Zippo was firing on 75mm position.
92. 2030 hrs Message from DEPCORDS, TRAC - indicating need for increased readiness.
93. SGT Ferguson confirmed Spectre on station at Loc Ninh - Danger 79 requested.
94. 2030 hrs At 2030 hrs illumination ship left Loc Ninh area. Loc Ninh taking B-40 and small arms fire at this time.
95. 2100 hrs NVA are broadcasting with a loudspeaker to the District Chief personally, asking him to give up.
96. 2134 hrs Spectre on station with only 1 hour 10 minutes on station because of distance.
97. 2240 hrs Quarter Pole 1R requested a US headcount broken/civilian & military.
98. 2245 hrs Spectre departed Loc Ninh.
99. 2300 hrs (See item #83) Hit by TAC AIR and truck is reported burning.

Wednesday, 5 April 1972 (Continued)

100. 2315 hrs Was notified that the lapses between Spectre's departure and return to station would be rectified if possible.
101. 2330 hrs Loc Ninh receiving incoming at S/S HQ, 01 truck burning.
102. 2350 hrs Spectre back on station, Loc Ninh still receiving sporadic mortar fire.

Thursday, 6 April 1972

103. 0006 hrs VN TOC reported people moving on the southeast side of An Loc, will fire 81 ILL.
104. 0020 hrs Binh Tuy had just received mortar attack, tried to raise Quarter Pole 1, Negative contact, I attempted to relay, negative contact with Quarter Pole 1 or Quarter Pole 2.
105. 0330 hrs Received word from TRAC that there are 10 F-4 scheduled for Binh Long Province.
106. 0125 hrs URS: Enemy, 5th Div forward element passed within 1,000 of XT 723887. 5th NVA Div forward element late afternoon of 5 April.
107. 0159 hrs URS: Reports MR 10 HQ at XT 985859 as of late afternoon 5 April.
108. 0345 hrs CG, 5th ARVN Div has started to attempt to reinforce Loc Ninh. They are fighting their way in.
109. 0400 hrs Suspect Forward Element 5th NVA Div west of An Loc. Only friendly element between An Loc and 5th VC Div are 214, 399 RF and PF Flt.
110. 0403 hrs Commo check with Boxleaf Capone, 5x5.
111. 0415 hrs Snowball 53 relayed message that relief columns are moving toward Loc Ninh supported by A/S effective 0400 hrs.
112. 0420 hrs Relayed above info to Quarter Pole 12, Quarter Pole 12 relayed to Quarter Pole 1C.
113. 0425 hrs Contact with HS 73, advised him of 5th Div push into Loc Ninh.
114. 0530 hrs Loc Ninh taking heavy B-40 fire from west at XU 727083.
115. 0537 hrs Loc Ninh received 75RR & B-40 from west. 9th Rgt Advisors state situation growing critical and requested continuous air coverage. Passed info to Quarter Pole 12 and asked for assistance in obtaining OK for Spectre 15 to refuel at Tan Son Nhut.
116. 0545 hrs Boxleaf MR3 Capone informed this station that additional TAC AIR and FACs on the way and that Spectre 15 is returning to Loc Ninh, will be able to stay on station 1 more hour.
117. 0613 hrs A-37 in support of Loc Ninh, took 51 Cal. hits during Air Strike. Fire coming from NW of south end of runway, 1½ kilo. Aircraft now enroute Saigon.
118. 0642 hrs Request for 4 A/S paralleled by LTC Corley to Lai Khe.
119. 0651 hrs Chico 11 on station.
120. 0715 hrs Delayed Entries: VN report that 0315 hrs 256 RF Co. located at Can Le, XT 735950, came under rocket attack - received 02 rounds 107mm.  
VN report that at 0335 hrs Chon Thanh Subsector was attacked by VC - received 02 rounds B-40 fire.
121. 0730 hrs Message from 62 just received - 02 rounds at coord. 759889 and 755886.
122. 0755 hrs Quarter Pole 1 Air notified us Dean 843 arriving at this location 0800 hrs, will be our Work Chopper.

Thursday, 6 April 1972 (Continued)

123. 0802 hrs Delayed Entries: 0745 hrs VN reports VC fired 02 rounds into air field at XT 762892 - no casualties. Counter battery fired into XT 705900 and XT 706895.

0700 hrs VC mortar attack, 20 rounds 82mm into 211 Compound Tan Khai, XT 769757, counter mortar fire fired into XT 730750.

124. 0803 hrs Informed 33 to meet Ranger 6 bird per 02's instructions.

125. 0826 hrs Contacted by Mighty Snowball for situation up-date - given - he stated nothing significant for their units at this time - requested status of US in Loc Ninh.

126. 0817 hrs - 0827 hrs 33 and Mr. Walkinshaw visited TOC. Mr. Walkinshaw given an up-date on current situation.

127. 0832 hrs Dean 843 called, said he is proceeding north to Loc Ninh with 02 on VR - will monitor our alternate push.

128. 0834 hrs 02 called, stated incoming round landed just south of hospital in populated area - observed from air by 02.

129. 0835 hrs From 88: 01 round landed on soccer field.

130. 0837 hrs From 02: Reports one of Civilian Compound guards heard VC mortars fire from due West of Civilian Compound - approx grid 743889.

131. 0843 hrs 124 & 130 confirmed by VN - report came from Thunder 4.

132. Delayed Entry: 0810 hrs - Quan Loi took incoming rounds - counter mortar at XT 791915.

133. 0846 hrs From 88: Reference 129, 130 and 131 (above) status as follows - 02 rounds 57 RR, 1 serious, 1 slight - rounds landed per spot 129, none at soccer field.

134. 0848 hrs Contacted by 02, has had contact with 73 - is currently taking incoming at this time - further Zippo Charlie has given permission to put hard bombs into Loc Ninh city - 73 states not needed, situation not as critical as Zippo states and 73 has a company in city and police - 02 requested contact Snowball and get Zippo to call off.

135. 0850 hrs Contacted SP Roberts at Lai Khe, he states Zippo Charlie has message (#134) and is rerouting strikes - attempted to notify 02, no success.

136. 0851 hrs 1 more round incoming - appeared to be in vicinity of Snowball - this confirmed by SGT Vycius at 0900 hrs who was on location.

137. 0856 hrs 88 departing on mission.

138. 0902 hrs 88 called, requests status on AIR for his mission - attempting to get read out from Lai Khe. From 02 is on call.

139. 0907 hrs Incoming into area between S-1 and a & L Co. - NW end of soccer field.

140. 0910 hrs 02 call, wants check on 73 and 66 status.

141. 0912 hrs 88 called, units will be in position shortly.

142. 0910 hrs From VN: An Loc reports 01 VC round landed at XT 760893.

143. Reference #129: An Loc reports rounds fired from XT 756877 or XT 760875 - results; 01 civilian KIA, 03 civilians WIA.

144. 0918 hrs VN report situation at Loc Ninh improved, radices tied up can't contact 73 or 66 at this time.

145. 0925 hrs Message from 62 states he observed a VN male age 30, observed at #37 Duong Ngo

Thursday, 6 April 1972 (Continued)

Quyen (AT 753882) watching civilian compound thru binoculars - requested 62 pass to 02.

146. 0928 hrs Citizen 42 inbound 04.

147. 0929 hrs Sabre 37 inbound with radios requested transportation at pad.

148. 0930 hrs 02 requested National Police and Quan Chanh be sent to intersection of road by high school and road to PRU - VN contact QC. They said they would go (0935 hrs).

149. 0943 hrs 88 proceeding on mission - have known VC location to front - calling in Arty on VC position, 773734.

150. 0949 hrs Dean 843 departing Lai Khe - arriving this location 10 - 15 minutes. Notified 33.

151. 0956 hrs Delayed Report: 0800 hrs VC shelled and took Phu Mieng Hamlet, 790913, 257 RF Platoon and PF 33 were assigned to that location.

152. 0959 hrs Lamson taking incoming.

153. 1000 hrs 02 request contact 88C and see if he knows anything about small arms fire NW of An Loc.

154. 1001 hrs Dean 843 will set down at Snowball pad - notified 02.

155. 1002 hrs 02 requested contact 73 or 66, have pilot make bomb assessments on village and hamlets so can plan for refugees - also check on food and water supply; attempting to contact.

156. 1006 hrs 88 called: He is at a halt observing enemy positions.

157. 1010 hrs 62 arrived this location with 4 CVN leaflets attached.

158. Delayed Entry: 1845, 5 April: XT 717753, 07 VC on side of road - QL 13 from Lai Khe to An Loc only cut by mortar round. No road blocks.

159. Reference #153, 1010 hrs unable to contact 88C.

160. 1013 hrs 02 called: Requested we inform 02C that Ranger 6 and 6C enroute to 02's house.

161. 1015 hrs Vanguard 6 Requested Direction & Max ord of Arty out of An Loc - passed 7500' 338°.

162. 1024 hrs 88 called: His location is 767747.

163. 1025 hrs 02 requested we contact TRAC G-4; have them get a water blivet and 25 cases MCI's to Loc Ninh District.

164. 1029 hrs Passed message to G-4 TRAC via CPT Davis, Lai Khe - awaiting his reply - will notify us what TRAC says.

165. 1020 hrs 02 called 66 - water and food finished - VC still around compound - 02 informed 66 that Sector had no plans to resupply district to our knowledge.

166. 1041 hrs 33 inbound, requested vehicle.

167. 1045 hrs Small arms fire, vicinity of Civilian Compound. Also 01 more round incoming, vicinity of air strip (from SGT Ferguson).

168. 1047 hrs From SGT Ferguson: Small arms ceased, only 1 burst of heavy cal. small arms.

169. 1050 hrs Delayed Entry: 0925 hrs 256 RF Platoon reported that at 0700 hrs VC shelled and attacked their compound, XT 722973.

170. 1045 hrs From Thunder 4: VC shelled province with 01 round - round came from west.

171. 1056 hrs No further status on Phu Mieng.

Thursday, 6 April 1972 (Continued)

172. 1059 hrs From 88: RF Co. vicinity 767747 received mortars.

173. 1059 hrs CPT Davis Lai Khe called had passed message (Reference #163 - 164) to G-4. Want to check to be sure was for Loc Ninh - TRAC not sure how going to get it in - nothing further.

174. 1059 hrs Ranger 6 and 02 requested Arty clearance to Loc Ninh (Stay East of QL 13 and there is nothing).

175. 1100 hrs From 02: Contact Snowball and request Gun Ship and FAC on Stand By for 88 who is on operation moving south to clear road, presently using 105, request Gun Ship and FAC for final assault - estimate in 2 $\frac{1}{2}$  hrs.

176. 1105 hrs Reference 175 (above): Contacted Lai Khe, CPT Davis said must go thru 5th ARVN Forward in An Loc (MAJ Borstoff).

177. 1115 hrs Sent CPT Faxon to 5th Div Forward to contact MAJ Borstoff, ref. #175.

178. 1100 hrs RF 6 and 213 RF Platoon made contact with VC, XU 774035. RESULTS: 07 VC KIA, 06 AK and 01 M-79 and 01 B-40 CIA. VC withdrawing to East - no friendly casualties.

179. 1120 hrs Lamson took 01 round of incoming.

180. 1127 hrs 02 requested Arty clearance Loc Ninh to An Loc - okay so long as stay west of QL 13.

181. 1138 hrs From 02: Danger 79C due in to this location in few minutes.

182. 1145 hrs Delayed Entry (Report): At 1115 hrs VC put 01 round into Lamson, XT 747873 - no casualties. See #179.

183. 1147 hrs 62 returned from Snowball's TOC (MAJ Borstoff) - he said call on Burgundy Diagram Freq - said couldn't provide on Stand By as Loc Ninh has priority - if get in contact let him know.

184. 1152 hrs From 30: Multiple choppers landing at An Loc air strip, received automatic small arms fire from NW end of airstrip, took off to engage target if can locate.

185. 1213 hrs Contacted by 66 and 73 on VN net, his situation is not good - they have plenty of air support but wants to know about reinforcements - its going to take men on ground to dig VC out and relieve them - request 02 give him status on the reinforcement plan - also most of equipment at Loc Ninh has been destroyed to include his (73's) which went up in flames. He is going off VN push and will be monitoring Zippo push when we need to contact him. Further 66 says he can't understand why there have been no arc-lights to slow or stop VC reinforcements.

186. 1223 hrs From 88: Will be firing 10 - 15 more rounds in support, then going in - no VC sighted on objective - present location is approx 767737. Also while at that location observed VC unit with 82mm put mortar rounds in RF unit in that vicinity.

187. 1224 hrs Dean 843 was on pad, took off after it received 01 round incoming 50 meters south of chopper - only 01 round landed again.

188. 1203 hrs 988 RF Co. - Platoon made contact with unk size VC force vicinity XT 7568, while attempting to clear road. RESULTS: 01 Friendly WIA.

189. 1240 hrs Contacted CPT Davis, Lai Khe, requested status on MCI and water for Loc Ninh; nothing. Request that they pass to TRAC G-4 that Loc Ninh water tower is gone and they have no water.

190. 1242 hrs From 88: 1st Elements of 88 at objective - no contact or resistance, however have not cleared or consolidated the objective.

191. 1250 hrs Chico 07 enroute to Loc Ninh, spotted 88 column on road is going to check area out for him.

192. 1309 hrs Danger 79 contacted this station and said he had been informed by our 66 element that the RF were looting building - 79 demands we put a stop to it and contact our counterparts on it - notified 02 - 79 said that RF were not manning bunkers.

Thursday, 6 April 1972 (Continued)

193. 1310 hrs 02 contacted Chico 07, requested Gun Ships at 767730 - Chico 07 - VC on either side of road - working with 02C and 88 on this.

194. 1315 hrs Delayed Entry: 1235 hrs 251 RF Co. in contact with VC at XT 793885. RESULTS: Friendly 02 KIA, 03 WIA, 02 weapons LIA.

195. 1320 hrs 02 contact Danger 79 reference looting (#192) and informed him that 02C and 73C would be in contact and handle the situation.

196. 1330 hrs From 88: They are in contact, have taken 57 or 75 into his position - elements of VC to South and East of 88's position.

197. 1329 hrs Received 01 round incoming in wire NE corner of Love (Tri) Compound.

198. 1335 hrs From SGT Smith, TRAC, Dust Off 101 leaving Long Binh at this time for Chon Thanh - contacted Civilian Compound told them to get a backseat lined up for possible use on dust off.

199. 1342 hrs From 88, coord 765712, request Chico 07 look at and put in strikes in a 300 meter radius of center of mass - Chico is trying to get fighters.

200. 1344 hrs Dust Off 101 trying to contact this station.

201. 1345 hrs 88 and Snowball 67 discussing possible use of Youthful Attorney Light Fire Team arrives this location in 10 - 20 minutes.

202. 1353 hrs Passed to 02 from Youthful Attorney that he would have Inferno 65 come up on our push to talk with 88 and assist if possible on way north in approximately 30 minutes.

203. 1355 hrs 02 contacted 88, informed him of link up with 88 forces from 82 location - 66C is coordinating forces for link up.

204. 1357 hrs 02 going south to Chon Thanh to handle Dust Off 101 - base station has not been able to contact Dust Off 101.

205. 1405 hrs From 02: Dust Off complete 1404 hrs.

206. 1405 hrs From 02: Pass to Danger 79 and Snowball 53 that APCs that are supposed to be in southern area are not there - notified SP Roberts at Lai Khe, he will pass to Snowball 53.

207. 1412 Delayed Entry: 1235 hrs 295 RF Co. in contact with VC at XT 860857. RESULTS: 01 Friendly KIA - fighting is underway. Report came from 2LT Loung to VN TOC.

208. 1415 hrs Contacted by Youthful Attorney, Light Fire Team will be in area in 10 - 15 minutes - notified 02.

209. 1418 hrs 02 notified 88 that there are 02 75 RR on either side of highway by dirt road.

210. 1419 hrs Inferno 26 contacted 02.

211. 1420 hrs 02 rounds landed 100 meters outside wire to north of Love Compound per 33 (XT 758-893).

212. 1425 hrs From CPT Davis: APC have not left Lai Khe and will probably not leave until tomorrow AM - notified 02 (Reference #206).

213. 1425 hrs Gave 02 clearance that no Arty going south - (From An Loc AWCC).

214. 1427 hrs Love Compound took 01 round 30 meters to north of S-2 Office (XT 758873).

215. 1430 hrs Strikes in support of 88 started going in on west side of QL 13 - 1440 hrs moving now to hit east side of highway.

216. 1450 hrs Contacted by Sundog 33 (02 FAC) will work for us - will stand by and work for 88, can call TAC AIR if necessary.

Thursday, 6 April 1972 (Continued)

217. 1451 hrs From 02: Contact Quarter Pole 1 Air and request extension on bird.

218. 1455 hrs Called by SP Moak - TFAD - CORDS TRAC Team wants to send a Team up to inspect CORDS Compound - told Moak to tell them we can't handle them - SSG Cox informed us they will not be coming.

219. 1455 hrs No contact with Quarter Pole 1 Air - Moak will try and contact to get a 02 hour extension on WC.

220. 1456 hrs Youthful Attorney contacted 02 - said was a big show underway at QL.

221. 1500 hrs 88 notified this station that his elements have re-established contact - are continuing to move south.

222. 1503 hrs 02 leaving for LK to top off.

223. 1504 hrs 88 taking fire from 75 RR.

224. 1504 hrs SP4 Moak called 02 hour extension granted.

225. 1505 hrs 02 contacted Sundog 33 and requested TAC AIR - coord. 767720.

226. 1525 hrs 88 told by Sundog 33 to pull Forward Element back some so he can put hard bombs in.

227. 1520 hrs Thunder 4 reports 01 107 round landed at XT 762895 - came from West. RESULTS: 04 WIA (Friendly - Ranger Troops).

228. 1545 hrs Snowball informed 02 that Quan Loi and Loc Ninh District are being overrun and there are no air assets in area.

229. 1530 hrs - 1550 hrs Snowball putting in CBU on VC positions at 88's location.

230. 1550 hrs From VN: VC attacking Loc Ninh Subsector.

231. 1600 hrs 02 enroute to 73 - passing over HQ airstrip took some small arms fire from NE on airstrip - 02C has unit going in to investigate, not a RF/PF or 5th Div unit however.

232. 1600 hrs 88 informed us he is moving out - TAC AIR finished off with strafing runs.

233. 1600 hrs SP4 Moak called: Air America wants to send ship in at 0900 - 0930 hrs on 7 Apr - told Moak to tell them we'll advise them in morning if is clear.

234. 1617 hrs 02 update on 73: Water tank has hole in it; food not critical; still need reinforcements; TAC situation about the same as yesterday.

235. 1618 hrs Gave 02 update on 88's situation. 88 now has his counterpart with him - is trying to move south again - has taken B-40 and some small arms fire - attempting to move out.

236. 1618 hrs VN notified us that have AA located at 765895 (north of HQ runway).

237. 1620 hrs Sundog 26 came on push - offering assistance - referred him to 88. Sundog 33 still on station, Sundog 26 return to west.

238. 1625 hrs Delayed Entry: 1600 hrs estimated VC Co. sighted at following locations: 720830, 724830, 728827. VN requested Arty on these positions.

239. 1650 hrs Danger 79 called: Zippo says 66 and 73C want to join Zippo's location - request 02 contact 02C, discuss and let know what they decide.

240. 1650 hrs Sundog 26 in contact with 88 - will supply 88 a Spectre ship (Spooky) if needed, can put ord in within 60 meters of troops - 88C turned it down, can't use.

241. 1658 hrs 02 contacted Danger 79 - 02 & 02C agree is a good idea - are checking out - 79 wants us to pass to....

Thursday, 6 April 1972 (Continued)

242. 1705 hrs Danger 79 wants us to get answer to 73 and 66 element ASAP.

243. 1710 hrs Contacted 88 - he stated is moving north using V100's and 105 to cover move north.

244. 1714 hrs Released Dean 843.

245. 1720 hrs 02 contacted Danger 79 and information that consolidation of S-2C and elements of Zippo was okay - leaving the timing up to 82C.

246. 1725 hrs Per TSGT Scott (27) VN trying to get bird to take 2 seriously wounded south - 27 standing by, waiting further info on chopper.

247. 1730 hrs message from Danger 79 - unit from LN city moving up to Loc Ninh Compound with no difficulty, it will reinforce area - all other units will remain in present locations - per Danger 79 - 02 is passing info to 02C.

248. 1742 hrs Contacted 88: is still enroute to our location.

249. Delayed Entries - 1800 hrs:

- 1645 hrs AL reports 9 82mm mortars fell into Hung Phat Hamlet at XT 860854.
- 1735 hrs AL reports VC came into Loi An Hamlet, XT 798898.

250. 1802 hrs Received incoming 107 rocket round in rubber across from Tri Compound, XT 758872.

251. 1803 hrs Message from SM4 Moak -

Friday, 7 April 1972

252. 1647 hrs All Team 47 personnel except 02, 88 and 36 evacuated from Binh Long Province!!!

253. 1910 hrs Called Boxleaf Capon, requested information on arrival of Team 47 personnel evacuated by CH-47 at 1630 hours, and also status of 4 civilians - evacuated in a Camp Monitor Bird (162) at approximately 1400 hours.

254. 1920 hrs Boxleaf Capon informed this station that all 4 civilians and 16 military personnel of Team 47 were successfully evacuated out of province.

255. 1935 hrs Dynamite 6 to Snowball 53 - instructions given to FAC to keep Spectre on station, also FAC on station over LN. One FAC checked in with Snowball 53. One FAC with Zippo Whiskey.

256. 2023 hrs Chopper will bring SOI code tomorrow at 1400 hours - message from Quarterpole 1 air, Samba 02 informed 1 air that ship must come up on our push prior to arrival.

257. 2032 hrs Snowball informed Youthful Attorney 53 that Dustoff is coming in to pick up 6 WIA at VIP pad. Wanted someone on snowball push to monitor medevac. Snowball 56 passed message.

258. 2045 hrs Cancelled medic mentioned previous note.

259. 2345 hrs Ben Cat, Lai Khe, An Loc, Song Be, Hac Long 01305. Flare ship (VN) working circular route. As they pass over Sector they use Hac Long calling on spector frequency. Passed to Province Chief 2350 hrs.

Saturday, 8 April 1972

260. 0009 hrs Three rounds of 82mm landed in vicinity of sector compound! Firing psn. 719869. Unable to reach TRAC on "B" secure - called Lai Khe and requested 5th Division CPT Santor to pass. He complied. 5th Division also informed this station that secure had been compromised and was to be used only in emergency!

Saturday, 8 April 1972 (Continued)

261. 0120 hrs Call from Snowball 56 reference CBS newsmen - did they get out? Affirmative.

262. 0140 hrs Snowball 56 requested st tus on contact between Hac Long and spector. Lai Khe looking into the problem.

263. 0150 hrs G-1, TRAC requested number of American personnel remaining with Team 47 in An Loc. Answer passed through Snowball 56 in Lai Khe.

264. 0245 hrs Called 5th Division in Lai Khe - requested info on situation in Phuoc Long - negative information - 5th Div hasn't had contact with Phuoc Long for past hour. Also requested MAJ Foltz to pass on to TRAC that we had negative green capability.

265. 0310 hrs Monitored call from Sundog 33 to Snowball 67 reference mortar flashes due west of An Loc. Negative incoming reported.

266. 0308 hrs Two incoming rounds landed in Lam Son Compound. Negative casualties. Passed to Lai Khe. Lai Khe passed to TRAC (MAJ Foltz)!

267. 0340 hrs Lam Son artillery Compound under attack. Coordinates XT 747873.

268. 0350 hrs Notified Quarterpole 1 Lam Son receiving fire. Requested flare ship and gunships.

269. 0400 hrs 56 and 67 are 55.90. Youthful Attorney on 59.45.

270. 0410 hrs American flare ship came on station in VN. Said they had him on board. Tried to contact . . .

271. 0420 hrs Cleared fire for Coordinates XT 740870.

272. 0425 hrs Cleared 720870, 740870, 720850, 740850 for fire. Received report "No Gas" at contact at 747873.

273. 0430 hrs Tact Air on station to strike 740870.

274. 0435 hrs Lai Khe said no U.S. on flare ship.

275. 0440 hrs Passed 7084, 7185, 7089, 7189 to Youthful Attorney 53. Area cleared this afternoon.

276. 0700 hrs FAC reports vehicles moving north on Highway 13 north of Cam Le.

277. 0943 hrs Dean 816 (Work Chopper showed up).

278. We're going to get batteries and water - OK. Intel passed to Phuoc Long. E-6 and 174 Loc Ninh - E-6 has broken away and moving south along the Saigon corridor. 165 is 8-10 Kilometers west of An Loc. 272 NE of An Loc. An Loc is receiving incoming rockets and mortars and helicopters are receiving anti-aircraft fire as they come and go. Minh Thanh Village in Chon Thanh District is under fire. The forward elements are known to have 75 and 57mm recoilless, 82mm, B-40, and B-41 rockets. For all intents and purposes Loc Ninh has been conceded to the NVA. We believe that APC's formerly belonging to 74th Rangers and Cav are now in the hands of the enemy moving towards Bo Dup. 745875 contact.

279. 0820 hrs AC provide cover for Chinooks on 64.50 freq.

280. 0820 hrs Passed message to Lai Khe to hold WC, and to come up on Admin Net. Terminal push 64.50 to Lai Khe.

Sunday, 9 April 1972

281. 1220 hrs Reported two VNAF helicopters went down at grid XU 774745, passed to Rawhide Crickett 1221 hrs.

Sunday, 9 April 1972 (Continued)

282. 1225 hrs Passed report of downed choppers to CORDS Duty Officer.

283. 1235 hrs Corrected report only 1 slick down. Blue Max recon, shot out.

284. 1255 hrs Troops on highway unarmed; outpost checking it. 762910 proved to be civilians.

285. Where is Airborne Bde? Where is TAC Air? Passed question to III CORPS - 2 companies in heavy contact of the Bde - location unknown - Emphasized that we have the targets but not sufficient TAC Air to engage them - emphasized the request for TAC and FAC. 5 Bn. North 5 West - 5 split between East and South - Estimate by 5th Div.

286. 1340 hrs Trying to get heavy fire support - Dynamite 6.

287. 1355 hrs Based to III Corps Duty Officer - weather closing.

288. 1400 hrs Cleared box 7085-7087/7487-7485 for open fire for Spectre, center grid 728863, 750857 friendly outpost.

289. 1415 hrs 707869, 708869, 709769, 711870, 70968709, 70968706 - first set of grids came from Dynamite 6, G-3.

290. 1435 hrs Friendly - Hit 1 grid north of railroad tracks, 762930.

291. 1440 hrs 750911 to west 3 or 4 clicks - free fire area. Comet.

Monday, 10 April 1972

292. 1300 hrs RF Co. reported AA at 794882, Div. notified OK to fire on it.

293. 1310 hrs Div. (adv) want to know if there will be a mail bird today - advised them . . .

294. 1315 hrs Spot from FAC - bridge (reference #292.) looks destroyed. Structure standing but no main part. RR bridge standing with some rail ties intact. Looks like a ford site where river splits at RR bridge. There are 2 trucks in compound to south of Cam Le. Many trucks north of Cam Le - possible target for Spectre aircraft tonight (ie; ford site). ~~Target analysis: 7085-7087/7487-7485~~

295. 1325 hrs Danger 79 (Hollingsworth) coming to see Tunnel 10 (Miller) at 1305 hours. Corley and Nhut will meet also.

296. Called Lai Khe - no mail bird for Miller (reference #293 above).

297. TAC Air put on 212 Co. - Div. was notified of 212 location (reconfirmed again by me). Apparently VN at Div. did not tell advisors(?) - results 20 KIA/WIA (mixed). Corrected update 10 WIA, 3 KIA.

298. 1405 hrs Tomahawk 6 (Col Casey) seriously wounded, medevac being called into Lai Khe.

299. 1455 hrs Minh Thanh under mortar and rocket attack (643669).

300. 1500 hrs CPT Ingram Lai Khe called with message to be passed to Col Miller.

301. 1500 hrs Received report Minh Thanh under mortar, rocket and ground attack.

302. 1500 hrs XU 741081 reported to have an enemy Reg't. CP within 900 m.

303. Reference #300 - CPT Ingram Lai Khe sent following message for Col Miller.

1. Airborne has linked up South of Chon Thanh. 1 more kilometer of road to clear.
2. 21st Div. moving north to Chon Thanh.
3. VN CH-47 bringing in ammo to An Loc.

Monday, 10 April 1974 (Continued)

304. Passed coordinate 643669 (reference #301) to Tunnel concerning the Minh Thanh outpost under attack.

305. 1530 hrs Tunnel wants to know where FAC and TAC Air is? Lai Khe is trying to get through to TRAC for answer.

306. 1605 hrs Striking YT 721981 (Spectre).

307. 1700 hrs MAJ Neale call from III Corps. Talked with Gen McGiffert reference "spirit of offensive." He agreed 5th must push out. Also the 2 headquarters should be collocated for coordinates.

308. 101500 Apr 72 - Matter of Record: on 101500 Apr

a. Div. was requested to put air into Minh Thanh area.

b. Request was denied because of the stated position "this is NOT in our area."

c. Col Miller says everything below 80 line belong to higher. He was advised yesterday (9th) that this command (5th Div) had only this small area around An Loc and everything below the 80 line belonged to higher. This message supposedly came from "someone back there."

d. LTC Corley called Bien Hoa. They had no knowledge of the above.

309. 1730 hrs 1st chopper with emergency medical supplies arrived. Second bird due soon.

310. 1835 hrs VN request Spectre SPT for Minh Thanh. Minh Thanh will not have arty spt tonight.

311. 1940 hrs Lai Khe called to see if we had any new Sky spot targets. Also we will have Stinger, Spectre and FAC spt tonight.

