

Document No. 4: Secret Telegram from Rapacki (New Delhi) to Naszkowski (Warsaw), 21 January 1963

Secret

Ciphergram No. 915

From...New Delhi...dispatched on 01.21. at 15:30 hours...received on 01.21. at 14:37 hours...
Came in to the Decoding Department...01.21. at 18:30 hours.....

Urgent

Naszkowski

On Sunday from the conversation with [Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal] Nehru.

1. I presented to him our view on the international situation (Cuba, the German question, disarmament). I emphasized the role of non-aligned nations. I presented the prospect of future development of Polish-Indian economic relations.
2. In his reply, Nehru first of all assumed a positive attitude towards economic talks.
3. [Nehru] avoided any critical remarks directed toward the US, only expressing hopes as to the development of Kennedy's political line. He emphasized that he received help from the US and England during critical times [an obvious allusion to Washington's support during border clashes with China the previous fall].
4. As far as the PRC, he was very brief ("we have serious difficulties with the Chinese.") He said that they accepted the Colombo proposition, but until now they haven't received a reply from the PRC. He is in favor of a cease-fire. I agreed, while expressing hope that both sides would soon come to an agreement.
5. I emphasized India's devotion to the policy of neutrality. He added that they emphasized this to the US and England at the time they received aid from them and [stressed that] they would not change this policy.

No. 19

Deciphered on 01.21. at 19:30

Deciphered by Jaszczak, checked by Fiutowski

/-/ Rapacki

[Source: Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (AMSZ), Warsaw, 6/77, 1963: w-102, t-608, obtained and translated by Margaret Gnoinska.]

Document No. 5: Secret Telegram from Rapacki (New Delhi) to Naszkowski (Warsaw), 22 January 1963

Secret

Ciphergram No. 995

From...New Delhi...dispatched on 01.22 at 23:30 hours...received on 01.23. at 10:56 hours...
Came in to the Decoding Department...01.23. at 12:15 hours.....

Immediately
But not at Night

Naszkowski

1. Further talks [with Nehru] did not contain many political elements except for the continuous emphasis of adhering to non-alignment. The Indians did not broach the Chinese issue. As far as nuclear tests, [India's Foreign Minister M.R.] Desai assumed a negative attitude toward the position of the US, but he only proposed that our representatives in Geneva communicate so as to begin lobbying activity against the US. As far as the Vietnam issue, we will send interesting information separately.
2. The Indians do want a communiqué. They point to precedence.
3. The atmosphere of the talks – warm. All of the interlocutors expressed a great interest in deepening economic cooperation.
4. Today we received the Ceylonese government's invitation from the Ceylon embassy to pay a visit in Ceylon directly after our visit in India. We realize all the drawbacks of this visit, but [we] also [anticipate] a political awkwardness if we decline. We see in this the intention of strengthening [the] Colombo [proposition], according to the intentions of our friends.

Besides, this is a matter of an overall [communist?] camp tactic. We did not inform anyone about this here. I request a decision of the leadership, at the latest on Wednesday night Warsaw time.

No. 22
Deciphered on 01.23. at 13:30
Deciphered by Piecuch, checked by Fiutowski

/-/ Rapacki

[Source: AMSZ, Warsaw, 6/77, 1963: w-102, t-608, obtained and translated by Margaret Gnoinska.]

**Document No. 6: Secret Telegram from Rapacki (Warsaw) to Jaszczuk (Moscow),
31 January, 1963**

Warsaw, 31.I. 1963

Ciphergram
Secret
Immediately

1186
31.I.at 11:20 hours

MOSCOW-JASZCZUK

Go urgently to [Foreign Minister Andrei A.] Gromyko or [Deputy Foreign Minister Georgi M.] Pushkin:

We would like for Cde. Michałowski to personally inform the leadership of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs [in Moscow] about the conversations in [New] Delhi, and especially [have him] discuss the American probes [with Soviet comrades] which arose in light of the Indian initiative regarding the resolution of the South Vietnam problem.

Given the above it seems to me that Michałowski's arrival is urgent.

Michałowski will also bring with him a note for the CC CPSU about these conversations for you to pass on to them. (A normal exchange of information).

Inform about the reply. We think that M[ichałowski] should be leaving in 2-4 days.

Rapacki

[Deciphered on] 31.I.63 at 12:00 noon

[Source: AMSZ, Warsaw, 6/77, 1963: w-100, t-603, obtained and translated by Margaret Gnoinska.]

**Document No. 7: Secret Telegram from Jaszczuk (Moscow) to Rapacki (Warsaw),
13 February 1963**

Secret

Ciphergram No. 2004

From...Moscow...dispatched on 02.13.63 at 13:10 hours...received on 02.13.63 at 13:25 hours...
Came in to the Decoding Department...02.13.63 at 16:00 hours.....

Eyes Only
Immediately

RAPACKI

From the conversation with Gromyko:

- 1) I relayed to him the content of your conversation with [DRV Ambassador to Poland] Tran Chi Hien.
- 2) Gromyko received from [Sergei?] Vinogradov a message that an economic counselor of the DRV in Paris informed him about the fact that the Americans desired the neutralization of Vietnam. The counselor assessed this as an important and interesting message.
- 3) After the conversation with Michałowski, Gromyko presented its content to the leadership of the CC [Central Committee]. The assessment is as follows: The US would like to get out of the uncomfortable situation in South Vietnam. It was only in Vienna [in June 1961] when Kennedy was telling Khrushchev that their presence and entanglement in the war in Vietnam was the result of Eisenhower's policies. The CC concludes that the possibility of solving the problem in South Vietnam is rising – Of course, this solution must be in our favor and not in that of the Americans. That is why a decision was also made to have the Soviet side talk to the DRV, with the suggestion proposed by us. They will have their conclusions ready in 2-3 days and they will turn to us for a consultation.
- 4) [Information regarding Gromyko's trip to Scandinavia, NATO, the Warsaw Pact, etc. – none related to discussion on Vietnam].

