

ANNEX K (3d Brigade, 1st US Cavalry) to After-Action Report, BINH LONG Campaign.

1. PURPOSE. The purpose of this Annex is to present the activities of the 3d Brigade, 1st US Cavalry Division during the Binh Long Campaign.

2. INTRODUCTION.

a. 3d Brigade situation, 31 March 1972

(1) Task Organization. Appendix 1

(2) The mission of the 3d Brigade (Separate), 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) was to perform dynamic defense of the Bien Hoa-Long Binh-Saigon complex within and along the Bien Hoa-Long Binh rocket belt and to be prepared to execute assigned contingency missions. The 2d Battalion, 5th Cav and 2d Battalion, 11th ACR had completed standdown as a part of Increment XI of the USARV Force Reduction. The 1st Battalion, 7th Cav was in its AO north of Bien Hoa operating from FSB Grunt II and Spudis. The 1st Battalion, 12th Cav was in its AO northeast of Bien Hoa operating from FSB Bunker Hill and Drinon. The 2d Battalion, 8th Cav was in its AO east of Long Binh Post operating from FSB Melanie and Ennis. All of the infantry battalions were conducting a program of aggressive company and platoon sized patrols and ambushes. Three air cavalry troops were assigned or under the operational control of the brigade (F/9 Cav, D/229 AHB, and F/4 Cav) with one of the troops habitually being employed in support of TRAC visual reconnaissance missions. The 1st Battalion, FA; 229 AHB; and other brigade elements were supporting operations in the brigade area of operations. Company D, 229 AHB had been performing visual reconnaissance in the vicinity of Mimot, Cambodia, in the preceding several days.

(3) At 0330 hours, TRAC changed the mission of D/229 based on a report by woodcutters of the sighting of fifty PT-76 tanks and 500 infantry near YU 065395. Company D, 229 AHB was to stage from Song Be airfield (I LZ Buttons), YU 1809. Nothing was sighted in the vicinity of the report and at approximately 1200H, D/229 resumed its visual reconnaissance mission in the cross-border area west of Loc Ninh, staging at Quan Loi airfield, XT 8190.

(4) At 1610H Bien Hoa Sector reported the possibility of an all out attack throughout Vietnam during the night. At 1615H TRAC ordered Bien Hoa Army Base to Grey Alert, to be followed by Yellow Alert at 1900H. At 2200H the DCO-A, LTC Casey ordered 3d Brigade units to Red Alert status effective 2300H.

b. Events preceding the battles of An Loc and Loc Ninh.

(1) 1 April. At 0200H 3d Brigade reverted to Yellow Alert status. Later that day TRAC sent D/229 to VR the border area in northern Tay Ninh Province. The troops staged at Tay Ninh west airfield. At 1035H D/229 reported that Thien Ngon had received a one hundred round rocket and mortar attack and was under ground attack. At 1255H an OH-6A exploded in mid-air after receiving .51 cal ground to air fire near XT 087800. Both crewmen were killed. At 2046H TRAC directed the immediate release from brigade operational control of F/4 Cav and placed the troop under the operational control of 12 CAG for movement to Military Region I for further operations in support of FRAC. The troop was enroute to MR I by 0700 the next day.

(2) 2 April. At 0530H TRAC directed that D/229 be sent to Tay Ninh as soon as possible to support FSB Lac Long (old FSB Pace), XT 073884, which was under heavy attack by an estimated enemy regiment supported by armor and artillery. At 0915H a D/229 Pink Team was performing bomb damage assessment of VNAF airstrikes around the firebase. Tank tracks and many fighting positions were sighted later in the day near XT 075975. On 3 and 4 April D/229 continued air cavalry operations in support of TRAC near old FSB Pace in northern Tay Ninh (P). Fifty-one cal and small arms AAA fire were received throughout the area near the firebase. At 1105H on 4 April a light fire team of two AH-1G gunships from F/9 AFA was sent to reinforce D/229. Another section of gunships from F/79 was provided later the same day in support of a medevac mission. That same day the infantry company (D/2-8 Cav) from the brigade which was on standdown at Vung Tau R&R Center became the quick reaction force for Vung Tau during that area's night time Yellow Alert status.

3. DISCUSSION

a. LOC NINH

(1) 5 April

(a) This day found F/9 Cav supporting TRAC in Tay Ninh (P). At 0815H TRAC directed F/9 Cav to move to Quan Loi airfield to operate against ground attacks near Loc Ninh. At 0910H TRAC requested aerial field artillery support and five minutes later a heavy fire team (three AH-1G) and a light fire team (two AH-1G) were enroute to the area. At 0920H the Brigade CG ordered all helicopters and crews to a 15 minute standby status. At 0945H the DCO-A reported that Quan Loi had received a 100 round attack by fire the night before. TRAC directed that operations stage from Lai Khe rather Quan Loi and requested that D/229 be sent to Lai Khe as well. Two Pink Teams (one AH-1G and one OH-6A each) and one section of aerial field artillery from F/79 AFA were retained to support the Brigade's own area of operations, establishing a condition of limited but adequate support which was to remain in effect throughout most of the Battle of An Loc. With the aero rifle platoons (Blues) from both air cavalry troops committed in support of TRAC operations it was necessary to place the Ranger Company, H/75 Infantry on standby for aero rifle platoon operations in the Brigade AO.

(b) At 1055H TRAC reported that Quan Loi airfield had been overrun, that 174th NVA Regiment was between Loc Ninh and An Loc, and that the enemy was trying to cut the road between Lai Khe and An Loc.

(c) At 1410H TRAC directed 3d Brigade to rescue five US Advisors from Quan Loi TOC. The DCO-A directed that 10 UH-1H and four CH-47 helicopters be sent to Quan Loi to extract eight US Advisors and 130 ARVN soldiers. The mission was completed successfully. However, one AH-1G from F/79 AFA exploded in mid-air at XT759753 with no survivors. Two other AH-1G had been damaged during the day. Brigade missions in the area were completed at 1830H, but the Brigade was directed to provide the same air support the following day for similar missions throughout Military Region III.

### (2) 6 April

(a) On 6 April both air cavalry troops and three fire teams from F/79 AFA were again sent to Loc Ninh, An Loc, and Quan Loi to provide aerial reconnaissance and gunship support. F/9 Cav was employed in the vicinity of Loc Ninh and D/229 was employed near Quan Loi. Heavy small arms, automatic weapons, and .51 cal AAA fire was encountered throughout the area. At 1100 hours the Brigade CG ordered the rearm-refuel point at Song Be airstrip (LZ Buttons) YU1407 opened to reduce the turn-around time and increase the helicopter on station time over the An Loc-Loc Ninh area. The point was open at 1435H.

(b) Throughout the day Loc Ninh was under constant artillery and ground attack, as was Quan Loi airstrip. Two companies of the 92d Ranger Bn with four APC's broke through to Loc Ninh from the north and one company from the south, but by 1545H the Loc Ninh District compound was penetrated. Gunships firing final protective fires along the perimeter broke the attack. During the day D/299 was credited with 27 enemy killed and two ammunition dumps destroyed near the Quan Loi airfield. Two AH-1G from F/9 Cav were slightly damaged by .51 cal fire. Later that evening TRAC alerted the brigade to recover several 105mm howitzers and other items of equipment which had been abandoned at Thien Ngon, Tay Ninh (P). Plans for the mission were made by 1-21 FA with aviation support being provided by 229 AHB.

### (3) 7 April

(a) 3d Brigade staged its aviation elements at Song Be and Lai Khe for operations - near Loc Ninh and An Loc. Critical shortage of 2.75" rockets at Song Be airfield required re-supply by 8 sorties of USAF C130s in addition to several CH-47 sorties hauled from Bien Hoa. At 0810H TRAC reported that the center compound at Loc Ninh airfield had been overrun by the NVA and that enemy tanks were in both compounds. At 0915H the enemy attack on Loc Ninh was renewed.

(b) At 1030H TRAC alerted the Brigade for the rescue of the American Advisors who were trapped within the compounds at Loc Ninh airfield. Brigade planned to land a rescue team from H/75th Inf (Rangers) on the airfield, rescue the advisors, and extract them under the cover of tactical air delivered riot control munitions. When they finally arrived, the munitions were not available in quantity sufficient to suppress the intense .51 cal fire and the rescue mission was aborted. During the day the artillery recovery mission at Thien Ngon was cancelled. In addition 229 AHB elements extracted most of the advisors from An Loc, leaving only a small volunteer advisory team behind, and also extracted some of the civilians advisors from Phuoc Long (P).

(c) An unsuccessful attempt was made by a Dustoff medical evacuation helicopter to rescue three US Advisors who had been cut off and surrounded at Cam Le Bridge on QL 13 following the ambush of elements of 52nd ARVN Regiment (See Appendix 4, Annex D).

b. AN LOC

(1) 8 April

(a) At 0520H TRAC requested a helicopter carrying flares and a section of AFA to provide illumination and fire support on Nui Ba Den, where the signal relay station was under mortar and ground attack.

(b) At 0830H BG Hamlet gave three mission orders: Task Force Casey composed of D/229 and H/75th Rgr under the command of DCO-A, LTC John Casey, was to rescue the three US Advisors who were cut off and surrounded at the Cam Le bridge. Task Force McKee, under LTC Richard McKee, the Brigade S3, was to relieve the signal relay station on Nui Ba Den, Task Force Keaton, commanded by LTC Jack Keaton, CO, 1st Battalion, 21 FA and composed of elements of 1st Battalion, 21 FA, F/9 Cav, and 362nd AVN Co, supported by 120 AVN Co, was to evacuate 2000 ARVN soldiers and several artillery pieces from Bu Dop to Song Be in Phuoc Long (P). Simultaneously, the 3d Brigade was to be committed in three separate airheads while still performing its operational mission in its own AO. By 1110H the advisors at the Cam Le bridge had been rescued by Task Force Casey. Captain Donald Whitehouse, flying an OH-6A into the pick-up zone, took four solid hits from AAA fire, then flew his aircraft and passengers to safety at tree top level carrying the three advisors, four ARVN soldiers, his gunner and himself. For his gallantry in action he was recommended for the Congressional Medal of Honor.

(c) On Nui Ba Den, Task Force McKee with elements of A/229 AHB, 362nd AVN Co, and F/79 and 26th Chem Detachment, helilifted an ARVN infantry company into a landing zone on the mountain at 1310H to begin the relief of the signal relay site. After the company cleared the top of the mountain, the task force began extracting the dead and wounded. By 1845H, six US wounded and seven other US and eleven ARVN soldiers were evacuated from the mountain. Extensive AAA fire was received during the operation, damaging one AH-1G, one OH-6A, and two UH-1H, and wounding two crewmen (For more details, see Annex C and Appendix 2 to Annex J).

(d) Staging at Song Be airfield, Task Force Keaton evacuated 1500 ARVN soldiers, 2000 civilians, six 105mm and two 155mm howitzers from Bu Dop and Bo Duc to Song Be airfield. In addition to organic brigade aviation, a CH-54 helicopter from 12 CAG and USAF C130s and C123s supported the operation. Critical fuel shortage at Song Be airfield were replenished by the quick response of the Brigade S4 section, 215 CS Bn, and USAF C130 and C123 Tanker aircraft. In this operation an OH-6A from F/9 Cav was shot down and the pilot killed.

(e) There was a good feeling in Bien Hoa that night, for although the Brigade had suffered one killed and three wounded and had lost one OH-6A helicopter and had several others damaged, the 3d Brigade had successfully accomplished three widely separated and diverse missions in the best traditions of the First Team.

(2) 9 April

(a) By 0600H, both F/79th AFA and F/9 Cav had departed for the Lai Khe staging area. At 0900H, Col Spence, DCO-B, ordered the removal of all US equipment from Song Be airfield to include the 17lb and HEAT rockets. At 0910H a FAC reported seeing several vehicles on the airfield southwest of Loc Ninh apparently resupplying. The An Loc ground commander was reluctant to call for airstrikes since he believed the vehicles were logging trucks and the airstrikes would be targeted in the center of the city. To counter the enemy in lieu of the airstrikes, a Spectre gunship was dispatched. (C130 with variety of armaments to include rapid fire, short barrel 105mm howitzer; 20mm cannon; and 40mm grenade launcher.)

(b) At 0935H, the ARVNs reported that an unknown number of trucks and over 1000 rounds of 155mm ammunition had been left at grid XU949262. Ten kilometers to the east at XU958 261 they had also left 8 vehicles and more 100 assorted weapons.

(c) At 1035H a report of 100 ARVN and 2 US Advisors being held in a rubber factory in the vicinity of Quan Loi was received. The 5th ARVN Div began to prepare for a counterattack and an airmobile brigade from the 7th Division and several armor battalions moved up.

(d) Later in the day at 1315H, a pink team from D/229 on visual reconnaissance reported seeing a large number of people, tank tracks, and possible camouflaged vehicles, all indicating heavy movement to the south in the vicinity of XT993567. Three F4 aircraft engaged the area with BDA showing 100% of the ordinance on target. At 1340H D/229 reported that the activity had been exaggerated somewhat in that the area had recent use by a large number of personnel and some wheeled trucks and track vehicles in the past 24 to 48 hours.

(e) The evening was much the same as previous with more FAC sightings of enemy vehicles around An Loc and their subsequent engagement by Spectre gunships. Air sorties for the day had totaled 74 with 26 by A37, 36 by F4, and 10 by A6 aircraft.

(3) 10 April

(a) At 0920H TRAC directed 3d Brigade to send one air cav troop to conduct a visual reconnaissance of Highway QL 13 from north of Chon Thanh to the 80 east-west grid line south of An Loc. The morning operations were in progress with an escort of a section of AFA from F/79 for a TRAC CH-47 on a resupply mission of barrier and commo equipment to Nui Ba Den as well as the assigned VR of QL 13. At 135H, LTC Casey, flying in the vicinity of An Loc (XT 7872) was hit by .51 cal ground to air fire and seriously wounded in the arm. LTC McKee immediately assumed LTC Casey's functions and responsibilities and MAJ Phillip C. Kane took charge of the Nui Ba Den mission. The .51 cal site was apparently destroyed by airstrikes and Spectre at 1545H. Meanwhile, another Spectre engaged 17 trucks at XU 7000 and destroyed 7.

(b) The action at An Loc continued regardless. At 1445H MG Hollingsworth reported that the 95 C Regt had been broken up into small groups and that the 5th ARVN Div and 3d Rangers were in platoon and company size contacts. The 1st ARVN Airborne Brigade was still stalled about half-way between Chon Thanh and An Loc, with no progress reported since the 9th. By 1800H the only activity reported was the combat assault of the 2/8 ARVN Regt in An Loc covered by a section of F/79 AFA with no incidents noted.

(4) 11 April

(a) On 11 April, F/9 Cav and F/79 AFA supported TRAC with enemy activity increasing by noon. Another resupply mission commanded by Major Jean D. Reed, S3 Operations, was conducted to Nui Ba Den, with all 3 sorties missions completed by 1115H. At 1100H, a light observation helicopter (OH-6A) from F/9 sighted a possible staging area recently used by more than 100 individuals (XT 6867). At the same time an AH-1G Cobra from F/9 engaged a tank with unknown results. Concurrently, a Spectre gunship at XU 6833 began engaging several trucks and 1 tank causing them to catch fire. As the insertion of 8th ARVN Infantry troops from Dau Tieng to An Loc progressed, support gunships and other aircraft received both intense ground to air fire (GAF) and indirect fire while on the ground. Throughout the mid-day and the rest of the afternoon aircraft continued to receive intense GAF and to sight various GAF sites in and around An Loc. (GAF was often intense up to altitudes of 4,000 to 6,000.) In addition, two 105mm howitzers were sighted in an old firebase engaging ARVN elements (XT 69997). In late afternoon, aircraft from F/9 sighted both tank and armored personnel carrier movement as well as troop concentrations of company size in the vicinity of XT 6995. Airstrikes, Spectre gunships and Cobra gunships engaged with results unknown.

(b) At 1830H the ARVN Airborne Brigade south of An Loc reported being in heavy contact to include receiving 122 rockets. The brigade had lost 2 tanks from enemy fire as Spectre gunships supported. Intelligence analysis from TRAC considered 2 NVA Regt to be astride QL 13 south of An Loc. The 7th NVA Div was SW of An Loc and the 5th VC Div between An Loc and Loc Ninh with artillery. Their future operations were believed to be to attack An Loc to destroy it, and either attack and destroy the relief column enroute to An Loc or destroy it upon its link up with element in An Loc.

(5) 12 April

(a) At 0740H TRAC directed the 3d Brigade to send one air cavalry troop to support the 5th ARVN Div west of An Loc, one heavy fire team to the Lai Khe airfield to be on immediate alert, and to complete the lift of the 1/8th ARVN Inf Regt from Dau Tieng to An Loc. By 0950H the first lift of the 1/8 was completed into An Loc and Major Davidson, a MACV Advisor missing for 4 days, was extracted from An Loc to Plantation. An hour later, the heavy section of AFA from F/79 on standby at Lai Khe was dispatched to support the 8th ARVN Airborne Battalion in contact (XT 7475). Fighting continued with another airborne unit being engaged by the enemy at 1235H, 10 kilometers to the southeast (XT 764668).

(b) The remainder of the day was accented with sporadic contacts and indirect fire attacks. At 2035H, however, the activity on Nui Ba Den signal relay site was renewed by an enemy CS attack. By 0900H the next morning, all was reported quiet on the mountain.

(6) 13 April

(a) Early on the 13th, TRAC directed the 3d Brigade to provide immediate assistance to an An Loc contact. By 1750H both a heavy fire team (F/79) and an AH Company (D/229) had departed

for the area southwest of An Loc. FACs in the area reported intense AA fire to include 51 Cal and 23mm.

(b) At 1030, 127 HEAT Rockets were delivered to Lai Khe to be used for tank killer missions only. Total HEAT Rocket status for MR III was 1142 rds. (Bien Hoa 496, Lai Khe 228, Thanh 118, and 3d Ord 300)

(c) The An Loc situation continued to be shaky with the enemy controlling the northern two streets in the city and reinforcements apparently enroute. Evidence of the uncertainty became apparent when at 1520H MG Hollingsworth considered extracting the 11. Americans from the An Loc soccer field. By 1600H, however, the rescue was cancelled since it appeared the city defenses would hold and reinforcements efforts would continue. ARVN felt uncertain about the impending situation although Col Miller, US Advisor in An Loc believed the ARVN were in sufficient strength to hold the city. Meanwhile the ARVN ABN Bde (OPCON 21 Div) was pushing Northwest of QL 13 and one regiment of the 21st ARVN Div with an armored battalion pushing northwest of QL 13, both towards An Loc. One regiment of the 21st was in reserve.

(7) 14 April

(a) 14 April began much like the previous days with D/229 and heavy fire teams from F/79 in Lai Khe by 0930H. They were to be tasked with visual reconnaissance missions until 1150H when they would support a VNAF airmobile operation in the vicinity of the Quan Loi airfield following an ARC Light (B-52) Strike.

(b) At 1050H reports had confirmed enemy to the east and southeast of An Loc, tanks suspected in and around the city, and intense GAF in the vicinity of the Quan Loi airfield. By 1310H the city was under heavy attack with support from captured ARVN 105 and 155 howitzers. The situation continued to deteriorate and by 1500H the ARVN had withdrawn to the An Loc soccer field to defend. ARVN remained fearful of the situation and were reluctant to counterattack north and south as the Senior Advisor, Col Miller, advised would succeed. Although FAC and pink team visual reconnaissance proved fruitless in the search for the enemy 105 and 155 firing locations, F/9 Cav was credited with the destruction of 13 2½ and 5 ton trucks and one 75mm recoilless rifle (Confirmed by FAC). In addition, a FAC confirmed a tank destroyed by an unknown ARVN element in An Loc.

(8) 15 April

(a) At 30 minutes past midnight, five 122 rockets impacted in a residential area near the Tan Son Nhut AB. Targeted for the US installation, the rounds fell short killing 15 innocent civilians, wounding 6, and damaging 5 houses.

(b) By sunrise the weather was hindering the tactical operation of virtually all types fighter/bombers and was marginal at best for rotary wing aircraft. Elements of F/9 and F/79 were to support TRAC at An Loc. An Loc came under a renewed ground attack at 0520H from the south to southeast with support by heavy indirect fire. At 0940H the ARVN ground commander at An Loc reported enemy tanks 500 meters from their tactical operations center and requested gunship support. The enemy threat again appeared to be from the North, Northeast, East and Southeast portions of the perimeter appeared secure. Nine tanks were seen within the perimeter and two were destroyed and one damaged by gunships from F/79. In addition, 100 individuals supporting the armor were engaged with unknown results. At 1440H the situation remained critical on all sides with a penetration reported on the North. At 1500H four AH-1G Cobras from F/79 AFA engaged four enemy tanks, destroying three and damaging 1. Soon thereafter a FAC adjusted airstrikes on the damaged tank, destroying it. Meanwhile 10 enemy tanks attacking An Loc from the southwest and west were delayed and stopped by ARVN who blocked the streets with debris and then engaged them with M72 LAW. Nine of the 10 attacking tanks were destroyed and the ARVN's self-confidence restored. This marked the turning point in the campaign for An Loc.

(9) 16-23 April

(a) The week of 16 through 22 April proved to be far less active than the earlier 2d week period in terms of the intensity of the enemy attacks on the city of An Loc. The 16th found little activity in the An Loc area itself but throughout the rest of Military Region III there were numerous sporadic attacks by fire and ground attacks. Tan Bien, Tan Hung, Song Be, Tan Uyen, Fire Support Base Spudis (US) were all hit between 0500 and 0800H. The most notable losses were 700 million piasters worth of ammunition destroyed by sabotage in a Lai Khe ammunition dump and three US wounded in the attack by fire on FSB Spudis.

