

RUSE OF THE DRUMMED-UP RETREAT

There is a striking similarity between the Soviet alleged withdrawal from Afghanistan and the Vietnamese Communist claimed termination of their troops presence in Cambodia. Moscow wasted 55,000 troops to fight the resistance of the Afghanistan after nearly 10 years in this country, and Hanoi suffered concerted embargo from Western and ASEAN countries and a 60,000-man loss in vain for a colonial rule against the Cambodian Resistance during its 10-year occupation. Both faced serious economic and political crises at home, and both publicly bemoaned about the casualties in their adventures. Their unprecedented lamentation have enraptured the world which for a period overrejoiced in the idea of being on the right offensive track. The issue of their sincerity was only lowly concerned matter because the general consensus was that Hanoi and Moscow had no choice but to try hard to get out of their quagmires. What really happened after the claimed total pullouts did not get to the front page headline. The general public, comfortable at the new victories, seems to be content with Hanoi's and Moscow's claims.

Not so encouraging is the reality. Moscow continued to pour arms secretly to the Kabul regime, and Hanoi deceptively left behind a sizable army under civilian disguise and Phnom Phenh uniform. Yet, immediately there were Western talks of cutting weapons aids to the Afghanistan Resistance, and there were some voicing about the leading role of King Sihanouk and the merit to support the Cambodian Resistance. Within days of the claimed pullouts, someone even raised the question why it took so long for the Afghanistan Resistance to win over Kabul while a few others expressed doubts whether it could be a winning situation in Cambodia. The shows of lamented pullouts, so unexpected thus too readily accepted, have almost scored their tactical marks against the Resistance.

In fact, Hanoi persistently rejected an International Control Mechanism to verify its troop withdrawal. The regime offered no justifiable reason for the decline of this necessary measure, simply because it could not conceal the troops left behind under Phnom Penh uniform or as Cambodian civilians. ASEAN officials closely monitoring

the pullouts, i.e. Thai Acting Supreme Commander General Chavalit Yongchaiyudh, and Armed Chief of Staff General Sunthorn Kongsompong, have expressly rebutted Hanoi's claim. Thai Armed Forces spokesman Lt. General Naruedol Dejpradiyuth maintained that there were 50,000 Hanoi troops left in Cambodia. Similar view was shared by Singapore Foreign Minister Wong Kan Seng and Thai Deputy Foreign Minister Prapas Limpabandhu. At the last hours of the Paris Conference in last August, Hanoi via its Phnom Penh proxy evaded the proposal for a "comprehensive solution" for Cambodia by the demand to exclude the Khieu Samphan faction from the political process. Either Hanoi was afraid of the Cambodian Resistance victory at the poll, hence its loss of domination over this country, or it may have wrongly assessed the West and ASEAN countries' determination. In any case, the fact remains that Hanoi did not attempt any compromise to make the political settlement possible.

Psychologically, Hanoi wants to maintain the political clout of a regional empire that it has enjoyed since 1975. Its top leaders, as well as their predecessors, have long dreamed of a Federal Union of Indochina and have labored since the early 1940's for such a goal. Their 40-year cultivation of Hanoi's cadres into the Communist Party of Laos was rewarded with the untroubled control of this country. The invasion of Cambodia and lingering occupation has cost Hanoi regime even more in terms of human casualties and world political condemnation. Ironically, the event has elevated it to a regional power that it psychologically and materially want to achieve.

Materially, Hanoi robbed the prosperous lands of Cambodia and Laos to meet its problem of social unrest. The Cambodian and Laotian territory has offered ample resources that Hanoi top leaders needed to give their troops as appeasement. Their control and exploitation of these 2 countries were certainly reckoned against benefits that may come from the prospect of Western aids and ASEAN investment. In the minds of these irrational rulers, those latter short-term inducements perhaps were not the comparable trade-off for long-term reign of the Federal Union of Indochina.

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Also, Hanoi top leaders have probably overestimated their maneuvering as well as the willingness of ASEAN and Western countries to invest in its market place. Hanoi undoubtedly will count on the shortness of human memories and the blindness of mercantile avarice to salvage their mistake. There were indications that the Hanoi regime hoped and behaved as if its past record of obstinacy and treachery in international affairs were not relevant. In the short run, Hanoi will expectedly hoard accusations of foreign abetment to the popular resistance movement in Vietnam to counter any charge about its disguised troops in Cambodia.

Given goodwill efforts by ASEAN and other concerned nations during the last 2 years, the dubious position and winning-by-all-means approach of Hanoi and Hanoi's proxy at the Paris Conference last August need to be registered as a permanent factor of consideration in any future dealings.

The diplomatic and economic isolation has been effective to bring Hanoi to the discussion table. But this measure alone was insufficient to force Hanoi abandon its ambition to control Cambodia and Laos and to be the receiver of foreign aids. Hanoi was besieged not only by outside embargo but also by all-faceted attacks from the Vietnamese people. Given the serious crisis of the regime due to the popular organized opposition, increased pressures from within the system would help to bring it into a genuine retreat. It's time to consider the factor "the Vietnamese Resistance" with seriousness.

RESISTANCE NEWS

Vietnamese Resistance Radio established by NUFRONLIV in late 1983 broadcasts 8 times daily on the 30m and 40m wave bands (10.3MHz and 7.4MHz) to inform and mobilize the Vietnamese at home on the liberation struggle. Due to limited space, we can only excerpt part of the VRR daily news programs.

NEWS FROM VIETNAM

News Brief from VRR broadcast of July 7, 1989

NUFRONLIV Fighters Meet Workers of Sa Thay Forestation Plant

According to the report of the Resistance Administrative Committee of Gia Rai-Komtum province, one of the province armed resistance units had attacked the Sa Thay forestation plant in early May. After a brief fighting two Hanoi's soldiers were killed, the resistance unit seized one K-54 handgun, one AK-47 rifle, two CKCs, some documents, and ammunition. All employees of the plant had gathered to meet NUFRONLIV fighters who talked about the liberation strategy and asked the people to join the organization. After the meeting, one young worker decided to join the armed resistance unit.

A State Truck Blocked

The Resistance Administrative Committee of Quang Da province reported that one of its armed resistance units had blocked a state truck on a road linking Da Nang city and capital

of Quang Da. The driver happily obeyed the order, while a Hanoi State Security agent was killed because he opened fire at the resistance fighters. The resistance unit seized one K-54 handgun, some documents, and ammunition. The driver was released after being explained about popular participation in the resistance movement. All the documents and equipments had been seized by the resistance fighters and the truck was burned.

NUFRONLIV rallys Cuu Long People Against Hanoi Programs

The Resistance Administrative Committee of Cuu Long province reported that in the recent months the NUFRONLIV cadres had mobilized the people against Hanoi projects of production. The people of Tra Cu, Duyen Hai, and Vung Liem districts, had strongly protested the seizure of foodstuffs and imposition of local new taxes, regardless of Hanoi State Security Forces' intimidation. Many people risked being arrested to demand for the return of their lands, which the Hanoi had seized in the past. The report also mentioned that in the end of May, a young man threw a grenade into a post of the State Security Forces, causing one agent dead and three injures. The young man reportedly escaped unharmed. The State Security agents of the above post were widely known as the most wicked and brutal agents in the district. Higher State Security agents had conducted an investigation but they could not trace the young man.