/-/ Jaszczuk

No. 75
Deciphered on 02.13.16:30
Deciphered by Jaszczak, checked by Strzelecki

*[Source: AMSZ, Warsaw, 6/77, 1963: w-100, t-604, obtained and translated by
Margaret Gnoinska.]*

**Document No. 8: Secret Telegram from Jaszczuk (Moscow) to Rapacki (Warsaw),
13 February 1963**

Secret

Ciphergram No. 2019

From...Moscow...dispatched on 02.13.63 at 20:40 hours...received on 02.13.63 at 21:44 hours...
Came in to the Decoding Department...02.13.63 at 23:45 hours.....

Eyes Only
Immediately

RAPACKI-KLISZKO

From the conversation with Andropov:

- 1) I relayed to him the note and informed him about [your] conversation with [DRV Ambassador to Poland] Tran Chi Hien.
- 2) Andropov acknowledged the seriousness of the matter... Nevertheless, according to A[ndropov], some statements of the Vietnamese do not fully correspond with the position of the DRV's leadership. From the talks which Andropov conducted in Hanoi recently, one gets the impression that, among other things, one can see the source of overcoming a series of difficulties in the DRV as far as the victory of the revolution (not postponed for years to come.). That is why we will have to explain to the Vietnamese comrades that there should be no talk about any concession or tying their hands; otherwise, the Chinese will come out ahead. They exert a very large influence on the DRV (both within the party as well as in the army, where there are their [Chinese] commissars. The PRC extended a credit of 400 million rubles, of which 100 million would not have to be paid off. Andropov's conversations, which took several hours, shed light on a series of unclear matters. For example, regarding the issue of missiles in Cuba, Ho [Chi Minh] sided with the Chinese position (why send them and then withdraw them), but after [hearing] the explanation, he recognized the correctness of the Soviet conduct.

On the matter of Cuba, some Vietnamese comrades were saying that, if it were them, the DRV would continue to build socialism quietly, and on the outside it would assume a position of coexistence and neutrality. Andropov is pleased with the talks. He thinks that the position of the VWP [Vietnamese Workers' Party] is currently much better than before. The VWP's statement, which was published today in *Pravda*, is closer to the Soviet position (even though it does not mention a Soviet initiative to stop public criticism and meeting despite the fact that it assigns an equal role to both the CPSU [Communist Party of the Soviet Union] and the CCP [Chinese Communist Party] .)

Andropov sees serious difficulties in the lack of speedy and thorough information (this phenomenon occurs in the entire region of Southeast Asia) which often can make their understanding difficult and cause the wrong stance to be taken. For example, Khrushchev's speech at the VI Congress of the SED [Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands – The Socialist Unity Party of Germany (German Democratic Republic)] initially came as a summary (3 pages), and then in a few days in the full form. No wonder that the reaction is not as quick as for example that of Europe. The lack of detailed and accurate information facilitates for the Chinese the propagating of their position and struggle with “the contemporary revisionism.”

During Andropov's conversation with Ho [Chi Minh] it became clear that nobody is imposing on the DRV the forms of activity within the framework of Marxism-Leninism. The DRV should act within this framework as it deems correct, but the USSR can also choose such means which it sees [fit] to bring good results in its situation.”

- 3) Andropov's conversations in Beijing were formal and did not bring anything new.
- 4) Yesterday, [John] Gollan [Member of the Communist Party of Great Britain] left Moscow. His report was rather stingy. The Chinese are in a “bellicose mood,” but they say that they do not want it to come to a split. As to Gollan's proposition of meeting with the CPSU, they avoided a clear reply. Andropov thinks that a year-long campaign in the CCP and the nation makes it difficult for them to withdraw. The economic situation in the PRC is bad. An atmosphere of further difficulties is on the rise. There is a talk of a future disaster of drought [even] before the beginning of spring works.
- 5) I informed Andropov about the future plenum and its principal themes. Andropov is asking to give him the dates when their party delegation (headed by the CC Secretary) could come visit us. He sees March as the earliest possible date, but he leaves the final dates to us.

/-/ Jaszczuk

No. 80

Deciphered on 02.13.09:50

Deciphered by Stafiej, checked by Zagórowicz

[Source: AMSZ, Warsaw, 6/77, 1963: w-100, t-604, obtained and translated by Margaret Gnoinska.]

**Document No. 9: Secret Telegram from Rapacki (Warsaw) to Jaszczuk (Moscow),
15 February 1963**

Ciphergram
Secret

Warsaw, 15 February, 1963

1689 15.II.63 at 12:10 hours

MOSCOW-JASZCZUK

Your conversations with Gromyko and Andropov:

We [Poles] hope that it is clear to them [Soviets] that:

- 1) We did not insinuate anything to the [North] Vietnamese, except only to make them aware that the matter [was] important, even though we rejected the first American proposition;¹³⁷
- 2) We were careful all the more since [the North Vietnamese] Ambassador [in Warsaw Tran Chi Hien] immediately accentuated, with his entire honesty, the differences of the views within the Party:¹³⁸

We limited ourselves to taking notes, asking his position and listening to his long arguments, which we considered “symptomatic, but not conclusive.”

[Deciphered on] 15.II.63 at 13:00 hours

/-/ Rapacki

[Source: AMSZ, Warsaw, 6/77, 1963: w-100, t-603, obtained and translated by Margaret Gnoinska.]

¹³⁷ It is not clear what American proposition Rapacki refers to here.

¹³⁸ It is not clear what Rapacki refers to here, but, most likely, the allusion is to differences over the Sino-Soviet split and the advisability of pursuing an armed struggle even at the risk of an escalated conflict with the Americans.