(b) On 17 April few enemy ground attacks were reported and ARVN operations began

in the south, southeast, and southwest areas of An Loc. Throughout the day and evening both AFA and Spectre engaged enemy movement destroying four towed 105mm howitzers (former ARVN), and destroying two trucks and damaging three of seven seen. Throughout the morning and evening hours of the 18th, enemy 105 and 155 indirect fire continued to pound the city. Visual reconnaissance missions continued to find signs of heavy troop movement as well as four more enemy tanks in the area. Resupply was becoming more and more critical as relatively few drops were successful, most falling outside ARVN control. Only two tons of medical supplies were dropped into An Loc by C130 HALO (high altitude, low opening) drops. Since intense GAF was blocking helicopter and fixed wing aircraft resupply landings in An Loc, the success of failure of the C130 HALO drops was critical to the fate of the troops in it. See Annexes C and D for details on aerial resupply.

(c) The situation remained much the same on the 19th with continuing intense GAF around the besieged city. Despite the lack of ground action, an AH-1G Cobra was shot down, exploding in mid-air, crashing and killing the two pilots. Once again GAF prevented any chance of extracting the bodies. With indirect fire still falling heavily on the city, ARVN troops in An Loc reported hearing tanks moving to the southeast at 0515H on the 20th. By 0630H the city was under heavy attack from all sides with tanks again in the city to the north. The Airborne Brigade to the southeast reported contact at that time. The west side of the perimeter came under heavy armor supported attack at 1215H. At 1330H two tanks were engaged and destroyed by AH-1G Cobras from D/229. Despite the ARVN's ability to hold their positions, the supply drops continued to fail. Earlier in the day, at 1105H Dau Tieng and Tri Tam came under enemy attack with the enemy gaining the compound in the latter. For details on the Dau Tieng and Tri Tam battles, see Annex E and Appendix 6 to Annex J.

(d) The next three days were relatively free of enemy ground operations against the city as the ARVN's continued to consolidate their positions. Poor weather prevented nearly all air support to the city until the afternoon of the 21st, and the morning of the 22nd and the 23rd.

(e) Psychologically and physically the ARVN's got their break on the 23rd. With unprecedented success, the C130 HALO drops all fell into friendly hands. When helicopter resupply missions were attempted again, they too, met with success to include the evacuation of 30 friendly WIA's.

(10) 24 April - 10 May 1972

(a) The period between 24 April and 10 May was distinctive only in the relative stability of the ARVN defenses. The city continued to receive vast numbers of rounds of all types of indirect fire, a situation so common that it was no longer considered intense (literally thousands of rounds fell on An Loc nightly during this "Lull"). Resupply continued to be a key factor to the island city as HALO drops fell both to the ARVN and enemy hands on a regular basis. Anti-aircraft fire deterred air operations, as usual, with the loss of a C130 on 26 April west of the city and the failure of four resupply drops on the 27th. Likewise, two UH-1H were shot down on 29 April and 1 May, and a US C119 was downed on 2 May west of An Loc with five of ten crewmen surviving and being recovered. Throughout the period, however, TAC Air, Spectre, and gunships engaged AA sites as they were discovered. Although the enemy seemed to have eased his offensive, the city's defenders were soon to discover that the reason was not to quit the campaign but to prepare a renewed drive on the city.

(11) 11 May - 16 May 1972

(a) Unlike the majority of the previous mornings, An Loc began receiving almost three times as much indirect fire by 0345H, 11 May. At the same time, the ARVN's noticed heavy troop and armor movement to the southeast and northeast of the city. At 0530H an enemy radio transmission was intercepted that indicated that the big attack for An Loc had begun. Throughout the remainder of the day, enemy AA fire was intense to include suspected SA-7 SAMs and enemy armor and infantry pushed to penetrate the defensive perimeter. In all an AH-1G, two F4Cs, and two Birdog aircraft were shot down. A total of 13 tanks were destroyed by tactical air support, Spectre and Cobra gunships.

(b) Eleven ARC LIGHT strikes were made on enemy positions close to the perimeter of the city on the 11th, and 7 on the 12th. At 1900H on the 12th, the city again came under heavy attack on all sides to include direct fire of 105mm howitzers and tanks to the west. Thunderstorms and lightning prevailed, but throughout the night Spectre and tactical air engaged the targets, relieving some of the pressure. Between midnight and 0600H, six more ARC Light strikes were employed with what was believed to be devastating effects. By midday on the 13th, the attack's intensity had decreased even though three tanks had penetrated the northern perimeter and AA fire remained

active. The tanks were engaged and destroyed by ground troops.

(c) The 15th brought good weather and Spectre and tactical air support were successfully employed. A convoy of 18 vehicles to the west of An Loc was engaged and destroyed by Spectre. At 1700H an ALE was shot down by the AA fire and the US pilot was extracted by an OH-6A from D/229. On the 16th two of three tanks engaged by Spectre were destroyed and reports were received which credited the ARC LIGHT strikes of the previous few days with over 300 enemy killed or wounded and two 105 howitzers and two .51 AA sites destroyed. The total effects of the ARC LIGHTS was believed to be even greater.

(12) 17 May - 20 July

(a) The weeks following the repulse of the enemy's 11 May attack were characterized by continuing daily attacks by fire on An Loc, by ARVN attempts to open QL 13 from Lai Khe to An Loc, and by enemy attempts to keep the road closed. On an average day 3d Brigade aviation elements of one air cavalry troop and one or more heavy fire teams of aerial field artillery would be supporting ARVN forces in An Loc, along QL 13 or elsewhere in Military Region III. Brigade and task force fire teams supported medical evacuation missions and missions to exchange advisors throughout the period.

(b) The city's defense held and the level of enemy activity gradually decreased; however, the fight was not without its losses to the First Team. Anti-aircraft fire continued to be intense and frequently included the SA-7 "Strella" missile. On 13 June a UH-1H helicopter was downed by automatic weapons fire and the crew rescued. On 20 June an AH-1G gunship was struck by an SA-7 missile and crashed, killing both crewmen. A second AH-1G was also downed by enemy ground to air fire. The crew escaped from the downed helicopter but were killed by enemy small arms fire. That same day, a third AH-1G was hit by .51 cal fire and a B-40 rocket, but was able to limp back to Lai Khe. Within fifteen minutes on its first day of existence Task Force "Garry Owen" had lost three helicopter gunships to the intense fire.

(c) On 21 June another AH-1G was shot down by an SA-7 which severed the ship's tail boom, and sent the helicopter spinning toward the ground. This time, however, the pilot Captain Mike Brown maintained control of his aircraft and crash landed into the trees. Both he and his gunner survived the crash without serious injuries, the first time that anyone had survived in a helicopter struck by a SA-7. See Appendix 3 for a detailed description.

(d) On 13 June 1972, 3d Brigade aviation elements began the first of a series of helilifts of ARVN replacement units into An Loc and along QL 13. Reinforcements were lifted into An Loc, and tired units pulled out to refit and to begin other operations. Ultimately approximately 13,500 troops were to be moved by the Task Force and Brigade aircraft with assistance from VNAF. This included some 6000 troops who were moved during the period 10-12 July 1972.

(e) The "Cav's" aircraft also provided a needed psychological boost to the GVN during this period. On 16 June LTG Minh, III Corps CG, and MG Hollingsworth, CG, TRAC, were taken into An Loc while that city was still under fire. This was repeated on 30 June when Sir Robert Thompson, Advisor to President of the United States, was escorted into and out of An Loc by the air cavalry of the task force. The culmination of these missions came on 7 July, when Task Force Garry Owen escorted the President of the Republic of Vietnam into and out of An Loc under extremely hazardous weather conditions and the constant threat of anti-aircraft fire.

(f) A critical factor which complicated the task force's mission was the loss of F/79 AFA to 11 Combat Aviation Group on 25 June for operations in Military Region I. This forced the task force to use the two air cavalry troops D/229 and F/9 for both their normal visual reconnaissance mission and the armed escort and strike missions heretofore flown by the aerial field artillery battery F/79 AFA.

c. Appendix 2 is a record of brigade aviation performance and vulnerability data provided to the 3d Brigade Command Group for the period 4-21 April. In general, it is characteristic of the aircraft experience throughout the period.

4. LESSONS LEARNED

a. Aviation Tactics: The key lesson learned was to test the premise that the helicopter could survive in the anti-aircraft environment of a mid-intensity war by using nap of the earth techniques. In Vietnam enemy small arms and automatic weapons fire had forced helicopters to higher and higher altitudes. The intense fire encountered at An Loc during the first two weeks had the same effect and operating altitudes of 3000 feet AGL and above were not uncommon for the AH-1G gunships. How-

ever, this put the helicopters in the primary zone for SA-7 missile fire. As a result, the helicopters were forced to fly at treetop level using nap-of-the-earth techniques in order to perform their mission and survive. Although low-level approaches did reduce the pin point firing accuracy of the AH-1G gunship, the helicopter was able to perform its escort and fire support mission with only a slight decrease in overall effectiveness.

b. Gun Team Organization: Before the battle of An Loc began, aerial field artillery in the brigade had been employed in sections or light fire teams of two AH-1G gunships each. Because of the intense anti-aircraft fire, heavy fire teams or heavy sections of three aircraft were employed. This permitted aircraft making firing runs to be given continuous coverage by other aircraft of the section: one aircraft pulling out of a firing run and up to a covering position, one aircraft beginning its firing run, and the third aircraft in position to provide cover for the other two before it also began its firing run. When this number of aircraft was combined with the hard-hitting 2.75" rocket with 17 lb HE or 11 lb anti-tank warhead, the fire power of the heavy section was devastating.

c. Visual Reconnaissance Team Organization: The 3d Brigade's traditional employment of the air cavalry troop has been in Pink Teams of two aircraft, one LOH and one AH-1G, each. The LOH or "Low Bird" performs low level reconnaissance at treetop level and is covered by the AH-1G or "High Bird". When working in areas with a high probability of encountering significant anti-aircraft fire a "Purple Team" of one LOH, one AH-1G, and one UH-1H has been used. The UH-1H serves as a command and control aircraft and is able to recover the crew should one of the other helicopters be shot down. In An Loc, because of the intense fire, it was again necessary to increase the number of "guns" in a visual reconnaissance team: one LOH, two AH-1G, and one UH-1H comprised a heavy Purple Team. These teams had sufficient fire power to find a target and then destroy it or keep fire on it until assistance in the form of tactical air support could arrive.

d. Air Cavalry Troop Maintainance: With the loss of aerial field artillery on 25 June, all of the AH-1G mission requirements were given to the two air cavalry troops. Although they performed both the visual reconnaissance and armed escort missions outstandingly, particularly during the mass unit exchanges between Lai Khe and An Loc, the almost total commitment of all flyable aircraft every day had a severe impact on the maintainance and mission readiness of the two troops. Losses of aircraft mechanics when the task force was required to lose an additional 300 men at the end of Increment XII, USARV Force Reduction, severely hurt the air cavalry troops because the extra mechanics were not available to perform the additional maintainance workload. The maintainance structure of the air cavalry troop needs to be increased to give the troops the capability to perform round the clock maintainance.

e. Integral Combat Service Support: The 215th Composite Support Battalion gave the 3d Brigade a capability for flexible response that was truly unique. Because of this organic capability the Brigade was able to shift its forward aviation operating base of a day-to-day, and in some cases, an hour-to-hour basis. The support battalion met requirements for aviation POL and medical evacuation support at Aong Be, Lai Khe, Vung Tau, and other locations throughout Military Region III.

## 5. CONCLUSIONS

a. The 3d Brigade (Separate) and Task Force Garry Owen (Provisional), 1st Cavalry Division, supported ARVN forces in An Loc and along QL 13 from the beginning of the battle until mid-July 1972. During the battle aviation elements of the First Team experienced the most intense volume of anti-aircraft fire yet seen in South Vietnam, covering almost the complete range of such fires available in a modern field army: small arms, automatic weapons, .51 calibre machinegun, 23mm, 37mm, 57mm, and 85mm gun, and the SA-7 heat seeking missile. That our helicopters were able to continue to fight in this environment attests to the training, dedication, and professionalism of the air craft crews and those members of the brigade and task force who maintained their aircraft and supported their operations.

b. Time and time again the flexibility of the brigade and the task force was proven when multiple operations were in progress on a given day or when we were required to suddenly shift our base of operations to counter a new enemy threat or because of a treat to the base itself.

c. The air cavalry troops again proved their worth. Repeatedly they sought out the enemy and found his troop concentrations, armored vehicles, and anti-aircraft and artillery sites, which were then engaged by gunships and tactical air support. The ability of the helicopters to get right down to tree top level to find the enemy was a major factor in their success. When the aerial field artillery battery was sent to Military Region 1, the cavalry troops took over their armed escort

mission and performed in an outstanding manner. However, this dual mission required the almost total commitment of both air cavalry troops, particularly on those days in late June and early July when major unit replacements of ARVN troops were made in An Loc and along QL 13, and severely strained the maintenance capability of the units.

d. The AH-1G gunship provided outstanding fire support in the hands of both the aerial field artillery and the air cavalry. Its pinpoint accuracy permitted it to be used in close proximity to ARVN troops and civilians in An Loc when nothing else would suffice, and broke the back of the armor attack on An Loc at probably the most critical period.

e. There is much that can be said about the aviators and those who supported them in the brigade and task force. Simply stated, however, their thoroughly professional performance of duty, courage, and gallantry were in the finest traditions of the First Team.

f. Finally, a comment must be made about the performance of the ARVN soldiers, particularly those who served with the 5th ARVN Division and the 1st Airborne Brigade, the 3d Rangers, and the RF/PF in An Loc during the first two months of the battle. Although they were given the most concentrated air support ever given in this war, the courage and tenacity with which these men fought and died, in the final analysis, stopped the NVA attack on An Loc.

APPENDIX 1 (Task Organizations) to Annex K (3d Brigade (Separate), 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) to After-Action Report, Binh Long Campaign.

31 March 1972

Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 3d Brigade (Separate)  
1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry  
2nd Battalion, 8th Cavalry  
1st Battalion, 12th Cavalry  
1st Battalion, 21st Field Artillery  
229th Assault Helicopter Battalion  
    A Company (Assault Helicopter)  
    B Company (Assault Helicopter)  
    D Company (Aerial Weapons) (OPCON Bde S-2)  
    362nd Assault Support Helicopter Company  
    F Battery, 79th Aerial Field Artillery (OPCON 1-21 FA)  
    F Troop, 9th Cavalry (OPCON Bde S-2)  
    1st Aviation Platoon (Pathfinder)  
F Troop, 4th Cavalry, 12th Combat Aviation Group (OPCON 3d Bde, further OPCON Bde S-2)  
215th Composite Support Battalion  
501st Engineer Company  
H Company (Ranger), 75th Infantry  
252th Signal Company  
34th Infantry Platoon (Scout Dog)  
26th Chemical Detachment  
191st Military Intelligence Detachment  
US Army Installation, Bien Hoa  
US Army Installation, Long Thanh North

Changes to Task Force Organization

1 April 1972

F/4 Cav (released from opcon 3d Bde) attached 11 CAG 22 May 1972  
D/229 AHB (released from opcon Bde S-2)  
F/9 Cav (released from opcon Bde S-2)  
F/79 AFA (released from opcon 1-21 FA)

20 June 1972

\*\*\*3d Bde (Sep), 1 ACD

Task Force Garry Owen

\* 1-7 Cav  
229 AHB  
    A/229  
    B/229  
    D/229  
    362 ASH  
    F/79 AFA  
    F/9 Cav  
\*\*D/1-21 FA  
H/75 Inf  
501 Engr Co (-)  
525 Sig Co (-)  
26 Chem Det  
191 MID

\* Includes Hq & Hq Det, Task Force  
\*\* Subsequently redesignated F/26 FA  
\*\*\* Completed standdown 27 June 1972

25 June 1972

F/79 AFA, attached less admin 11 CAG

Bde Troops

\*\*\*2-8 Cav  
\*\*\*1-12 Cav  
\*\*\*1-21 FA (-)  
\*\*\*215 CSB  
\*\*\*HHC, 3d Bde

27 June 1972

Plt/B-229, attached less admin 11 CAG

24 July 1972

Task Force Garry Owen, released from OPCON TRAC OPCON USARV for standdown.

APPENDIX 2 (Performance and Vulnerability Data) to Annex K (3d Brigade (Separate), 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile)) to After-action Report, Binh Long Campaign.

1. PERFORMANCE DATA

| A. Mission Design Series             | AH-1G   | UH-1H | OH-6A | CH-47 |
|--------------------------------------|---------|-------|-------|-------|
| B. Hours Flown                       | 1,363   | 977   | 478   | 124   |
| C. Sorties Flown                     | 1,379   | 1,293 | 429   | 165   |
| D1. Number Fax Carried               | 1       | 1,734 | 72    | 1,863 |
| D2. Number Patients Carried          | 0       | 3     | 0     | 0     |
| E. Tons Cargo Hauled                 | 0       | 6     | 0     | 165   |
| F. Number Rounds 7.62 Expended       | 111,992 | 9,650 | 4,000 | 0     |
| G. Number 2.75 Inch Rockets Expended | 18,927  | 0     | 0     | 0     |
| H. Number Rounds 20MM Expended       | 4,027   | 0     | 0     | 0     |
| I. Number Rounds 40MM Extended       | 13,539  | 250   | 0     | 0     |
| J. Enemy killed by Aircraft          | 26      | 0     | 0     | 0     |
| K. Structures Damaged by Aircraft    | 23      | 0     | 0     | 0     |
| L. Structures Destroyed by Aircraft  | 37      | 0     | 0     | 0     |
| M. Tanks Damaged by Aircraft         | 5       | 0     | 0     | 0     |
| N. Tanks Destroyed by Aircraft       | 6       | 0     | 0     | 0     |
| O. Trucks Damaged by Aircraft        | 7       | 0     | 0     | 0     |
| P. Trucks Destroyed by Aircraft      | 19      | 0     | 0     | 0     |

2. Vulnerability Data: This data was submitted using the following format:

- A. Mission Design, Series
- B. Unit Identification Code - Standard 6 digit UIC less the first and last characters.
- C. Aircraft Serial Number
- D. Julian Date
- E. Time (Hotel)
- F. Mission Function Codes:
  - (1) AVH Armed visual reconnaissance
  - (2) VR Visual reconnaissance
  - (3) CC Command and control
  - (4) MED Medical evacuation
  - (5) AH Armed helicopter
  - (6) RCVY Recovery
  - (7) AES Armed escort

- (8) IR Infra-red
- (9) EX Troop extraction
- (10) AJ Artillery adjustment
- (11) FAC Forward air controller
- (12) CCJO Combat cargo
- (13) CTC Combat troop carrier
- (14) LOTC Logistical troop carrier
- (15) LOGO Logistics cargo
- (16) AL Administrative liaison
- (17) TNG Training
- (18) SAR Search and rescue
- (19) SMK Smoke
- (20) PKD Parking in an unprotected location
- (21) PKDR Parked in a revetment or shelter
- (22) PSY Psychological warfare
- (23) PHTO Aerial photography
- (24) MNT Maintenance flight
- (25) SLR Side Looking Radar

#### G. Flight Phase

- (1) EH - Enroute high (1500 feet above the terrain or higher)
- (2) EL - Enroute low (less than 1500 feet above the terrain)
- (3) TO - Take off
- (4) HO - Hovering
- (5) LD - Landing
- (6) OG - On ground in LZ or PZ
- (7) OR - Orbiting
- (8) TA - Target attack
- (9) TN - Target withdrawl

#### H. Type Damage

- (1) A - Incident damage (AR 385-40)
- (2) B - Minor damage (AR 385-40)
- (3) C - Major damage (AR 385-40)
- (4) L - Loss

#### I. Cause

- (1) AAA - Anti-artillery (20mm and over)
- (2) ART - Artillery
- (3) DPC - Destroyed to prevent capture
- (4) DSL - Dropped sling load
- (5) EXP - Explosion of friendly ordnance
- (6) FLA - Flame thrower
- (7) GDE - Grenade and RPG
- (8) GFL - Ground fire less than 50 cal in size
- (9) GMH - Ground fire 50 cal to 20mm in size
- (10) LM - Land mine
- (11) LZD - Enemy emplaced landing zone obstacles
- (12) MAC - Mid-air collision
- (13) MTR - Mortar
- (14) NAP - Napalm
- (15) NGF - Naval gunfire
- (16) OTH - Other (must be explained in remarks)
- (17) RKT - Rocket
- (18) RR - Recoilless rifle
- (19) SAM - Surface-to-air-missile
- (20) SCH - Satchel charge
- (21) STM - Storm
- (22) MIF - missing in flight

J. Altitude  $\downarrow$  in feet above terrain

K. Air speed

L. Number of hits

M. Shot down

(1) Y - yes

(2) N - no

N. Recovered

(1) Y - yes

(2) N - no

O. Number of crew members killed

P. Number of crew members missing

Q. Number of crew members wounded

R. Number of passengers killed  
 S. Number of passengers missing  
 T. Number of passengers wounded  
 U. Grid coordinates  
 3. The following is vulnerability data.

