

The VIETNAMESE RESISTANCE published by the General Directorate of Overseas Affairs to provide background and information on the liberation struggle of the Vietnamese. Subscription is \$12.00 US dollars or other currency equivalence. Please contact respective offices for inquiries and changes of address. Financial contributions to our cause are greatly appreciated.

## NUFRONLIV

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## INTERNATIONAL FORUM ON CAMBODIA: SOLE BLESSING FOR HANOI

As the September date draws near the total withdrawal of Hanoi occupying army from Cambodia become more illusory. The highly expected International Conference on Cambodia under the sponsorship of France ended on August 30 in Paris without any brighter prospect. Foreign ministers of the United States, the Soviet Union, and China cancelled their attendance on the concluding ministerial session of the Conference. Many international analysts predicted intensified fighting between the Cambodian resistance and the Hanoi-backed regime to come in months ahead.

The major stumbling block was Hanoi insistence on "partial solution" for the settlement of the Cambodian problem. Hanoi, via its Phnom Penh client government, rejected the proposal to form a quadripartite provisional government in replacement of the Hun Sen-led regime prior to a tentative general election, and demanded that this "internal aspect" be set aside from the international talk. Believing a civil war and political chaos would follow if a provisional governing body including all 3 Cambodian resistance parties is not instituted, the ASEAN countries, the United States, and China strongly defended a "comprehensive solution" to the Cambodian settlement.

Culmination of Hanoi position appeared in the August 7 statement of the Phnom Penh delegation that sternly upped its demand to the exclusion of the Khmer Rouge from all forms of participation, and the dismantlement of its military as well as political organization as the condition for the general election. As the new demands unexpectedly came one month apart from the withdrawal

date promised by the Hanoi regime the move was seemed as calculated to stonewall a political solution to the situation in Cambodia.

Hanoi wants an image of a peace-making partner with its promise of troop withdrawal, even though the pullout came as a necessity rather than a choice. At the same time, top leaders in Hanoi clearly desire to maintain their close control of the 2 neighboring countries of Laos and Cambodia. The economic collapse and the widespread resistance have forced Hanoi to improve its image for foreign aids and political support. With settlers migration in the last 10 years and troops disguise, Hanoi has, however, retained its decisive say in any future turns of Cambodia.

It's therefore no surprise when the Vietnamese Communists tried to trumpet their termination of Cambodia control with the troop withdrawal promised for September. The number of more than 1 million Vietnamese settlers since 1978 and nearly 200,000 armed civilians left behind in Cambodia is agreed by most analysts as the formidable source threatening the self-determination of the Cambodian people. In face of serious concerns expressed by many ASEAN leaders, Hanoi now admitted, a clearly discounted number of 80,000 civilians, but it remains silent to its agent network combed into various levels and organizations of the Cambodian society. A new devise was invented to deflect the world attention from this issue and the continuing defacto rule of Hanoi in Cambodia: the exclusion of the Khmer Rouge from any political talks and solutions; the brutal record of this Khmer Rouge faction was played up by Hanoi's client regime for justification.

(Continued, next page)



Hanoi's continuing desire for control of Cambodia is nonetheless revealed itself when through the client regime in Phnom Penh it unreasonably refuses to accept a U.N. supervision force to monitor the withdraw of troops, agents and Vietnamese settlers from Cambodia.

Indonesian Foreign Minister Alatas has reportedly lost his patience with Hanoi's Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach, on the latter's insistence for a "partial solution" - discussing only the "external aspect" of the settlement - which would in effect benefits the communist regime in Vietnam without rendering any potential solution to the miserable situation of Cambodia. The dissatisfaction with Hanoi top leaders' obstinacy has been voiced in a current statement of the Singaporean Foreign Ministry. Nguyen Co Thach, at the end of the Conference, bluntly spoke of the possibility of Hanoi troops return on the request of any future Cambodian government, a veiled threat that greatly angered the Thai government.

Hanoi's intention in all talk engagements of Cambodian problem has become apparent through the review of its long-range plans and short-term tactics. Since the last 2 years, the Vietnamese Communists have taken advantages of Jarkarta Informal Meeting I, II, Conference, and various meetings and appearance with foreign leaders as opportunities to refurbish their images for badly needed aids and assistance. Despite of the quest for foreign money, their cunning maneuvers in international forum were often overshadowed by philosophy of using violence and threats as the primary tools of their foreign policy. The Vietnamese Communists never compromise their goals, even their tactics may be changing and flexible. History of their foreign affairs remains to be the evidence and clue. Their occupation and domination of Cambodia must be accordingly assessed and dealt with. For long enough it has appear that the Hanoi regime, instead of being treated as the culprit of this war-wretched Indochina, was welcomed in international forums as the savior for this messy quagmire. ■

# RESISTANCE NEWS

Vietnamese Resistance Radio established by NUFRONLIV in late 1983 broadcasts 8 times daily on the 30m and 40m wave bands (10.3MHz and 7.4MHz) to inform and mobilize the Vietnamese at home on the liberation struggle. Due to limited space, we can only excerpt part of the VRR daily news programs.

## NEWS FROM VIETNAM

News Brief fom VRR Broadcast of  
May 19, 1989

### Resistance fighters ambush Hanoi agents at Song Cau district

The Administrative and Resistance Committee of Phu Khanh province reported that in the middle of March the Armed Resistance Unit ambushed a group of state security agents at Song Cau district. After a few minutes of fighting, they fled away and leaving 3 dead agents and 2 injured. The Resistance Unit had seized 3 AK-47, one K-54, grenades, documents, and ammunition. One of the injured

was in critical condition and later died, the other was treated and released after the wound healed. Touched by the care of the Resistance fighters he promised to leave the Hanoi rank and would propagate the NUFRONLIV's Greater Union and Pardon Policy to others. The Resistance Unit suffered no casualty.

### People of Tien Giang province help resistance fighters

According to the Vietnamese Resistance Radio on May 19, 1989, the Administrative and Resistance Committee of Tien Giang province reported that it had organized two military basic training classes for youths of Cai Lay, Cho Gao, Cai Be, and Go Cong Tay districts. Beside the military training, they were taught about mass mobilizational techniques.



A Resistance fighter tries on rocket launcher B-41.

When the classes ended, 16 youths volunteered to join the Armed Resistance Force. Others returned to their villages and brought along documents and leaflets for the local people. With active helps from the people of Cai Lay district, a NUFRONLIV resistance unit reportedly destroyed one bridge and many electrical poles which were exclusively used by the state security force.

#### Two resistance groups in Cuu Long join NUFRONLIV

The Administrative and Resistance Committee of Cuu Long province reported that two resistance groups, after having contacted with NUFRONLIV cadres in March, joined NUFRONLIV rank. One group, led by ARVN First Lieutenant Hieu, brought along one rifle, some grenades, and many documents. Another group, called Restoring National Front, was consisted mostly of young members. Both groups said that they had learned about NUFRONLIV organization and strategy long before they met members of NUFRONLIV. The Committee also reported that it had received about 400 kilos supplies of rice, salt, medicine, and some explosives and time fuses from the people of Cuu Long province.