Document No. 10: Secret Telegram from Ogrodziński (New Delhi) to Michałowski (Warsaw), 4 March 1963

Secret

Ciphergram No. 2793

From...[New] Delhi...dispatched on 03.04. at 12:30 hours...received on 04.03. at 12:30 hours...
Came in to the Decoding Department...03.04. at 13:30 hours.....

Michałowski

On the eleventh of this month, [Foreign Minister] Desai will come for a private dinner [at my place]. Do you see any matters to be broached? (Vietnam?).

/-/ Ogrodziński

No. 70

Deciphered on 03.04. 15:15 hours

Deciphered by Górski, checked by Grunwald

[Source: AMSZ, Warsaw, 6/77, 1963: w-102, t-608, obtained and translated by Margaret Gnoinska.]

Document No. 11: Secret Telegram from Maneli (Hanoi) to Spasowski-Morski (Warsaw), 11 March 1963

Secret

Ciphergram No. 3175

From...Hanoi.....dispatched on 03.11. at 12:00 hours.....received on 03.12. at 12:21hours...
Came in to the Decoding Department...03.12.63. at 14:30 hours.....

Spasowski-Morski

Eyes Only

(FYI: Trojanowski, Thee)

I conducted lengthy conversations with Prime Minister [Pham Van Dong] and [Soviet Ambassador] Tovmassian.

Synthetic¹³⁹ conclusions are as follows:

- 1) The Prime Minister underscored several times that their policy regarding general Vietnam matters entirely corresponds with [those] of Moscow and Warsaw, that they want consistent execution of the Geneva Accords, that this is actually the neutralization of which [Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal] Nehru and [US Ambassador to India John Kenneth] Galbraith were speaking.

They considered and continue to consider the Geneva Accords as beneficial, [and] they do not want any foreign [military] bases or military alliances anywhere in Vietnam.

We assess this statement, together with Mikołaj [the Soviet embassy] as a real consent to something along the lines of neutralization also of the North under the condition that some other terminology be used.

- 2) The aim of struggles in the North, the Prime Minister said, is to aspire to establish a government based on a wide democratic range like the Laotian type.

The intensification of the struggles should lead to an international conference. I reminded [him] of the statement of Goburdhun that the Americans could withdraw only under the circumstances of saving face. He replied that he appreciated this necessity and that the Poles would surely find some intelligent formula [to solve this problem].

¹³⁹ Translator's Note: In this case, synthetic means "relating to or involving synthesis: not analytic."

- 3) I am to present the following matters during the sessions of the commission [ICC]:
- a) introduction of weapons based on weekly reports of permanent groups
 - b) chemical warfare
 - c) provocations [conducted by] the South in the demilitarized zone.
- 4) In case of counter-accusations about the sabotage, I am to express consent for the creation of a mobile group which would conduct a full investigation with the participation of communication officers from both sides. Goburdhun told me that proving the sabotage by legal [court] channels is impossible.
- 5) Tovmassian informed me that the Chinese pressured [the DRV] to cause incidents in the demilitarized zone, but Secretary Le Duan decisively opposed this while stating that they wanted to show the world their good will. I add that based on the information and opinions of our officers one can recognize that there were attempts to cause incidents in the [demilitarized] zone by the North. They also acted ambiguously in Haiphong. I will relay details of these matters, as well as further results of consultations, later.

/-/ Maneli

No. 94

Deciphered on 03.12. 18:30 hours

Deciphered by Miaškiewicz, checked by Bakunowicz

[Source: AMSZ, Warsaw, 6/77, 1963: w-96, t-1368, obtained and translated by Margaret Gnoinska.]

Document No. 12: Secret Telegram from Ogrodziński (New Delhi) to Wierna (Warsaw), 15 March 1963

Secret

Ciphergram No. 3359

From...N. Delhi....dispatched on 03.15. at 10:00 hours.....received on 03.15. at 08:33 hours...
Came in to the Decoding Department...03.15. 11:40 hours.....

Wierna

Your 2640.

- 1) The Americans are decisively disheartened by Diem. If they had a successor who would be suitable for them, they would go for a change. As is evident from the entirety of information, and especially from the reaction of Kennedy to Mansfield's report, they don't have one. One cannot exclude the possibility that some in the American spheres are betting on a military coup d'etat [in South Vietnam].
- 2) It does not seem that India has a clear policy in this matter:
 - a) Nehru himself (according to information, which I could not check) would be willing to pull India out of Vietnam in order to "leave the PRC and the US one on one."
 - b) [Foreign Minister M.R.] Desai supports Galbraith's conception.
 - c) A great deal of the Indian apparatus shares sympathy for Diem due to ideological reasons which increased in light of the conflict with the PRC. Besides, many Indians in the commission [ICC] are surely on Diem's payroll.
- 3) This objective fact has decisive significance [in this]: the undoubted crisis in American policy of military intervention and fighting with the guerillas. Both the Americans and Diem can independently aspire for a ceasefire, as both are ready to make concessions – the Americans at the cost of Diem, and Diem at the cost of the Americans. The situation is surely conducive to our diplomacy.

/-/ Ogrodziński

No. 85

Deciphered on 03.15.63 at 13:15

Deciphered by Stafiej, checked by Strzelecki

[Source: AMSZ, Warsaw, 6/77, 1963: w-102, t-608, obtained and translated by Margaret Gnoinska.]

Document No. 13: Secret Telegram from Michałowski (Warsaw) to Jaszczuk (Moscow), 4 April 1963

Warsaw, April 4, 1963

Top Secret

No. 3640

MOSCOW-JASZCZUK

05.IV.63 at 12:30

1) On March 22 of this year, the DRV ambassador [to Poland Tran Chi Hien] relayed to us the position of the Political Bureau of the CC VWP towards well-known to you Galbraith's initiative.

