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PERIOD COVERED: 081601Z TO 151600Z AUGUST

1. GENERAL:

A. VIET CONG INITIATED ACTIVITY REPORTED THIS WEEK INITIALLY SHOWED NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGE FROM THE PACE OR PATTERN OF THE WEEK BEFORE; HOWEVER, TOWARD THE END OF THE PERIOD THERE WERE SIGNS OF AN UPWARD TREND IN THE NUMBER OF VC INCIDENTS. THERE WERE FEWER ATTACKS THAN DURING THE PRECEDING WEEK; HOWEVER, ONE OF THEM IN QUANG TIN WAS CONDUCTED BY A VC COMPANY, AND ANOTHER VC ACTION, IN PHONG DINH PROVINCE, WAS POSSIBLY OF BATTALION SIZE. IN QUANG TIN, GVN EFFORTS TO REOPEN HIGHWAY 9 FOR TRAFFIC WERE FURTHER DISRUPTED BY VC MINING OF THREE BRIDGES.

B. THE MOST SIGNIFICANT JOINT OPERATIONS OF THE WEEK OCCURRED IN DINH TUONG PROVINCE OF THE TIEN GIANG TACTICAL AREA (SEE PARA 2A(1)), AND IN BINH DUONG PROVINCE OF TET CITZ. THIS LATTER OPERATION WAS HIGHLIGHTED BY ONE OF THE

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OPERATIONS CONDUCTED IN THE AREA OF
USAF AND VNAF BOMBERS, AND THE
BY USAF AND VNAF BOMBERS, AND THE
DETAILS ARE DESCRIBED IN PARA 24(2).

SEVERAL SENIOR RVNAF OFFICERS WERE PROMOTED DURING
THE WEEK. THESE INCLUDED THE PROMOTION OF MAJOR GENERAL
TRAN THUC KHEM, THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, TO
LIEUTENANT GENERAL, MAKING HIM THE SENIOR MILITARY OFFICER
ON ACTIVE DUTY IN THE REPUBLIC.

ALTHOUGH THE NUMBER OF MAJOR GROUND OPERATIONS
DECREASED, THE ACTUAL TONNAGE OF OPERATIONS INCREASED AS
EVIDENCED BY A RISE IN THE NUMBER OF DAYS THAT THE SEVEN
BATTALIONS SPENT IN THE FIELD DURING THESE OPERATIONS.
THE NUMBER OF SMALL UNIT ACTIONS DECREASED IN COMPARISON
WITH LAST WEEK. MAJOR PACIFICATION OPERATIONS INCLUDED THE
SAME AS LAST WEEK WITH TWO CLEARING OPERATIONS AND NINE
SECURING OPERATIONS UNDERWAY.

AIDED BY IMPROVED WEATHER CONDITIONS THROUGHOUT THE
RVN, VNAF/USAF AIR ACTIVITY ROSE SHARPLY THIS WEEK. THE
MOST SIGNIFICANT COMBAT AIR SUPPORT WAS PROVIDED GROUND
OPERATIONS IN TT, TET, AND TV CTR. THE US AIR FLEET
WAS AUGMENTED BY THE ARRIVAL OF THIRTY-SEVEN C-119 AIRCRAFT

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WHICH COMMENCED OPERATIONS ON THE SOUTHEAST ASIA AIRLIFT TWENTY-FOUR HOURS AFTER ARRIVAL IN COUNTRY. LOGISTICS, PHOTO RECONNAISSANCE, AND PSYWAR AIR OPERATIONS WERE CONDUCTED WITHOUT INCIDENT. THE VC REACTION TO AIR OPERATIONS WAS EFFECTIVE, AGAIN THIS WEEK. A US NAVY AIRCRAFT WAS FIRED ON SHORTLY AFTER TAKING OFF FROM DA NANG, AND A VNAF C-47 WAS HIT WHILE AIRDROPPING AMMUNITION TO A POST IN IV CORPS.