OVERSEAS NEWS

TORONTO: VIETNAMESE DENOUNCE HANOI ON BLACK RIBBON DAY

Hundreds of Vietnamese in Toronto joined the Black Ribbon Day organized on August 23, to denounce the in-human Vietnamese Communist regime. A Vietnamese speaker shared with the demonstrators the ongoing Vietnamese Resistance Movement and its goal to overthrow this regime and to restore freedom, democracy, and prosperity for the people of Vietnam.

The Black Ribbon Day this year has successfully drawn nearly 5000 people from different nationalities whose countries were ruled by brutal communist regimes.

FLORIDA: COMMUNIST FLAG REMOVED

The Vietnamese students at Jacksonville Community College informed to the school administration that the Vietnamese communists' flag hung with 24 nations' flags in a Cultural Event was not the national symbol to the Vietnamese, and requested it being replaced by the correct one - the yellow flag with three red stripes.

With the local Vietnamese community's and American friends' supports, and thorough explanation that the Hanoi regime being the culprit to sufferings of

60 millions Vietnamese during and after the 40-year devastating war and the cause of misery to neighboring peoples with its the current occupation of Laos and Cambodia, thus its flag is not accepted as the Vietnamese national symbol, the Vietnamese students finally convinced the school to replace the communist symbol. The national flag of free Vietnam since then flies with others in the school campus.

LONDON: RESISTANCE ACTIVITY DISPLAYED IN CULTURAL FAIR

More than 3000 Vietnamese and over 1000 Britons gathered at Kenington Park in London, England on August 20 for the Vietnamese Cultural Fair. Special



A planning meeting of the Action Committee Against the Hanoi financial scheme in Tokyo, Japan.

guests included the Mayor of Lambeth City, the former Ambassador of Great Britain in South Vietnam, the chairman of the Vietnamese Refugees Community, and the head of NUFRONLIV local chapter. The cultural exhibition was highlighted by pictures illustrating the resistance movement inside Vietnam and overseas. The spectators

have warmly expressed their sympathy to and admiration for the Vietnamese Resistance's determination during the viewing.



The Vietnamese and friends rally to unveil the Hanoi business scheme in West Germany.

TOKYO: FURTHER ACTIONS PLANNED AGAINST HANOI

Members of the Action Committee Against Vietcong Financial Scheme in Japan meets with the local Vietnamese on September 10 at Ebara Conference room, Tokyo, to summarize achievements by the local and worldwide movement and to detail further actions against the Vietcong's tourism, illegal trades and currency transfers. The com-

mittee, working closely with Japan's authority, has successfully identified and isolated the regime's affiliates and agents disguised as Vietnamese refugees, as well as effectively blockaded Vietcong's propaganda and financial schemes.

FRANKFURT: VIETNAMESE PROTEST HANOI REGIME

September 2, about 200 Vietnamese gathered for a mass demonstration against the Hanoi regime in front of the City Hall of Frankfurt, West Germany. A Vietnamese representative handed a petition to the authority requesting legal actions against the regime's affiliates and agents disguised as Vietnamese refugees, and especially ASICO, a Hanoi-owned business. Resistance-inspiring chorus singing and performance have captivated a large audience of passer-by and journalists. The event was later reported on many channels and newspapers. After the mass demonstration, many participants attended a fund raising dinner to support the resistance movement led by NUFRONLIV inside Vietnam.

HOLLAND: VIETNAMESE CUT TULIPS TO RAISE MONEY FOR NUFRONLIV

In response to the worldwide resistance movement against the Hanoi regime, 40 Vietnamese from different cities in Holland have gathered on weekends of July at Anna Paulona, a famous place for tulips, to pick tulip roots then donated the money to the NUFRONLIV-led resistance movement. Participants, including 50 plus-year old ladies and teenagers, enjoyed the meaningful task and decided to continue throughout the season.

TOKYO: A HANOI SPECIALIST DEFECTS WITH NUFRONLIV HELP

Tran Quoc Duc, a member of the 6-person technical team sent by Hanoi to evaluate cinematographic equipments of Matsushita Company for purchase, have defected on October 5 with the help of the NUFRONLIV Chapter in Japan.

Working in the Ho Chi Minh City Magnetic Motion Picture Agency, Duc has witnessed the severe infightings between factions under concealment of the "untying thoughts" policy. As a member of the visual propaganda section, he was instructed to promote the party loyalty and obedience with more flexible methods under the "open-

ness" banner. Resentment was so widespread and critical among the soldiers and cadres that Hanoi's top leaders had to order "rectification of thought" campaign recently, Duc informed. The economic and social order was so ravaged as to be corrected by Hanoi's measures, he said.

CANBERRA: VIETNAMESE YOUTHS CHALLENGE HANOI REGIME

About a thousand of Vietnamese rallied in front of Hanoi Embassy in Canberra, Australia on August 26, 1989 to pressure and challenge Hanoi to respect human rights and exercise true democracy in Vietnam. The rally was organized by the Action Committee of Free Vietnamese Students and Youths in Canberra. The participants, braving showers and wind, coming from different parts of Australia, marched toward Hanoi embassy with banners



The youth and student protest against the Hanoi regime in Canberra, Australia.

such as: "Disband the Vietnamese Communist Party, Human Rights for Vietnam, etc..." A drama "Prison K.18" depicting the suffering of oppressed Vietnamese and political prisoners was performed by the delegate of Victoria state and was noted to bring tears to the marchers as well as to the watching police officers.

According to the organizers, the rally is part of the continuous efforts of the Vietnamese people to push Hanoi into a double bind, challenging its show of openness: If the Hanoi leaders would truly move toward respecting human rights, accepting true democracy, the communist regime would lose its hold. On other hand, if they respond negatively to this challenge, they would reveal this liberal mask, thus nullifying their efforts to break the free world's political isolation and economic embargo.

The rally in Australia was part of Vietnamese Students and Youths' worldwide movement in response to NUFRONLIV's July 1989 Declaration of the National Innovation for Vietnam.

WHAT FUTURE FOR HANOI REVERSED STAND?

Over 2 years ago Hanoi had a great hope in its drive to renovate its economy management, intendedly fashioned after methods and techniques of a market-driven economy. Along, some controls in cultural activity were slightly relaxed, a half-way measure that Hanoi top leaders flaunted as a major switch of policy. The move was duplicated the Soviet "restructuring" and "openness", catchy terms that gained popularity in the West by and because of Western media enthusiasm to a startling outlook than because of their true attributes or results. Today, 2 and a half years later, the Hanoi regime sharply reversed every move that it had laboriously advertised as the change of policy.