The Vietnamese comrades think that the fight of the national liberation movement will eventually lead to an international solution of the problem in South Vietnam. They see such a solution in the form of an international conference based on those of 1954 and 1962, which would enable the victory of our camp while still saving face for the US. While stipulating that in their opinion the situation in South Vietnam has not yet matured for such a conference to be taking place, the Vietnamese comrades agree that the continuation of sounding out the real intentions of the United States is desirable. The probe could lead to an explanation of whether the United States already truly desires a peaceful settlement of the problem in South Vietnam. The probe would also aim at explaining the American conception regarding a ceasefire for a period of six months, withdrawal of foreign troops, and the neutralization of both parts of the country. They are asking us to undertake the continuation of the probe as to the American side. (Handwritten text: We are sending you by courier a note from the conversation with the DRV ambassador which clearly explains the issue).

2) The ambassador also relayed to us a copy of the Political Bureau CC VWP letter to the CC CPSU, whose content does not deviate from the above.

3) We intend to authorize Ogrodziński to broach the topic with Galbraith.

Relay possible suggestions of the Soviet comrades.

Michałowski
(signature)

Initialed by:

Cde. Minister Naszkowski
Cde. Ambassador Wierna
Cde. Director Findziński
Cde. Director Morski
Cde. Director Spasowski
Cde. Director Pohoryles

Deciphered on 05.IV.63 at 14:30 by Karcz

[Source: AMSZ, Warsaw, 6/77, w-100, t-603, obtained and translated by Margaret Gnoinska.]

**Document No. 14: Secret Telegram from Maneli (Saigon) to Spasowski (Warsaw),
24 April 1963**

Secret

Ciphergram No. 5295

From...Saigon.....dispatched on 4.24. at 0:30 hours.....received on 4.24. at 10:40 hours.....
Came in to the Decoding Department...4.24. at 16:00 hours.....

Spasowski

(FYI: Trojanowski, Thee, Chodorek, Ludwik, Mikołaj)

- 1) Today Ambassador [Ramchundur] Goburdhun left for India. He again reminded [me] that he would visit Ambassador [Przemysław] Ogrodziński. He is to discuss in [New] Delhi general matters and those related to the [International Control and Supervisory] Commission. Commission-wise – the matters of chemical weapons, and particularly providing access for the Commission to conduct examinations from the legal point of view.
- 2) I am recreating the following picture of the Indian conception of settling the Vietnam matter from a several conversations with G[oburdhun].
 - a) They take it as a sure thing that the NLF [National Liberation Front] will not achieve further military or political victories and that the regime of [Ngo Dinh] Diem [has been] strengthened, and the action of the strategic hamlets proved to be successful.
 - b) They consider Diem, his brother [Ngo Dinh Nhu], and sister-in-law, Madame Nhu, to be the main elements [which] strive to make the Americans withdraw.
 - c) They are against the American-English conception of removing them from power by means of a possible coup, because they do not want an official government run by a military junta.
 - d) [Jawaharlal] Nehru supposedly agreed to a wide political amnesty due to the Indian advice. The policy of so-called “open arms” has already been proclaimed towards the insurgents who resigned from the fight.
 - e) The Nhu group is supposedly agreeing to reorganize the government and allowing a few ministers from the emigration and even from the liberation front.
- 3) G[oburdhun] takes very seriously the private statement of Nhu [which posits] that they don't want South Vietnam to be a springboard against world communism, and that after the reorganization of the government and establishment of peace they will follow Nehru's way.
- 4) According to the plan of this group, the Americans would have to leave Vietnam in the nearest year, given the gradual solution of the political matters and establishment of peace.

- 5) I let [Goburdhun] know in [our] conversations that the [Indian] plan was based on a series of illusions and unfounded assumptions.

No. 188

Deciphered on 4.24.at 17:45 hours

Deciphered by Lewandowski

/-/ Maneli

[Source: AMSZ, Warsaw, 6/77, w-102, t-625, obtained and translated by Margaret Gnoinska.]

**Document No. 15: Secret Telegram from Maneli (Saigon) to Spasowski (Warsaw),
29 May 1963**

Secret

Ciphergram No. 7237

From...Saigon.....dispatched on 29.5.63 at 6:50 hours.....received 30.5.63 at 9:50 hours.....
Came in to the Decoding Department...30.5.63 at 14:00 hours.....

Spasowski

FYI: Trojanowski, Thee, Chodorek

I am passing on, in a summarized form, a report from the talks with Premier [Pham Van Dong], with the current [Xuan Thuy] and previous [Ung Van Khiem]¹⁴⁰ Minister of Foreign Affairs, [and Soviet] Ambassador [Suren] Tovmassian. I will discuss separately the contacts with the Chinese ambassador. The Poles were welcomed with a special kindness.

1. The need for further compliance with the principles of not activating the [work of the International Supervisory and Control] Commission was acknowledged. However, due to tactical considerations, we should establish, from time to time, our points even if we were to do so without carrying them out until the end. For example, this is how we are to take care of the matter of the American intervention and the reactivation of the Mixed Commission.

2. Everyone is very pleased with the way we are carrying out the matter of chemical weapons within the Commission. The reasons for this positive assessment:

- a) The possibility exists of utilizing the letter of the Commission for propaganda-political matters.
- b) The partners [Canadian and Indian delegates to the ICC] found themselves in a very uncomfortable situation; they are delaying the matter under the embarrassing pretext of waiting for a legal decision from New Delhi and Ottawa. We strengthened our position towards them since to their accusations of sabotage we have two [counterpoints]: the American intervention and chemical warfare.
- c) It will be more difficult for the partners to look into the matters which are convenient to them since given such a fundamental [matter] they could not agree. We are to bring up this matter from time to time.

