

## The Prospect of US-Hanoi Normalization, Where's The Beef?

The miracle that Hanoi leadership is looking for to lift the regime out of its current crisis situation is the diplomatic and economic normalization with the United States.

They feel that the diplomatic normalization would lead to the ending of economic embargo not only from the United States but also from the rest of the Free World; U.S. businessmen and others, Eximbank, international organizations such as the World Bank Group, IMF, or the Asian Development Bank would pour in their investments and technology to salvage its economy destroyed by the very Marxist-Leninist system the Hanoi regime is trying to save. The Hanoi leadership desperately counts on joint ventures with foreign entities, private credits, technical assistance, preferential access to markets, and most of all, investment guarantees and soft loans (subsidized by the American tax payers) as their means of survival.

To these Vietnamese communists, whose skill in exploiting a diplomatic advantage and turning it into a political asset to buy time is quite contrary to their incompetence in economic management, being able to establish relations with the U.S. will mean an instant credit to their image, and inspire hope and a way out to their despair situation (even without actual economic outcomes), which otherwise will bury the regime alive under the destructive force of anger from the people and party members.

In the current international arena, Vietnam is no longer on the United States' list of priorities as it was in the 60's. Then what desperate moves must Hanoi leadership take in their pursuit of winning Washington friendship?

Hanoi recent "good will gesture" includes satisfying some of the U.S. demands on MIAs and POWs, and allowing some of the former South Vietnamese officers who have been imprisoned to emigrate to the United States. But the

one which requires the regime's most effort is a satisfactory solution to the Cambodia problem. The latest measure suggested by Australia in which the United Nations plays the supervisory role in the organization of the general election for Cambodia, without the previous requirement of dismantling the Hunsen regime, and the likelihood that Hanoi and Beijing will move closer in their extremist stance from the rest of the world communism provide a sound condition for another "good will gesture" from Hanoi in the eyes of the world and the United States.

The above scenario coupled with the U.S. businessmen's drive for thinking Vietnam is a conceivable market of great potential, will exert extra pressure on the Bush administration to lift the economic embargo and normalize relations with the Hanoi regime.

But, what gains could the United States possibly get in normalizing its relations with Hanoi, the regime that is deeply hated by the Vietnamese people, openly condemns the United States as their eternal enemy, portrays Washington as the world imperialist, and has killed more than 56,000 Americans and still the captors of several more?

Economic gain in Vietnam under the communist rule is an impossible dream for foreign investors, and U.S. businessmen should take this lesson from several other

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**Enclosed:  
The Declaration  
of  
Renewal of Vietnam**

Western and Asian entities who have encountered bitter experiences with the Vietnamese communists throughout the past few years. The obsolete infrastructure and chaotic situation with fragmented and corrupt bureaucracy have rendered any economic adventures in Vietnam extremely risky and unprofitable.

The use of economic aid in the hope of changing Hanoi's political structure is an even more unrealistic goal, since Hanoi has openly and repeatedly reinstated its firm position against any democratic system. In the era of changes, they remains one of the few communist regimes on earth that insists on the supreme role of the communist party, upholds its totalitarian dictatorship, and continues to travel against the principles honored by mankind. To normalize relationship with the Hanoi regime is to credit its extremity and madness.

Hanoi has been a long term economic burden to the Soviet Union without any prospect of being able to reduce its 14 billion dollar foreign debt, and even Moscow is considering cutting Hanoi off. The United States certainly does not want to take the Soviet's place in helping this inept and regressive regime to defray its debts, especially with the money of taxpayers who do not wish to support such an oppressive regime.

In all, Washington would be putting the American businessmen at risk, wasting the taxpayers' money, and undermining America's national ethics by normalizing its relations with Hanoi, which would also harm America's image in the eye of the world community.

To the Vietnamese people, a simple question would certainly be asked in the face of American moves to befriend the Hanoi regime "Do the American policy makers want to smear your hands with bloods of the innocent Vietnamese people and betray American sacrifices in the Vietnam war?"

# INSIGHT

## POPULAR BOYCOTT OF THE REGIME'S OFFICIAL MEDIA

"By comparing the figures for Julies of 1988 and 1989, the amount of circulation had been declined sharply for all official media, approaching the 50% rate in the Northern provinces." Alarmed by the *People Army* newspaper.