News Briefs from VRR Broadcast of June 15, 1989

#### Peoples in Long An disseminate leaflets

The Administrative and Resistance Committee of Long An province has trained many local people for mobilizational activities in Can Giuoc, Thu Thua, Moc Hoa districts and Tan An city. Several thousands disseminated leaflets have provided guidance on lowering productivity and avoidance of crops seizure. Popular boycotts had turned Hanoi's seizure programs into a total failure. The shrimp seizure attempt was most effected. In early May, a Hanoi tax col-

lector named Thanh was killed in Can Giuoc district. According to the people, he was one of the most vicious tax collector in the region. His killing reflected the people's reaction to the regime's unjust and oppressive policy.

#### Mobilizational lessons offered to people of Hau Giang

In April and early May, the Administrative and Resistance Committee of Hau Giang province organized many mobilizational classes, especially on the techniques to persuade Vietcong cadres and soldiers to join

cadres destroyed one bridge in My Xuyen district, where the state security force maintained its regular reconnaissance post.

#### State Security Force unit attacked in Di Linh district

In early June, with information provided by the people of Di Linh district, a Resistance Armed Force unit successfully ambushed a State Security Force unit. After few minutes of fighting, 3 State Security agents were killed, the others fled away. One resistance fighter was slightly injured. The Resistance unit seized 2 AK-47, one K-54, some grenades, many documents, and



Vietnamese in Europe petition European Economic Commonwealth to deny Hanoi's application. Bruxelles, Belgium. Summer 1988.

resistance rank. By the end of April, 7 young people and 5 Hanoi soldiers were sworn in as NUFRONLIV resistance fighters. Lam, a former Hanoi soldier, said: "All soldiers in my unit are extremely frustrated of being mistreated and of the starving conditions. Their anger against the regime was vented unhiddenly toward their superiors. Everybody is ready to desert whenever the chance comes." Before leaving his unit, he destroyed one communications equipment and brought along 4 kilos of explosives with time fuses. Also in April, NUFRONLIV

ammunition. Before returning to the base, the Resistance unit disseminated many leaflets which called upon Vietcong soldiers and cadres to disobey orders, to desert or to join the resistance rank. The Committee also reported that many meetings between the Committee's members and the people had been organized in various places in the province. These meetings were to explain the NUFRONLIV strategy and to provide mobilizational techniques. The people had given rice, corn, and some dried foods for resistance fighters in these meetings.

# OVERSEAS NEWS

## Hanoi Minister's threat stuns the public audience

A Minister of the Hanoi regime had stunned the participants and audience of a meeting in Canberra with his profane threat to a Vietnamese student. The Vietnamese Communist Embassy in Canberra together with David Marr, a leftist professor, on May 16, 1989 arranged a meeting for Vu Tuan, the Hanoi's Minister of Light Industry, to appear at the Australian National University. The meeting attracted a scanty audience of seven people. Among his call for foreign aids,



Demonstrators burn Vietnamese Communist flag in propaganda film protest in Portland, USA. June 1989.

in particular, technological supports from foreign universities, students, personnel and Vietnamese students abroad, Tuan especially emphasized the promising future for young Vietnamese students overseas who would be willing to give hands to the Hanoi regime. Vu's enticement did not serve its purpose. On the contrary, a Vietnamese student, Nguyen Quang Duy, had cornered the regime's representative with a series of questions on current violations of human rights in Vietnam, the regime's continuous broken promises, and persecution in "re-education camps" and New

Economic Zones. Unable to give satisfactory answers and lost his temper, Vu stood up, pointed his finger to Duy's face, and said: "We will not let you get away with this, boy!". The meeting



Demonstrators stop the Hanoi's propaganda tour in Paris, France. May 20, 1989.

image as an open and democratic country. One of the schemes was musical performance with the hope to portrait the regime as art loving thus being truthful and peace loving. Hanoi's attempt met a strong resistance from the Vietnamese around the world. On May 20, 1989 the performance group and their advocates travelling on a bus on the way to Moulbert Theater were blocked by hundreds of Vietnamese. The Vietnamese demonstrators have called on the conscience of these performers to stop giving hands to the deceit shows of the regime. The show, started an hour late, only drew a small audience, mostly communist sympathizers. The next morning, May 21, Nguyen Binh, the Hanoi's Ambassador in France, decided to cancel all other performance plans and shipped the group back to Vietnam. On the same day, Hanoi cadres in Southern France also cancelled the meeting scheduled at Amidonniers auditorium, Toulouse, whose speaking guest, Trinh Cong Son was known as a Hanoi's sympathizer.

## Ho Chi Minh's crimes unveiled

The Vietnamese people in Paris on May 20, 89 also organized a mass demonstration at Trocadero park to reveal Ho Chi Minh's record of crimes. Hundreds of Vietnamese people had gathered for the demonstration. Unaccountable number of pictures illustrat-

## Hanoi's advocates face people's opposition in Paris

In order to persuade the Western countries about its "openness" policy, the Hanoi's regime has recently sent several propaganda groups to France and the United States to shine up its





Mass demonstration unveils Ho Chi Minh's record of crimes. Paris, France. May 20, 1989.

ing brutal acts of the Communist Party of Vietnam under Ho Chi Minh's orders were exhibited. Several representatives of Vietnamese organizations came to the stage to reveal the crimes committed by the Hanoi regime and its founder, Ho Chi Minh, through various periods and in different places. The speeches also criticized the UNESCO's decision to promote Ho

namese organizations in England in coordination with the NUFRONLIV England Chapter have arranged a mass demonstration against the scheme. Facing questions from demonstrators outside the meeting hall, Tran Van Hung and his associates have left the place before the meeting started. Last September, Tran Van Hung was summoned to the British Foreign Office for

learned of the event and peacefully demonstrated against it. Thousands of leaflets were disseminated to the local people. On June 23, noticing the Vietnamese refugees among the audience, the Communist agents cancelled their show at the last minutes of the schedule. In April the Vietnamese communist organizers had to cancel their propaganda film show at the University of California in Los Angeles because of consistent demonstrations of the Vietnamese.

#### **Fund Raised for the NUFRONLIV in Sydney, Australia**

On June 11, 1989, the Resistance Support Groups and the NUFRONLIV members' families in Sydney organized a Fund Raising Dinner at Masonic auditorium. Over one hundred guests attended. In the opening speech, the NUFRONLIV chapter head in Sydney, analyzed the goal to consolidate the deteriorating power in misleadingly named "national reconciliation and concord" policy trumpeted by Hanoi. He emphasized that top leaders of the oppressive Communist Party only retreat temporarily at the hard times and would resume their oppression later. He also announced to the guests of a fund raising plan, called "Medicine for Resistance Fighters" initiated by the NUFRONLIV Chapter in Sydney.

#### **Vietnamese Refugee Delegation Received by Canadian Parliament**

On July 11, 1989, a Delegation of the Vietnamese Community in Ottawa and the NUFRONLIV's Head of the



Resistance Fundraising Dinner in Sydney, Australia June 11, 1989.

Chi Minh as one of the international persons of fame in 1990. A pantomime was performed at the park to illustrate the barbarous policy of Ho Chi Minh-ordered agricultural reforms of the 1950s, during which hundreds of thousands of innocent Vietnamese had been killed.