|    |          |          |          |          |          |          |
|----|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| A. | AH-1G    | AH-1G    | AH-1G    | AH-1G    | AH-1G    | AH-1G    |
| B. | HDA      | HDA      | HDA      | HOJA     | HOJA     | HOJA     |
| C. | 68-15183 | 68-15021 | 67-15594 | 68-15149 | 69-16431 | 63-17064 |
| D. | 2096     | 2096     | 2096     | 2096     | 2097     | 2097     |
| E. | 1300     | 1330     | 1520     | 1700     | 1100     | 1100     |
| F. | AH       | AH       | AH       | AH       | AH       | AH       |
| G. | TA       | TA       | TW       | TA       | TA       | EH       |
| H. | C        | A        | L        | C        | A        | A        |
| I. | GNH      | GNH      | GNH      | GNH      | GNH      | GNH      |
| J. | 3000     | 3000     | 3000     | 2500     | 2000     | 2000     |
| K. | 130      | 120      | 140      | 120      | 100      | 130      |
| L. | 2        | 2        | UNK      | UNK      | 1        | 1        |
| M. | Y        | Y        | Y        | Y        | N        | N        |
| N. | Y        | Y        | N        | Y        | Y        | Y        |
| O. | 0        | 0        | 0        | 0        | 0        | 0        |
| P. | 0        | 0        | (2 2)    | 0        | 0        | 0        |
| Q. | 0        | 0        | 0        | 0        | 0        | 0        |
| R. | 0        | 0        | 0        | 0        | 0        | 0        |
| S. | 0        | 0        | 0        | 0        | 0        | 0        |
| T. | 0        | 0        | 0        | 0        | 0        | 0        |
| U. | XU705068 | XU705053 | XU747056 | XU765785 | XU704005 | XU704005 |
| A. | AH-1G    | UH-1H    | CH-47A   | OH-6A    | OH-6A    | OH-6A    |
| B. | HOJA     | HKCB     | CJNA     | HOJA     | AAXD     | AAXD     |
| C. | 67-15600 | 69-15218 | 65-7991  | 67-16589 | 69-16039 | 69-16243 |
| D. | 2097     | 2098     | 2098     | 2093     | 2099     | 2099     |
| E. | 1300     | 1630     | 1645     | 1745     | 1015     | 1045     |
| F. | AH       | MEO      | EX       | VR       | VR       | VR       |
| G. | EH       | ID       | TC       | EL       | TO       | EL       |
| H. | A        | C        | C        | B        | B        | B        |

| I. | GNH      | GNL      | GNH      | GNL      | GNH      | GNL      |
|----|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| J. | 3500     | 30       | 10       | 25       | 40       | 100      |
| K. | 130      | 40       | 30       | 100      | 60       | 40       |
| L. | 2        | 8        | 8        | 3        | UNK      | UNK      |
| M. | N        | N        | N        | N        | N        | N        |
| N. | Y        | Y        | Y        | Y        | Y        | Y        |
| O. | 0        | 0        | 0        | 0        | 0        | 0        |
| P. | 0        | 0        | 0        | 0        | 0        | 0        |
| Q. | 0        | 1        | 0        | 0        | 0        | 0        |
| R. | 0        | 0        | 0        | 0        | 0        | 0        |
| S. | 0        | 0        | 0        | 0        | 0        | 0        |
| T. | 0        | 0        | 1        | 0        | 0        | 0        |
| U. | XU705004 | XU750050 | XT755883 | XT732085 | XT718998 | XT719998 |
| A. | OH-6A    | CH-47A   | UH-1H    | UH-1H    | UH-1H    | AH-1G    |
| B. | AAXD     | CJNA     | AAXA     | AAXA     | AAXA     | HOJA     |
| C. | 68-17313 | 68-091   | 69-15739 | 70-15736 | 68-16339 | 68-15157 |
| D. | 2099     | 2099     | 2099     | 2099     | 2099     | 2099     |
| E. | 1400     | 1400     | 1400     | 1400     | 1400     | 1630     |
| F. | VR       | EX       | CTC      | CTC      | CTC      | AH       |
| G. | EH       | TC       | CG       | CG       | CG       | EH       |
| H. | B        | B        | B        | B        | B        | B        |
| I. | GNL      | GNL      | GNL      | GNL      | GNL      | GNL      |
| J. | 4000     | 75       | 0        | 0        | 0        | 2000     |
| K. | 90       | 40       | 0        | 0        | 0        | 130      |
| L. | 2        | UNK      | UNK      | UNK      | UNK      | UNK      |
| M. | N        | N        | N        | N        | N        | N        |
| N. | Y        | Y        | Y        | Y        | Y        | Y        |
| O. | 0        | 0        | 0        | 0        | 0        | 0        |
| P. | 0        | 0        | 0        | 0        | 0        | 0        |
| Q. | 0        | 0        | 0        | 0        | 2        | 0        |
| R. | 0        | 0        | 0        | 0        | 0        | 0        |
| S. | 0        | 0        | 0        | 0        | 0        | 0        |
| T. | 0        | 0        | 0        | 0        | 0        | 0        |
| U. | XT283525 | XU980290 | XT282583 | XT282583 | XT282583 | YU974253 |

|    |          |          |          |          |          |                          |
|----|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|--------------------------|
| A. | OH-6A    | UH-1H    | OH-6A    | UH-1H    | UH-1H    | UH-1H                    |
| B. | HOJA     | HOJA     | HOJA     | AGHA     | HOHB     | AAXB                     |
| C. | 67-16078 | 69-15024 | 69-15999 | 69-15314 | 69-15575 | 68-16032                 |
| D. | 2099     | 2099     | 2099     | 2101     | 2101     | 2102                     |
| E. | 1645     | 1645     | 1650     | 1400     | 1440     | 1345                     |
| F. | VR       | MED      | SAK      | CC       | MED      | CIC                      |
| G. | EL       | HO       | OR       | EH       | EH       | EL                       |
| H. | L        | B        | B        | A        | A        | A<br>(SHELL<br>FRAGMENT) |
| I. | UNK      | GAL      | GAL      | GNH      | GNH      | 100                      |
| J. | UNK      | 10       | 70       | 1800     | 2500     | 100                      |
| K. | UNK      | 0        | 60       | 100      | 95       | 80                       |
| L. | UNK      | UNK      | UNK      | 1        | 1        | 1                        |
| M. | Y        | N        | N        | N        | N        | N                        |
| N. | N        | Y        | Y        | Y        | Y        | Y                        |
| O. | 1        | 0        | 0        | 0        | 0        | 0                        |
| P. | 0        | 0        | 0        | 0        | 0        | 0                        |
| Q. | 1        | 0        | 0        | 1        | 0        | 0                        |
| R. | 0        | 0        | 0        | 0        | 0        | 0                        |
| S. | 0        | 0        | 0        | 0        | 0        | 0                        |
| T. | 0        | 0        | 0        | 0        | 0        | 0                        |
| U. | YU975270 | YJ975270 | YU974253 | XT787723 | YT790530 | XT750885                 |
| A. | AH-1G    | AH-1G    | UH-1H    | UH-1H    | UH-1H    | AH-1G                    |
| B. | HNDA     | HNDA     | AAXA     | AAXA     | AAXB     | AAXD                     |
| C. | 67-15633 | 69-15369 | 69-15383 | 67-19521 | 69-15369 | 67-15342                 |
| D. | 2102     | 2102     | 2102     | 2102     | 2107     | 2110                     |
| E. | 1445     | 1500     | 1700     | 1900     | 0020     | 0830                     |
| F. | AES      | AES      | CTC      | CTC      | VR       | AVR                      |
| G. | EL       | EL       | EH       | ID       | EL       | EL                       |
| H. | A        | L        | B        | B        | C        | L                        |
| I. | GNH      | GNH-DSL  | GNH      | GNH      | GNL      | GNH                      |
| J. | 100      | 100      | 3500     | 20       | 50       | 1000                     |
| K. | 100      | 100      | 90       | 100      | 60       | 100                      |
| L. | 1        | 1        | 1        | 1        | 10       | UNK                      |
| M. | N        | Y        | Y        | N        | N        | Y                        |

| N. | Y        | N        | Y        | Y        | Y        | N        |
|----|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| O. | 0        | 0        | 0        | 0        | 0        | 2        |
| P. | 0        | 0        | 0        | 0        | 0        | 0        |
| Q. | 1        | 1        | 0        | 0        | 0        | 0        |
| R. | 0        | 0        | 0        | 0        | 0        | 0        |
| S. | 0        | 0        | 0        | 0        | 0        | 0        |
| T. | 0        | 0        | 0        | 0        | 0        | 0        |
| U. | XT750835 | XT750835 | XT768824 | XT764392 | YT032164 | XT509498 |

4. Aircraft status during this period.

|          | <u>AH-1Gs<br/>ASSIGNED</u> | <u>AH-1Gs<br/>MISSION READY</u> | <u>AH-1Gs<br/>COMMITTED</u> | <u>SORTIES<br/>FLOWN</u> | <u>HOURS<br/>FLOWN</u> |
|----------|----------------------------|---------------------------------|-----------------------------|--------------------------|------------------------|
| 16 April | 34                         | 29                              | 19                          | 59                       | 78                     |
| 17 April | 34                         | 29                              | 19                          | 79                       | 105                    |
| 18 April | 35                         | 29                              | 14                          | 71                       | 101                    |
| 19 April | 34                         | 28                              | 18                          | 59                       | 97                     |
| 20 April | 33                         | 25                              | 18                          | 60                       | 79                     |
| 21 April | 33                         | 26                              | 16                          | 95                       | 57                     |

APPENDIX 3 (Statement of CPT Michael Brown) to Annex K (3d Brigade (Separate), 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile)) to After-Action Report, Binh Long Campaign.

The following is the statement of Captain Michael Brown, pilot of an AH-1G Cobra which was shot down by enemy SA-7 surface-to-air missile in the vicinity of An Loc. This is description of how he received the ground air fire and what he did to successfully negotiate the crash and live to tell about it.

On 21 June 1972, I was working on a mission in support of an ARVN Airborne Brigade in the vicinity of the village of Tan Khai on Highway 13, approximately six miles South of An Loc. We were escorting a U.S. slick unit which was tasked with extracting the ARVN Airborne Brigade from Tan Khai. In support of this we had a heavy fire team, 3 AH-1G Cobras. I was the aircraft commander of CHAUCK 3. Our method of support was to put one ship low with the lift flight and two ships high to provide overall area coverage. CHAUCK 2 and 3 in the heavy fire team were the high birds. I was CHAUCK 3. On my second gun run into the area in which I was attempting to provide suppressive fire, I broke to the right and I made a path Southeast to Northwest breaking right over Highway 13. I was in the process of rejoining CHAUCK 2 to take up his wing position when I was struck by an SA-7 missile. So far as I know no one else has ever survived in a helicopter; anyway, no one else has ever survived this type of anti-aircraft fire. I think there was a combination of things that account for the fact that I'm alive and my pilot is alive, and I don't want to underestimate the importance of luck. I feel that the biggest thing, the most significant thing, the most significant contributor to our good fortune was luck. I do feel however there were some things which we did, that had we not done, the luck we had would not have been able to save us. In describing the impact of the SA-7, first let me back track a little bit. I think probably the single most important thing that happened was the fact that other personnel in the area, other aircraft in the area were able to observe the missile being fired. As they observed it, they yelled missile, missile, missile over the VHF radio. I think the fact that I knew what I was hit by, what the aircraft should do was the single most important contributing factor outside of luck in my Bible. I feel that every unit or every task force that's operating in the area were SA-7s and are known to be should have an SOP on alerting aircraft when a missile is fired. It also has aircraft posted in such positions as to provide or to observe 360° around the flight's possible so that these can be seen. After hearing the word missile, missile, I looked over my left shoulder. I saw the signature of the missile. I saw that it was heading for my aircraft and just as I saw the missile, it hit my aircraft. Probably at the same time it was hitting my aircraft I was rolling off my throttle and bottoming my collective pitch. The impact of the missile on my aircraft did not seem to be that severe. There was concussion, however, it was not as much as one might expect. I would say, judging on the way it felt to me as far as concussion was concerned, there probably is no more HE charge in the warhead of the SA-7 than there is in a 40mm grenade. What happened to the aircraft as it hit is the tailboom was totally severed, completely severed in the vicinity of the battery compartment which on the Cobra is directly below the exhaust deck. The aircraft, as soon as it was hit, jostled slightly. It seemed to pitch up and then pitch down and from side to side. This was followed by doing my auto rotation of the aircraft. It began to spin about its mass to the right and picked up a nose low altitude. As the aircraft descended, it spiraled and made a spiralling descent continuing to spin slowly about its mass. The speed of the spin about the mass which I would say about the same angular velocity about its mass as one would experience in a normal rate pedal turn. I did not look at any of my instruments after being hit. Shortly after being hit, as soon as I was hit, I lost all radio communications. I had no radio communications whatsoever. I did however have intercom with my front seat and using the intercom. I instructed my pilot, CPT Cordon, to attempt to empty his turret weapon system, fire it out. He attempted to do so and was unable to do it. My control moments during the descent were very few. Having been aware for sometime of the possibility that this could happen, I pretty well thought it through if I were ever hit by a SA-7 and my tailboom were severed. It seems to be characteristic of the missile that it does sever the tailboom if it strikes from the side. I felt that the biggest problem that I would have with no tailboom would be the CG shift. That it would be most difficult to prevent the nose from becoming extremely low particularly in a loaded helicopter, and this would be the biggest problem that I would have to cope with. As it worked out, that was exactly the case. I told myself that if this were the case and this was prior to the crash, I told myself that my action would be to pull complete aft cyclic in an attempt to correct for the CG shift. This I did. It did not prevent a nose low attitude. Those who observed my descent said I appeared to descend in a skids level attitude. However, I felt that I was nose low. I attempted to experiment with the cyclic enroute to the ground. I tried slight right and left cyclic movements which did little for me and as far as I'm concerned were a waste of time. I feel that if anybody - whoever has the same misfortune that I had in flight should attempt only to pull complete aft cyclic his concern should be CG as far as cyclic movement is concerned. I bottomed the pitch and I left it that way. I made no attempt whatsoever to control RPM. I made no attempt whatsoever to select a forced landing area. There was no way that I could have controlled the aircraft enough to bring it to a forced landing area and probably if I had selected a forced landing area I probably wouldn't have made it

anyway even if I could have guided the aircraft to it, and I'll explain the reasons for this later on. During the descent RPM apparently build and as it built I felt feed back forces in the cyclic and the collective. The cyclic tried to pull itself forward and I pulled it back and I was able to keep it against the rear stop during the entire descent. The collective attempted to push itself up. I was able to keep it on the bottom during the entire descent until my pitch pull. Also, during the descent a couple of other things that I tried to do after trying to fire out my turret, I saw that I was not able to adjust my CG. I attempted to jettison my wing store - my wing store jettison did not function. I suspected, and having thought about this prior to my accident that it would not, since the wing storm jettison circuit breaker and your electrical power is largely located in the forward portion of the tailboom. So my wing store jettison capability was lost. Having determined this, I attempted to fire out the remainder of my ordnance. I was about 50 percent expended at the time. My ordnance, my rockets, 2.75 inch rockets could not be fired. At these three unsuccessful attempts, the turrets, the wing store jettison, and the rocket fire-all these failings I abandoned any further hope of slowing my rate of decent by getting rid of extra weight or shifting the CG by getting rid of extra weight in the wrong places. As I said before the only control movement that I made cyclic-wire was to pull complete aft cyclic and hold it there and to bottom my collective pitch and held it there. At about 30 feet above the trees was where I pulled my pitch. I pulled pitch at about the same rate that I would in a normal auto rotation except that I pulled every bit of pitch that I had, collective which was full up as I reached the ground. It significantly slowed my decent and also somewhat assisted my center of gravity problems. I wouldn't say that I had recovered the nose low attitude, but I had recovered somewhat. It also began a violent spin. At this point I can't remember if the spin was to the right or to the left. I do know it was violent. I do know that I was stopped by my landing in the trees. The second most significant thing I think that saved me was the fact that I did land in trees. I had no choice over whether I was going to land in trees or in an open area. It was something that fate alone could determine because I said there was no directional control, no selecting of forced landing area. But luck was with me and I did land in trees and trees helped me in two ways. One, they stopped the spin of the aircraft and two, they assisted in cushioning the fall. On impact there was no fire. The engine had continued to run. I had rolled off the throttle to the flight idle position initially, however, I did not make further attempts to shut the engine down. If I had to do it over again, I would probably do that. I would probably attempt to shut the engine down. I would have had time to do so. My concerns were fire and my ordnance exploding; however my impact was soft enough that I do not believe the fuel cells were broken and therefore the fire was not a factor as it had been in other cases where people who had come down as a result of an SA-7 strike. As far as what I did on the ground, I was on the ground for approximately 10 or 15 minutes and I don't believe that what I did on the ground is of that much assistance to any one else. I was surprised to say that I did land in a bunker complex. My front seat and I both made attempts to conceal ourselves until friendly aircraft did arrive over the area. My emergency radio would not operate, therefore, we moved into a clear area and waved until we were spotted by friendly aircraft and at this point we concealed ourselves again to await pick up. Other significant things I think that contributed to the success here were No. 1, I had only 600 pounds of fuel on board the aircraft at the time of the crash and I was 50 percent expended. I had fired all of my outboard parts and I believe a few of my inboard rounds. As far as feelings, I think that psychology is as important as anything else as to how you survive this thing. There was no question having been around the SA-7 environment for approximately the last two months, there was no question in my mind that I was dead on the way down, however, I never gave up. I had enough control over the aircraft to do something for myself. I still had a good rotor. I still had two controls, my out cyclic and my pitch control and in the end, the things I was able to do with these two controls assisted in saving my life. I think probably the most critical point is when you come to about the altitude when you should pull pitch, 30 feet or so. You know in your mind or I knew in my mind that I'd had it. That I was dead from this point on. I would be dead in a very short span of time. However, I did what I thought I should do anyway and fortunately for me, it worked out for the best. I hope that my putting these things on record and putting them in a place where other people operating in the same environment can have access to what I say, I hope that it will save other lives. I feel however that all the elements must be working in one favor as they were with me. I feel that as I said in initially, luck was the biggest factor in saving my life. The aircraft did go to place i.e., the trees where ground conditions assisted in bringing the descent to a favorable conclusion. There is no question in my mind that I had gone to an open area, that the outcome would have been much different. And as I said also whether I would have wanted to or not, I would have had no control over the aircraft. I will not say its impossible to survive this type of a crash by landing in an open area. I feel now that an important thing is that as long as you continue to fly the aircraft no matter what your situation is that you use every available control that you have--every control that you have is an asset and you have some chance. I do feel however that in my case because of the violence of the spin after pitch pull and probably the fairly high rate of descent, I don't believe that we would

have made it out of the aircraft had it not been for the trees. Other things that were beyond my control were situations, factors, or the fact that I was 50 percent expended and the fact that I did have only 600 pounds of fuel. Had I had 100 percent ordnance on board and a 1200 pound load of fuel, the situation probably would have been far different. So again, I conclude I can say that it is my hope that this record will do some good and was the right combination of luck in knowing what to do with the aircraft in the event that this happens to anyone else and that it will result in saving somebody's life.

Z 010205Z APR 72

FM MG HOLLINGSWORTH CG TRAC

TO GEN ABRAMS COMUSMACV

C O N F I D E N T I A L HOA 0507 EYES ONLY

SUBJECT: DAILY COMMANDER'S EVALUATION, 311000H MAR - 011000H APR 72.

1. (C) ENEMY ACTIVITY INCREASED SLIGHTLY DURING THE PERIOD WITH 4 ATTACKS BY FIRE, 3 TERRORIST BOMBINGS, 1 STANDOFF ATTACK AND THE ABDUCTION OF 11 PSDF BEING REPORTED. THERE WERE NO REPORTED MAJOR ENEMY RELOCATIONS OR NEW UNITS IDENTIFIED DURING THE PERIOD. ENEMY ACTIVITY MAY BE EXPECTED TO INCREASE DURING THE PERIOD. CURRENT REPORTS STATE THAT FIREBASES IN TAY NINH PROVINCE ALONG QL 22 BEGAN TAKING FIRE AT 0530 THIS MORNING.

2. A (C) AT 0040 HOURS, 2 KM NE OF LONG THANH, THE 755 RF PLATOON WAS ATTACKED, WITH 1 RF KILLED, 1 WOUNDED, AND 2 RF, 4 PSDF AND ONE NATIONAL POLICEMAN MISSING. AT APPROXIMATELY 0530, SIMULTANEOUS ATTACKS BY FIRE WERE DIRECTED AGAINST TRAI BI, THIEN NGON AND LAC LONG. THE ATTACKS CONSISTED OF 30, 20, AND 100 RDS OF MIXED 82MM MORTAR AND 107MM ROCKETS RESPECTIVELY. THERE HAVE BEEN NO CASUALTIES REPORTED, AND ONE M113 RECEIVED LIGHT DAMAGE. THE ATTACKS BY FIRE CEASED AT 0810 HOURS. ALL WAS REPORTED QUIET AT ALL FSB'S ALONG QL 22.

B. (C) AT 0700 HRS, NAT'L POLICE TRAINING CENTER AND THE NAVY PIER AT VUNG TAU REC'D 4-7 122MM ROCKETS. 1 US AND 1 CIV WERE REPORTEDLY WOUNDED AND ONE CIV KILLED. DAMAGE WAS REPORTED AS LIGHT.

3. (C) FRIENDLY SITUATION:

A. DISPOSITION OF FORCES: THE 4TH RANGER GROUP AND THE 6TH ACR RETURNED TO IV CORPS CONTROL AS OF 010800H THIS MORNING.

B. FRIENDLY ACTIVITY: NO SIGNIFICANT CONTACT WAS REPORTED BY III CORPS DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD.

C. FUTURE PLANS: BECAUSE OF REPORTED MOVEMENT OF ENEMY UNITS ALONG AND INTO THE MR 3 BORDER AREA IN TAY NINH PROVINCE, GEN MINH HAS POSTPONED THE BA 354 OPERATION AND HAS PLACED MR 3 ON RED ALERT. AS A PRECAUTIONARY MEASURE, I HAVE PLACED US INSTALLATIONS ON GREY ALERT DURING DAYLIGHT HOURS AND ON YELLOW ALERT, LAST NIGHT. HOWEVER, IF NOTHING FURTHER DEVELOPS, WE WILL REMAIN ON GREY ALERT TONIGHT AND UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE.