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AVIATION ACTIVITY IN THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM INCREASED SHARPLY DURING THE PAST WEEK, DUE IN GREAT MEASURE TO THE SIZE OF 5TH DIVISION CONTROLLED OPERATION CHINH NGHIA 45. IN OTHER CORPS AREAS, NORMAL ASSAULT AND RESUPPLY MISSIONS WERE FLOWN IN SUPPORT OF THE VARIOUS SUBORDINATE PROVINCES. US MARINE AVIATION ACTIVITY INCREASED SLIGHTLY DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD. AIR SUPPORT WAS DIRECTED PRIMARILY TOWARD AIRLANDED RESUPPLY MISSIONS.

VNN SEA AND RIVER FORCE EMPLOYMENT WAS HIGH THIS WEEK WITH A SIGNIFICANT INCREASE IN THE EMPLOYMENT OF SEA FORCE UNITS DUE TO THE POSITIONING OF SHIPS IN A READY STATUS ON THE SOI RAP RIVER. THE EMPLOYMENT OF COASTAL FORCE UNITS REMAINED GENERALLY UNCHANGED FROM LAST WEEK

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DESPITE HEAVY SEAS FROM TYPHOON IDA THAT HAMPERS COASTAL AND SEA FORCE ACTIVITIES. ACTIVITY IN THE HUNG SAT SPECIAL AREA REMAINED GENERALLY SLACK AGAIN THIS WEEK AS VMC CRAFT CONTINUED THEIR PATROL AND SHORE BOMBARDMENT MISSIONS.

PROGRESS IN THE PACIFICATION EFFORTS OF SEVERAL OF THE CRITICAL PROVINCES WAS HAMPERS BECAUSE OF LACK OF SECURITY. IN THESE PROVINCES THE TROOPS, BOTH ARVN AND PARAMILITARY, SEEM TO HAVE REACHED THE POINT WHERE THEY CANNOT EXPAND THEIR EFFORTS UNTIL PRESENT GAINS HAVE BEEN CONSOLIDATED. THE 20 DIVISION COMMANDER HAS ADDED A BATTALION AND A COMPANY TO THE PACIFICATION FORCES IN QUANG TIN AND HAS ASSIGNED DEFINITE RESPONSIBILITIES FOR THE DIRECTION OF THE EFFORT THERE. PACIFICATION IN THE CRITICAL PROVINCES IN II CORPS CONTINUES TO MOVE FORWARD MODESTLY; BUT IN III CORPS, IT REMAINS HAMSTRUNG BY THE LARGE NUMBERS OF VC LOCATED THERE. IN THE 7TH DIVISION AND IN THE IV CORPS ZONE, THERE WAS LITTLE PROGRESS MADE IN THE PACIFICATION PROGRAM.

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2. FRIENDLY:

A. SIGNIFICANT OPERATIONS

(1) THANG LONG 17, A JOINT SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATION CONTROLLED BY THE 7TH DIVISION, WAS INITIATED 100700H AUGUST IN DINH TUONG PROVINCE, ABOUT 15 KILOMETERS WEST OF MY THO (XS5040).

INTELLIGENCE REPORTS INDICATED THAT A VC COMPANY, DESIGNATION AND DESCRIPTION UNKNOWN, WAS IN THE OPERATIONAL AREA. IN ADDITION, THE NEWLY FORMED VC "B BINH DINH" PLATOON WITH AN ESTIMATED STRENGTH OF 50 MEN WAS ALSO REPORTEDLY IN THE AREA.

THE FRIENDLY FORCES CONSISTED OF AN AIRBORNE BATTALION, TWO RANGER BATTALIONS, AN INFANTRY BATTALION, AND AN M113 TROOP. A PLATOON OF 105 HOWITZERS SUPPORTED THE OPERATION. A RIVER ASSAULT GROUP PROVIDED NAVAL SUPPORT BY PATROLLING THE MY THO RIVER ALONG THE SOUTHERN BOUNDARY OF THE AREA.

