



# The Times of Viet-Nam

MAGAZINE

Vol. V. No. 40 — October 6, 1963







#### OUR COVER :

Fishing village at Lang Co, Central  
Vietnam.

(Photo by Nguyen Cao Dam)

## The Times of Viet Nam magazine

October 6, Vol. V. No. 40

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## worth repeating

### On Confusing American Public Opinion

NEW YORK (VP) Oct. 5.—While calling the views expressed by Mr. McNamara and Gen. Taylor on the possible duration of the war in Viet Nam « optimistic », the editorial in the *New York Herald Tribune* of Sep. 27 wrote that there is time to go ahead with rational negotiations to obtain necessary reforms in Saigon and Washington.

To unravel the State Department tangle is the most urgent task, and the McNamara-Taylor mission, although primarily a military one, is a step in the right direction. Then will come the more difficult task of « persuading » the Vietnamese Government to make the « reforms » Washington deems necessary.

The *New York Times* meanwhile said: The confusion, cynicism and frustration of the American people in the Viet Nam affair certainly is not solely due to the nature of the Diem regime or to its quarrels with the Buddhists. The information policies of the two governments, the U.S. as well as Saigon, were both responsible from the outset for a major part of this confusion.

(The *New York Times* forgot to add that it was one of the main culprits in this confusion, systematically nurtured for many months by its editorial policy and the dispatches of its Saigon correspondent, David Halberstam, VP Ed.)

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# REVIEW OF ITALIAN PRESS ON MADAME NGO DINH NHU'S VISIT TO ROME

PARIS Oct. 2 (VP)—Madame Ngo Dinh Nhu's arrival in Rome on Sept. 21, heralded by the Italian press, radio and television for many days, was considered a political event of prime importance by the Italian press corps.

For several days her least sayings and doings in the Italian capital were front-paged in detail by the large information press as much as by the political papers—from the neo-fascist extreme right to the Communist extreme left. As soon as the journalists and photographers learned that Madame Ngo Dinh Nhu was staying at the Vietnamese Embassy, they literally invaded the normally peaceful villa in the quiet Janicolo quarter.

The Italian newspapers and magazines illustrated their articles with numerous photographs of Madame Ngo Dinh Nhu's arrival at Fiumicino Airport, her attendance at Sunday mass in the little church of the quarter where the Vietnamese Embassy is located, her visit to the Trevi Fountain and Rome's silk shops.

## Press Conference

The principal event was naturally the press conference held by Madame Ngo Dinh Nhu at the Vietnamese Embassy to which all the Italian press—including the Communists—was invited. The representatives of the American, British, French and German press were also present, not to mention Italian and American radio and television men and photo-journalists of all nationalities.

Concerning the Buddhist conflict in Viet Nam, the Sept. 24 *Seccolo D'Italia* wrote: «As everyone expected, Madame Ngo Dinh Nhu was assailed with insidious questions on the so-called religious persecutions in her country, but with perfect logic and precision she demonstrated how in fact there was no religious persecution whatsoever in her country, and that the widely touted suicides were only barbaric spectacles by which the Communists strived to create a non-existent dissension between Catholics and Buddhists.»

The Communist *Paese-Sera* daily having said on Sept. 22 that Madame Ngo Dinh Nhu had threatened to burn the journalists like bonzes if they did not leave the premises of the Vietnamese Embassy, the *La Stampa* reported her formal denial:

«It is not true,» Madame Ngo Dinh Nhu said, «that in Rome I had spoken of burning the journalists, primarily because I had no wish to do so and also because I do not want to waste gasoline to do it.»

The same day, the *Il Messagero* daily reported the incident provoked by the chief editor of the *L'Unita*, the official mouthpiece of the Italian Communist Party. The Communist newsman showed Madame Ngo Dinh Nhu a series of photographs aimed at «demonstrating» the alleged regime of violence and terror in Saigon. Quick at reacting and showing a great speaking talent, Madame Ngo Dinh Nhu seized the photographs and turned the tables by attributing the whole responsibility to the Communists. Her words, at that moment, took on a particularly polemical vehemence with sharp, peremptory sentences that admitted no reply.

## Grotesque Questions

The *Il Giorno* daily (Sept. 24 issue) reported the words Madame Ngo Dinh Nhu had effectively pronounced: «Here, these photographs remind you that if you do not fight the Communists, your own country may also be reduced to the same situation. The Free world has given up many parts of the Free World without a fight, but only in Viet Nam are we successfully struggling against the Communist threat.»

The *Il Messagero* article mentioned above concluded by saying: «The newsmen's attempts to put Madame Ngo Dinh Nhu on the spot all came to nothing; on the other hand, some of their questions seemed, even to those imperfectly informed on the situation in Viet Nam, strange and sometimes completely grotesque.»

## Women in Viet Nam

The *Il Tempo*, which has the largest circulation in Italy, on Sept. 24 wrote: «The Vietnamese President's sister-in-law was the living personification of femininity during the press conference. It is beyond question that Madame Ngo Dinh Nhu has won for the Vietnamese woman a place which, in our eyes, could appear privileged in the nation.»

Still on the topic of the status of the Vietnamese woman, the same *Il Tempo* on Sept. 27 published an interview Madame Ngo Dinh Nhu granted to its representative, Mr. Guglielmo Rospigliosi: «The emancipation of the woman is our best weapon against Communist attempts to infiltrate the family. In South Viet Nam the women have more rights than their sisters in the North. The Communists, who pretend to be in the vanguard in the domain of reforms, are at any rate lagging behind in regard to the rights of women—at least in Viet Nam. That is why the latter are not Communist.

Touching on the condition of the Italian woman, Madame Ngo Dinh Nhu said: «Give liberty to the woman and she will turn her back on Communism. Don't hesitate. Don't risk losing the invaluable anti-Communist element the woman represents.»

## Communist Maneuvers

During the press conference a few young Communists had wanted to cause trouble by the demonstration here described by *Il Tempo*:

«While Madame Nhu was speaking, about 40 young people staged a modest demonstration outside the Embassy. They monotonously shouted in unison: 'No more Diem.' They called themselves members of a Catholic movement, but among them were the children of Communist Deputy Lombardo Radice. The Trastevere authorities arrested five on charges of demonstrating without authorization.

## Sympathy And Encouragement

Aside from the Communists, wherever Madame Ngo Dinh Nhu and her daughter, Miss Ngo Dinh Le Thuy, went they encountered liveliest sympathy from the people of Rome. Men and women warmly applauded them and stopped traffic by their large numbers, to such an extent that the Police had to intervene to let the car move on.

The shops which welcomed them had to close their doors temporarily to keep from being invaded. Despite this, young Americans and Italians broke through the crowd to loudly tell Madame Ngo Dinh Nhu: «Hold on! Don't pay attention to those who criticize and insult you. They only speak for themselves and the Communists. We may seem silent but we none the less follow your efforts in order to support you.»

These encouragements deeply moved Madame Ngo Dinh Nhu. They are known to be the cause of the extension of her stay. For instead of four days, she finally stayed a whole week in Rome. — END —

# VN TO THE POLLS

## 92.82 Per Cent Of Voters

SAIGON (VP) — Complete preliminary returns in the third National Assembly elections throughout the country were chalked up on the board at Lam Son Square in the heart of downtown Saigon last week.