Z 020310Z APR 72

FM MG HOLLINGSWORTH CG TRAC LBN RVN  
TO GEN ABRAMS COMUSMACV SGN RVN  
C O N F I D E N T I A L HOA 0514 EYES ONLY

SUBJECT: DAILY COMMANDER'S EVALUATION 011000H-021000H APR 72

1. (C) ENEMY ACTIVITY

A. ENEMY ACTIVITY WITHIN MR III CONTINUED AT AN INCREASED LEVEL DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD. THERE WERE NO MAJOR ENEMY RELOCATIONS OR NEW UNITS REPORTED. EIGHTY-FIVE PERCENT OF ENEMY INITIATED INCIDENTS HAVE OCCURRED IN BA RIA SR AND ALONG QL 22 IN NORTHERN WZ "C", WITH ONLY SPORADIC INCIDENTS REPORTED IN THE REMAINDER OF THE MR. ENEMY ACTIVITY IS EXPECTED TO SUBSIDE DURING THE NEXT 24 HOURS, WITH SPORADIC ABF AND LIMITED GROUND PROBES EXPECTED IN NORTHERN WZ "C". THE SITUATION AT FSB LOC LONG APPEARS SERIOUS. AS OF 0500 HOURS, 02 APR, III CORPS REPORTED THAT ARVN HAD ABANDONED THE BASE, AND HAD TAKEN 50 KIA AND 46 WIA (KIA REPORTS ARE BELIEVED TO BE ON THE HIGH SIDE). AS OF THIS REPORTING PERIOD, SPECIFIC DETAILS OF THE ATTACK ARE NOT AVAILABLE; HOWEVER, III CORPS REPORTED FSB LOC LONG WAS ATTACKED BY AT LEAST A REGT'L SIZED ENEMY UNIT, SUPPORTED BY INDIRECT FIRE AND ARMORED VEHICLES (NFI).

B. AT 1230 HOURS, 01 APR 72, AN OH-6A FROM D/229, 3/1 CAV CRASHED AND BURNED FROM GAF 2 KM SOUTH OF THIEN NGON BC (XT 088791), RESULTING IN 3 US KIA. AIRCRAFT HAS BEEN SECURED AND TWO BODIES HAVE BEEN RECOVERED BY FRIENDLY ELEMENTS. AT 0945 HOURS, 01 APR 72, 22 KM NE OF TAN UYEN (YT 1936) Rngr TM 73 ENGAGED 2 ENEMY, RESULTING IN 1 US SLIGHTLY WIA AND 1 VC KIA.

2. (C) FRIENDLY SITUATION

A. DISPOSITION OF FORCES: DUE TO INCREASED ENEMY ACTIVITY IN MR 3, TASK FORCE CUU LONG WILL REMAIN UNDER OPCON III CORPS UNTIL 4 APRIL. THE 6TH RGR GP COMPLETED ITS MOVE FROM TONLE CHAM TO SUOI DA VIC XT 3458. AS DIRECTED BY COMUSMACV, F-4 AIR CAV TRP AND TWO CH-47 HELICOPTERS ARE DEPLOYING TO MR-1 WHERE THEY WILL BE PLACED UNDER OPCON OF FRAC. UNITS DEPARTED HOME STATION AT 020730H APR WITH AN EXPECTED TEN HOURS TRAVEL TIME.

B. FRIENDLY ACTIVITY: IN THE 25TH DIVISION AREA OF OPERATIONS, TASK FORCE CUU LONG (44TH RGR BN AND 3/6 CAV) WHILE ON SEARCH AND ROAD CLEARING OPERATIONS VIC XT 1079 (3KM SOUTH OF THIEN NGON) KILLED 18 ENEMY AND CAPTURED 1 B-40, 1 B-41, 1 CHILOM RADIO, AND 1 AK-47. 11 ARVN WERE WIA. ELEMENTS OF THE 3/49TH INF WHILE ON SEARCH OPERATIONS DURING THE EARLY AFTERNOON ENGAGED AN UNKNOWN SIZE ENEMY ELEMENT KILLING 5 ENEMY AND CAPTURING 2 AK-47'S. FRIENDLY LOSSES WERE 5 WIA. IN THE

92D RGR BN AREA OF OPERATIONS (VIC TONLE CHAM), ONE COMPANY OF THE RGRS ENGAGED AN ESTIMATED VC  
PLT VIC XT 5979 KILLING 8 ENEMY AND CAPTURING 5 AK-47'S WITH NO FRIENDLY LOSSES REPORTED.

C. FUTURE PLANS: THE 25TH DIV HAS A RELIEF FORCE ENROUTE NORTH ALONG HWY 22 TOWARDS FSB LOC  
LONG AT THIS TIME. THE FORCE CONSISTS OF 2/49 INF BN, 49TH RECON CO AND TASK FORCE CUU LONG (32D,  
43D, AND 44TH RGR BNS). MISSION OF THIS FORCE IS STILL UNCLEAR BUT PROBABLY IS TO LINK UP WITH  
FRIENDLY ELEMENTS REMAINING IN VIC OF LOC LONG AND POSSIBLY TO REOCCUPY THE FSB.

D. LATE REPORT (021030H APR). IT IS REPORTED THAT 2 OR 3 ENEMY ARMORED VEHICLES HAVE BEEN  
DESTROYED IN THE LAC LONG AREA.

Z 030235Z APR 72

FM MG HOLLINGSWORTH CG TRAC LBN RVN  
TO GEN ABRAMS COMUSMACV SGN RVN  
C O N F I D E N T I A L HOA 0519 EYES ONLY

SUBJECT: DAILY COMMANDER'S EVALUATION 021000H-031000H APR 72

1. (C) ENEMY ACTIVITY:

A. ENEMY INITIATED ACTIVITY IN MR III SUBSIDED DURING THE 24 HOUR PERIOD, WITH 14 ENEMY INITIATED INCIDENTS REPORTED (3 GAF, 1 DIRECT FIRE, 7 ABF, 2 BBT, 1 TERRORIST). IN ENEMY UNIT IDENTIFICATIONS, A PW CAPTURED 7 KM EAST OF LAI KHE BC (XT 845366) CLAIMED TO BE A MEMBER OF A RECON PLATOON, 1 CO, 6 REGT, "R" (COSVN). ENEMY ACTIVITY IS EXPECTED TO REMAIN AT A LOW LEVEL DURING THE NEXT 24 HOURS.

B. DURING THE ATTACK ON LAC LONG ON 2 APR 72, 2 M41 TANKS WERE DESTROYED OUTSIDE THE BC PERIMETER. ACCORDING TO III CORPS, THE TANKS WERE LOST BY ARVN FORCES DURING THE BATTLE OF SNOUL.

C. AN UPDATE ON THE OH-6A WHICH WAS SHOT DOWN 2 KM SOUTH OF THIEN NGON ON 1 APRIL REVEALS THAT THERE WERE ONLY TWO CREW MEMBERS IN THE AIRCRAFT RATHER THAN 3 AS PREVIOUSLY REPORTED. BOTH BODIES WERE RECOVERED YESTERDAY.

2. (C) FRIENDLY SITUATION:

A. DISPOSITION OF FORCES: NO CHANGE

B. FRIENDLY ACTIVITY: IN THE 25TH DIVISION AREA OF OPERATIONS IN TAY NINH PROVINCE, NO SIGNIFICANT CONTACTS WERE REPORTED. TWO SIGNIFICANT CONTACTS WERE REPORTED IN BINH DUONG PROVINCE. ONE COMPANY OF THE 41ST RF GROUP AT 021100H APR, WHILE ON SEARCH OPERATIONS VIC XT 5735 (2 KM N OF BEN SUC) ENGAGED AN ESTIMATED ENEMY COMPANY SUFFERING 01 KIA, 08 WIA, AND 16 MIA. 21 M-16'S, 03 M-79'S, 03 45 CAL PISTOLS, AND 01 PRC-25 WERE REPORTED MISSING. IN A DELAYED REPORT VIC XT 8436 (7 KM E OF LAI KHE) AT 1940 HRS ON 01 APRIL THE 4/306 RF BN KILLED 05 VC AND CAPTURED 04 INDIVIDUAL WEAPONS. FRIENDLY LOSSES WERE 02 WIA. IN THE EASTERN MILITARY REGION, THE 415TH RF CO AND THE 40TH PF PLT ON SEARCH OPERATIONS AT 021130 APR, VIC YT 5710 (10 KM E XUAN LOC) MADE CONTACT WITH AN ESTIMATED VC COMPANY RESULTING IN 06 PF KIA AND 02 RF WIA. ENEMY LOSSES WERE UNKNOWN. IN DELAYED REPORTS THE 415TH RF CO WHILE ON SEARCH OPERATIONS DURING THE AFTERNOON OF 01 APRIL ENGAGED AN ESTIMATED 02 ENEMY PLATOON VIC YT 5708 (10 KM E XUAN LOC) RESULTING IN 06 RF KIA, 02 MIA, 02 M-16'S AND 01 PRC-25 WERE REPORTED MIA. ENEMY LOSSES WERE UNKNOWN. IN ANOTHER DELAYED REPORT, THE 36TH PF PLT VIC YT 4302 (6 KM SW OF XUAN LOC) WHILE ON AMBUSH PATROL KILLED 05 VC AND CAPTURED 01 AK-47. NEGATIVE FRIENDLY CASUALTIES WERE REPORTED.

C. FUTURE PLANS: IT IS REPORTED THAT GEN MINH INTENDS TO REOCCUPY FSB LOC LONG TODAY. HOWEVER, NO SPECIFIC DETAILS CONCERNING TODAY'S OPERATIONS ARE AVAILABLE AT THIS TIME.

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Z 040215Z APR 72

FM MG HOLLINGSWORTH CG TRAC LBN RVN  
TO GEN ABRAMS COMUSMACV SGN RVN  
C O N F I D E N T I A L HOA 0529 EYES ONLY

SUBJECT: DAILY COMMANDER'S EVALUATION 031000H-041000H APR 72.

1. (C) ENEMY ACTIVITY

A. ENEMY ACTIVITY IN MR III REMAINED AT A LOW LEVEL DURING THE 24 HOUR PERIOD, WITH 8 ENEMY INITIATED INCIDENTS REPORTED (1 DIR ATK, 1 GND ATK, 2 ABF, 3 BBT, 1 TERRORIST). THERE WERE NO SIGNIFICANT ENEMY UNIT RELOCATIONS DURING THIS PERIOD. ON 031300H APR 1/2 KM WEST OF THIEN NGON (XT 080820) THE 44TH RNGR BN MADE CONTACT WITH AN UNKNOWN SIZE ENEMY FORCE RESULTING IN NEG FRDLY CAS, WHILE 1 ENEMY WAS KIA AND 1 CIA. INITIAL INTERROGATION OF PW IDENTIFIED HIM AS A MEMBER OF THE 7 NVA DIV.

B. ON 031330H APR 72, 3 KM SOUTH OF XA MAT (XT 072860) OP 32, OCCUPIED BY THE 49TH RECON COMPANY, REC'D FIRE FROM THE JUNGLE SURROUNDING THE POSITION. THE OP WAS EVACUATED AT 1350H. THE 2/49 AND 3/49 ASSISTED THE WITHDRAWAL AND ENGAGED AN UNKNOWN SIZE ENEMY FORCE, SUPPORTED BY ARVN ARTY AND VNAF TAC AIR. THE 49TH REGT, MOVING TO RECOVER THE OP LATER IN THE AFTERNOON, HAD ELEMENTS WITHIN 300 METERS OF THE OP BY NIGHT FALL. RESULTS TO DATE ARE ARVN KIA: 1; WIA: 28, WHILE ENEMY CASUALTIES ARE UNKNOWN.

2. (C) FRIENDLY SITUATION

A. DISPOSITION OF FORCES: NO CHANGE

B. FRIENDLY ACTIVITY: IN THE 25TH DIVISION AREA OF OPERATIONS, A TASK FORCE COMPOSED OF TWO BATTALIONS OF INFANTRY, FROM THE 49TH REGT, THE 32ND RANGER BN, AND THE 2/10 CAV BEGAN MOVING NORTH TO REOCCUPY FSB LOC LONG ABANDONED ON 02 APRIL. ALTHOUGH THE TASK FORCE REPORTED HEAVY RESISTANCE TO THEIR MOVEMENT, CASUALTY FIGURES DO NOT YET SUBSTANTIATE THE REPORT. BY LATE AFTERNOON THEY WERE LOCATED SOME 2.5 KM SOUTH OF THE FIRE BASE, VIC XT 0886. IN THE 5TH DIVISION AREA OF OPERATIONS, ONE COMPANY OF THE 3/7 INFANTRY BN AT 0730H ENGAGED AN ENEMY SQUAD VIC XT 6991 (8 KM W OF AN LOC) KILLING 05 VC AND CAPTURING 02 AK-47'S AND 01 M-79.

C. FUTURE PLANS: IN CONJUNCTION WITH A CHANGE IN COMMAND CEREMONY AT XUAN LOC THIS MORNING, GEN MINH PLANS TO HAVE A MEETING WITH HIS DIVISION COMMANDERS. DETAILS OF THIS MEETING ARE UNKNOWN AT THIS TIME, BUT WILL PROBABLY INVOLVE FUTURE OPERATIONS.

Z 050220Z APR 72

FM MG HOLLINGSWORTH CG TRAC LBN RVN

TO GEN ABRAMS COMUSMACV SGN RVN

C O N F I D E N T I A L HOA 0534 EYES ONLY

SUBJECT: DAILY COMMANDER'S EVALUATION, 041000H-051000H APR 72

1. (C) ENEMY ACTIVITY

A. ENEMY ACTIVITY IN MR III HAS INCREASED SINCE EARLY MORNING HOURS, 1 DIR FIRE, 2 GAF, 7 ABF, 6 BBT, AND 2 TERRORIST INCIDENTS WERE REPORTED. FROM 0100-0340 HOURS, 5 APR, LAI KHE BC RECEIVED 50 60MM MORTAR ROUNDS AND AN UNKNOWN NUMBER B-40 ROUNDS, RESULTING IN 8 ARVN KIA AND 17 ARVN WIA.

B. SKETCHY REPORTS FROM BINH LONG (P) AND 5TH ARVN DIV INDICATE THAT QL 13 MAY BE CUT BETWEEN CHON THANH AND AN LOC AND AN LOC AND LOC NINH. THERE IS AN UNCONFIRMED REPORT THAT QUAN LOI WAS LOST TO A GROUND ATTACK AT ABOUT 0930 THIS AM (THIS COULD BE CRITICAL SINCE IT IS A HELICOPTER REFUEL AND REARM BASE) AT ANY RATE ALLIED INSTALLATIONS AT LOC NINH, AN LOC, QUAN LOI AND CHON THANH ARE UNDER ENEMY ATTACK. THERE ARE NO REPORTS OF CASUALTIES. ENEMY UNITS IN CONTACT-THOUGH NOT CONFIRMED BY ANY SOURCE-ARE LIKELY ELEMENTS OF THE 5 VC DIV.

2. (C) FRIENDLY SITUATION:

A. DISPOSITION OF FORCES: THE 4TH RANGER GROUP COMPOSED OF THE 32ND, 43RD, AND 44TH RANGER BNS WERE RELEASED TO IV CORPS. THE 5TH RANGER GROUP INCLUDING THE 30TH, 33RD, AND 38TH RANGER BNS; AND THE 6TH RANGER GROUP COMPOSED OF THE 34TH, 35TH, AND 51ST RANGER BN; WERE RELEASED FROM III CORPS CONTROL AND BEGAN MOVEMENT TO I CORPS BY C130 FROM TAY NINH.

B. FRIENDLY ACTIVITY: IN THE 25TH DIVISION AREA OF OPERATIONS, GROUND TO AIR FIRE WAS REPORTED IN THE AREA OF FSB LOC LONG VIC XT 0787. 12 SORTIES OF USAF TAC AIR AS WELL AS HELICOPTER GUN-SHIPS WERE DIRECTED AGAINST THE SUSPECTED FIRING SITES. FRIENDLY ELEMENTS ADVANCING TOWARD LAC LONG HAVE RETURNED TO FSB THIEN NGON (VIC XT 0881). CONTACT WAS REPORTED DURING THE LATE AFTERNOON VIC XT 1394 (13 KM NE OF THIEN NGON) BY THE 31ST RANGER BN WHO KILLED 15 ENEMY WHILE SUFFERING 01 WIA. AT 1400H THE INTEL PLATOON FROM THE 2/50 INFANTRY VIC XT 3686 FOUND AN ENEMY GRAVESITE WITH 20 ENEMY BODIES. THE ENEMY HAD BEEN KILLED APPROXIMATELY TWO DAYS PREVIOUSLY. IN THE 5TH DIVISION AREA OF OPERATIONS, THE 3/43 INFANTRY AT 0900 ON 04 APRIL WHILE ON SEARCH OPERATION ~~KILLED~~ 04 VC AND CAPTURED 56 B-40 ROUNDS. FRIENDLY LOSSES WERE 2 KILLED AND 3 WIA.

C. FUTURE PLANS: THE LOSS OF THE RANGER GROUPS TO I CORPS WILL UNDOUBTEDLY RESULT IN A

CHANGE IN PLANS FOR III CORPS. HOWEVER, NO SPECIFIC DETAILS ARE AVAILABLE AT THIS TIME CONCERNING ANY REORGANIZATION OR CHANGE OF PLANS.

CITE: ARV 0743

DTG : 060207Z APR 72

FROM: MG HOLLINGSWORTH CG TRAC LBN RVN

TO : GEN ABRAMS COMUSMACV SGN RVN

C O N F I D E N T I A L

S U B J E C T : DAILY COMMANDER'S EVALUATION 051000H - 061000H APR 72.

1. (C) ENEMY ACTIVITY:

A. ENEMY ACTIVITY IN MR III REMAINED AT A HIGH LEVEL DURING THE 24 HOUR PERIOD, WITH 34 ENEMY INITIATED INCIDENTS REPORTED (1 DIR FIRE, 5 GND ATKS, 28 ABF). THERE WERE NO SIGNIFICANT UNIT IDENTIFICATIONS OR RELOCATIONS DURING THIS PERIOD. ENEMY ACTIVITY IS EXPECTED TO REMAIN AT THIS HIGH LEVEL DURING THE NEXT 24 HOURS.

B. DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD, THERE WERE 2 ENEMY INITIATED INCIDENTS INVOLVING US PERSONNEL, RESULTING IN 5 US WIA AND 2 MIA. ON 050152H APR, 3 KM SOUTH OF LOC NINH (XU 747056), A COBRA GUNSHIP WAS SHOT DOWN BY GAF. THE TWO CREWMEN ARE LISTED AS MIA AND THE G/S IS A COMBAT LOSS. ON 051115H APR, A CO, 1/12 CAV DETONATED A BBT WHILE DEPLOYING DURING A COMBAT ASSAULT (YT 126252) 4 KM NW OF BEAR CAT. 5 US WERE WOUNDED.

C. ALTHOUGH ARVN REPORTS ARE SLOW AND RELATIVELY INACCURATE, THESE ARE MY OBSERVATIONS OF THE BATTLE OF LOC NINH. AT ABOUT 0530 HOURS ON 5 APR, LOC NINH WAS BROUGHT UNDER HEAVY ATTACK BY WHAT I ESTIMATE TO BE A REINFORCED REGIMENT (PROBABLY FROM THE 5 VC DIV). THERE WERE A SERIES OF GROUND ATTACKS WHICH, AT TIMES, PUT THE ENEMY IN AND NEAR THE WIRE. THROUGHOUT THE DAY, THE ENEMY POUNDED THE AREA WITH HEAVY FIRES (60/82 MORTARS AND 107 ROCKETS. THERE WERE ALSO UNCONFIRMED REPORTS OF 105 HOW AND 76MM TANK GUN FIRES). GROUND TO AIR FIRES PREVAILED THROUGHOUT THE PERIOD - MOSTLY SMALL ARMS BUT SOME .51 CAL. THE ENEMY WAS PRESSING FROM THE WEST, SOUTHWEST AND, LATER IN THE DAY, REPORTEDLY FROM THE NORTH. THERE CAN BE NO QUESTION THAT LOC NINH WOULD HAVE FALLEN IN THE HANDS OF THE ENEMY EARLY IN THE DAY HAD IT NOT BEEN FOR THE MAGNIFICENT SUPPORT OF THE 7TH AF AND THE BRILLIANT FIRE DIRECTION EFFORTS OF A YOUNG ARMY CAPTAIN SMITH. AS IT NOW STANDS, LOC NINH REMAINS IN FRIENDLY HANDS, AND THE ENEMY THRUST HAS BEEN BLUNTED. IT REMAINS FOR ARVN TO BEGIN THE MANEUVER TO DRIVE HIM OUT OF THE PROVINCE. ASIDE FROM THE COBRA CREW OF TWO, THERE HAVE BEEN NO REPORTS OF CASUALTIES AT LOC NINH. THIS IS DUE TO THE PAUCITY OF THE REPORTING SYSTEM, SINCE I FEEL THAT OTHER CASUALTIES HAVE OCCURRED.