THE GENERAL PLAN OF MANEUVER CALLED FOR THE LAUNCHING OF A THREE PRONGED ATTACK SOUTH FROM NATIONAL HIGHWAY 4, WITH THE M113 TROOP ON THE EAST FLANK, THE AIRBORNE BATTALION IN THE CENTER, AND THE INFANTRY BATTALION ON THE WEST FLANK. THE TWO RANGER BATTALIONS WERE TO

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SIMULTANEOUSLY LAUNCH AN ATTACK FIVE KILOMETERS TO THE SOUTH OF HIGHWAY 4, MOVING FROM EAST TO WEST TO CREATE AN EFFECTIVE BLOCKING FORCE.

THE OPERATION WAS EXECUTED ACCORDING TO PLAN. ALL UNITS MADE VC CONTACT WITHIN TWO HOURS, WITH THE STRONGEST CONTACT MADE BY THE TWO RANGER BATTALIONS IN THE SOUTHERN PART OF THE AREA OF OPERATIONS. THE RANGER BATTALIONS CONTINUED TO PRESS FORWARD TOWARD THE INFANTRY BATTALION ON THE WEST FLANK, AND A VC FORCE WAS CAUGHT BETWEEN THE TWO FRIENDLY FORCES. THIS APPEARED TO BE A LUCRATIVE TARGET; THEREFORE, THE RANGERS CALLED FOR A VMAF AIR STRIKE, AND ESTABLISHED A BLOCKING POSITION. THE AIR STRIKE HIT THE VC POCKET OF RESISTANCE BETWEEN THE RANGER BATTALIONS AND THE INFANTRY BATTALION. GROUND TROOPS LATER VERIFIED BY BODY COUNT THAT THIS STRIKE WAS VERY SUCCESSFUL. THE TWO RANGER BATTALIONS THEN PRESSED ON TO JOIN THE INFANTRY BATTALION. THIS WAS THE MOST SIGNIFICANT ACTION OF THE OPERATION.

THE FINAL RESULTS WERE: FRIENDLY LOSSES: 16 KIA, 41 MIA; VC LOSSES: 42 KIA, BY BODY COUNT, WITH ANOTHER ESTIMATED 60 TO 70 KIA/MIA CARRIED OFF, 3 PW, 3 INDIVIDUAL WEAPONS, AND SOME DOCUMENTS. THE OPERATION TERMINATED 111600H AUGUST.

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IN ANALYSIS, THE OPERATION WAS WELL PLANNED AND EXECUTED. THE ARTILLERY WAS ADEQUATE AND CAPABLE OF SUPPORTING THROUGHOUT THE OPERATION. WHEN THE SITUATION DEVELOPED A SUITABLE TARGET, TACTICAL AIR WAS REQUESTED AND RESPONDED IN ABOUT TWENTY MINUTES WITH EXCELLENT RESULTS. THE GROUND UNITS WERE AGGRESSIVE AND PROPERLY EMPLOYED. NO MAJOR TACTICAL ERRORS OR SHORTCOMINGS WERE NOTED IN THIS SUCCESSFUL OPERATION.

(2) OPERATION CHINH NGHIA 45

THIS WAS A 5TH DIVISION CONTROLLED SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATION INITIATED 120700H AUGUST IN BINH DUONG PROVINCE OF III CTZ.

THE VC HAD BEEN INTENSIFYING THEIR AGGRESSIVE ACTIVITY ALONG HIGHWAY 13 FROM BEN CAT (XT7030) TO CHAU TRAM (XT9060), AS WELL AS ALONG OTHER HIGHWAYS IN THE VICINITY. VC PERSONNEL IN THE AREA WERE ESTIMATED AT 2300, WHICH INCLUDED A COMBAT STRENGTH OF 1500 MEN. THEY WERE REPORTED TO BE ORGANIZED INTO ONE MAIN FORCE REGIMENT WHICH INCLUDED TWO INFANTRY BATTALIONS AND A COMBAT SUPPORT BATTALION. OTHER ELEMENTS INCLUDED TWO MOBILE COMPANIES, ONE LOCAL COMPANY, THE ARMED ELEMENTS AT A TRAINING CENTER, AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION CAMPS, MACHINE SHOPS, STOCKADES,