#### **Hanoi's solicitation for aids aborted**

On June 9, 1989 a leftist organization in England arranged a meeting between its members and Hanoi's Ambassador in Great Britain, Tran Van Hung. The meeting was to assist Hanoi in soliciting money from foreign individuals and organizations. Viet-

a harsh warning, and a Third Secretary of the Hanoi regime was later expelled from Britain due to his pointing a Colt-45 at the demonstrators.

#### **Vietnamese Denounce Hanoi's Propaganda Film Show in Portland, Oregon.**

Hanoi's agents, under the arrangement of The World Affairs Council of Oregon and Oregon Art Institute, organized a film show from June 15 to July 7, 1989. The show advertised to the American was carefully announced to avoid attention of the Vietnamese community in the region. The Vietnamese community, however, still

Eastern Canada Chapter had a meeting with the Honorable Mac Harb, a Representative of the Canadian Parliament, at the Capital Center. In the meeting, the delegation presented to Representative Harb a petition with over 500 signatures of the Vietnamese people in Ottawa, asking the Canadian Government to take measures against illegal trading businesses operated by Hanoi agents and affiliates in Canada. It's reported that the Department of External Affairs and the Justice Department have a great concern over this matter.

#### **Annual meeting of Hanoi's front organization in Japan foiled**

On July 2, 1989, the annual meeting of The Association of the Vietnamese in Japan, a Hanoi's front organization, was cancelled due to a prompt reaction from the Vietnamese community in Japan. From the early morning, over a hundred Vietnamese gathered around Jimbocho, Tokyo to be ready for the demonstration against activity of this association. Around 10 a.m., some would-be guests arrived but then left after being explained and shared the viewpoints of demonstrators. The annual meeting



Vietnamese foil Japan-based Hanoi front's annual meeting. Tokyo, Japan. July 2, 1989.

supposedly for around two hundred participants and supporters to cheer the Hanoi regime and its leaders ended up as a dismal event with only 29 people attended including children. Vo Van Sung, Hanoi's Ambassador in Japan invited as honorable guest, being informed of the demonstration, did not show up. The expensive party dinner was cancelled and the supposedly whole-day event lasted for only one hour.

#### **Hanoi Propaganda blocked in Boston**

The William Joiner Center, an American leftist association at Boston University, had organized the Writer's

Workshop for three Hanoi's propagandists to advertise the regime's so called "openness" policy. Fifteen Vietnamese associations in the region promptly organized an Action Committee Against Vietcong Propaganda Scheme to counter-attack the propaganda attempt. On July 26, over a hundred Vietnamese gathered for a mass demonstration at Copley Square outside the Boston Public Library, where the first session of Writer's Workshop was being convened. During this session, the three writers were stifled with questions from the Vietnamese audience. The embarrassed writers later cancelled their scheduled July 31 session. ■

The National United Front For Liberation Of Vietnam (NUFRONLIV) was formed in 1980 to absorb Vietnamese at home and abroad into a mass organization to free Vietnam from the Vietcong and Soviet domination, and to build a democratic and prosperous country for the Vietnamese people.

NUFRONLIV liberation strategy emphasizes on mass mobilization for an all-front struggle that utilizes all available means and imaginative methods of the mass to destroy the enemy, in which military approach is conceived supplemental to mobilizational activity.

Overseas the NUFRONLIV has chapters almost everywhere there is a Vietnamese community. Inside Vietnam the infrastructure expands even far deep into the North. Besides the cadres network, NUFRONLIV communicates with people inside Vietnam via its Vietnamese Resistance Radio, broadcasting 8 times a day for one hour each.

NUFRONLIV President:  
Commissioner-General/Directorate of Inland Affairs:  
Commissioner-General/Directorate of Overseas Affairs:  
Commander in Chief/Armed Resistance Forces:

HOANG CO MINH  
NGO VAN TU  
NGUYEN KIM  
DANG QUOC HIEN

# ARMS TRAFFICKING THREATENS HANOI SECURITY ENFORCEMENT

Arms trafficking in Vietnam has now come to a threatening magnitude that 2 major official newspapers have consistently warned of its consequences and called for cooperation of the Ministries of National Defense and Interior.

The NHAN DAN (The People) in an article *"A Problem Worthy of Concern: Checking the Theft of Weapons"* on April 24, 89 cited that "since 1981, there have been 763 cases of theft involving 10,681 guns, 6 metric tons of explosives, 2.65 million detonators, 10,621 grenades, 3,700 mines, 14,000 rounds of ammunition (including 2,890 100mm shells and 80 antitank rockets), and more than 20,000 meters of delaying fuses." The problem spread from borders provinces in the North to cities of the South, involving large bombs, grenades, and even 105mm shells.

There is no prospect in sight of its decrease as the soldiers and officers played major part in this arms trade deals. The same article stated: *"during the first 3 month of 1988 there were 122 cases of theft, 23 percent of which occurred at armed force's units, involving 131 guns, 22,000 detonators, and 50 grenades."* When these figures might well have been underreported, the roots of the problem were clearly a cause of great concern to the Hanoi regime. The situation was attributed to *"degenerated cadres, workers, storekeepers, and cadres stole and sold weapons, or lost their vigilance and let thieves"* to *"depot managers carelessly lost their vigilance and let thieves sneak into the depots to steal."* Collaboration instead of alleged negligence is, however, very likely in these cases of weapons disappearance.

Euphemism was used to shield the regime from embarrassment. Similarly, Hanoi authorities alleged that these weapons and ammunition were then sold to "hooligans", a term purposely used to dissidents and resistance fighters. The article alleged that "hooligans" have used stolen weapons to kill people, seize property, and to fight public security agents and military personnel on duty. One can not stop from wondering why the alleged "hooligans" might want to even purchase explosives, mines, bombs, 105mm shells, and antitank rockets. An organized armed resistance has certainly expanded underground. The grave situation

revealed itself when the article called for propaganda and education of cadres and soldiers and spying works of the mass as main solutions to the problem. These solutions bespeak the demoralization and resentment among soldiers and cadres, and the popular cooperation with anti-regime activities.

*"The phenomenon of weapons and explosives lying beyond state control is a cause of great concern"*, asserted Huy Thiem in article *"Weapons, Explosives Among the People Cause Serious Damage"* appearing on QUAN DOI NHAN DAN (The People's Army) of April 21 this year. Some figures were volunteered by the author: *"In 1988, according to incomplete reports from 24 localities countrywide, there have been 182 cases of murder by weapons and explosives - killing 79 and injuring 193 others - and 437 accidents killing 281 and injuring 457 others, causing losses of billions of piasters. In February 1989 alone, 76 accidents caused by weapons occurred, killing 52 and injuring 206 others."* The volunteered numbers underscored the formidably increased disorder and security breakdown. When no nature of these killings were specified, the article perhaps inadvertently mentioned an interesting case: *"On February 20 1989, State Security Captain Nguyen Dang Hanh was shot dead by three robbers aboard ship M51 while trying to arrest them."* One hardly can visualize an armed scuffle between 3 "robbers" and state security troops led by a Captain on board a military ship if it is not an attempt of non-robbery nature. Under the Communist regime ambushes and killings of state security agents are always termed "robbery" or "social criminal act."