The figures showed that the voters' turnout was very high in the capital and provinces as well. The percentage even reached 100 in several provincial constituencies.

In Saigon the percentage of eligible voters who cast ballots varied from 79.6 in constituency 3 to 88.1 in constituency 9. The 84.1 per cent average compares very favourably with the 81 per cent recorded in the two first Assembly elections.

The percentage was above 90 in most of the 114 constituencies in the provinces. Only four were lower than 80. Every single of the voters in Phu Bon's sole constituency, Khanh Hoa's constituency 1, Ninh Thuan's constituency 2, Kien Hoa's constituency 4, and Quang Tin's constituency 3 had done their duty, returning a solid 100 per cent vote.

Observers here said that the massive participation of the population, including the Montagnards, in the election despite the present situation testifies to the eagerness of the Vietnamese people to take part in nation's activities.

In the provincial constituencies, where most of the voters know the candidates personally, the winners' percentages were usually very high. Mr. Ngo Dinh Nhu, Deputy to the first and second Assemblies, was reelected in Khanh Hoa's constituency I with 99.99 per cent of the votes. Next

came Dr. Bui Kien Tin elected in Quang Nam's constituency 6 with 99.8 per cent; Mrs. Ngo Dinh Nhu reelected in Long An's constituency 4 with 99.8 per cent; Mr. Co Van Hai reelected in Kien Tuong's single constituency with 99.7 per cent.

In the capital the percentage of the vote obtained by the winners was lower because of the greater number of candidates in each constituency and the resulting hotter competition. A few winners just edged out their nearest runner-up by a few votes.

Figures released by the Interior Department's election return office showed that 92.82 per cent of all eligible voters in Viet Nam cast their ballots last Friday.

The highest percentage, 98.12, was recorded by the Central Delta. Next were the Western Provinces: 96.72; the Eastern Provinces: 90.4; the Highlands: 90 per cent Saigon: 84.15.

The following table shows the percentages in Viet Nam's major areas:

	Ballots cast	Eligible voters	Percentage
Saigon	568,212	675,283	84.15
Eastern Provinces	1,024,422	1,132,112	90.4
Western Provinces	2,402,390	2,587,785	96.72
Central Delta	1,997,581	2,039,532	98.12
Highlands	337,226	374,366	90
National total	6,329,831	6,809,078	92.82

# NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ELECTION

PREFECTURE OF SAIGON			
District	Electoral Constituency	ELECTED REPRESENTATIVE	
		Name	Votes Received
District I	1	Nguyen Huu To	9.052
District II	2	Lam Minh Le	13.569
District III	3	Mrs. Huynh Ngoc Anh	12.124
District III	4	Ho Hue	10.381
District IV	5	Nguyen Van Dieu	17.917
District V	6	Nguyen Van Thiep	43.005
District V	7	Mrs. Nguyen Phuoc Dai	16.497
District VI	8	Phan Van Vien	21.133
District VII + VIII	9	Nguyen Van Chieu	11.370

SW REGION OFS VN			
Province	Electoral Constituency	ELECTED REPRESENTATIVE	
		Name	Votes Received
An-Giang	1	Ho Van Ky Tran	69.372
	2	Le Van Thinh	32.052
	3	Lu Minh Chau	52.359
	4	Huynh Van Bao	41.827
	5	Vo Van Gioi	96.318
	6	Nguyen Van Quy	35.090
An-Xuyen	1	Duong Dan Hoa	37.864
Ba-Xuyen	1	Nguyen Van Lien	26.142
	2	Mrs. Tran Thi Tao	77.464
	3	Vo Van Nhim	61.037
	4	Nguyen Van Duc	61.484
Chuong-Thien	1	Pham Duy Lau	46.732
	2	Mrs. Pham Thi Khanh Trang	60.148
Dinh-Tuong	1	Nguyen Quoc Hung	65.520
	2	Truong Van To	47.279
	3	Huynh Minh Y	30.626
	4	Mrs. Nguyen Thi Mai	40.659
	5	Do Viet Phuc	49.771
Kien-Giang	1	Mrs. Dinh Thuy Yen	57.052
	2	Nguyen Huu Chinh	52.475
	3	Bui Van Lam	40.051
Kien-Hoa	1	Nguyen Van Vinh	35.851
	2	Nguyen Khac Tan	32.421
	3	Pham Van Hat	27.776
	4	Tran Van Tho	21.951
Kien-Phong	1	Pham Van Giac	45.035
	2	Truong Ngoc Khoa	25.588
Kien-Tuong	1	Co Van Hai	31.127
Long-An	1	Mrs. Trinh Thi Minh Ha	37.971
	2	Nguyen Van Tho	51.886
	3	Le Thi Hue	11.095
	4	Mrs. Ngo Dinh Nhu	47.406
Phong-Dinh	1	Huynh Ngoc Diep	84.057
	2	Phan Huu Nghi	45.033
	3	Nguyen Thieu	42.321
Vinh-Binh	1	Mrs. Ngo Thi Xuan	46.731
	2	Nguyen Van Thinh	51.361
	3	Truong Bui Dieu	53.047
	4	Huynh Van Hen	53.377
Vinh-Long	1	Mrs. Nguyen Khoa Thi	45.433
	2	Mrs. Ho Thi Chi	52.954
	3	Tran Van Khiem	46.357
	4	Le Van Thieu	50.346

# RETURNS SEPTEMBER 27-9-1963

EASTERN REGION OF S VN			
Province	Electoral Constituency	ELECTED REPRESENTATIVE	
		Name	Votes Received
Bien-Hoa	1	Mrs. Truong Cong Cuu	31.801
	2	Do Cao Lua	38.210
Binh-Duong	1	Tran Van Trai	74.590
	2	Mrs. Nguyen Thi Minh	26.375
	3	Tran Tan Thong	50.690
Binh-Long	1	Nguyen Van Chuc	12.775
Gia - Dinh	1	Mrs. Tang Xuyen An	21.976
	2	Lai Tu	46.973
	3	Vu Minh Tran	28.059
	4	Chung Duc Mai	25.021
	5	Truong Vinh Le	58.527
	6	Vo Van Nghiem	15.278
Long-Khanh Binh-Tuy	1	Nguyen Phuong Yen	48.810
Phuoc-Long Quang-Duc	1	Nguyen Van Thanh	28.083
Phuoc-Thanh	1	Thai Manh Tien	25.999
Con-Son Phuoc-Tuy	1	Nguyen Xuan Khuong	42.156
Tay-Ninh	1	Nguyen Huu Luong	18.256
	2	Lam Ngoc Diep	17.658