Even many army units have stopped subscribing to the *People Army* and the three major official dailies can no longer be found on newspaper stands in cities of South Vietnam. The fact strongly discredits the regime's source of information since the only truth that can be found reported is the one that works to the regime's advantage; the rest are distorted to serve the regime's purpose.

## HANOI ISSUED NEW LAW TO TIGHTEN CONTROL OF MEDIA

A new media law was issued following the 8th National Assembly of the 6th term that reinstates the sole role of media as serving the Party and protecting the Communist ideology. Item 7 of the law specifies "To truly exercise the freedom of speech, news media must not abuse its right to instigate people against the state, collaborate with the enemy in its imperialistic scheme, disclose confidential state information in military affairs, economics, security, and always be for the Party and the State."

A decree to wipe out all local

newspapers that "misled" the public and provided "distorted" views of the regime was urgently carried out, especially in the southern cities. Item 28 of the new law that specifies punishment for violators is even harsher than that issued in 1957.

## PUBLIC SECURITY CLASHES WITH AIRPORT CUSTOMS

A clash between the public security and the custom cadres at the Tan Son Nhat airport in early February this year had caused many tourist flights between Saigon and Bangkok to be cancelled. The outbreak was linked to unequal sharing of gains racketeered from the overseas Vietnamese visitors and recipients of cargo from Vietnamese relatives abroad.

This is a typical example of the degeneration among the communist cadres and of the loss-of-control situation in Vietnam.

## HANOI DISAPPOINTED WITH IMF

Hanoi recently voiced its disappointment of the IMF for its postponement of a loan to Hanoi despite the regime's fulfillment of necessary requirements. Hanoi charged the reason for IMF "swallowing of promise" as purely political stemming from its much controversial yet "groundless" troop withdrawal from Cambodia. Hanoi's refusal of an International Control Mechanism in its troop withdrawing process and a comprehensive political

solution to the Cambodia issue has further darkened its grave image to the world.

Regardless of Hanoi claims of a successful reduction of its spiralling inflation rate of 700% to practically nil last year, its current bankrupted economy with the prospect of Soviet aid coming to an end and the past prolonged late payment of loan to IMF are good enough reasons for this organization to consider twice any of its future loan to the regime.

## **RICE PRICE RISES**

A rush to hoard rice had arisen in different provinces that had caused the rice price to rise according to the news broadcasted by the Hanoi radio service on December 29, 1989. The rise

had forced the Agricultural Minister to meet with various local agencies to discuss and implement urgent measures to stabilize the rice market. Rice is the major staple food consumed in Vietnam and was the number one exported item of South Vietnam before 1975, however, it has become a scarce commodity under the communist rule. Despite Hanoi claims of increasing rice production in 1989, this rise in rice price serves as a good indication of a potential rice shortage.

## **DEMORALIZATION ADDRESSED**

Nguyen Van Linh, in one of his rare reappearances after the trip to East Germany last October, at the 60th anniversary of the Vietnamese Com-

munist Party on February 2nd, spoke of his concern over the widespread demoralization among the Party members. "I have mixed emotions about the quality of Party members. I am sad for witnessing the increasing degree of demoralization which is approaching the alarming level. Yet I am happy that we have the needed courage to admit to our mistakes....This demoralized situation has severely undermined the Party image and power, especially under the current circumstances", Linh said.

Unless Hanoi takes positive measures to change the situation, it would be impossible for the Vietnamese Communist Party to win its party members back after a prolonged illustration of the Party's failures, and in the era of worldwide communism retreat.

The National United Front for the Liberation of Vietnam (NUFRONLIV) was formed in 1980 to absorb Vietnamese at home and abroad into a mass organization to free Vietnam from the Hanoi regime and Soviet domination, and to build a democratic and prosperous country for the Vietnamese people.

NUFRONLIV liberation strategy emphasizes on mass mobilization for an "All People-All Front" that utilizes all available means and creative methods of the mass to destroy the enemy, in which military approach is conceived supplemental to activity of mass mobilization.

Overseas the NUFRONLIV has chapters almost everywhere there is a Vietnamese community. Inside Vietnam the infrastructure expands even far deep into the North. Besides the member network, NUFRONLIV communicates with people inside Vietnam via its Vietnamese Resistance Radio, broadcasting 8 times a day for one hour each.