The flourishing of arms trafficking in border provinces and in Saigon was also admitted in the latter article whose author again called for cooperation and action from the Vietnamese Communist Ministries of National Defense and Interior.

Reading between the lines, this widespread and persisting arms trafficking alarmed on the two major dailies has provided an interesting clue to the scope of a popular resistance movement in Vietnam as well as the threatening deterioration of the regime's security apparatus.

# HANOI ISSUED ORDERS TO COUNTER THE VIETNAMESE RESISTANCE

In recent months, 2 major training periodicals of the Communist Party of Vietnam have published several articles to warn of the widespread security breakdown and specifically to counter activities of the Vietnamese Resistance led by Admiral Hoang Co Minh. Most explicit among these articles are: 1) *"Defeating the Infiltration Scheme and Trick of the Hoang Co Minh Clique of Exiled Vietnamese Reactionaries"* in Tap Chi Quoc Phong Toan Dan (All People's National Defense Journal) of May 89, by Colonels Tran Ngoc Que and Pham Tan Ba, 2 high ranking members of the Central Military Committee, and 2) *"Intensify National Defense and Security Tasks"* in Tap Chi Tuyen Truyen (Propaganda Journal) of July 89 by Senior Lieutenant General Dang Vu Hiep, deputy director of the Political General Department.

The first article focused exclusively on strategy and tactics to crush the resistance waged by the National United Front for the Liberation of Vietnam (NUFRONLIV) whose leader, Chairman Hoang Co Minh, the Hanoi regime has 2 years ago disinformationed as being killed in a series of clashes in Southern Laos. Out of all measures that Hanoi had to institute and drill with its troops and cadres, many information from the usually misleading and/or secretive news machine of this regime have come to light.

First, the strength of the NUFRONLIV and the resistance movement that it incited has truly worried top ranking Vietnamese communist authorities. Its leadership and organization were not demolished as Hanoi media had blatantly claimed during 1987 and 1988. On the contrary the determined and organized resistance forces of the NUFRONLIV have forced Hanoi to mobilize armed vehicles and helicopters for defense. The article stated: *"A combined force must be organized to attack the enemy with flexible fighting tactics. Such an attacking force should be made up of both stationary and mobile units belonging to the regular army, local forces, and the militia and guerrilla forces in the defense zone and the theater of operation."* and *"The command detachment must have enough authority and facilities to provide guidance and command to all combat and combat support forces involved, such as to mobilize the army's mechanized facilities, use armed helicopters in reconnaissance, guide the combat ground forces in determining the guidelines for coordinating combat, and organize the fire power of the military region to give direct support to the offensive infantry."*

Tactics instructed to counter the Vietnamese Resistance forces was specifically given. *"When launching an attack, direct and parabolic fire support should be arranged to overwhelm the enemy while infantry takes advantage of fortifications and available terrain contours and other natural covers to gradually approach and charge the enemy's formation. Intense, overwhelming firepower together with infantry charges should be launched in one direction to force enemy troops to pull out in another direction where they will be either destroyed or captured by our ambushing force"*, the article stated.

The troops level prepared for clashes with NUFRONLIV resistance fighter forces was also disclosed. *"Platoon, companies, and battalions will be combined for joint tactical training..."* and *"This situation requires the armies and peoples of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia to strengthen their vigilance, firmly grasp the strategy of the enemy, strictly control the border areas, be prepared in thought and action, and resolutely foil all the enemy's schemes, plans, measures, and tricks to launch new infiltrations, thereby firmly defending the border areas of the socialist fatherland."* The population mobilization is further illustrated in detail, *"such as mobilizing the local troops and people to give rice supply to the army soldiers, carry wounded soldiers, support combat, and intercept and capture enemy soldiers."* A remnants of 15 resistance fighters after the Summer 1987 clashes - as the author alleged - would certainly not have worried the Vietnamese Communist Defense Department as such.

Second, in this article the 2 Communist colonels no longer hide the fact that the Vietnamese resistance network was widely expanded inside Vietnam and was almost intact after many Hanoi attempts to quell it. It's certain that Hanoi had not been able to track down resistance fighters and did not gain much information, therefore, had to emphasize on the live capture and interrogation of NUFRONLIV leaders. Apparently, the Defense Department in Hanoi scantily knew about the organization and the policy of its arch enemy. They wrote: *"it would benefit us a great deal if we could capture those stubborn and die-hard enemy commanders. From these enemy commanders, we could determine the locations of their bases in the country and familiarize ourselves with the policies adopted by reactionaries abroad to undermine our revolution."*



Third, what even more frightening to the Hanoi regime is the demoralization and rancor of the armed forces which it had for long counted on their protection. The NUFRONLIV has long called on the Hanoi soldiers to avoid fighting with the Resistance forces, a message that was reportedly well responded by officers of the demoralized and disillusioned army. To different extent they often refused to confront Resistance activities, an issue the Hanoi Defense Department disguisingly portrayed as the lack of unified command and inadequate authority among units that had faced the NUFRONLIV force. The article proposed, *"Besides organizing the unified command network, a forward command detachment at the military region level must also be established whenever it is deemed necessary. This command detachment must have enough authority and facilities to provide guidance and command to all combat and combat support forces involved."* The article then went into detail about basic fighting techniques. To the armed forces that has fought for more than 30 years in its own terrain, the authors' earnest proposal told more about the troops demoralization than its military values.

The problem of command, disciplines, and morale however, was obliquely addressed when the 2 colonels admitted: *"In furnishing troops with political education prior to engaging in combat activities, we must oppose simplistic thinking, subjectivism, and the practice of underestimating enemy capabilities. We must also strive to make all of them understand that these enemies have been poisoned and brainwashed with extremely reactionary conceptions, have been supplied with money and equipment, and have been trained adequately in every respect in order to oppose and undermine the Vietnamese revolution. On the basis of correctly realizing our duties and accurately estimating enemy capabilities, we must harden the will of our troops and equip them with a high determination to annihilate these enemies so as to make a reputation for the Army."*

The fatal breakdown of a the whole system was even clearly portrayed in an article that called for all-out counter measures.

In the second article *"Intensify National Defense and Security Tasks"*, Senior Lieutenant General Dang Vu Hiep warned about a resistance movement that is actively attacking the Vietnamese Communist regime on all fronts. He wrote: *"By combining the strength created by Vietnamese reactionary elements with the support provided by foreign forces and through espionage activities and military pressure, the enemies have persisted in their attempts to launch repeated attacks against us on the political, ideological, economic, cultural, social, diplomatic, and military fronts. At times, they have concentrated efforts on dealing deadly blows to key areas."*

The all-front attacks of the Vietnamese resistance strategy that mobilizes Vietnamese at home and abroad to cripple the regime by all available means and with creative methods has made its marks. These attacks have for last 10 years consistently forced Hanoi regime with various unsolvable problems. Accumulated crises have deprived all initiatives the Vietnamese Communists used to have during the war. The regime realized the blows and its tolls but did not know how to counter.