3. Everyone considers our task of conducting political probes regarding all Vietnamese matters as particularly important and perhaps most urgent [at this time]. We were

¹⁴⁰ Ung Van Khiem, labeled as a revisionist and pro-Soviet by the North Vietnamese leadership, was replaced by Xuan Thuy on April 30, 1963 as DRV's Minister of Foreign Affairs.

reminded of the great usefulness of the probes conducted by Ambassador [Leonard?] Pohoryles, and especially given the new situation we should, all the more, show activity and quickly provide information. They are expecting that due to the crisis in American politics, more and more people from the diplomatic corps and from the South government will be seeking contacts with us. Premier [Pham Van Dong] and the Minister of Foreign Affairs [Xuan Thuy] presented to us what they wanted us to emphasize during the contacts. The Chinese ambassador was particularly in favor of expanding probes; Ambassador Tovmassian underlined the significance of our information due to changes in Soviet-Vietnamese relations. There are matters which were dispatched to Saigon and to the West without informing the Soviet comrades.

4. I emphasized that I would pass on to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs all new elements regarding the policy and the tasks in order to receive instructions.

5. I will discuss further issues in the next cable.

/-/ Maneli

Circulated to:

Cde. Rapacki
Cde. Czesak

Cde. Naszkowski
Cde. Winiewicz
Cde. Wierna
Cde. Michałowski
Cde. Birecki
Cde. Katz-Suchy
Cde. Spasowski
Cde. Findziński
Cde. Morski

No. 255

Deciphered on 30.5.63 at 21:00 hours

Deciphered by Koprowski checked by Grunwald

[Source: AMSZ, Warsaw, 6/77, w-102, t-625, obtained and translated by Margaret Gnoinska.]

**Document No. 16: Secret Telegram from Maneli (Saigon) to Spasowski (Warsaw),
31 May 1963**

Secret

Ciphergram No. 7353

From...Saigon.....dispatched on 5.31 at 10:00 hours.....received 6.1 at 9:58 hours.....
Came in to the Decoding Department...6.1. at 14:30 hours.....

Spasowski

FYI – Trojanowski, Thee, Chodorek

I am reporting further results of the consultations in Hanoi.

1. The conversation with the Premier [Pham Van Dong] was planned for one hour. On his initiative, it lasted two hours. The issue of the development of the Diem-US spat was discussed in detail. He presented his own, not abridged, assessment. Once again, he expressed his will to comply with the Geneva Accords. As far as the South is concerned, the formula of wide neutral coalition government still applies. As to the question of who is to make up the right and the center, he replied: This will crystallize itself, the presence of certain people from the Diem regime is not out of the question. The people of the right will only be a fiction for the countries abroad, without a significant influence on governing. It is true that the Laotian example did not work out – this does not matter. The change in government in the South will happen after military defeats. Only then will the Americans and Diem be forced to participate in an international conference. In exchange for the neutrality of the South, the North will comply with the Geneva Accords.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs asked to relay to those interested in the South that they wanted to begin cultural [exchanges] and trade (rice, coal) before political settlements [were reached]. Both strongly asked that the probes be expanded, which is mentioned in the previous no. 255.

2. The Premier was saying almost the same thing during my previous visit, as if nothing changed on their end. He emphasized the work of the Poles for Vietnam. He used the word “socialist camp,” talking about the role of the USSR; he did not mention China even once. Ambassador Tovmassian was very pleased with these statements of the Premier.
3. The formula along the line of 1954 is more strongly evident in all the reports. The Chinese Ambassador was talking about the new Dien Bien Phu, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs about the defeat in Algeria. Ambassador Tovmassian found out, unofficially, that they were planning to organize a 500 thousand men army in the South by 1965. The costs of maintenance were paid by the Chinese,

and the rest came from local sources. The high degree of participation of the Chinese is a surprise to Cde. Tovmassian.

4. The special intelligence gathered for us regarding the battles in the South confirms our assessment relayed in a report: the balance of forces. They admitted defeat, but they still maintain that they control 75 percent of the territory and 50 percent of the population, even though certain changes have occurred as to the spheres of influence.

/-/ Maneli

No. 262

Deciphered on 6.1. at 9:00 hours

Deciphered by Jochimek, signed by Fintowski

[Source: AMSZ, Warsaw, 6/77, w-102, t-625, obtained and translated by Margaret Gnoinska.]

**Document No. 17: Secret Telegram from Maneli (Saigon) to Spasowski (Warsaw),
30 August 1963**

Secret

Ciphergram No. 11266

From...Saigon.....dispatched on 8.30.63 at 12:00 hours.....received on 9.1.63 at 9:20 hours
Came in to the Decoding Department...9.1.63 at 16:40 hours.....

Spasowski

FYI: Siedlocki, Trojanowski, Thee

During the reception at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Italian and French ambassadors arranged my meeting with Mr. Nhu. He welcomed me with ostentatious kindness. He said that Poland, after France, was the second most respected and well-known country [in Vietnam] and he invited me for a talk.

Tovmassian recommends that I go.

/-/ Maneli

No. 393

Deciphered on 9.2.63 at 18:15 hours

Deciphered by Szopa, checked by Bakunowicz

[Source: AMSZ, Warsaw, 6/77, w-102, t-625, obtained and translated by Margaret Gnoinska.]