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LOGISTICAL DEPOTS, PLANTATIONS, AND MILITIA UNITS OF THE COMBAT VILLAGES AND HAMLETS. THE VC WERE ESTIMATED TO BE CAPABLE OF CONDUCTING DELAYING ACTIONS ALONG THE AXES OF ADVANCE OF FRIENDLY TROOPS TO ALLOW TIME TO EVACUATE THEIR INSTALLATIONS AND WITHDRAW FROM THE AREA. THEY WERE CONSIDERED ABLE TO CONDUCT A STRONG RESISTANCE AT THE CENTER OF THE LONG NGUYEN SECRET ZONE IN NORTHERN BINH DUONG PROVINCE.

THE 8TH REGT (- ONE CO); THE 1ST BN, 430 REGT; THE 30TH, 34TH, AND 39TH RANGER BATTALIONS; THE 1ST AND 5TH ABN BATTALIONS; AND A TROOP OF M113 CARRIERS CONSTITUTED THE GOVERNMENT MANEUVER FORCES. ONE BATTERY OF 105 HOWITZERS AND A BATTERY OF 155 HOWITZERS PROVIDED ARTILLERY SUPPORT. USAF A-1E AND VNAF A-1H AIRCRAFT PROVIDED COMBAT AIR SUPPORT. US ARMY UH-1B AND VNAF CH-34 HELICOPTERS PERFORMED TROOP LIFT AND MEDICAL EVACUATION. THE RESERVE CONSISTED OF AN INFANTRY BN, A RANGER BN, AND AN AIRBORNE BN.

THE SCHEME OF MANEUVER CALLED FOR SURROUNDING THE VC WITH A SERIES OF BLOCKING POSITIONS LOCATED AROUND AN APPROXIMATE CIRCLE WITH A RADIUS OF 15 KILOMETERS, THE CENTER OF WHICH WAS LOCATED ABOUT 12 KILOMETERS NORTHWEST

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OF THE TOWN OF BEN CAT. THE DISTANCE BETWEEN BLOCKING POSITIONS AROUND THE PERIPHERY OF THE CIRCLE AVERAGED ABOUT FIVE KILOMETERS.

THE MAIN MANEUVER ELEMENTS WERE AN INFANTRY M13 TASK FORCE UNDER CONTROL OF THE 7TH REGIMENTAL COMMAND GROUP, AND TWO AIRBORNE BATTALIONS UNDER CONTROL OF AN AIRBORNE BATTLE GROUP HEADQUARTERS. THESE TWO FORCES WERE TO LAUNCH A COORDINATED ATTACK AT 120700H AUG TO SEIZE AN OBJECTIVE LOCATED IN A RUBBER PLANTATION IN THE EAST CENTRAL PORTION OF THE OPERATIONAL AREA, APPROXIMATELY NINE KILOMETERS TO THE WEST OF HIGHWAY 13. THE AIRBORNE FORCE WAS TO BE HELILANDED NINE KILOMETERS TO THE NORTHWEST OF THE RUBBER PLANTATION, ATTACK SOUTH, AND JOIN THE 7TH REGT CONTROLLED TASK FORCE AT THE RUBBER PLANTATION. A NO FIRE LINE WAS ESTABLISHED JUST TO THE NORTHWEST OF THE OBJECTIVE TO COORDINATE FIRES IN SUPPORT OF THE TWO FORCES. AIR AND ARTILLERY WERE TO PROVIDE FIRE SUPPORT.

WHILE THE BASIC SCHEME OF THE OPERATION WAS FOLLOWED, A MAJOR CHANGE IN TIMING TOOK PLACE. THE AIRBORNE LANDING HAD TO BE DELAYED FROM 0700 TO 0900 BECAUSE OF FOG IN THE LANDING ZONE AREAS. TO FURTHER COMPLICATE MATTERS, THE 5TH DIV TACTICAL CP WAS DELAYED ENROUTE TO ITS FIELD

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LOCATION BECAUSE OF VC ESTABLISHED ROAD BLOCKS. THE FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION CENTER, WITH THE CP GROUP, WAS UNABLE TO CONTACT THE AIR FORCE TO STOP PRESTRIKES AGAINST SELECTED TARGETS WHICH WERE FLOWN AS ORIGINALLY SCHEDULED. HOWEVER, THE CP WAS ABLE TO CONTACT THE ARTILLERY AND HOLD OFF ITS FIRES UNTIL NEEDED FOR THE NEWLY ESTABLISHED TIME FOR THE HELIBORNE LANDINGS.