312. 1945 hrs Called Div. reference #311. Will get answer ASAP also answer on item #310. /— (1.) Sky Spot to fire the 20 targets already submitted and any of the old ones not yet fired. (2) Spectre cannot work tonight (effectively) if weather doesn't improve, however if he can work and An Loc doesn't have him tied up he can spt Minh Thanh (VN TOC advised).

313. 2015 hrs Sector B-52 strikes called into Div.

a. 648688, 660673, 668669, 658690.

b. 615675, 622670, 633699, 642692.

c. 6890, 6897, 6990, 6987.

d. 7087, 7086, 7387, 7386.

e. 7795, 7792, 7895, 7892.

f. 720910, 730905, 710884, 720880. End of Day.

Tuesday, 11 April 1972

314. 0700 hrs Div. advised FAC that a report from towns people at YT 791895. People of that village being pushed west towards An Loc with VC following behind and partially mixed in.

315. 0715 hrs Received request to use Spectre primary to adjust FAC aircraft. Receiving attack from west - 3 kilometers out, E-3 kilometer out, S-1.5 kilometer out. Gave permission. Additional FACs on way, spectre aircraft on station.

316. 0735 hrs Col Thanh advised large enemy force 739881. Relayed to 74A./Div. going to see primary to adj FACs. Advised 74A we would use alternate if we needed him.

317. 0825 hrs Col Nhut feels main force may be trying to withdraw. People say VC withdrew last

Tuesday, 11 April 1972 (Continued)

317. Continued - night but guerrillas. Rocket Site 720905 calling in air.

318. 0830 hrs Col Thanh requested air for Minh Thanh which is under ground and rocket attack. (Delayed entry; should have been 0820 hrs)

319. 0830 hrs Received rocket fire from 720905. Tunnel 74A says it will take 15 minutes to get TAC AIR.

320. 0850 hrs Passed blocks for TAC AIR a. 708916, 705913, 725905, 722899 b. 6992, 7193, 7192, 6990.

321. 0855 hrs Col Thanh - 747857 mortar site (82) relayed info. - Passed to Div. 0905 hours.

322. 0925 hrs XT 780905 82mm possible location. Passed to Div. 0927 hrs.

323. 0940 hrs 2-57rr in woods XT 764821 passed to Div 0943 hours.

324. 0952 hrs Requested TAC AIR apt 500 meters around Minh Thanh post (634668) with exception of village on SW corner. Passed to Div. 1000 hours, Div. getting FAC to coordinates.

325. 1005 hrs Received rocket fire.

326. 1007 hrs Soc Be - MAJ Thinh reported alone that location.

327. 1025 hrs MAJ Thinh recovered.

328. 1030 hrs Davidson last seen at Xom Bung - 750060.

329. 1030 hrs Wanat last seen at XT 730036.

330. 1035 hrs Many VC - 744967, passed.

331. 1040 hrs Villager of Binh Tay, 738882, report tanks moving East toward An Loc.

332. 1040 hrs a. AA site 793883 (passed).  
b. Rocket 6993 - 7192, 6992 - 7193.  
c. Rocket 708916 - 725905, 722899 - 705913.  
d. Rockets 746852.

333. 1100 hrs Mortar position 6992 - 6990 passed, 7192 - 7190.

334. 1240 hrs MAJ Thinh debriefed and debrief passed to LTC Midgett.

335. 1255 hrs Request CBU 55 on coordinates 650650, 660650, 650670, 660670 also 650670, 657680, 635680, 640690 (passed to Div.).

336. 1200 hrs Requested CBU 55 at coordinates 647670, 643675, 785889 (mortar position and pt targets), passed to Div.

337. 1220 hrs 766823 - position of 57mm.

338. 1347 hrs Mortar positions - 690920, 710920, 710900, 690900. Passed to 5th Div. Pink team dispatched immediately.

339. 1350 hrs Mortars (rocket launcher sites) reported - 705927, 711924, 696933, 695934, 710925. Passed to Div.

340. 1430 hrs Reported mortar, rocket and 105 firing into An Loc Sector Compound, XT 822907 (passed to Div.).

341. 1440 hrs AA fire from 780890 (passed).

Tuesday, 11 April 1972 (Continued)

342. 1450 hrs XT 770870 still has population there. Called into Div.

343. 1455 hrs Request Arc Light ASAP at 690925, 708942, 720900, 636916, called into to CORDS. Set AF - MK NEI, LAO WDX, SBH NAT, SCM NVR.

344. 1525 hrs Called Bien Hoa - request all Spectre aircraft must have infrared capability when sent up - if not send them w/o it - but send them!!

345. 1540 hrs Enemy mortar position 730753 - relayed to Div.

346. 1607 hrs Armed vehicle at 691955 (Comet 65 just reported) Div. is aware of it - also notified Dynamite.

347. Spectre requests B-52s following areas - 637647, 644643, 649667, 655663, 65-662, 658665, 641683, 643687. Out of 105 ~~ammo~~, need ASAP. Passed to Div.

348. 1655 hrs Called into Lai Khe coordinates of Col Miller (Tunnel 10). 7547/8787 - MICR/SMIR.

349. 1657 hrs Received 2 rounds 82mm.

350. 1745 hrs Evacuated MAJ Thinh on Huey #533. Pilot briefed on his importance. Received heavy .51 cal. fire and rockets on LZ.

351. 1805 hrs Enemy howitzer positioned at 699997.

352. 2010 hrs Made radio commo with MAJ Davidson. Escaped and Evasion into 31st Regt. area An Loc (NW corner).

353. 2020 hrs Advised CPT Hensley. Told him of recovery of Davidson and told him to pass the word to TRAC.

354. 2035 hrs Received call from Bonito asking if all was quiet here. Gave him a "yes."

355. 2125 hrs Finished long talk with MAJ Neale - news is encouraging.

356. 2237 hrs Spectre 21 arrived on station with Rash 13.

Wednesday, 12 April 1972

357. 0025 hrs Spectre 21 went off station had almost expended and sky spot was due in area.

358. 0040 hrs Rash 14 came on post. Weather ceiling 3500' doesn't look real good.

359. 0400 hrs ARC Light into area West of An Loc (center of mass 720920) FAC reported secondary explosions.

360. 0100 hrs Received call from Hensley no stinger until 0230 hours. Requested he try and get that moved up.

361. 0130 hrs FAC reported vehicle moving WNW out of Quan Loi area with lights ON. Couldn't shoot arty because it's too dark for FAC to give a grid. NO Spectre available. Div. calling to higher to find out why we have no Spectre during hours of darkness.

362. 0145 hrs Small contact on west perimeter. No details yet.

363. 0155 hrs Spectre 05 in-bound.

364. 0200 hrs ARC Light to North and East (center of mass 732912).

365. 0200 hrs Spectre 05 out. Need illumination on Western perimeter in contact area.

366. 0210 hrs Spectre 05 on station.

Wednesday, 12 April 1972 (Continued)

367. 0215 hrs Small action (reference #362) involved springing of 05 mech. ambushes.

368. 0245 hrs Whiz Wheel posted - Day 12.

369. 0400 hrs Checked with COL Nhut. He feels it will be at least 0900 before Davidson will be at this location, therefore sent following message to Hensley at Bien Hoa:

a. Request medevac chopper for MAJ Davidson O/A 0900 hours.

b. Recommend chopper include; stretcher, tie down straps, Dr./medic, and member of Team 47. It is felt that the sight of a familiar face during evac will be in the best interest of the evadee.

c. Will contact Bien Hoa in AM for recommended specific ETA of evac chopper. There is no point in a first light arrival as all the incoming chopper setting on the soccer field is attracting indirect fire as happened today during insertion of re-enforcements.

370. 0410 hrs Rash 14 leaving station. Rash 05 coming on.

371. 0515 hrs Specter 74 arrived on station. Arrived with no flares.

372. 0515 hrs Rash 05 detected trucks on North side of RR bridge and other troop movements to east of that bridge. (Maybe truck supplies down and hand carry supplies rest of way—my comment.)

373. 0630 hrs Talked with Hensley - ARVN assetting into Binh Long today medevac chopper to follow along. Recommend they follow what I already coordinated with COL Nhut.

374. 0635 hrs Advisor to 3rd Rgr Group called LI. Suggested a pick up vicinity XT 763895 (intersec of trail and Highway 13) around 0800 hrs. Land Line phone # unknown... ask for 3rd Rgr Grp Lien Duan Quan-Ba. (Corley—"too damn many people already getting involved.")

375. 0640 hrs ARC Light hit to west of An Loc.

376. 0645 hrs Corley talked to Hensley. Delvin (26) will come up on our push. ETA medevac is 0900 hours.

377. 0645 hrs Contacts at XT 735886 and XT 740830. Tunnel 10 has called for TAC AIR and alerted gunships. Monitored his transmission - he said VNs say "many VC".

378. 0920 hrs XT 784910 - 75rr position putting fire on AF and an observation post - passed to Div. - Incoming 82mm - Div put TAC AIR on it.

379. 0923 hrs ARC Light at XT 7592.

380. 0932 hrs Tail #392. Chopper taking Blair and Davidson to Bien Hoa from Lai Khe.

381. 0945 hrs 107 round hit at 753875. 1 KIA and 3 WIA. Passed info to Div. - we will observe and if we learn where it is coming from we will pass that also.

382. 1100 hrs Civilians reported that between 730820 and 740850 200 dead NVA were observed.

383. General Comments - positioning of 7th Regt in City Park was ill advised - endangered civilians plus it put arty in a position where it could not fire supporting fires nor put down final protective barrage of all sides of An Loc - COL Nhut to cover this, put his 105s on the North and South of An Loc to fill in the gap. The Province Chief also constantly pushed his troops outward to locate the enemy - after this proved infeasible, he had his intel platoon and PRU get into civilian clothes and move about in 360° in an effort to positively identify enemy locations. His units provided excellent info on rocket and mortar positions which enabled TAC Air to destroy them.

384. 1118 hrs Call from LTC Abramowitz. Air lifts are going in - being run by Bien Hoa or Saigon - doesn't know exactly who yet but they are working on it. Chinook are working for ABN now but will be working for An Loc this afternoon - trying to keep supplies coming - Abn had a contact this morning at 67 line - Passed to COL Miller at 1130 hours.

385. 1122 hrs Mr. Rice called. Rice, dried fish and milk are all ready to come just as soon as we pass the word. Notified him to plan for an estimated 20,000.

Wednesday, 12 April 1972 (Continued)

386. CCL Nhut's intell - 777836, 1 plt VC; 797835, 1 Co. VC. Passed to Div. at 1132 hours.

387. 1138 hrs 82mm incoming.

388. 1140 hrs ARV Light at XT 8090.

389. 1157 hrs 7393, 7396, 7893, 7896 - possible 105 howitzer site, passed to Div.

390. 1158 hrs 82mm incoming. Notified Div.

391. 1223 hrs B-52 strike in block 3. Div. CG and COL Nhut agree! COL Nhut again initiated. 770930, 782935, 784900, 797904.

392. 1231 hrs Incoming 82mm approximately 6 rounds.

393. 775835, 790835, many VC digging in, observed by RF. Passed to Div. at 1238 hours.

394. 795830 - VC moved to this location after air strike on 393 above. Notified Div.

395. VC at XT 790836 withdrew to XT 803842. Passed to Div. at 1308 hrs.

396. 1313 hrs At XT 795830 many VC with crew served weapons - passed immediately to Div.

397. On 1450 hrs, 5th ABN Bn. captured one POW at XT 763685. Unit: B41 Co, 7th Division, rank: soldier. B41 Co, 7th Div. is antitank unit. Crew mission of 7th Div is attack the reinforcements from Chon Thanh to Tau-o. 209 Regiment, 7th Division from XT 761670 to 760622. 165 Regiment, 7th Division from XT 762692 to 761708. It's Headquarters, Information, Recon of 7th Division at XT 760691. 141 Regiment, 7th Division from XT 761710 to 762745. Each Infantry Regiment must set up one antitank company. Moved from Cambodia (unknown coordinates) on 30 March, reached Chon Thanh on 5 April with 20 days of ration.

398. 1349 hrs At XT 793830, many VC taking a break, passed to Div. at 1355 hours.

399. 1353 hrs At XT 780903, PF saw 2 vehicles with troops. Div. knows already!!

400. 1515 hrs Colonel Belknap, TRAC G-2 and Major Blair left the area safely.

401. 739879 after air strikes 01 ammo dump was hit with explosions for about 10 minutes.

402. 730880 mobile mortar truck on the road.

403. There were 02 big guns with camouflage at XT 757916. Passed to Div.

404. Discussed general situation with COL Miller and utilization of CPT Hall and CPT Gaynor - OK'd by Miller and he understands.

405. 1634 hrs 82mm incoming.

406. 1802 hrs 82mm incoming.

407. 1807 hrs Heavy Arty warning (Item #391).

408. 1808 hrs 82mm incoming 02 Rounds, passed to 5th Division.

409. 1912 hrs 82mm incoming at Cashews location, 03 rounds.

410. 2007 hrs 2 rounds incoming - 82mm.

411. 2345 hrs 1 round incoming - 82mm - it sounded like it was traveling East to West - advised Division.

412. 2350 hrs 211th RF Company reports forward edge of airborne Bde is located approximately at XT 765920.

413. General report submitted at approximately 1915 hrs. 60 rounds. VC digging definite posi-

Wednesday, 12 April 1972 (Continued)

413. Continued - tions, 835-E-W.

Thursday, 13 April 1972

414. 0059 hrs 82mm impacted - Division notified.

415. 0430 hrs Trucks moving vicinity 79-89 reported to Division by Cashew.

416. 0431 hrs Tanks reported moving South on QL 13. Reported by Cashew - Spectre 10 sent to check it out.

417. 0350 hrs Delayed report - Spectre destroyed 04 trucks vicinity XU 6823.

418. 0449 hrs 798835 tanks reported to Division by Cashew - Spectre found and engaging 02 tanks.

419. 0510 hrs Vehicles reported moving vicinity 804860, 800862 to the North.

420. 0517 hrs 788895 05 tanks reported by S-D 23 to Cashew - Cashew reported to Division. Spectre is engaging.

421. 0521 hrs Ammo going off - hit by Arty at . . .

422. 0523 hrs Spectre stopped 05 tanks, 01 more spotted and engaged.

423. 0530 hrs New coordinates for tanks, 786896.

424. 0542 hrs 01 tank of 6 knocked out by Spectre. *P.C.*

425. 0548 hrs Incoming 82mm, 02 rounds.

426. 0558 hrs Tanks moving South-East - Cashew reported to 5th Division.

427. 0620 hrs Another flight A-37 arrived with mixed load CBU-25, 750 lb Napalm, rockets.

428. 0625 hrs Report of 23mm AAA from SD 23. 794883.

429. 0629 hrs 20 to 25 tanks on East side of city - passed to Bien Hoa 786896 E. 794897 - 23mm 51 Cal.

430. 0910 hrs Passed to Division - 799862, troops; 800855, APC; 800860, troops.

431. 251st is on the top of the hill.

432. During most critical phase led by APC and tanks. Province Chief and Staff are taking positive steps to eliminate armed vehicles with M-72 LAWs. Destroyed 6 to 10. Province Chief in complete control, Staff responds to his directives. Under fire and pressure he is extremely cool, level headed, shows concern about friendlies. Decisive in his instructions. His personnel responded to his direction.

433. 0931 hrs 771896. 3 tanks and many troops moving from that coordinate in a SW direction.

434. 0940 hrs APCs we fired at 800865 were not destroyed but moved to 803845.

435. 0950 hrs 7691 - tanks moving south down QL 13.

436. 0952 hrs Province Chief moved 105 to South side of town. Firing point blank at tanks and APCs.

437. 1003 hrs Informed 5th Division to tell Cobras not to fire into market place without having target.

438. 1005 hrs Informed CORDS TAC AIR not stacking up. Heavy contact on north side of town.

Thursday, 13 April 1972 (Continued)

439. 1009 hrs POW brought to Sector HQs for interrogation. He is a member of a tank company equipped with T-54s. 226 Co. M-72 Bn - tank destroyed at XT 759871.

440. 1020 hrs Another POW brought to Sector for interrogation.

441. 1022 hrs 805855 VC and tanks. Passed.

442. 1025 hrs Info from POW - linked with element of 5th Division (NVA) at Soc Trao (H) to attack An Loc City.

443. 1036 hrs POW is from 226 Co. M-72 Bn. or A-3 Bn. - Unit equipped with 09 T-54s, Name: Van Mai, 22 years old, CPL, NVA - Radio in every tank, log support, 04 persons per tank.

444. 1042 hrs Info passed reference POWs to CORDS.

445. 1052 hrs Informed 5th Division that more M-72 and 90mm recoilless needed to combat tanks that M-72 has with them.

446. 1100 hrs XT 753892 many VC with 3 tanks. Passed to Division.

447. 1107 hrs 802843 breaking from that point with tanks and troops to South East.

448. 1116 hrs 775 870 Talked to Danger 79 reference position of RF. Gave him the block as a no fire - 780750, 780780, 775750, 775780 (Friendlies).

449. 1120 hrs Further report on POW: Came from Cambodia in Feb 72. He was in Six Thu Chun Village. On 13 April he and his company moved out from Quan Loi. As they moved toward An Loc they were hit by aircraft at 0500 - after dodging the aircraft they attacked An Loc. His tank was attacked as it moved into the center of town and destroyed.

450. 1143 hrs 785884 - AAA (Machine gun) reported by Tiger 36 (Rangers).

451. 1150 hrs Call sign and Freq for Tanks attacking An Loc - Commander 52, frequency 212250. Passed to III CORPS for monitoring.

452. 1200 hrs Checked with Province Chief reference 766873 - 764878 line and stream 7686 grid. Province Chief said they may be montagnard.

453. 1206 hrs No contacts reported from 7th, 8th or 52nd Regiments - only people in contact are Rangers and RF/PF. Question: What are the other Regiments doing?

454. 1226 hrs XT 760862 - AA site dug in (hit with Cobras, unsuccessful).

455. 1228 hrs 761810 - 764810 For Highway. 50 to 100 meters on both sides of QL 13 - 767792 and 772793.

456. 1233 hrs Guards at Civilian Compound furnished the retreating 5th Div Arty troops M-72s with which they destroyed 01 tank.

457. 1236 hrs SGT Luong WIA slightly on resupply mission.

458. 1240 hrs ARC Light in Block 4 to West of An Loc.

459. 1245 hrs Heavy Arty unit that supported tanks location 02 KM North of air strip.

460. 1300 hrs 767892 Elements in contact with tanks.

461. 1312 hrs Numbers of T-54 tanks - 949, 946, 938, 937, 939, 949, 943, 948, and 952 is Command tank. Operated on 21.00 Freq.

462. 13.. hrs Moonbeam - maybe call sign of air drop for LAWs.

463. 1338 hrs 16 Kms from Tri Compound (would make it the 712 grid line). I don't believe this!!

464. 1338 hrs 90 LAWs on the way - ETA will be provided.

Thursday, 13 April 1972 (Continued)

465. 1340 hrs Radio was pulled out of T-54 tank - radio setting 21250 - type of radio - Russian P-113.

466. 1347 hrs At XT 7791 . . . until 1350 hrs.

467. 745867 secondary explosions.

468. 1430 hrs XT 734898 possible tank location and AA position.

469. 1435 hrs 775903 possible AA site (Notified III CORPS to give Div. their freq so we could help get 123 in and out).

470. 1442 hrs 732S98 direct hit with secondary explosion.

471. 1450 hrs 795887 and 805863 possible mortar positions firing into 251 position (hill at 789-858). Passed to Cashew.

472. 1455 hrs 780855 possible tank site (by troops) - passed to Division.

473. 1500 hrs XT 806867, 805854 Enemy digging in - 793883 mortar position.

474. 1620 hrs 785855 . . 785875 . . 810860 Enemy moving to West. Passed to Division.

475. 1626 hrs XT 785875, 810860, 785855 troop concentrations.

476. 1637 hrs 795889 many VC that are in the open.

477. 1645 hrs 765750 03 NVA Co. attacking 211th RF Co. position. Reported to 5th Division - need A/S. 767755.

478. 1658 hrs Stinger, Spectre, Flare ships, TAC AIR, FACs promised from III Corps.

479. 1715 hrs Tanks at 764893.

480. 1725 hrs Plots for B-52 strikes for close in defense of An Loc City:

- a. 750902, 750896, 780902, 780896.
- b. 770893, 770868, 760893, 780368.
- c. 765860, 770865, 780840, 785845.
- d. 723865, 780870, 742846, 750852.
- e. 724380, 730875, 740900, 745895.
- f. 749850, 757851, 753820, 761820.
- g. 766340, 766830, 792340, 792830.

481. 1730 hrs 761855 - AA position called report to . . .

482. 1859 hrs 211 Co. in heavy contact at 770756. Fire on outside of box - 767753, 775553, 767-760, 775760. Passed to Division.

483. 2015 hrs Called MAJ Allen at III Corps. Cont. 2 FAC. Stinger 12 at 1800-2100, Spectre 06 at 2130-2330, Stinger 14 at 2400-0300, Spectre 04 at 0300-0500, Spectre 01 at 0500-0700. Between now and 0600 - 35 sorties F4 Frag. Do have orders. One hour apart. Flare ship - no plan at this time.

484. 775752 to 775760 as 1st priority. Shoot there and anything else around the outpost shoot it.

Saturday, 14 April 1972

485. 0101 hrs Incoming, 122mm.

486. 0103 hrs Incoming, 122mm.

487. 0104 hrs Incoming, 122mm.

Saturday, 14 April 1972 (Continued)

488. 0105 hrs Incoming, 122mm.

489. 0330 hrs 836886 tank. 05 or 06 tanks - using black out drive. Passed to Division.

490. 0440 hrs 122mm rounds coming from 728879. Have been taking 01 round every 15 to 20 minutes since 0330 hours.

491. 0515 hrs 122mm incoming - power out - informed Division.

492. 0525 hrs Power restored - ARC Light at Loc Ninh.

493. 0600 hrs Incoming 122mm. Heavy.

494. 0615 hrs XT 753863 possible launching and mortar site - air strike put in.

495. 0620 hrs XT 757860, 765860. VC along this line.

496. 0650 hrs South 864 and West of 780 grid line EW line stops at QL 13.

Day of decision

497. 0655 hrs With reference 0650 . . .

498. 0658 hrs 18 minutes from now or 0716 - Heavy arty warning.

499. 0659 hrs Province Chief gave clearance to fire at any armed vehicle inside of the city. Passed to Division.

500. 0711 hrs ARC Light.

501. 0650 hrs Delayed Report - Friendlies at 765845 PF 2. Passed to Div.

502. 0713 hrs 211th still at 770756.

503. 0735 hrs 86 line just east and west of QL 13 - for approximately 100 meters. Passed to Division.

504. NO strike requests were forwarded to division until we (Team 47) assured ourselves that the VN had already passed it to 5th Division on the VN side - After several days we reached an understanding that in the interest of time the Sector personnel would not give us info until after they had already passed it - This expedited coordination immensely.

505. 0742 hrs Small stuff 760883 enemy concern ration. Called 52nd Regt. and asked them to also check!

506. 0752 hrs 668904 Intell reports enemy location.

507. 0810 - 0835 hrs ARC Light warning - aircraft clear the area.

508. 0822 hrs CP location for 2/7 Regt 755872 disposed laterally with troops out  $\frac{1}{2}$  Km to S and SW.

509. Squad size contacts this morning - no further indications of movement - nothing since 0630 hours.

510. 0827 hrs ARC Light NE of An Loc.

0827 hrs Minh Thanh reported under attack. 3/25 CP at 645669. Request air strike at 660680 against troops.

512. 0834 hrs 760884 - plt of NVA - Cashew handling.

513. 0850 hrs Mortar/rocket attacks 0600 hours TF 52 - 4 KIA, 3 WIA.

514. 0853 hrs VC troops moving W to E 770845, 782848. Passed to Div.

Saturday, 14 April 1972 (Continued)

515. 0857 hrs 768904 AA from village.

516. 08.. hrs 792873 enemy troops moving to north. Passed to division - A/S already planned.

517. 0930 hrs 772860 many VC. 757867 friendlies - don't shoot.

518. 0940 hrs 765845 to 789860 friendlies possibly took one marking round on their position.

519. 0943 hrs 762855 many VC at that location - strike from N to S for 300 meters.

520. 0945 hrs 767878 VC at that location.

521. 0950 hrs 780855 PF location 790860.

522. 0955 hrs PF 2 is no longer at 765845.

523. 1006 hrs Cam Lai Bridge repaired - put A/S on it - from Dynomite 6. Passed to Division.

524. 1030 hrs Small arms fire SE-SW perimeter. B-40 round fired at Sector Headquarters - missed 500 meters - west. Passed to Division.

525. 1032 hrs Resupply ships not taking fire. Passed to Division.

526. 1125 hrs Heavy Arty Warning.

527. 1128 hrs TAC Air strike with CBU-25 - inadvertently results 05 KIA, 15 WIA in Tiger 36 unit. Position marking error unknown at this time.

528. 1145 hrs 643710 2 vehicles and many VC bunkers.

529. 1154 hrs Incoming 122mm.

530. 1156 hrs 768860 1 plt VC. Passed to Division.

531. 1200 hrs From 82 to 85. EW grid line along QL 13 - VC are establishing mortar positions. Passed to Division. 300 meters.

532. 1215 hrs Counter arty fire being adjusted by Sundog 13.

533. 1216 hrs Contact with 7th Regt. SW perimeter VC support with mortar fire. Passed to Division.

534. 1217 hrs 785844 - 750864 probable rocket/mortar sites.

535. 1229 hrs 775865 friendly troops at listed coordinate.

536. 1240 hrs From 86.7 EW to 87.0 line west of QL 13 CBU-55. Requested by Division.

537. 1307 hrs 765882 from there to E 220 meters. Tiger 36 local.

538. 1320 hrs 765862 enemy, 100 moving N along railroad tracks.

539. 1401 hrs 808889 - Tank tracks moving along road and hiding in rubber.

540. 1407 hrs 765882 VC to East contact.

541. 1414 hrs Tanks at 808889.

542. 1417 hrs 796874 01 Co. VC in Tan Loi (H). Passed to Division.

543. 1426 hrs 739968 Troops in open. West into tree line. 4 choppers took moderate fire. Reported to Division.

544. 1446 hrs ABN Brigade being inserted 800-860 (initially 1 Co.)

Saturday, 14 April 1972 (Continued)

545. 1447 hrs Incoming.

546. 1530 hrs 792843 Enemy Anti-aircraft site. Passed to Division.

547. 1533 hrs Incoming.

548. 1630 hrs 795834, 805855, 812871 AA position and mortar position.

549. 1720 hrs 765812 tanks and trucks - passed to Division.

550. 1655 hrs Major Haney, 52nd Regt Advisor WIA by incoming rocket.

551. 1730 hrs PF 2, RF 251 and rangers are together at 790360. 2 FACs, 1 Spectre and 1 stinger - 1 flare ship is available if needed and requested. 758975 - corner of soccer field - 3 C130s re-supply drop.

552. 1850 hrs 211th Co. 770775 in heavy contact.

553. Enemy attack N, S and E - passed to Div.

554. 1905 hrs Lam Son Compound reports muzzle flashes in direction of 724598.

555. 1930 hrs 754865 enemy setting up a gun position.

556. 2040 hrs 865 line and south on SE of QL 13 from 300 meters E of Highway to 300 meters E.

557. 2035 hrs 3 tanks SW of compound with troops. CBU was put in on top.

558. 2047 hrs 06 tanks reported 762838 - 781830.

559. General Comment: Spectre should come on station ready to go - he has been arriving without bore-sighting his guns - a process which takes 20 minutes of station time.

560. 2110 hrs From XT 760849 to 762836 along QL 13 observed six tanks. Passed to Div.

561. 2123 hrs 759857 . . .

562. 2132 hrs Search and strike below the 865 line - for and against tanks.

563. 2155 hrs Spectre picked up a tank 8 or 9 Km South of An Loc. Kill anything South of 860 line.

564. 2210 hrs 200 meters east of road . . .

565. 2216 hrs XT 746882 2 or 3 tanks sited. Passed to Div.

566. 2300 hrs Spectre was hosing down an area with mini guns instead of looking for the tanks.

Sunday, 15 April 1972

567. 0150 hrs Two tanks spotted by Stinger at XT 759872 - tanks turned out to be the ones destroyed 02 days ago.

568. 0200 hrs XT 761869 Friendly unit location.

569. 0250 hrs Muzzle flashes from 7388.

570. 0320 hrs 759862 01 VC tank moving slowly east.

571. 0330 hrs ARC Light.

572. 0430 hrs Incoming, 03 rounds.

Sunday, 15 April 1972 (Continued)

573. 0438 hrs ARC Light.

574. 0450 hrs Tic South and Southeast.

575. 0455 hrs 748853 - mortar; 715889, 725898, 732888 - rocket; 778819 - rocket; 808899 - rocket.  
Forwarded to Div.

576. 0500 hrs 705922, 767970 - Heavy Arty positions.

577. 0507 hrs Trucks - 7006-8657. Passed to Div.

578. 0525 hrs Guard . . .

579. 0527 hrs 7986 - Friendly position.

580. 0528 hrs It appeared every time TAC AIR was on station to attack lucrative targets - TAC AIR forced off station by B-52 - TAC AIR and B-52 arrive at same time. USAF could better coordinate B-52s and TAC AIR.

581. 0542 hrs ARC Light to North.

582. 0610 hrs AA position at 743882.

583. 0615 hrs Mortar and rocket attack from the South approximately  $1\frac{1}{2}$  to 2 Kms south of our position. Report of tanks in spt.

584. 0630 hrs I predict we will lose some tactical air today.