Document No. 18 (Handwritten): Secret Telegram from Maneli (Saigon) to Spasowski (Warsaw), 4 October 1963

Saigon

Dispatched 10.04.63 at 11:10 hours
Received [in Warsaw] 10.08.63 at 09:00 hours
Came into the Decoding Department on 10.08.63 at 10:10 hours

No. 12830

Spasowski

1. I am trying to carry out the instructions within my capabilities. The Commission and its agendas are not working (for the past 8 months of my stay there were three meetings) which require a lot of hassle. All my contacts are those of a social character. There was no single incident in which I would act as an intermediary in anything at the request of the Vietnamese comrades; I have been informing you about everything without delay.
2. It does not correspond with the truth that I was allegedly invited to Hanoi at the time of the Buddhist crisis and the state of siege. On the contrary, I was advised not to come and to stay put, as was emphasized, in the [best] interest of everyone. In the early days of August, we were bound by the official decision of the Commission: the chief delegates committed themselves not to leave Saigon. [Canadian] Ambassador Cox gave up his travels. I did not go to the DRV's [Independence Day] holiday on September 2, after having consulted with Hanoi, and I informed you about that (yours 384). We were expecting bombings at the time. I reckoned that it would be unworthy of the chief of the delegation to leave and to head for a safe place. I sent comrades Lato and Szmidt [to Hanoi]. My decision at the time and during my current stay in Hanoi was acknowledged legally by the Vietnamese. This is the reason for their warmhearted welcome at my reception [in early October]. Connecting this matter to [French] Ambassador Lalouette is a misunderstanding. L.[alouette] was in Saigon at the time, there are our [cables] from the time 390 and 392, and 393 and 398 about his pronouncements. He left for Hanoi after the situation had stabilized. I admit with regret that you were led into error.
3. I am presenting the facts as far as the issue of Nhu. I immediately conveyed the public invitation by Nhu at the party – yours 393. On September 1, I received an invitation signed by the chief of the Liaison Mission for September 2. I understood the lack of your reply as the lack of reservations [on your part], and I knew about the positive position of the Soviet comrades; I therefore thought that I could not decline [the invitation]. I made this decision in very difficult conditions. I received your [cable] which prohibited me to go [to meet with Nhu] on September 5, that is after I sent the report of

the conversation. As to the démenti, I sent it before your 10788 (our 466).
The second option of démenti – yours 462.

Maneli
(signed in hand)

No. 463
Deciphered on 10.08.63 at 14:35 hours
By Piłkuła and Gorki (?)
Checked by Meller on 10.08.63 at 14:45 hours

[Source: AMSZ, Warsaw, 6/77, w-102, t-625, obtained and translated by Margaret Gnoinska.]

Document No. 19: Secret Telegram from Maneli (Saigon) to Spasowski (Warsaw), 2 September 1963

Secret

Ciphergram No. 11289

From...Saigon.....dispatched on 9.2 at 8:00.....received on 9.2. at 7:40 hours.....
Came in to the Decoding Department...9.2 at 15:00 hours.....

Spasowski

1. On Sunday night [1 September 1963] Ambassador Lalouette reported:
 - a) According to Washington's decision, Lodge's mission is based on ousting Diem and the family. The coup d'etat is expected any hour, any time. The American military junta will be set up. The Americans paid off some generals, among others the new leader Duong [Van Minh, or "Big Minh"].
 - b) Diem-Nhu are inclined to announce a declaration regarding the willingness to comply with the Geneva Accords, to carry out de Gaulle's [29 August 1963] statement, [and] to demand the withdrawal of the Americans. They would like to know, however, what the reaction of the North would be.
2. I suppose that given the above, Nhu invited me for a conversation. It will occur in a few hours.

No. 398

Deciphered on 9.2 at 18:30 hours

Deciphered by Cheba, checked by Fiutowski

[Source: AMSZ, Warsaw, 6/77, w-102, t-625, obtained and translated by Margaret Gnoinska.]

Document No. 20: Secret Telegram from Maneli (Saigon) to Spasowski (Warsaw), 5 September 1963

Secret

Ciphergram No. 11462

From...Saigon.....dispatched on 9.5 at 13:00.....received on 9.5. at 10:33 hours.....
Came in to the Decoding Department...9.6 at 15:00 hours.....

Spasowski

Your [cable] 10016.

The invitation to Nhu occurred through the communication [liaison] mission on the evening of the 1st [of this month] for two [o'clock] in the morning.

The chief of the mission contacted me directly in the morning regarding this matter. Without your instructions it was not possible to reject the invitation, and besides I took into consideration the suggestions of the Soviet comrades.

Making it seem as if it were a visit at the palace [organized] by [way] of a formal invitation is no longer feasible. The Canadian [Ambassador Cox] and the Indian [Ambassador Goburdhun] were already [formally] invited by Diem-Nhu in the days prior [to my visit].

/-/ Maneli

No. 403

Deciphered on 9.6 at 18:20 hours

Deciphered by Kotliński, checked by Fiutowski

[Source: AMSZ, Warsaw, 6/77, w-102, t-625, obtained and translated by Margaret Gnoinska.]

Document No. 21: Secret Telegram from Maneli (Saigon) to Spasowski (Warsaw), 4 September 1963

Secret

Ciphergram No. 11424

From...Saigon.....dispatched on 9.4 at 11:00 hours.....received on 9.5 at 11:39 hours.....
Came in to the Decoding Department...9.5.63 at 17:10 hours.....

Spasowski

FYI: Siedlecki, Trojanowski, Thee, Ludwik, Mikołaj

The conversation with Nhu lasted almost two hours. The main theses:

- 1) The current difficulties are a result of the activity of the [Buddhist] monks and students directed by the imperialists. The [South Vietnamese] government will win even this plot. A new phase has taken place in South Vietnam; it is fighting against the guerrillas and imperialism.
- 2) They are studying Ho Chi Minh's declaration as to a ceasefire. Something will take place in the next three months. Officially, he [Nhu] cannot assume a positive position because the government would have to submit itself to brutal pressure and the US would have a legal argument to topple [it].
- 3) The US hates him for the ability to talk to the communists and for his statements directed at the political and military personnel [which posits] that the US has to withdraw and [that] a period of negotiations with the North is near. He is still of this opinion and he is preparing the political ground most of all by [strengthening] the consciousness of the personnel and the strategic hamlets. He is considering the Geneva Accords in this context. He is paving the way in the same way for trade exchange with the North.
- 4) The government's goal is an independent Vietnam, without foreign troops, neutral, and it is not to be a military springboard against communism.
- 5) He did not assume any position as to de Gaulle's declaration under the pretext that he did not have the official text. The exposition on the philosophy of the cult of personality and the strategic hamlets took much time. He posed several general questions as to the policy of socialist countries. I replied in a very general manner while

emphasizing our attitude toward the Geneva Accords. He tried to be kind [and] avoided sensitive topics and even terms.