THESE HELIBORNE LANDINGS WERE THE HIGHLIGHT OF THE OPERATION WHICH WAS ONE OF THE LARGEST AIRBORNE OPERATIONS CONDUCTED IN VIETNAM TO DATE. EIGHTY-FIVE US ARMY HELICOPTERS FROM III CORPS, IV CORPS, 7TH DIVISION AND GENERAL SUPPORT AVIATION UNITS, AUGMENTED BY TWELVE VNAF CH-34, WERE MUSTERED TO AIRLIFT TWO AIRBORNE BATTALIONS IN TWO LIFTS, ONE SCHEDULED AT 0700H AND THE OTHER AT 0900H. THE LIFTS WERE TO BE PRECEDED BY A PRESTRIKE OF THE PRIMARY LANDING ZONE AT 120640H HOURS, BUT DUE TO LOW CLOUD COVER THIS COULD NOT BE ACCOMPLISHED. ONE PLATOON OF FIVE ARMED HELICOPTERS FROM THE UTT COMPANY, SCHEDULED TO FOLLOW THE VNAF PRESTRIKE, WERE DEPLOYED A FEW MINUTES AHEAD OF THE TRANSPORT HELICOPTERS TO PROVIDE SUPPRESSIVE FIRE IN THE LANDING AREA. EXTREMELY HEAVY AUTOMATIC WEAPONS FIRE WAS RECEIVED FROM PREPARED POSITIONS ENVELOPING THE LANDING

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ZONE. THE INTENSITY OF THE FIRE, WAS SUCH THAT THE UTT
CONTINGENT HAD TO WITHDRAW FROM THE AREA, WITH ONE AMERICAN
GREENLAND DEAD AND TWO WOUNDED. DUE TO THE LOW CLOUD
COVERINGS AND THE GROUND RESISTANCE ENCOUNTERED, THE FIRST
ATTEMPT TO LAND TROOPS WAS ABORTED, AND THE LANDING DEVIATED
TO AN ALTERNATE LANDING ZONE IN THE GENERAL VICINITY. HERE
THE AIRBORNE FORCE AGAIN ENCOUNTERED GROUND FIRE, WHICH
PROVED INEFFECTIVE, AND THE LIFTS WERE COMPLETED
SUCCESSFULLY.

THE AIRBORNE FORCE AND THE INFANTRY MILE FORCE
LINKED UP AT THE RUBBER PLANTATION AT 140900H WITHOUT
ESTABLISHING VC CONTACT OTHER THAN SNIPER FIRE. SOME MINOR
CONTACTS, NONE OF SIGNIFICANCE TO THE OUTCOME OF THE
OPERATION, OCCURRED AT THE BLOCKING POSITIONS IN THE
SOUTHERN PART OF THE OPERATIONAL AREA.

DURING THE CRITICAL MORNING OF THE FIRST DAY
OF THE OPERATION, FOUR USAF A-1E AIRCRAFT FLEW PRESTRICKES
ON SEVERAL LANDING ZONES. EIGHT USAF A-1E SCHEDULED TO
CONDUCT PRESTRICKES WERE DIVERTED TO OTHER TARGETS OUTSIDE
OF THE OPERATIONAL AREA. SIXTEEN VNAF A-1H AIRCRAFT FLEW
DIVERSIONARY INTERDICTION MISSIONS DURING THE PERIOD.