On economic front, the article enumerated: *"They have spared no means to attack us, ranging from economic blockade and embargo and prevention of humanitarian aid organizations from having relations with Vietnam...creating disturbances in our market; sabotaging production and business in our country; dumping fake bank notes into Vietnam; feeding false rumors about our changes and abolition of bank notes; encouraging speculation in order to destroy our financial and currency systems; upsetting prices; performing tricks to discredit our goods; destroying our machinery, warehouses, and some important projects; instigating theft of state assets; and resorting to many other tricks to sabotage and restrain our production. They have exploited the blind pragmatism of some people and have driven these people into joining their sabotage activities out of personal interests."*

The official recognition of the grave economic situation by a ranking member of the Party Central Committee revealed the regime's long-held helplessness. It also illustrated that the Vietnamese people have unceasingly attacked this regime by a variety of methods, especially on economic front, an area where the regime is least equipped and least able to defend. Hanoi, however, suffers not less forceful blows on other areas from the organized resistance.

General Dang admitted, *"Politically, they have used all reactionary media - radio and the press - to spread false rumors, distort the situation, and sow suspicion and pessimistic thoughts among the people in the face of difficulties in our current socioeconomic life. Taking advantage of shortcomings in localities, they have instigated the masses, divided our internal ranks,... in order to make our people lose confidence in party."* Operating since December 1983 the Vietnamese Resistance Radio has aired its program to the blindfolded Vietnamese inside Vietnam, informing and mobilizing them for creative attacks on the regime, and persuading the regime cadres and soldiers to desert and join the resistance rank. Printed materials were smuggled by mail channel into the country; many have targeted at the officials and cadres of the system.

*"Ideologically and culturally, they have sought ways to dump hundreds of types of magazines, books, films, and videotapes and thousands of musical tapes with decadent and*

*reactionary contents, clandestinely infiltrated and circulated these materials, and openly disseminated some of them, causing limitless bad consequences..." and "militarily, they have adopted several operations aimed at, on the one hand, wasting our energy and resources to cause more difficulties for our economy, and on the other, deterring us in order to serve their long-range strategy. At times, they have coordinated these operations with other sabotage activities being conducted from other directions", the article continued.*

The urgency of the security issue manifested itself in a sequence of articles appeared on major dailies. In May, the official voice of the Military Central Committee conveyed its specific concerns about a popular resistance movement led by NUFRONLIV and with suggested counter measures to the lowest military unit levels; 2 months later, General Dang Vu Hiep, a Deputy Director of the Political General Department of the Party Central Committee, again moaned about the overall deteriorated situation and urged the cooperation from various components of the disintegrated system. Hiep wrote: *"In the present situation, defending the homeland and preserving peace are not an exclusive task of the national defense sector...To strengthen our national defense capabilities and ensure the country's*

*political security and public order, all party organizations, administrative agencies, echelons, mass organizations, and people's armed forces should thoroughly study, deeply understand, actively concretize, and effectively implement the measures defined in the resolution of the party Central Committee's sixth plenum... Therefore, we must inculcate in the entire party and people a sense of permanent vigilance and the will to struggle against all schemes and sabotage of the enemies and their attempts to bring about changes by peaceful means. Stringent regulations must be adopted to protect our internal ranks and preserve national secrets."*

In all, the detrimental at breakdown of the Hanoi security system, reflected in different levels and in all areas, have inched toward effecting the downfall of the regime. What is not clearly visible to the outsiders has become so imminent and fateful to those Vietnamese Communists at the top levels. Their realization of the cumulative crises at work, however, does not guarantee them a way out. The grave problem has started many years ago. Their impotence at the onset is the best clue to their doomed destiny in the short future. The Vietnamese people and their Resistance movement only begin to show their force. ■

## REPOSE OF HANOI'S DISCHARGED SOLDIERS

**T**he prospect of troops withdrawal from Cambodia at the end of this September certainly will create many headaches for the Hanoi regime. Hanoi recently announced that it will discharge troops who had served in the Cambodia in last ten years. ( According to Prince Shianouk, Hanoi, however, left behind nearly 200,000 troops disguised as civilians and Phnom Penh soldiers). Incorporating these soldiers back into civilian life would certainly bring about many social and economic perturbations. A small number of the discharged will be enough to cause a big socioeconomic problem that the regime must deal with.

Facing this problem, the Hanoi regime turned to its traditional solution: The Vietnamese Communist Defense Department in the past two years sent more than 25,000 discharged soldiers and personnel to work in defense industry workers of the Soviet Union, German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria in the "labor cooperation" program. In an interview with Quan Doi Nhan Dan (People's Army Journal) on July 7, Colonel Vu Quang Huy, member of the Defense Department, said: "According to a decision of the National Defense Ministry, preferred selection for the next "batches" will be given to those who have returned or will return from Cambodia after fulfilling their internationalist duty."

Is it really an honorable treatment reserved for those soldiers? People obviously have a lots of doubts about it

when they discovered the living and working condition of these laborers in those countries. Their monthly pay ranges from 160 to 200 rubles in Soviet Union, 850 to 1000 marks in East Germany, and 1800 to 2000 Koruny in Czechoslovakia. The Hanoi regime seizes one third of the pays to defray its debt to these countries. These emigrating laborers have no health care, insurance or injury compensation. They do heavy and dangerous works usually assumed by the local labor prisoners.

To solve the problem, the Hanoi regime also has another plan called "New Economic Zone". General Tran Cong Man, member of the Central Military Commission, revealed that Hanoi would send the rest of discharged soldiers to New Economic Zones as a "voluntary force" for deforestation. In the past ten years, more than 3.5 millions Vietnamese have been forced to move to the new economic zones. No electricity, basic health facilities, school, nor local administrative organs been set up to help those people. After a very short period, most of them people have sneaked back to the cities.

The repose of discharged soldiers under Hanoi style mirrors the case of "a piece of lemon had been squeezed to the last drop and then thrown into the trash basket." Victimized of this inhumane policy, it's no surprise that many Hanoi soldiers disobeyed their superiors, fought back the regime, and defected to the Vietnamese Resistance ranks. ■

# RAID OF PETTY BUSINESSES IN SAIGON: The Case of A Regime in Trouble

Since December 1986 the Hanoi regime has gone out of its way to advertise for the "openness" policy to lure foreign investment. But the incident in last June again added more doubts to the true goal of the "openness" policy when thousands of petty businesses selling imported consumer goods were raided in the Saigon metropolitan city. Imported merchandises and even personal belongings with foreign marks were all confiscated with vague explanations. Hundreds of people were arrested on accusation of tax evasion and illegal dealings. The raid has rumbled daily activities of this populated city. Scope of the raid certainly bespoke of the order of a high authority.

The aim of the raid, according to official later announcement, was to curb illegally imported merchandises in order to protect domestically produced goods. The regime's excuse was not sound nor logical as the economy under Hanoi's rule crumbled because of several reasons, the least of which was the "invasion of imported goods". For several years, production of consumer goods almost stalled because of reasons inherent to a communist system and because of the peculiar resistance of the Vietnamese. Consumer goods brought into Vietnam were not at all the types that domestic industries are producing or are able to. The raid in June thus invites other explanations.