**NUFRONLIV President:**

**Commissioner-General/Directorate of Inland Affairs:**

**Commissioner-General/Directorate of Overseas Affairs:**

**Commander in Chief/Armed Resistance Forces:**

**Hoàng Cơ Minh**

**Ngô Văn Tự**

**Nguyễn Kim**

**Đặng Quốc Hiền**

# "REVISED SOCIALISM" WITHIN COMMUNISM

**M**arx identified his ideology as "Scientific Socialism" to differentiate it from others which were often viewed as "Utopian Socialism". Could Marx have known to what ends his philosophy would be used?

V.I. Lenin, the founder of the Soviet Union, who criticized the more moderate socialists of his era as being "Revisionists", made use of Marx's "Scientific Socialism" and turned it into the most powerful tool of totalitarian oppression the world has ever known. Seventy years later, Marxism's "Dictatorship of the Proletariate" became the "Dictatorship against the Proletariate" imposed upon the entire populations of those countries unfortunate enough to fall under Communist rule.

The destructive manifestation of the utopian idea has consequently brought upon itself the worldwide condemnation of Communist ideology; more notably so within the victimized countries.

A doctrine in its death throes often yields a product of revival. It could be the old one with a new revised content or an heresy, such as the condemned "Revisionism" of the past. It would not be surprising to see the Soviet Union and other communist countries trying to search within the Marxist Utopia a new reasoning to defend communism, including the Social Democratism endorsed by Karl Kautsky and especially Eduard Bernstein but later on condemned by Lenin. They will blame communist failures on Leninism, considered the past 70 years as just an experimental stage of Marxism, but with other experiments yet to come; and the victimized people are no more than the ideological guinea-pigs.

With habitual timidity, some people felt relieved as if the experiment had come to an end without any effort to account for the casualties inflicted on human beings by this unthinkable madness. Even worse, there are some who still believe in the new Communist derivatives, failing once again to recognize the wolf in sheep's clothing for what it really is.

By the same token, the Vietnamese communists are trying very hard to maintain the last bastion of this dying ideology under the banner of "reformed communism" or perhaps, a "Ho Chi Minh's genuine Socialist path". What ever the name is, it is only to serve the regime's sole pur-

pose, that being to maintain its grip of power in the face of mounting pressure from the popular opposition and the ideological crisis within the communist system. Their frantic search will get them no where for it is framed by the identical school of thought; whether it is Marxism, Leninism, Stalinism, Maoism, or even Hoism, the destructive nature of Communism still surfaces and gains no trust or sympathy among the Vietnamese people.

Like other communist leaders in the world, Ho was a prolific writer, but his work was merely a flimsy reproduction of his peers. It would be extremely difficult for the Hanoi leadership to depend on Ho's writing for any kind of reasonable justification of their failures, or for an attempt to create their version of Socialism with a human face, i.e. a political and economic system that can incorporate a liberated market and some Capitalist economics into the totalitarian political system. It is even harder for them to revert back to the Socialism of the First and Second International. The simple reason is that Ho Chi Minh was one of the most radical Communists, whose legacy is nothing but Communist dogma and an emphasis on the consolidation of the Party's supreme authority.

Even if the Hanoi leadership can overcome the identity crisis and renounce Ho's radical Communism and accept a more moderate form within the Marxist guidelines with a limited form of political democracy, they still will not succeed. The Vietnamese people are willing to work with different philosophies for the well-being of the people, but reject the despotic monopoly of any single one, especially Marxism with its tenants of "Class Struggle". Politically, the Vietnamese Communists have failed miserably in the eyes of the Vietnamese people, and as opposed to the communist Parties of Eastern Europe (and contrary to speculation by some shallow Western observers), Hanoi does not have the capability to carry out an orderly retreat without bloodshed such as its East German, Hungarian or Czechoslovak counterparts. That is why they remains the most extremist, hurtling toward their own destruction.

The Socialist Republic of Vietnam is neither a Republican nor a Socialist state. It is a "State of Doom" in the eyes of the Vietnamese people, and their determination will lift its tyranny from the face of Vietnam.

# HANOI'S DILEMMA

**A** close examination of the situation in Vietnam for the past several decades leads one to believe that the Vietnamese communists are extremely versatile and flexible, capable of adapting to any difficulties encountered. However, focusing on the past ten years, any observer can clearly see certain special traits of the Vietnamese communist hard-liners: subjectivity, total lack of understanding on international matters, and extreme conservatism in dealing with adverse situations.