585. 0645 hrs Three tanks in An Loc - in 8th Regt area.

586. 0650 hrs RF, FF and Rangers on hill mass to SE. ABN Bde. just to their west (since 14 Apr).

587. 0653 hrs Heavy arty warning - TAC AIR and cobras had to break off - Again A-37s had mechanical problems at a critical phase - situation is tense.

588. 0655 hrs 3 tanks destroyed in city - 3 additional tanks in town.

589. General Comments: 1 tank by police check point destroyed by RF soldier running alongside and threw a grenade into the open cupola and then others started hitting it with LAWs.

590. 0700 hrs 2 tanks destroyed by rangers at QL bridge.

591. 0702 hrs ARC Light on east side of town.

592. 0704 hrs 771870 (Thu Bor) Anti-aircraft site. Div notified.

593. 0705 hrs Very patchy overcast, thin scattered clouds at 5,000'.

594. 0708 hrs Incoming rounds from the north.

595. 0710 hrs T-54s were used in a very unprofessional manner - not supported by infantry, not moving fast and decisively coming in blind and uncoordinated.

596. This is "conventional warfare" and 5th Div. did not fight it in . . .

597. 0722 hrs XT 728991 trucks.

598. 0725 hrs 1 tank burst into flame - destroyed.

599. 0728 hrs 1 more tank bursted into flame.

600. 0730 hrs Only 1 tank spotted still firing.

601. 0740 hrs 758886 tank - next block over to east, 2 or 3 plts moving south.

Sunday, 15 April 1972 (Continued)

602. 0750 hrs 7787 moving south (200 people) most probably montagnards.

603. 0752 hrs 775875 - possible location of FO.

604. 0800 hrs Tank at 758886 linked up with enemy and moving south.

605. 0810 hrs " " " " " " " " " " " " .

606. 0812 hrs 100 troops, T-22 and T-21 on the map.

607. 0820 hrs Troops and tank still moving.

608. 0830 hrs 757898 - mortar position; 760890 - 75rr position.

609. 0837 hrs 760862 supplies missed their drop - request they be destroyed.

610. 0840 hrs 756898 - mortar and 75 RR position.

611. 0940 hrs Cobras engaging the remaining 2 tanks.

612. 1013 hrs 7290 to 733890 3 tanks moving.

613. 1014 hrs Updated rocket sites, two sites 758923, 765925. Box 715888, 735890, 723899, 727880.

614. Mortar sites 758923, 756898. 57 RR sites 760865.

615. 1032 hrs Two columns of tanks from this point 699900 on a bending line following the road to 700891 then follow road to point XT 725888.

616. 1040 hrs Rangers reported a build up of activity to their east. This coupled with movement from NW to An Loc indicates that maybe this is the big push we've been waiting for - be especially alert on the Southern, SE and SW sections.

617. 1110 hrs Possible 105 arty position 756861 with mortar position just across road at 760862.

618. 1118 hrs At 713907 many tanks and Russian trucks well camouflaged by bamboo.

619. NVA digging in their positions (1143 hrs) at 754870, 751871 and 746870.

620. 1155 hrs 745873 FAC confirmed 1143 hrs siting and 200 - 300 people West of Lam Son Compound.

621. General Comment: Province Chief sent out this morning a 3 man intel team to gather intel to the SW - the above info is what they brought back.

622. 1222 hrs XT 778835 to 775835 Anti-aircraft positions. Passed to Div.

623. 1232 hrs 758883 5 tanks moving south.

624. 1234 hrs 758862 civilians moving up road with VC behind them.

625. 1245 hrs 754887 01 tank and 10 troops.

626. 1250 hrs 759901 from this point took a direct hit on command bunker. Div. notified. 75 RR destroyed at 1330 hrs.

626. 1305 hrs 765815 Possibly 01 NVA Company.

627. 1312 hrs 765865 - Position of Anti-aircraft weapons.

628. 1410 hrs 3 enemy tanks sited at 773886 to Rangers engaged and destroyed lead tank by a LAW.

629. 1430 hrs 763878 tanks stuck in the mud.

630. 1433 hrs 766860 tanks moved out of mud.

Sunday, 15 April 1972 (Continued)

631. 1438 hrs Chon Thanh District still in GVN hands.
632. 1510 hrs At 775875 is target for tanks and trucks - Cashew will handle.
633. 1518 hrs Danger 79 was given an update. He said Dynamite 6 would be up shortly with information about heavy artillery to the NW tonight. ??
634. 1601 hrs Heavy arty warning.
635. 1658 hrs 720863, 745925 and 756898 rocket sites. Passed to Div.
636. 1705 hrs Grid line to hit at SW corner - 752868 to 753867 to 753865. Passed to Cashew.
637. 1745 hrs VN C-123 shot down by anti-aircraft.
638. 1800 - 1812 hrs Rockets, mortars, 105s - roughest barrage to date.
639. 1818 hrs 58 rounds since 1800 hours.
640. 1819 hrs 686934 - L-19, spotted a possible 105 arty position.
641. 1821 hrs 753867 anti-aircraft position.
642. 1913 hrs Enemy in T-2 area attacked. Enemy was brought under small arms and mortar fire and enemy was driven back - need napalm in this area - used carefully!!
643. 1917 hrs Lam Son Compound - ST 745874.
644. 1940 hrs Tanks spotted in 2 northern blocks of An Loc.
645. 1955 hrs 725890 many headlights spotted - west.
646. 2003 hrs 745882 many headlights spotted.
647. 2016 hrs 741883 4 tanks observed by Starlight scope.
648. 2046 hrs Tanks are on west side of rice paddy.
649. 2050 hrs 2 tanks are at 746884. 2 tanks are at 742885.
650. 2115 hrs Heavy arty warning. Same situation as always set of fighters on station and one arriving.
651. 2140 hrs SW - many vehicles at 750863 (could be fires from ARC Lights).
652. 2141 hrs Tanks coming from the east going west at approximately 770870.
653. 2130 hrs TAC AIR left station - F-4s could not be used profitably because of their very short station time, length of time lining up the target and ground fire being directed at Stinger who returned to base at the critical moment of engaging the fighters. As soon as the next sortie arrived we received heavy arty warning and F-4s were sent home.
654. 2204 hrs 3 trucks at 721820. Spectre located on west side of town.
655. 2300 hrs Vehicle headlights spotted at 746865.
656. 2340 hrs Informed 10 that I would be monitoring the Crispy push.
657. 2345 hrs Things are unbelievably quiet! (Knock, knock wood)!

Monday, 16 April 1972

658. 0030 hrs Sundog 26 reported on station. Received briefing from Cashew.

Monday, 16 April 1972 (Continued)

- 659. 0058 hrs Changed freq to monitor Tunnel push.
- 660. 0140 hrs ARC Light - Southeast.
- 661. 0210 hrs Aircraft still not authorized in AO.
- 662. 0215 hrs ARC Light - east.
- 663. 0216 hrs XU 769149 06 tanks engaged by Spectre.
- 664. 0217 hrs Weather in An Loc area below minimum for Spectre.
- 665. 0239 hrs Spector 03 on station.
- 666. 0333 hrs 692914 Spector firing on vehicle.
- 667. 0350 hrs 757898 VC at north part of town shooting 57mm RR fire. Passed to Cashew.
- 668. 0355 hrs 687933 possible VC arty site.
- 669. 0406 hrs 753873 - 754873 - 755873 VC dug in along this line. Passed to Cashew.
- 670. 0455 hrs Tanks in SW firing into compound.
- 671. 0415 hrs 835899 tanks or trucks moving.
- 672. 0530 hrs Spector firing under Crispy adjustment in SW rubber.
- 673. 0533 hrs 734883 rocket launching site. Passed to Div.
- 674. 0605 hrs At 733863 - 57 RR site - still pouring it in here.
- 675. 0615 hrs 23mm anti-aircraft fire at A-37s running air strike SW rubber.
- 676. 0618 hrs 2 tanks 300 meters west of berm XT 748880. Tanks accompanied by troops.
- 677. 0632 hrs Spector on station to cover gaps in TAC AIR.
- 678. 0638 hrs 02 tanks 740884 moving west to east. Passed to Div!
- 679. 0659 hrs 846703 - moving NW toward An Loc - enemy using route as a means of resupply.
- 680. 0720 hrs It appears as if US armed forces have a CYA complex. Initials, repeating coordinates 3 and 4 times before firing marking rounds, and adjustments on enemy targets which have been positively identified just won't "make it" in a conventional warfare role or situation.
- 681. 0723 hrs F-4s checking on station.
- 682. 0727 hrs 6972 grid - possible rocket launching site.
- 683. 0733 hrs 744864 - enemy targets being engaged by Spector 02.
- 684. 0757 hrs 686933 2 each 105 in position.
- 685. 0803 hrs 770735 friendlies.
- 686. 0810 hrs Bde has no troops south of 86 line and no troops west of 77.
- 687. 0811 hrs ABN Bde now in 7687 grid.
- 688. 0812 hrs All TAC AIR on guard.
- 689. 0813 hrs 100-200-500 people 3 Km south of An Loc on QL 13 moving north - appears to be civilians.

Monday, 16 April 1972 (Continued)

690. 0852 hrs ARC Light.

691. 0905 hrs 759863 possible 23mm site.

692. 0906 hrs XT 720900 - 740903 - 743907 possible 105 arty sites. Passed to Cashew, will check out immediately.

693. 0920 hrs Oil skin element of Abn Bde in contact at XT 7787.

694. 0930 hrs Sundog 07 dropped down to look at group of people moving north on QL 13. There are some children but not as many as there should be. Moving ox carts which could be hiding/carrying weapons.

695. 0945 hrs One tank observed burning at 743883.

696. 0950 hrs 751870 Sector Recon unit (about 3 men) went into this area.

697. 1028 hrs Units going to SE (PRU).

698. 1040 hrs Gave Province Chief permission to allow any and all foodstuffs at CORDS Compound to be used to assist in relief of population.

699. 1055 hrs Incoming from NW. Informed Div.

700. 1115 hrs Received word that Danger 79 directed that MAJ Haney be "dusted off".

701. 1117 hrs I am sending this log out to be used as Danger 79 sees fit - I do request that it be returned to me ASAP so I can use it to assemble after action reports. SIGNED, Robert J. Corley, LTC, CE, PSA.

702. The morning of 16 April concerning SGT Ngia, I advised Province Chief and LTC Thanh that I would not have him as a member of Team 47 anymore.

703. 1240 hrs Dustoff in-bound for Major Haney and 4.

704. 1241 hrs Dustoff departed for Bien Hoa.

705. 1255 hrs Bodies are lying unburied in the streets. MP are doing the best they can - bloated bodies of men, women and children are evident everywhere you look.

706. 1300 hrs 720880 tanks, number unknown, direction of travel unknown, reported to division. Later report (1303 hrs) tanks moving to the west. Spector going to conduct search and destroy.

707. 1317 hrs Tanks identified and taken under fire by Spectre 05 - TAC AIR being called in to finish the Job!

708. 1322 hrs XT 708894 02 105mm howitzers.

709. 1330 hrs XT 763860 - 757869 location of friendly troops.

710. 1400 hrs C-130 took hits on eastern perimeter.

711. 1410 hrs 764853 air strike requested in support of friendly troops in contact with 01 NVA Company. Passed to Div.

712. 1415 hrs Contact above (#711). Air strike requested for 764853.

713. 1510 hrs Received over Crispy net: (in VN) (?) 760882 - 762888 many anti-aircraft positions. VC are holding numerous civilians hostage including a pregnant woman about to give birth. Passed to Div.

714. 1515 hrs 10 A and Chico working out establishment of EW line to determine safe lines of fire and to identify from troops.

715. 1528 hrs From troops now located at 770860 and 760683 - checked on request for air strike

Monday, 16 April 1972 (Continued)

715. Continued - of 1410 hours.

716. 1532 hrs Persons sent out on Dustoff are safely in Bien Hoa and documents arrived at TRAC. Included the French Canadian reporter who was slightly wounded.

717. 1540 hrs Sector decided to fire arty on 764853 - no air strike available - MAX ord 1600 feet.

718. 1628 hrs Abn Bde arrived at 758883!! Northern section of town - 1 Co.

719. 1845 hrs 715887 Vehicle and personnel concentration. Passed to Div.

720. 1940 hrs 736886 5 tanks sited moving west to east toward An Loc.

721. 1956 hrs ARC Light at 700800 S/W of An Loc - could the 7th Div. be returning to the fishhook?

722. Again the point must be made - the 5th ARVN Div. conceded too much ground without employing delaying tactics of any type other than screaming for more and more TAC AIR - TAC AIR admittedly is effective - they have kept us here thus far - but it is no substitute for infantry engaging infantry and when necessary, as I feel it was in An Loc City, for infantry to go after tanks with tank killer weapons. Tanks were in the city at night and were never engaged by infantry - only TAC AIR - and if a tank is ever vulnerable it's at night in a city supported by a relatively few ground troops. Thus far their tank tactics have been atrocious - for what reason I don't know - I think the first time the tanks came into the city they thought the infantry had already taken the town, because they drove down the main thoroughfare of town from north to south and waved at the RF in the General Tri Compound before the territorials engaged with LAWs and destroyed two tanks and captured a tanker.

723. 2030 hrs This afternoon the Province Chief and I went to Div HQ to complain (PC did the complaining) about the looting of the town being conducted by 5th Div. troops and about the tactics of TAC AIR destroying 2-4 city blocks searching for tanks - no ARVN infantry went looking - I feel it was unnecessary but in view of the CG's refusal to use his infantry - I don't know of any other alternative. His comment - "To use infantry is very easy to say but very difficult to do" leaves me stunned.

724. 2115 hrs One B-40 round and one 57 RR hit outside compound and entirely too much fire power reacted to the attack. It took about 6 minutes to get the VN C-119 to stop firing - To my knowledge no one requested his assistance and FACs could not get him on the radio - called Div. to get them stopped. VMAF must be requested to coordinate with both sides as do U.S. aircraft.

725. 2125 hrs Div. advised that aircraft are free to fire south of the 866 line east of the 74 line and west of the 78 line.

726. 2130 hrs All quiet - too quiet and where is the 21st Div. we keep hearing about - but never see!!

727. 2205 hrs Heavy arty warning.

728. 2210 hrs B-52 strike to the south.

729. 2310 hrs 735885 enemy vehicles, unknown type. 758860 enemy recoilless rifle position. Passed to Div.

730. 2336 hrs 745883, 750885 - locations of 02 tanks, reported to Div.

Monday, 17 April 1972

731. 0210 hrs 7610 Sky spot.

732. 0230 hrs Incoming.

733. 0240 hrs Incoming.

734. 0245 hrs 721900 incoming location. Jeep burning on Tri Compound.

Monday, 17 April 1972 (Continued)

735. 0249 hrs Power went off.

736. 0322 hrs Power restored.

737. 0332 hrs Spectre on station.

738. There was little or no control exercised by Div. G-4 in the use and/or distribution of supplies which were air dropped. I know in one instance Div. got all of the meat, rations and Sector got all the rice and COL Nut tried without success to work out a mutually satisfactory arrangement. If a unit needed something they would shop around at the various drop zones until they found what they needed and leave the remainder.

739. 0345 hrs Flare dropped by FAC did not work properly and dropped on a jeep - set it afire, this in turn set off an ammo pallet which cooked off until 0425 hrs - also destroyed one building.

740. 0530 hrs Bombs dropped too close - almost impacted in compound at 757872.

741. 0550 hrs Spectre 04 is over on station with 2½ hours station time. Div. HQ under mortar attack.

742. 0555 hrs 748875 - possibly 57 RR or 100mm tank gun fire.

743. 0615 hrs Direct fire weapon impacted in compound - counter arty fired at 740879.

744. 0633 hrs ARC Light to the NW of An Loc.


745. 0724 hrs At 765910, 811858 moving vehicles - are they enemy or friendlies? Referred over to Abn Bde. for clearance to fire.

746. 0735 hrs Later this morning 1 company of 1/48, 257th Co. and the intell plt will search this block: 750870, 750850, 770870, 770850.

747. 0736 hrs 211th Co. now located at 752677.

748. 0742 hrs 760862 and 752863 Sector will fire arty in these locations.

749. 0900 hrs Abn Bde. Honor 72  
5th Bn Oil Skin  
6th Bn Boiler Hotel  
8th Bn Sawdust  
81st Abn Rangers Depot Bridge  
(IRR) (LRRP)



Monday, 17 April 1972 (Continued)

750. 0906 hrs 695925 (105) - 720995 (155) - VC Arty positions. Passed to Division.

751. 0935 hrs XU 763035 03 trucks with guns taken under fire by Spectre.

752. 1020 hrs Danger 79 came up to check on situation - assured us that TAC AIR would continue to come.

753. 1050 hrs Sectre requests air strike south of a line joined by 755854, 764853 along both sides of QL 13 south. Passed to Div.

754. 1113 hrs 764885 82mm position. Passed to Div by FAC - troops and tanks.

755. 1115 hrs 767885 to 772887 along Highway 303 north side of . . .

756. 1119 hrs 773860, 755863, 764862 friendly location. Shoot 200 meters south of 86 line 500 meters both sides of the road.

757. 1130 hrs 695925, 724876 mortar/arty positions. Passed to Div. by Sealskin.

758. 1140 hrs 767882 troops and tanks. Passed to Div.

759. 1141 hrs 710890, 720900 - arty positions.

760. 1135 hrs 02 mortar rounds landed on civilian compound killing civilian cook for Team 47. He had prepared meals for all Americans in An Loc during the course of the battle for the city.

761. 1205 hrs 758857 Anti-aircraft position. Passed to Div.

762. 1258 hrs 86 line south Tic - request FAC to support by observation. Passed to Div.

763. 1338 hrs 778818 04 trucks and personnel - Serpent 32 asking for permission to fire - got it from Tunnel, Crispy, unable to get it from Honor stations for unknown reason. \* U.S. Air has a bad case of "Cover your ass""itis" - lucrative targets are being passed up because of the ridiculous red tape!

764. 1340 hrs Troops in contact to the south. Tried to get details for air strike from VN TOC - NOTHING other than heavy contact involving 251st and intel squad.

765. 1415 hrs B-52 strikes request at following sites - 760860, 770860, 770840, 760870, 746863, 757863, 746840, 757840. Disapproved by CG at 1428.

766. 1429 hrs Province Chief requested CBU-55 at a position south of 864 EW line and between NS lines of 750 and 768.

767. 1450 hrs 708902 and 718903 - tank at each location.

768. 1455 hrs Received word that CBU-55 would be available in 3 hours - or 1755 hours. COL Nhut approved this block - 750850, 750864, 768850, 768864.

769. 1513 hrs Heavy arty warning.

770. 1527 hrs 733822 mortar position. Passed to Div.

771. 1532 hrs Following are friendly locations: XT 758371, 755871, 753873.

772. 1655 hrs Danger 79 talked with Tunnel (10A) on station. Wanted to know if we had stopped the mortars (just as one landed) and anti-aircraft.

773. 1705 hrs Danger 79 called - No more troops, must use existing troops. More air on the way. Use it all. 74A monitored at Div and advised to pass on to 10.

774. 1710 hrs 608922 staging area and bridge used recently.

775. 1715 hrs Called 10A to confirm MSD of CBU-55. Response was 01 Km (from Air Cmdr on station).

Monday, 17 April 1972 (Continued)

- 776. 1745 hrs Heavy arty warning.
- 777. 1855 hrs 725971 - 2 each 105 howitzers. Informed Div. - destroyed 08 days ago.
- 778. 2217 hrs 750870, 754370 VC AAA sites passed to Division.
- 779. 2220 hrs 736885 Headlights moving East - passed to Division.

Tuesday, 18 April 1972

- 780. 0110 hrs 758357 Truck lights moving from South to North.
- 781. 0355 hrs 747927 105 Arty Position 720900 82mm Mortar A&L Co taking incoming at this time.
- 782. 0600 hrs Heavy mortar barrage.
- 783. 0634 hrs 82mm Mortar site. 755862
- 784. 0640 hrs CBU-55 strike should arrive at 0800 hrs.
- 785. 0650 hrs Heavy Artillery warning until 0710 hrs strike to go into the Southwest (about 6KM away).
- 786. 0700 hrs B-52 strike to the Southwest.
- 787. 0800 hrs Serpent 26 checked in on station.
- 788. 0833 hrs 760889-04 PT76 Tanks Spectre has under fire - TAC Air being called.
- 789. 0845 hrs Tanks turned out to be 04 trucks destroyed 09 days ago.
- 790. 0930 hrs Informed that CBU 55 was on its way - after requesting this at 1445 hrs 17 April 1972 this long delay is intolerable because as long as one is kept hanging on "yes its coming" - "its on its way all we need are the coordinates" - Coordinates were provided a minimum of seven times - things must be getting better because we seem to be getting bogged down in "red tape". As long as we are waiting we can't take other positive steps which need to be taken.
- 791. 1025 hrs 1st Set of CBU 55 strike went in - not very good coverage so Chico 7 called in for 2 more Air strikes.
- 792. 1045 hrs CBU 55 strikes South of town.
- 793. 1047 hrs CBU 55 strikes finished.
- 794. 1048 hrs 722982 - 2 each 105 positions.
- 795. 1054 hrs 765854
- 796. 1056 hrs FR Loc 765873
- 797. 1104 hrs Sawdust Hotel - Sweeping SD  
743377 S.W. 81st Gp Dimple Bag 767874  
5th Bn (Oilskin) 774876  
6th Bn (Boiler) 793374  
6th Bn Element 810364  
CP Bde Main 790360  
Recon Platoon 872362
- 798. 1215 hrs 767887 - Enemy MIA & some mobile  
773877 - 2 each Enemy platoons - secured clearance to fire on both targets.
- 799. 1230 hrs One C-130 shot down by AA fire coming from west side of road 3KM south of Ar Loc. Plane went down west of city - 765855 & S of 763865.

Tuesday, 18 April 1972 (Continued)

800. 1400 hrs Sector Artillery will fire on 755260 and 755365 direction 250265 Range 4200 May 0rd 1400

Spec 19 working w/Cashew  
Rash 10 working w/Cashew  
Sundog 23 working with Cashew Sawdust Hotel

TO THE NORTH

801. 1500 hrs For resupply - FRC 25 batteries 300 each  
C Rations 100 Cases  
LFRP Rations 20 Cases

802. 1510 hrs Heavy artillery warning - screwed up TAC AIR strikes again - for the umpteenth time.

803. 1512 hrs B-52 strike complete.

804. 1621 hrs Cashew called to stop Air strike to ME too close to Cashew people.

805. 1624 hrs Serpent 24 to go to Sawdust and whiskey.

806. 1636 hrs 765383 AA 768890 AA Artillery sites.

807. 1640 hrs All sky spots must be submitted by 1100 hrs the day requested.

808. 1646 hrs 746276, 761895 AA Sites passed to Division.

809. 1652 hrs 763883, 766891 AA Sites.

810. 1703 hrs 747877 AA Site passed to Division.

811. 1755 hrs Sawdust, W keeps after the VC with M82 & Spectre.

812. 1955 hrs Rash 05 for Sawdust W.

813. 1925 hrs 760853 Tanks (?) moving from South to North.

814. 1930 hrs 730882 82mm Mortar Position.

815. 2025 hrs Minh Thanh under heavy contact - we requested division to pass request to Corps to provide illumination at least.

816. 2035 hrs CBU 55 Requested for 778876 - 778888  
SKY SCTS ADDITIONAL  
1. 744863 2. 743857 3. 751851  
NIGHT AIR STRIKES STARTING 2200  
1. 753860-773889 2. 753856-781889 3. 745853-778877  
Approx 2200 - Ask FAC for these as desired.

817. 2040 hrs Artillery from Lam Son to 7489 - cleared by division.

818. 2042 hrs 10A called and stated we must have a four coordinate box & must be called in by Honor 72 (Ref 2035 entry).

819. 2100 hrs Abn Bde requested this strike 780900 790900 780882 790882. CBU requested by Honor 72 at

820. 2200 hrs MSD cleared with 10A also. Rash 15 still waiting for ASf for Whiskey Sawdust.

821. 2215 hrs Have requested Spectre bird for the Honor Unit for the third time since 2200 hrs. A Rash FAC informed us that an approval was made at 1730 hrs for Honor to have a separate spectre.

Wednesday, 19 April 1972

Wednesday, 19 April 1972 (Continued)

822. 0103 hrs 5th Div has no final word on CBU-55 drop scheduled for 0800.

823. 0105 hrs Got Whiskey Elm hooked up with Sundog 25, his new FAC.

824. 0138 hrs Stinger 22 to replace 25 in 20 minutes (no constant coverage! 25 departed this station 0140 hours.

825. 0142 hrs Weather deteriorating - below fighter utilization minimums.

826. 0206 hrs Cloud bases 4000' north of An Loc. 6000' south of An Loc.

827. 0207 hrs Stinger will arrive at An Loc area approximately 0212 hours, 22 minutes after 25 departed!

828. 0250 hrs Still no word on CBU-55 - 74 said he would inform us as soon as decision is made.

829. 0250 hrs Commo with Sawdust Elm to the south - impossible, 74 directed Sundog 25 remain over their location/monitor push.

830. 0251 hrs Commo re-established with Whiskey.

831. 0252 hrs Heavy arty warning to the west for the next 20 minutes.

832. 0258 hrs Heavy arty turned out to be sky spot, all aircraft departed area to east for 20 minutes.

833. 0300 hrs 08 rounds incoming since 0000.

834. 0320 hrs Stinger 22 reported large secondary just east of NE end of runway.

835. 0321 hrs Whiskey Elm receiving incoming - Sundog 25 looking for source. If found will bring Stinger to bear.

836. 0328 hrs 747853 82mm mortar position. Passed to Div.

837. 0330 hrs It appears as if every time there is a secondary, mortars start to fall.

838. 0356 hrs Incoming.

839. 0405 hrs Sundog 21 and Spectre 02 supporting Whiskey Elm.

840. 0406 hrs Overcast Ceiling 2500 feet.

841. 0425 hrs Stinger 22 departed station - 2 medium secondaries.

842. 0430 hrs 18 rounds incoming since 0300 hrs.

843. 0459 hrs Incoming from the south, Spectre looking for it.

844. 0545 hrs Incoming 82mm from the south.

845. 0555 hrs 757860 82mm position passed to Div.

846. 0615 hrs 15 rounds incoming since 0430 hours.

847. 0645 hrs Word on CBU-55. Although not confirmed is a negative.

848. 0725 hrs Sawdust Hotel W wants Spectre to find mortar positions.

849. 0745 hrs F-4 arrived on station with mostly hard bombs and napalm - will use hard stuff south and napalm in support of Oilskin.

850. 0912 hrs 760879 possible location of tank. Passed to Div.

851. 1050 hrs B-52 strike requested for following locations: 626660, 626650, 655660, 655650,

Wednesday, 19 April 1972 (Continued)

851. Continued - 650681, 662658, 657686, 670661. Passed to Div.

852. 1020 hrs B-52 strikes to go to the following locations: 814817 - 800842 to 809846 - 824820 at 1500 hours. 777900 - 787900 to 777927 - 787927 at 2240 hours, to be approved and hit ASAP 785-907 - 833921 to 823928 - 808916.

853. 1425 hrs At 670890 enemy 105 position.

854. 1448 hrs C-123 went down at approximately 771870. Plane is burning.

855. 1453 hrs At 721976, 729966 and 73694? - at each coordinate one each 105 arty position.

856. 1605 hrs At 766845 plans were fired at from this location - Province officials cleared it to fire on.

857. 1645 hrs 778887 - anti-aircraft position.

858. 2143 hrs Sundog 14 on station.

859. 2245 hrs Today witnessed small progress, the 81st Bn. cleared the western and NW section of An Loc. Rangers worked in the same location all day long trying to dislodge a tenacious enemy fighting them from house to house with automatic weapons and B-41s. Abn. Bde. evacuated 59 WIA on the resupply choppers and pushed about  $\frac{1}{2}$  Km further south out of the city. A mortar round landed in arty supply area and exploded all ammo and disabled (not destroyed) all 6 each M-102 howitzers. C.O. Bde desires to get them evacuated to provide him with greater mobility and deny these arty pieces to the enemy. The southern end of the perimeter remained fixed without being severely tested - 105s, mortars, rockets and direct fire weapons continue to pound all areas held by friendly units. Everywhere you look you see the scars of heavy barrage. Water becomes a critical problem. There is still plenty of food. Mass burials continue - common holes dug by a bulldozer. Thus far there are 9 known KIAs buried on the CORDS Compound.

Thursday, 20 April 1972

860. 0140 hrs Sundog 41 put air strike in on rubber refinery SW of town by 2 F-4s.

861. 0215 hrs Stinger 25 came on station for Honor 72.

862. 0250 hrs Stinger 25 returned to base.

863. 0317 hrs 15 rounds, 155 and 105, from XT 705924 (I heard Tunnel 74 talking about it 5 minutes ago). He is calling Spectre 22 in on it. Passed to 74.

864. 0320 hrs Honor 72 under heavy arty attack.

865. 0350 hrs Requested flare ship through Sundog 41 for Honor 72.

866. 0405 hrs Honor 72 reports he believes he has tanks and infantry near his position and boiler's position. Passed to Tunnel 74.

867. 0425 hrs Stinger 22 reported to Honor 72 to locate tank(s) and drop flares.

868. 0404 hrs Delayed entry - Sundog 37 replaced Sundog 41.

869. 0450 hrs Stinger 22 engaged tank at 790873.

870. 0500 hrs Stinger 22 returned to base. Tank still there.

871. 0520 hrs Chico 08 came over to Honor 72 with flares.

872. 0522 hrs Spectre 12 came on station and engaged tank at above coord.