2. (C) FRIENDLY SITUATION:

A. DISPOSITION OF FORCES: NO CHANGE.

B. FRIENDLY ACTIVITY: IN THE III CORPS AREA OF OPERATION FRIENDLY ELEMENTS CONTINUED TO REACT TO ENEMY ATTACKS, PRIMARILY WITH US AIR FORCE GUNSHIP, TAC AIR, AND HELICOPTER GUNSHIP SUPPORT. AS OF THIS HOUR ALL MAJOR AREAS REMAIN UNDER FRIENDLY CONTROL WITH PRESSURE ON LOC NINH STILL REMAINING CRITICAL. ALTHOUGH QUAN LOI WAS SUBJECTED TO ABF AND GROUND PROBES YESTERDAY, THE HELICOPTER REFUEL AND REARM POINT REMAINS UNDER ARVN CONTROL. IN THE 5TH DIVISION AREA OF OPERATIONS NUMEROUS SIGNIFICANT CONTACTS WERE REPORTED. AT 0645 YESTERDAY THE 5TH DIVISION RECON COMPANY REPORTED ENGAGING AN ESTIMATED COMPANY VIC XT 7851 (12 KM N LAI KHE) KILLING 21 ENEMY AND CAPTURING 01 AK47 WHILE FRIENDLY LOSSES WERE 2 KILLED, 06 WIA AND 03 WEAPONS MIA INCLUDING 01 M-60 MG. DURING THE AFTERNOON ELEMENTS OF THE 52ND REGIMENT SWEPT THE AREA IMMEDIATELY TO THEIR FRONT VIC XT 6399 (12 KM SW LOC NINH) WHERE HEAVY CONTACT HAD BEEN REPORTED WITH AN UNKNOWN SIZE FORCE FINDING 12 VC KIA AND 2 AK47 CIA. AT 1345 HOURS ELEMENTS OF THE 986 AND 987 RF COMPANY ON SEARCH OPERATION ENGAGED AN ENEMY FORCE VIC XT 7668 (20 KM S AN LOC) KILLING 07 ENEMY AND CAPTURING 01 AA MG AND 02 MGS. AT 1420 HOURS VIC XT 5843 (20 KM W LAI KHE) THE 3/43 INFANTRY WHILE ON SEARCH OPERATIONS FOUND 25 ENEMY BODIES AND CAPTURED 03 B-40 RL'S FRIENDLY FORCES ALSO REPORTED DESTROYING 01 ENEMY TANK BY ARTILLERY DIRECT FIRE WHILE VNAF REPORTED DESTROYING 01 ENEMY 105MM HOW VIC XU 655035. NO SIGNIFICANT FRIENDLY CONTACTS IN THE 25TH DIVISION AREA OF OPERATIONS WERE REPORTED. THE 4TH, 5TH AND 6TH RGR GPS CLEARED MR3 YESTERDAY.

C. FUTURE PLANS: LAST NIGHT I DISCUSSED PLANS FOR TODAY WITH GEN MINH. HE PLANS TO AIR LIFT THE 3D RANGER GROUP WITH THE 31, 36 AND 52 BNS TO AN LOC. IN ADDITION, HE PLANS TO MOVE THE 3D ACB WITH THE 18TH ACR, 2-8 INF AND 1 CAV TRP TO CHON THANH, CLEARING THE ROAD, THEN RETURNING TO THE SOUTH OF LAI KHE. AS THESE MOVES TAKE PLACE, THE PLAN IS TO CONSTITUTE A RESERVE WITH ELEMENTS OF THE 50TH REGT AND POSSIBLY TWO BORDER RGR BNS AND POSITION THEM IN THE VIC OF TAY NINH.

CITE: ARV 0753

DTG : 070315Z APR 72

FROM: MG HOLLINGSWORTH CG TRAC LBN RVN

TO : GEN ABRAMS COMUSMACV SGN RVN

C O N F I D E N T I A L

SUBJECT: DAILY COMMANDER'S EVALUATION 061000H - 071000H APR 72.

1. (C) ENEMY ACTIVITY:

A. ENEMY ACTIVITY IN BINH LONG (P) REMAINED AT A HIGH LEVEL, WHILE ONLY SPORADIC ENEMY INITIATED INCIDENTS WERE REPORTED IN THE REMAINDER OF MR 3. A TOTAL OF 26 ENEMY INITIATED INCIDENTS WERE REPORTED, THE MAJORITY IN BINH LONG (P), COMPARED TO 34 DURING THE PREVIOUS PERIOD. THERE WERE NO SIGNIFICANT UNIT IDENTIFICATIONS OR RELOCATIONS REPORTED. ENEMY ACTIVITY IS EXPECTED TO REMAIN AT A HIGH LEVEL IN BINH LONG (P) AND POSSIBLY IN NORTHERN BINH DUONG (P) ALONG QL 13. ENEMY ACTIVITY IN THE REMAINDER OF MR 3 IS EXPECTED TO BE AT A MODERATE LEVEL DURING THE NEXT 24 HOURS, PRIMARILY IN THE FORM OF ABF AND POSSIBLE SAPPER/RECON PROBES.

B. DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD, THERE WERE NO ENEMY INITIATED INCIDENTS INVOLVING US PERSONNEL.

C. THE ENEMY CONTINUED TO MAINTAIN PRESSURE ON LOC NINH THROUGHOUT THE DAY. DISTRICT AND 9 INF REGT COMPOUND WERE UNDER ATTACK ALL DAY. AGGRESSIVE TACTICAL ATR EMPLOYMENT BLUNTED AND KEPT ENEMY FROM OVERRUNNING BOTH COMPOUNDS. SHORTLY AFTER NOON, IT BECAME APPARENT THAT THE ENEMY HAD REINFORCED SOUTHEAST OF THE CITY. MAJOR GROUND ATTACKS WERE LAUNCHED DURING THE AFTERNOON - AGAIN, THEY WERE SUCCESSFULLY BEATEN OFF. DURING ONE OF THE AFTERNOON ASSAULTS, ENEMY ATTEMPTING TO CROSS THE RUNWAY FROM THE EAST AND WEST AND WERE REPELLED WITH WELL PLACED CBU STRIKES. IN ANOTHER ASSAULT, THE ENEMY IN THE WIRE ON THE EAST SIDE OF THE REGT'L CP COMPOUND WERE SLAUGHTERED BY GUN SHIPS AS THEY ATTEMPTED TO COME THROUGH THE DEFENSES. I ESTIMATE THAT THE BETTER PART OF THE REGIMENT OPERATING SOUTH WEST AND WEST OF LOC NINH HAS BEEN BLOWN AWAY BY TAC AIR STRIKES. THE SITUATION CALMED AND STABILIZED BY NIGHTFALL. EARLY THIS MORNING, THE ENEMY BEGAN TO CLOSE IN. ENEMY TANKS WERE HEARD AT THE SOUTHERN END OF THE RUNWAY AND SHORTLY THEREAFTER INFANTRY WAS IN THE WIRE. JUST PRIOR TO THE INITIAL ASSAULT AT ABOUT 0530, TANKS BEGAN TO APPROACH FROM THE NORTHWEST AND SOUTHEAST. IT APPEARS THAT THE FORCES AT LOC NINH FOUGHT VALIANTLY, BUT THE CAMP APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN OVERRUN AT ABOUT 0745. AFTER TANKS IN GROUPS OF 7 & 8 WERE BEATEN BACK ON 5 OCCASIONS. I HAVE OBSERVED FIVE TO SIX DESTROYED TANK HULLS IN THE IMMEDIATE VICINITY. SOME FIGHTING CONTINUES. I HAVE NO ESTIMATE OF THE EXTENT OF FRIENDLY CASUALTIES WITHIN THE LOC NINH

COMPLEX. I FEEL THEY MUST BE HEAVY. THOSE ON THE GROUND AT LOC NINH FOUGHT GALLANTLY AGAINST INSURMOUNTABLE ODDS TO INCLUDE 25-30 TANKS. DAUNTLESS AND REMARKABLE COURAGE KEPT THEM GOING. AGAIN, WITHOUT TACTICAL AIR FROM OUR 7TH AF AND THE TRULY GREAT EFFORT OF CAPTAIN "ZIPPO" SMITH, WHO WAS APPARENTLY OVERRUN AT 0755 WHILE IN RADIO CONTACT WITH ME, THIS WOULD NEVER HAVE BEEN A BATTLE. AT THIS HOUR - 1030 - WE ARE STILL IN CONTACT WITH ZIPPO WHISKEY (ADVISOR TO 9TH INF REGT) AND SAMBA 66 THE ADVISOR TO LOC NINH DISTRICT. AS THE PICTURE BECOMES CLEARER, I WILL BRING YOU UP TO DATE.

2. (C) FRIENDLY SITUATION

A. DISPOSITION OF FORCES: 3D RNGR GP WITH THE 31, 36 AND 52 BNS IS UNDER THE OPCON OF 5 DIV AND THE HQ CLOSED AN LOC AT 061520 APR. THE 18TH ACR IS ALSO UNDER THE OPCON OF THE 5 DIV AND IS LOCATED AT PHU LOI (XT5515). THE 15 ACR HAS BEEN PLACED OPCON TO THE 25 INF DIV AND IS LOCATED AT TRANG SUP (XT1555). THE 2-8 INF IS AT LAI KHE (XT7737).

B. FRIENDLY ACTIVITY: FRIENDLY OPERATIONS CONTINUED TO CENTER AROUND LOC NINH AND TO THE EAST AND WEST OF HWY 13. AS REPORTED ABOVE WE LOST LOC NINH THIS MORNING. I ESTIMATE THAT ALONG WITH THE HQ OF THE 9 INF REGT THE ARVN HAVE LOST 2 REINFORCED BN AND 1 ARMD CAV TROOP AND A DIST HQ IN THIS BATTLE. DETAILS OF LOSS OF COMBAT CAPABILITY WILL BE FORWARDED AS SOON AS KNOWN.

C. FUTURE PLANS: ALTHOUGH GEN MINH PLANS TO EXTRACT THE FORCES OCCUPYING BINH MINH (XT0278), TODAY HE HAS NOT REVEALED ANY PLANS TO MOVE NORTH ON HWY 13. AT THE MOMENT HE PLANS TO HOLD AT AN LOC. HE EXPECTS TO BE GIVEN THE AIRBORNE BRIGADE NOW IN SAIGON TOMORROW AND WILL MOVE IT TO LAI KHE. AS PLANS FIRM UP TODAY I WILL KEEP YOU INFORMED.

CITE: ARV 0763

DTG : 080230Z APR 72

FROM: MG HOLLINGSWORTH CG TRAC LBN RVN

TO : GEN ABRAMS COMUSMACV SGN RVN

C O N F I D E N T I A L

SUBJECT: DAILY COMMANDER'S EVALUATION 071000H - 081000H APR 72.

1. (c) ENEMY ACTIVITY:

A. ENEMY ACTIVITY IN BINH LONG (P) DECREASED SLIGHTLY DURING THE PERIOD WHILE SPORADIC ENEMY ACTIVITY WAS STILL REPORTED THROUGHOUT MR III. THERE WERE 38 ENEMY INITIATED INCIDENTS REPORTED DURING THE 24 HOUR PERIOD. THERE WERE NO SIGNIFICANT UNIT IDENTIFICATIONS OR RELOCATIONS REPORTED. ENEMY ACTIVITY IS EXPECTED TO REMAIN AT A HIGH LEVEL IN BINH LONG (P), WHILE ENEMY ACTIVITY THROUGHOUT THE REMAINDER OF MR III IS EXPECTED TO REMAIN AT A MODERATE LEVEL.

B. THERE WERE TWO INCIDENTS REPORTED INVOLVING US PERSONNEL, RESULTING IN 1 US KIA AND 2 US WIA. AT 1920H, 10 KM NE OF AN LOC (XT 718978), DUST-OFF 107 RECEIVED GAF WHILE ATTEMPTING TO EXTRACT 2 - 3 US WIA AT THE 52 INF CP. THE WIA WERE NOT PICKED UP AND 1 US WAS KILLED, WHILE 1 UH-1H WAS SLIGHTLY DAMAGED. ADDITIONALLY, THE 5TH DCAT REPORTED AT 2005H THAT THE 52 REGT WAS APPARENTLY IN BAD SHAPE. 3 US ADVISORS AT THE REGT WERE TO STAY WITH REGT'L ELEMENTS DURING THE NIGHT. 2 OF THE ADVISORS WERE WIA.

C. THE ENEMY HAS HELD ESSENTIALLY ALL OF LOC NINH SINCE 0745H YESTERDAY. THEY BITTERLY RESISTED AND REPELLED ALL FRIENDLY EFFORTS TO EVACUATE US SURVIVORS FROM ISOLATED BUNKERS IN THE BASE COMPLEX. HE CONTINUED SPORADIC TANK ATTACKS, MORTAR AND ROCKET FIRES AND GROUND ASSAULTS ON THESE POSITIONS. HE HAS THE AREA PRETTY WELL RINGED WITH ANTI-AIRCRAFT MACHINE GUN POSITIONS - THEIR FIRES HAVE BEEN EFFECTIVE. IT APPEARS THAT THERE MAY HAVE BEEN ELEMENTS OF TWO REGIMENTS INVOLVED IN THE LOC NINH AREA - NONE, HOWEVER, HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED TO DATE. IT WOULD ALSO APPEAR THAT THE ENEMY ELEMENT THAT FORCED THE EVACUATION OF QUAN LOI HAS NOW MOVED WEST AND MAY HAVE BEEN INVOLVED IN THE AMBUSH OF THE 52 REGIMENT MOVING SOUTH ON QL 13 TOWARD AN LOC. THAT WOULD PUT ELEMENTS OF THREE REGIMENTS IN NORTHERN BINH LONG PROVINCE. THE ENEMY CAN BE EXPECTED TO CONTINUE SOUTH. THE CITY OF AN LOC STANDS AS HIS NEXT LOGICAL TARGET.

D. IN TAY NINH PROVINCE ENEMY ACTIVITY WAS RELATIVELY LIGHT YESTERDAY. EARLY THIS MORNING, HOWEVER, AN ENEMY FORCE (PROBABLY THE 13 SAPPER BN) ATTACKED OUR COMMUNICATIONS RELAY SITE ON NUI BA DEN (NORTHEAST OF TAY NINH CITY). THOUGH REPORTS REMAIN SKETCHY, IT APPEARS THAT THE INSTALLA-

TION IS IN DANGER OF BEING OVER RUN; HOWEVER, AT THE PRESENT TIME THEY ARE HOLDING THE POSITION. ELSEWHERE IN TAY NINH PROVINCE THE MOST LOGICAL THREAT LIES WITH THE BINH MINH AND THIEN NGON FIRE SUPPORT BASES IN THE NORTHWESTERN PORTION OF THE PROVINCE. THERE COULD BE ELEMENTS OF PERHAPS TWO REGIMENTS IN THE IMMEDIATE VICINITY. THIS SITUATION SHOULD DEVELOP IN THE NEXT TWO OR THREE DAYS.

E. IT APPEARS THAT ELEMENTS OF FIVE REGIMENTS NOW ARE OPERATING OR ENGAGED IN THE REGION.

2. (C) FRIENDLY SITUATION:

A. DISPOSITION OF FORCES: 1 ABN BDE WITH THE 5, 6, AND 8TH BN ARE LOCATED AT LAI KHE (XT 7737). THE 52D REGT HAS MOVED TO AN LOC (XT 7688).

B. FRIENDLY ACTIVITY: IN THE 5TH INF DIV AREA, FRIENDLY OPERATIONS AGAIN CENTERED AROUND LOC NINH AND ALONG HWY 13 AS FRIENDLY FORCES CONTINUED TO MOVE GENERALLY SOUTH TOWARD AN LOC. OUR EFFORTS TO EXTRACT AMERICANS OUT OF NORTHERN LOC NINH CAMP WERE FRUSTRATED BY A SHORTFALL IN THE AMOUNT OF CBU 19 DROPPED AND INTENSE GROUND TO AIR FIRE. HOWEVER BY LATE EVENING WE WERE STILL IN CONTACT WITH THEM. THREE AMERICANS, ONE SUFFERING FROM SEVERE FACE WOUNDS, MANAGED TO LEAVE THE SOUTHERN CAMP AND EVADE SOUTH ALONG HWY 13 TO A POINT JUST NORTH OF THE TONLE TROU RIVER VIC XT 720979. FSB HOUNG THANH (XT 710998) WAS EVACUATED YESTERDAY AND THE UNIT AMBUSHED AT THE JCT OF LTL 17 AND QL 13. IN THE 25TH INF DIV AREA, FSB BINH MINH (XT 0278) WAS EVACUATED YESTERDAY. 2 105 HOW WERE LEFT BEHIND, AS WELL AS A CH 47 DAMAGED DURING THE EXTRACTION. IN NORTH EASTERN TAY NINH APTY WAS EVACUATED FROM ALL FIRE BASES WITH THE EXCEPTION OF TON LE CHAN (XT 6282). THESE BASES ARE BEING CONSOLIDATED ALONG AN ARC AROUND TAY NINH FROM BASE AREA 355, NORTH OF NUI BA DEN, INTO THE WOODS N OF THE MOUNTAIN AND AROUND TO THE SOUTH WEST OF TAY NINH. THERE WERE NO SIGNIFICANT FRIENDLY OPERATIONS IN THE 18TH INF DIV AO.

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

D. PERSONAL ASSESSMENT: THE COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS OF THE FORCES OPERATING IN THE 5TH DIV AO HAS BEEN CONSIDERABLY REDUCED DURING THE PAST 4 DAYS. I BELIEVE THE 1 ACR ALONG WITH THE 9TH REG AND THE 74 RGR BN HAVE BEEN RENDERED COMBAT INEFFECTIVE DUE TO COMBAT LOSSES, SURRENDER AND DESERTION. THE 9TH REGIMENT SURRENDERED ITS REMAINING FORCES IN LOC NINH TO THE EN AT 071415 APR. THE 52D REGT IS INTACT AT AN LOC, HOWEVER I HAVE NO INFORMATION CONCERNING THE 2-52 INF OF THE 1-48 INF. ANY COMBAT UNITS NORTH OF THE TONLE TROU RIVER (XT 722973) HAVE PROBABLY DISBANDED INTO SMALL GROUPS AND HOPEFULLY ARE WORKING THEIR WAY SOUTH. THERE HAS BEEN A HEAVY LOSS OF EQUIP (MUCH OF IT SERVICEABLE) SUFFERED AT LOC NINH, HOUNG THANH, BINH MINH, AND QUAN LOI. ON THE ENCOURAGING SIDE OF THE COIN IS THE RECEIPT OF THE 21ST DIV AND THE 1ST ABN BDE. I RECOMMENDED TO MINH THAT HE MOVE THE BDE TO AN LOC ASAP. IF THE ABN BDE GETS TO AN LOC BEFORE A MAJOR ATTACK IS LAUNCHED, I BELIEVE THEY CAN HOLD THAT POSITION. IF THEY DON'T, AN LOC WILL FALL AND IT WILL BE CLEAR SAILING INTO LAI KHE. US TAC AIR WILL CONTINUE TO SLOW THE ADVANCE BUT THERE MUST BE MANEUVER BNS ON THE GROUND. I WILL PROVIDE YOU WITH A MORE DEFINITE ESTIMATE OF THE EQUIPMENT LOSS BY FRONT CHANNEL MSG.

GP-4

CITE: ARV 0777

DTG : 090430Z APR 72

FROM: MG HOLLINGSWORTH CG TRAC LBN RVN

TO : GEN ABRAMS COMUSMACV SGN RVN

C O N F I D E N T I A L

SUBJECT: DAILY COMMANDER'S EVALUATION 081000H - 091000H APR 72.

1. (C) ENEMY ACTIVITY:

A. ENEMY INITIATED CONTACTS IN BINH LONG (P) REMAINED AT A MODERATELY HIGH LEVEL DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD. ENEMY WAS ALSO ACTIVE THROUGHOUT THE DAY AT NUI BA DEN AND SOUTH OF THIEN NGON BC. ONLY SPORADIC ENEMY ACTIVITY WAS REPORTED IN THE REST OF THE MILITARY REGION. THERE WERE A TOTAL OF 17 ENEMY INITIATED INCIDENTS REPORTED DURING THE 24 HOUR PERIOD. NO SIGNIFICANT ENEMY UNIT RELOCATIONS WERE CONFIRMED. III CORPS HAS REPORTED THAT A DOC WAS CAPT'D ON 5 APR BY ELM'S OF THE 3/49 REGT IN THE VIC OF THIEN NGON WHICH TENTATIVELY IDENTIFIED AN ELM OF THE 271 INDEP. REGT. ALTHOUGH FULL DETAILS CONCERNING THE DOC ARE NOT AVAILABLE, III CORPS HAS STATED THAT THE DOC IS A DIARY WHICH BELONGED TO A MEDIC IN THE 271. THE DIARY MENTIONED THAT A MAJOR ENEMY PLAN WAS TO "DESTROY" THE 49TH ARVN REGT AND THAT THE CURRENT OFFENSIVE WAS CALLED "NGUYEN HUE". ENEMY ACTIVITY IS EXPECTED TO REMAIN AT A MODERATELY HIGH LEVEL IN BINH LONG (P), POSSIBLY NORTH-ERN BINH DUONG (P) AND IN THE TRAI BI/THIEN NGON AREAS DURING THE NEXT 24 HOURS. ACTIVITY IN THE REMAINDER OF MR 3 IS EXPECTED TO REMAIN AT A LOW LEVEL.

B. DURING THE AFTERNOON OF 8 APR, TF 49, MOVING SOUTH FROM THIEN NGON ALONG HWY 22, WAS AMBUSHED BY AN USEF 2 1/2 KM SOUTH OF THE BASE. DETAILS OF THE ENCOUNTER ARE SKETCHY, BUT EQUIPMENT LOSSES WERE REPORTED AS 4 155MM HOW, 1 105MM HOW, 13 TRUCKS, 3 TRACTORS, 10 M113, AND 2 TANKS EITHER DESTROYED OR DAMAGED. CASUALTIES FIGURES HAVE NOT BEEN REPORTED. THE BALANCE OF TF 49 IS NOW REPORTED TO BE SOUTH OF TRAI BI, HOWEVER, AN ASSESSMENT OF ITS COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS CANNOT BE MADE AT THIS TIME. NO US CASUALTIES WERE REPORTED IN THE AMBUSH. AT 1110 HOURS, 8 APR, (HWY 13) EX-TRACTION OF THE 3 US ADVISORS TO THE 52 ARVN REGT WAS ACCOMPLISHED. IN THE PROCESS THE ENEMY FORCE SURROUNDING THEM RECEIVED VERY HEAVY US TAC AIR AND COBRA AIR STRIKES AND IS BELIEVED TO HAVE SUFFERED HEAVY LOSSES. AT 1605 HOURS, 8 APR, IN THE VIC OF BU DOP (XU975290), AN OH6A ON A VR MISSION REC'D GAF AND CRASHED. 1 US KIA, 1 US WIA, AND THE OH6A WAS A CBL. AT 0515 HOURS, 8 APR, NUI BA DEN (XT282582), SECURED BY THE 963 RF CO, REC'D 150 UNK TYPE ROUNDS, RESULTING IN 2 US KIA, 2 RF KIA, 5 US WIA, 6 RF WIA, AND 1 US MIA. ADDITIONALLY, 1 GAS DUMP AND 6 BUNKERS WERE

DESTROYED. 18 EN WERE KIA, 2 B-40 RL, 1 B-41 RL, 8 AK-47, 1 CC RADIO, AND AN UNKNOWN AMOUNT OF EXPLOSIVES WERE CIA. ALL PERSONNEL HAVE BEEN EVACUATED. THE 13 SAPPER BN, 429 SAPPER GP WAS PROBABLY THE ENEMY UNIT INVOLVED IN THE ATTACK. ALSO IN THE VIC OF NUI BA DEN YESTERDAY, 2 UH-1H REC'D GAF, RESULTING IN 1 US WIA AND 1 UH-1H DAMAGED. US TAC AIR SUPPORT IN THE BINH LONG AND NUI BA DEN AREAS CONTINUED TO BE MAGNIFICENT YESTERDAY.