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SIX MORE VNAF A-1H AIRCRAFT FLEW AIR COVER FOR THE REMAINDER OF THE DAY. TO DATE, VNAF HAS FLOWN A TOTAL OF 63 MISSIONS AND USAP HAS FLOWN A TOTAL OF 39 MISSIONS IN SUPPORT OF THE OPERATION. THE OPERATION TERMINATED 150900H AUGUST.

RESULTS ARE AS FOLLOWS: FRIENDLY LOSSES: KIA (INCLUDING 1 US), 21 WIA (INCLUDING 2 US); WEAPONS: 17 KIA, 4 PW, 2 SUSPECTS, 4 INDIVIDUAL WEAPONS, 3 GRENADES, AND A QUANTITY OF DOCUMENTS.

WHILE THE RESULTS OF THIS OPERATION TO DATE ARE NEGLIGIBLE, ANALYSIS REVEALS LESSONS WHICH CAN BE LEARNED AND APPLIED TO FUTURE OPERATIONS.

HIGHWAY 13, THE ROUTE OF THE 5TH DIV, IS AN IMPORTANT BLOCKING ELEMENT, SHOULD HAVE BEEN CLEARED BY AN ADVANCE FORCE SUPPORTED BY ENGINEER TROOPS.

ALTERNATE MEANS OF COMMUNICATION IN THE PSOC MIGHT HAVE ENABLED IT TO MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH SUPPORTING ELEMENTS DESPITE THE FACT THAT IT WAS STOPPED ON HIGHWAY 13 BY VC ROAD BLOCKS. SUCH CONTACT COULD HAVE BROKEN THE AIR STRIKE OF THE LANDING ZONES AT THE ORIGINAL PLANNED TIME. AIRBORNE TACTICAL COMMAND BONES SHOULD BE USED IN FUTURE OPERATIONS. THE FAILURE TO MAINTAIN CONTACT WHICH REQUIRED THE 5TH DIV TO WITHDRAW THEIR FORCES, SHOULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED.

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FACTOR OF ADVANCE WARNING TO THE VC, WAS THE STEADY DRONE OF HELICOPTERS OVER SAIGON WEDNESDAY NIGHT ENROUTE TO TAN SON NHUT AIRPORT. THIS MASSING OF THE HELICOPTERS WAS A TIP OFF THAT A LARGE AIRBORNE OPERATION WAS IN THE IMMEDIATE OFFING. THE FIRST AIR STRIKE SERVED TO PINPOINT THE LOCALE OF THE ATTACK.

THE BLOCKING POSITIONS AROUND THE PERIPHERY OF THE OPERATIONAL AREA WERE TOO FAR APART TO EFFECTIVELY SEAL OFF THE VC ESCAPE ROUTES. WHEN THE NUMBER OF TROOPS WHICH CAN BE ALLOCATED TO AN OPERATION IS A LIMITING FACTOR, THE NEXT ACTION SHOULD BE TO REDUCE THE SCOPE OF THE OPERATION TO INSURE BETTER SUCCESS AGAINST A MORE LIMITED TARGET.

A WEATHER RECONNAISSANCE OF THE AREA OF OPERATIONS WAS NOT CONDUCTED ON THE MORNING OF THE OPERATION. WARNING FROM SUCH A MEASURE COULD HAVE PROVIDED SOME ADDITIONAL TIME TO ADJUST TO THE CHANGED CONDITIONS. IN CONCLUSION, IT CAN BE MENTIONED THAT VNAF DEMONSTRATED AN IMPROVED CAPABILITY BY THE PERFORMANCE OF ITS HELICOPTERS DURING THE TROOP LIFT AND MEDICAL EVACUATION MISSIONS THROUGHOUT THIS OPERATION.

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B. SUMMARY OF GROUND OPERATIONS (STATISTICS IN ANNEX A)

(1) LARGE AND SMALL UNIT OPERATIONS:

(A) ARVN GROUND OPERATIONS EMPLOYING FORCES OF THREE RIFLE COMPANIES OR LARGER DECREASED FROM LAST WEEK'S FIGURE OF 76 TO 56. OF THESE OPERATIONS, 31 RESULTED IN ONE OR MORE VC CONTACTS. IV CORPS HAD TEN CONTACTS, II CORPS AND TIEN GIANG EACH HAD SIX, III CORPS HAD FIVE, AND I CORPS HAD FOUR.