First, it's commonly known that Hanoi badly needs and only wants hard currency and gold from Vietnamese overseas. Consumer goods only benefit the people, and at the same time nurture the underground market that rivals the regime's control and channels. With the raid, the regime in effect was trying to nudge the Vietnamese overseas to send U.S. dollars and gold instead of consumer goods to their relatives in Vietnam. By a more subtle way, the Hanoi regime in the past few years has exacted heavy taxes on consumer goods received in Vietnam as gifts from relatives while granted various privileges for dollars and gold transfers into the state's banks. Since 1988 the increased enforcement of the United States government against illegal money and gold transfer to Vietnam has severely curtailed this convenient source of foreign cash for the regime. Worldwide campaigns by the Vietnamese communities since 1987 to discourage money and gold sending to relatives in Vietnam have made a significant impact. The Hanoi

regime may have retaliated with the raid and Saigon is the best place to make this warnings widely known.

Second, there is a similar market and activity in Hanoi, but the fact that only Saigon was so far subjected to this type of raid may signal the muscle flexing in proceeds sharing of a Hanoi-based faction against its Saigon-based counterpart which is less political powerful but is endowed with more lucrative opportunities. Jealousy and envy from the Hanoi-based faction has resulted in the break-up 2 years ago of the regime's largest business conglomerate stationed in Canada. The raid may also indicate a disarray of power between business authorities and the state security forces, only this time it may have happened at a much larger scale.

Third, the raid may indicate the perplexity and uncertainty of top leaders in Hanoi about their current crises. Three years ago, facing the fumbling production, social frustration in all segments of the population, and growing resentment from the cadres, workers, and party members, the Hanoi regime had to allow some reliefs in forms of private enterprises and family business. The business selling consumer goods out of gifts sent by overseas relative grew fast under tacit permission of Hanoi authorities in the last 2 years along with the regime's attempts to impress the world of its new image. The booming activity has provided a foreign sustenance to the failing economy, and at the same time functioned as a showcase to lure foreign investment. But the existence of these activities has also generated another livelihood alternative for cadre, party members, and soldiers that in effect released them from the control and dependence of the regime. Loyalty to the Party was trailing, faith to Marxist-Leninism rapidly disappeared, and political power and foundation of the regime were critically threatened. The relief valve and showcase have since become a major nuisance to the regime. And the raid might have come about as a policy switch in disarray.

No single reason seems sound enough to explain the raid in last June. A combined 3 reasons above perhaps is the answer. Whatever the reason was, the raid in June has signified an ominous indication that a detrimental outcome with larger implications is very likely inevitable. ■



## GLOOMY PROSPECT FOR FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN VIETNAM

**N**guyen Van Linh, the Secretary General of Communist Party of Vietnam, in a news conference last February conceded: *"Our biggest obstacle is to overcome the economic crisis. No medicine of magic power can give instant remedy to this dismal situation"*. His statement is not just a comforter but a sullen admittance of the destiny of a collapsing economy.

Measure that the Hanoi's leaders took to alleviate the economic crisis, ie. relaxed controls to farmers, private trading, and family-operated businesses, have gone against the Communist power-consolidating principles. The regime is caught in its own vicious circle between the need to redress its economic problems and the desire to maintain its dictatorial power. The dilemma has increasingly eroded the regime to the point of no return.

Conflict between economic remedies and political measures was not the only fundamental reason of Hanoi's continuous failures. Mismanagement, bureaucratism, shortage of capital and technological expertise, pervasive corruption were all contributing factors. The major one, however, was the prevalent opposition of the people to the regime itself. There were growing dissatisfaction among all segments of the people, including party members, cadres, and soldiers. The living standards had spiralled downward unceasingly, basic rights and freedoms were taken away, and tens thousands of Vietnamese young men lost their lives in the occupation of Laos and Cambodia. The people of Vietnam, realizing that the only way to have a decent life is to overthrow the communist regime, have been doing all they can to destroy the system, from passive opposition to joining the wide spread resistance movement.

In addition to internal problems, the Hanoi government also faced diplomatic isolation and economic sanction from Asian and Western countries due to its occupation of Cambodia. Hanoi long dependency on the Soviet Union, a burden amounted to 3 billion dollars a year, did not show any sign of improvement has recently led to Moscow curtailing of its financial aid to the regime. The compound politico-economic crisis had compelled Hanoi's leaders to adopt a "Openness" image in hope of diplomatic normalization with the free world for aid and support.

In the framework of "Openness", a Code of Foreign Investment, promising several privileges to foreign investors, was introduced by the Hanoi regime to scurry for outside capital. The policy change had been noisily advertised since 1987 but the outcome was not very

impressive. Among 1,700 companies with interest that had gone to Vietnam to investigate the opportunity, only 53 companies ended up signing the surveying contracts by early this year, of which only 13 companies proceeded their contract executions. Among these, 2 contract have been dead.

The situation was summarized in the Foreign Trade Office of France statement of February 15, 1989 meeting: **"It is advised that all investments to Vietnam be studied and proceeded with extreme caution."**

Reasons for concern are numerous but there are 4 main areas that foreign investors should thoroughly consider:

### 1. Inadequate infrastructure:

Under the communist rulings, Vietnam has gone backward more than 70 years and became one of the poorest countries in the world. The adverse risks awaiting any kind of investment are many, among them are shortage of competent workers, unreliable power supply, obsolete transportation and communication system, and inept supporting industries.

According to the Vietnamese Communist Minister of Transportation: *"One hundred thousand kilometers of National highway are severely damaged while government budget for road development and maintenance only provided 20% of the needed services"*.

Railroad and highway network was damaged not only due to lack of maintenance but also due to the people's and workers' intents to destroy the communist system. The following example is perhaps illustrative: On official permission of private vegetable growing, the people plowed land surrounding airports for their private enterprise, and at the same time, knowingly destroyed the airports' sewage systems, rendering airstrips unusable.

The highest speed for train transportation in Vietnam recorded in 1987 was 15 miles per hour which went down to 12 miles per hour in 1989. It took 7 days for a train to travel from Saigon to Hanoi as contrast to 48 hours before 1954. The major problems were shortage of coal supply, spare parts, damaged railroad and non-cooperation of servicemen. Eighty percent of goods transportation is on water. Still there are numerous old ships, lacking parts and servicemen for proper repair, sitting idle at harbour around the country.

The communications network in Vietnam is even worse. Its obsolete system, deemed as one of the obstacles for overseas transactions by many foreign business investigators, will not substantially improve in a foreseeable future.

## **2. Adverse economic atmosphere:**

Inflation rate in Vietnam is above 100% monthly. The economic policy in Vietnam is self-defeating. In July 1988, forced by economic imperatives, the Hanoi's regime issued a new resolution to: *"redevelop privately owned business, trans-state and private enterprises"*. The resolution, however, emphasized *"proper state control and alignment in these sectors for the building of socialism."*

Farmers were forced to sell agricultural products to the state at a very low price. Industrial workers and civil servants were not only underpaid and overworked but were paid late, usually 4 to 5 months. The (Vietnamese Communist) Labor Daily News wrote on March 23, 1989: *"up to the end of February, 1989, the National Bank has owed workers of the Rubber Industry alone 9 billion piasters in payroll"*. Workers, under the harshest working conditions, with starving pay and being paid several months late, are extremely frustrated. The consequences are widespread absenteeism, low production, poor product quality, and high quitting rate even unemployment hovers at 30%. Vo van Kiet maybe understated when he admitted: *"more than 10,000 workers quitted in the past year"*.