Given the current political disintegration, the regime's piecemeal economic remedies have backfired. Each half-way measure cancelled out the other, and the popular distrust drove the confusion into further chaos. For the regime, the overall situation was much worse now than before late 1986. Production did not increase, inflation yet shot up to 1,500% a year. Unemployment rate reached 60% among the working age population. Reduction of the regime's budget deficit and inflation remained the utmost economic priority. Repeated exchange rate adjustments, while not effective to bring the state-controlled production system into realistic cost accounting, have spurred price vertically. Primary attempts to replace the "necessities subsidy system" with "pay hike system", inconsistently enforced and incapable to stem inefficiency of the bureaucracy, brought more inflation. Subsequent ironic measure to stall payroll - in many factories and collectives, products and produces given in place of pay for as long as 6 months - have sent wild resentment to a vast array of state workers and cadres who began to look out to private deals for survival.

Politically, even guarded criticism caused unbearable damages to the regime. Power of the Party and Party figures were indirectly called into question although publicized exposures of shortcomings already limited the criticism to the functioning bureaucracy and to isolated incidents. Out of relaxed control, media reports have brought to the fore the widespread political resistance as well as the Army's critically low morale and militia's dying enthusiasm. Armed protests have been reported in Northern provinces. Constant sabotage of communications cables and water system could not be stopped. Demonstrations of college students and of farmers became issue of security concern. Small arms and even rockets, explosive charges, were siphoned out to the populations. Increased assassinations and attempts on the State Security agents

could no longer be concealed. Armed resistance movement has forced the regime to order counter-measures to the smallest military units.

The policy reversal began on the 6th plenum of The Party Central Committee in March, 1989. Six principles laid out all asserted the goal to build socialism and to consolidate the leadership of the Party, which immediately became the framework for all following policies. Since then, there were raids of private petty businesses. Writers involved in exposures and criticism incidents were arrested. Eight publishing houses were closed, many permits were revoked. Raids and confiscation of unauthorized printed materials and video tapes were reported from the North to the South. Articles aiming to terrorize any political organized opposition were unusually seen and heard in official media. As the regime failed to recover the world's trust and aids with its maneuvering via the Cambodia issue and the troops pullout, it saw less and less need to maintain the "openness" image.

On the 7th plenum convened in mid-August, the Party Central Committee was bolder to reveal Hanoi's hard-line stand. The West and especially the United States were harshly accused as abettors to the counter-revolutionary forces in Eastern Europe. Official media lashed out attacks at anti-socialist forces and demands for changes in Poland and Hungary, particularly the Polish Solidarity Labor Union. Stern warnings to any bent to multi-party system or pluralism were repeated in all major speeches of Communist party Secretary-General Nguyen Van Linh. Campaigns of thought rectification began heard after this plenary session.

In light of the increase in scope and intensity of the hard-line policy, this reversed trend would not be a short time episode. Given the same highest leadership that announced and then renounced the "openness" policy and given its brief trial, the policy switch has well indicated Hanoi's original intention of consolidation of the party dictatorship and top leaders' power, a fact also repeatedly affirmed by Hanoi resolutions. For the regime's survival, unexpected backlashes that it faced in various domains may have accelerated the sharp return. Either because of Hanoi top leaders' unwillingness for genuine changes or because of the increased popular opposition to their superficial measures, the consequences of reversed policies waiting for them in the near future may be the same.

First, we expect more economic chaos, management confusions, and distribution disturbance at all levels. There would still be petty businesses and some tolerance of small scale and of individual basis. Foreign investment, then already small, will halt indefinitely for better atmosphere and confirmed stability. Foreign aids would be a remote dream. Given the void of foreign aids and investment, the economy will further sink in trouble of no remedy. A doom atmosphere will prevail, replacing the exhilarating one that those hoped to have deals with the "open" regime might have previously felt. Cultural and educational activity will come to a mundane dead end, and more social unrest of larger magnitude will certainly be unavoidable. Organized protest of different scales will expected to increase.

Policy reversion will become opportunities of elimination between rival groups. There may, however, be no significant rivalries among the top leaders or between factions of the top leaders, given the common increasing threat they face from the population. Instead, it will be the fierce battle between the top echelon and the base of the party and the army.

Since long, the grass roots of the system have realized the failure of communist ideology, and the deception of its party leadership throughout 40 years of war and the 2 invasions of neighboring countries. During the course of the policy switches in the last 2 years, they have wit-

nessed the concession and the impotence of the top party leaders. On the other hand, a brighter and long-term solution of the free and democratic model has presented its results to cadres and soldiers who have come in touch with the formerly prosperous South Vietnam. Upheavals in Eastern blocs would likely have impact on these grass roots cadres and soldiers that they behold the power for radical change.

The habitual Communist solution to replace current top leader by another in order to delay its collapse will no longer be effective. Similarly, a communist-prone opposition led by a member of the Vietnamese Communist Party would not draw the following of these disillusioned party members and soldiers. The only and most probable way for the grass roots is to fight back their own Party's top leaders. In fact this situation has gained its strongest momentum. Some have expectedly remained in the system and drew as much the resources of the dwindling system as they can without any concern for its collapse, others have joined the anti-communist resistance movement to fight back the regime. Their self-survival actions already began to turn into conscious acts to erode the remaining energy of the regime. Whether it was underground dismantling of machinery and equipments for scrap metal exports or was a defection to the resistance ranks, these acts are increasing in numbers and in magnitude. The aftermath of Hanoi's policy switching will be doomier than anytime before.

HANOI CONDEMS POLISH DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT

On August 26 1989, Vietnamese Communists (Vietcong) organized a mass meeting at Nghe Tinh Province (North Vietnam) to support the Polish Communist Party. Around 200 participants were mustered from the cadres and ranks of Vietnamese Communist Party, Party-affiliate organizations, and fronts.

In this gathering for propaganda, the Vietcong denounced the Solidarity Trade Union as "those reactionaries supported by the U.S.-led imperialist

forces, attempting to stage a counter-revolutionary coup d'etat to divert Poland onto the path against socialism."

Vietcong Party organizers expressed their concerns to the declining power of the Polish Communist Party and vowed their support "to fight against the hostile forces, regain power, and firmly protect the revolutionary gains." In a subtly threatening speech aimed to those tinkering with economic liberalism and democracy, the Vietcong organizers emphasized that a

multi-party government is against communism.

It is noted that the mass meeting of this kind was limited within Nghe Tinh Province and several central government institutions, over which Hanoi has firmer control. Though Hanoi needs to assert its dictatorship and communist ideology, but it seems likely either the regime wanted to avoid over-publicize the democratization movement in Poland or could not rally the sufficient mass for denouncement in large cities.

US COUNTERFEITS FIGHT HANOI INFLATION BATTLE

Recently, there has been a catch in advertisements on money transfers to Vietnam: recipients in Vietnam can collect US dollars for moneys sent by overseas relatives. The only problem: those US bills are counterfeits. People in Vietnam have informed their relatives abroad, which confirmed the rampant matter. Hanoi regime lightly mentioned of the situation in the August 15 issue of the Public Security Journal issued in Ho Chi Minh city. Two ranking State Security officers of Ho Chi Minh city were arrested for the collusion in the counterfeit circulation. Some sources have estimated the amount of US counterfeits reaching tens of millions in Ho Chi Minh city alone. The most circulated were reportedly the US\$50 and \$100 counterfeit bills.