HIGHLANDS OF C VN			
Province	Electoral Constituency	ELECTED REPRESENTATIVE	
		Name	Votes Received
Ninh-Thuan	1	Ngo Khac Tinh	53.137
	2	Quang Dai Minh	10.741
Phu-Yen	1	Cao Van Chieu	53.282
	2	Doan Dinh Duong	18.348
	3	Nguyen Van Tanh	67.461
Quang-Nam	1	Ha Nhu Chi	30.958
	2	Khong Truong Lo	20.241
	3	Nguyen Xuan Thai	41.560
	4	Dinh Xang	35.307
	5	Dinh Van Vinh	23.447
	6	Bui Kien Tin	55.911
Quang-Ngai	1	Nguyen Van Tho	4781
	2	Le Quang Kham	50.847
	3	Mrs. Le Thi Van	35.350
	4	Cao Van Minh	38.108
	5	Vu Dang Dung	40.632
	6	Truong Quang Nhuan	18.665
	7	Vo Van Chat	20.891
Quang-Tin	1	Le Ba Ngoc	61.352
	2	Ho Lien	52.378
	3	Truong Thieu	19.912
Quang-Tri	1	Pham Van Nhu	39.471
	2	Le Anh Kun	35.581
	3	Nguyen Cao Thang	34.317
Thua-Thien	1	Ha Thuc Lang	58.901
	2	Le Trong Quat	54.584
	3	Hoang Trong Ba	39.770
	4		

LOWLANDS OF C VN			
Province	Electoral Constituency	ELECTED REPRESENTATIVE	
		Name	Votes Received
Hue	1	Hoang Huu Khac	10.773
Da-Nang	1	Vuong Duy Quynh	9.423
Binh-Dinh	1	Le Van Tha	7.691
	2	Mrs. Pham Thi Boi Hoan	63.136
	3	Nguyen Nghiem	46.807
	4	Hoang Ba Vinh	43.094
	5	Tran Tai	52.786
	6	Dang Bat	23.190
	7	Doan An	18.437
	8	Bui Tuan	70.177
Binh-Thuan	1	Tran Ba Nghia	64.528
	2	Le Thanh Chi	41.305
Khanh-Hoa	1	Ngo Dinh Nhu	53.879
	2	Do Cao Minh	31.283
	3	Mrs. Ta Ngoc Diep	27.299



# HOW ASIAN COUNTRIES REGULATE IMPORTS

CALCUTTA, September — (NAFEN) — In ECAFE countries tariffs, traditionally designed to earn revenue, have been differentiated in order to foster economic and industrial development only recently, according to a survey issued recently by the United Nations.

In the new tariff schedules of many countries of the region, a distinction between « essential » and « non-essential » commodities is common. Tariffs on essential commodities are very light but those levied on non-essential commodities are heavy. Essential food and capital goods are particularly favoured against manufactured goods which are deemed luxuries or which compete with locally manufactured goods.

In close connection with tariffs are internal taxes such as excise taxes, transaction and consumption taxes levied on both imported and domestic products. While these internal taxes exercise no differential effects on imports against domestically produced goods, they do have restrictive effects on imports by reducing consumers' demand through higher prices. In general, these taxes are imposed chiefly for revenue; they are very high on luxury items with low demand elasticity, such as liquor tobacco and petrol (for private passenger cars) but low on essential consumers' goods.

## Tariffs On Productive Machinery & Luxury Goods

Tariffs on productive machinery are comparatively low. In India, most items of productive machinery and apparatus are subject to a tariff of 15 per cent ad valorem, and a very large number of such imports are exempted from that part of the import duty which exceeds 10 per cent of the import value. Machinery and implements for agriculture, dairy and poultry farming pay no tariff

at all; transport equipment used for commercial purposes pays a duty of 15-20 per cent, and aircraft and ships pay 0-20 per cent; all consumer durables are taxed at much higher rates, many at 95 per cent; protective tariffs on a few categories of machinery and parts thereof range from 15 to 95 per cent.

In Pakistan, productive machinery, as a rule, pays a tariff of 12.5 per cent, but many items of machinery for use in mining and agricultural pursuits pay lower rates and a few items of government imports pay only 0.5 per cent. Agricultural tractors and parts thereof are free from tariff; ships, boats and floating structure pay 0.5 per cent tariff; consumer durables are dutiable mostly at 80 per cent, and passenger vehicles at 40-250 per cent.

In Thailand, a model tariff rate of 11 per cent is applied to a large number of complete sets of machinery, but the rate is only 5 per cent if they are imported on government account.

In the tariff structure of Ceylon, there is an over-riding clause which calls for the payment of only 7.5 per cent tariff on imports certified by the Director of the Development Division (Industries) as being essential for further development of the economy.

In addition to the low tariff rates on productive capital goods (but not on consumer durables), most countries allow tax concessions or rebates which, in effect, nullify even those low tariff rates.

Thus, in the Philippines, since 1946, incentives for « new and necessary » and « basic » industries include, among other privileges, exemption from tariff duty, foreign exchange margin fee, special import levy, etc., on imports of machinery,

equipment, and spare parts.

In the Federation of Malaya, the Pioneer Industries Ordinance introduced in 1958 provides duty concession for imports of capital goods and materials for pioneer industries.

In Thailand, the new Promotion of Industrial Investment Act effective from February 1962 provides that the investor will not have to pay import duty on materials and equipment for use in factory construction.

Luxury goods, in contrast, and goods competing with domestic products pay up to 100 per cent ad valorem in India, up to 250 per cent in Pakistan and up to 80 per cent in Thailand. The recent change in the tariff scheme of Thailand clearly makes deliberate use of tariffs to restrict total as well as non-essential imports and to protect a few industries; duties of 25 per cent and above are not uncommon. Taking the proportion of total revenue from import duties to the total value of imports as a rough indication of the general level of tariff incidence, Thailand's general tariff rate increased from 18 per cent in 1957 to 25 per cent in 1957-58.

## Quantitative Import Restrictions

Countries which use quantitative import restrictions extensively, especially Burma, India and Pakistan, have raised their tariff levels to a much lesser extent.

Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, China, Taiwan, India, Indonesia, Laos, Pakistan, the Philippines (prior to 1961) and Southern Viet Nam, have at one time or other resorted to extensive import and exchange controls, although some of them have also simultaneously used foreign exchange manipulations for the purpose of import control.

Quantitative import controls generally exercise a tight restriction of the maximum level and composition of imports, either by allocations of foreign exchange or by import licences for broad commodity categories. Investment goods have invariably been favoured as helping to achieve a planned rate of growth in general and particular production targets, and essential goods especially food, have also been treated rather liberally in order to avoid scarcities.

Under this system every transaction involving, or likely to involve, payment of foreign exchange comes in for scrutiny and sanction so that excessive imports can be prevented, as can fluctuating levels of imports which would greatly disturb markets and production programmes. Prevention of these dangers has been the main concern of the carefully prepared foreign exchange budgets on which import and exchange controls are based. Even experienced governments, however, have not avoided far-reaching alterations in foreign exchange allocations, and periods of import liberalization have been followed by periods of extreme stringency when even imports of developmental goods are rigidly controlled.

## Quantitative Exchange Control

The immediate aim of quantitative exchange control, viz. regulating the level and composition of imports, is easy to achieve, but the more fundamental aim of exercising this control without hindering industrial and economic development, and without giving rise to grave popular discontent, is more difficult to attain. It would require not only that certain types of good should be imported but also that they should go to the right persons at the right time and at the right prices, and if they are producers' goods or intermediate products, that they should be used for the right purposes. As some imported goods can be used for production or consumption, or for producing alternative goods, various additional safeguards to exchange control become necessary.