The Vietnamese people have keenly observed the Vietnamese communists' distinct characteristics: backwardness and brutality. Many irrational and anti-scientific measures have been executed by the febleminded and moronic leaders in Hanoi. Costly and unbeneficial decisions have been carried out, not necessarily for the happiness and prosperity of the common people.

Hanoi stiffening up position against the democratic wave that has brought Eastern European communist countries and the Soviet Union to its knee might caught the world with surprise, but it is not indifferent with the Vietnamese expectation out of these hard-line communists. To the same token, the Vietnamese view to "What would be Hanoi next move?" might be quite different from that of Western observers.

Formally speaking, the Vietnamese communists are preparing for the Eighth Plenum of the Party Central Committee (consisting of high ranking officials selected from the Sixth National Party Congress, December of 1986) with the goal of finding a replacement for the Party's Chief, Nguyen Van Linh. This is an urgent matter that the Hanoi leaders must accomplish during the coming weeks. Concurrently, they are also making plans for the Seventh National Party Congress, which is to elect a new Executive Central Committee with a new Politburo and Party Central Secretariat. They expect to hold this meeting before this year's end.

However, these crucial Central Committee meetings and congress only emphasize matters of formalities. In substance, Hanoi must seek basic means to avert the current simmering crisis. The appointment of a new General Secretary to replace Nguyen Van Linh, and the preparations for the coming National Congress will present an opportunity for them to re-evaluate the current situation in order to find a way out of the turmoil. What problems are

they facing, and what could be done to break out of the deadlock?

## To begin with, how do foreign affairs create problems for the Hanoi regime?

The Soviet Empire is on the path to disintegration and may have to retreat to a type of "*national bolshevism*" disguised as "Planned-Market-Socialism" in order to ride out the cataclysm of the coming decade. Each of the Soviet Union's vassals must find a solution for its own survival. The Vietnamese communists are no exception, and they will not receive their regular shipments of aid from the Soviets. The Soviet Union has already sent out such warnings, as she desperately seeks her own way out. Since Vietnam does not lie within the immediate periphery of the Soviet Empire, changes in Vietnam will not cause grave imbalances, such as those in Eastern Europe, the warfare in Azerbaijan or the secession of Lithuania. Against this backdrop, Hanoi desperately wants to establish diplomatic relations with the West, especially the United States whose capitalist aid will help to revive their totally collapsed Marxist economy. Will the people's wishes and the economic means permit the United States to make such absurd and costly donations to Hanoi? Neither should Hanoi be overly optimistic about aids from other Western nations considering that a solution for Cambodia has not been found satisfactory.

## As for domestic affairs, the regime are facing more complicated headaches.

The Vietnamese communists encounter resistance and sabotage from the people under different guises, not necessarily only through overt acts of violence that create attention in the media. Meanwhile, the Secret Police apparatus is slowly losing its ability to effectively remain in control and preserve the regime. It has only the most corrupt morals. On the high level, within the party Central Committee, the regime is losing the power to exert its authority on Party members. Facts from the past 6 months indicate that the Vietnamese Communist Party has had to resort to purging party members through what they call "*the reconstruction of ideology and the strengthening of the Party's leadership role*". These desperate acts show that there are serious crises within the party ranks. Along with this situation, the course of the economy is teetering closer and closer to the brink of collapse : 60 percent of national busi-

nesses have gone bankrupt; unemployment is at 30 percent; shortage of necessities persist; and inflation still remains at the 700 percent per annum. Hence, the regime has no apparatus to implement their own version of "Perestroika". Depression of the economy vitiates their authority, and decentralized measures, instead of invigorating the economy, are leading toward anarchy by the national managerial cadres. Lastly, the Army's discontent, coupled with its hostility toward the Secret Police, is creating a powder keg ready to explode at any time.

As ideology loses the power to motivate, and while the Socialist Fatherland (a Vietnamese communists term referring to the Soviet Union) is going through a breakdown and is sinking in a sea of crisis, the Vietnamese communists cannot initiate an orderly retreat because the Party apparatus does not have the know-how to control and organize as well as its Eastern European counterparts. The fact that these hard-liners pulled their reins tighter after the Sixth and Seventh Plenums of the Party Central Committee (held in March and August of 1989), at a time when the Eastern Europeans were savoring the first fruits of democracy, only further demonstrates how isolated and insecure the Hanoi leadership is.

