



Figure III-2 (C). Phase II: Attack to Tchepone and consolidation (U)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

53km 50km

40 km

30km

20kg

10

0

TCHEPONE

KHE SANH

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LAOS

TRWIN

卷之三

SOPHIA
LIZ

A map showing the locations of KEPON, ALUOI, and LOTO. The map features a winding river or coastline. The word 'KEPON' is written in capital letters above a section of the river. The word 'ALUOI' is written in capital letters above another section of the river. The word 'LOTO' is written in capital letters below the river, near a hatched area.

A map showing the Río Tabat flowing from the south towards the north. The river is represented by a thick black line. The name 'RÍO TABAT' is written in capital letters along the river's path. A dashed line indicates a boundary or a path that branches off from the river. The area is labeled 'TABAT'.

51

0
KHE SAN

Airmobile Move

→ Move by Foot

 Armor Move

0 5km 10km

Figure III-1 (C). Phase I: Attack to ALUOI and consolidation (U)

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d. Flight Control

Flights of ten UH-1H aircraft were determined to be most acceptable and provided flexibility and control. This coincided with the requirement of ten aircraft per lift company and promoted flight integrity. Internal flight control was conducted on VHF.

5. Reconnaissance

a. Initial Reconnaissance

The primary reconnaissance of LZ areas was accomplished by the division's organic cavalry squadron. The cavalry troop assigned the reconnaissance mission of a designated LZ area would begin its work as much as three to four days in advance of the assault. The reconnaissance of the LOLO area began a full week prior to the assault. Particular attention was devoted to locating usable touch-down points, and detecting enemy positions. All detected enemy positions were dealt with by the appropriate weapons system available which ranged from airstrikes to AH-1G gunships. Three 12.7mm positions approximately one kilometer southwest of LOLO were detected by the cavalry one week prior to the assault. These targets were given to the Air Force and destroyed. This is only one example of the rapid employment of massive fire power in response to reconnaissance information which has proven to be so successful in neutralizing enemy threats. The locations of possible LZ's, enemy positions, and notable cache sites were passed by the cavalry troop through its higher headquarters to the AMC and Ground Commander. The troop would continue its reconnaissance of the LZ area during the following days in attempts to detect and neutralize additional enemy positions. When the AMC and Ground Commander decided upon a suitable touchdown point, the cavalry troop employed air strikes and TAC air on the primary LZ, its approach and departure paths, and areas which were suitable for use as alternate LZ's. The troop placed great emphasis on continuing its operation in a large area to prevent the enemy from determining the exact location of the LZ and adjusting his defense accordingly.