Difficulties arising from quantitative import restrictions have led some countries of the region to resort to state trading, and other countries to allow the price mechanism to function only on a limited basis. In order to counteract defects of quantitative import control (and partly for ideological reasons), some countries have even created state import monopolies in particular commodities. In Indonesia, state enterprises have a monopoly of specified imports, amounting to one half of total imports, but as they also import commodities not exclusively reserved for

them they handle approximately 80 per cent of total imports. In Burma, semi-state joint venture corporations handle all imports of foodstuffs, textiles, hardware, building materials and some imports of industrial materials. In Ceylon, all imports of rice, sugar and flour are a monopoly of the Government and dried and salted fish is imported by the Government's Co-operative Whole Establishment.

## State Trading

State trading, by virtue of its monopoly position, has a definite influence on the availability and price of imports and a still greater influence on the direction of a country's import trade, particularly when this is tied up with bilateral agreements and external official financial assistance. The opening of new markets through bilateral trade agreements for export products from mainland China, the Soviet Union and eastern European countries has had a clear impact on the direction of trade in several countries of the region, particularly Burma, Ceylon, India, Indonesia and Nepal.

Even when quantitative import restrictions (and state trading) are strictly applied, difficulties remain. Apart from the difficult task of efficiently allocating raw materials and producer goods, there is the question of equitable distribution. As a complete allocation and rationing system has been found impracticable, many countries of the region have had to make more use of the price mechanism. Various alternative are possible here and in most cases manipulations are practised on the foreign exchange market, such as an alternation of the exchange practices, exchange retention schemes, etc. These various devices are not all designed to influence the structure and direction of imports. The single floating exchange rate in the Philippines and Thailand, for instance, has no differential effects on import commodities at all.

## Multipurpose Exchange Practices

Multipurpose exchange practices which allow a certain portion of foreign exchange earnings to be retained by the exporter, are applied in Burma, Cambodia, Pakistan and the Philippines. They were designed chiefly for encouraging exports; but, when such retained foreign exchange has to be used for importing specified commodities, it affects the composition of imports. This is the case in Pakistan, where retained foreign exchange has been allowed to pay only for developmental imports, although a small part can also be used for motor-cars, scooters and motor cycles. Multiple exchange rates are explicitly used

in Afghanistan and Indonesia which both have five different rates for imports; the most favourable rate is applied to government or essential capital and consumer goods, other imports coming under different graduated exchange rates according to essentiality. In Indonesia, moreover, import licensing and advance deposit requirements reinforce this differential treatment.

In short, most developing countries of the region use quantitative import restrictions to bring about deliberate changes in the pattern of their imports so as to favour investment goods and food. In those countries where quantitative restrictions predominate, the degree of restriction is more severe when the external value of the currency is over-valued. To the extent that a currency is overvalued, the restrictive effects of tariffs on imports will, of course, be offset, but import restrictions then reinforce domestic inflation in raising general costs so that exports begin to suffer and the pressure on the exchange rate is increased. Active export promotion measures have then to be adopted, many of which may partly or wholly nullify the adverse effects of import control-cum-currency over-valuation, but they seldom affect the pattern of imports.

In countries which combine quantitative control with multiple exchange rates for imports, the level and pattern of imports is partly restricted through the working of the price mechanism. This combination sometimes serves as a transitional device in moving towards a more stable and simplified exchange system as the general monetary situation improves, but it tends to add more controls if the general monetary deteriorates.

A few countries of the region, which enjoy reasonable monetary and balance-of-payments stability, resort mainly to tariffs for modifying the level and pattern of imports. But these countries do not seem to have proceeded with industrialisation as far as their foreign exchange resources would permit.

Irrespective of the types of commercial policy adopted by developing ECAFE countries, imports of capital goods (and food) are generally least restricted or most encouraged. Imports of manufactured consumer goods are subject to the greatest restriction, the success of which in the long run depends not merely on import controls but, basically, on home production of import-substitutes. It is in this context of changing import patterns that the trade of developing ECAFE countries with western Europe has to be examined.



# THE NEW TECHNIQUE OF ARTIST VAN BA

**A**RTIST Van Ba is exhibiting his works this week at the Continental Hotel here and the display includes many paintings he says have been created according to a new technique which he calls «oil carving.» The technique consists of putting couches of oil of different

colors on Bristol paper and carving down to the color which the artist wants to make his painting.

Van Ba says the technique is quite new in Viet Nam and represents for him the outcome of long months of efforts «to escape the conventional pattern of oil painting and contribute

something to the advancement of the art in this country.»

Van Ba's subjects, however, remain the same as those which drew much attention last year when he exhibited his works at the City Information Hall. His present show also expresses the feelings of a man of the working

class who has experienced bitterness and frustration throughout his span of life and remains in profound communion with those who work hard yet enjoy few pleasures, with the oppressed, suffering humanity.

(Continued)

Children's Festival



Ice-Cream Peddler



Parallel Sentences



Harvest



Sisters







The Plain of Reeds .

Photo right above :  
Fishing.



Photo right below :  
Source of life.



Van Ba was born in 1915 in Sa Dec, the native province of many leading South Vietnamese artists, writers and politicians. He began to be interested in the art of painting in his early childhood, and at the age of 19, decided to earn a living with his pencil and brush though he had never attended any painting school. It was when he returned to Saigon from a long stay in Phnom Penh, Cambodia as a « portrait maker », that Van Ba entered the Superior School of Fine Arts as an « auditeur libre » and became a student of Prof. Le Van De.

At the same time, Van Ba started doing posters, shop signs, and other works of the same kind a living for himself and his family of eight.

His paintings first appeared at an exhibition jointly held with artist Van Nguyen, his former teacher, and immediately caught the attention of critics who called him an « experienced beginner. » He later won prizes at an international exhibition in Malaya, and in the 1961 Stanvac Calendar Contest.

Van Ba said although several of his works feature the darker side of life

with scenes of poverty and hunger, loneliness or resignation he never loses hope in the future of man. His prime ambition, Ba said, is to inspire « something of a universal love to anyone who happens to have a glimpse of my paintings. »

Van Ba now lives with his wife and eight children at a modest house, 32 Phan Hong Thai, Saigon. Still engaged in advertising business the artist divides the rest of his time between his canvas and his children « to whom I teach the art of living. »

— END —

# MR. HA NHU CHI'S ADDRESS IN BELGRADE

(Herewith is the full text of the speech made by Mr. Ha Nhu Chi, a member of the Vietnamese parliamentary delegation, to the 52nd Inter-parliamentary Union session in Belgrade on September 14.)

Mr. President,

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Madame Ngo Dinh Nhu, the head of our delegation, yesterday made a much noted address in which she presented, in clear concise and distinct terms, the situation of Viet Nam at the present time.

After that speech, any other from our delegation would seem superfluous.

If my delegation still finds it necessary to speak again today the reason is that in the name of the friendship which binds all the members of the Interparliamentary Union together, we find it our duty to do our best to dissipate all misunderstanding which could be not only prejudicial to our country but also to the prestige of every friendly member, if he happened, because of this misunderstanding, to adopt an unjust position based on a false information.