873. 0550 hrs Aircraft emergency on A-37. Strike was aborted due to lead aircraft catching on fire - other flights are on order.

Thursday, 20 April 1972 (Continued)

874. 0555 hrs Both FACs are out of flares.

875. 0610 hrs 775884 mortar positions - (Oilskin Whiskey).

876. 0627 hrs For the third time, requested more TAC AIR - FACs keep saying it's on the way! But no birds!

877. 0640 hrs At 800874 enemy troops moving from there to the east.

878. 0647 hrs Oilskin Tango under ground attack.

879. 0700 hrs Chico 08 returned to base. Replaced Chico 04.

880. 0700 hrs Sundog 37 returned to base. Replaced by Rash 08.

881. 0723 hrs Requested Spectre 20 to request another Spectre to be on station before he leaves. Spectre 20 acknowledged.

882. 0705 hrs Delayed entry - Oilskin Whiskey coordinate air strike with hard bombs. Chico 04 FAC got secondary explosion from mortar position.

883. 0735 hrs Air strike for Oilskin Whiskey complete.

884. 0635 hrs Delayed Entry - Honor 72 confirmed 04 tank kills for Spectre 20.

885. 0745 hrs Spectre 15 reported into net.

886. 0805 hrs Spectre 20 returned to base and will not return.

887. 0900 hrs Chico 04 put in air strike for Oilskin Whiskey.

888. 0940 hrs Completed air strike for Oilskin Whiskey.

889. 0953 hrs Rash 08 replaced Chico 04 as FAC for Oilskin Hotel.

890. 1000 hrs Spectre 15 returned to base.

891. 1002 hrs Rash 08 is replaced by Chico 08 as FAC for Oilskin Hotel.

892. 1010 hrs Oilskin Whiskey and Hotel called a confirmed body count of 20 and 1 each .51 cal. machinegun, still counting bodies.

893. 1012 hrs Oilskin Hotel says from coordinates 764884 to about 100 meters NE enemy is congregating in trees.

894. 1034 hrs Oilskin Whiskey reports 1 anti-aircraft gun at 774880 still firing.

895. 1045 hrs Chico 08 commenced air strike for Oilskin Hotel.

896. 1055 hrs Spectre 01 checked into net and was given to Boiler Whiskey.

897. 1205 hrs Heavy arty - B-52 strike to NE.

898. 1230 hrs 3 each tanks spotted by VNAF - 745817.

899. 1300 hrs Tanks confirmed by Spectre 01 at 74468162. Between 759768 and 74468162 many supplies, trucks and tanks.

900. 1320 hrs Emphasized to 10A that 1300 hrs report needs support by FAC, TAC AIR and Spectre.

901. 1520 hrs Heard from Div. advisors that 3/8 Bn. would come in by helicopter this afternoon or tomorrow. 111st probably was the regiment which hit the two Bns. of Abn Bde at hills 694 and hill to NE of 694.

902. 1535 hrs 4 each 105s at 725874 and one at 702928 and one at 718902.

Thursday, 20 April 1972 (Continued)

903. 1535 hrs Div. confirmed that two of four tanks to the SW were destroyed and two trucks - FAC reported they destroyed all they saw - many secondary explosions. (Assumed to be ammo.)

904. General Comment: The only explanation for the tanks and trucks in the vicinity of 745817 is possible reinforcement effort by the 7th NVA Div. from the south. If this be true, then the 21st ARVN Div should move toward An Loc with greater ease!

905. 1700 hrs Sawdust Whiskey wants to know if it is correct that Sawdust Whiskey and 72 are to come to Hotel and Sawdust Whiskey is to be replaced by Sawdust Tango. Replied Roger.

906. 1702 hrs Stinger 50 reported into net and to Boiler Whiskey.

907. 1745 hrs VC Bn. preparing evening meal vicinity of 741883 and 743885. Also secondary explosions at 780832.

908. 1800 hrs Bde. staff and remnants of Bde. staff arrived at An Loc - morale is low - but after a night's rest they should be okay!

909. 2005 hrs 6th Bn. (Abn) is in heavy contact - FACs with very limited flares on station. We need FACs with flares, spectres, stingers, gun ships, TAC AIR and dedicated troops on the ground.

910. 2025 hrs 6th Bn (-) one company - other 2 companies of the 6th Bn. are at approximately in heavy contact with many wounded (Lt. Kelly is with these 2 companies).

Friday, 21 April 1972

911. 0615 hrs At 752863 VC digging in.

912. Friendly locations: 5th Bn at 762858, 762863 (Oilskin Hotel); 6th Bn at 757873 (Boiler Whiskey); 8th Bn at 758864 (Sawdust Tango).

913. 0723 hrs 8th Bn. under mortar and small arms fire. Nothing more!

914. 0728 hrs Spectre 20 is on station.

915. 0803 hrs Send snakes to 753863. Snakes returned to base because of weather.

916. A relatively quiet day punctuated by activity to extract two companies of the 6th Bn, Abn. Bde. which was successfully accomplished with exception of one platoon, approximately 30 men. North side of An Loc still in the hands of NVA. 5th Div. remains inside their tight perimeter with fighting trying to push out left to Abn Bde., Rangers and 81st Group. Just before dark, there was a heavy arty and mortar barrage and heavy small arms contact on the south. With the arrival of TAC AIR and rain the attack was stopped. Two B-52 strikes and 3 sky spots before 2200. Still no resupply or evacuation of WIA. Sanitary conditions are deteriorating and mass burial continues. Medical supplies are growing scarce and water remains a critical problem.

Saturday, 22 April 1972

917. Great deal to do about nothing! No resupply for 2 days.

Sunday, 23 April 1972

918. Hurricane 33 would like best estimate of civilians in An Loc - 12,000 estimate provided after talking with CPT La and Province Chief. (Estimates range between 12,000 to 20,000.)

919. 0435 hrs B-52 strike at 700900.

920. 0447 hrs 760912 - location of 105 position.

7-1-J-39

Sunday, 23 April 1972 (Continued)

921. 5th NVA - E-6; 174; 275 Regiments.  
7th NVA - 165; 209; 141 Regiments.  
9th NVA - 272, 271, 95C Regiments.

922. Total of 10 civilians thus far have been killed on our CORDS Compound! (And temporarily buried there.)

923. 19-4-72 CT9 XT 703360.  
20-4-72 174 XT 574496.  
CT5 XT 787830.  
21-4-72 CT7 XT 644733.  
E-6 XT 630747.  
209 XT 759625.  
22-4-72 CT9 XT 737878.

Positions of enemy units as best we can plot them; however I personally subscribe to the belief that major units have by-passed An Loc and have moved further south. "If" we could get resupplied and "if" afterwards someone could convince General Huong to push out, I feel that it could be accomplished - with losses for sure - but greater losses would be inflicted upon the enemy and it would enhance the overall chances of complete victory - not only in Binh Long Province but throughout South Vietnam. The GVN now has an opportunity to destroy the best Hanoi has to offer and they should not let the opportunity slip through their fingers!!

924. On 19 April 1972 CPT Charles M. Hall was WIA by a piece of shrapnel.

925. 2021 hrs 155 positions 690871 and 715893.

926. 2035 hrs Call from TRAC concerning number of civilians - Province Chief says close to 20,000 - I passed to MG Hollingsworth 16,500 people.

Monday, 24 April 1972

927. For the third day a block to the south of An Loc was cleared of USAF and reserved for VNAF to resupply the ABN Bde and extract their WIAs. This block was only used for approximately 40 minutes but was blocked for about five hours each day. Closer coordination would allow for more efficient utilization of air space. For the first time the enemy mounted an attack just prior to darkness on the south, east and north. Close to 16000 rounds of mixed rockets, mortars and howitzers were thrown into the city.

Tuesday, 25 April 1972

928. OERs, EERs, awards, plaques, George Wanat (Letter to his family) - Get members of the team together, political report, VN recommendations for awards, province report, check on IG Team visit. Approximately 14 April, 5th Division troops moved into Fort Prune and took it over. I don't know what the status is at that location. Cash register with approximately \$150.00 in it was still on CORDS Compound - no key so we don't know if money is still in it. I authorized civilians to use CORDS Compound to live and eat all remaining food that was there. I checked with Tai Khanh today and he has things still under control and has a 3 day supply of food remaining. Club snack bar operation needs to be closed and establishment of "Other Sundry Fund" must be completed. Claims of team members on combat losses must be processed!! Reconstitution of the team!! Another 6,000 refugees left An Loc yesterday and today - it is estimated that 10,000 civilians remain in An Loc!!!!

929. There were troops in contact on the west at 752879, on the north at 753882 and in the south at 752872 - TICs continued until about 1200 hours. Four helicopters came in to 752864 and evacuated more WIAs. Close to 2,000 rounds of mixed rockets, mortars, and howitzers were thrown into the city - first reports received of enemy using 160mm mortar.

Wednesday, 26 April 1972

A-1-J-40

A-1-J-10

Wednesday, 26 April 1972 (Continued)

930. Enemy 155 howitzer positions at 705223 and 695910.

931. 5th and 8th Bn. under attack from 0500 hours until 1700 hours. Preceded by one of the heaviest mortar barrages concentrated in one area - over 600 rounds. One of the areas of greatest concern was the penetration by the enemy on the west (750831). Three tanks sited at 895735 and seven at 773870. One additional ABN Bn. CA'd into area SE of Duoc Vinh I (approximately 785805).

932. Advise DEPCORDS to send Major Neale home if he hasn't already done so!!

Thursday, 27 April 1972

933. A normal type day with arty barrages, resupply, medevacs and the tenacious enemy clawing closer and closer to the core of the city. The stagnant fixed positions of the defenders must be pushed out to alleviate the suffering and dying of the civilian populace and to exploit a thinning force around the city. Received word that 4,000 more refugees had arrived in Chon Thanh. Estimated number of refugees in An Loc is now approximately 9,000. Received word at 2300 hours that Minh Thanh was under heavy attack (XT 643669). Called division twice and asked that they send help of some sort immediately. VNAF must vary its tactics; four days in a row they have flown the same pattern into the same LZ for resupply and medevac and "charlie" has zeroed in on these areas. They need to vary approaches and LZs. Weather was good most of the day for TAC AIR and the night was perfect - clear sky with a full moon.

Friday, 28 April 1972

934. Beautiful flying weather and TAC AIR working nicely but still no "pushing out" by the ground troops so in a day or so we will be bombing and strafing again in the same areas.

Saturday, 29 April 1972

935. Refugees moving from Tan Kai (XT 765770) north toward An Loc - best intelligence available indicates that 9th Division moved into Phuoc Long and 5th Division minus E-6 (heading south around Minh Thanh) and (minus 174th Regiment around Tri Tam) is in Loc Ninh and moving north - 7th Div. or elements thereof are between Chon Thanh and An Loc (209th North of Chor. Thanh) 141st and 165th Regiments are conspicuous by their absence. 429th Sapper Regiment are carried west of Minh Thanh in Tay Ninh Province. I believe that we have a thin screen of residual 9th Division personnel surrounding An Loc being supported by elements of the 69th Arty Command.

936. Building where Doctor Risch, Davidson, Neale, Mauleon and Zeigler lived received a direct hit and burned totally. These four individuals are authorized to submit claims for everything therein. Our CORDS Headquarters building has now received two direct hits but no fires, my office has been turned into a kitchen by parties unknown. I am sure that by now the entire building has been looted. My jeep continues to run - one of the very few after getting parts and tires from other stricken vehicles.

937. The Province Chief sent 3/18 Lie Doi, 212, 251 Companies and the intelligence platoon to 764875 and 766875 respectively - The 212 is to establish a NDP at 766875. The 5th Bn. will move to 760860 and establish strong points at 757854 and 758848 (1155 hours).

Sunday, 30 April 1972

938. Enemy at 765878 and 767877. Friendlies at 764875 and 765875. Contact at 1105 hours. From friendly smoke fire 150 meters to the north-east. Contact broke after 40 minutes - restarted at 1315 hours. Enemy at 767878 and friendlies at 766877.

939. Friendlies at 764830 along line to 766873. Enemy location along line 767878 to 768877.

940. 5th Division (Rangers and 81st Group) pushed north about 200 meters. 150 men of 1/43rd moved

Sunday, 30 April 1972 (Continued)

940. Continued - south behind 2 ABN Bns. and another 80 men are awaiting orders to move south. All elements of units in An Loc were pushing out with the notable exception of 5th Division forces. No resupply as of 1630 hours.

941. 5th Div. - Freedom Monitor - 61.05. 5th Div. (Admin Net) - Guitar Squirrel - 64.35. COL Miller - 62. LTC Benedict - 62A. MAJ Borgstoff - 76. Binh Long Province - Vivid Marshal - 59.85. 52nd Regt - Marshal Whiskey. 1st Bde. - Limit Extra - 64.65. 3rd Bde. - Lunar Torreador. 5th Bn, 1st Bde - Bastille Salesman. 8th Bn, 1st Bde - Income Skillet. 21st Div - Autocrat Alpine - 57.50.

942. 2030 hrs Heavy contact with 5th and 8th Bn, 1st Bde (ABN) - mortar barrage lasted 20 minutes - Spectre and FAC were sent. Chico 35 was supposed to put a set of A-7s in. Aircraft checked in with target known and identified. Chico 35 was unable to coordinate the air strike and lost the flight. Returned to base for fuel.

Monday, 1 May 1972

943. 0825 hrs Sector requested an air strike along a line XT 767878 to 768877. Contact lasted off and on until 1630 hours. Sector forces are aggressively moving out in an effort to widen the perimeter to the east and SE in support of the ABN Bde's efforts to the push out to the south. RFs efforts were supported by air strikes and Spectre. CPT Gaynor and Hall left and CPT Hensley arrived.

Tuesday, 2 May 1972

944. Beginning morning hours were star-studded with a bright clear moon - around 0730 hours weather started closing in making TAC AIR support difficult to work. Five tanks assembly area is vicinity of 787875 north to 787888. Reported by civilian who worked his way free of the NVA.

945. 0830 hrs At 770870 anti-aircraft site (Thu Bon). Closely from 500 meters to NW.

946. 1400 hrs COL Nhut requested air strike or Spectre to operate in block 767884, 768882, 773-888 and 775886. BDA for Chico 33 this morning - captured many claymore mines, and many blood trails with evidence that dead and wounded were pulled away to the north and northeast.

Wednesday, 3 May 1972

947. Sector desires to push toward Thu Lon (770870) and has requested an air strike to precede their movement. 775876 to 770870 was requested direction of strike. Fighters took ground fire from 775874 - TAC AIR hit area of ground fire at 783865 - Chico 11.

948. 769884 to 775886 tree line. Friendly unit at 768873. Also anti-aircraft fire .51 Cal at 775860 (1800 hrs).

949. 2330 hrs Three vehicles were spotted moving from east to west towards An Loc on Highway 303.

Thursday, 4 May 1972

950. A quiet day beginning with one company of the 5th Bn, 1st ABN Bde being ordered to recon out "in front of the 7th Regiment position"??? Unit ran into light resistance but was successful in checking out area in question. Question really is "why couldn't the 7th Regt perform this mission instead of ordering another unit to backtrack from 1 Km to move into position???" Fewer air strikes lead one to believe that pressure is greater in other locations than An Loc. SGT Huong, interpreter deserted today. Lai Khe was notified (SFC Boyle) and advised him to turn Huong over to VN MPs. Also talked with Boyle about getting rice and other supplies ordered by COL Nhut over two weeks from III Corps. Colonel Nhut's estimate of number of refugees is now around 20,000 people in and around An Loc. Binh Long Hospital resembles a pig sty, filth and litter and blown out walls and roofs, no sanitary conditions could possibly be achieved in such an environment. I officially

A-1-J-42

A-1-J-42

Thursday, 4 May 1972 (Continued)

950. Continued - confirmed total destruction of team house and everything therein. I am advised that it was a bomb run that fell short that did the job (CBU 24 run). Only facility on the compound still standing is the trailer with the rear end blown out of it. Also notified Boyle that Hall And Gaynor could begin processing their claims for total combat loss. I am sure my medical and dental records plus receipt for rosewood chest at TSN Concession were destroyed. I think I had approximately \$40/\$45 as a balance - all records on land purchase in N.C., all bank statements and cancelled and unused checks, income tax records. W-2 forms also destroyed.

951. PF platoon at Thu Bon received mortar fire at 2130 hrs from 776874 from 600 meters to the west.

952. Sector desires air strikes for (5 May - 0800 hrs) two locations 775875 and 771870. Sector troops will move into these locations, the return to perimeter 775875 is suspected sites of mortar. After moving into 771870, the I&R platoon will remain in place. Passed request to Div.

953. VN on Tri are improving defenses and sanitary conditions, e.g. digging trenches between perimeter defensive positions, sumps, and individual fighting positions. Morale - no visible change. Everyone who speaks English (peons, I mean) want to know when the ARVN will get to An Loc. Many wounded are still manning the perimeter. In one case, an ARVN Pvt with both legs and one arm bandaged was holding a sand bag with his one good arm while another wounded man filled the bag. A VNAF resupply/medevac mission successfully completed at 1330 hrs. We (US) had no notice that it was coming. About 30 seconds before the choppers landed, the first mortar round hit the 5th Div. chopper pad. Second round hit inside Tri front gate, then remaining rounds went into the edge of the rubber. I ran toward chopper pad to see if Mr. Thieu (Nguyen), former mechanic at Loc Ninh was put on. He had not even been taken to the pad. People caring for Thieu complain that his wounds are stinking badly. To go back a bit, the fact that the first mortar round hit before choppers arrived alludes to the probability that NVA (VC) have some type of early warning system set up to the SE. Thank goodness their mortar fire hasn't hit the highway yet. I feel the approach route and landing site should be changed. Today was a good day for Halo C-130 resupply. Only three pallets were known lost, and attempts were made to destroy them. We now have an operational 81mm behind the mess hall. Gen. Hollingsworth sent PSA a bottle of Jack Daniels (came in yesterday). Gen. Hollingsworth appeared to be cheerful and optimistic during his daily fly-over. (Relief by the weekend? What's up? Only the Shadow knows.)

Friday, 5 May 1972

✓ 954. 771870, 775869 and 775863 from 1 Km to west. Air strikes and resupply operations overlapped and general confusion reigned until approximately 1400 hours. Medevac came in and Mr. Thieu, Nguyen, was gotten out on it at approximately 1410 hours. Assisted CPT Hensley in getting Thieu on chopper and carrying for him was: Nguyen Ho Anh, DOB 16 Sep '45, POB Nam Dinh (NVN), SN 66/159.-875. I recommend him for the Bronze Star with "V" device. Learned later that this chopper was hit and he didn't get out after all!!!

955. I officially recommend CPT Hall, Gaynor and Hensley for the Silver Star with "V" device for valorous acts in directing air strikes against attacking NVA against Territorial Forces positions. Braving artillery and mortar fire directing evacuation of seriously wounded personnel, etc, etc. Hall and Gaynor from \_\_\_\_ April to 1 May 1972 and Hensley for period 1 May to \_\_\_\_ 1972. Advisor to 52nd Regt after MAJ Heney was medevaced - CPT James Wilbanks, Silver Star with "V" for period 12 April through \_\_\_\_ May 1972.

956. Mortar position at 780881 at 1445 hours firing on friendlies moving to the south and east.

957. I certify that CPT Hensley was WIA (slight) during the medical evacuation operation on 5 May 1972.

958. Mortar position at 780881 - put air strike into that area - Chico 30.

959. 1945 hrs Numerous reports (ABN, Ranger and 5th Div) that a large fire and many secondary explosions were observed at XT 7888 (site of PSA's adjustment of TAC AIR on suspected mortar position).

960. Subsequent report of vehicle lights near the scene of fire (#959). Due to bad weather, we were unable to get Stinger into the area. COL Corley just remembered that Mrs. Khut had a birth-

Friday, 5 May 1972 (Continued)

960. Continued - day on 3 May.

961. PSA called CPT Davis, 5th Div TOC in Lai Khe and passed message to the highest authority and Mr. Rice: "Imperative that Minh Thanh Hamlet receive food and supplies." (COL Nhut reported earlier that the 300 still there have exhausted all food supplies. Earlier drops (presumably Halo) drifted and landed 1 to 2 Km from the hamlet.

962. Now, concerning today (5 May): Several Halo supply drops were made, but the majority either were lost (west of the perimeter) or streamered in. The supplies recovered included mortar ammo (60 and 82mm), rice, small arms ammo, and C-rations (fruit and meat). Initially, here on Tri, it was "grab and run", but the sector sergeant major did an admirable job of bouchoring a detail to safeguard, stockpile and distribute the supplies. Some ammo is scattered around the compound, but the majority is near the south and eastern perimeter in holes. The remaining gas (I saw about 6-55 gal drums) is buried near the generator shed. One B-52 strike went in at 2315 hrs northeast of 7688, 1000 meters from friendlies. No effect on friendlies was reported. And that's the day that was, Friday, 5 May, the 27th day of the Siege of An Loc.

Saturday, 6 May 1972

963. The following is the substance of info received from a POW captured in action on the morning of 6 May. (POW was wounded, and the other three members of his patrol were KIA.) POW was Assistant CO of B-3 Co. of the 2-23 Sapper Bn, an element of the 5th NVA (VC) Division. His unit was entrenched along the SW corner of Quan Loi airstrip, and was on a scrouring mission on the SE edge of An Loc near Highway 303 when CIA by members of the 399th RF Co.

The 5th NVA Div has several units, including a recon company, in well constructed bunkers and defensive positions along a line from XT 853857 - XT 853869.

A Bn, not friendly, is in defensive positions about 500 meters NW of Tan Hung. The positions are approximately 600-800 meters long and run from NE to SW on the SE slope.

A Bn sized group containing an engineer company and a sapper company is dug in on a line from XT 819907 to XT 825910 on the SE side of the air strip. The unit has the mission of firing on any aircraft which attempts to land on the airstrip (SIC).

A company of infantry, not friendly, and the company of which POW was XO, is located in defensive positions along a line running from XT 807898 to XT 807904, SW of the Quan Loi airstrip.

6 well camouflaged 105mm howitzers of unknown manufacture are located in the rubber plantation in the vicinity of XT 827894. The guns are not dug in and ready to fire.

6 well camouflaged tanks (type unknown, but presumed to be T-54s) are located in the vicinity of XT 795885 (Note: last night, 5 May, Sectre received reports of tanks at 8087. Stinger was unable to verify the report.).

3 anti-aircraft machine guns are emplaced in a triangular configuration in the vicinity of XT 825917, north of the end of the Quan Loi airstrip.

At 1500 hrs yesterday (5 May) all (?) individuals were resupplied. Personal issues were 14 kilos of rice,  $\frac{1}{2}$  kilo of sugar, 1 box of dried (powdered) milk and 1 kilo of beef. The issue was in preparation for another attack on An Loc by the 5th Div. POW stated that the attack order had not yet been given. The 5th Div is to attack An Loc, take the city and continue to move south. (The only time frame mentioned was that the 5th Div had reported to COSVN that it could take An Loc in two days.) An Loc is then to be secured by the 9th NVA Div and local force VC.

POW's unit was part of force that pushed the 6th ABN Bn off of the hill at XT 796874 on 20 April.

POW's company has from 58-60 people. Assigned equipment is: 2<sup>nd</sup> AV, 4 CKC, 3 B-40 launchers, 23 B-40 rounds, 1 81mm mortar with 38 rounds, 1 K-54, 90 large (SIC) hand grenades, 21 Kg of C-4, 17 flares, 53 small hand grenades, 210 detonators (SIC), 381 detonators (SIC), 4 pair wire-cutters, 3 watches, 3 compasses and one pair of binoculars.

The units around Quan Loi have been retrieving supply drops which have drifted east of An Loc. Two platoons, not friendlies, are stationed near Highway 303, vicinity XT 769885 and have the mission of retrieving the supply drops.

POW reports that the 5th Div received a resupply from evacuation yesterday. Signed - CPT Donald W. Hensley Sr. (as received from MAJ Thiet, S. S-2).

964. 1035 hrs Sector reports 03 VC KIA and 01 VC CIA vicinity 7788, by 399 RF Co. Prelim interrogation report: CIA is a member of 2nd Bn, 272 Regt. 272 has three battalions: 1 is NNE of An Loc on line 800 meters long, vicinity 765890 on latitude of approximately 280°, one Bn is south of Quan Loi airstrip, vicinity 810888, and one Bn south of Tan Loi vicinity 700884. More info to follow.

Saturday, 6 May 1972 (Continued)

965. Anti-aircraft site 780890 .37mm observed by 214 RF Co. Notified Div. and advised them that we could adjust - VNAF hit it without adjusting.

966. 1420 hrs Resupply operation. Supplies were delivered but no patients were evacuated - birds did not sit down.

967. XT 805866 - .47mm anti-aircraft gun at 1715 hrs. Notified Div. and they put a strike in!

968. Mr. Lam Hen died yesterday at the CORDS Compound. He was head of the guards at Fort Prune before Rangers and 5th Div troops forced them out!!

969. The food drop to the 300 souls at Minh Thanh outpost was completed. 10 parachutes outside, one landed inside. 3/25 suffered 3 KIA and 3 WIA in an effort to get some of the other pallets.

Sunday, 7 May 1972

970. Called SFC Boyle and emphasized necessity for resupply at Minh Thanh again. Also emphasized that it is imperative that An Loc be relieved before the next onslaught is released by the NVA against An Loc.

971. Talked with BG McGiffert by phone and he is leaving TRAC on 8 May '72. To Clark for several days then return for reassignment to MACV. Talked with MG Hollingsworth about the need for B-52 strikes against the 5th NVA Div in their assembly and headquarters areas to the east of An Loc. He assured me we would get strikes into that area - the POW interrogation must have corroborated earlier intelligence because one strike also went into the area last night.

972. Received word from Lai Khe that next big attack against An Loc would come within the next 72 hours. Documents, radio traffic and POW report indicate another big attack but no time frame other than 10 May which does coincide. But report of a fresh division from Cambodia is a new twist.

973. Went to Team 47 Headquarters building to open safe and get money and documents there from. All safes had been forced open and looted and inside of building had been wrecked by mortar and artillery fire and uninvited occupants. They had ripped and torn, mutilated and ruined what remained and were living in an animalistic state - on the floor with desks, chairs, charts, typewriters, etc, etc, piled above them surrounded by human fecal matter and urine right next to dirty cooking utensils. Evidence of prior looting was everywhere - including SECRET VN documents left lying around "helter skelter." Salvaged Pres. Nixon's and Mr. Walkinshaw's pictures and that was about it!!

974. I hope that what I saw and witnessed today is not typical of the 'brave' defenders of An Loc. First, Javor, SGT Luong and I moved Mr. Thieu to the pad for another (the 10th?) attempt at medevac. The guards (?) at the pad contemptuously asked why we go to so much trouble for an old man when many of their soldiers had been wounded and not medevaced. (I could have replied that if the well and running-wounded would do their duty, rather than rushing on and assaulting the choppers, the badly wounded could have gotten out.) We made no reply. At 1140 hrs, three VNAF choppers came in, passed over the assembled wounded at the pad and truck then landed on the old 5th Div pad. No one was medevaced when the three went out. (Perhaps all was not wasted: The incoming hit the Tri pad, rather than the 5th Div. This points out the wiseness of switching landing sites.) After returning Mr. Thieu to his bunker, the lordly occupants refused to allow us to the room where he had been. Sgt Lighia, formerly a TOC interpreter, was one of the 7 or 8 individuals who made the gallant stand in the bunker door. (He will be remembered!) Mr. Thieu is in what has now been designated the medical bunker.

My vocabulary is not big enough to properly describe my feelings when I went with LTC Corley to our old S-1; pride and center of activity for Team 47. More damage had been done by looters than mortar or artillery fire. The safe in Mr. Rice's office which had been cemented into the wall had been blasted off and opened. The charred remains lay in the outer office. LTC Corley's office was occupied by some representative manpower of the 5th Div. They had stockpiled food and medical supplies and gave the appearance of hiding. That building will require considerable cleaning and airing before it can be occupied by humans. (God, was I angry when I saw the mess.)

On the brighter side, resupply today was great. Only one pad landed outside the perimeter and it's in a place where the VC can't get it. A B-52 strike went in at 2340 hrs, west of An Loc, scaring hell out of beaucoup Vietnamese and Co Vans Ny. - by CPT Hensley.

Monday, 8 May 1972

975. 1120 - 1235 hrs Tried to get through to Lai Khe to pass list of needed supplies, but the line was in constant use by the 5th Div. (My bowels loosened up today for the first time. YIP-PHE!!!)

976. "For Those Who Have Fought And Almost Died, Life And Liberty Have A Special Flavor That The Protected Will Never Know." - Unknown.

977. I officially certify that all personal and team property of Team 47 can be written off. We went to Fort Prune today and all personal and team property has disappeared. Mr. Davenport's room was the same as the rest. Human fecal matter and urine all over the place. It was occupied by PSDF and Suzie's family (12 total).

978. CORDS Compound personnel have finally opened up the well and they now have good water and plenty of rice. Suzie and Ft Prune people need more food and diarrhea pills.

979. We must get the rice resupply drop on a dedicated aircraft with notification to Sector or me before it drops. I've talked with MG Hollingsworth, COL Tallman and Mr. Metcalf about this problem. Also SFC Boyle at Lai Khe!!

980. LTC Corley got a 2 inch laceration on his right upper arm today. He's not sure what caused it, but it probably came from shrapnel of either a rocket or mortar which hit while he was outside this morning. He washed and dressed the wound himself.