No solid evidences are yet available to indicate the source, but several factors have pointed to Hanoi as the culprit or the major accessory of this counterfeit scheme.

The Hanoi regime is fighting a failing battle against inflation. All international lending organizations embarked on substantial reduction of inflation as prerequisite of any type of loans to Hanoi. For as long as six months many state collectives and factories had to pay their employees with produces and products. Payrolls were totally withheld as money was no longer distributed by the regime to its own agencies and organs. Unreal as it seemed, it was exactly the way Hanoi has done for nearly a year to fight the inflation battle. Without being aware of this, one would otherwise be baffled at other desperate attempts of the Hanoi regime.

Many among nearly 2 million Vietnamese around the world regularly sent money home to feed their job-deprived relatives in Vietnam. In North America alone, it amounted to nearly 200 million US dollars a year. A vast network of outlets openly affiliated or disguised as privately owned, in and outside Vietnam, was under Hanoi monopolized control to provide currency transfers between Vietnamese overseas and their relatives in Vietnam. In the past, recipients in Vietnam received Hanoi-issued piasters or taels of golds for the transferred foreign money. The state did not benefit much when repaying with golds. And both gold and piasters

pouring into the market this way have driven up the price of merchandises in the non-producing economy. The Hanoi regime in dire need of hard currency from Vietnamese overseas had formerly opted to suffer the inflationary downside of this practice. Now it has to battle the fatal inflation to cajole more foreign money from outside lending sources. US counterfeit money was the viable solution to exchange for hard currency and simultaneously, to fight against the inflation.

Hard currencies from the money transfers went into the state coffer as usual, and US counterfeits were distributed out to the market. The real foreign currencies funneled into Hanoi's state banks were used to defray for the ever-increasing import expenses. The influx of US counterfeits later emerged when the Hanoi regime was ready for its second step: to cut down the flow of circulated money, US bogus bills would then be officially confiscated or be revealed and eased out of circulation. The people of Vietnam are robbed outright, yet the Hanoi regime may look like just doing a goodwill gesture to the United States.

Prior to Hanoi mention of US bogus bills in circulation, there were reports of official buying its own currency with 3 million dollars of "US" bills to pay for domestic harvest crops. A seemingly ironic event if it had not been the US counterfeit money that they used for the deals and if it had not been a deliberate move in the well-charted scheme. Genuine US dollars then in circulation in Vietnam might also be replaced with the bogus by state agents.

The volume of US counterfeit bills reportedly changing hands in Vietnam attests that the situation has been going on for quite a long time and also makes it very likely that the scheme has had the involvement or cooperation from the policy-making level of the Hanoi regime. Those bills may have been printed in Vietnam or allowed to enter the country. Two middle-level scapegoats were a small price for Hanoi to pay in order to make a dent in the intractable battle against the 4-digit inflation and to rob tens of millions of US dollars from the Vietnamese. No one will ever be sure what crime the nonplussed regime would refuse to do in face of the imminent collapse.

Interview NUFRONLIV Commissioner-General of Overseas Affairs: THE DECLARATION OF NATIONAL INNOVATION FOR VIETNAM

Last August, Vietnamese at home and abroad have received with enthusiasm the Declaration of National Innovation for Vietnam, proclaimed by the National United Front for The Liberation of Vietnam. To give our readers a better understanding on the significance of this document, we have requested an interview with the NUFRONLIV's representative overseas, Mr. Nguyen Kim, Commissioner-General of The Directorate of Overseas Affairs. The interview took place in late September 1989.

Vietnamese Resistance: Mr. Commissioner-General, what are the motives or reasons that led to the Declaration of National Innovation for Vietnam, especially why this time?

Mr. Nguyen Kim: In the summer just passed, the Vietnamese Resistance Council held a special session to evaluate the progress of the resistance movement, and to map out immediate tasks for the Vietnamese, in and outside of the country, to accelerate the Hanoi collapse and to prepare for our nation-rebuilding. Along with other commissioners in the Directorate of Overseas Affairs, I have returned to the resistance base for this special meeting. The Declaration was completed out of this July meeting and publicized overseas last August. The Declaration was named "National Innovation for Vietnam" because it emphasizes the goal to innovate our country.

Overthrowing the Hanoi regime is only a part in our entire struggle. Based on assessment of the current situation, it's relatively an easier goal to reach than the following phase which is the reconstruction of a free, just, and progressive Vietnam after years of war under the communist rule.

Vietnamese Resistance: Some people wonder if there is any other solution besides overthrowing the Hanoi regime? Doesn't Hanoi "Openness" policy satisfy the Vietnamese?

Mr. Nguyen Kim: Basic characteristics of the communism are anti-progressive and backward. The Vietnamese communists are also brutally dictatorial, and among the communist world it is the one that has the most failures in the shortest time. Based on the average GNP, Vietnam is one of the poorest nations on earth under Hanoi rule. Merging from this rule, the Vietnamese people have steadfastly pursued their struggle for freedom in their own way. Facing the popular inland resistance and international pressure, at the same time worrying about being abandoned by the Soviets who are

also trying to solve their own problems, Hanoi is forced to declare a policy of "openness in thinking and actions".

The goal of this policy does not aim at improving people's life but at consolidating the regime's power, in other words, intensifying the regime's dictatorship and repressiveness. Hanoi has reconfirmed this goal in the 6th and 7th plenums held in late March and mid August. The regime's openness policy, therefore, cannot bring changes to the existing situation in Vietnam, let alone innovating the country. In order to innovate Vietnam, the Vietnamese people have no other choice but to overthrow the communist regime.

Vietnamese Resistance: But isn't it a difficult task to overthrow a despotic regime operating with a large army and secret police forces?

Mr. Nguyen Kim: These military forces consist of normal human beings. They came from the rank of ordinary citizens. How could they survive when the regime is paralysed on all fronts, unable to provide their needs? The most important thing, however, is that they have witnessed people's hatred toward the regime and felt isolated by the mass thus lost their faith in the system.

The strategy of our struggle is to mobilize the people to undermine every ways the wills of those protecting the regime. That's why we don't hear of explosive fighting but instead notice Hanoi's increasingly alarms of its army's demoralization and degeneration. The percentage of army deserters has reached a dangerous level, and dissatisfaction among the State Security Forces has become the regime's great security concern. The people of Vietnam want to overthrow the communist regime in order to innovate our country, thus our victory should not be reached upon total destruction and ruins of the country. Our struggle, therefore, must be based on humanitarian grounds and on intelligent creativity, not on ordinary military solutions which could cause people more sorrows and create much more difficulty for the restoration of our country. This strategy will accelerate the enemy's defeat which surely will come sooner than anticipated by those who don't have a clear view of the current situation in Vietnam or don't understand the philosophy applied in this struggle.

Vietnamese Resistance: In other words, Hanoi will not succeed despite its Party's intensified control and stricter rule behind the disguise of "openness" policy?