- 6) My assessment: the purpose of inviting me was to establish contact which would not bind [anyone] to anything for now. In his defense against the US, [Nhu] turns to us while presenting himself as a statesman able to negotiate with the North.
The non-concreteness of [Nhu's] statements results from the instability and hope that the bridges with the US have not yet been burned.

/-/ Maneli

No. 401

Deciphered on 9.5. at 18:55

Deciphered by Górski, checked by Paździerz

[Source: AMSZ, Warsaw; 6/77, w-102, t-625, obtained and translated by Margaret Gnoinska.]

Document No. 22: Telegram from the Central Intelligence Agency Station in Saigon to the Agency, 6 September 1963

Telegram from the Central Intelligence Agency Station in Saigon to the Agency

Saigon, September 6, 1963

...8. Nhu claims he answered Maneli to the effect that, while de Gaulle's statement was interesting, only combatants in this war had the right to speak and act. SVN [South Vietnam] is allied with the US and it would be an "immoral act" to explore such a problem unilaterally behind the back of the Americans. Commercial relations with North Vietnam would have inevitable political repercussions on the fighting morale and political clarity of SVN population. Maneli asked what was the next step and Nhu said he replied, "continue building strategic hamlets." To CAS [Controlled American Source, i.e., Central Intelligence Agency] Nhu said that he has no secret channel to Hanoi but could communicate through Goburdhun or Maneli if he wished. His contacts are with the Viet Cong in SVN and his objective with them is to win them over against North Vietnam...He states that he is adamantly opposed to neutralism, although CAS had not brought up this subject. Neutralism, according to Nhu, is completely contrary to GVN's [Government of Vietnam's] outlook and policy.

9. Without specifying, Maneli told [Nhu?]¹⁴¹ Saigon GVN would soon have four enemies against it, presumably including the US. Nhu says he answered Maneli with the comment that GVN [was] accustomed to being attacked from many sides and would prefer to go down with dignity than to live on its knees. Nhu told CAS that neither GVN nor any other government could possibly negotiate with Hanoi either openly or secretly, except after having won a guerrilla war and not in term of neutralization, but rather within the framework of a strong SVN seeking to incorporate North Vietnam within a free world order...

[Source: U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Volume IV: Vietnam August – December, 1963 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1991), pp. 125-126]

¹⁴¹ "[Nhu?]" in original source.

Document No. 23: Secret Telegram from Maneli (Saigon) to Spasowski (Warsaw), 4 September 1963

Secret

Ciphergram No. 11464

From...Saigon.....dispatched on 9.4. at 10:00 hours.....received on 9.6. at 10:00 hours.....
Came in to the Decoding Department...9.6.63 at 15:00 hours.....

Spasowski

FYI: Siedlecki, Trojanowski, Thee

I asked Ambassador Lalouette to explain the attitude of de Gaulle's declaration as to the Geneva Accords. He replied:

1. We rest on the Geneva Accords as the basis of legal and political solutions for the Vietnam matter. The first commentary of the Moscow radio was not correct, but the voices from the Soviet press were better. The thesis [in the Soviet media] that the point is to "mock the US" simplifies the declaration; Poland and the USSR should assess it positively for accepting the Geneva Accords.
2. The military junta would be the worst thing; the US politicians are childish, they committed terrible errors in Laos.
3. The French and the Poles should be working together discreetly in order to lead to North-South negotiations according to the Geneva Accords. If Diem and Nhu, I quote here, "whom France has always criticized, hold onto power, then even weakened and hated, they will have to come into understanding with Hanoi. This will be a prelude to a further evolution."

/-/ Maneli

No. 402

Deciphered on 9.6 at 20:50 hours

Deciphered by Szopa, checked by Paździer

[Source: AMSZ, Warsaw; 6/77, w-102, t-625, obtained and translated by Margaret Gnoinska.]

**Document No. 24: Secret Telegram from Maneli (Saigon) to Spasowski (Warsaw),
25 September 1963**

Secret

Ciphergram No. 12328

From...Saigon.....dispatched on 09.25.63 at 12:00 hours.....received 09.27.63 at 8:40 hours...
Came in to the Decoding Department...09.27.63 at 12:45 hours.....

Spasowski

For the information of: Siedlecki, Thee, Haraśny, Mikołaj

- 1) Henry, a counselor of the US embassy [in Saigon], invited me for dinner, just the two of us. The purpose of the invitation:
 - a) Establishing a private [and] convenient contact [between] the [US] embassy [and the Polish] delegation.
 - b) A general probe preceding a possible conversation with Lodge.
 - c) Obtaining information about my conversation with Nhu.
- 2) Regarding c) – I said: it took place on the initiative of Nhu, the invitation came through the communication mission. N.[hu] said what he wanted, my questions pertained only [regarding carrying out] the Geneva Accords. As to the question how the Ministry of Foreign Affairs [of the DRV?] assesses the results of the conversation, I said: there is nothing to assess, because Nhu did not say anything new and important, and [besides] visits at the representatives' of both governments are normal for the commission [ICC], as for example, a recent visit of Canadian Ambassador [to the ICC - Gordon Edwin Cox] with the Prime Minister of North [Vietnam].
- 3) Henry spoke with enmity [animosity] about Diem, his regime and ideology.
- 4) The Vietnamese comrades relayed the assessment of [my] conversation with Nhu, [it's] not concrete, but they are pleased with the fact that and are asking to maintain contact.

I will discuss this [issue] in Hanoi in the spirit of your 10016.

/-/ Maneli

No. 443

Deciphered 09.27.63 at 14:45 hours

Deciphered by Górski, checked by Bakunowicz

[Source: AMSZ, Warsaw; 6/77, w-102, t-625, obtained and translated by Margaret Gnoinska.]