981. The Civilian Compound is a total wreck (as previously stated). 12 bodies are in temporary (hopefully) graves on the lower level south corner. I was surprised that one of the T-54s had driven over the fence and over the site which later became the grave site. Tai Khanh fired M-72s at the tank and chased it away. LTC Corley's safe was intact and he retrieved some of his personal papers and his K-54. The loyalty and dedication of the guards must be rewarded. Some of the vehicles on the compound may be repairable. The PRU Compound could again be made liveable after considerable work. The commander of the PSDF assured the Colonel and I that he would direct his PSDF members to clean the buildings of trash and fecal matter and dig sanitary facilities. In view of the fact that this will probably again be my home, I will personally follow up on this. Everything (I mean everything) has been taken from the compound. (Air conditioners, beds, wall lockers, dishes, tables, chairs, fini het roi.) Rockets had hit each building once, but they can be repaired. The generators appear to be okay, as is the water tank. Oh yes, all windows and doors have been removed.

982. The one VNAF resupply/medevac was not announced (to U.S.). 3 choppers landed on the 5th Div pad at 1120 hrs and took out two loads of people (wounded? Who knows?) Halo resupply took a new twist with "high velocity" drops (small chutes which open high and fall rapidly). This method appears to be an improvement because the landing zones were a maximum of 200x100 meters. All pallets were apparently recovered.

983. 1940 hrs VN reported mortar firing at 745865 and requested air strike.

984. 2020 hrs Got slow movers to put in napalm and several hard bombs. Secondary explosions observed.

985. 2130 hrs COL Nhut reported lights and secondary explosions vicinity 747863. Requested air strike, but 62R reports FAC busy with four targets, of higher priority.

986. 2135 hrs Stinger 58 going to look at 747863. Mortar going in there, Stinger will observe. 2140 hrs he's seen fires and secondaries. Correct 50 meters west then 75 south, then east 60-5 meters.

987. Passed info to CPT Delvin at Lai Khe about air drops of food for refugees. He was directed to notify Mr. Rice and he would work out the details, plus prepare "goodie drop" to be placed on next chopper that brings in and takes out Americans. Colonel Miller should be going out the next run. Tentatively planned for 10 May 1972.

988. At 767874 - report of enemy movement. At 760870 and 770870 requested illumination. Movements tonight indicate that the enemy is positioning his troops for another go at An Loc.

Tuesday, 9 May 1972

989. (1) See Dr. Quy and have him check Mr. Thieu (mechanic). (2) Check Intel Platoon and determine what tripped all those claymores. (3) Check on rice (food) drop. (4) Drawing stinger away from TIC?? (5) Food and medicine for Suzie at PRU. (6) Cigarettes for Tai Khanh - and food for Tai Khanh but no rice - they have plenty!!

990. Sector has established a seriously wounded area with Dr. Quy and Dr. Phuoc and the ABN Brigade doctor in attendance; it's in a bunker on sector compound and the operating room is now being established.

991. Had my first confrontation with Colonel Nhut today concerning food and medical supplies. The clearing of the air may have done some good. It's too early to say at this time.

992. Pres Nixon's talk - Haiphong harbor will be mined, but not activated until after 3 daylight periods. During this period ships would be allowed to leave. At the conclusion of the 3 days ships will enter and depart at their own risk. Pres. stated that at the (1) Completion of return home of all POWs and (2) a cease fire under supervision of an International Control Commission that ALL US FORCES would be returned to the United States, from that date, within four months.

993. Requested 30,000 units of cholera units (Province Chief) - hopefully they will be sent soonest!!

994. Artillery fire increased from 1800 to time of writing (2145 hrs). My personal feeling is that the NVA will attack An Loc within the next 36 hours!!

Wednesday, 10 May 1972

995. Colonel Miller and CPT Wilbanks successfully evacuated from An Loc. COL Ulmer and MAJ Hallum, Joe arrived at 0610 hours. (9 May E-6 Regiment reported at XT 840830).

Four more civilians were killed on CCPODS Compound - 3 children and 1 woman. This brings to 14, the number of people buried on our compound.

105 and 155 reported in grid square 755930, 755925, 768930, 768925. (Reported by MAJ Qui. Info relayed to Monitor 62R for exploitation.)

996. Hensley - Mail for COL Corley and I came in this morning on the chopper. There were no other supplies. Why??? We have called to Lai Khe numerous times and requested medicines, food, and health and comfort items. There is no apparent sense of urgency or priority applied to our requests. Someone must exert effort to fulfill our requests, and act with some sense of urgency.

997. There was plenty of room on the chopper to bring in the items we requested. (Perhaps there are some serious deficiencies in our supply system?? Maybe someone should take a critical look.)

998. PSA, LTC Taylor, and I went to 5th Div TOC at 1130 hours. Shortly after we arrived, incoming mortar ignited a supply pallet just outside the TOC. CS gas, possibly from the pallet, drifted through the TOC and compound and we had to put on our protective masks. Enroute to and from the 5th Div TOC we saw numerous ammunition pallets (small arms and 90mm) which had not been retrieved.

Thursday, 11 May 1972

999. 0330 hrs At 766877 enemy contact. Friendlies at 765875. Put strike in 766881 to 767878. 75 RR located 770875 - mortars fired immediately and cut off at 0350 hours to allow fighters in! Sundog 37 took over from Chico 33. At 769873 another 75 RR.

1000. 0428 hrs At 766882 reported tanks on road.

1001. 0440 hrs B-40 fire on NP at 753873. Along a line 765875 to 767875 Priority 1.

1002. 0447 hrs At 788901 probable 105 position firing (FAC observed).

1003. 0515 hrs NVA using gas against NP - also 52nd (1/48 area).

A-1-J-47

A-1-J-47

Thursday, 11 May 1972 (Continued)

1004. 0525 hrs 4 tanks inside birm  $\frac{1}{2}$  block on the west. 750880 - 2 tanks. 753370 - 2 tanks.

1005. 0730 hrs One tank destroyed at 754868 by Sector and 1/48th.

1006. 752873 is SW corner of NP compound. Cobras working. Danger 79 says #110 has been diverted and should come in very soon.

1007. 0805 hrs 2nd report at XT 746373 .51 Cal position.

1008. 0807 hrs Crash site \_\_\_\_ of A-37 (All FACs left station without permission.). 01 report: XT 749880 (tank location, stationary, no troops noticed in the vicinity).

1009. 0825 hrs Unable to contact Chico 11 to report above.

1010. 0810-0830 hrs Complete absence of air cover and FACs (Note: at 0810 a Hawk was reported down north of town. Apparently all FACs are working on rescue (?).)

1011. 0829 hrs Province Chief requested CBU strike at 765880, 767880, 765873, 767873 center of mass at 766878. Nearest friendly 350 meters to the west.

1012. 0830 hrs Five Chieu Hoi arrived at 21st ABN Ranger Group.

1013. 0855 hrs Last air strike was at 0755 hrs. This problem with FACs leaving push without permission must be corrected.

1014. 0858 hrs Discussed FAC problem with Danger 79.

1015. 0907 hrs Heavy arty warning at exact time FAC came on station.

1016. 0909 hrs Danger 79 wants matter of record on next TAC AIR strike arrival at An Loc. Passed to Monitor 62. Cancelled out by crash!!

1017. 0913 hrs ARC Lights will go in at same time. Straight from Danger 79. Passed to all FACs. Passed to Monitor 62 as well!!

1018. 0920 hrs ARC Light to west. Skillet Hotel reported secondaries and fires on an azimuth of approximately 275°.

1019. 0925 hrs Geronimo 6 called to check on TAC AIR. Replied "no", but that we had indications it was on the way. Geronimo 6 talked with Chico 11. Chico appeared skeptical about the weather conditions and apprehensive about "losing another bird today."

1020. 0930 hrs Chico 11 checked in with napalm. Wanted and got approval to put it in the CBU Box to the east.

1021. COL Nhut reported receiving a report that an L-19 was down vicinity 764875 - 0935 hours.

1022. 0939 hrs COL Nhut directed that a 90mm RR be sent to police compound to protect the SW corner.

1023. COL Nhut reported the downed Aircraft was on 0-2. Downed by a Heat Seeking missile.

1024. 0946 hrs Danger 79 called reference downed 0-2.

1025. 0947 hrs Notified we would get Cobra support for rescue attempt. Outlook 24 is Cobra team, Rash 10 is FAC.

1026. 0950 hrs Last three numbers on Chico 11's tail are 060.

1027. 0955 hrs 742883 - Skillet Hotel report as location of gun (?) that shot down two planes.

1028. 1005 hrs Geronimo 6 advised that ARC Light would go in at 1020 hours and all craft should be alerted. 1006 Rash 10 so advised.

1029. 1011 hrs ARC Light NW of town. (Give 'em hell!!) Clos-!!

Thursday, 11 May 1972 (Continued)

1030. 1030 hrs TAC fighters worked over tree line at approximately 766377.

1031. 1059 hrs COL Nhut reported close-in contact at 763375 and requests close support.

1032. 1100 hrs Cobras in area almost out of ammo and unable to fly the mission. 72A suggested VII AIE could fly the mission. Suggestion passed to COL Nhut.

1033. 1104 hrs 2 F-4s on station. Per request of CCL Tan the strike is to be north to south or south to north from 766374 to 765380 about 100 meters east of the stream. Sundog 28 is controlling the strike.

1034. 1114 hrs B-52 strike went in SW of town.

1035. 1120 hrs Cloud cover has closed in east of town, too low to put in F-4s. Possibly we can hit with a slower bird later. FAC and F-4s snapped up by 72A.

1036. 1135 hrs Cutlook 25 checked in, is looking for Sundog 34, last heard from before heavy arty warning.

1037. 1155 hrs Heavy arty warning from now until 1215 hours.

1038. 1228 hrs H-72s, 57 RR, 90 RR and ammo. Passed request to Danger 79 for listed items at 1228 hours.

1039. 1300 hrs Heavy arty warning.

1040. 1310 hrs 766375 57 RR - counter mortar put on 57 RR.

1041. 1332 hrs 2 Spectres all night - one with 105 howitzer. (Received word from Danger 79.)

1042. 1445 hrs Enemy company reported at \_\_\_\_\_ - Chico 31 has good mark on center of mass - need to work 100 meters to north and 100 meters to south of mark (Passed to Chico 31).

1043. 1535 hrs 752873 enemy digging in - just outside the herd. (Passed to Chico 31.) Nearest friendlies at 755870 and 753375.

1044. 1545 hrs Heavy arty warning.

1045. 1551 hrs B-52 strike.

1046. 1615-1622 hrs CBU strike at 764374 on the east.

1047. 1650 hrs Received heavy arty warning for 1655 hours.

1048. 1658 hrs ARC Light in directly east of town, close.

1049. 1700 hrs Chico 31 being replaced by Chico 35.

1050. 1732 hrs At 743872 2 tanks were observed. Report from 5th Div.

1051. 1751 hrs Chico 35 reported that 62A had a higher priority for the napalm on station.

1052. 1800 hrs Request by LTC Ton for three Sky Spots: COM: (1) 740908; (2) 756925; (3) 780920.

1053. 1755 hrs Above request relayed to 62 via 72A.

1054. 1815 hrs Message from Danger 79. 4 A-37, CBU, HB 1830 hours. 1830 3 F-4s with Nape, HB. 1830 3 F-4s with Nape, and hard bombs on the way.

1055. 1820 hrs 752872, 763873, 763875 should be hit.

1056. 1823 hrs Spectre comes up at 1900, switch around as needed, coordinate with 62. (Message from Danger 79.)

1057. 1825 hrs From 62A: 155s (friendly from Tong Le Chon) are not shooting at this time.

Thursday, 11 May 1972 (Continued)

1058. 1827 hrs We will get A-37s first to hit target on SW. A-37s are arm'd with some type of WP.

1059. 1831 hrs Targets (in order of priority) passed to Chico 35.

1060. 1850 hrs Chico 35 advises that, considering the advance to be used, target point is very close to friendlies. I suggest target area further to south, so that spread will still hit target area.

1061. 1855 hrs Putting in WP and M-82s vicinity 752872.

1062. 1920 hrs 752872 troops digging in - Naped!!

1063. 1920 hrs 770876, 772876, 771874, 774876 106 RR.

1064. 1928 hrs 743877 .51 Cal. 740874 vehicles.

1065. 1937 hrs 773874 tank.

1066. 1939 hrs 345° azimuth NW quadrant, (5th Bn called it in). 23 or 37mm anti-aircraft weapon position. 757876 (5th Bn CP).

1067. 2015 hrs (1) 764875, (2) 766874 - targets given Chico 35. Target #1 is a 57 RR, target #2 is an 82mm mortar (lights observed in vicinity of #2, possibly a tank or a wheeled vehicle).

1068. 2047 hrs ARC Light in.

1069. 2050 hrs Chico 35 ready to put in strike, but requests a flare. Strike cancelled in east due to wasting time. Strike passed to Skillet Hotel.

1070. 2115 hrs Priority for future targets: (1) 57mm RR at 764875, (2) 81mm and vehicle(s) at 766874, (3) 752871 (possible vehicles inside tree line).

1071. 2140 hrs 768873, three tanks moving from east to west reported by Sector Duty Officer. LTC Ton awakened and he gave the above corrected coordinates.

1072. 2144 hrs ARC Light in.

1073. 2243 hrs ARC Light strike in.

Friday, 12 May 1972

1074. 0455 hrs ARC Light strike in.

1075. 0520 hrs COL Ihut reported a 57mm RR firing at 768875 and an 82mm firing at 775875. Called 62 for air strike but was told the FACs were all busy. We should get a strike soon.

1076. 0605 hrs Heavy arty warning until 0620 hours.

1077. 0616 hrs ARC Light strike in.

1078. 0617 hrs Called 62 again about strikes on the above two targets. 62 said we would "be able to take care of it as soon as possible"(?).

1079. 0630 hrs Danger 79 on station! 62 reported a 45 minute lag in air cover. 79 said, "Bull shit! There won't be any days like that! You just hang in there. I'll get you some \_\_\_\_ air in there. I'll be right back. Out!"

1080. 0635 hrs Danger 79 reports 2 sets of A-37s enroute now and 15 sorties of F-4s due on station at 0700. (Gave 79 a 10 second update!)

1081. 0639 hrs Heavy artillery warning.

1082. 0649 hrs Report of 70 VC in open at 749881 moving east to west (running away from town?).

Friday, 12 May 1972 (Continued)

1083. 0650 hrs Sundog 40 will be FAC for air strike. Cave 40 specifics for air strike.

1084. 0705 hrs Outlook 33 (Cobras) on station.

1085. 0655 hrs Sundog 40 will hold air strike until after ARC Light.

1086. 0710 hrs Salesman Tango could use . . .

1087. 0715 hrs ARC Light strike in.

1088. 0730 hrs A-37 air strike at 763874 to the east - troops.

1089. 0755 hrs At XT 740870 - anti-aircraft position - Quad. .50.

1090. 0758 hrs 767874 to 767878 (troops). 57 RR position at 766877. Quad .51 position 775889. (Position reported by Cobras - Outlook 33.) Friendlies position 763880.

1091. 0820 hrs Napalm strike put in at 767874 to 767878 (and 57 RR at 766877). Got two secondary explosion!!

1092. 0858 hrs CBU 24 strike 767874 to 767878. Mark 82s on Quad .51 at 775889.

1093. 0930 hrs The following information was obtained from POW Le Van Thanh, captured in the late afternoon of 11 May 1972; by the 81st Ranger Group:  
POW was a member of C-4 Company, 2177 Tank Battalion, 203 NVA Regiment. POW is a sergeant. On 6 May, POW's Battalion left the base area near the Me Kong River, travelled via Tong Le Chon and arrived at the rubber plantation south of An Loc on 8 May. In the rubber plantation POW's unit was located with an NVA infantry battalion, NFI. POW's battalion had four companies, but only the C-3 and C-4 were sent to An Loc. Each company had 11 tanks.  
Company C-3 has 85 men, no anti-aircraft weapons, and type K3A tanks (similar to T-34 and PT-76). 8 of these tanks were brought to An Loc.  
Company C-4 started out with 10 type K3B tanks but two had mechanical difficulty between Tong Le Chon and An Loc and were abandoned. 8 tanks of C-4 arrived in An Loc. C-4 arrived with 8 anti-aircraft guns and 85 men.  
The C-3 and C-4 were given the mission of attacking An Loc. The C-4 was ordered to attack from the west of An Loc on 110400 and maintain the attack for 03 days. The C-4 had provisions to last for 3 days.

1094. The following info was obtained from documents captured by the 81st Ranger Group on 11 May: The 174th Regiment was given the mission of attacking An Loc from the North. Two battalions were to be on line and one battalion in reserve. (Note: The info from #1093 and above was obtained from MAJ Thiet, Binh Long Sector S-2. The information is skimpy, but that is all we have.)

1095. Missile being fired at aircraft is believed to be of the "red eye" type. Not too effective head on but better on a side shot. Range 3½ Km Slant Range with maximum altitude of 9,000 feet.

1096. 1305 hrs Six to ten tanks spotted at approximately 774874. Sundog 21 sent to check it out.

1097. 1345 hrs We must use Psyops!! It's a must!! And do it now - and it must be done constantly!!! (Passed to Geronimo 6.)

1098. 1545 hrs MAJ Qui reported 5 tanks at 780870, moving north. FAC not available to check it because of bad weather. One tank reported at 770873. 57mm RR reported at 745875. One tank each at 738879 and 745874.

1099. 1830 hrs Spectre 14 assigned to us for mission on tanks on the east.

1100. 1830 hrs Spectre 14 diverted to take care of troops moving in on the west vicinity 745883 (100 to 150 troops).

1101. 1855 hrs Anti-aircraft sites at 770898, 775895, 771890 and 776887. Tanks (about 10) just east (100 meters) east of 77 line in 7787 grid square. 767873 - one tank. 773873 - one tank.

1102. 1915 hrs CCL Khut requested the following APC Light boxes (1) 770900, 780900, 770800, 780-860; (2) 730900, 740900, 730870, 740870. These request paralleled to 5th Div.

Friday, 12 May 1972 (Continued)

1103. 2020 hrs Air strike to the east along 77 grid line.

1104. 2110 hrs Request for B-52 strike 740890 - 740900, 765890 - 765900. Sky spots at 751852 - 753855 - 750858 - 747860 - 747864. Province Chief passed to division.

1105. 2130 hrs 767883 - two tanks moving from east to west, using UV lights (sic).

1106. 2215 hrs 768878 tanks - start there searching with the Spectre. Div. reluctantly turned him over to us to check the east side.

1107. 2250 hrs Reference above: sorry about that, Sir; they didn't after all.

1108. 2338 hrs B-52 strike to the NE of An Loc.

Saturday, 13 May 1972

1109. 0132 hrs B-52 strike to the west of An Loc at 7488.

1110. 0235 hrs B-52 strike to the southwest of An Loc.

1111. 0330 hrs B-52 strike.

1112. 0430 hrs B-52 strike.

1113. 0528 hrs B-52 strike north (per 111 and Danger 79).

1114. 0625 hrs 57 RR at 745880. Notified Div.

1115. 0655 hrs Province Chief authorized refugees to move south along QL 13 only. He said he would accept responsibility for any casualties. I tried to get him to hold them where they were for 2 or 3 hours but he decided against it.

1116. 0800 hrs Passed message to Danger 16 concerning necessity for B-52 strikes in the NW, along the artillery belt.

1117. 0810 hrs Passed message to Rash 10 asking him to keep tab on the refugees moving south.

1118. 0815 hrs 766876 - location of missile launching site (observed by Rash 10). E-6 Regiment located at 840830 on 9 May (URS).

1119. 0940 hrs Company move to 761875. 763875 air strike requested by LTC Ton prior to move.

1120. 0950 hrs 764874 approximately 30 VC attempting to move east to west. Air strike is going in there (controlled by whom?). If we could adjust 100 meters south we should be on target.

1121. 0955 hrs We checked, but can't find out who is controlling air strike vicinity 764874.

1122. 1005 hrs 759873 Only F-4s with CBU 49 and M-82 available. Rash 10 is trying to get soft ordnance up ASAP.

1123. 1035 hrs Danger wants 25-30 sky spot and locations sent in by Div.

1124. 1045 hrs Delayed Entry - anti-aircraft missiles are S/A-7s (reported by Rash 10).

1125. 1050 hrs Asked LTC for 25-30 sky spot request in order of priority.

1126. 1100 hrs Sky spot locations listed and sent: VN sky spot request in order of priority (LTC Ton and MAJ Qui): 769875, 770880, 770885, (765895, 766887, 763889 - AA sites), 776886, 773-891, 779901, 786903, 726872, 725880, 755925, 742909, 734918, 716893, 716881, 714874, 707876.

1127. 1105 hrs Put in marking round on east. Move 200 meters to east and we'll hit their heads.

1128. 1115 hrs Sundog 23 informed me that the slow movers will arrive in 15 minutes (Already!!).

Saturday, 13 May 1972 (Continued)

1129. 1120 hrs 23 says he will have 4 F-4s with 28 cans of Napo.

1130. 1140 hrs Final marking round put in by 23 (right on bullseye!).

1131. 1145 hrs Napo in on target at 764874. Receiving S/A from vicinity 758855.

1132. 1150 hrs Strike completed. All 28 pads on target. An outstanding job by Sundog 23.

1133. 1155 hrs Bounty reports 81mm at 767886 and AA at 765877. Sealskin reports 23mm (anti-aircraft) 765895 and other anti-aircraft sites at 777896, 777897, 777900, 766887, 763889.

1134. 1445 hrs VNAF AIE down SW of town. Rescue efforts are being made.

1135. 1545 hrs 165 Regimental CP located at 687785, 11 May (URS), 174 Regimental CP located at 840845, 11 May (URA), E-6 Regimental CP located at 820855, 11 May (URS).

1136. 1905 hrs C-20 located at 745912 (12 May), URS. 271 located at 780822 (12 May) URS. 5th Div. located at 890892 (12 May) URS. 5th Div (Fwd CP) located at 890843 (12 May) URS.

1137. B-52 - 772857, 761853, 786886, 797880. 725840, 735840, 725870, 735870. 713876, 721874, 727903, 735897. The above strikes will go in night of 13 May. It is the unanimous opinion of all high ranking officers here that An Loc is still held only because of the numerous close-in B-52 strikes which obviously disrupted the NVA plan for a 3-day offensive which began at 110330 April. These B-52 strikes must be continued if we are to hold An Loc until relieved or we take offensive action. Stacked up TAC AIR must be maintained as long as we can use it. When we can't, the requested sky spots must be flown. We were told today that III Corps had come up with a plan to drop a Command Vault on the SI tomorrow morning at approximately 0730 hrs. Two ARVN ABN were killed and four wounded when the back door of our TOC took a hit. Later inspection revealed that it had to be at least a 105 howitzer firing from the north.

1138. 2045 hrs First resupply drop.

Sunday, 14 May 1972

1139. 0325 hrs B-52 strike to the SE of An Loc.

1140. 0428 hrs B-52 strike to An Loc.

1141. 0450 hrs Vehicles heard moving at 750863.

1142. 0455 hrs Resupply drop.

1143. 0500 hrs Tank observed firing at 752870.

1144. 0520 hrs B-52 strike.

1145. 0700-0730 hrs Strike by big stuff SW of town in rubber.

1146. 1030 hrs Call from Geronimo 6.

1147. 1500 hrs FAC shot down by SA-7. Two possible SAM sites given by ground units - (Sundog 7).

1148. 1510 hrs FAC who bailed out (Sundog 07) grabbed by 8th Bn south of town. He is okay, with only a scratch on his nose. Arrangements being made to get him out. We have continued to take artillery fire here on Tri Compound, but it is less intense than in the past three days. A new twist, however, is that this morning we took several rounds of artillery fire (from the north) which apparently had VT fuzes since they were all airbursts.

1149. 1545 hrs FAC enroute to us from 8th Bn.

1150. 1550 hrs SAM site sighted at 790865 by FAC (Rash 5).

1151. 1630 hrs Sky spots sent to division - 730880 (tanks-2), 764892 (AA), 762872 (81 mortar),

Sunday, 14 May 1972 (Continued).

1151. Continued - 750363 (tank), 747881 (AA).

1152. 1710 hrs 770874 - tank reported moving west.

1153. The following information was obtained from POW Bui Trung, born 1951, in North Vietnam: POW turned himself in to the National Police, who man a position of the SW An Loc perimeter at 0700 hrs, 14 May. POW was a member of A-5 section, D-2 Platoon, C-3 Company, D-1 Battalion, Group 2040. The Group, composed of approximately 500 men, left North Vietnam on 22 December 1971 and arrived in Kampuchea (Cambodia) in early April 1972. After a few days rest, POW's battalion (D-1) consisting of approximately 200 men, left the Milmot area, enroute to Binh Long Province. The unit planned to cross the river north of Tong Le Chon, but a change was made and the unit crossed in the vicinity of XT 9557. After crossing into Binh Long Province, the unit (D-1) was met by an element of the 9th NVA Division (presumed to be a recon element by POW) and escorted to Binh Phu Hamlet (XT 715888), arriving there during the night of 11 May. POW's unit was attached to a regiment (11FI) of the 9th NVA Division. D-1 battalion had 3 companies, C-1, C-2, and C-3, each with 45 to 50 personnel. During the morning hours of 13 May, C-1 company attacked the western perimeter at a point what been previously penetrated by the NVA. On the evening of 13 May, C-3 Company (of which POW was a member) was given the mission replacing C-1 company. At approximately 0200 hours, 14 May, while POW's unit was moving toward the penetration, his unit was hit by a "horrendous mortar barrage." (Note: This is believed to be a CBU-49, since we did not fire mortars into that area at that time.) About 20 men were killed immediately, and many more seriously wounded. POW ran to the southeast and hid until 0700 hours, 14 May when he slowly approached the National Police perimeter and surrendered. POW was a B-40 man and his basic load was three rounds. He did not have them with him when he surrendered. POW's unit was told that C-3 would remain in An Loc for one day and one night. Since POW was so young and of such low rank (PVT) he was never told anything further concerning unit composition, mission, or higher unit disposition. (Note: I realize the info reported above is sketchy, but it is complete, as obtained from the Sector S-2.) Signed Donald M. Hensley Sr.

1154. 1840 hrs On the next chopper in, we need (in order of priority) two 57mm Recoilless Rifles, one 90mm RR and numerous diarrhea pills.

1155. 1845-1900 hrs Tried to get through to Lai Khe to pass the above message to CPT Delvin. Land Line is broken and could not get through on the 72-B.

1156. 1945 hrs ABN Bde. intercepted FM broadcasts from "a VC General". Most of the transmission was encoded but the time 0630 was repeated many times. The FM frequencies were 38.00 and 44.00.

1157. 2010 hrs The above info was shacked and passed to a FAC for a "cut", as recommended by Sundog 07.

Monday, 15 May 1972

1158. 0520 hrs B-52 strike to east.

1159. 0620 hrs B-52 strike to northeast.

1160. 0720 hrs B-52 strike to southwest.

1161. 0757 hrs 745881 - anti-aircraft site. 745884 missile launching site.

1162. 0828 hrs Lt McPhillips (FAC) arrived back at Command Center. He was supposed to go out at 0600 but we never heard from anybody.

1163. 1150 hrs Province Chief requested CBU-55 and 49 strike in box 765880, 765870, 770880, 770-870. CBU-49 on west side of box and CBU-55 on east. Center of mass at 767875. Friendlies 1,000 meters to the west. (Troops, anti-aircraft, 61mm mortar.) Shacked and sent to Chico 33 to forwd.

1164. 1215 hrs 761900 - 105 and 155 positions.

1165. 1250 hrs Talked with Danger 79 at length.

1166. 1315 hrs 763820 and 766319 2 tubes arty.

Monday, 15 May 1972 (Continued)

1167. 1315 hrs 763803 - 2 tubes arty.

1168. 1400 hrs 740870 target maximum 9,000 feet - arty firing from the south. Martha 03 - 30.40 - V: FAC.

1169. 1433 hrs CBU-55 strike at center of mass 767875 - FAC marked and was verified by territorials on ground. Very good strike!!

1170. 1505 hrs 798897 regiment headquarters - 1st priority at old French hospital PJ - WFNUSZ.

1171. 1542 hrs Air strike against regt CP - 2 sets.

1172. 1630 hrs Mortar position at 769881.

1173. 1638 hrs Bounty reports mortar and anti-aircraft at 766886.

1174. 1652 hrs Mortar position at 766874 and 767873.

1175. 1840 hrs Again described target and gave location of French dispensary, and told of results of previous strike. Requested another hit on the hospital and directed that they knock out the water cistern and tower (before dark if possible).

1176. 1915 hrs Sky spot requests: 690906, 721899, 715886, 720861, 780861, 700837, 710925, 760-913, 788896, 799899, 789883, 780881, 765846, 805847, 791941, 756835, 805867, 816802, 835884. Checked and forwarded parallel to Div.

1177. 1920 hrs Sky spots requests paralleled to 62R.

1178. 2000 hrs Requests for two ARC Light strikes submitted on basis of intelligence report on the following (and this page) page. (#1 - 730870, 730840, 740870, 740840)(#2 - 740865, 740845, 748864, 748345)

1179. On 15 May 1972, an individual who chooses to remain unidentified, provided substantially the following information to COL Nhut, Binh Long Province Chief:

Subject was halted by the NVA between An Loc and Chon Thanh while trying to flee south, and was made a forced laborer, one of many. Subject was one of a group who was forced to carry NVA supplies and equipment from Mirh Duc Village (XT 720820) to an area (vic XT 737855) approximately 1 Km west of Thanh Binh Village (XT 750855). Among the items subject was forced to transport was a large missile or rocket (IFI) which was so heavy that it was very difficult for two strong men to carry. Several of these missiles were brought to the area west of Thanh Binh. Subject escaped from the NVA on 15 May and volunteered the above info. He is not presently available for further questioning.

Note: Due to the range capability and weight (101 pounds), it is not likely the missile is a 122mm. It is suspected that the missiles are either SA-7s or B-20 or B-30 rockets or a similar type. Signed CPT Donald K. Hensley, Sr.