C. ONE OF THE TWO REGT'S (271 IND) ENGAGED IN TAY NINH (P) HAS NOW BEEN IDENTIFIED. NONE OF THE THREE BELIEVED ENGAGED IN BINH LONG (P) HAS, AS YET, BEEN IDENTIFIED. BATTLEFIELD INTELLIGENCE AND REPORTING REMAIN UNSATISFACTORY. THERE HAVE BEEN NO PRISONERS AND NO DOCS REPORTED CAPT'D IN BINH LONG.

2. (C) FRIENDLY SITUATION:

A. DISPOSITION OF FORCES: THERE WERE NO SIGNIFICANT RELOCATIONS OF FRIENDLY FORCES.

B. FRIENDLY ACTIVITY: FRIENDLY INITIATED OPERATIONS WERE AT A RELATIVELY LOW LEVEL THROUGHOUT THE REPORTING PERIOD. THE MOST SIGNIFICANT OPERATION WAS CONDUCTED BY THE 3/1 CAV YESTERDAY WHEN THEY EXECUTED A RATHER SPECTACULAR SNATCH AND RECOVERED THE THREE AMERICANS WHO HAD BEEN EVADING SOUTH OF LOC NINH (XU 7409) ON HWY 13, ALONG WITH 4 WOUNDED ARVN SOLDIERS. AFTER AN INITIAL PREPARATION OF THE AREA WITH CBU 19'S FOLLOWED BY CBU 49'S, TWO LOW BIRDS, ONE TO DRAW FIRE AND ONE TO PICK UP, SWOOPED IN TO MAKE THE SNATCH. THE PICK UP SHIP, IN SPITE OF SUSTAINING 2 HITS IN THE MAIN ROTOR, FUEL CELLS AND THE TAIL BOOM, SUCCESSFULLY PICKED UP THE 3 AMERICANS AND 4 WOUNDED ARVN SOLDIERS AND RETURNED THEM TO FRIENDLY HANDS. IN THE 25TH DIV AREA, THE 49TH INF WITH THE 10TH ACR EVACUATED AND DESTROYED THIEN NGON AND MOVED SOUTH TOWARDS POSITIONS IN AN ACR NORTH OF TAY NINH. IN ANOTHER OPERATION ALL US WOUNDED WERE EXTRACTED FROM NUI BA DEN, WHILE IT WAS REPORTED THAT OVER 100 VC WERE KILLED BY AIR DURING THE INITIAL PREPARATION OF THE AREA. IN THE AFTERNOON OF 8 APRIL THE 1ST BN, 9TH REGT AND THE TERRITORIAL FORCES IN BO DUC DIST, PHUOC LONG PROV, WERE AIRLIFTED TO SONG BE, THE PROVINCE HEADQUARTERS WHERE THEY ARE CURRENTLY DEPLOYED.

C. FUTURE PLANS: GEN MINH AND HIS STAFF HAVE PUBLISHED AN OPERATIONS ORDER ADJUSTING AO'S WITH THE ARRIVAL OF THE 21ST INF DIV AND 1ST ABN BDE. THE AO OF THE ABN BDE INCLUDES A NORTH-SOUTH CORRIDOR CENTERED ON HWY 13 APPROXIMATELY 20 KMS WIDE EXTENDING FROM CHON THANH (XT 765622) NORTH TO THE CAMBODIAN BORDER. THE 21ST INF DIV AO EXTENDS FROM LAI KHE NORTH TO THE ABN BDE AO VIC CHON THANH, AND WILL BE EXTENDED FURTHER NORTH AS THE AIRBORNE MOVES NORTH. THIS PLAN REPLACES THE PREVIOUS PLAN OF AIR ASSAULTING THE ABN BDE TO THE SOUTH OF AN LOC AS REPORTED YESTERDAY. THE 21ST INF STARTS TODAY MOVING ONE REGT PER DAY INTO LAI KHE (XT 7738) AS THEY ARRIVE FROM THE SOUTH. CONCURRENTLY, THE 1ST ABN BDE CONTINUES THE MOVE BEGUN YESTERDAY TO CHON THANH. LEAD ELEMENTS

WERE IN NDP LAST NIGHT AT XT 784494. THE 18TH ACR IS REPORTED MOVING TO MR 1 TODAY.

D. PERSONAL ASSESSMENT: MY ASSESSMENT IN YESTERDAY'S MESSAGE (080230Z APR) REMAINS GENERALLY VALID, HOWEVER, THE FOLLOWING IS AN UPDATED ACCOUNT OF ARVN UNITS THAT HAVE BEEN BADLY MAULED - THE FOLLOWING UNITS ARE CONSIDERED TO BE COMBAT INFFECTIVE AS A RESULT OF BATTLE IN NORTHERN BINH LONG PROVINCE: 1 ACR, 2/9 INF, 3/9 INF, 2/52 INF (18TH DIV), 1/48 INF (18TH DIV) AND 74 RGR BN. IN ADDITION THE 9TH REGT AND THE 52D REGT'L TF (2/52 INF AND 1/48 INF OPCON TO 5 DIV FROM 18 DIV) ARE INEFFECTIVE AS REGIMENTS. IT HAS BEEN REPORTED THAT APPROXIMATELY 650 INDIVIDUALS FROM THESE UNITS HAVE FILTERED INTO AN LOC AS OF THIS TIME, HOWEVER, VERY FEW OFFICERS OR NCO'S ARE AMONG THEM, AND THEY DO NOT CONSTITUTE Viable FIGHTING UNITS.

CITE: ARV 0788

DTG : 100300Z APR 72

FROM: MG HOLLINGSWORTH CG TRAC LBN RVN  
TO : GEN ABRAMS COMUSMACV SGN RVN

C O N F I D E N T I A L

SUBJECT: DAILY COMMANDER'S EVALUATION REPORT 091000H - 101000H APR 72

1. (C) ENEMY ACTIVITY:

A. DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD, ENEMY INITIATED ACTIVITY WAS AT A REDUCED LEVEL IN BINH LONG (P) WHILE ONLY SPORADIC ENEMY ACTIVITY WAS NOTED IN THE REST OF MR III. THERE WERE 15 ENEMY INITIATED INCIDENTS DURING THE PERIOD. NO ENEMY RELOCATIONS WERE REPORTED. IN UNIT IDENTIFICATIONS, THE 25TH ARVN DIV CAPTURED A DOCUMENT ON 6 APR 72 AT XT 065807 WHICH HAS IDENTIFIED THE 271 INDEP REGT (REFERENCE SPECIAL CDEC REPORT). ACCORDING TO THE SA, 52D ARVN REGT, 18TH ARVN DIV, DOCUMENTS WERE FOUND ON A BODY SOUTH OF LOC NINH (NCA) WHICH HAVE TENTATIVELY IDENTIFIED THE D-13 BN OF THE 274 REGT, 9 VC DIV. TRAC OB HAS NO HOLDINGS ON A D-13 BN OR A 274 REGT OF THE 9 VC DIV. HOWEVER, THE D-13 BN IS A KNOWN AKA FOR THE 6 BN, 272 REGT, 9 VC DIV AND THIS IS PROBABLY THE UNIT REFERRED TO IN THE DOCUMENT. ADDITIONALLY, ON 9 APR, 3 KM EAST OF AN LOC (XT 792878) A PW CIA BY THE 52D Rngr BN HAS IDENTIFIED HIMSELF AS A PVT IN D CO, 27 RADIO RSCH BN, 9 VC DIV. THE PW STATED THAT HIS COMPANY WAS ATTACHED TO THE 272 REGT, 9 VC DIV. THE PW HAD A SIGNAL DOCUMENT (NFI) AND A GRC-9 RADIO. THE PW FURTHER STATED THAT A VC RADIO STATION WAS LOCATED 4 KM EAST OF AN LOC (XT 799879) AND THAT THE 1 BN, 272 REGT WAS LOCATED IN THE GENERAL VICINITY OF TAN LOI (V) (XT 792894). INTERROGATION CONTINUES. AT 1125HRS, 9 APR, 6 KM SW OF AN LOC (XT 720820), A PW WAS CIA WHO CLAIMED TO BE A COMPANY COMMANDER OF THE 21 RECON CO, 271 REGT, 9 VC DIV. THE PW STATED THAT THE 271 REGT LEFT THE CHUP PLANTATION ON 31 MAR AND ARRIVED IN BINH LONG (P) (XT 7189) ON 8 APR. THE REGT IS STILL AT XT 7189. THE PW'S DESCRIPTION ON THE ORGANIZATION OF THE 271 REGT IS COMPATABLE WITH TRAC OB HOLDINGS. INTERROGATION CONTINUES. ENEMY ACTIVITY IS EXPECTED TO BE AT A MODERATELY HIGH LEVEL IN BINH LONG (P) AND POSSIBLY IN NORTHERN BINH DUONG (P), HOWEVER, THE REMAINDER OF THE MILITARY REGION IS EXPECTED TO REMAIN AT A LOW LEVEL.

B. NO INCIDENTS INVOLVING US PERSONNEL WERE REPORTED DURING THE 24 HOUR PERIOD.

C. TWO PW HAVE BEEN CAPTURED IN BINH LONG (P) WHICH HAVE TENTATIVELY IDENTIFIED THE 271 REGT AND 272 REGT, 9 VC DIV. A SIGNAL DOCUMENT WAS ALSO CAPTURED IN BINH LONG (P) WHICH HAS IDENTIFIED THE 9 VC DIV (SEE PARA 1A, ABOVE). DETAILED FIELD INTERROGATION REPORTS HAVE NOT, AS YET, BEEN RECEIVED, BUT IT IS NOW ESTIMATED THAT THE 5 VC DIV WITH AT LEAST ONE REGT (POSSIBLY TWO) AND THE

9 VC DIV WITH 2 REGT (POSSIBLE 3) ARE COMMITTED TO THE BINH LONG (P) AREA. IN WAR ZONE C, ONE REGT (271 INDEPENDENT) IS KNOWN TO BE COMMITTED IN THE THIEN NGON AREA. IT IS PROBABLE, HOWEVER, BASED ON PAST ENEMY ACTIVITY, THAT ANOTHER REGT IS ALSO COMMITTED. I WILL INFORM YOU OF OTHER DETAILS AS THE SITUATION DEVELOPS.

2. (C) FRIENDLY SITUATION:

A. DISPOSITION OF FORCES: IN THE 25TH DIV AO THE CURRENT DISPOSITION OF FORCES IS AS FOLLOWS: THE 46TH INF WITH THE 1-46, 2-46, 3-46 REMAINS THE SAME. THE HQ OF THE 49TH INF IS LOCATED AT TRANG SUP (XT1655), THE 2-49 AT GIANG BAC (XT 0659), THE 3-49 AT TRI BINH (XT 1051). THE HQ 50TH INF IS NOW LOCATED AT LONG THOI (XT2253) WITH THE 1-50 AT TAY NINH WEST (XT1751), 2-50 AT SUOI DA (XT 3357), 3-50 AT HIEP LAM (XT 2751). THE RANGER COMMAND JUMP CP CONTROLS THE 84TH RGRS FRENCH FORT (XT 3862), THE 65TH RGR, KHE DOL (XT 2863) AND THE 73RD RGR, XA LOC NINH (XT 3862). IN THE ABN BDE AO THE 6TH ABN BN IS AT CHON THANH (XT 7660); THE 5TH ABN BN IS HALF WAY BETWEEN CHON THANH AND LAI KHE (XT 7848) AND THE 8TH ABN BN IS AT BAU BANG (XT 7945).

B. FRIENDLY ACTIVITY: FRIENDLY OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD CONSISTED MAINLY OF ADJUSTING AND CONSOLIDATING POSITIONS IN THE 25TH DIV, MOVEMENT TO CONTACT IN THE ABN AO AND THE RECEPTION OF THE 21ST DIV. THE 49TH INF COMPLETED ITS MOVE SOUTH PASSING THROUGH THE 46TH INF AND OCCUPYS POSITIONS IN AN AO NORTH AND WEST OF TAY NINH. THE DIV SA INDICATES THAT THEY ARE UNDERGOING A COMPLETE REORGANIZATION AT THE PRESENT TIME AND ESTIMATES THAT THEY ARE ONLY ABOUT 50 PERCENT EFFECTIVE. THE 50TH INF IS NOW OPERATING IN AN AO AROUND NUI BA DEN AND SOUTH TO E W GRID LINE 50. IN THE ABN AO, THE 6TH ABN BN REACHED NDP POSITIONS JUST SOUTH OF CHON THANH (XT 7660). THEY HAD ONE SIGNIFICANT CONTACT WITH AN UNKNOWN SIZE EN FORCE RESULTING IN 3 ARVN KIA AND 18 WIA. EN LOSSES ARE UNKNOWN. I PREVIOUSLY INDICATED TO YOU THAT AN A1E HAD GONE DOWN IN THIS AREA HOWEVER LATER REPORTS REVEALED THAT IT WAS A VNAF UH1H WHICH CRASHED BETWEEN CHON THANH AND AN LOC. THE 21ST DIV CONTINUES TO ARRIVE. AT THIS TIME MOST OF THE 32D REGT WITH ITS DS ARTY HAS MOVED TO LAI KHE AS THE 31ST REGT ARRIVES AT BIEN HOA.

C. FUTURE PLANS: NO CHANGE AT THIS TIME, BUT I WILL BE CONSULTING WITH GENERAL MINH AS WE REFINE THE PLANNING FOR USE OF THE 21ST DIVISION IN IT'S MOVE NORTH.

CITE: ARV 0803

DTG : 110230Z APR 72

FROM: MG HOLLINGSWORTH CG TRAC LBN RVN

TO : GEN ABRAMS COMUSMACV SGN RVN

C O N F I D E N T I A L

SUBJECT: DAILY COMMANDER'S EVALUATION REPORT 101000H - 111000H APR 72.

1. (C) ENEMY ACTIVITY:

A. DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD, ENEMY INITIATED ACTIVITY WAS AT A REDUCED LEVEL IN BINH LONG (P). IN THE REMAINDER OF MR 3, ENEMY INITIATED INCIDENTS WERE AT A LOW LEVEL, WITH ONLY SPORADIC CONTACTS REPORTED. THERE WERE 12 ENEMY INITIATED INCIDENTS REPORTED DURING THE 24 HOUR PERIOD COMPARED TO 15 LAST PERIOD. THERE WERE NO SIGNIFICANT ENEMY UNIT RELOCATIONS REPORTED. IN UNIT IDENTIFICATIONS, A PW CIA BY THE 52D ABN CO ON SEARCH OPNS CLAIMED TO BE A MEMBER OF THE 2 BN (AKA 8 BN), 101 REGT. THE PW FURTHER STATED THAT HIS UNIT WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR BLOCKING ACTION BETWEEN LAI KHE BC AND CHON THANH (V). INTERROGATION CONTINUES. ENEMY ACTIVITY IS EXPECTED TO REMAIN AT A MODERATE LEVEL IN BINH LONG (P), HOWEVER, THE REMAINDER OF THE MILITARY REGION IS EXPECTED TO REMAIN AT A LOW LEVEL OF ENEMY INITIATED INCIDENTS.

B. THERE WAS ONE INCIDENT INVOLVING US PERSONNEL DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD. AT 1400H, 11 KM NORTH OF CHON THANH (V) (XT 787720), A UH-1H FROM ELEMENTS OF THE 9TH CAV RECEIVED 10 ROUNDS OF .51 CAL GAF, RESULTING IN 1 US WOUNDED.

C. THE 5 VC DIV, WITH AT LEAST ONE REGIMENT (AND PROBABLY TWO) IS COMMITTED TO BINH LONG (P) IN THE VICINITY OF LOC NINH (V) AND SOUTH ALONG HWY 13 TO AN LOC. THE 9 VC DIV, WITH AT LEAST TWO REGIMENTS (AND PROBABLY THREE) IS COMMITTED IN THE PROVINCE IN THE VICINITY OF AN LOC AND SOUTH ALONG HWY 13 TO POSSIBLY CHON THANH. IN WAR ZONE C, ONE REGIMENT (271 INDEPENDENT) IS KNOWN TO BE COMMITTED IN THE THIEN NGON/HWY 22 AREA. IT IS POSSIBLE, HOWEVER, THAT ANOTHER REGIMENT IS ALSO COMMITTED. AS PREVIOUSLY REPORTED, INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION OBTAINED IN THE COMBAT AREA IS SKETCHY, UNTIMELY, AND LACKS DETAILS. 3 PW AND ONE DOCUMENT PLUS THE REPORTED "SOI" OF THE 9TH VC DIV, WHICH IS NOW IN THE HANDS OF THE 5TH ARVN DIV AT LAI KHE, HAVE BEEN REPORTED CAPTURED IN THE COMBAT AREAS. DETAILED INTERROGATION REPORTS PERTAINING TO THE 3 PW HAVE NOT YET BEEN RECEIVED. THERE HAS BEEN NO ARVN READOUT ON THE DOCUMENT. ALMOST NO INFORMATION HAS BEEN RECEIVED ON ARVN CASUALTIES, ARVN EQUIPMENT LOSSES, AND ENEMY KIA. IF AND WHEN THIS INFORMATION IS RECEIVED, IT WILL BE REPORTED.

2. (C) FRIENDLY SITUATION

A. DISPOSITION OF FORCES: THE ONLY CHANGE IN THE DISPOSITION OF FORCES IS REFLECTED IN THE CONTINUED ARRIVAL OF THE 21ST DIV. THE 32D INF MOVED TO FSB VAN DON (XT7515). THE 31ST INF (-) AND THE 1-33D INF CLOSED LAI KHE AT 1630 AND 1750 RESPECTIVELY. YESTERDAY AFTERNOON THE 2-8 INF STARTED MOVING BY AIR FROM LAI KHE TO AN LOC. BAD WEATHER INTERRUPTED THIS MOVEMENT BUT IT WILL BE COMPLETED THIS MORNING.

B. FRIENDLY ACTIVITY: FOR THE SECOND STRAIGHT DAY FRIENDLY ACTIVITY CONSISTED PRIMARILY OF READJUSTMENTS IN TASK ORGANIZATION, FORMATION OF A PROVISIONAL UNIT AND THE MOVE FORWARD OF THE 21ST DIV. AS OF 0800 THIS MORNING THE 8TH INF AND THE 43D INF HAVE BEEN PLACED UNDER OPCON OF THE 25TH DIV. THE 3D OCS BN (PROV) MOVED TO SAIGON, CLOSING AT 1000H YESTERDAY AND ARE SERVING AS PALACE GUARDS. THE 5 ACR (-) WITH 2 PROVISIONAL TROOPS FROM THE ARMORED SCHOOL AND THE 1-5 ACR HAVE BEEN PLACED UNDER THE OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF THE ABN BDE. A CORPS RESERVE HAS BEEN FORMED AND CONSISTS OF THE HQ 3D ACB, 2-5 ACR, 3-5 ACR AND THE 301ST RF BN. THIS MORNING THE MOVE OF THE 2-8 INF TO AN LOC CONTINUES WITH A LIGHT CP FROM THE 8TH INF AND THE 1-8 MOVING FROM DAU TIENG TO JOIN THEM.

C. FUTURE PLANS: OPERATIONS CONTINUED WITH NO APPARENT CHANGE IN PLANS. I HAVE ENCOURAGED MINH TO SPEED UP HIS REINFORCEMENT OF AN LOC AND TO START PLANNING FOR AN AIR ASSAULT OPERATION BACK INTO LOC NINH.

GP-4

CITE: ARV 0817

DTG : 120245Z APR 72

FROM: MG HOLLINGSWORTH CG TRAC LBN RVN

TO : GEN ABRAMS COMUSMACV SGN RVN

C O N F I D E N T I A L

SUBJECT: DAILY COMMANDER'S EVALUATION REPORT, 111000H - 121000H APR 72.

1. (C) ENEMY ACTIVITY:

A. DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD, ENEMY INITIATED ACTIVITY REMAINED AT A RELATIVELY MODERATE LEVEL IN BINH LONG (P), WHILE ENEMY INITIATED INCIDENTS CONTINUED AT A LOW LEVEL IN THE REMAINDER OF THE MILITARY REGION. THERE WERE 14 ENEMY INITIATED INCIDENTS REPORTED DURING THE 24 HOUR PERIOD, COMPARED TO 15 DURING THE LAST PERIOD. NONE OF THE INCIDENTS IS CONSIDERED SIGNIFICANT. THERE WERE NO SIGNIFICANT ENEMY UNIT RELOCATIONS OR NEW IDENTIFICATIONS REPORTED. ENEMY ACTIVITY IS EXPECTED TO REMAIN AT A RELATIVELY MODERATE LEVEL IN BINH LONG (P) AND WAR ZONE "C". ONLY LOW LEVEL, SPORADIC ENEMY INCIDENTS ARE EXPECTED IN THE REMAINDER OF THE MILITARY REGION.