Yesterday Mr. Senanayake of the Ceylonese parliamentary group asked here if « the Government of Madame Nhu » were ready to accept a U.N. investigation on the « Buddhist » affair.

The Vietnamese delegation feels obliged to express its astonishment on the subject of this declaration by Mr. Senanayake, for if it was not incomprehensible it is of a leading nature which seems to us incompatible with the solemn and serious character of this assembly.

As to Mr. Senanayake's question itself, the Vietnamese parliamentary delegation does not feel competent to speak for any government.

However it is happy to provide some

clarifications: the Constitution of the Republic of Viet Nam admits no discrimination, either for or against any minority or majority whatever.

This is why although the Buddhists of the protesting group only constitute a small minority, they have never been the object of any discrimination. Their minority has been proved by their own chief layman, who in his book published in 1961 gave the number of one million adherents out of a population of 14 million — moreover this one million has never been proven by any records.

Viet Nam has been always known as the most tolerant Asian nation in the matter of religion. This state of things is normal because of the disparity and multiplicity of religions which exist side by side.

If the Vietnamese Buddhists have known a crisis this crisis, is rather due to their lack of cadres. And it is this lack of cadres that has caused the regrettable infiltration into the Buddhist movement of alien agents from the East as well as the West.

The Vietnamese delegation accompanying Madame Ngo Dinh Nhu can bear witness to this state of things as all its members including myself are either Buddhists or Confucianists.

As regards Viet Nam, it is therefore particularly uncalled for to speak of persecution of Buddhists for the sole reason that they want to live as such, and the more so as Buddhism is known for its pacifism and its practice of compassion. It is seemly to recall that in regard to the Viet Cong themselves (Vietnamese Communists who, as known by all, follow the orders of

China) who fight us arms in hand and do not spare even inoffensive village school teachers and members of medical teams on purely humanitarian missions in our remote hamlets Viet Nam, obeying her tradition of humanity and tolerance, has not hesitated to implement the humane « Open Arms » policy for its « prodigal sons ». Thanks to it, in the last five months 10,000 Viet Cong have returned.

If we treat our own enemies — the most ferocious — as strayed brothers and have preferred to apply a policy of generosity, it therefore seems particularly unjust and gratuitous to speak in regard to our country of « violations of the rights of man, threats to peace and persecutions of Buddhists for the sole reason that they want to live as such and because they do not find to their taste the democracy practiced in Viet Nam » — the more unjust and gratuitous when one asks oneself what are these accusations founded on?

In effect, if each country were accused on the grounds of « they say », what would we come to, I wonder?

Concerning the democratic path Viet Nam has chosen for herself and which has been defined by the head of our delegation, I think that no one is competent to give his opinion except for the Vietnamese people themselves. This people is the more competent to do so as it is perhaps the only people in the world who, despite nine years of a particularly murderous war, has already had five general elections with universal suffrage to express its wishes and choose its representatives, not counting local elections to endow each hamlet, each city quarter (Saigon has 57

(continued on page 16)



# ASIAN BUDDHISTS AND CHINA

## (Part II)

By Holmes Welch

(Continued from last week)

All this and more has been spelled out in hundreds of newspaper and magazine articles published in China (in Chinese only) from 1950 to 1960. But some of the people I talked to were unwilling to believe that it could be so; others made the comment that when a great country industrialises, sacrifices must be expected from everyone. In Ceylon, a monk who always received me lying on his bed, where he lolled during the several hours of our interviews, said that the monks he had seen in China were too old to do manual labour, but if they were doing it, it would be good for them. "I wish we could labour here. It would be better for me than lying around my bed all day."

"Even if you had to labour eight or ten hours a day?" I asked.

"Yes," he said, with conviction, and then continued: "As I said when I came back from China, if our young men and women had the same opportunities for employment as in China, the number of monks and prostitutes would go down here too."

One might have thought that this eminent monk looked contemptuously on his own vocation, but in a previous talk he told me that ideally everyone should become a monk. The Sangha, that is, the congregation of monks, was "all important." Yet in another breath he expressed complete indifference as to whether the Sangha died out in China or not. "If it does, it can be revived there, as it was in Ceylon." He said this when I pointed out that virtually no ordinations had been held in China since

1957. "When I was in China," he said, "I was not interested in ordinations. I went to China to learn about schools, factories, and farms, not to learn about religion. I had seen enough of religion in other countries. I assumed that since ordinations were allowed in other countries, they were allowed the same way in China."

Thus I was also baffled in my interviews by an apparent indifference to facts that would be unfavourable to the Chinese Government, and a resistance to drawing conclusions from them. A Nepalese monk, for example, said it was probably true that fewer ordinations were being held and the Chinese Sangha was getting smaller, but this was a good thing: now only those who had really mastered Buddhist doctrine could become monks. It was no longer enough to be able to chant the scriptures, sweep the floors, and light incense. A conservative Sinhalese monk expressed a similar thought when he said that only those monks and monasteries that strictly followed monastic rules were allowed to exist as before. Hence he felt that the decline in the number of monks and temples in China was a good omen for Chinese Buddhism.

I remember another Sinhalese monk, whose opinion I asked about a Chinese Communist statement that "the religious viewpoint is reactionary, anti-socialist, and anti-communist." He was not in the least perturbed: "Oh," he said, "they are not talking about Buddhism. Buddhism is not a religion, but a science." (I wish that the Communists agreed.)

### Dalai Lama

The saddest rationalisation of all, perhaps, concerned the Dalai Lama. To many I put the question: who is telling the truth about recent events in Tibet — the Chinese or the Dalai Lama? The Dalai had few champions. In Japan, Nepal, India, and Ceylon, people told me that Tibet was not a part of their respective countries, but belonged to China. They should therefore express no opinion on the subject. In the words of a prominent Nepalese Buddhist layman: "We just do not think about the Dalai Lama."

The Chinese Communists themselves have suggested a somewhat more ingenious approach to the problem. A monk from Ceylon was told by Shirob Jaltso, the President of the Chinese Buddhist Association, that the Dalai Lama was his disciple's disciple and he, Shirob, was therefore the Dalai Lama's teacher's teacher. For this reason (*sic*) the Chinese Government was correct in doing what it could to develop Tibet. In the second place, when it came to any conflict in veracity, it was obviously the teacher and not the disciple whose words must be accepted, Shirob, of course, has fully supported Chinese actions in Tibet. I heard something similar from a Burmese monk: "Only if you ask Panchen Lama," he said, "will you get the whole answer on Tibet. He is the Dalai's teacher." (He is also a Chinese puppet.)

A prominent monk in Nepal averred that he "pitied" the Dalai Lama, but as to who

was telling the truth about Tibet he told me that he had "nothing to say." The Indian philosopher, whose faith in the growing spirituality of Marxism I have mentioned earlier, snapped that he had no respect for the Dalai, who was not worth talking about. An Indian Buddhist monk would comment only that the Dalai was suffering from the influence of a very unfavourable star called «Shami.» On the whole, the reaction of most Buddhists in Asia towards the most dramatic persecution of Buddhism in a thousand years was a desire to change the subject.