Tuesday, 16 May 1972

1180. 0125 hrs 57 RR and .90mm weapons will be delivered to An Loc today or so we were advised by Monitor 62R. Also, our food drop for civilians is supposed to be the last drop of the day which is presently scheduled for 1315 hours. On the 15th the NVA pushed another salient into the perimeter on the NE approximately 100 meters, the noose grows tighter every day and still no 21st Div and no aggressive action by the 5th ARVN Div. or its CG.

1181. 0132 hrs B-52 strike to the \_\_\_\_ of An Loc.

1182. 0232 hrs B-52 strike to the south of An Loc, around 30 line.

1183. 0430 hrs B-52 strike.

1184. 0630 hrs B-52 strike.

1185. 0635 hrs Sky spots - about 40 - south.

Tuesday, 16 May 1972 (Continued)

1186. 0900 hrs 621 notified me that our "goodies" would be dropped on the second drop. The time still tentative, but we will be notified.

1187. 1015 hrs B-52 strike south of An Loc.

1188. 1020 hrs 764219 - location of one arty piece, on north side of French home (20 - 30 meters from remains of house) - other tube is on east side of road and west of small outpost.

1189. 1110 hrs B-52 strike between 21st Div and An Loc.

1190. 1245 hrs COL Nhut reported that his people had monitored NVA radio traffic on 44.00 FM following the latest ARC Light near Duc Vinh (vicinity XT 763816). The transmission indicated the unit was badly hit and that the survivors were in a confused state. This info was shacked up and passed to Sundog 00 for a possible a.

1191. 1305 hrs COL Nhut reports 02 tanks located at AM-AFMHQ - 730875 whenever a plane flies over they withdraw into the jungle. When the plane leaves, they put out and fire at the SW side of this perimeter vicinity 750877.

1192. 1310 hrs B-52 strike to the south of An Loc.

1193. 1340 hrs Adjusting Sundog 00 onto tank targets at 730875. Using A & L and 01 to adjust. . . . Their heads now!! Dump the load!!

1194. 1420 hrs One tank hit, secondary (small) and fire reported.

1195. 1440 hrs Second tank within 5-10 meters of last impact. Tank is not moving. Third tank reported 300 meters south of last impact. A-37s with API scrambled and enroute.

1196. 1500 hrs 03 tanks knocked out - controlled by CPT Hensley.

1197. 1950 hrs 02 anti-aircraft positions 763888 and 745882.

1198. At this time in CORDS Compound there are 60 people; 15 men, 10 women and 30 children. All of us in the compound will "defend it to the death", in any way, any situation. Therefore we request that you don't let air strike hit the compound in any way. Because sometimes there are some VC that may enter compound and say request an air strike. Sector and your approval "of this" will kill all of us. Sincerely, Thank you...

1199. Sir, Mr. Thai Khanh (guard honcho) was wounded an shoulder by sniper fire but his situation now is OK, but he needs medicine very much. Sometimes compound was searched by 5th Rangers (reason they suspected that VC were in the compound). That is all we have to report to you, sir.

Wednesday, 17 May 1972

1200. 0132 hrs B-52 strike.

1201. 0525 hrs B-52 strike due west of An Loc.

1202. 0717 hrs B-52 strike south of An Loc.

1203. 0930 hrs Sky spot requests received from Major Qui and paralleled to 5th Div.

1204. 1015 hrs Targets for TAC AIR are 766873, 768873, 765876, 768877 - block. Anti-aircraft and mortar positions.

1205. 1100 hrs Received call from 5th Div. Our other two 90mm are there and will be sent on down to us ASAP. 3-57s were on the evac chopper which tried to come in this morning. 62A wants to know whether they should be sent back from Lai Khe to TSM for putting on a pallet for air drop. COL Nhut feels that the chance of loss is too risky and that they should be held at Lai Khe for the next chopper which comes in. This was passed to 62A - sights.

1206. 1350 hrs Four more people died on the CORDS Compound! I've lost track of how many are

Wednesday, 17 May 1972 (Continued)

1206. Continued - buried there now. I'll have to refer to the log to be sure of the total. Thai Khanh was wounded again - in the right shoulder this time. KIA - Danh Le, Lam Trac, Lam Sam and Lam It.

1207. 1815 hrs Two more pallets of 90mm ammo (100 rounds) received from 5th Div. Minh Thanh will be resupplied by air again tomorrow. Time not available at present.

1208. 2105 hrs (Yippee!!) Artillery (ours) from Tan Kai is firing into rubber processing plant area. Movement had been reported there.

1209. 2245 hrs B-52 strike.

Thursday, 18 May 1972

1210. 0030 hrs One tank reported stopped at 740835, two tanks at 752892.

1211. 0125 hrs Skillet Tango reports sounds like a tank running vicinity rubber processing plant.

1212. 0130 hrs Above info also reported by Sealskins counterpart.

1213. 0135 hrs Tank reported moving west to east at 745835.

1214. 0200 hrs Received 3 rounds of arty on Tri Compound. Skillet Tango reported the rounds came from Az 260° - 265°. Reported this to 62-R.

1215. 0234 hrs B-52 strike SW of An Loc.

1216. 0310 hrs Sky spot close NE. (It was supposed to hit 2½ Km WNE of town and hit 100 west of friendlies in town - right in area where Stinger was going to work. Too close for comfort - 6 WIA.)

1217. 0312 hrs Sky spot close NE.

1218. 0428 hrs B-52 strike west of An Loc.

1219. 0445 hrs Artillery yesterday morning at 0600 when we were at the chopper pad was out of the west. Also this morning it seems to be coming out of the west!!

1220. 0700 hrs Chico 33 checked in with 8 H-32s. Considering blade time, target type and type of aircraft, they are being put in on the hospital at 793397. This was a regimental Command Post on Monday and was hit and destroyed, but has probably been reestablished by now. Completed strike at 0725 hrs, had direct hits on the main building.

1221. 0930 hrs Arty that is firing into the compound appears to be coming from vicinity 7482 (Az 245°, rather than 265° as earlier reported). Let's get this bastard!!

1222. 0930 hrs Geronimo 6 called for update and got it.

1223. 1850 hrs B-52 strike NE of An Loc.

1224. 1916 hrs B-52 strike E of An Loc.

Friday, 19 May 1972

1225. 0815 hrs 763334 (57 RR 900 meters west), 773836 (57 RR 1400 meters west), 765916 (105 city). 105/155 positions observed at 773926 and 777927.

1226. 0915 hrs Talk with DEPCORDS and discuss possibilities of getting Sector the U.S. presidential unit citation plus Team 47. (Has DA notified? My orders?)

1227. 0920 hrs At 777869 - .37mm. Passed to Div.

Friday, 19 May 1972 (Continued)

1228. 1512 hrs NVA platoon at 770370 (Thu Bon Hamlet).  
1229. 1853 hrs B-52 strike NE of An Loc. 755909 - 75911 - 764916 possible 105 howitzer locations.

Saturday, 20 May 1972

1230. 0645-0650 hrs 15 to 20 rounds (incoming) hit compound.  
1231. 0715 hrs Notified by 621 that 4th supply drop would have two pallets of 57mm ammo and three pallets of 90mm ammo. 5th drop will have lots (?) of blood mixed in with 60mm ammo. Blood must be retrieved and taken to Doctor immediately. COL Nhut notified of the above.  
1232. 0800 hrs Rash 16 is FAC. 770889 - 82mm site - friendlies 1000 meters SW. 767874 - 2 platoons of VC in shallow trenches north to south or south to north run. Nearest friendlies 600 meters west. Will adjust mark. Marks (2) on line north and south. Move 200 meters east from 1st drop. (Rocket malfunction, we have to get another set.) Anti-aircraft site (.51mm) reported at 766884. Relayed this to Rash 16. Shiny metal under a truck at 768878. Metal moved (?)  
1233. 0850 hrs Rash 16 reports two more fighters (fast movers) enroute.  
1234. 0915 hrs Heavy artillery warning.  
1235. 0924 hrs B-52 strike.  
1236. 0925 hrs COL Luong reports that 6 tanks have been knocked out down south and three have surrendered intact. He says this is confirmed info. (Are there any tanks left? Where in hell do they all come from?)  
1237. 0955 hrs Call from Geronimo 6.  
1238. 1005 hrs Unknown block east of 75, south of 89. We cancelled strike.  
1239. 1025 hrs Sundog 40 replaced Rash 16. Two F-4s will be in in 10 minutes. 770875, 57mm, friendlies 900 meters west, N-S along S-W run. Can adjust mark. Mark okay. First Strike okay, now work 50 S and 50 N of first strike. Strike in on target. 1120 hours slow movers with napalm on order. 1125 hours two companies moving out.  
1240. We need cold patch tire repair kit (beaucoup) and hand pump. (Relayed this info to SFC Boyle on 10 May '72.)

Sunday, 21 May 1972

1241. 1605 hrs At 780925 or 774924 - One 105 arty position knocked out by F-4s w/Sundog 14 controlling.  
1242. 1640 hrs At 768902 a large caliber - 100 or 105 at that position.  
1243. 1700 hrs At 775900 and 778910 - 105 arty position -  
On 20 May at 1230 hours Major Todd, CPT McDermott, LTC Benedict, and LT McPhillips (PEP) Sundog 07 left An Loc and Major Skarupa, CPT Riccinto, CPT Lowry and SFC Sherrill arrived. Also received mail and resupply! (Incl 3 ea 37mm RR & 4 90mm RR sights.)  
1244. 1755 hrs 105 arty position firing at 780927.  
1245. 1830 hrs 105 arty position firing at 773927 and 779920.  
1246. 1942 hrs 51 Cal 44 position at 763889.  
1247. 2010 hrs C2 FTVC - NVA freq - maybe Spectre can home in on this??  
1248. 2115 hrs \*Have my orders arrived? If so, has someone sent copies to my wife? Has anyone

Sunday, 21 May 1972 (Continued)

1248. Continued - \*checked on my request for surface transportation? If so, what is the status of this request? Did Colonel Rawlins get the response back to DA on my orders? Did someone call Gen. Johnson and ask him to call Chief of Engrs, DA and explain my predicament and to please cut the orders for my PCS? Is my replacement at Bien Hoa and if so, is he getting things ready to move back to Binh Long at the earliest possible moment?

Mondaw, 22 May 1972

1249. 0615 hrs Informed by Monitor 62 that first three supply drops today will be for civilians. First one due in in about 10 minutes. Notified Sector D/O.

1250. 0740 hrs Three flights (16 pallets each) of rice dropped. All drops okay, contained food for the civilians. First and second flights took 37mm fire. It was reported initially that "many people were stealing the rice." (?)

1251. 0840 hrs 768903 is being hit by air strike. 62I requests that Skillet got in a position to adjust.

\*AR 621-101, ROTC Instructor Program - Army Times of 10 May 72 stated "Officers who work toward their advanced degree under this program must pay all of their school expenses." Question - Does this include tuition of not???

1252. 1045 hrs Report from MAJ Qui: 81 or 82mm located at 767887, 51mm located at 772386. Reported to 62-5 at 1047.

1253. 1100 hrs 4 more pallets dropped which landed approx. 100 m N. of northern perimeter of this compound. (62-5 corrected this 300 N, 150 W.)

1254. 1200 hrs COL Nhut reports the following items captured by the RF companies on operations to the east, ( ): 80 x B-40 rounds, 80 x 61mm rounds, 1000 x AK rounds, 16 x hand grenades, 2 x 107 rockets, 4 x 122mm rockets, 11 x claymores, and miscellaneous detonators.

1255. 1205 hrs B-52 strike in SW of town.

1256. 1300 hrs (1) 767888 (AA), (2) 772386 (57mm RP) AA position line between the two contains troops which fired on the RF companies this morning. Requested air strike.

1257. 1700 hrs B-52 strike SW of An Loc.

1258. 1725 hrs 781923 - position, rptd by Cover -

1259. 1726 hrs Talked w/Danger 79 -

1260. 1955 hrs At 840810 and 850820 - About a company of NVA - Reported by people who arrived at the Song Be Bridge today - B-52 strike requested for block 837830 - 847830 - 837800 and 847800 - Passed to Div.

1261. 2030 hrs MAJ Qui reported that an operation was planned for tomorrow morning and requested air prep of area. The operation will involve 2 RF companies who will sweep (search & destroy) the following block: 766875, 773375, 766867, 773867. He wants air strikes to start at 0830. I relayed (paralleled) this request to 5th Div. and requested 2 slow movers with soft ordnance and 2 fast movers with M-61's and M-62's.

Tuesday, 23 May 1972

1262. 0050 hrs Heavy mortar, artillery and small arms contact between 15th Regt/9th Div and the NVA - lasted about 30 minutes results unknown!

-About 0200 Skillet reported tanks moving South toward Snapper. Air was called in and a strike was put in on the tanks. The strike apparently disrupted the attack. (1) Shortly afterward a T-54 came tooling north on 13 just west of Skillet's position. Said tank was pounced upon and promptly knocked out. (2) A tank was knocked out on the road to the processing plant (by a LASER guided missile). (3) A monstrosity of an APC-type vehicle came right through the wire of

Tuesday, 23 May 1972 (Continued)

1262. Continued - Skillet's position, accompanied by some infantry. Preliminary reports are that 20 personnel were killed inside the APC. A big prize, this one: the command group of the 204th ARV. Two wounded prisoners and many documents were captured by Skillet. (4) two more tanks, believed to be immobile, are located by Skillet and Saleman 01's people. Air strikes have been requested to finish them off. (5) another armored vehicle with twin 51's was also knocked out in Skillet's area. Friendly casualties for the above action are 1 KIA, 2 seriously wounded. SP7 Dakota was slightly wounded.

1263. 0740 hrs COL Corley passed to Lai Khe that DEPCORDS is to get a chopper up here to come up on our push daily. Purpose is to take care of admin traffic.

1264. 0755 hrs Confirmed count of Skillet action: 32 NVA KIA.

1265. 0810 hrs Air strike directed by Skillet knocked out 3 tanks 758853, 758862, 759863.

1266. 0840 hrs Two of the tanks knocked out were o/a new design: BTR-50 PK.

1267. 0930 hrs Notified that we have 3 F-4's to be controlled by Sundog 40 (1) 775876 (VC), (2) 770868 (VC plt), (3) 775870 (VC plt). Nearest friendlies 800 w. can adjust Sundog 31 replaced 40. 40 has no marking rounds. We must mark.

1268. 0943 hrs Call for PSA from Vanguard 6. (Pilot) Duplex Nightcap. (Walkinshaw)

1269. 1005 hrs Heavy artillery. Warning.

1270. 1012 hrs B-52 strike.

1271. 1020 hrs FAC given target descriptions. Mortar marking round in on 775877. Mark needs no correction. Mortar marking round in on 770867. Good strike in on 770867. Now move to 775877. Good hits, now strew them from there to 100 meters south. Now hit 3rd target. All of load dropped, hit 500-100 south of target. Will give ground BDA to Sundog 31 later.

1272. 1220 hrs Sundog 14 has two planes (A-37) with M82s, rockets, and CBU-25s. Target along stream bed from 786923 to 783927. Target given by COL Nhut on basis of info received from refugees from Loc Ninh yesterday and this morning. A large (MFI) VC unit was in open on both sides of the stream (and just east of two confirmed artillery locations). (Personal note: This strike was ordered per request of MAJ Qui at 1100 hours to support the operations of PF to the east. The FAC checked in at 1220 hours, had short blade time on fighters and needed immediate targets. For 15 minutes I waited but MAJ Qui was unable to give me the target. I was in the process of telling the FAC to go to Monitor for a target when COL Nhut walked in and gave me the above target. I hope this is not a wasted target.)

1273. 1400 hrs Air strike in 773889. Chico 30. Friendlies 1000 meters west. Secondaries reported.

1274. 1500 hrs Change to results of Skillet action this morning: total now 42 NVA KIA, 8 tanks fini.

1275. 1500 hrs COL Corley reports multiple secondaries on my 1435 air strike.

1276. 1515 hrs (Delayed entry) - VHF frequency on the command vehicle knocked out by Skillet is 219.50. Passed to Monitor 62R.

1277. 1625 hrs Armored vehicles destroyed this morning at 755854 - 757858 - 760854 (2 each) - 759855 - 758866 (T-54 tank), 757865 (37mm) - 758865 (CID vehicle). BTR-50-PK.

1278. 1730 hrs 838798 - Contact between Snapper and NVA. Talked with Danger and gave him an update.

1279. 1750 hrs MAJ Qui requests Sky Spots at 795941, 801933, 776920, 783913. Parallelled to 62I. He is aware of target. Division already has plans to hit the area tonight with CBU-55.

1280. 1930 hrs The following is a report from POW (Hai Thung Kinh, 19 years old). Unit B-4, C-4, arrived in South Vietnam in March 1972. Departed North Vietnam on 19 February 1972. 19 May, arrived Soc Tranh Hamlet. His unit had 20 tanks. Last night was to attack Tan Kai Hamlet (15th

Tuesday, 23 May 1972 (Continued)

1280. Continued - Regiment). Two tanks lost in Cambodia (broke down). The attack last night was to support two units (size not indicated); one from the 7th NVA Division and one from the 9th Division. Enroute to Tan Kai, the 18 tanks were split and separated from the infantry.

PCW was severely wounded and was unable to answer any other questions. PCW died at approximately 1100 hours.

1281. 2000 hrs The following information was provided by NP Lt. Tai, formerly of the Loc Hoa National Police Substation in Loc Ninh District.

On 4 April when the NVA attacked the 74th Ranger Battalion and swept through Loc Hoa (Hamlet), Tai fled to Loc Thanh Hamlet where he was captured by VC. On 7 April Tai escaped from the VC and went to the woods in the vicinity of KU 6819 where he stayed for three days. He then went southeast to Khanh Hung (KU 730036). On 11 April, Tai saw MAJ Thinh (Loc Ninh District Chief) and Captain Wanat from a distance.

On 12 April, Tai went back to Khanh Hung to his uncle's house. Wanat was there at that time, being sheltered by Tai's uncle. From 12 April to 30 April, both Tai and Wanat stayed there in Khanh Hung. On 30 April, Tai received word that the NVA were searching all homes in the village because they had received information that an American was being held there. Tai left and went to a hamlet (Lang Kai vicinity KU 695098). On 7 May Tai's uncle's wife came to see Tai and told him that his uncle had been killed and Captain Wanat captured by the NVA. Tai had no further information concerning Wanat. Tai subsequently received info that An Loc still was being held by GVN forces and that reinforcements were on their way. He escaped south and arrived in An Loc on 23 May at 1130 hours.

Wednesday, 24 May 1972

1282. 0715 hrs MAJ Qui requests air strikes at the following coordinates in support of RF operations today: 766835 and 768327. RF operations today will be an area bounded by RR tracks on west, 89 line on north, 77 line east, and 87 line south. This info passed to 62I. LTC Ton also said he would send three men (RF) in Montagnard clothing to Soc Gon Hamlet (781882).

1283. 0800 hrs Three resupply drops have already been made. The first two were designated for sector. They landed at the Province Chief's house and contained only water and small arms ammo. 62I says that the rest will be dropped at Division and will contain food. I was unable to convince Major Ingram that one of these food drops should be dropped near Sector. COL Nhut is pissed off about this.

1284. 0900 hrs Rash 09 with two slow movers with CBU, Nape, H-82s and AP rockets. SW to NE run. Nearest friendlies 700 meters west. 09 has targets in sight but we can adjust.

1285. 0920 hrs TIC at 761384, our strikes are being pulled, but we have another ordered up.

1286. 1325 hrs MAJ Thiet reported that a recently arrived group of refugees from Song Be gave the following NVA position: (1) The area outlined 870980, 880980, 861950, 872946, is a large NVA supply area; (2) large enemy positions are at 829830, 837857, 850821, and 860830; (3) artillery positions are at 837790, 835765, and 865760. Major Qui wants B-52 strikes on the first two sets and air strike or sky spots on the arty positions. I paralleled the request, but told Qui that the FCL was the 86 line and all targets south would have to go through Snapper.

1287. 1430 hrs Enemy troops concentration along stream - XT 840845 - 845840 (best spot) - 850833.

1288. 2200 hrs Enemy frequencies being monitored are 47.85 - 50.00 - 48.50 - 53.15 - 60.00 - 40.50.

Thursday, 25 May 1972

1289. 0730 hrs MAJ Qui indicated that their RF companies would be operating in GS 7639 and Soc Gon hamlet would be reconned.

Major Hallum cut his eye on a piece of tin getting clear of incoming arty.

1290. 0755 hrs First supply drop of the day. Four pallets landed SW of the outpost, but are re-

Thursday, 25 May 1972 (Continued)

1290. Continued - coverable. 62I corrected 300 meters north and 200 meters west.

1291. 0900 hrs Contacted by 40, 42, and 45.

1292. 0930 hrs Supply drop again. 12 pallets in just north of Tri Compound perimeter.

1293. 0945 hrs Delayed entry: Yesterday the RF companies operating to the east captured the following equipment: 4 x 122 rockets, 50 x B-40 rounds, 100 hand grenades, 20 Bangalore torpedoes, 3 x M-10 anti-personnel mines, 40 kg plastic explosive and TNT, 50 rounds of unknown type (approximately 40mm size). All destroyed in place.

1294. 1800 hrs URS reports 275 Regiment at 853862 on 24 May.

1295. 2100 hrs Major Qui reported that sector had received info that NVA units, NFI, had moved into positions at 690835, 700838, and 710838. He has requested a B-52 strike for the area. Coordinates and 683840, 683830, 713830 and 713840. Request paralleled to 62I.

Friday, 26 May 1972

1296. 0640 hrs First supply drop (4 pallets). All on target near water tower. 62I corrected 50 west and 50 north.

1297. 0700 hrs When the C-130 dropped the remaining 12 pallets, he took 37mm from the SE. No coordinates available yet, but everybody is watching.

1298. 0725 hrs 37mm at 801841.

1299. 0835 hrs C-47 Bullshit Bomber Psyops bird checked in with Monitor. Will be working the Loc Ninh area. I asked 62I to get us the context of the psyops to be broadcast.

1300. 0920-0955 hrs Contacted by Marshal 42, 40 and 41. 40 wanted (and got) estimate of civilians in An Loc in need of hospitalization. Also a list of needed medical supplies was passed to 40. COL Nhut's VIP trip to US not favorably considered. Province Chiefs are not considered for the trips. Province Chief's Legion of Merit favorably indorsed and forwarded to DA. No word yet on approval from DA. I told 98 to start work on a Presidential Unit Citation for Sector and Team 47. He WILCO.

1301. 1000 hrs Major Qui reported that the 257th RF Company is in ambush positions at 770870. This info passed to 62S.

1302. 1130 hrs LTC Ton notified me that the 214th RF Co. is in contact (SA) with an estimated VC platoon. VC are located at 767887. Friendlies 700 meters to south, 1,000 meters to SW. Sundog 31 is FAC. We can adjust mark. Fighters are A-4s with K-81s and M-82s. Mark down. 100 meters south of mark. Fighters to pass from west to east, then break north. (1) West 200 meters from first bomb. (2) South 100 meters. (3) South 50 meters. (.51 cal fired at fighters from 765887. I told him to hit the .51 if he can spot it.) Marking round is down within 50 meters of the .51. The strike against the .51 was 100 to east, but load is expended. Sundog 31 is trying to get some more fighters. Delayed report: we got one large secondary out of the strike just before the AA opened up. The secondary went off about 10 minutes after the fighters had left the area.

1303. 1315 hrs Major Qui informs us that our air strikes killed two VC. This was confirmed by ground troops who swept the area after the air strike. Further, two B-40 rounds were captured.

1304. 1900 hrs Complete of readout of material today by Sector in operation to the east: 04 VC KIA, 03 AK CIA, 01 M-16, 01 B-40, 02 B-40 rounds, 02 hand grenades.

1305. 1930 hrs URS Reports: Forward CP, 429th Sapper Group: XT 601753, Recon Company, 9th Div: XT 643864, 101st Regiment: 583323 (out of our area). Bn size locations: 660820, 629826, 726854 and 675888.

1306. 2018 hrs Tanks and vehicles sited at 766881 approximately 7 each.

Friday, 26 May 1972 (Continued)

1307. 2047 hrs B-52 strike SE of An Loc.

1308. 2050 hrs Tanks spotted by Spectre at 756842.

Saturday, 27 May 1972

1309. 0055 hrs Three tanks sited at 775826 - Passed!!

1310. 0110 hrs Three tanks moved to 768884 - Passed!!

1311. 0135 hrs Spectre 01 working.

1312. 0620 hrs First supply drop of 4 pallets. All good and recoverable. 62R corrected 120 meters west.

1313. 0920 hrs S-3 reported that the PRU would be moving out to Soc Gon Hamlet (780822). This info passed to 62S.

1314. 0930 hrs Delayed Entry: At 0805 hrs, PSA talked to 62 about getting a counter mortar radar set up here.

1315. 0935 hrs Mr. Rice and Doctor Risch came up on the horn. PSA instructed Mr. Rice to find Sundog, Rash and Chic and express our thanks for a job well done. PSA wants the copy of Life magazine which has the article concerning An Loc. CPT Hall should send claim statements to Major Dallow. We also need a multiple connector for 292 and extra cable. PSA gave Mr. Rice an estimate of civilians in town as 10,000. Doctor Risch wants us to tell Dr. Phuoc that the request for medical supplies has been passed to the right people and it should be air-dropped soon.

1316. 1000 hrs Danger 79 called and PSA gave him an update. CCL Corley further requested that consideration be given to getting a counter mortar radar up here.

1317. 1400 hrs Monitor 62I notified me that Minh Thanh was going to be dropped rice and food supplies right away.

1318. 1550 hrs Geronimo 6 called. LTC Corley gave him an update.

1319. 2030 hrs Skillet Hotel reports Snapper 12 is in contact and that the NVA have used 'gas'. Snapper has had no incoming artillery today, only mortar fire.

1320. 2040 hrs URS Reports: 275 CP: 818348; Bn size units at 894984, 758973, 852934, 867777, 845828, 880743, and 744337.

1321. 2100 hrs Delayed Entry: RF Companies on operations today discovered 3 badly dismembered bodies (VC) at 767822, along with much dried blood and indications that bodies were drug and carried away. The PRU attempted to recon Soc Gon Hamlet this morning, but when about 400 meters away an estimated platoon-sized VC unit in Soc Gon began firing on the PRU. The PRU withdrew.

1322. 2105 hrs Requested two sets of fast movers with H-32s and H-33s to hit Soc Gon Hamlet. Requested for 0830 hrs. 774876, 780881: targets, 4 sets requested for 0830 hrs.

(Personal note: Here at Tri Compound we had an increase in incoming artillery fire over the past few days. There was a decrease, however, for the city perimeter as a whole. Skillet reported that his area was receiving only 122 rocket fire and that Snapper 12 got only mortar fire.)

Sunday, 28 May 1972

1323. 0400 hrs Checked on air requested for 774876 and 780881 for 0830 t-day and was advised by 62I that it had been approved!!

1324. 0525 hrs Snapper 12 element in heavy contact from 0525 until 0610!! Spectre working with them! Enemy used B-40s, 75 RR and 82mm mortar with sporadic heavy arty. The attack was primarily

Sunday, 28 May 1972 (Continued)

1324. Continued - from the east side of Snapper's position.

1325. 0623 hrs First resupply drop, all okay!! Corrected 300 meters south and 200 meters west!!

1326. 0650 hrs Anti-aircraft positions located at 773857. (23mm) AA was firing at resupply plane.

1327. 0810 hrs Strike against 37 vicinity 770833. Sundog 40 controlling. Friendlies 800 meters S.E. First two marks no good. From 3rd smoke 50 west, south 40 meters. All bombs dumped. No BDA yet.

1328. 0850 hrs Marshall 45 and 42A (Homer) came up. 45 has taken care of awards for himself, Neale and Gaynor, and is just waiting for 11 and 11A to get out. 45 wanted to know how much rice 11C had and how long it would last. LTC Ton said there was no rice, 45 said 10 tons are to be dropped every day and dedicated to 11C. Homer wanted to know how many civilians we had in town and where they were. I told him 10,000 and that they were in holes or trenches or whatever they could find underground. He wanted to know what helmets were still lived in by civilians. I told him "none in the immediate vicinity." No official word on PSA's surface travel, but everything possible is being done to see that he gets on the 16 June boat. LTC Corley's orders are not yet in his hands, but 45 was told that they have been cut. 45 did not talk to Mr. Rice this morning, so he did not know whether he had gotten through to Mrs. Corley. Mr. Rice will be up tomorrow.

1329. 1000 hrs Aircraft now available and FAC is Sundog 40. Ready to put in strikes in RF operational area. LTC Ton declined the strikes.

1330. 1140 hrs LTC Thanh reported that RF troops went in to Soc Gon and found 30 NVA bodies, small arms, hand grenades and large amounts of small arms ammo and an unidentified type of ammo approximately 100mm in size and 20-24 inches long (Note: possibly tank ammo). A complete list is to follow. PRU is presently operating at 779865.

1331. 1520 hrs Results of Soc Gon operation: 31 NVA bodies in a shallow mass grave, 2 AK-47s, 1 B-40 launcher, 9 B-40 rounds, 3 61mm rounds, 22 82mm rounds, 10 hand grenades, 1 bangalore, 30 blocks of plastic explosive blocks, 1 61mm mortar base plate, 20 Kg of rice, 20 shovels.

1332. 1842 hrs 100 meters ESE of large tree south of Highway 303 should be a burned out truck - check it out!!!

1333. 1853 hrs We must get replacements into the perimeter of An Loc and get all the seriously wounded out of here!! I consider it a shame of national proportions that the WIA have been allowed to suffer and die without any real effort made to get them to proper medical care!!!!