B. THERE WERE 2 ENEMY INITIATED INCIDENTS REPORTED INVOLVING US PERSONNEL DURING THE 24 HOUR PERIOD. AT 1755H, 1 KM SW OF CHON THANH (XT 766605), THE 1ST ABN BDE HQ REC'D 7 107MM RCKTS. 2 ARVN WERE KIA, 4 WERE WIA, AND 3 US WERE WIA. AT 2242H, BIEN HOA ARMY REC'D 14 82 MM MORTAR RDS FROM THE NORTH, RESULTING IN 2 US WIA AND SOME MATERIAL SLIGHTLY DAMAGED.

C. DETAILED INFORMATION CONCERNING ENEMY ACTIVITY IN CAMBODIA/MR3 IS CONTAINED IN TRAC INTSUM NO 102 AND TRAC DISUM NO 103. FROM 0800H - 1800H, AN LOC (XT 765890) REC'D APPROXIMATELY 100 ROUNDS OF 82MM, 105MM, AND 107MM ROUNDS INTERMITTENTLY THROUGHOUT THE DAY. 4 ROUNDS IMPACTED AT THE AIRSTRIPE AND THE FWD CP OF THE 5TH ARVN DIV. 5 ARVN WERE KIA, 2 WIA. AN UNK NUMBER OF CIVILIANS WERE EITHER CAPTURED/WOUNDED. FURTHER DETAILS ARE UNKNOWN. INTELLIGENCE REPORTING REMAINS SKETCHY AND, FOR THE MOST PART, UNACCEPTABLE.

2. (C) FRIENDLY SITUATION

A. DISPOSITION OF FORCES: CHANGES IN THE CURRENT LOCATION OF UNITS IS AS FOLLOW:

32D INF XT 7661

THE 3D ACB WITH THE 2-5 CAV, 3-5 CAV AND THE 301 RF BN ARE AT CAMP PRICE (XT 0411).

THE 1-8TH INF, 2-8TH INF, 8TH RECON CO AND A LIGHT CP FROM THE 8TH INF ARE NOW LOCATED AT AN LOC.

EXCEPT FOR 2 BNS OF THE 33D INF, THE 21ST DIV HAS CLOSED INTO MR III. THE DIV IS EXPECTED TO CLOSE TODAY.

B. FRIENDLY ACTIVITY: THE MOST SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY AGAIN CENTERED AROUND HWY 13 AND THE MOVEMENT TOWARD AN LOC. IN A COORDINATED OPERATION THE 6TH ABN BN MOVED NORTH ON THE WEST SIDE OF HWY 13 WHILE THE 8TH ABN BN MOVED NORTH ON THE EAST SIDE OF THE ROAD. AT APPROX 1755H YESTERDAY BOTH UNITS WERE ENGAGED SIMULTANEOUSLY BY AN UNKNOWN SIZE ENEMY FORCE. VNAF AND US TAC AIR SUPPORTED. RESULTS OF THIS CONTACT ARE UNKNOWN AT THIS TIME. THE CONTACT BROKE LAST NIGHT AT APPROX 2300 AND THE 6TH BN ESTABLISHED A NDP AT XT 7665 WHILE THE 8TH BN ESTABLISHED THEIRS AT XT 7667. CONCURRENTLY THE 32D INF AND THE 1ST ABN BDE WITH TF BRAVO (5TH ACR (-) CONSISTING OF 2 COMPOSITE TROOPS AND THE 1-5 CAV) MOVED INTO CHON THANH (XT 7661) BEHIND THEM. FRIENDLY INITIATED ACTIVITY IN THE REST OF THE MR REMAINED AT A RELATIVELY LOW LEVEL.

C. FUTURE PLANS: CURRENT PLANS CONTINUE WITHOUT CHANGE.

Z 130255Z APR 72

FM MG HOLLINGSWORTH CG TRAC LBN RVN

TO GEN ABRAMS COMUSMACV SGN RVN

CONFIDENTIAL ARV 0834 EYES ONLY

SUBJECT: DAILY COMMANDER'S EVALUATION REPORT, 121000H - 131000H APR 72.

1. (C) ENEMY ACTIVITY:

A. DURING THE 24 HOUR PERIOD, ENEMY INITIATED ACTIVITY INCREASED IN INTENSITY IN BINH LONG (P), WHILE ENEMY ACTIVITY IN THE REMAINDER OF MR3 CONTINUED ON A LOW LEVEL. THERE WERE 14 ENEMY INITIATED INCIDENTS REPORTED DURING THE PERIOD. NONE OF THE INCIDENTS WAS CONSIDERED SIGNIFICANT. THERE WERE NO SIGNIFICANT ENEMY UNIT RELOCATIONS. IN ENEMY UNIT IDENTIFICATIONS, G-2 III CORPS REPORTED THAT A PW, CAPTURED YESTERDAY (XT768237) BY ELEMENTS OF THE AIRBORNE, CLAIMED TO BE FROM "B-41, 7 NVA DIV". THE PW IS SERIOUSLY WOUNDED AT THE FIELD LOCATION BUT WILL BE INTERROGATED. IIR WILL BE FORWARDED UPON RECEIPT. ALTHOUGH CURRENT OB HOLDING CANNOT EQUATE A "B-41" WITH ANY UNIT OF THE 7 NVA DIV, III CORPS STATES THE "B-41" IS THE 141 NVA INF REGT. ONLY LOW LEVEL, SPORADIC ENEMY INITIATED INCIDENTS ARE EXPECTED IN THE MILITARY REGION OUTSIDE OF BINH LONG (P).

B. THERE WAS ONE ENEMY INITIATED INCIDENT INVOLVING US CASUALTIES. AT 1640H, 3 1/2 KM NW OF TAN UYEN (XT958263), ELEMENTS OF THE 1/7 CAV ON GRD OPNS DET AN UNK TYPE BBT MINE. 1 US WAS KIA WHILE 1 US WAS WIA.

C. DETAILED INFORMATION CONCERNING ENEMY ACTIVITY IN CAMBODIA/MR3 IS CONTAINED IN TRAC INTSUM NO 103 AND TRAC DISUM NO 104. THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING PHUOC TUY (P) IS PROVIDED (REF TRAC DISUM NO 103):

(1) SINCE 31 MAR, SOUTHERN PHUOC TUY (P) HAS EXPERIENCED A SHARP INCREASE IN ENEMY TERRORIST, SABOTAGE AND PROPAGANDA ACTIVITY. THE EMPHASIS OF THIS ACTIVITY APPEARS TO COUNTER GOV'T PACIFICATION AND ESTABLISH VC INFLUENCE. WHILE RF AND PF UNITS, ALONG WITH THE PSDF ARE BY FAR SUPERIOR NUMERICALLY, AND ARE MORE THAN ENOUGH TO HANDLE THE SMALL NUMBER OF VC MILITARY IN THE AREA, THE NATURE OF THIS ACTIVITY MAKES IT DIFFICULT TO CONTROL. RESEMBLING COMMON CRIMES, THE INCIDENTS IN THIS (P) HAVE BEEN CHARACTERIZED BY KILLINGS, FIRE BOMBINGS, PILLAGING, AND ABDUCTIONS. ENHANCING THIS VC BACKED "CRIME WAVE" HAVE BEEN VC PROPAGANDA EFFORTS, WHICH BRING OUT THE LACK OF THE GOV'T CONTROL OVER THE SITUATION, THUS COUNTERING A PACIFICATION CLAIM OF PROTECTION FOR THE PEOPLE. THE VC ALONG WITH VCI, GUERRILLAS AND LOCAL FORCE UNITS, ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE RISE IN PHUOC TUY'S HOSTILITIES. WHILE ENEMY DIVISIONS ARE THREATENING NORTHERN MR3, THIS ACTIVITY IN

PHUOC TUY HAS BEEN GIVEN NO REAL ATTENTION. IT SHOULD BE NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT PRACTICALLY EVERY HAMLET AND VILLAGE IN SOUTHERN PHUOC TUY (P) HAS HAD SOME SORT OF VIOLENT TERRORIST INCIDENT RECENTLY, AND THAT PROPAGANDA ACTIVITY HAS RISEN ACCORDINGLY. IF GVN OFFICIALS DO NOT MOVE TO STOP THIS ACTIVITY, AND FAIL TO EXERCISE THE PROPER DEGREE OF INFLUENCE AND CONTROL, THESE INCIDENTS COULD SPREAD TO THE NEIGHBORING (P)'S OF BIEN HOA, LONG KHANH AND BINH TUY. THIS SITUATION COULD THEN GET SERIOUSLY OUT OF HAND, DUE TO THE LARGER NUMBER OF VC IN THOSE AREAS AND THEIR MORE SOPHISTICATED MODES OF OPERATION. GEN MINH AND HIS STAFF ARE AWARE OF THIS SITUATION, AND THE PROVINCE CHIEF IS DEPLOYING ALL AVAILABLE FORCES TO COUNTER THE ABOVE ACTIVITY.

(2) AT ABOUT 0500 THIS MORNING AN LOC CITY RECEIVED 50 ROUNDS OF MORTAR AND ROCKET FIRE, RESULTING IN THE DESTRUCTION OF AN AMMO AND POL DUMP AT 0525. AT APPROXIMATELY 0555 THE FIRST TANKS WERE HEARD NORTH OF THE CITY. AS MANY AS 20 TANKS HAVE BEEN REPORTED - THREE ARE IN THE CITY, ONE IS SOUTH OF THE CITY NEAR THE HELICOPTER PAD. FIVE APC HAVE BEEN REPORTED DESTROYED IN AND NEAR THE CITY. AT ABOUT 0815 A HEAVY GROUND PROBE WAS REPORTED ON THE NORTH EASTERN PORTION OF THE CITY NEAR THE AIR STRIP - ENEMY WERE REPORTED IN THE WIRE. AT 0845 THE PSA, BINH LONG PROVINCE REPORTED THAT HIS PEOPLE HAD DESTROYED AT LEAST ELEVEN TANKS AND APC NEAR THE PROVINCE COMPOUND (IN SOUTHERN PORTION OF AN LOC) - AT LEAST ONE ARMORED VEHICLE HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED AS A PT 76. THE GROUND ATTACK WAS REPORTED SUBSIDING AT 0855. FAC AND HELICOPTERS OPERATING OVER AN LOC ARE NOW REPORTING HEAVY GROUND TO AIR FIRE FROM 51 CAL AND SUSPECTED 23MM AND 37MM WEAPONS. THEY CONTINUE TO REPORT AIR BURSTING AMMUNITION BEING FIRED FROM BOTH EAST AND WEST OF QL13 NORTH OF THE CITY. SPECTRE AND FIGHTERS ARE WORKING THE AREA AND I PLAN TO HOLD AN LOC.

2. (C) FRIENDLY SITUATION:

A. DISPOSITION OF FORCES:

(1) THE ENTIRE 8TH INF HQ IS NOW LOCATED AT AN LOC, WITH THE 1-8, 2-8, AND HAS BEEN RELEASED FROM OPCON 25TH DIV AND PLACED UNDER THE OPCON OF THE 5TH DIV.

(2) THE 43D INF (XT5125) ASSUMED CONTROL OF THE AO OF THE 8TH INF. THE HQ 43D INF (-) IS LOCATED AT CHA RAY (XT 5225) AND CONTROLS THE 4-43 (XT 5225) AND THE 2-43 (XT 6162). A LIGHT CP FROM THE 43D INF MOVED TO TRI TAM AND CONTROLS THE 3-43 AND 4-52 ALSO LOCATED AT TRI TAM.

(3) IN THE 3D ABN BDE THE 5TH BN IS LOCATED AT XT 7666, THE 6TH BN AT XT 7660 AND THE 8TH BN AT XT 7671.

(4) THE LAST ELEMENT OF THE 21ST INF DIV CLOSED INTO MR3 YESTERDAY. THE TOTAL COMPOSITION OF THE DIV IS 3 INF REGTS, 1 ACR, 4 BNS OF ARTY, 1 ENGR BN, AND 1 LOG BN.

B. FRIENDLY ACTIVITY: YESTERDAY, FRIENDLY ACTIVITY ALONG HWY 13 CONSISTED PRIMARILY OF SMALL

UNIT CLEARING OPERATIONS TO THE EAST AND WEST OF HWY 13. MOVEMENT NORTH WAS FRUSTRATED BY BOTH DIRECT AND INDIRECT FIRE FROM THE ENEMY. THESE ATKS WERE SMALL SCALE IN NATURE BUT TEND TO SLOW DOWN SEVERELY THE ADVANCE OF THE ABN BDE. THE 81ST ABN RGR BN DEPLOYED TEAMS INTO 5 SEPARATE AO'S APPROX 10 KM AROUND AN LOC, AND THEY ARE BEGINNING TO RENDER SPOT REPORTS ON DAMAGE SUFFERED BY THE ENEMY AS A RESULT OF ATTACKS BY AIR. THESE TEAMS SEEM TO HAVE A FAIR DEGREE OF MOBILITY AND, SO FAR, HAVE AVOIDED EN CONTACT. THE FORCES IN AN LOC SENT RECON TEAMS OUT 2-3 KM FROM THE BASE WITH RELATIVELY LITTLE CONTACT. HOWEVER, BEGINNING AT 0500, THE DECISIVE BATTLE OF AN LOC APPEARED TO DEVELOP AS DESCRIBED ABOVE IN PARAGRAPH 1 C (2). IN PHUOC LONG (P) THE EVACUATION OF BUNGIA MAP CONTINUES WITH 8 SORTIES OF FIX WING AIRCRAFT BEING USED TO MOVE EQUIPMENT. THERE WAS NO SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY IN THE REST OF MR3 DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD.

C. FUTURE PLANS: CURRENT PLANS CONTINUE WITHOUT CHANGE.

GP-4

CITE: ARV 0855

DTG : 140220Z APR 72

FM : MG HOLLINGSWORTH CG TRAC LBN RVN

TO : GEN ABRAMS COMUSMACV SGN RVN

C O N F I D E N T I A L

SUBJECT: DAILY COMMANDER'S EVALUATION REPORT, 131000H - 141000H APR 72.

1. (C) ENEMY ACTIVITY:

A. DURING THE 24 HOUR PERIOD, ENEMY INITIATED ACTIVITY REMAINED AT A HIGH LEVEL IN BINH LONG (P), CENTERED PRIMARILY IN THE AN LOC AREA, WHERE SPORADIC ABF AND GROUND ATTACKS OCCURRED. THE THE REMAINDER OF THE MILITARY REGION EXPERIENCED A LOW LEVEL OF ENEMY INITIATED INCIDENTS. THERE WERE 12 INCIDENTS REPORTED DURING THE PERIOD, COMPARED TO 14 THE LAST PERIOD. NONE OF THE INCIDENTS WAS CONSIDERED SIGNIFICANT. THERE WERE NO SIGNIFICANT ENEMY UNIT RELOCATIONS OR NEW UNIT IDENTIFICATIONS REPORTED. I EXPECTED NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN THE LEVEL, FREQUENCY, AND INTENSITY IN ENEMY ACTIVITY IN BINH LONG (P) AND POSSIBLY NORTHERN BINH DUONG (P). ONLY SPORADIC, LOW INTENSITY ENEMY ACTIVITY IS EXPECTED IN THE REMAINDER OF MR 3, CONSISTING OF SPORADIC ABF AND RECONNAISSANCE.

B. THERE WERE NO ENEMY INITIATED INCIDENTS REPORTED DURING THE 24 HOUR PERIOD WHICH INVOLVED US PERSONNEL EXCEPT THE ATTACKS ON AN LOC.

C. DETAILED INFORMATION CONCERNING ENEMY ACTIVITY IN CAMBODIA IS CONTAINED IN TRAC INTSUM NO 104 AND TRAC DISUM NO 105.

(1) CAPABILITIES AND VULNERABILITIES: ENEMY FORCES ARE CAPABLE OF STAGING SAPPER ATTACKS THROUGHOUT MR 3, ESPECIALLY IN TAY NINH (P), SR-1, TBSR, SR-23, AND BRSR. THE ENEMY IS CAPABLE OF CONDUCTING LIMITED BATTALION SIZED ATTACKS ON INSTALLATIONS IN BRSR AND SR-1. COORDINATED BATTALION REGIMENTAL SIZED ATTACKS CAN BE CONDUCTED IN THE WAR ZONE "C" PORTION OF TAY NINH (P). COORDINATED, SUSTAINED BATTALION AND REGIMENTAL SIZED ATTACKS IN SUPPORT OF THE NGUYEN HUE CAMPAIGN CAN BE CONDUCTED IN THE BINH LONG (P) PORTION OF PBLSR AND POSSIBLY IN THE NORTHERN PORTION OF BINH DUONG (P). THE ENEMY HAS THE MEANS AND SUPPLIES TO CONTINUE ATTACKS IN THOSE AREAS. THROUGHOUT MR 3, THE ENEMY IS CAPABLE OF CONDUCTING LIMITED SMALL SCALE GROUND ATTACKS, PROBES, AND RECONNAISSANCE. ATTACKS BY FIRE AGAINST SELECTED TARGETS IN MR 3 CAN BE CONDUCTED USING ROCKETS, MORTARS, AND DIRECT FIRE HEAVY WEAPONS. THE LEVEL, INTENSITY, AND DURATION WILL DEPEND ON ENEMY INTENTIONS, THE LOCATION OF HIS FORCES, AND THE DETERMINED AGGRESSIVENESS OF TERRITORIAL AND ARVN FORCES. INTERDICTION OF LOC AND AMBUSHES CAN BE INTENSIFIED FOR LIMITED PERIODS OF TIME.

ATTEMPTS TO DEFEAT THE VIETNAMESE PACIFICATION PROGRAM CAN BE MOUNTED BY TERRORIST, SABOTAGE, ASSASSINATION, PROPAGANDA, SUBVERSION, AND POLITICAL ACTIVITIES. THE ENEMY IS CAPABLE OF INFILTRATING MAIN FORCE UNITS INTO MR 3 TO SUPPORT LOCAL FORCE EFFORTS TO SUBVERT THE POPULATION. THE ENEMY IS ALSO CAPABLE OF REPOSITIONING MAIN FORCE UNITS IN MR 3 CLOSER TO POPULATION CENTERS FOR THE SAME PURPOSE. THE ENEMY HAS THE DETERMINATION AND INTENTION BUT IS NOT CAPABLE AT THIS TIME, TO CONDUCT SUSTAINED, ALL OUT "WIN OR DIE" ATTACKS ON FRIENDLY FORCES IN BRSR, SOUTHERN PORTION OF TAY NINH (P), SR-23, AND THE MAJORITY OF TBSR. THE ENEMY IS CAPABLE OF CONDUCTING EXTENSIVE .51 CALIBER GAF IN BINH LONG (P), BINH DUONG (P), AND TAY NINH (P). IT HAS BEEN REPORTED THAT THE ENEMY HAS 23MM AND 37MM AA WEAPONS IN BINH LONG (P). AN UNKNOWN NUMBER OF TANKS CAN BE EXPECTED TO SUPPORT ATTACKS (M41, PT 76). THE ENEMY IS PARTICULARLY VULNERABLE TO AGGRESSIVE ARVN SWEEP OPERATIONS, AIR STRIKES, AND DETECTION BY VR. SEE TRAC PERINTREP 20-71 FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION.

(2) CONCLUSIONS: GIVEN THE CAPABILITIES AND VULNERABILITIES, THE ENEMY WILL CONTINUE TO CONDUCT HIS NGUYEN HUE CAMPAIGN IN BINH LONG (P) AND POSSIBLY IN NORTHERN BINH DUONG (P). AT PRESENT, THE ENEMY'S 5 VC DIV WITH TWO REGIMENTS (F6 AND 174) IS COMMITTED TO THE LOC NINH AREA. HIS 9 VC DIV, WITH TWO (271 AND 272 IDENTIFIED) REGIMENTS, IS COMMITTED IN THE AN LOC AREA. THE 9 VC DIV'S 95C REGT IS PROBABLY COMMITTED IN THE AN LOC AREA, BUT HAS NOT BEEN IDENTIFIED. RECENT REPORTS HAVE INDICATED THAT THE 7 NVA DIV IS LOCATED SOUTH OF AN LOC ALONG QL 13 TO THE VICINITY OF CHON THANH. NO UNIT IDENTIFICATIONS HAVE BEEN MADE, ALTHOUGH ONE PW CLAIMS TO BE FROM THE 141 REGT, 7 NVA DIV. IN SUMMARY, THE ENEMY PROBABLY HAS THREE DIVISIONS COMMITTED IN COMBAT IN BINH LONG (P). A PW FROM THE 2 BN, 101 REGT, SAID HIS BATTALION IS ENGAGED IN QL 13 INTERDICTION FROM CHON THANH SOUTH TO LAI KHE. THE ENEMY WILL PROBABLY NOT EXTEND THE NGUYEN HUE CAMPAIGN TO SR-23, SR-6, AND BRSR. LOW LEVEL, SPORADIC ABF, AND GROUND PROBES ARE EXPECTED, SPECIFICALLY IN SR-1 (DAU TIENG/TRI TAM AREA), WITH MISSIONS OF KEEPING ARVN/TERRITORIAL FORCES ENGAGED IN PIECEMEAL COMBAT IN ISOLATED LOCATIONS. THE MISSION OF ENEMY FORCES ENGAGED IN THE NGUYEN HUE CAMPAIGN, AS STATED IN CAPTURED DOCUMENTS AND BY PW'S, IS TO CONTROL BINH LONG (P), ESTABLISH A PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT, AND TO "LIBERATE SVN" BY DEFEATING ARVN FORCES IN DETAIL. OTHER THAN IN WAR ZONE "C" AND BINH LONG (P), THE ENEMY IN MR 3 HAS SHOWN SIGNS OF PLACING A STRONGER EMPHASIS ON POLITICAL RATHER THAN MILITARY OBJECTIVES, UTILIZING HIS ECONOMY OF FORCE TACTICS, I.E., TERRORIST, SAPPER, AND INDIRECT FIRE ATTACKS. PRIMARY ENEMY OBJECTIVES IN WAR ZONE "C" ARE XA MAT, LAC LONG, AND THIEN NGON (THESE BC HAVE ALREADY BEEN EVACUATED). THERE IS NO INDICATION, AT THIS TIME, THAT TAY NINH CITY IS A MENTIONED TARGET. MILITARY OBJECTIVES IN BINH LONG (P) ARE LOC NINH (EVACUATED), QUAN LOI (EVACUATED), AN LOC, AND CHON THANH. OBJECTIVES IN THE REMAINDER OF MR 3 ARE ISOLATED RF/PF OUTPOST, US/ARVN AIRFIELDS, FUEL AND AMMUNITION STORAGE AREAS, CONVOYS, AND HELICOPTERS IN-FLIGHT. THE ENEMY WILL ATTEMPT TO REINFORCE UNITS WITHIN THE MILITARY REGION WITH )

UNITS WITHIN THE MILITARY REGION WITH THE INFILTRATION OF MEN AND SUPPLIES FROM CAMBODIA. VC/NVA UNITS WILL CONTINUE TO PRESSURE AND ATTACK ARVN FORCES IN WAR ZONE "C" AND BINH LONG (P) DURING THE COMING WEEK; ELSEWHERE IN THE MILITARY REGION, ENEMY FORCES WILL PROBABLY NOT RISK A MAJOR MILITARY OR POLITICAL DEFEAT AND WILL PROBABLY CONTINUE TO AVOID MAJOR ENGAGEMENTS WITH FRIENDLY FORCES.