Mr. Nguyen Kim: Surely not. On the contrary, the Vietnamese people have creatively exploited the disguised "openness" policy for opportunities to cause more



Mr. Nguyen Kim, Commissioneer-General of the Directorate of Overseas Affairs.

problems to the regime, and made the collapse more imminent. For illustration, the regime is like a bicyclist on a rail track who will fall if not pedalling, skid if making turns. The Hanoi leadership doesn't see the reality, and doesn't end its dictatorial rule, namely to get off the bicycle, concentrates instead on diversionary maneuvers of making turns to consolidate their power. The time the regime makes the turn is therefore the perfect time for us to oust them. Never in the history of the regime that it is so unstable and insecure like the present time. The Declaration analyses this situation and emphasizes our opportunity clearly.

Vietnamese Resistance: Suppose that the regime will be overthrown, what direction will the Vietnamese follow to innovate the country?

Mr. Nguyen Kim: The Declaration clearly spells out basic principles for the national innovation. Foremost is the innovation of people's thinking in order to convert the spirits of freedom, progressivism and self-reliance into leading philosophical ideas. Next is the innovation of the political structure, which at the present represents the products of anti-progress and dictatorship, in order to build a foundation for democracy and justice, and to limit governmental intrusion to people's daily activities. Third is the innovation of the economic system including but not limited to the restoration of private ownership, the development of a free market economy in which people are free to make a living under a simple bureaucracy without interference of politics, and encouragement of trade relations with all nations. The last is the innovation in foreign relations: Vietnam will maintain independent, peaceful and equal relations with all nations, and respect territories and sovereignty of neighboring countries. On these four principles, we challenge the Hanoi to follow. They will neither dare nor being able to for fear of losing limitless privileges that they currently held.

Vietnamese Resistance: On international relations, some people raised the question why don't we appeal the world to pressure the regime for changes with inducements of trade and technological assistance. Isn't it an easier and more peaceful solution?

Mr. Nguyen Kim: All communist regimes shared the same specialty in causing disasters to their own economies and societies. They then appealed to the Western nations for economic and technological aids in promise to be "more peaceful and democratic" and to reduce people's sufferings". But in reality, after receiving

assistance, they returned to original policies of oppressive nature. Western governments or cooperations which already lent money or invested in those countries then found it difficult to end their ventures because too much stakes have involved. They therefore could not use these types of inducements as to pressure the communist regimes as originally hoped and intended.

We just talked about what consistently happened since 1920. By reasoning, economic assistance alone cannot lead to political change if these dictators do not elect to do so or if it's not accompanied by a struggle well organized and participated by the people from within. Recent events in the communist world from Europe to Asia have proven this point. Under the current situation and condition in Vietnam, no foreign country will benefit economically or politically to have trade with the Hanoi regime. Assistance or trade will not cause the regime to change and none of the benefit will trickle down to the people. On the contrary, it only helps to strengthen the regime's oppressive apparatus and to consolidate its political standing.

Vietnamese Resistance: To rephrase it, the Vietnamese people do not want other countries to establish diplomatic or trade relations with the Hanoi government?

Mr. Nguyen Kim: The Vietnamese people want to establish friendly relationship with other people and governments. But at this moment the Vietnamese are being ruled by a minority oppressive regime. Any foreign government or foreign firm that maintains a relationship with this regime is regarded as un-

friendly to the Vietnamese people. A country, if unable to advance the cause of the Vietnamese people's resistance movement that would bring peace to Indochina and stability to Southeast Asia, at least should not collaborate with a criminal hated regime which does not represent the Vietnamese people.

We appeal to the world to maintain economic sanctions and diplomatic isolation against Hanoi as the most appropriate and realistic policies for Indochina and Southeast Asia. These are also the policies of ASEAN nations after Hanoi shot down all political solutions to the Cambodia issue in the Paris International Conference held last August.

Vietnamese Resistance: While the outside world continues to put on the pressure, how do the Vietnamese people struggle from within?

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Mr. Nguyen Kim: The Vietnamese people have fought to bring the Hanoi regime down to its current condition. The regime receives 2 billion dollars in aid from the Soviet Union every year. We only need to spend 500 dollars to destroy a project worth 50 million dollars, or 100,000 times its worth and turn the regime into an unbearable cost center for the Soviet. This is the attritional resistance that the Vietnamese traditionally master.

The Declaration suggests more than 200 practical scenarios of resistance so everyone in each own unique situation can always participate to fight. This approach is derived from a strategy shortly named "EVERYONE-EVERY FRONT" that NUFRONLIV declared in its Political Program proclaimed in 1982.

I need to add that, because of the communist oppression in the country, we must also resist via the military approach, still it is not considered the most important one. Abroad, we only look to the mass mobilization, meaning we rally every Vietnamese and foreign friend to bring more pressures on the regime and to assist the Resistance Movement in our country. The basic strategy is to exclude no legal and moral means to weaken the regime in both its real strength and its standing, and to increase the strength of the Vietnamese Resistance Movement in order to solve a problem for Vietnam, but also a menace for the world.

Vietnamese Resistance: Mr. Commissioner-General, thank you for granting us the interview.

The VIETNAMESE RESISTANCE published by the General Directorate of Overseas Affairs to provide background and information on the liberation struggle of the Vietnamese. Subscription is \$12.00 US dollars or other currency equivalence. Please contact respective offices for inquiries and changes of address. Financial contributions to our cause are greatly appreciated.

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
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The National United Front for the Liberation of Vietnam (NUFRONLIV) was formed in 1980 to absorb Vietnamese at home and abroad into a mass organization to free Vietnam from the Hanoi regime and Soviet domination, and to build a democratic and prosperous country for the Vietnamese people.

NUFRONLIV liberation strategy emphasizes on mass mobilization for an "Everyone-Every Front" that utilizes all available means and creative methods of the mass to destroy the enemy, in which military approach is conceived supplemental to activity of mass mobilization.

Overseas the NUFRONLIV has chapters almost everywhere there is a Vietnamese community. Inside Vietnam the infrastructure expands even far deep into the North. Besides the cadre network, NUFRONLIV communicates with people inside Vietnam via its Vietnamese Resistance Radio, broadcasting 8 times a day for one hour each.

NUFRONLIV President:

Commissioner-General/Directorate of Inland Affairs:

Commissioner-General/Directorate of Overseas Affairs:

Commander in Chief/Armed Resistance Forces:

Hoàng Cơ Minh

Ngô Văn Tự

Nguyễn Kim

Đặng Quốc Hiền

MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENTS DESTROYED EN MASSE

Hanoi decision in August to suspend export of scrap metals was in fact a last resort to cope with a peculiar kind of sabotaging activities involving high ranking officials and organized networks. According to Hanoi Radio broadcast of September 18, many equipments and machinery from various national defense, railroad, power line, and mining projects have been dismantled into scrap metals for export sale. The surreptitiously destructive activities, collaborated by powerful authorities because of their lucrative profits, have profoundly impaired industrial infrastructure and production programs of the regime. Usual raids and harsh punishment were ineffective to thwart this fast expanding activity.