Towards the end of each of my interviews I asked about the probable future of Buddhism in China. The clearest answer came from the leftist monk in Japan, who represents a sizeable body of opinion, particularly in the Nichiren Sect. Chinese Buddhism, he said, was not going to disappear, but would survive and develop. It would differ from Buddhism in other countries and from Buddhism in its original form. That is, it would incorporate elements of Marxism. But he would still call it Buddhism, though others might not. An equally clear statement came from a monk in Ceylon. He was the one who welcomed the Chinese Government's decision to wipe out Mahayana Buddhism. Since he also believed that they planned to introduce Theravadin Buddhism in its place, the future of Buddhism in China seemed to him very bright.

From most people the answers I got were much more equivocal. A Nepalese Buddhist layman, active in politics, told me that religion was a sign of weakness. Someday, when every need was satisfied it would no longer be necessary. (This, of course, is an orthodox Marxist view.) But, he added, religion would not completely die out. This was because, on the one hand, people would never lose their fear of illness and misfortune, while, on the other, there would always be a small minority who understood the true Buddhism, which is scientific. In fact, as a devout Buddhist, he felt that the survival of Buddhism was terribly important, both in China and elsewhere, since it was a force for peace. (He was not necessarily contradicting himself. It is logical to maintain that Buddhism, as a religion, is a sign of weakness, but as a science, it is a force for peace.)

I would say that the most common attitude towards the future of Buddhism in

China, as towards the question of Tibet, was indifference. As the Nepalese monk put it: "Buddhism in China is not going forward, but neither is it going backwards very quickly... Religions are always decaying and being created." He said that he was concerned about the new generation of Buddhists in China, but he was concerned about it everywhere. There must be changes in a country that is industrialising. And so on.

### The Reasons Why

As an admirer and student of Chinese Buddhism, I found these interviews more and more exasperating. It was hard for me to understand how Buddhists, who advocate compassion for all creatures in suffering, should feel none for the sufferings of their fellow Buddhists.

One reason was, of course, that most of them did not know what their fellow Buddhists were suffering. Of all the many visitors to China that I interviewed, not one spoke Chinese. Not one brought his own interpreter. Not one ever stayed in a Chinese monastery or talked alone with a Chinese monk, and even if he had, he could not have made himself understood, since virtually no Chinese monks speak English. It is true that the Japanese visitors were able to read Chinese, but this did not mean that they took full advantage of their ability. The Nichiren monk whom I have quoted shrugged his shoulders when I asked about the Peking monthly, *Modern Buddhism*, and said that he never looked at it.

Many of the Southeast Asian Buddhists, on the other hand, cannot even read English. They have no access to translations from the Chinese mainland press or to international discussion of events in China. They have no way of knowing that their Chinese hosts publish one thing in Chinese for consumption at home and quite another thing in foreign languages for consumption abroad. When such visitors are invited to China and shown monastery after monastery, beautifully restored, with monks in immaculate robes reciting the scriptures, there is no possible corrective to the false impression they receive. The remarkable thing is how many of them suspect that it is false.

Actually, however, few people in Asia seem to feel much interest in what is going on outside their own national borders, and because of sectarian differences, this applies especially to the fate of Chi-

nese Buddhism. In Southeast Asia, as I have already suggested, most people look upon Mahayana as a heresy, while in India most people look on Buddhism of both varieties, Theravadin as well as Mahayana, as mere deviations from Hinduism. Even in Japan, the leftist monk that I talked to said that he was not interested in the survival of Zen meditation in China, since he belonged to the Nichiren Sect.

Some readers may dismiss all these attitudes as «naivete». Naivete — or what seemed like it — I cannot deny. A Nepalese monk who was a most honoured guest in Peking several years ago told me that he had asked to stay in the principal Peking monastery. The request was refused on the grounds that he «would not be comfortable there.» He assured his hosts that he was accustomed to hardship and would gladly put up with any discomfort in order to stay where, as a monk, he ought to stay. The request was still refused. They insisted that he would not be comfortable. So far as I could tell, he accepted this explanation, and the more obvious one (a fear that he might see or hear something that he was not supposed to) never occurred to him. He was the same person who assured me that his visit Peking's showplace nunnery, with interpreter and driver, was «unannounced.» Even if it was (which is unlikely) what he did not appreciate, perhaps, was the fact that one function of this nunnery is to be kept in perpetual rediness for visitors.

Several of the people I interviewed told me that if I wanted information on Buddhism in China, I should write to the Chinese Buddhist Association in Peking. «They don't tell lies, because they are dealing with the world,» as a Burmese put it, and by this I think he meant that, if a lie were detected, they would be discredited before the whole world. I did not ask him how the whole world hear about it. Similarly, when a prominent monk in Ceylon came across a quotation that was allegedly from a Soviet book, but seemed in conflict with what he had read about the Soviet Union, he decided to check whether or not there was such a book. To whom did he write? To the Soviet Embassy, of course, which assured him that the book did not exist.

I do not think, however, that ignorance, indifference, and naivete really explain the attitudes that I found. The explanation, I believe, lies first in certain hopes and



fears, and second, in the very nature of Buddhism. By «fears» I mean, for example, the fear of displeasing one's own government. In some countries, like Ceylon and in Nepal, the government took with distaste on anything that disturbs its policy of building better relations with Communist China. Buddhists who wish to be on good terms with their government must adjust to the political atmosphere. By «hopes» I mean, for example, the Japanese hope to re-establish trade with China, which causes many Japanese to cooperate in the Buddhist «friendship act» staged by Peking. Other Japanese cooperate in the hope that by making Chinese Buddhism useful to Peking, their cooperation will help keep it alive. In many countries Buddhists hope to build a world Buddhist movement that is truly international, and so they hesitate to say or do anything that would cause the withdrawal of the *bloc* representatives.

### Chinese Contribution

Another hope is more material. The Chinese Buddhist Association has made frequent gifts to Buddhist organisations abroad. In one case they gave half a million *rupees* to a monk in Nepal who, by an odd coincidence, produced a book soon afterwards, praising Communist treatment of Buddhism. Part of the money he received was used to construct some much-needed school buildings.

Then there is the prospect of travel. Many Southeast Asians told me that they enjoy nothing better than travel. Since they are unable to get foreign exchange, their only hope is to go abroad as the guests of a government or institution. Some look towards the West, some towards the *bloc*, and some manage both. On the whole, the *bloc* seems better equipped to make a good impression on them.

An early Sinhalese visitor to China said that he was given three rooms in his hotel in Peking, with a telephone in each. He cut a grand swathe, even interceding on behalf of a Ceylon trade delegation that had been trying for weeks to get an agreement out of the Chinese. Within twenty-four hours of his intercession, the delegation got what it had been asking for. Many Buddhist travellers attend meetings and conferences and may enjoy the excitement of representing their own country with more privileges than the accredited ambassador.