Document No. 25: Secret Telegram from Maneli (Saigon) to Spasowski (Warsaw), 3 October 1963

Secret

Ciphergram No. 12768

From...Saigon.....dispatched on 03.10 at 10:00 hours.....received on 06.10 at 10:50 hours...
Came in to the Decoding Department...06.10 at 15:40 hours.....

Spasowski

I am presenting, in its summary, the report from my visit in Hanoi:

1. I was received by the prime minister [Pham Van Dong], the minister of foreign affairs [Xuan Thuy], and Ambassador Tovmassian.
2. As far as South [Vietnam is concerned], they [the North Vietnamese] stated:
 - a) They will carry out the fight until there is a change in the constellation of forces, and then the US would agree to negotiations and formation of the government [based] on a democratic coalition. Subsequently, this government will transform itself into a socialist one by way of peace, and not military means.
 - b) They want to exploit the divergences "Diem-USA"; if a part of the military loyal to the US were to rebel they would support Diem.
 - c) They positively assess de Gaulle's declaration, but they are not taking any public stance towards it. There are many signs which point to a rapprochement with France. They asked me about the divergences "Diem - Vatican - Western Europe" and the possibilities of exploiting them.
 - d) What struck me [while listening] to the [North] Vietnamese contemplation was the fact that they were ignoring the overall world situation and the existence of the socialist camp.
3. As far as the [International Control] Commission [is concerned], the prime minister [Pham Van Dong] and [foreign] minister [Xuan Thuy] accentuated the necessity of maintaining good cooperation with it. However, Ludwik [Ha Van Lau] stated that the [work of the] Commission should be limited by, among other things, reducing the number of [supervisory] groups. He asked about [our] opinion. I replied, "I will present this to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; as for now, I don't see any appropriate legal or political arguments."
4. The Vietnamese comrades want to establish contact between the Commission and the [National] Liberation Front. They will propose that the Commission, within the framework of good humanitarian services, be present at returning the six American prisoners of war by the [National Liberation] Front. I replied that I would turn [to you] for instructions. The Soviet comrades are supporting this proposal.

5. As to the meeting with Nhu, they asked not to decline if I were invited again. I justified my negative stance [towards such a request].
6. I was welcomed very warmly; Prime Minister [Pham Van Dong] in particular thanked me for all of the materials and the analysis.
7. All matters mentioned above were discussed with Tovmassian with the participation of Siedlecki.

Please [send] your instructions as to 3 and 4.

/-/ Maneli

No. 460
Decoded on 07.10 at 8:30 hours
Decoded by Retański
Checked by Fiutowski

[Source: AMSZ, Warsaw; 6/77, w-102, t-625, obtained and translated by Margaret Gnoinska.]

Document No. 26: Secret Telegram from Chodorek (Hanoi) to Morski (Warsaw), 25 November 1963

Secret

Ciphergram No. 15053

From...Hanoi.....dispatched on 11.25.63 at 1700 hours...received on 11.25.63 at 11:20 hours...
Came in to the Decoding Department...11.25.63 at 14:20 hours.....

Urgent

Morski

(FYI: Thee, Maneli)

On the 22nd of this month, on the instructions of the [DRV] Ministry of Foreign Affairs Ha Van Lau relayed the decision of the Vietnamese leadership regarding the ICC in Vietnam:

1. Coming out of recommendations of the conference in Honolulu, which postulated the intensification of the war with the Vietcong in South Vietnam, as well as postponing the elections until its successful outcome, Ha Van Lau presented in quite dark colors the past and the future of the ICC in Vietnam, challenging both the efficacy of its activity and purpose of its further existence at a time when the US is breaking the Geneva Accords, continues to intensify military aid, and intervenes in internal affairs of the South.
2. Since 1958 the ICC has not only not thwarted the US in their military aggression in the South and their breaking of the Geneva Accords, but with each day its activity deviates from the principal goals of the Geneva Accords, and in many cases goes beyond the framework of the accords (spying by the Indians and Canadians, accusations of the DRV, etc.)
3. The main responsibility for the activity of the ICC lies with the Indian [delegate] instructed by his own government, which "in the past few years has been getting closer to the West, especially the US, with each day."

That is why "the DRV thinks that the activity of the Indian delegation executes the instructions of US policy in Southeast Asia." "Recent political preparations by the Indian, which could be a detriment to us" (subversion, return to the issue of war ships in the DRV, etc.) also testify to this.

4. Under these circumstances the DRV decided to limit the activity of the representatives of India and Canada, as well as to prevent their actions [which would be] harmful to carrying out the Geneva Accords.

For this purpose, the DRV's government puts forth the issue of eliminating ICC groups in North and South Vietnam, excluding the demilitarized zone.

Temporary groups can be formed in Saigon if necessary and the headquarters of the Commission in Hanoi. Saigon does not like Hanoi. "If the future shows the necessity of a reactivation of groups in the North and the South, the DRV will express consent, but under the conditions which will be beneficial to them."

5. The struggle for carrying out this postulate will be difficult; the joint position of Poland, the USSR, and the DRV will lead to victory. The DRV will avoid the political aspect of the issue in the face of the co-chairmen of the Geneva Accords (the limitation of harmful consequences of which could result of the position of the representatives of India and Canada), while limiting the motive of its own move regarding organizational and financial difficulties of the Commission.
6. At the end, HVL asked that I relay this issue, as well as his opinion, to our leadership in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. According to HVL, Soviet comrades had already been informed about this a few days before. HVL read from the text dated the 13th of this month.

/-/ Chodorek

No. 396

Deciphered 11.25.63 at 16:40

Deciphered by Szwech, checked by Górski

[Source: AMSZ, Warsaw; 6/77, w-96, t-1368, obtained and translated by Margaret Gnoinska.]

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