Finally, the Council of Ministers had to issued a directive to block all export of scrap metals. The directive states: "Effective 25 August 1989, the export of scrap metals, including ferrous and nonferrous metals, shall be temporarily suspended, except for those scrap metals already loaded onto ships or approved for export before 25 August. It is, however, necessary to carefully check these goods to make sure that they belong to the right category of metals allowed for export. The Ministry of Foreign

Economic Relations will stop granting permits for the export of scrap metals." Several cross checks between Ministries were also instituted for future permits of scrap metal export in attempt to detect inside collaboration.

In the past 15 years, continuous opposition, sabotages, and resistance from grass roots populace have, slowly but effectively, crippled the Hanoi regime. A few illustratives are: premature crops harvest, deliberate evasion of machinery maintenance, destruction of communication cables, dismantling railroads, siphoning away arms, and elimination of equipments. The scrap metal deals now added to the long list of anti-regime activities, only this time they were originated from privileged factions in power.

A fact solidly proved but underevaluated: Hanoi ravaged economy was the ineluctable outcome, not only because of its top leaders' management incompetence and their anti-economic dogmas but also because of the persistent and organized resistance movement inside Vietnam.

DANIEL ROBINSON'S ORDEAL

Westerners, planning to visit Vietnam or to do business there, should reflect on the experience of a young American college student named Daniel Robinson.

Daniel Robinson, 25, of San Rafael, California had been in Vietnam for ten weeks researching a travel guidebook under contract to the Lonely Planet Publishing Company of Victoria, Australia. His trip was fully authorized by the Hanoi Tourism agency and the Hanoi Foreign Ministry.

By early August, 1989, he was called in for questioning by the police

three times during as many days before they arrested him. He was told he didn't have the proper documentation, and would have to leave Vietnam. Daniel Robinson was then held for five hours, two of them in manacles. All his requests to see Australian Embassy officials were denied. He was then taken to the International Airport in Hanoi where police held him in a "half-Nelson" while he was searched and his film was seized. The film was to be used in the Travel Guide to Vietnam. He was then placed on a flight to Bangkok. He was given no satisfactory explanation for the harsh treat-

ment he was being subjected to. Typical. To add insult to injury, the Vietnamese Communists demanded that he pays US \$160 for his air fare. "I was completely at their mercy." Robinson was quoted as saying.

It was fortunate for Robinson that the regime might have already restrained itself during its flaunting "openness" policy. With the recent ideological crackdown and vehement denouncement of Western influence, a foreign traveller will never know if an ordinary and innocent activity he does may be labelled as serious Crime Against The State and what kind punishment may be waiting for him.

THE END OF HISTORY PROPHETISM?

More than 10 years ago, people had a depressing vision about the future of the Western liberalism.

At that time, economy in the West was overwhelmed with the oil shock, energy uncertainty, world monetary disturbances due to demonetization of gold, and stagflation - a simultaneous phenomenon of stagnation and inflation that was often thought of impossible to occur - with a double digit inflation. Ecology crisis, overpopulation, malnutrition, income gap between Northern and Southern hemispheres were seriously alarmed in the World Food Conference convened in Rome. Coming along was the winning of communism in Indochina and in Angola, and hence, the perceived imminent threat of the Soviet Red Army to Western Europe after nearly 10 years of detente.

Ten years ago, the Western intelligentsia would not confidently bet on the long term future of the political democracy and capitalist system that have continuously generated peaceful stability and economic progress to industrialized countries for more than 3 decades. Some people fond of Cassandra's prophetism have quickly projected warnings of Western decadence.

Today, one has to wonder what has happened that prompts an optimistic view asserting that the world history has come to an end with the victory of Western liberalism. Unlike obscure prophets being forgotten as soon as their words come out of the press, Francis Fukuyama will have enjoyed publicity for the next few months with his article "**The End of History**" in the Summer 1989 issue of The National Interest. It is so because he is holding the post of Deputy Director of the Policy and Planning of the U.S. State Department, albeit his affirmation that the expressed view is his own and does not represent that of the Department he is working for.

What has happened that turned the predominant pessimism ten years ago into a phenomenon of today optimistic exhilaration? Did Western liberal democracy truly prevail over other ideological models, and we are arriving at a universal and homogenous state, thus the end of history? Is it truly as Fukuyama has worried that we - at least the intellectuals - be sad that human kind now void of "large problem" to concern?

Being victimized by the colonialism of France, where ideals of the Enlightenment leading to the French Revolution, by the fascism of Japan, and afterward by the communism, the Vietnamese have a more cautious view than that of Fukuyama's.

Theoretically, Francis Fukuyama based on Hegel's philosophy of history under the interpretation of Alexandre Kojève. To Hegel, history has come to an end in 1806 with Napoléon's victory over the Prussian, marking the domination of the French revolutionary thoughts that Fukuyama proposed eventually lead to a universal and homogenous state. In Kojève's view, philosophy has no future after Hegel, and history has ended after the second World War (He, therefore, no longer taught philosophy at École Practique des Hautes Etudes since 1945, chose to work as an international specialist in French Minister of Finance and Economic. Only when European Economic Community was established he moved to work there.) To Fukuyama, the history ended since the late of 1980's.

On the reasoning that history develops rationally and ends when there is a domination of a universal ideology, three temporal markers - 1806, 1945, 1989 - were mentioned as the end of history. But, what people witnessed was a lingering bloodshed after 1806 and 1945. The victory of the French Empire marked by 1806 according to Hegel opened a spreading war for almost 10 years in Europe. The end of Second World War in 1945 - contrary to what Kojève saw it - has commenced the rampant ravagement of communism to mankind from Europe to Asia. Could one ever be sure that after the time peg of 1989 the mankind will no longer suffer consequences of unpredicted upheavals in the world?

We may believe that human being is perennially looking for political solutions to happiness and peace. History of mankind, however, not necessarily evolves under the spell of determinism. History often turned with inordinary events and by irrational thinking of leader maniacs.

What's happening in reality has not solidly fallen into the perspective that Fukuyama attempted to depict. He presented the defeat of communism in forms of self-alteration or transformation on the basis of recent events in the world. It's undeniable that communism has lost its

attraction to people outside its control, and has failed to mobilize the people inside its confinement. But a regime, even one established on a failing ideology, would outlive the ideology that it bases on.

What recently occurred in Tienanmien Square in Beijing indeed professed the longevity of such a regime. The Manúel Noriega phenomenon, without blessing of any ideology, defying the United States in its own sphere of influence, still is a matter of concern. Fukuyama is most faltering in citing the case of the Soviet Union. Crises of different extends and aspects in this empire - very serious notwithstanding - have not in fact destroyed its warring capacity. Fukuyama himself also admitted the uncertainty in predicting the Soviet behaviors, or in another word, its being a cause of concern in the "rational" determinist course of history.

Indeed, facing the aggressive expansionism of fascism and communism, the democratic liberalism has not actively embarked the course to prevail them, only contained and defended with a moderate success at a very high cost. The dominance of Western liberalism today idly came as a byproduct of the communist failure in social welfare.