### Chou En-lai's Views

With these thoughts in mind, therefore, some Buddhists feel as if they were already

riding the wave of the future. They turn from fear to hope. Religion will always be necessary. Even the Marxists say that it cannot be eliminated in the near future, and the Marxists are sure to find, once material needs are satisfied, that something spiritual is required above and beyond. Is not Buddhism best suited to supply this spiritual something? No religion is so compatible with Marxism. In fact, like Marxism, Buddhism is not a religion at all, but a science. So perhaps Marxism, instead of destroying Buddhism, will spread it.

This idea is so intoxicating that sober heads are turned. Provided one is certain that Marxism is evolving—*must* evolve—in the «right direction», one can dismiss all Marxist pronouncements on religion as having only historical interest. I have already mentioned the monk in Ceylon who believes that the Chinese Government plans to replace Mahayana with Theravadin Buddhism. This is what he was told by Chou En-lai, he said, and Chou had come to favour such a plan after a talk he had with U Nu on the relative merits of the two kinds of Buddhism. Theravada was pure and scientific, while Mahayana was corrupt and superstitious.

According to Chou En-lai the reason that the Chinese Buddhist Institute was founded in Peking seven years ago was to introduce Theravada and gradually to do away with Mahayana. But Chou admitted that it would be difficult to convert the Chinese people to Theravada because their Mahayana habits were so deeply engrained (thus, in his usual farsighted way, he provided himself with an alibi should the conversions of China fail to materialise).

To spread the *dharma* among seven hundred million people—what a glorious prospect for any Buddhist monk! what enormous merit would be generated! and how resolutely any attempt at sabotage must be resisted! Only in these terms can I explain the extraordinary conversation that we then had. I asked this monk if it would not be a good idea for him to know more about the present situation of Buddhism in China. Would he like to see translations from Peking newspapers? He began by saying that he would. Then, after a few moments' reflection, he changed his mind. The Chinese Communists, he said, had been striving to put their country on its feet. Certain steps had necessarily been taken that were detrimental to Buddhism, but these steps were correct. Similarly, in the history of Ceylon, some kings had conducted wars of libera-

tion. Though many were killed, the people were grateful and the monks chanted psalms of praise (*pitis*) to show that they sanctioned it. Some day in China, a stop would come to all these things: «one has to deal with the people, and so there will be liberalisation.»

### Outsiders

Still, I asked, would it not be best for him as a visitor (he is going to China again this year) to have as much information as possible, particularly if he hopes to undertake such a vast programme of conversion? No, he said, if outsiders knew what was going on, the Communists would not be able to carry on their plans of reconstruction (*sic*). In the United States, too, outsiders were kept from knowing certain things. But, I persisted, was it not safer to know what the Chinese had been saying to one another in their own language? Was it wise to run even the remotest risk of being used?

That was not the way to look at it, he said. If he knew beforehand the real conditions in China, he might feel an aversion to going there. Also, it was like trying to find out too much about a man's weaknesses: it could spoil your relationship with him. Even in Ceylon, social and economic conditions made it impossible to practice Buddhism perfectly.

And so it went for nearly two hours. Yet we parted on the best terms, and I think that he held no ill will for my persistent questions. I for my part did not consider that he was «naive», but simply that his good judgment had been overwhelmed by the hope of changing the world for the better.

I do not want the reader to be misled by the conversations recounted above, many of which I have selected more because they are striking than because they are typical. I do not consider that the majority of Asian Buddhists have sacrificed their good judgment or intellectual honesty for the sake of currying favour with their own government, or for the sake of foreign trade, Chinese donations, guided tours, or the prospect of converting Communists to Buddhism. Let me make this point very clear: the majority of the people that I talked to were more or less aware of the nature of the Chinese Communist regime and had doubts about the survival of Buddhism in

(Continued on page 16)

## Customs Of Viet Nam VI :

# Vietnamese Feasts And Holidays

By Truong Van Binh

(Continued from last week)

is known to be produced by the weavers of Phung Xa, his native village where a temple was built to his memory as a token of gratitude.

Traditional methods of weaving silk consist of the following operations :

- Cleaning of cocoons in hot water.
- Unwinding of cocoons to produce silk threads.
- Winding of silk threads on a core to make a skein.
- Winding of the warp and the weft on shuttles.

Then these threads pass through an unwinding device to a loom made of wood. The weaver operates the loom, which has no automatic device to send the shuttles back, with his hands and feet.

With a continuous improvement through the centuries Vietnamese silk weaving craft has produced various kinds of materials, to meet the requirements and satisfy the taste of the users.

After Phung Khac Khoan, this craft was largely taught to the Vietnamese people during the reigns of Emperors Minh Mang and Tu Duc.

Silk materials commonly known are : the Lua Van brocaded with big flowers : Voc also brocaded but of better quality : xuyen, light, soft without figure; the very light and thin, brocaded or without figure : Nhieu; of usually heavier fabric, and Satin shining soft and very smooth.

All these materials are suitable for both summer and autumn dresses of either sex, lined clothes, warm and made of the Voc, Nhieu and Satin are for winter.

Today, with modern automatic weaving

machines Vietnamese craftsmen can produce great amounts of silk materials of better quality and greater volume which are in great demand in local market.

### Embroiderers

According to history the initiator of embroidery craft in Vietnam was Le Cong Hanh a mandarin at the Court of Emperor Le Chieu Ton and native of the province of Ha Dong. He was sent to China to find some possible new trades for his country. But during his stay there he was greatly interested in embroideries and learned this art with the hope of teaching it later to the inhabitants of his native village. Soon after he returned home, the first Vietnamese embroideries which were much appreciated by his emperor and by the nobles and the aristocrats of his country, appeared.

From that day this craft spread rapidly and brought prosperity to many villages in North Vietnam. Today most of the Vietnamese embroideries are still made by hand and the methods remain unchanged.

At first, a piece of material, usually of fine local or Chinese silk is stretched on a frame made of bamboo or wood. Then a picture is drawn on a sheet of thin paper. The craftsman sticks the picture on the framed material and embroiders it with floss silk threads, silver and gold threads or cotton threads of various colors.

The pictures to be embroidered are drawn right on the framed material where it is possible.

Embroideries are used primarily as ornamentation but later mainly as the expression of one's sentiments of respect, gratitude, friendship, appraisal etc... to-

wards a superior, a benefactor, a friend, or the interpretation of certain philosophical and religious concepts.

For these reasons an embroidery is often offered a man on the occasion of his marriage, his appointment to an important post, his assistance and charity to other people. The designs of the embroideries and the sentences written in Chinese characters below them vary with the circumstances under which they are offered. To a man or a girl about to be married, the pictures usually show a couple of phoenix (Loan Phung) meaning love and harmony, with a sentence wishing happiness, fecundity and longevity.

To an official on his appointment to a higher position the picture would show a mandarin working or reading at his desk with a sentence expressing respect, congratulation and success.

Sentence parallels written in Chinese characters are usually embroidered on black or white cloth to pay respect to the dead.

In pagodas and temples, embroideries usually show fabulous animals : dragons, unicorns, turtles, phoenix (tu linh) or the five sacred tigers (nhu ho).

An old man is often presented, on the anniversary of his birthday, with the picture of five bats symbolizing five cases of happiness (ngu phuc) : wealth health ; longevity, tranquillity and quiet death.