**Under such dangerous circumstances, does the Vietnamese communist regime have a way out?**

The communists can choose to remain on their present course and proudly boast of being one of the last defender of "*pure socialism*" on this earth. If this is the case, efforts leading to the replacement of the General Secretary and preparations for the Seventh National Congress will give us signs worth examining. They must achieve a conciliatory stance toward opposition trends within the Party Central Committee, with a General Secretary acceptable to the opposition groups, since their power is eroding. Vo Chi Cong and Tran Xuan Bach are both qualified candidates, but since Bach is younger and is well experienced in the Party's infrastructure, he is being groomed for the new role. From below, opposition forces will endorse a collective leadership in which both the Secret Police and the Army will play key roles. This is the general paralysis of a gradual atrophy, which will last but a few years, and will end with a general uprising of the people.

They may explore a more spectacular solution by following in the footsteps of their Eastern European fraternal socialist countries, who have bent with the new winds of change. Taking this route would release some pressure, and at least buy them some more time. They could create a pseudo-democratic coalition government made up of former Communist Party members who now wear the cloak of the opposition forces, and non-communists who want to

reconcile with them in exchange for a role in government affairs. Events taking place in Saigon - Nguyen Van Linh's secret campaigns in southern Vietnam, the creation of an opposition force made up of former "National Liberation Front" members and the "split" within Vietnamese communists ranks in Europe (of which Paris is the first example) - clearly show that Hanoi may resort to this tactic of "*fuite en avant*" (lurching forward while trying to keep its balance).

Nevertheless, the Party's deteriorating condition, together with the difficulty of facing the resistance forces in the country, may lead to their final downfall at the hands of their own creation, the Democratic Front. The shrewd scheme of creating a pseudo-democracy can result in true democracy, and the regime might be dismantled by the very same forces that they release. Certainly Nguyen Van Linh, who was present in Eastern Europe last October, knows very well the fates of Erich Honecker and Egon Krenz when they tried to become "*fuite en avant*" artists.

Nonetheless, due to the serious contradictions of the Vietnamese communist's internal affairs, it is feared that before a pseudo-democratic plan can materialize (which would then be replaced by the people's struggle to make democracy come true), the regime will explode in a series of internal complications: disputatious Party factions will seize the opportunity of being "the loyal opposition" and vie for power using semi-military and semi-political pressures. A form of civil war among Party factions would evolve, with armed conflict taking place in many areas, especially in the South, in occupied Cambodia, and even in the North between Army units and the Secret Police (Which has been regimented and totally modernized and equipped to be a separate elite armed corps). In this event, the communists self-destruct after killing each other, spilling the blood of many innocent victims in the process. Dictatorship is like a helpless beast which struggles violently and bites frenziedly as it is terrified at the final hour of death.

Given all of the hypotheses mentioned, one outstanding fact remains: there is no respite offered the regime, and the Hanoi leaders are incompetents who do not have the ability to overcome current challenges. The task of the Vietnamese people is to end, with the least possible damage, communist rule in Vietnam. As the regime sprints to a dead end, struggle on all fronts, military and political, with politics holding the key role, will be the most efficient method of resistance since it will cause minimal damage. This approach will slowly bleed the regime's strength on all fronts and will dilute its forces as they attempt to block the people's general uprising, which will of course be safeguarded by the Armed Resistance Forces. ●

# RESISTANCE NEWS

Vietnamese Resistance Radio established by NUFRONLIV in late 1983 broadcasts 8 times daily on the 30m and 40m wave bands (10.3MHz and 7.4MHz) to inform and mobilize the Vietnamese at home on the liberation struggle. Due to limited space, we can only excerpt part of the VRR daily news programs.

## NEWS FROM VIETNAM

News brief from VRR broadcast of November 18, 1989

### Ben Tre province:

**People resist the regime's seafood collection - Youths join the resistance**

The NUFRONLIV Resistance-Administrative Committee of Ben Tre province reported that in September, responding to NUFRONLIV's appeal to boycott the Hanoi regime's economic programs, the people of Ben Tre had concurrently impeded the regime's foodstuff collecting programs by protesting against the destitute official price and refused to hand in their products. As the consequence, Hanoi shrimp collection in the recent months had been significantly declined.