While Fukuyama's view about the end of history is debatable in theory and in reality, an aspect of his conclusion about a boring future without history is worth to be mentioned. Western liberalism is often characterized as non-ideological or anti-ideological. We address it under different terms - Capitalism, Western liberalism, democratic pluralism - a fact which signifies the characteristics of this very liberalism. It is not an ideology, namely a global system of thoughts to explain *ex post facto* every human activities under a certain chain of logic, and from such derived explanations, to regulate human behaviors. In that sense, communism is an ideology, with quasi-religious nature, thus it is totalitarian: subjecting everyone to the interpretations of objective rationalism of the ruling party. The Western liberalism on the other hand based on political democracy and economic liberalism; it has no ambition to provide precepts in life styles, thoughts, arts, religious worships, etc. under a framework of "objective principles" but whose ambiguous interpretations are reserved exclusively to ruling leaders.

If the future of Western liberalism were boring, it would be our responsibility, or in another sense, our remaining right to deal with it: we may and can always ameliorate the society with more concepts than just politi-

cal democracy and economic liberalism. To expect solutions for esthetics, ethics, or metaphysics from liberalism is to cage mankind in a set of fixed concepts. Liberalism is not a religion; and human cannot become God to decide on happiness for other.

To propose the end of history and to view the world future as boring is an act apathetic to an array of exigencies still besieging mankind. Fukuyama has summed up Kojève's view of the history end by the year of 1945; he did not mentioned that Kojève was a Stalin loyalist during 1938-1939. Is it possible that, to Hegel's exemplar, Kojève regarded Stalin as another Napoléon, to universalize all revolutionary ideas and to conclude the evolution of history by the birth of the Soviet Union state? When Kojève ceased to teach philosophy, the wheel of history kept rolling and millions of people kept dying. Do they, as philosophers, ever concern?

Today, communism has lost its spell, particularly to the intelligentsia - as Feng Lizhi and Solzhenitsyn would attest - but it is still a problem to a third of humankind. The other two third may not see life boring as Fukuyama would grieve. They are facing so many problems and solutions, rational and irrational, sensible as well as malicious.

Eighty years ago, Lenin predicted that as human society reaches the communist state the management of the economy will be simple - and mundane? - as the job of a mailman. Today, Fukuyama proposed that the world has approached the pinnacle with democratic liberalism, and all problems rivet around worldly economic matters. Did Fukuyama follow Lenin with a rationalist and oversimplified view about human life?

Before Fukuyama, there were predictions about victory of some ism and demise of others, there were also predictions about the Death of Ideologies. After Fukuyama, there would still be predictions. But who knows where the history of human will head to? Hegel in his days of old age has expressed his skepticism of philosophical prediction in his reference to "*the owl of Minerva which starts on its flight only when the evening dust has set in*". And if he knew about Fukuyama's venture he might have repeated:

"As every individual is a son of his period, so philosophy is nothing but its period comprehended in thought. It is just as foolish to imagine that any philosophy would go beyond its present world as an individual could jump beyond his time."

HANOI REVERSES SHOW OF CULTURAL OPENNESS

Hanoi officials, alarmed that video screening and circulation of unauthorized printed materials have grown more and more uncontrollable, have stepped up actions of legal disguise to curb the trend.

There are thousands of unlicensed video recorders in Vietnam, and tens of thousands of illegal tapes. Unauthorized materials are typically smuggled in from overseas and copied in Vietnam. "Decadent, harmful, and dangerous" were more often used to describe materials that portray life in the Free World.

Many state-controlled agencies have been charged of covering up and even facilitating the circulation of unauthorized videos and journals. Hanoi Radio news broadcast of July 21 reported a long list of violators that included units of the Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Information, and those of the Police Department, Hanoi Military Region, Son Tay City General Services Corporation, to

name a few. The problem seems to be more rampant even in the Military and in South Vietnam, prompting the Defense Ministry to take actions against 200 soldier families in Go Vap District. The State Security Force has also raided 43 households in the living quarters of the Logistic General Department of Tan Son Nhat Airport, Saigon City, and arrested many officers. In addition, 8 publishing houses were closed. Tran Van Phac, Minister of Culture, acknowledged at the June 27 meeting of the National Assembly his Ministry failure to control video screening and criticized the "opposing negativism" found in published newspapers and books.

Along with the arrests, the regime has responded with a new set of restrictive laws:

- Commercial video shows are to be banned everywhere in the country except within the network established for the purpose of implementing State plan.

- All videotapes to be shown legally must be censored by the Central Cinematographic Agency.

- the State will stop importing video recorders, and all privately owned recorders are to be heavily taxed

These developments again proved the oppressive nature that Hanoi resorted to when its paltry measures toward image-polishing openness have backfired. The people are taking advantage of any opportunity to realize their aspiration for freedom. This situation has deeper implications, however. The fact that those "unauthorized" tapes and books are extremely welcome among soldiers and cadres of various ranks and agencies brings up a fundamental question: how can a regime that was alienated by its own soldiers and employees effectively maintain its reign over 60 million people? In short, it can't.

HANOI MILITIA FORCES CRUMBLING

Facing the Army demoralization, Hanoi was now burdened with the sweeping disintegration of its militia forces. In the heading "Today's Militia" article broadcasted by Hanoi radio on July 3, 1989, Dao Van Tu, a member of Vietnamese Communist Military General Staff, brushed upon the stagnancy and inactivity of communist militia organizations from the North to the South.

The situation was noted worst in the Northern border provinces. False report about activity and meetings, slovenly recruitment, and orders disregard have become common. Out of Tu's admission, a phenomenon was unveiled: the regime maintained militia organizations by reward of contract, but with the militia's alienation to the system, these inducements only bred more reports of inflated figures and sloppy works to meet head count requirement.

The overall corrosion of instruments of force, namely the Armed Forces and the State Security, has also induced the breakdown of the militia system. During the war, Hanoi has been able to count on the Army and the State Security Forces to brace the militia organizations. Now, with the rivalry between the Army and the State Security Force, and especially the widespread resentment among the former, Hanoi multi-level defense has visibly been shaken to the grass roots.

In the broadcast, Tu suggested the renewal of patriotic calls in order to salvage the situation. Given popular disillusion about the wartime sacrifice and distrust toward the regime, one need not wonder where his proposal would lead to.

ARMED PROTEST IN NORTH VIETNAM

Hanoi leaders rarely admitted any manifestation of social disorders and political opposition unless the situation had been so critical and widespread that forced publicized measures. The Hanoi regime was never hesitant in using force and terror to rule and control. With its formidable State Security Forces, one could hardly imagine that people dare openly confront the regime. A recent armed protest involving 2000 villagers in North Vietnam has brought to the fore a situation that likely occurred in several other localities.