In churches, banners, flags, altar clothes, chasubles and other vestments of the priests at Mass are now all embroidered by local craftsmen whose skill and adeptness are beyond comparison.

(To be continued)

# ASIAN BUDDHISTS AND CHINA

(From page 14)

China. They were not stupid, nor were they Communist dupes.

If they often seemed evasive and self-contradictory, it was because they were trying to observe a cardinal principle of Buddhism: avoid partisanship. Monks may not engage in partisan politics. If Buddhism is persecuted, they must, as always, obey Government decrees and wait for a suitable time to speak.

For example, Buddhist monks in Ceylon could take no action to help Buddhists in Tibet. They could merely express *sanvega*, «impersonal regret», and meetings were actually held for this purpose in Ceylon after the suppression of the Lhasa uprising. They were meant to be non-partisan, but some Buddhists would not have considered them so and certainly the Chinese Embassy did not.

If one follows the principle of non-partisanship a little further, one can finally see, I think, the underlying reason for so much of the apparent indifference and rationalisation that I encountered from Buddhists in many countries. I was an American, representing (in their eyes) partisanship personified. I was necessarily *against* the Soviet Union and *against* Com-

munist China. I was a supporter of the world contest that now exemplifies the three primary Buddhist evils: greed, anger, and stupidity. How were these monks and laymen to deal with me? If they accepted accepted what I had to say or, rather, if their thinking was moved in the direction indicated by my question (for I tried to avoid the expression of my own opinions), they too would run the risk of being snared by partisanship and slipping back into the greed, anger, and stupidity which they had spent their lives overcoming.

Thus the monk who shrugged his shoulders when I mentioned the possible demise of the Chinese Sangha and said: «Well, if the Sangha is destroyed, it can be revived» — his concern at that moment was not for the Chinese Sangha, but for himself and for me. Would he allow my question to turn him against the Chinese Communist? Was there any way in which he could turn me, perhaps, away from my partisanship? It was not he who was «fuzzymind», but I. In his view, my efforts were directed towards criticising the People's Government, whereas they should have been directed towards criticising myself.

One difference between Theravadin and

Mahayana Buddhism has been and still is that in the Theravada the first problem is oneself. For how can one help others until one has clarified one's own mind? Many (though not all) of the quirky statements that I have quoted above make perfectly good sense when seen as an effort on the part of the people I was interviewing to avoid falling into partisanship at the hands of a dangerous American diversionist. The more compelling the evidence such people are offered about the true status of Buddhism in Communist countries, the more rigorously they must discipline their minds to discount it. The greater the indignation that outsiders may feel over the treatment of Buddhism in China, the harder Buddhists must try to teach them the non-attachment which alone leads to true compassion.

I wish that I could leave it at that. But I must tell my friends in Southeast Asia — if any of them ever read these lines — that their approach seldom has the effect they hope for. To most non-Buddhists the Theravadin attitude to the problem of Communism is simply incomprehensible. Non-Buddhists are not stirred to self-examination, but to scorn. I feel not scorn, but sadness. One young monk in Ceylon told me that he and eighty *per cent* of his contemporaries hoped that their country would soon have a Communist government.

I have made a special study of Buddhism in China. I know what has happened to it in the last twelve years; both the good and the bad. I think that I know what would happen to the Sangha in Ceylon if their government were Communist. Buddhism would die a painful death. This may, in fact, happen. There is nothing an outsider can do to warn the victims. Any warning will be regarded as partisan propaganda. Nor can he urge those Buddhists who know the facts to proclaim them publicly, for that would be engaging in partisan politics. Nor, for the same reason, can he expect them to take joint action in their own defence. The outsider can only sit by and watch.

It is my impression that the devout Buddhists of South-east Asia, if confronted by a choice between self-defence and destruction, would choose destruction. They may remember the famous Jataka tale in which the Buddha, in one of his previous lives, felt compassion for a hungry tigress and provided his own body as a meal. Non-Buddhists may wonder what practical purpose was served by the sacrifice: they miss the point. The point was the change that it represented in Buddha's mind. Unfortunately this is not the kind of mental change that a Communist regime will permit.

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## Mr. HA NHU CHI'S ADDRESS IN BELGRADE

(from page 11)

quarters) with an administration committee comprising administrative, military, economic and social officials, charged by the local population with all affairs concerning it.

The Viet Cong have not hesitated to take arms and wage a pitiless war against us to show that the democracy we have chosen and of which we are extremely proud is «not to their taste.»

This criminal undertaking is being brought to an end by a resounding defeat. All those who supported it did not hesitate then to violate, as the last card in a desperate situation, the most sacred institutions namely religion, order to catch naive souls and to better continue their work of subversion.

On this subject I would like to remind that the enemy who dons civilian clothes to better indulge in subversive acts in a war-torn country is exposed to the gravest penalties if caught. What then shall we say when he dares disguise himself in religious robes? In Viet Nam, less than ten subversive agents have indulged in such treason.


In the victorious war Viet Nam is brave-

ly waging for the triumph of Democracy over an enemy not only cruel but the most deceitful, she therefore considers it right to be able to count at least on the moral if not material aid of all the members of the Interparliamentary Union.

Everyone can thus understand that being within reach of the final victory at so high a cost, Viet Nam could not in any case betray the aspirations of people and the confidence of her friends by indulging in a senseless religious persecution which could only jeopardize her chances of success.

The Vietnamese parliamentary delegation sees it a duty to entreat the distinguished members of this assembly to which Viet Nam has the honour of belonging, not to give credence to the systematic campaign of calumnies aimed above all at hiding from the world a well-deserved defeat of our enemy, and the enemy of all the Free World, for he does not hesitate to indulge in blackmail, crime, intoxication, war, to try to demolish what we respect and defend the most: Democracy and its grand principles of respect for the dignity of the human person.





# Books

## YOU WILL WANT TO READ

- RADIOISOTOPE TECHNIQUES
- GEOPHYSICAL PROSPECTING
- GAS PURIFICATION
- GYNECOLOGICAL THERAPY
- PRACTICAL PRESTRESSED CONCRETE
- PRINCIPLES OF BIOCHEMISTRY
- WEATHER AND CLIMATE, for Geographers, Meteorologists, or Climatologists.
- FOLK MEDICINE
- WISDOM OF THE WEST
- STRENGTH OF MEN AND NATIONS
- TRIUMPH IN THE WEST
- LITERATURE AND WESTERN MAN
- THE LIFE OF SIR ALEXANDER FLEMING, Discoverer of Penicillin
- DOCTOR ZHIVAGO
- I REMEMBER
- THE UNCERTAIN TRUMPET
- LIFE IN THE SEVEN SEAS
- TREASURES OF THE SEVEN SEAS
- BOOK OF THE SEVEN SEAS
- ASIA: CHALLENGE AT DAWN
- LAND OF THE LAMAS
- DRAGON AND SICKLE
- COMMUNISM AND WAR IN ASIA
- THE STORM WITHIN COMMUNISM
- THE SOVIET DICTATORSHIP
- THE REVOLT IN TIBET
- A SHORT HISTORY OF MIDDLE EAST
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