In the same month, the Committee also received several young Vietnamese who voluntarily joined the resistance ranks. Four of them were Hanoi soldiers who defected while on duty.

### Song Be province:

**People deliver foodstuffs and gun powder to the Resistance - NUFRONLIV members destroy a bridge and several electricity posts**

During September 1989, the people of Tan Uyen and Tan Ngon districts collected more than 400 kilos of

dry foods, medicines, cigarette, winter cloths and 50 kilos of gun powder in their effort to support the Resistance.

NUFRONLIV members also destroyed a bridge and several electrical transmission towers in Ben Cat district in September. Also, a Hanoi cadre was reportedly killed near the Loc Ninh forestation plant for his crime against the people of the district.

### Sai Gon city:

**NUFRONLIV Magazines, music tapes, documents, and leaflets circulate in Sai Gon city**

The Resistance-Administrative Committee of Sai Gon city reported that many documents, music tapes, magazines, and leaflets produced by NUFRONLIV have been widely circulating in Sai Gon city. Other anti-regime publications are also found.

Despite Hanoi harsh measures against the distribution of these products including imprisonment, political intimidation, and ransacking imported cargo, these materials still find its way through the masses.

Information about the events in Eastern Europe, though carefully barred from public, are the hot topic of discussion among college and high school students.

## OVERSEAS NEWS

### Bergen, Norway:

**Dr. Tran Xuan Ninh, Deputy General of NUFRONLIV's Overseas Affairs, visits Norway**

On November 26 1989, Dr. Tran Xuan Ninh, Deputy Commissioner General of the NUFRONLIV General Directorate of Overseas Affairs, had met with the Vietnamese community in Bergen, Norway and shared with them the positive developments and progress of the Vietnamese Resistance in and outside of Vietnam, the need to prepare for the rebuiding and develop-



Dr. Tran Xuan Ninh, Deputy General of NUFRONLIV's Overseas Affairs, spoke to the audiences in Bergen, Norway on November 26, 1989.



ment of Vietnam after the liberation, and praised the community in their effort to support the Resistance through out the long struggle against the Hanoi regime.

**The 6th Anniversary of the Vietnamese Resistance Radio (VRR) celebrated worldwide**

Yearly, while people around the world celebrate Christmas and New Year, the Vietnamese people gather together for the celebration of the Vietnamese Resistance Radio anniversary. This clandestine radio program was first broadcasted on December 27, 1983, and since has maintained a program of 5 transmissions daily. Its programs instruct and mobilize the internal Vietnamese accordingly to the "all people all front" strategy, and inform them of the world events, advancement and progresses. Funded by the Vietnamese, the VRR is manned and protected by NUFRONLIV's resistance fighters.

This year celebrating includes many events such as fund-raising, musical performing, meetings, picnics, film shows, etc... through out the world: in Svendborg, Denmark (12/9/89); Sydney, Australia (12/30/89); Melbourne,

Australia (01/7/90); Houston, USA (12/17/89); Zurich, Switzerland (12/2/89); Atlanta, USA (12/17/89); Chicago, USA (12/30/89); Hoorn, Netherlands (12/23/89); Toronto, Canada (12/23/89); Oklahoma, USA (12/17/89); Vancouver, Canada (12/23/89); Oregon, USA (01/6/90); Minnesota, USA (1/6/90); Ottawa, Canada (1/13/90); San Jose, USA (12/16/89); Los Angeles (12/17/89); Tokyo, Japan (12/3/89); Adelaide, Australia (12/16/89); Perth, Australia (12/23/89); Cornwall, Canada (12/16/89); Denver, USA (1/29/90); Munchen, West Germany (1/20/90); San Diego, USA (12/16/89);...

**Paris, France:**

**Rally for freedom and democracy in Vietnam**

On December 16, 1989, more than 200 Vietnamese in Paris gathered at Madeleine Park to denounce the inhumane and totalitarian nature of the Hanoi regime. Two other rallies had also been organized on the previous weekend at the Georges Pompidou cultural center and in front of the Hanoi embassy in France.



The Vietnamese people in France gathered for freedom and democracy in Vietnam on December 16, 1989.

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**The VIETNAMESE RESISTANCE welcomes and appreciates all moral and material supports and constructive opinion to our cause.**

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