Hanoi, for 2 times in less than 10 years without warning, replaced the money in circulation with new bills and limited the amount that each family could exchange. It is one of the regime's schemes to confiscate personal assets of the people. The people therefore have long been distrusting the regime's currency. Black market is booming and the currencies of trading values are U.S. Dollars and gold. People are stocking up goods for private trade which gradually paralyzes the state-controlled market.

The regime's foreign debt is 14 US billion while its foreign reserve dropped to \$16 US million. Industrial sector only operates at 30% of its capacity. The Vietnamese Communists import around 1 US billion of goods from the Soviet Union and \$300 to \$600 US million from other countries. Seventy percent of the imports are spare parts, input materials and consumer goods. Vietnamese Communist Prime Minister, Do Muoi, conceded in a meeting of National Assembly in December 1988: *"It is impossible to uphold an economy where there is enormous gap between supply and demand of parts and components to all sorts of industries, especially in agriculture and light industry. We have to import almost all of the required input materials, spare parts and equipments and we have to borrow money to do so because our exports can only pay for 30% of the*

*imports"*. The export situation is in disarray; In 1987, seventy to eighty shipments of goods exported to Eastern Europe were returned due to poor qualities.

Unequal trading practice with the Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc's Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) also put the regime in an awkward situation. According to the Hanoi's radio broadcast on August 6 1989: *"While the official exchange rate is 700 piasters for 1 ruble, our Intimex Company (a Hanoi import-export company) must pay at the rate of 1200 piasters for 1 ruble in all transactions with CMEA, a loss of 500 piasters"*.

## **3. Political uncertainty:**

Constant power struggle between communist party's members, from top to bottom, are unsurmountable roadblocks for execution of any long term project or investment. Corruption further aggravates the contention between various factions and groups. The impact of this power struggle and factionalism is readily illustrated by the break-up last year of its Canada-based headquarters in charge of all financial, political, espionage activities of North America.

The continuous struggle of the people of Vietnam since 1975 to overthrow the Hanoi regime further intensifies this socio-economic political turmoil. The resistance recruits have extended from civilians to different levels of cadres and communist troops. Peasants prematurely harvesting crops or secretly siphoning crops to the resistance, workers destroying machines and equipments, avoiding work, producing poor quality products are causes of the increasingly stagnant agricultural and industrial production. Passive opposition among official cadres includes ignoring acts of sabotage, demurring to carry out the regime's policy, or defecting to join the resistance movement.

## **4. Deceitful nature of the Vietnamese Communists:**

In numerous times in the past, Hanoi regime has rescinded many measures that some people had optimistically construed as indications of its profound change of course. Innumerable Vietnamese were victims of its on-and-off policy. Two months ago, again, thousands of small businessmen in Saigon-Cholon metropolitan area were harassed, arrested, imprisoned, and their stocks were seized. The major swept took place just a little more than 2 years after the announcement of "openness" policy and in the midst of Hanoi wooing for foreign investment.

Regarding foreign investments, leeways to justify future policy revision and interpretation can be seen in a host of open-ended vaguenesses of the 1987 Code of Foreign Investment. Chapter 8 of the Code stated:

"Values of investment from foreign entities will be determined by authorized officials according to the value of international market". The Chapter, however, neither set out the basis and criteria of evaluation nor specified the authorized officials and how these officials be selected. The Code omits the investors' right to select and hire workers which would automatically leave this matter in the hands of the Vietnamese Communists regime. The regime may demand high wages and compensations in US Dollars and yet pays workers at minimal or starving rate. The regime's long record of "controlling people through their stomachs" policy makes this scenario very likely.

False reporting and lying were prevalent at various party and organization levels. The de facto inoperability of the Bai Bang paper plant is a typical example of a case where the Swedish government was misled by false information and reports from the Vietnamese communists to a point where no appropriate measures could save the plant.

It is safe to conclude that all facts, data and information officially released by the Vietnamese communist government are false or questionable, including the Annual Statistic, the main data source that had been considered highly secret and was only

limitedly released after the 1986 Congress Meeting of the Communist Party of Vietnam. (However, the Vietcong government recently asked the French government to help set up a statistics system. This meant that all statistical data they provided so far are purely erroneous.)

In short, with the inadequate socio-economic infrastructure, the threatening political instability, any long term investment, even with ample foreign expertise and capital, would not be feasible or profitable.

It would be natural for any foreign investor to ask himself the following questions before considering any business venture in Vietnam:

What can one possibly perform in a system that is totally anti-economic in nature and so inadequate in infrastructure?

How can one profit from doing business with rulers who are facing the mounting resistance movement which is so prevalent and resolute?

What in the long term can one get from a questionable partner that holds deceit as the only operational method? ■

## HANOI ALARMS HIGH-SCALE COMMUNICATIONS SABOTAGE

**H**anoi again alarmed on its Vietnamese-language radio broadcast on July 21, 1989 of the persistence of communications cables theft in North Vietnam. The theft situation was so widespread and persistent that a conference on protection of communications cables was held in Mid-June by Hanoi authorities to deal with the rising problem.

A total of 189,470 meters (115 miles) of cables, belonging to the state postal, telegram and telephone services, have been stolen since 1988, of which 149,970 meters (92 miles) were stolen from December 1988 to February 1989, averaged out 20,000 meters (12 miles) per week. Hanoi authorities alleged that illegal copper trade along the Northern border areas has prompted the continuing sabotage. Each 2 kilos of cables (4.4 pounds) was worth one Chinese thermal container, 10 kilos a watch or electrical fan, 20 kilos a radio-cassette. The trade, however, did not extend to other copper products, and the trading values assigned to chopped up cables were higher than the in-tact roll.

Measures taken after the June conference unable to stop the theft situation. The radio

broadcast admitted that 16,000 meters of cables were still lost in a month, causing a breakdown of 137 hours. The problem seriously persisted in the Sino-Vietnam border provinces of Lang Son, Cao Bang, Quang Ninh, Ha Bac and so forth that effected 625 hours of communications breakdowns within a month. Hundreds of theft cases went unprosecuted because the cover-up of local enforcement agencies, the broadcast warned.

Hanoi has charged this situation to "large-scale sabotage of our communications system from our enemies." The term "enemies" clearly implies those instigated the illegal border trade, those destroyed the cables, and those covered up. In another sense, it reflected the alarming enforcement and security breakdown of the Hanoi regime. As telephone services are exclusively reserved for top-ranking officials and cadres, the destruction of communications network solely affects the command system of the Vietnamese Communist hierarchy. The situation provides a vivid example of the Vietnamese all-front resistance which even secured the cooperation of officials and cadres who are in charge to enforce security measures and to protect the regime.