1334. 1855 hrs URS Reports: COSVN ~ XU 330466, XT 488629 - (429 Sapper Group), XT 960945 - (257th Regiment), Bn size units at XT 708712, 700896.

1335. 2000 hrs Snapper 12 in heavy contact - mortar, arty, etc - lasted until 2030 hrs.

Monday, 29 May 1972

1336. 0105 hrs Snapper 12 in heavy contact - arty, mortar, direct fire weapons lasted until 0140 hours.

1337. 0710 hrs Air drops are okay, but too far north toward 5th Division.

1338. 0720 hrs RF, PRU operational block for today is a 3 square Km area SE of town outlined by 767872, 730874, 767840, 780840. I notified 62I of this and told him to keep TAC AIR all of them unless we call for it.

1339. 0730 hrs Encoded the above coordinates and passed it to Skillet Hotel.

1340. 1240 hrs Recon unit returned with info that at 780855 NVA has a AA site.

1341. 1350 hrs 76873 to 765800 friendly troops back into position.

1342. 1615 hrs Send paper back reading books on next US resupply chopper - include "The Source"

Monday, 29 May 1972 (Continued)

1342. Continued - if you can find it! "Minds of War" "Arms of Krup" - Mysteries - "Armagedon" - "War and Peace"

1343. 1640 hrs Two each five gallon water cans.

1344. 1705 hrs Skillet Hotel reports that enemy arty can now be heard firing out of the SW.

1345. 1800 hrs PNU (dressed as Montagnards) reconed to the SE and discovered the following - at 780855 one enemy AA site - at 780350 50 enemy bunkers, one squad still there - at 771861 at least 50 bunkers - at 764836, 81mm mortar. In addition, they discovered 30 enemy graves, and additionally 40 bodies, obviously dead a long time. All in all a very good day - kicked off by a fake fire-fight in Thu Bon hamlet and the montagnards allegedly escaped from the GVN forces.

1346. 1950 hrs Deck of bridge cards, Sundry pack, medical supplies.

Tuesday, 30 May 1972

1347. 0105 hrs Reported lights (1 set each) at ZT 767833 and 765836.

1348. 0126 hrs Vehicle moving to SE reported at 780860.

1349. 0415 hrs Snapper 12 in heavy contact. Stinger was on station at the time and was relieved on station by a Spectre. Contact lasted until 0450 hours.

1350. 0442 hrs Enemy mortar sited at 740870. Check on medical supplies today! Were they received in proper quantity and what was requested??

1351. 0815 hrs All supply drops for the day have been completed. All landed at 5th Division and near the northern perimeter.

1352. 0920 hrs VII report 37s at 780840 and 776836. Relayed to Monitor 62S.

1353. 1010 hrs Dynamite 6 came up for update and got it.

1354. 1515 hrs Small harassing attack at both penetrations, on the North and West. Lasted for about 30 minutes.

1355. 1550 hrs 20,000 cholera immunizations were received and troops and civilians were immunized or at least it was started - For the record - I received a cholera shot today.

1356. 1600 hrs What causes cholera - what advice can we give the doctors that might assist them??

Wednesday, 31 May 1972

Send Chuck Hall's briefcase to him with K-54 and letter inside.

1357. 0205 hrs Enemy mortar spotted by Chico 64 at 753868. Advised to contact Monitor 62 for confirmation.

1358. 0630 hrs A very, very quiet morning thus far!!

1359. 1030 hrs Dynamite 6 got his update.

1360. 1205 hrs PNU reports approximately two companies of NVA in houses and trenches on a line running 200-300 meters north of 764833. We can adjust. Request paralleled to 62S.

1361. 1230 hrs SP7 Tekata, CPT Moffet, MAJ Ingram and SFC Yarta went out on resupply bird - CPT Davis and MAJ Scodnicki arrived as replacements - Mail and resupply also came in.

1362. 1400 hrs Sector reports 1 enemy Bn at 840830, one 105 position at 836823 and 7 tanks at 804780 (reported by civilians) to 820810.

Wednesday, 31 May 1972 (Continued)

1363. 1430 hrs 8th Bn reports mortar at 763360.

1364. 1440 hrs For the record, on the resupply chopper today we received one sack which continued the following: (1) Tire repair kit with patches and pump (2) mail for LTC Corley and me, including three packages from PMA's wife (3) two sets of starched (?) fatigues for me (4) five cartons of cigarettes (3 Salem, 2 Winston) (5) Cartons of gum (6) 8 PRG-25 batteries (7) 1 pack (small) of Mixture 79 pipe tobacco (8) 6 pairs of socks (9) 2 packets of handkerchiefs (10) 6 ball-point pens (11) pipe cleaners and (12) four rolls of Life-Savers.

1365. 1510 hrs 347916 - Do we have tanks sited here? Negative!

1366. 1555 hrs 757931, 765931, 757927, 765927, 727884, 731824, 727877, 731877, Arty positions (boxes) provided by 8th Bn.

1367. 1845 hrs 782344 best position 8th Bn can give for 37mm position.

1368. 2055 hrs Tanks heard at approximately 752862 by 1/48.

1369. 2140 hrs Received one round of CS mortar right outside our bunker. We had to remain masked for 10 minutes.

1370. 2300 hrs Revised list to be forwarded when we try to find out what happened to our resupply run!! Lighter fluid (2 cans), toilet paper (6 rolls), washing powder (6 boxes), perking coffee (2 ea 3lb cans), kool-aid (presweetened - 20 each), C-rations or MRE Rations (5 cases), pipe tobacco - cherry blend, Amphora-Lix 79 (10 packets each), cigarettes - Pall Mall, Salem - Marlboro (3 cartons each), throat lozenges (200 each), beer - Budweiser, Schlitz (1 case each), coke (1 case), newspapers (23 May to present), mail and packages, R&R for Hensley around the 1st of July, paper back reading books, 5 gal water cans (2 each), sundry pack (1 each), insect spray, spray deodorizer, whiz codes, Army Times, Newsweek and Time, two small uniforms and boots (size 7 for Sgt Luong).

Thursday, 1 June 1972

1371. 0350 hrs Sector has troops in contact with an estimated VC company at 765884. VC has one mortar and machine gun. We are presently firing on the VC with our 81, but have requested slow movers with soft ordnance.

1372. 0930 hrs Rash 05 has fighters to put in. Friendlies 400 meters south. We can adjust (1) 15 meters west of fight smoke. (2) 25 meters west of 2nd smoke. Fighters to come in to east with north break. (3) North 50 meters in from 1st bomb. (4) West 100 meters from last. (5) Last on target. Ordnance was M-82s followed by GBU-25.

1373. 1010 hrs Enemy 105 located at 801858 (Sector report). Reported to 653 and Superman.

1374. 1205 hrs Squad of VC in culvert under 303 at 766881. Reported to 653.

1375. 1330 hrs. Sundog 40 has 4 F-4s with M-81s. F-4s have only 15 minutes station time. (Sector reported this to Div as a TIC, and the fighters were turned over to us on that basis. I was never so advised!) Friendly positions marked by smoke. Harking round good. Fighters taking ground fire from SW, coordinates not available. Move 100 meters north from first bombs.

1376. 1400 hrs Dynomite 6 got his daily 4-second update.

1377. 1810 hrs Citizen 653 reports 7 tanks spotted at 743874.

1378. 1835 hrs 5 tanks at 744374 and one tank at 737885.

1379. 1855 hrs 1/48 reports incoming mortars, and probe with small arms fire!! (Total rounds impacting near Tri Compound - 32)

Friday, 2 June 1972

Friday, 2 June 1972 (Continued)

Yesterday, LTC Taylor, Major Hallum and I visited the field position of the 1/48 and 8th Bns. LTC Taylor visited 5th Bn and Div Headquarters earlier!!

1380. 0400 hrs Talk with Colonel Nhut about mail and maybe a few personal things we can bring in for him. Coordinate this with Team 47 at Iai The!!

1381. 1200 hrs I did a complete update on our situation map. NVA units formerly against us which are now out of our area of influence are: 101 Regt (XT 598233 on 27 May), 174 Regt (XT 885437 on 16 May), 275 Regt (TU 087055 on 28 May), Forward CP of 5th NVA Div (XT 2040 on 27 May), and main CP of 5th NVA Division (XT 9150 on 30 May). Units no longer effective; decimated; and with the remaining members being assigned to other units are: 271 Rgt, 272 Rgt, 175th Rgt, and 204th ACR. LTC-20 was last reported at XT 335875 on 15 May, but it not believed to be there at present. The 69th NVA Arty Division CP was last reported at XT 663942 on 18 May. It is believed to have moved from that point location, but is still within our area. Other major unit locations in Binh Long Province as last reported are: 9th NVA Div CP at XT 483851 on 28 May; 165th Rgt at XT 687784 on 11 May; B-6 Rgt at XT 840830 on 9 May; 141 Regiment at XT 721714 on 16 May; 209th Regiment at XT 803720 on 16 May; 7th NVA Div. CP at XT 619709 on 28 May. 95-C Rgt was last reported NE of Dong Xoai about 35 days ago. The sources of the above information are URS reports, POW interrogations, and captured documents. (Note: Personally, I feel that the above patterns indicate disengagement and withdrawal, leaving only minimal mortars, artillery, tanks and troops (to fight to the death) as DMIC to cover the withdrawals. Again, this is a strictly personal analysis, not necessarily endorsed by the management or publisher. History (or tomorrow) may prove me wrong.

1382. 1310 hrs Mr. Thieu, mechanic from Loc Ninh walked to our TOC today. He looks much better, but still has a bullet in him. We need to get someone to take care of him. PSA will assign this little duty to Sgt Sun, who reported this morning that he had nothing to do.

1383. 2045 hrs Recommend that my turtle be given a tour of the Spectre and Stinger before he comes up and that he bring either a working transponder or "maybe" beacons that Spectre can identify on the ground!!!!

1384. 2205 hrs Arrange for meat to be sent to Tai Khanh.

1385. 2345 hrs For the past 3½ hours the Superman element to our south has been attacking a massive bunker complex 150 meters south of their NDP. So far three VC have been CIA (but later died from wounds), 3 B-40 CIA, 6 AK-47 CIA, 4 resupply bundles recovered. This night-time aggressive action on Superman's part is a new twist. More to come? Let's hope so.

1386. 2347 hrs Specter 01 on station. The transponder is being tested now; the target is the jail. Let's see what happens.

Saturday, 3 June 1972

1387. 0250 hrs B-52 strike to the SE of An Loc.

1388. 0347 hrs B-52 strike to the SE of An Loc.

1389. 0442 hrs B-52 strike to the South of An Loc.

1390. 0528 hrs B-52 strike to the South of An Loc.

1391. 0555 hrs 5 pallets of rice and one with medical supplies will be on the fourth drop this morning. For Sector!! Notified HAJ Dien!!!

1392. 0625 hrs B-52 strike to the SW of An Loc.

1393. 0700 hrs Supply drops have started.

1394. 0730 hrs 3 B-52 strikes were in vicinity of 7674, 2 were at vicinity of 7784/7884.

1395. 0850 hrs Invited to dinner at DEPCORDS?? (Talked with CPT Hall and Gaynor)

1396. 1050 hrs Civilians returning to An Loc reported the following during questioning by Honest

Saturday, 3 June 1972 (Continued)

1396. Continued - Mike counterpart: At 762816, approximately 200 NVA were either killed and/or badly wounded last night during bombing by TAC AIR. The remaining healthy carried out a lengthy medevac of the area, withdrawing to the NE.

1397. 1140 hrs LTC Thanh reports that RF company on operations had discovered approximately 200 NVA/VC bodies at 784877, apparently killed by a B-52 strike. The bodies were in a decomposed state, indicating that the B-52 strike which rubbed them out was not recent. Littered around were personal items and badly damaged individual weapons. A more complete report will follow when the RF company return.

1398. 2000 hrs 739922 is location of 105 howitzer and at 800893 is an NVA platoon. Reported by Major Qui.

1399. 2205 hrs B-52 strike in to the south.

Total rounds in or near Tri Compound - 15.

Sunday, 4 June 1972

1400. 0215 hrs Population status in Binh Long as of 3 June 1972: Loc Ninh - 25,000 includes people captured by NVA from An Loc; Chon Thanh - 4,000 most people have gone to Binh Duong Province; An Loc - 22,000 includes military, National Police, Territorials and civilians; 5,000 scattered around An Loc, Tan Loi, Tan Hung, Ka Trach and Tan Kai; Binh Long residents in Binh Duong - 22,632 confirmed by Binh Duong Province. Total 78,632. (These figures are the best estimates from COL Knut.)

1401. 0252 hrs Lights sited at 773863 - Spectre couldn't see the ground or pick it up on his sensors. Reported by 8th Bn.

1402. 0400 hrs Did neat get to Tai Khanh yesterday?

1403. 0730 hrs Sector requests air strike at 784877 and 780873. Chico 07 has requested the fighters.

1404. 1330 hrs Notified by 65 that a IX for PSA would be made tomorrow at 1150 (tentative).

1405. 1500 hrs Confirmed the above from 65, subject to approval by PSA. PSA to contact 65 before 1800 hours.

1406. 1530 hrs 212 RF Company returned from operation vicinity XT 772884, bringing an 37mm clip with 5 empty rounds and parts of a US radio, nomenclature R-1391/ARN-63, SN#6139. Further report to follow.

1407. 1800 hrs Results of RF operation today: 1 AK-47 CIA, 1 AK-50 CIA, 1 AK (modified) CIA, 10 rounds 82mm mortar ammo; Radio mentioned above; 1 37mm clip; 40 VC bodies and 1 61mm mortar.

1408. 2350 hrs B-52 strike in. (Music to our ears.)

1409. 2400 hrs Rounds of incoming on Tri today: 19.

1. (U) PURPOSE: To provide a chronological sequence of events describing those activities of friendly and enemy units/elements during the period 4 April 1972 through 25 June 1972 (Nguyen Hue Campaign) which directly or indirectly affected the Binh Long Campaign during the same time period.

2. (U) INTRODUCTION: The following report represents a total description and analysis of friendly unit actions and deployments resulting from enemy intelligence, operational and logistical movements during the above described campaign. This report further provides information regarding friendly and enemy activities in neighboring provinces and bordering countries, discussing other separate campaigns therein. This overview encompasses the operational, logistical and psychological transition experienced by the Free World Military Armed Forces from the beginning of the NVA offensive on 4 April to the end of the Binh Long Campaign on 25 June 1972.

3. (C) DISCUSSION:

a. Summary of Operations

(1) The early stages of the enemy offensive in and around Tay Ninh Province were characterized by large enemy unit troop movements from neighboring Cambodia into the northern portion of the Province known as War Zone "C" and increased indirect fire attacks of limited duration against RF/PF outposts in southern Tay Ninh. Frequent descriptions from aerial observers depicted the enemy as moving from Cambodia to the III Corps Region in convoy formation on the north and west. Artillery was reported as well as large enemy unit deployments.

(2) The first major GVN loss occurred when the 25th ARVN Division Fire Support Base at Lac Long XT075856 (FSB Pace) fell into enemy control (see Annex G). On 2 April, a massive tank supported ground attack was launched against Lac Long by an estimated battalion size NVA force. Lac Long was overrun with elements of the 25th Division suffering heavy casualties and withdrawing to the south along QL 22. Results reported from Headquarters, 25th Division listed at more than 50 the number of ARVN soldiers killed or seriously wounded. US and VNAF airstrikes were placed on enemy positions with the entire Tay Ninh area north of the east-west gridline XT87 considered enemy-held and a free fire zone by rules of engagement.

(3) Later the same day, Thien Ngon XT082817 received an indirect fire attack of 122mm rockets. This was to continue frequently until the 25th Division at this location withdrew two days later. Reports were received during this period that enemy truck convoys were moving along Highway 109 south from Kampong Cham in Cambodia towards Tay Ninh.

(4) Indirect fire attacks continued the following day against Fire Support Bases Thien Ngon and Binh Minh (XT029787) west of QL 22. Sporadic contact was made during this time as several RF units engaged small VC elements moving throughout the Province. Intelligence reports received from URS placed unknown size enemy units within 1200 meters of XU773203 and XU637096 and within 2600 meters of XT017916.

(5) On 5 April enemy indirect fire attacks continued along QL 22 and areas adjacent thereof, as FSB Thien Ngon, Binh Minh and Trai Bi received 122mm rocket and 82mm mortar fire. Indications of continued enemy buildup resulted as reports were received giving enemy unit locations as follows:

Two VC battalions located at XT1055  
Unk size unit located within 250 meters of XU452096  
Regimental size CP located within 1200 meters of XT800930  
D7/271 reported with mission to attack Bau Truong XT0679  
Unk size unit located within 2100 meters of XT322578

(6) RF/PF casualties increased during the day as mines and booby traps were triggered by friendly forces as they continued their offensive operations. Ninh Hung Hamlet XT295500 in Phu Khuong District was entered by a squad of VC on 5 April. The VC killed the Hamlet Chief, abducted 18 PSDF and captured approximately 30 small calibre weapons of all types.

(On 6 April, an UMS reported an unnumbered item) Indirect fire attacks continued against outposts and fire support bases along QL 22. In the early morning hours of 7 April, Major General Hollingsworth directed the withdrawal of and equipment from Binh Minh. The 3rd Bde, 1st Air Cav was redeployed along QL 22 to interdict and prevent an anticipated armor invasion against Tay Ninh City (see Annex K). Indirect fire attacks continued for the fourth straight day against all outposts along QL 22 in the northern War Zone "C" area of Tay Ninh Province.

(8) In the southern quadrant of the province, RF 160 in an outpost at XT214412 received 15 rounds of 82mm mortars. Negative casualties were reported.

(9) The Province personnel by then had received word on the fall of Loc Ninh to the NVA and the forward echelon penetrating An Loc. The province officials believed that an attack on Tay Ninh was inevitable. Enemy forces were attempting to eliminate all ARVN presence in War Zone "C" and obtain free movement of units, reinforcements, and supplies primarily in support of offensive operations in Tay Ninh and Binh Long Provinces. Information received in regard to the intention of Hanoi to use predesignated provinces to set up a Provisional Government after gaining complete control of the population and elimination all pro-GVN elements did little to calm the invasion jitters of the Tay Ninh populace.

(10) During the early morning hours of 8 April, the MR III Communications Relay Complex on Nui Ba Den (Black Lady Mountain) was attacked and destroyed by elements of the D16 Sapper Battalion and elements of the 7th NVA Division providing infantry reinforcements. Communications were disrupted between friendly units throughout MR III, particularly between besieged An Loc and rear support units at Lai Khe and Long Binh. The main objective of the attack, according to a PW, was to gain control of Nui Ba Den and establish control of the area for a later attack on Tay Ninh City, and to support enemy units attacking An Loc. An airmobile combat assault was conducted on the mountain that afternoon by RF Company 161, accompanied by 2 US advisors and one interpreter. The assault force regained control of the US and RF compounds and reestablished the relay facility within 72 hours. This was the first victory achieved by GVN forces during the Nguyen Hue Campaign and represented a tremendous psychological uplift for the citizens of Tay Ninh. This also increased the confidence of the RF/PF to engage the NVA in battle and defeat them soundly. This was also the most significant incident of the campaign in Tay Ninh (P) to involve US personnel which resulted in 2 US KIA, 1 US MIA and 5 US WIA. Territorial Force losses were 5 RF KIA, 11 RF WIA and 3 RF MIA. Enemy losses were listed as 52 VC KIA, 1 VC CIA and numerous weapons and ammunition CIA (see Annex C for more details).

(11) On 9 April the 25th Division abandoned Thien Ngon and Trai Bi fire bases under heavy pressure from enemy forces. Reports from civilian sources indicated that a tank supported force was moving along Highway 24 in Cambodia southeast towards the border outpost at Phuoc Tan XT020433 in preparation for an attack on Tay Ninh. The market was ordered closed by the Province Chief and the bridge at Ben Soi was destroyed by elements of the 25th Division as they pulled back from Thien Ngon and Trai Bi.

(12) The AO of the 25th was reduced to cover areas just north of the city, east of the city extending to the Saigon River area, and west to the Cambodian border. At the same time, RF/PF units were pulled in to cover the populated areas around Tay Ninh and assumed this defensive posture until late April. Concurrent with the withdrawal of the 25th Division from northern War Zone C, Phuoc Ninh District was declared as one of six VC controlled districts in South Vietnam.

(13) Viet Cong Forces launched extensive terrorist activities during this period and for most of the following week. Enemy activity, mainly in the form of indirect fire attacks, were directed in attempts to discredit the pacification effort in areas where PF provided the security. On 16 April the sub-sector at Hieu Thien received 5 rounds of 82mm mortar fire. At the same time, two additional outposts in Hieu Thien District received indirect fire attacks.

(14) On 17 April at 0845 hrs, Naval Territorial Force RID 54, while conducting a patrol on the Vam Co Dong River (vic XT155432 to XT208419) was ambushed by an estimated company of VC. Results were 2 friendly KIA, 5 WIA, 1 boat burned and 2 others damaged. On 20 April Lien Doi 3/51 at Cam Giang (XT263385) received a coordinated indirect fire and sapper attack. The attacking unit was identified as the D16/429, the same unit accredited with the attack on 8 April on Nui Ba Den. The main thrust of the attack was directed at the artillery platoon positions in the outpost.

one 155mm was destroyed and two 105's were damaged. More than 2000 rds of 155mm HE and numerous rounds of smoke and illumination were destroyed. At the same time, Territorial Force Artillery platoons at Suoi Da XT325564 and at Ninh An XT275510 were shelled which prevented them from firing in support of friendlies at Cam Giang.

(15) During the period 25-29 April a major coordinated attack involving five hamlets in the Ben Cau area XT239302 was conducted by the independent 24th and 217st NVA Regiments. This attack was launched in the AO of the 25th Division; however RF/PF units remained intact and defended their sectors. Artillery, US and VNAF airstrikes were deployed during the four day battle which resulted in 250 NVA KIA, unk WIA, and 1 NVA CIA. RF/PF losses were 4 KIA, 4 WIA and 6 MIA. The most significant aspect of the battle was that this was the first time that the Sector Commander and the ARVN Commander worked jointly to defeat the enemy during the campaign. Unfortunately, the five villages were totally destroyed by the continuous artillery and airstrikes in efforts to rout the NVA from the villages. On 30 April RF/PF forces again combined with elements of the 25th Division to conduct a sweep operation in the vicinity of XT298260. Territorial Forces made contact with an unknown size NVA force resulting in 25 NVA KIA and 2 NVA CIA. The PW's related that their mission was to kill all the Americans (see Annex G).

(16) During the same period of the action in Ben Cau, enemy forces were attacking friendly outposts in Cambodia along Highway 1. Friendly forces were forced to withdraw from Svay Rieng WT895247 and were pushed to the east along Highway 1 to the border station at An Thuan XT295246. For four days the border station received indirect fire attacks. Reports that a large tank supported enemy force was within two kilometers failed to materialize a ground attack. On 30 April, a URS indicated that the enemy had withdrawn across the border into Cambodia.

(17) The 271st NVA Regiment, although defeated at Ben Cau pushed across the Tay Ninh border into Hau Nghia Province in an attempt to cut Highway 1 at Trang Bang. Elements of the 271st did succeed to cut Highway 1 at Go Dau Ha in Hieu Thien District when water sappers on 1 May managed to blow one section of the Go Dau Ha bridge at XT373250. This was the only bridge remaining across the Van Co Dong River and the only link on Highway 1 running from Saigon to Phnom Penh in Cambodia. RF 613, on bridge security, suffered 16 KIA, 9 WIA the loss of 28 weapons and 2 PRC/25 radios. Enemy losses were 1 NVA frogman KIA. The loss of the bridge temporarily disrupted military operations and civilian traffic in the area until a ferry system could be established.

(18) Enemy activity through the remainder of the week was in the form of indirect fire attacks on RF/PF units in the Ben Cau area. A cross border operation on 3 May by RF 118 at the border station An Thuan yielded 9 VC KIA and no friendly losses.

(19) On 7 May at 0115 hours, 4 separate outposts in Khiem Hanh District received indirect fire attacks simultaneously. Counter-battery fire was directed in the suspected area of the origin of the attacks. An operation in that area (XT3021) yielded 10 VC KIA, 2 AK-47's and 47 107mm rockets CIA. Friendly losses were: 1 WIA.

(20) Enemy forces took control of the Ben Cau area on 10 May as RF/PF units were redeployed to strategic areas to counter the threat posed by enemy forces in Hau Nghia Province. Hieu Thien District headquarters was again shelled during this period, as were several outposts in Khiem Hanh. These indirect fire attacks were to continue through the night of the 14th as the 24th and 271st NVA Regiments made their escape from Trang Bang in Hau Nghia Province, after once-again unsuccessful attempts to cut Highway 1 leading from Tay Ninh to Saigon.

(21) On 19 May enemy activity surfaced in War Zone C as elements of the 92nd Rangers at Tonle Cham XT622815 were subjected to four separate indirect fire attacks and a supply aircraft took ground to air fire. This series of events led to speculation that the enemy was attempting to cover the infiltration of units and supplies to Binh Long Province or attempting to cover the withdrawal of battered units from Binh Hong. On 23 May, GVN forces moved back into Ben Cau and reestablished control in the area after a short contact in Tien Thom village XT260285. That afternoon, naval boats at XT393175 were ambushed by an unknown size enemy force. Results were 8 friendly WIA and 1 boat destroyed. There were no enemy losses.

(22) On 31 May, vic XT392173, RF 388 and PF 85, while on a blocking mission in coordination with an attack into Hau Nghia by the 50th Regiment, made contact with an estimated 200 to 300 VC. Artillery and airstrikes were called for and the results of this action were 2 friendly KIA, 7 WIA, 24VC KIA, 2 VC CIA and 4 AK-47's CIA. The prisoners identified their unit as the K9 Battalion, 271st Regiment.

23) On 4 June an unknown number of water sappers placed TNT on 2 docked boats of the 27th Boat Company at XT225431, resulting in 2 friendly MIA and 2 boats sunk. This was the first time that water sappers had been employed in the province since 1 May when the Go Dau Ha bridge was blown.

24) On 6 June in the vicinity of XT308420, the 277th and 910th RF companies on a sweep operation were attacked by an estimated battalion of VC. Friendly losses were 37 KIA, 7 MIA, 40 weapons and 1 radio lost. Enemy losses were 28 KIA and 9 weapons CIA.

25) RF companies 126 and 871 combined with elements of the 25th Division on 16 June to conduct a sweep operation into the area around Phuoc Tan Market. Reports had been received that the enemy was using his Rear Service Groups for replacements for combat losses, which meant a serious loss in the efficiency of his supply operations. At 0710 hours the friendly units received an indirect fire attack on their positions. However, at 0730 hours, the force captured 7 VC and 20 suspects. On 18 June PF 47 at XT207430 captured 2 large sampans on the Vam Co Dong River. Results were 4 VC, 100 rolls of nylon, 15000 ampuls of penicillin and 2 large sampans with motors CIA.

26) On 22 June at 1730 hours the 243rd and 688th RF companies at Suoi Da in the vicinity of XT330575 were attacked by an estimated VC company, later reinforced to a battalion. According to civilians in the Phuoc Long and Suoi Da hamlets, the VC deliberately burned and destroyed their homes in order to negate pacification efforts. A large number of houses were destroyed by artillery and VNAF airstrikes the next day in order to drive the VC out of the inhabited areas. The VC were finally driven from the area on 24 June and took refuge in the Crescent. This incident, the last of the Nguyen Hue Campaign, resulted in 34 RF KIA, 16 WIA, 6 MIA, 44 weapons and 2 radios lost. Enemy losses were listed as 39 VC KIA and 17 weapons CIA. As a result of this action, enemy forces were denied a vital area for a possible attack on Tay Ninh City, and more importantly, probably weakened the enemy capability to launch such an attack.

#### b. Personnel Functions

1) Friendly losses during the Nguyen Hue Campaign were as follows:

	KIA	WIA	MIA
RF	94	84	12
PF	18	28	8

(2) Morale: The morale of the Territorial Forces at the onset of the offensive was not one of optimistic enthusiasm. As the 25th ARVN Division redeployed from War Zone C, along with the sometimes exaggerated accounts of the enemy's tenacity and ferocity in battle, fears of invasion and subsequent defeat were prevalent. RF/PF units and members felt that they were incapable of defending against an armor attack. However, the 8 April battle on Nui Ba Den did much to quell the fears of the Territorial Forces and restore their confidence and aggressiveness. This was the first victory achieved by GVN forces in the Nguyen Hue Campaign. The psychological uplift was particularly noticeable in subsequent battles, specifically in Ben Cau, where the RF/PF remained intact to defend their sectors despite overwhelming odds. Of special note was the fact that the desertion rate during the Nguyen Hue Campaign took no noticeable upsurge.

(3) Awards: Awards were presented to RF/PF forces for their actions on 8 April and for their achievements at Ben Cau. A total of 13 awards were presented to US personnel for their actions on Nui Ba Den on 8 April.

#### c. Supply Functions

Supply functions did not vary throughout the campaign as Territorial Forces were not deployed outside of Sector Control. Unit losses of equipment and weapons during the Nguyen Hue Campaign were swiftly replaced by responsible Sector and subsector logistical centers. There was no critical shortage of food, ammunition or water and POL.

#### d. Communications

With the exception of the loss of communications on 8 April between friendly units in MR III when the relay on Nui Ba Den was rendered inoperative, communications were satisfactory throughout the campaign. Problems arose in heavily forested areas at times, but in all instances of units being in contact, no problems were conspicuous during the reporting period.

e. Psychological Functions and Other Aspects of the Campaign

(1) During the reporting period widespread psychological, political and economic effects were felt within the province, stemming not only from local enemy actions and ARVN responses, but also from the notoriety achieved by enemy efforts in other areas of MR III, MR I and II.