D. AT 0550H THIS MORNING, III CORPS REPORTED THAT AN LOC WAS RECEIVING A HEAVY ROCKET AND MORTAR ATTACK. THE 36 RGRS DETECTED HEAVY MOVEMENT TO THE EAST OF AN LOC (XT 775885). AT 0630H, THE SA, 5 ARVN DIV REPORTED VEHICLES MOVING 4 KM NORTH OF AN LOC (NCA). TANKS WERE OBSERVED TO THE EAST (NCA), AND THE ABF WAS CONTINUING, WITH ROCKETS AND MORTARS IMPACTING FROM THE SW, W, AND NE. FOUR ARC LIGHTS HAVE GONE IN THIS MORNING. THERE HAS BEEN NO SIGNIFICANT GROUND ACTIVITY IN THE AREA AS OF THIS HOUR.

E. ALTHOUGH I RECOGNIZE THE CURRENT BATTLEFIELD REPORTING IS POOR, I BELIEVE THAT I HAVE PIECED TOGETHER SOME REASONABLE PICTURE OF THE ARMOR ACTIVITY YESTERDAY. I ESTIMATED THAT THROUGHOUT THE DAY SOME 25-30 ARMORED VEHICLES WERE PART OF ASSAULTS ON AN LOC. I ALSO ESTIMATE THAT ABOUT 14 OF THESE HAVE BEEN DESTROYED BY AIR STRIKES AND GROUND FIRES: AN ESTIMATED TEN IN THE IMMEDIATE VICINITY OF THE PROVINCE COMPOUND EARLY IN THE MORNING, ONE JUST SOUTH OF THE HELIPAD LATER IN THE MORNING AND TWO OR THREE IN THE NORTHERN PART OF TOWN, ON THE SOUTH END OF THE RUNWAY, DURING THE LATE AFTERNOON ASSAULT. ONLY ONE, A PT 76, HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED AS TO TYPE. I BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT APC CONSTITUTE THE BULK OF THE ARMOR VEHICLES IN THE AREA. IT WILL TAKE A GOOD GROUND SWEEP TO SORT OUT THE FACTS. I WILL PRESS FOR THAT AS SOON AS ONE IS PRUDENT.

2. (C) FRIENDLY SITUATION:

A. DISPOSITION OF FORCES: IN THE 21ST INF DIV, THE 31ST INF IS NOW LOCATED AT XT 7664. THE LOCATIONS OF THE 32D AND 33D REMAINED UNCHANGED. THE LOCATION OF THE ABN BDE REMAINED UNCHANGED.

B. FRIENDLY ACTIVITY: TODAYS ACTIVITY CENTERED EXCLUSIVELY AROUND THE DEFENSE OF AN LOC. ALTHOUGH REPORTS ARE STILL SKETCHY, IT APPEARS THAT THE UNITS IN AN LOC ACQUITTED THEMSELVES QUITE WELL AND BY NIGHT FALL LAST NIGHT THE SITUATION AT LEAST APPEARED STABLE. THE MASSIVE AIR SUPPORT OF ALL TYPES TIPPED THE SCALES IN OUR FAVOR YESTERDAY. ONE STRIKE AT 1846H STOPPED A COMBINED ARMS ATTACK FROM THE NORTHWEST WHICH WAS PASSING THROUGH THE BOX WHEN IT WAS STRUCK. THE ATTACK NEVER MATERIALIZED AND IT WAS REPORTED THAT THREE OR FOUR TANKS WERE DESTROYED BY THE STRIKE. THERE WERE NO ESTIMATES OF ENEMY LOSSES AS A RESULT OF THE STRIKE; HOWEVER, THEY ARE EXPECTED TO EXCEED 100. LTG MINH MADE AN EFFORT YESTERDAY TO LIFT A BATTALION OF THE 21ST DIV INTO AN LOC. THE OPERATION GOT UNDERWAY LATE IN THE AFTERNOON; HOWEVER, WHEN THE LEAD GUNSHIPS RECEIVED HEAVY GROUND TO AIR FIRE ENROUTE BETWEEN CHON THANH AND AN LOC, THE MISSION WAS ABORTED. VNAF HAS BEEN

ABLE TO AIR DELIVER SUPPLIES INTO AN LOC. THEY DROPPED OVER 65 TONS YESTERDAY AND EXPECT TO DROP OVER 100 TONS TODAY. THE EVACUATION OF BU GIA MAP WAS COMPLETED YESTERDAY BY 1130H. THERE WERE NO REPORTS OF SIGNIFICANT FRIENDLY OPERATIONS IN THE REST OF MR3.

C. FUTURE PLANS: TODAY, GEN MINH PLANS TO AIRLIFT ELEMENTS TO THE AIRBORNE BRIGADE FROM CHON THANH INTO POSITIONS SOUTH OF AN LOC. IN ADDITION, HE PLANS TO ESTABLISH A LIGHT CP AT LAI KHE FROM WHICH HE WILL CONTINUE TO DIRECT THE OPERATION IN THE AN LOC/CHON THANH BATTLE AREA.

GP-4

(2) AT 0435H THIS MORNING, AN LOC BEGAN RECEIVING 155 MM HOWITZER AND 122MM ROCKETS. THE ENEMY WAS REPORTED IN THE WIRE ON THE S AND SE OF THE PERIMETER. ARMORED VEHICLES WERE AGAIN BEING REPORTED IN THE CITY. BY 0745 THE PRESSURE HAD EASED AND THE ARMORED VEHICLES REPORTED NEUTRALIZED OR DRIVEN OUT. AGAIN TODAY, HEAVY GROUND TO AIR FIRES (REPORTED US .51 CAL AND 23MM) ARE MAKING FLYING MOST GAMEY. BY 0900 IT HAD BEEN REPORTED FROM AN LOC THAT FROM SEVEN TO ELEVEN ARMORED VEHICLES HAVE BEEN DESTROYED IN AND AROUND THE CITY. I CANNOT CONFIRM THIS REPORT. BY 0920 TANKS WERE REPORTED WITHIN 500 METERS OF THE 5TH DIV CP AT AN LOC. THESE WERE BEING TAKEN UNDER FIRE BY GROUND AND AIR ELEMENTS. THE PRESSURE IS REPORTED TO BE HEAVY.

2. (C) FRIENDLY SITUATION.

A. DISPOSITION OF FORCES: THE 6TH AIRBORNE BATTALION HQ AND 380 PERS MOVED FROM XT 8087. THERE WERE NO OTHER MOVES INVOLVING BATTALION OR LARGER SIZED UNITS REPORTED.

B. FRIENDLY ACTIVITY: YESTERDAY'S ACTIVITY REVOLVED AROUND THE AIRMOBILE OPERATION AND SMALL UNIT ADJUSTMENTS NEAR AN LOC. AT 1430H YESTERDAY AFTERNOON THE AIRBORNE BRIGADE AIRLIFTED APPROXIMATELY 380 MEN FROM THE VIC OF CHON THANH TO AN LZ SOUTHEAST OF AN LOC (XT 8087). THE COMBAT ASSAULT WAS UNOPPOSED AND THE FORCE MOVED APPROXIMATELY 1 KM NORTHWEST WHERE IT WAS REPORTED TO BE ENGAGED WITH AN UNKNOWN SIZE ENEMY FORCE. TO THE WEST OF AN LOC THE HQ 2/7 INF ALONG WITH TWO COMPANIES MOVED BACK INTO THE SOUTHWESTERN EDGE OF THE CITY TO CONSOLIDATE THE DEFENSES. LIKEWISE, ON THE EASTERN SIDE OF TOWN, ONE RANGER BATTALION CONSOLIDATED ITS POSITION ON THE EASTERN PERIMETER. THERE WERE NO OTHER SIGNIFICANT OPERATIONS REPORTED IN MR 3.

C. FUTURE PLANS: THE 21ST INFANTRY DIVISION PLANS TO AIR ASSAULT TWO AIRBORNE BATTALIONS (5TH AND 8TH) AT 1000H INTO POSITIONS SOUTHEAST OF AN LOC IN THE VICINITY OF YESTERDAY'S AIR-MOBILE OPERATION. IN ADDITION, THEY PLAN TO AIRLIFT 1 BATTERY OF 105MM ARTILLERY INTO YESTERDAY'S LZ TO SUPPORT THE OPERATION. THEY THEN PLAN TO ATTACK NORTHWEST TOWARD AN LOC.

GP-4

CITE: ARV 0882

DTG : 160315Z APR 72

FROM: MG HOLLINGSWORTH CG TRAC LBN RVN

TO : GEN ABRAMS COMUSMACV SGN RVN

C O N F I D E N T I A L

SUBJECT: DAILY COMMANDER'S EVALUATION REPORT, 151000H - 161000H APR 72

1. (C) ENEMY ACTIVITY:

A. DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD, ENEMY ACTIVITY REMAINED AT A HIGH LEVEL IN BINH LONG (P), CENTERED IN THE AN LOC (V) AREA, WHERE GROUND AND ATTACKS BY FIRE OCCURRED. THE REMAINDER OF THE MILITARY REGION WAS CHARACTERIZED BY LOW LEVEL, SPORADIC ENEMY INITIATED INCIDENTS, PRIMARILY ABF. THERE WERE 12 INCIDENTS REPORTED DURING THE 24 HOUR PERIOD, AS COMPARED TO 13 THE LAST PERIOD. THERE WERE NO SIGNIFICANT ENEMY RELOCATIONS REPORTED. IN COLLATERAL IDENTIFICATIONS, THE 5TH ARVN DIVISION REPORTED THAT A PW WAS CAPTURED ON 12 APR BY ELEMENTS OF THE 1ST ABN BDE APPROXIMATELY 5 KM NORTH OF CHON THANH (XT 764685). THE PW IDENTIFIED HIMSELF AS A MEMBER OF THE C-41 HVY WPNS CO, 7 NVA DIV. THE COMPANY HAS 70 MEN. THE PW STATED THAT ELEMENTS OF HIS COMPANY HAD BEEN ATTACHED TO THE 165 REGT, 7 NVA DIV, AS DS. THE PW STATED THAT ON 30 MAR, THE ENTIRE 7 NVA DIV RELOCATED FROM PHUM KOKI (XU 262154) AND ARRIVED IN BINH LONG (P) (XT 716680) ON 5 APR. THE DIVISION TOOK A 12 DAY SUPPLY OF FOOD. THE PW FURTHER STATED THAT THE MISSION OF THE 7 NVA DIV IS TO CONDUCT LOC INTERDICTIONS AND AMBUSHES ALONG HWY 13 FROM CHON THANH TO AN LOC. AS OF 10 APR, THE PW GAVE THE FOLLOWING LOCATIONS OF ELEMENTS OF THE DIVISION: THE 165 REGT WAS DEPLOYED ALONG HWY 13 NORTH OF CHON THANH (XT 762692 TO XT 761708), THE 141 REGT WAS ALSO ALONG THE HWY (XT 761710 TO XT 762 745), THE 209 REGT WAS ALSO ALONG THE HWY (XT 761670 TO XT 760622), THE 7 DIV HQ, ITS RECON CO, AND SIGNAL CO AT XT 716681, AND THE AA AND ARTILLERY BATTALIONS AT 750691. THE PW CLAIMED TO HAVE NO KNOWLEDGE OF THE 5VC DIV OR 9 VC DIV. PW STATED THAT 25 TANKS WERE COMMITTED AT AN LOC, WITH 50 ADDITIONAL TANKS IN RESERVE FOR LATER BATTLES. 100 TRUCKS WERE BEING USED FOR ARTILLERY AMMO RESUPPLY. PW IS CURRENTLY BEING INTERROGATED BY THE 5TH ARVN DIV AT LAI KHE. IN DOCUMENTS CAPTURED BY THE 21ST INF DIV AT AN UNKNOWN TIME AND PLACE, THE 209 REGT, 7 NVA DIV, WAS IDENTIFIED (NFI). I BELIEVE THE ENEMY WILL CONTINUE HIS ATTACKS AGAINST AN LOC AND HIS LOC ATTEMPTS ALONG HWY 13 SOUTH OF AN LOC. ONLY SPORADIC, LOW INTENSITY ENEMY ACTIVITY IS EXPECTED IN THE REMAINDER OF THE MILITARY REGION, CONSISTING OF ABF AND LIGHT GROUND PROBES. INTELLIGENCE REPORTS CONTINUE TO INDICATE SAIGON WILL RECEIVE ADDITIONAL ROCKET ATTACKS AND THE SR-23 WILL EXPERIENCE AN INCREASE IN ENEMY ACTIVITY.

B. THERE WAS ONE ENEMY INITIATED INCIDENT REPORTED DURING THE 24 HOUR PERIOD WHICH INVOLVED US PERSONNEL. AT 0500 HOURS, FSB SPUDIS, 4 KM NORTHWEST OF TAN UYEN (XT 943268), RECEIVED 3-7 82MM ROUNDS, RESULTING IN 3 US WIA.

C. THE 21ST ARVN DIVISION WAS HEAVILY ENGAGED WITH ELEMENTS OF THE 7 NVA DIVISION NORTH OF CHON THANH THROUGHOUT THE DAY. A 7 NVA PRISONER STATED THAT ACCURATE ARVN ARTILLERY FIRES HAVE TAKEN A TOLL ON NVA REGIMENTAL FORCES PLACED IN THE AREA. THE 21ST ARVN DIVISION BEGAN TO MANEUVER AGAINST THESE SAME ELEMENTS AND WERE MOVING WELL TO EASE PRESSURE ON QL 13 8 KM TO THE NORTH FROM CHON THANH. SIMILARLY, THEY WERE DOING WELL AGAINST WHAT WE BELIEVE TO BE ABOUT TWO BATTALIONS OF THE 101 NVA REGIMENT SOUTH OF CHON THANH AND NORTH OF SUOI THON (VIC XT 7756) ON QL 13. LATE IN THE AFTERNOON ELEMENTS OF THE 21ST APPEARED TO BE TURNING THE NORTHERN FLANK OF THE 101 LINE NEAR THE RAILROAD EMBANKMENT JUST SOUTH OF CHON THANH. OVERALL, THE 21ST DIV FOUGHT WELL YESTERDAY, THEY EMPLOYED THEIR ARTILLERY WELL, AND THEY MANEUVERED EFFECTIVELY AGAINST BOTH THE NORTHERN FORCES AND THE SOUTHERN FORCES OUTSIDE OF CHON THANH. TODAY, THEY WILL CONTINUE THEIR FIGHT AGAINST THESE FORCES, AS WE PLAN FIRES UPON THEIR ROUTES OF WITHDRAWAL AND THEIR STAGING AND REORGANIZATION AREAS.

D. THERE WAS A GREAT BATTLE AT AN LOC YESTERDAY - PERHAPS THE GREATEST OF THIS CAMPAIGN. THE ENEMY ATTACKS BY FIRE WERE VERY HEAVY AND THE TANK AND 75MM RR FIRES WERE PARTICULARLY ACCURATE. ONE TANK IS REPORTED TO HAVE ROLLED TO WITHIN 200 METERS OF THE 5TH ARVN DIVISION CP AND DELIVERED DIRECT TANK GUN FIRE INTO THE CP AND TOC INSTALLATION. THREE ARVN STAFF OFFICERS (ONE WAS THE DIVISION G3) WERE KILLED. THE 75MM RR WAS PARTICULARLY TOUGH ON THE PROVINCE TOC. ENEMY TANKS CAUGHT HELL IN TWO GREAT PHASES OF THE BATTLE YESTERDAY. EARLY IN THE MORNING I BELIEVE ELEVEN TANKS ROLLED INTO AN LOC. FOR THE FIRST TIME, THAT I AM SURE OF, OUR ARVN GROUND HUNTER-KILLER TEAMS GOT INTO THE ACTION AND ACQUITTED THEMSELVES WELL. THEY, WITH THE TOP FLIGHT ASSISTANCE OF TAC AIR, KNOCKED OUT AT LEAST SEVEN OF THE ARMORED VEHICLES. LATER IN THE MORNING I BELIEVE THEY BAGGED THREE OR FOUR MORE. ABOUT 1400 YESTERDAY AFTERNOON, THE ENEMY ROLLED TEN MORE TANKS INTO THE CITY FROM THE NORTH AND WEST ACCCOMPANIED BY A BITTER MORTAR, ROCKET AND ARTILLERY FIRE ATTACK. AGAIN THE HUNTER-KILLER TEAMS AND TAC AIR RIPPED INTO THEM AND NINE OF THE TEN REPORTED DESTROYED. WE STILL HAVE SOME ARMOR NEAR AN LOC BUT IT'S NO LONGER SO AWESOME TO THE ARVN. BY LATE AFTERNOON THE AAA FIRE HAD ALSO BEGUN TO SUBSIDE. I BELIEVE THAT OUR TAC AIR WAS SUCCESSFUL IN LOCATING AND DESTROYING SOME OF THE POSITIONS.

E. I AM MOST PLEASED WITH THE OUTCOME OF THE BATTLE YESTERDAY. THE ENEMY HIT US HARD ALL DAY LONG WITH EVERYTHING HE COULD MUSTER - AND, WE THREW IT RIGHT BACK AT HIM. THE FORCES IN AN LOC REALIZED THEY HAD TO FIGHT AND THEY FOUGHT WELL. THE MORTAR, ARTILLERY AND ROCKET FIRES COMMENCED

AGAIN THIS MORNING AND CONTINUE SPORADICALLY. TANKS ARE REPORTED SOUTHWEST AND WEST OF THE CITY-BUT THE GARRISON AT AN LOC IS COPING WITH THE SITUATION WELL.

F. DETAILED INFORMATION CONCERNING ENEMY ACTIVITY WITHIN MR 3 IS CONTAINED IN TRAC INTSUM NO 106 AND TRAC DISUM NO 107. TODAY, THE FLOW OF COMBAT INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION FROM FIELD UNITS IMPROVED. HOPEFULLY, THIS TREND IN BETTER REPORTING WILL CONTINUE.

2. (C) FRIENDLY SITUATION.

A. DISPOSITION OF FORCES: A LIGHT CP FROM THE ABN BDE, 5TH BN AND 8TH BN ARE LOCATED VIC XT 797872. 1ST ABN BDE IS NOW DIRECTLY OPCON TO III CORPS. TF BRAVO HAS BEEN PLACED UNDER THE OPCON OF THE 21ST DIV.

B. FRIENDLY ACTIVITY:

YESTERDAY THE AIRMOBILE OPERATION INVOLVING THE 1ST ABN BDE WAS EXECUTED WITHOUT INCIDENT. A LIGHT CP FROM THE BDE HQ ALONG WITH TWO BATTALIONS (5TH AND 8TH) WERE AIR LIFTED FROM THE VIC OF CHON THANH TO AN LZ SOUTHEAST OF AN LOC (XT 8035). THE ARTY TO SUPPORT THIS OPERATION WAS NOT INSERTED YESTERDAY BUT PLANS CALL FOR IT TO BE AIR LIFTED THIS MORNING. BY NIGHTFALL LAST NIGHT THE UNITS HAD MOVED APPROX 1KM AND OCCUPIED THE HIGH GROUND VIC XT 797872. REPORTS INDICATE THAT THERE HAS BEEN FURTHER CONSOLIDATION OF UNITS IN AN LOC GENERALLY TO THE SOUTH AS ENEMY PRESSURE INCREASED FROM THE NORTH. AS OF LATE LAST EVENING THE SITUATION WAS RELATIVELY STABLE. THERE WERE NO SIGNIFICANT FRIENDLY OPERATIONS ELSEWHERE IN MR 3.

C. FUTURE PLANS: TODAY THE ABN BDE PLANS TO START WORKING ITS WAY TOWARD AN LOC. THEY HAVE ESTABLISHED INTERMEDIATE OBJECTIVES AS THEY MOVE NORTHWEST TOWARD THE CITY. GEN MINH PLANS TO INSERT THE 81ST ABN RGR GP, AS A BN, INTO THE AREA OF THE ABN BDE TODAY WHERE THEY WILL BE PLACED UNDER THE OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF THE 1ST ABN BDE.

GP-4