## HANOI DILEMMA: POWER DETERIORATION OR ECONOMIC COLLAPSE?

Just 5 months after the Sixth Plenum Meeting, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPVN) was again convened to focus on the debacle of faith to the Party and the Marxist-Leninism among its membership. The 7th Congress provided a fresh look on the CPVN disintegration, and to a larger extent, the scope of a dilemma that top leaders in Hanoi are facing.

The communique of the August 15 Plenum Meeting admitted "in the complicated development of the current situation, some members have demonstrated aberrant and reversed thinking, which if not be detected and stopped may lead to devastating consequences", and called for a mind-rectification campaign to all of the Party members and people. The communique emphasized the need to carry out the directives of the 6th Congress on this task "in order to elevate the quality and effectiveness of the mind rectification duty, to guarantee prompt initiatives and astute guard, to positively carry out policies of the state and the party, to reinforce unified thinking and action among all membership and the people, to proceed the 'openness', to stem unguarded despondence, to correct on time aberrant thinking, and actively to attack inimical views". These explicit words, however, have understated a larger problem that required swift and radical solutions from the CPVN three years ago.

Since December 1986, cumulative crises have forced Hanoi top leaders to relax several controls in cultural and socioeconomic area in order to defuse the widespread frustration, and to stem the tide that was pushing the regime to the brink of the collapse. Hanoi had to allow some limited forms of private and family business, to entreat foreign investors to come, and to tolerate some guarded criticism of the bureaucracy. The retreats worked as a relief valve to social frustration in short term, but at the same time they slowly destroyed the political power of the Hanoi regime. The existence of another underground

market working along side with the official one has provided economic vitality to the system, but its very existence beyond the state control also deprived the regime of its powerful monopoly of resources distribution it had on the party members, cadres, soldiers and workers. The state can no longer regulate, discipline or sanction its members with material privileges as gains on dealings in the underground market proved to be much more lucrative and easier.

The phenomenon reinforced what many party members and cadres have for a long time wished to witness in reality, namely the failure of the Marxist-Leninist model and the promise of another socio-political system to the

current crises. Concessions made by Hanoi top leaders have been viewed as the retreats of the Marxist-Leninism; relaxation of controls were shrewdly exploited as opportunities to strive for free and democratic manifestation. As the party's top leaders slumped into more crises, CPVN members' disillusion with their party leadership, and most significantly, with the Marxist-Leninism has been more openly displayed.

Compounded with the crises of their own land, CPVN members and cadres have witnessed intractable problems of the forerunner Soviet Union, and the brighter prospect of the Polish unified forces against the dictatorship of a

few Party top leaders. Events in the Eastern European blocs and in Soviet Union certainly made a significant impact in the mind of the majority of CPVN members. Pluralism become the hot topic secretly debated; dissident groups consisted of senior party members were organized. Overseas, agents of the regime's front organizations in Canada, France, West Germany are complaining of official delay and obstruction of the democratization. Other so frustrated have defected. Farmers' demonstrations in Southern provinces, strikes of thousand college students in Northern provinces, however limited in their demands, have confounded Hanoi top leaders with ominous

*"...pernicious schemes and conspiracy of the imperialists, led by the American imperialist, against the international revolutionary movement... More than ever, they focused their attacks on socialist countries, with crazy measures and vicious schemes... In the statement by Bush, that I have cited, as well as in many statements of politician leaders of the capitalist world, their swear to annihilate our socialism have been bluntly and blatantly asserted. They did not just speak, but actually carried out with zeal and craziness."*

Nguyen Van Linh  
General-Secretary of CPVN  
August 15, 1989





possibility of escalation that may cripple their power as seen in other communist countries.

The ideological breakdown among the CPVN rank, more serious than it seems to appear, reflects the regime's dilemma between power deterioration and economic collapse. The economic bankrupt requires immediate remedies, but the party disintegration is even more imminent. To save the party and his power, Nguyen Van Linh on August 15 had to upset a host of policies his regime has labored to advertise under the banner of "openness" and "restructuring" during the last 3 years.

In the speech of the 7th Congress concluding session, Nguyen Van Linh explicitly attacked a growing trend in the party that advocates or toys with multiparty and pluralism. Retreats of the Polish Communist Party to the Solidarnosc Labor Union also came under his harsh critics. More poignantly, Linh blasted at the West and particularly the U.S. for alleged sabotages against socialist countries. He said, *"In this 7th Meeting, the Party Central Committee has punctually analyzed pernicious schemes and conspiracy of the imperialists, led by the American imperialist, against the international revolutionary movement... More than ever, they focused their attacks on socialist countries, with crazy measures and vicious schemes... In the statement by Bush, that I have cited, as well as in many statements of politician leaders of the capitalist world, their swear to annihilate our socialism have been bluntly and blatantly asserted. They did not just speak, but actually carried out with zeal and craziness. The imperialists, the American imperialists in particular, are exhausting all tricks and plans, days and nights, to impact on the situation of some socialist countries in order to direct these countries into the capitalist world... While negotiating with the Soviet Union, they continue their Star War program, improve their strategic weapons. On another hand they are modernizing and building up (their forces) surrounding socialist states and progressive countries. In our region, they recently installed weapon depot in Thailand, and now attempted to establish a military base in Singapore. All of their undertakings form a chain of deterrence strategy, relying on military might to contend the Soviet Union, other socialist countries, and resolute self-determining and independent nations."*



Nguyen Van Linh accepts Rose Marti Medal from Fidel Castro, April 25, 1989

Vacillation of various membership levels was clearly manifested in Linh's extensive defense of the Marxist-Leninism and attack on capitalism. *"The capitalist road is not the choice of our people, for we have stemmed the birth of capitalism with a history full of bloods and tears. To follow the capitalist road will inevitably lead to the dependence one way or another on the capitalism or neo-imperialism... We understand that in a backward country, with the aim of development, especially after many years of a devastating war, the building of socialism is not easy, and will need to overcome many major obstacles... Once more time the communists and the proletariat of our country harden our resolute faith to socialism, firmly reject the road of capitalism"*, he stressed. The growing trend among CPVN

members that advocated a non-communist system also reflected in the revised view about nationalist leaders' contribution in the struggle against the colonialist French. To counter this phenomenon, Linh had to assert the leadership of the Communist party by unprecedentedly denouncing the national non-communist heroes of this period of independence struggle.

To unify thinking and to consolidate faith among the ranks and files, Linh's denouncements or staging attacks on foreign enemies, nonetheless, may not work. The situation has changed from the war time, and the cause of ideological doubts is more

deep-seated than can be treated with empty rhetoric. The deterioration might have begun 15 years ago during the integration process between the Communist model and the then relatively free, democratic, and prosperous society of South Vietnam. The situation is not tantamount to the intraparty power struggle between factions as of the past, hence, cut short the prospect that the prevalence of one faction would subsequently stabilize the regime. Rather than the oft-cited rivalry between one hard-liner faction of Le Duc Tho and the other reformist led by Nguyen Van Linh, the current situation may be better characterized as the struggle between a minority of top leaders and the rest of the party membership base, which, even can be temporarily contained with superficial measures, would most likely lead to more serious troubles and final collapse over the course of time.