Quan Doi Nhan Dan (People's Army Daily) of August 7, 1989 revealed that a 3-month encounter between the people of Tho Ngoc village and communist authorities had taken place in Thanh Hoa province, about 150 kilometers south of Hanoi. The incident initially happened on April 18 1989, when the villagers detained a district official to protest the regime's policy and its bureaucracy. The clash spread when the villagers captured 11 more officials of district and province levels on June 30 to press their demands. A subsequent outburst of armed encounter the next day involved 2,000 villagers and the State Security Forces equipped with hunting dogs and submachine guns. Two villagers were wounded as reported in the official newspaper. In return, the joint force of local people had captured several guns and 5 State Security agents and

stood their ground until official concession was made a month later.

On August 3, in the presence of reporters of 7 major newspapers, journals, and radio, and representatives of the Party and front organizations, the villagers released captured State Security agents in return for official purge of its party local leaders and promise of no retaliation against their villagers.

The defiance underlined that the people have clearly realized the regime's failure to mobilize its Army troops against them, and that the opposition was planned and well-participated at village level. Local troops's standoff and delay from rescuing captured State Security agents manifested the mute schism between the army units and the regime's another branch of terror. The division has indeed long existed at all levels between these two bodies of force, for the Vietcong Armed Forces, suffered unceasing griefs and losses from the regime-imposed internationalist duties, had deeply resented at power and material privileges of the State Security Forces. This schism has heavily affected the regime's rule by force. Impotent to provide material rewards to the huge Army, Hanoi top leaders could do nothing but dodged the solution.

WATER SYSTEM OF VIETNAM SABOTAGED EXTENSIVELY

According to Hanoi authority, the water system and dams in North Vietnam, vital to cultivation and life of the locals, had been damaged severely, especially in Ha Nam Ninh province. Ha Nam Ninh water system is the most critical one in North Vietnam with 120 kilometers of concrete and 123 kilometers of dams, of which 44 kilometers had to be built in double layers. "The major cause of damages was acts of sabotage from the reactionaries", Hanoi charged.

Resistance activities of the Vietnamese people have been often carried out with non-military means and

methods, not without sacrifices of their own welfare, yet in the long run have seriously crippled the communist rule and control. Nguyen Le Dieu, Assistant Director of Hydraulic Farming Controller organ, literally described the situation: "The local farmers pays no attention at protecting and maintaining the water system since they consider them the state's property. It is almost impossible to direct people in these tasks....If proper measures are not implemented soon, people will destroy all the water system to channel water into their own farms." The problem was officially alarmed in Nguyen

Quyet's article "What do we see in our tasks of protecting dikes, dams and water system" after an intensive investigation made in many districts of North Vietnam.

The situation partly illustrates the Vietnamese communist authorities' frustration and impotency in dealing with creative opposition from all population segments. The matter concerning Hanoi more, however, is the widespread indifference of enforcement cadres who ignored their duty and often abetted the people's vengeance.



Vietnam and the resistance

As a matter of policy, NUFRONLIV neither affirms nor denies any allegation by the Hanoi regime about the loss concerning our organization. This policy is in effect regarding the reprinting this article in the Vietnamese Resistance.

FORAYS by a Vietnamese resistance group through Laos more than two years ago revealed major flaws in dealing with anti-government guerrilla forces, according to two Hanoi officers who compiled a report.

A series of new security steps taken since the mid-1987 resistance attacks included placing Vietnamese military officers in direct command of Lao and Cambodia troops along the Thai and Vietnamese borders with the two buffer nations.

The authors of the Hanoi study, Col Tran Ngoc Que and Col Pham Tan Ba, said the resistance raids caused reviews of military policy by an army once touted the world's best guerrilla force.

Although raids by the resistance group led by former Saigon admiral Hoang Co Minh were detected and quickly broken up, the colonels noted serious deficiencies in border security.

Their article on "lessons learned" from the clashes with Hoang Co Minh's group appeared in the magazine *Military Studies*. Although the journal has only a tiny circulation, the frankness of the article in acknowledging problems was unusual.

The study was spurred by a series of attempts in 1987 by Minh's resistance group to break into Vietnam by way of Thailand and Laos. They aimed at starting a guerrilla war in Hanoi's backyard.

The actual operations were a military disaster, culminating in the death or capture of virtually everyone in a large push in May and June of that year.

In December, 1987, two dozen of those captured were put before a Ho Chi Minh City show trial. Several were sentenced to death and the others jailed for lengthy periods. All were overseas Vietnamese, mainly from America and France.

The fate of Minh himself remains unknown. Authorities in Ho Chi Minh showed newsmen pictures of a body they said was his. Others believe he escaped and returned to America.

The officers who wrote the report were identified only by name and rank. The tone of the article indicated they were staff officers, possibly on assignment to Dragon House, Vietnam's Pentagon.

Ironically, many of the steps they ordered in the wake of the initial resistance attacks echoed previous French and American manuals for anti-guerrilla forces — which were written to combat Vietnamese guerrillas.

The most radical by far was the placing of Vietnamese in command of Lao and Cambodian troops. Hanoi never before had admitted that its military officers had command of foreign forces.

The report said the areas of southern Laos and northeastern Cambodia were critical to Vietnam's defence efforts.

The area from the Thai frontier to Vietnam is commanded by a unit code-named N-76 and run from Military Region V headquarters at Da Nang. Unit N-76 operates in Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos — and presumably Thailand.

Colonels Que and Ba reported extensively on details of Minh's forward headquarters near the Ubon Ratchathani-Laos border. Although their report gives no sources, it appears some information was obtained by military intelligence before the first Minh raid.

That was in May, 1986. Minh ordered several advance parties into Vietnam in small groups to set up bases for the large group which he personally led in July, 1987.

Lao and Vietnamese security forces in southern Laos and western Vietnam captured many of the early infiltrators, although several got through. That was when Hanoi began exerting political pressure.

According to the report, "A unified command headquarters was established at the provincial level with the Lao provincial (commu-

by
Alan Dawson

nist) party secretary as commander and the Lao provincial unit leader and our regiment or division commanders as deputy commanders," the report said.

The colonels said the groups were far from perfect, because of unclear chains of command. "This has limited combat results," they wrote.

According to the Hanoi report, Vietnamese officers provide the major "authority and facilities" because they control helicopters and armour in the Lao and Cambodian provinces involved.

Among new steps ordered by Hanoi in Laos and Cambodia were the stationing of long-range patrol units.

The units patrol constantly under radio silence, forming a chain along the frontiers. Once a day, each team meets with the teams on either side of it to report developments.

But running anti-guerrilla operations, they found, is a different thing from being guerrillas themselves.

"The enemy is very tricky," they conceded. "It is difficult for us to spread out our forces and line in ambush for days and nights on end along a wide defence line that is hundreds of kilometres long."

The colonels criticized lack of coordination among security branches in detecting and hunting attempted infiltration by resistance forces.

"We must learn about the enemy by making full use of technical sources from higher echelons," they wrote. "We must use information from our underground bases in the enemy ranks, random intelligence tips, and information from the military intelligence network, which stretches from the border to the interior."

In Cambodia and Laos, they recommended separate commands for Vietnamese and local units. "This will reduce shortcomings which arise from the language barrier and other negative factors," they wrote.