(2) The initial strong showing of the enemy had the effect of causing widespread alarm, confusion and reduced confidence in ARVN forces. This result was somewhat reinforced by resentment caused in subsequent local actions in which GVN units seemed to rely on air and artillery responses to enemy presence rather than the less destructive effects of ground combat. Enemy propaganda sought to exploit the destructive effects of these actions along with the reluctance of ARVN units to engage in ground combat.

(3) The general local alarm was increased by the large scale early movements of refugees into the province from Binh Long and Binh Duong Provinces; the early movement of ethnic Cambodian refugees from a camp in the northern part of the province into Suoi Da; and a particularly large (7,000 people) movement of refugees from the Ben Cau area into camps nearer the local district and province capitals (nearly all have returned to their homes). The disheartening effect of these events on the people was compounded by a large scale exodus of wealthier families from the province to what were considered safer areas. This group included the Province Chief's family, a fact which unfortunately achieved wide notoriety. At least the District Chief deliberately brought his family from Saigon to join him during this critical period as a display of confidence and determination.

(4) The Social Welfare Service rose to the occasion during this period with quite encouraging effectiveness in providing food and shelter for the refugees. The refugees also became a rallying point for various social and religious charitable institutions. Other services of the provincial government, however, found their field operations severely hampered by the security situation and, for at least the first month of this period, a disappointing level of despair and pessimism was noted on the part of many senior civil government personnel.

(5) While the exodus of a significant portion of the population served to generally increase "invasion jitters", there was a conspicuous adverse effect on the economy. The departure of people from main urban areas was enough to substantially reduce normal trade and shut down many shops and businesses. This result was also increased by the general tendency of the remaining population to greatly reduce normal purchases, hoard some food items (in the earlier part of this period), and a money. By late April most of the families which had left for the more secure areas of Vietnam returned to Tay Ninh. The economy was fairly stabilized by the end of the reporting period with only a relatively low level of money hoarding.

(6) As the general enemy effort appeared to bog down and the local security situation seemed to improve, civil government functions resumed to nearly their normal levels. This gave rise to a general optimism as reports of the enemy failures at An Loc and Kontum were being exploited by the VIS. While the diminishing popular image of ARVN units did not seem to improve, particularly following the destruction of Suoi Da and Phuoc Long hamlets by VNAF airstrikes, GVN seemed to gain increased stature with the populace through effective Social Welfare Service operations and the civil government's role in managing the very popularly supported efforts of various private relief organizations operating under the Province War Victim's Relief Committee. Increased optimism and confidence in GVN, however, seemed to stem primarily from President Nixon's dramatic actions against North Vietnam and his widely publicized visits to Red China and the Soviet Union. Significantly, the apparent general feeling of hopeful optimism was believed also enhanced by the beginning in early June, of the village assembly meetings in which the individual village populations determined public utility projects and rural credit allotments in utilizing their respective village MORD VSD funds.

4. (C) CONCLUSIONS

a. The overall Nguyen Hue Campaign as conducted by enemy forces in Tay Ninh Province during the reporting period met with very little success. There were many instances where VCI would emerge and conduct themselves in the manner of government officials. Documents and intelligence reports indicated that much of the success of the enemy offensive would depend on the enemy's ability to win the people over. The enemy did not accomplish this goal. The pacification effort, however, did suffer setbacks, particularly when villages were destroyed needlessly by artillery and airstrikes.

b. The failure of enemy forces to achieve a military victory in Tay Ninh Province was due mainly to the tenacity and willingness of Territorial Forces to defend their homes and families.

Leadership at the small unit level was commendable, particularly in the Ben Cau action in late April. Territorial Forces proved that they were capable of defeating the enemy even when their homes or families were not involved.

5. (C) LESSONS LEARNED

a. The attacks by water sappers on 1 May and 4 June pointed out a lack of training on the part of the RF/PF on the techniques of defense against all types of sapper attacks and the actions to be taken once sappers penetrate the defense.

b. The attacks on Nui Ba Den and Cam Giang in April stressed the need for more sophisticated alert systems.

c. There was constant evidence throughout the campaign of failure to plan timely operations on solid intelligence. Often, operations were based on intelligence reports three and maybe four days old.

d. PSDF lack the training to cope with enemy hamlet incursions. PSDF were either too slow to react to the enemy or just did not act at all.

6. (C) RECOMMENDATIONS

a. Classes be given to all RF/PF/PSDF members regardless of rank on actions to be taken against sappers and the bolstering of defenses to provide timely warnings of sapper attacks.

b. RF/PF units should be issued more sensitive devices to provide early warning of enemy movement around their perimeter. Methods of increasing the effectiveness of alert systems and the perimeter defenses should be given priority consideration by higher headquarters to ascertain what devices (eg. sensors) could be incorporated into the TO&E of RF/PF units to give them this increased security capability.

c. Advisors should stress more heavily the timely planning of operations in response to intelligence information.

d. Training should be given high priority for key PSDF members to increase their capability to stop VC forces before they reach the hamlet. This would not only boost their confidence in their ability to defend their homes, but would allow the RF/PF units to move into the clearing and consolidation zones.

TABS

TAB A. Unit identifications-location

TAB B. Significant indirect and direct fire attacks

<u>DATE</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>SOURCE</u>
21 March 1972	D18/429	WT 912690	PW
April 1972	D16/429	XT 281582	PW
8 April 1972	429 Sapper Cmnd	XT 4459	URS
20 April 1972	D16/429	XT 263385	Documents
28 April 1972	24th, 271st Regt	XT 120458	Documents
29 April 1972	K9/271/C30B	XT 395145	PW
31 April 1972	271/C30B	XT 300248	PW
23 June 1972	C33 Local Force Co	XT 415305	HC

DATE	LOCATION	TYPE
1 April 1972	Thien Ngon-XT 082817 Lac Long-XT 075856	Indirect Fire
2 April 1972	Lac Long FSB XT 075856	Ground Attack
3 April 1972	Thien Ngon FSB XT 082817	Indirect Fire
3 April 1972	49th Regiment XT 027785	Indirect Fire
4 April 1972	Binh Minh FSB XT 029787	Indirect Fire
4 April 1972	Thien Ngon XT 082817	Indirect Fire
5 April 1972	Trai Bi XT 115705	Indirect Fire
5 April 1972	Thien Ngon XT 082817	Indirect Fire
5 April 1972	Hung Dao XT 097762	Indirect Fire
8 April 1972	Nui Ba Den XT 285582	Ground Attack
26 April 1972	Ben Cau XT 120458	Ground Attack
1 May 1972	Go Dau Ha Bridge	Sapper Attack

There were a total of 62 indirect fire attacks during the Nguyen Hue Campaign, these were the more significant ones which directly affected the conduct of the Nguyen Hue Campaign in Tay Ninh.

1. (U) PURPOSE: To provide a chronological sequence of events describing those activities of friendly and enemy units/elements during the period 4 April 1972 through 25 June 1972 (Nguyen Hue Campaign) which directly or indirectly affected the Binh Long Campaign during the same time period.

2. (U) INTRODUCTION: The following report represents a total description and analysis of friendly unit actions and deployments resulting from enemy intelligence, operational and logistical movements during the above described campaign. This report further provides information regarding friendly and enemy activities in neighboring provinces and bordering countries, discussing other separate campaigns therein. This overview encompasses the operational, logistical and psychological transition experienced by the Free World Military Armed Forces from the beginning of the NVA offensive on 4 April to the end of the Binh Long Campaign on 25 June 1972.

3. (C) DISCUSSION:

a. Summary of Operations

(1) The early stages of the enemy offensive in and around Tay Ninh Province were characterized by large enemy unit troop movements from neighboring Cambodia into the northern portion of the Province known as War Zone "C" and increased indirect fire attacks of limited duration against RF/FF outposts in southern Tay Ninh. Frequent descriptions from aerial observers depicted the enemy as moving from Cambodia to the III Corps Region in convoy formation on the north and west. Artillery was reported as well as large enemy unit deployments.

(2) The first major GVN loss occurred when the 25th ARVN Division Fire Support Base at Lac Long XT075856 (FSB Pace) fell into enemy control (see Annex G). On 2 April, a massive tank supported ground attack was launched against Lac Long by an estimated battalion size NVA force. Lac Long was overrun with elements of the 25th Division suffering heavy casualties and withdrawing to the south along QL 22. Results reported from Headquarters, 25th Division listed at more than 50 the number of ARVN soldiers killed or seriously wounded. US and VNAF airstrikes were placed on enemy positions with the entire Tay Ninh area north of the east-west gridline XT87 considered enemy-held and a free fire zone by rules of engagement.

(3) Later the same day, Thien Ngon XT082817 received an indirect fire attack of 122mm rockets. This was to continue frequently until the 25th Division at this location withdrew two days later. Reports were received during this period that enemy truck convoys were moving along Highway 109 south from Kampong Cham in Cambodia towards Tay Ninh.

(4) Indirect fire attacks continued the following day against Fire Support Bases Thien Ngon and Binh Minh (XT029787) west of QL 22. Sporadic contact was made during this time as several RF units engaged small VC elements moving throughout the Province. Intelligence reports received from URS placed unknown size enemy units within 1200 meters of XU773203 and XU637096 and within 2600 meters of XT017916.

(5) On 5 April enemy indirect fire attacks continued along QL 22 and areas adjacent thereof, as FSB Thien Ngon, Binh Minh and Trai Bi received 122mm rocket and 82mm mortar fire. Indications of continued enemy buildup resulted as reports were received giving enemy unit locations as follows:

Two VC battalions located at XT1055  
Unk size unit located within 250 meters of XU452096  
Regimental size CP located within 1200 meters of XT800930  
D7/271 reported with mission to attack Bau Truong XT0679  
Unk size unit located within 2100 meters of XT322578

(6) RF/FF casualties increased during the day as mines and booby traps were triggered by friendly forces as they continued their offensive operations. Ninh Hung Hamlet XT295500 in Phu Khuong District was entered by a squad of VC on 5 April. The VC killed the Hamlet Chief, abducted 18 PSDF and captured approximately 30 small calibre weapons of all types.

(7) On 6 April, an USA reported an unidentified enemy attack on the area around 1000 hours on XY677057. Indirect fire attacks continued against outposts and fire support bases along QL 22. During the early morning hours of 7 April, Major General Hollingsworth directed the withdrawal of men and equipment from Binh Minh. The 3rd Bde, 1st Air Cav was redeployed along QL 22 to interdict and prevent an anticipated armor invasion against Tay Ninh City (see Annex K). Indirect fire attacks continued for the fourth straight day against all outposts along QL 22 in the northern War Zone "C" area of Tay Ninh Province.

(8) In the southern quadrant of the province, RF 160 in an outpost at XT214412 received 15 rounds of 82mm mortars. Negative casualties were reported.

(9) The Province personnel by then had received word on the fall of Loc Ninh to the NVA and the forward echelon penetrating An Loc. The province officials believed that an attack on Tay Ninh was inevitable. Enemy forces were attempting to eliminate all ARVN presence in War Zone "C" and obtain free movement of units, reinforcements, and supplies primarily in support of offensive operations in Tay Ninh and Binh Long Provinces. Information received in regard to the intention of Hanoi to use predesignated provinces to set up a Provisional Government after gaining complete control of the population and elimination all pro-GVN elements did little to calm the invasion jitters of the Tay Ninh populace.

(10) During the early morning hours of 8 April, the MR III Communications Relay Complex on Nui Ba Den (Black Lady Mountain) was attacked and destroyed by elements of the D16 Sapper Battalion and elements of the 7th NVA Division providing infantry reinforcements. Communications were disrupted between friendly units throughout MR III, particularly between besieged An Loc and rear support units at Lai Khe and Long Binh. The main objective of the attack, according to a PW, was to gain control of Nui Ba Den and establish control of the area for a later attack on Tay Ninh City, and to support enemy units attacking An Loc. An airmobile combat assault was conducted on the mountain that afternoon by RF Company 161, accompanied by 2 US advisors and one interpreter. The assault force regained control of the US and RF compounds and reestablished the relay facility within 72 hours. This was the first victory achieved by GVN forces during the Nguyen Hue Campaign and represented a tremendous psychological uplift for the citizens of Tay Ninh. This also increased the confidence of the RF/PF to engage the NVA in battle and defeat them soundly. This was also the most significant incident of the campaign in Tay Ninh (P) to involve US personnel which resulted in 2 US KIA, 1 US MIA and 5 US WIA. Territorial Force losses were 5 RF KIA, 11 RF WIA and 3 RF MIA. Enemy losses were listed as 52 VC KIA, 1 VC CIA and numerous weapons and ammunition CIA (see Annex C for more details).

(11) On 9 April the 25th Division abandoned Thien Ngon and Trai Bi fire bases under heavy pressure from enemy forces. Reports from civilian sources indicated that a tank supported force was moving along Highway 24 in Cambodia southeast towards the border outpost at Phuoc Tan XT020433 in preparation for an attack on Tay Ninh. The market was ordered closed by the Province Chief and the bridge at Ben Soi was destroyed by elements of the 25th Division as they pulled back from Thien Ngon and Trai Bi.

(12) The AO of the 25th was reduced to cover areas just north of the city, east of the city extending to the Saigon River area, and west to the Cambodian border. At the same time, RF/PF units were pulled in to cover the populated areas around Tay Ninh and assumed this defensive posture until late April. Concurrent with the withdrawal of the 25th Division from northern War Zone C, Phuoc Ninh District was declared as one of six VC controlled districts in South Vietnam.

(13) Viet Cong Forces launched extensive terrorist activities during this period and for most of the following week. Enemy activity, mainly in the form of indirect fire attacks, were directed in attempts to discredit the pacification effort in areas where PF provided the security. On 16 April the sub-sector at Hieu Thien received 5 rounds of 82mm mortar fire. At the same time, two additional outposts in Hieu Thien District received indirect fire attacks.

(14) On 17 April at 0845 hrs, Naval Territorial Force RID 54, while conducting a patrol on the Vam Co Dong River (vic XT155432 to XT208419) was ambushed by an estimated company of VC. Results were 2 friendly KIA, 5 WIA, 1 boat burned and 2 others damaged. On 20 April Lien Doi 3/51 at Cam Giang (XT263385) received a coordinated indirect fire and sapper attack. The attacking unit was identified as the D16/429, the same unit accredited with the attack on 8 April on Nui Ba Den. The main thrust of the attack was directed at the artillery platoon positions in the outpost.

One 155mm was destroyed and two 105's were damaged. More than 2000 rds of 155mm HE and numerous rounds of smoke and illumination were destroyed. At the same time, Territorial Force Artillery platoons at Suoi Da XT325564 and at Ninh An XT275510 were shelled which prevented them from firing in support of friendlies at Cam Giang.

(15) During the period 25-29 April a major coordinated attack involving five hamlets in the Ben Cau area XT239302 was conducted by the independent 24th and 217st NVA Regiments. This attack was launched in the AO of the 25th Division; however RF/PF units remained intact and defended their sectors. Artillery, US and VNAF airstrikes were deployed during the four day battle which resulted in 250 NVA KIA, unk WIA, and 1 NVA CIA. RF/PF losses were 4 KIA, 4 WIA and 6 MIA. The most significant aspect of the battle was that this was the first time that the Sector Commander and the ARVN Commander worked jointly to defeat the enemy during the campaign. Unfortunately, the five villages were totally destroyed by the continuous artillery and airstrikes in efforts to rout the NVA from the villages. On 30 April RF/PF forces again combined with elements of the 25th Division to conduct a sweep operation in the vicinity of XT298260. Territorial Forces made contact with an unknown size NVA force resulting in 25 NVA KIA and 2 NVA CIA. The PW's related that their mission was to kill all the Americans (see Annex G).

(16) During the same period of the action in Ben Cau, enemy forces were attacking friendly outposts in Cambodia along Highway 1. Friendly forces were forced to withdraw from Svay Rieng WT895 247 and were pushed to the east along Highway 1 to the border station at An Thuan XT295246. For four days the border station received indirect fire attacks. Reports that a large tank supported enemy force was within two kilometers failed to materialize a ground attack. On 30 April, a URS indicated that the enemy had withdrawn across the border into Cambodia.

(17) The 271st NVA Regiment, although defeated at Ben Cau pushed across the Tay Ninh border into Hau Nghia Province in an attempt to cut Highway 1 at Trang Bang. Elements of the 271st did succeed to cut Highway 1 at Go Dau Ha in Hieu Thien District when water sappers on 1 May managed to blow one section of the Go Dau Ha bridge at XT373250. This was the only bridge remaining across the Van Co Dong River and the only link on Highway 1 running from Saigon to Phnom Penh in Cambodia. RF 613, on bridge security, suffered 16 KIA, 9 WIA the loss of 28 weapons and 2 PRC/25 radios. Enemy losses were 1 NVA frogman KIA. The loss of the bridge temporarily disrupted military operations and civilian traffic in the area until a ferry system could be established.

(18) Enemy activity through the remainder of the week was in the form of indirect fire attacks on RF/PF units in the Ben Cau area. A cross border operation on 3 May by RF 118 at the border station at An Thuan yielded 9 VC KIA and no friendly losses.

(19) On 7 May at 0115 hours, 4 separate outposts in Khiem Hanh District received indirect fire attacks simultaneously. Counter-battery fire was directed in the suspected area of the origin of the attacks. An operation in that area (XT3021) yielded 10 VC KIA, 2 AK-47's and 47 107mm rockets CIA. Friendly losses were: 1 WIA.

(20) Enemy forces took control of the Ben Cau area on 10 May as RF/PF units were redeployed to strategic areas to counter the threat posed by enemy forces in Hau Nghia Province. Hieu Thien District headquarters was again shelled during this period, as were several outposts in Khiem Hanh. These indirect fire attacks were to continue through the night of the 14th as the 24th and 271st NVA Regiments made their escape from Trang Bang in Hau Nghia Province, after once-again unsuccessful attempts to cut Highway 1 leading from Tay Ninh to Saigon.

(21) On 19 May enemy activity surfaced in War Zone C as elements of the 92nd Rangers at Tonle Cham XT622815 were subjected to four separate indirect fire attacks and a supply aircraft took ground to air fire. This series of events led to speculation that the enemy was attempting to cover the infiltration of units and supplies to Binh Long Province or attempting to cover the withdrawal of battered units from Binh Hong. On 23 May, GVN forces moved back into Ben Cau and reestablished control in the area after a short contact in Tien Thom village XT260285. That afternoon, naval boats at XT393175 were ambushed by an unknown size enemy force. Results were 8 friendly WIA and 1 boat destroyed. There were no enemy losses.

(22) On 31 May, vic XT392173, RF 388 and PF 85, while on a blocking mission in coordination with an attack into Hau Nghia by the 50th Regiment, made contact with an estimated 200 to 300 VC. Artillery and airstrikes were called for and the results of this action were 2 friendly KIA, 7 WIA, 24VC KIA, 2 VC CIA and 4 AK-47's CIA. The prisoners identified their unit as the K9 Battalion, 271st Regiment.

(23) On 4 June an unknown number of water sappers placed TNT on 2 docked boats of the 27th Boat Company at XT225431, resulting in 2 friendly MIA and 2 boats sunk. This was the first time that water sappers had been employed in the province since 1 May when the Go Dau Ha bridge was blown.

(24) On 6 June in the vicinity of XT308420, the 277th and 910th RF companies on a sweep operation were attacked by an estimated battalion of VC. Friendly losses were 37 KIA, 7 MIA, 40 weapons and 2 radios lost. Enemy losses were 28 KIA and 9 weapons CIA.

(25) RF companies 126 and 871 combined with elements of the 25th Division on 16 June to conduct a sweep operation into the area around Phuoc Tan Market. Reports had been received that the enemy was using his Rear Service Groups for replacements for combat losses, which meant a serious loss in the efficiency of his supply operations. At 0710 hours the friendly units received an indirect fire attack on their positions. However, at 0730 hours, the force captured 7 VC and 20 suspects. On 18 June PF 47 at XT207430 captured 2 large sampans on the Vam Co Dong River. Results were 4 VC, 400 rolls of nylon, 15000 ampuls of penicillin and 2 large sampans with motors CIA.

(26) On 22 June at 1730 hours the 243rd and 688th RF companies at Suoi Da in the vicinity of XT330575 were attacked by an estimated VC company, later reinforced to a battalion. According to civilians in the Phuoc Long and Suoi Da hamlets, the VC deliberately burned and destroyed their homes in order to negate pacification efforts. A large number of houses were destroyed by artillery and VNAF airstrikes the next day in order to drive the VC out of the inhabited areas. The VC were finally driven from the area on 24 June and took refuge in the Crescent. This incident, the last of the Nguyen Hue Campaign, resulted in 34 RF KIA, 16 WIA, 6 MIA, 44 weapons and 2 radios lost. Enemy losses were listed as 39 VC KIA and 17 weapons CIA. As a result of this action, enemy forces were denied a vital area for a possible attack on Tay Ninh City, and more importantly, probably weakened the enemy capability to launch such an attack.

#### b. Personnel Functions

(1) Friendly losses during the Nguyen Hue Campaign were as follows:

	KIA	WIA	MIA
RF	94	84	12
PF	18	28	8

(2) Morale: The morale of the Territorial Forces at the onset of the offensive was not one of optimistic enthusiasm. As the 25th ARVN Division redeployed from War Zone C, along with the sometimes exaggerated accounts of the enemy's tenacity and ferocity in battle, fears of invasion and subsequent defeat were prevalent. RF/PF units and members felt that they were incapable of defending against an armor attack. However, the 8 April battle on Nui Ba Den did much to quell the fears of the Territorial Forces and restore their confidence and aggressiveness. This was the first victory achieved by GVN forces in the Nguyen Hue Campaign. The psychological uplift was particularly noticeable in subsequent battles, specifically in Ben Cau, where the RF/PF remained intact to defend their sectors despite overwhelming odds. Of special note was the fact that the desertion rate during the Nguyen Hue Campaign took no noticeable upsurge.

(3) Awards: Awards were presented to RF/PF forces for their actions on 8 April and for their achievements at Ben Cau. A total of 13 awards were presented to US personnel for their actions on Nui Ba Den on 8 April.

#### c. Supply Functions

Supply functions did not vary throughout the campaign as Territorial Forces were not deployed outside of Sector Control. Unit losses of equipment and weapons during the Nguyen Hue Campaign were swiftly replaced by responsible Sector and subsector logistical centers. There was no critical shortage of food, ammunition or water and POL.

#### d. Communications

With the exception of the loss of communications on 8 April between friendly units in MR III when the relay on Nui Ba Den was rendered inoperative, communications were satisfactory throughout the campaign. Problems arose in heavily forested areas at times, but in all instances of units being in contact, no problems were conspicuous during the reporting period.

e. Psychological Functions and Other Aspects of the Campaign

(1) During the reporting period widespread psychological, political and economic effects were felt within the province, stemming not only from local enemy actions and ARVN responses, but also from the notoriety achieved by enemy efforts in other areas of MR III, MR I and II.

(2) The initial strong showing of the enemy had the effect of causing widespread alarm, confusion and reduced confidence in ARVN forces. This result was somewhat reinforced by resentment caused in subsequent local actions in which GVN units seemed to rely on air and artillery responses to enemy presence rather than the less destructive effects of ground combat. Enemy propaganda sought to exploit the destructive effects of these actions along with the reluctance of ARVN units to engage in ground combat.

(3) The general local alarm was increased by the large scale early movements of refugees into the province from Binh Long and Binh Duong Provinces; the early movement of ethnic Cambodian refugees from a camp in the northern part of the province into Suoi Da; and a particularly large (7,000 people) movement of refugees from the Ben Cau area into camps nearer the local district and province capitals (nearly all have returned to their homes). The disheartening effect of these events on the people was compounded by a large scale exodus of wealthier families from the province to what were considered safer areas. This group included the Province Chief's family, a fact which unfortunately achieved wide notoriety. At least the District Chief deliberately brought his family from Saigon to join him during this critical period as a display of confidence and determination.

(4) The Social Welfare Service rose to the occasion during this period with quite encouraging effectiveness in providing food and shelter for the refugees. The refugees also became a rallying point for various social and religious charitable institutions. Other services of the provincial government, however, found their field operations severely hampered by the security situation and, for at least the first month of this period, a disappointing level of despair and pessimism was noted on the part of many senior civil government personnel.

(5) While the exodus of a significant portion of the population served to generally increase "invasion jitters", there was a conspicuous adverse effect on the economy. The departure of people from main urban areas was enough to substantially reduce normal trade and shut down many shops and businesses. This result was also increased by the general tendency of the remaining population to greatly reduce normal purchases, hoard some food items (in the earlier part of this period), and save money. By late April most of the families which had left for the more secure areas of Vietnam returned to Tay Ninh. The economy was fairly stabilized by the end of the reporting period with only a relatively low level of money hoarding.

(6) As the general enemy effort appeared to bog down and the local security situation seemed to improve, civil government functions resumed to nearly their normal levels. This gave rise to a general optimism as reports of the enemy failures at An Loc and Kontum were being exploited by the VIS. While the diminishing popular image of ARVN units did not seem to improve, particularly following the destruction of Suoi Da and Phuoc Long hamlets by VNAF airstrikes, GVN seemed to gain increased stature with the populace through effective Social Welfare Service operations and the civil government's role in managing the very popularly supported efforts of various private relief organizations operating under the Province War Victim's Relief Committee. Increased optimism and confidence in GVN, however, seemed to stem primarily from President Nixon's dramatic actions against North Vietnam and his widely publicized visits to Red China and the Soviet Union. Significantly, the apparent general feeling of hopeful optimism was believed also enhanced by the beginning in early June, of the village assembly meetings in which the individual village populations determined public utility projects and rural credit allotments in utilizing their respective village MORD VSD funds.

4. (C) CONCLUSIONS

a. The overall Nguyen Hue Campaign as conducted by enemy forces in Tay Ninh Province during the reporting period met with very little success. There were many instances where VCI would emerge and conduct themselves in the manner of government officials. Documents and intelligence reports indicated that much of the success of the enemy offensive would depend on the enemy's ability to win the people over. The enemy did not accomplish this goal. The pacification effort, however, did suffer setbacks, particularly when villages were destroyed needlessly by artillery and airstrikes.

b. The failure of enemy forces to achieve a military victory in Tay Ninh Province was due mainly to the tenacity and willingness of Territorial Forces to defend their homes and families.

Leadership at the small unit level was commendable, particularly in the Ben Cau action in late April. Territorial Forces proved that they were capable of defeating the enemy even when their homes or families were not involved.

5. (C) LESSONS LEARNED

- a. The attacks by water sappers on 1 May and 4 June pointed out a lack of training on the part of the RF/PF on the techniques of defense against all types of sapper attacks and the actions to be taken once sappers penetrate the defense.
- b. The attacks on Nui Ba Den and Cam Giang in April stressed the need for more sophisticated alert systems.
- c. There was constant evidence throughout the campaign of failure to plan timely operations on solid intelligence. Often, operations were based on intelligence reports three and maybe four days old.
- d. PSDF lack the training to cope with enemy hamlet incursions. PSDF were either too slow to react to the enemy or just did not act at all.

6. (C) RECOMMENDATIONS

- a. Classes be given to all RF/PF/PSDF members regardless of rank on actions to be taken against sappers and the bolstering of defenses to provide timely warnings of sapper attacks.
- b. RF/PF units should be issued more sensitive devices to provide early warning of enemy movement around their perimeter. Methods of increasing the effectiveness of alert systems and the perimeter defenses should be given priority consideration by higher headquarters to ascertain what devices (eg. sensors) could be incorporated into the TO&E of RF/PF units to give them this increased security capability.
- c. Advisors should stress more heavily the timely planning of operations in response to intelligence information.
- d. Training should be given high priority for key PSDF members to increase their capability to stop VC forces before they reach the hamlet. This would not only boost their confidence in their ability to defend their homes, but would allow the RF/PF units to move into the clearing and consolidation zones.

TABS

TAB A. Unit identifications-location

TAB B. Significant indirect and direct fire attacks

TAB A. (Unit identifications and Locations) to Appendix 2 (Tay Ninh Province Report) to Annex  
J (Cords MR III) to after action report, Binh Long Campaign.

<u>DATE</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>SOURCE</u>
21 March 1972	D18/429	WT 912690	PW
8 April 1972	D16/429	XT 281582	PW
8 April 1972	429 Sepper Cmnd	XT 4459	URS
20 April 1972	D16/429	XT 263385	Documents
28 April 1972	24th, 271st Regt	XT 120458	Documents
29 April 1972	K9/271/C3OB	XT 395145	PW
31 April 1972	271/C3OB	XT 300248	PW
23 June 1972	C33 Local Force Co	XT 415305	HC

DATE	LOCATION	TYPE
1 April 1972	Thien Ngon-XT 082817 Lac Long-XT 075856	Indirect Fire
2 April 1972	Lac Long FSB XT 075856	Ground Attack
3 April 1972	Thien Ngon FSB XT 082817	Indirect Fire
3 April 1972	49th Regiment XT 027785	Indirect Fire
4 April 1972	Binh Minh FSB XT 029787	Indirect Fire
4 April 1972	Thien Ngon XT 082817	Indirect Fire
5 April 1972	Trai Bi XT 115705	Indirect Fire
5 April 1972	Thien Ngon XT 082817	Indirect Fire
5 April 1972	Hung Dao XT 097762	Indirect Fire
8 April 1972	Nui Ba Den XT 285582	Ground Attack
26 April 1972	Ben Cau XT 120458	Ground Attack
1 May 1972	Go Dau Ha Bridge	Sapper Attack

There were a total of 62 indirect fire attacks during the Nguyen Hue Campaign, these were the more significant ones which directly affected the conduct of the Nguyen Hue Campaign in Tay Ninh.