(B) SMALL UNIT OPERATIONS DECREASED FROM 15047 TO 13781; CONTACTS DECREASED FROM 67 TO 62.

(2) NIGHT OPERATIONS:

(A) BATTALION SIZE AND LARGER OPERATIONS INITIATED PRIOR TO DAYLIGHT DECREASED FROM 25 TO 20.

(B) THE NUMBER OF SMALL UNIT ACTIONS WITH CONTACT AT NIGHT INCREASED FROM 16 TO 26.

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C. SUMMARY OF AIR OPERATIONS

(1) VNAF: IN A WELL BALANCED FLYING PROGRAM WHICH EXERCISED ALL ITS AIR ELEMENTS, VNAF AIR ACTIVITY ROSE THIS WEEK. A-1H FIGHTERS RANGED COUNTRYWIDE CONDUCTING CLOSE AIR AND INTERDICTION SORTIES IN ALL CTZ AND THE TIEN GIANG TAC/ AREA. THE MOST SIGNIFICANT SUPPORT WAS PROVIDED A SERIES OF LARGE SCALE GROUND OPERATIONS IN II, III AND IV CTZ. WHILE THERE WAS A SLIGHT REDUCTION IN THE REQUIREMENT FOR AIR SUPPORT OF HAMLETS AND POSTS UNDER VC NIGHT ATTACK, APPROXIMATELY THE SAME NUMBER OF FLARESHIPS WERE EMPLOYED THIS WEEK WITH AN INCREASE IN FIGHTER SUPPORT ON THESE OPERATIONS. VNAF LOGISTICS AIRCRAFT CONDUCTED AIRLANDED RESUPPLY SORTIES AT AN INCREASED RATE WITH AN ATTENDENT INCREASE IN CARGO AND TROOPS ~~MOVEMENT~~. THE LOGISTICS EFFORT WAS HIGHLIGHTED BY THE AIRLIFT OF AN AIRMOBILE BATTALION FROM III CORPS TO I CORPS AND THE MOVEMENT OF ARVN RECRUITS FROM I CORPS TO IV CORPS ON THE RETURN FLIGHTS. THE EXTENSIVE TRAINING PROGRAM AND THE AUGMENTATION OF THE H-34 FORCE HAVE PERMITTED VNAF HELICOPTERS TO TAKE AN INCREASLY ACTIVE ROLE IN AIR OPERATIONS. THE PERFORMANCE OF THE 211TH HELICOPTER SQUADRON WAS PARTICULARLY SIGNIFICANT THIS WEEK WHEN THEY CONDUCTED SUSTAINED

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OPERATIONS THROUGHOUT THE PERIOD AND PROVIDED EFFECTIVE SUPPORT TO ONE GROUND OPERATION IN III CTZ (SEE PARA 2A(1) ABOVE). ON THIS LATTER OPERATION THE VNAF EMPLOYED THE LARGEST NUMBER OF HELICOPTERS (11) ON A SINGLE OPERATION IN THE UNIT'S HISTORY. VNAF PHOTO RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONS MAINTAINED LAST WEEK'S LEVEL AND WERE CONCENTRATED AGAINST TARGETS IN III AND IV CTZ. THE VNAF CONDUCTED ONE PSYWAR SORTIE THIS WEEK EMPLOYING THE L-20, EQUIPPED WITH SPEAKERS, IN SUPPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE TIEN GIANG TAC/AREA. ONE VNAF C-47, WHILE DROPPING AMMUNITION TO TAN DONG POST, WAS HIT BY GROUND FIRE, WOUNDING THE PILOT. THE AIRCRAFT RETURNED TO ITS BASE SAFELY. ONE VNAF AIRCRAFT WAS LOST THIS WEEK WHEN ON 14 AUGUST 64, AN H-34 CRASHED AND BURNED AFTER HITTING A TREE IN THE VIC OF BP920500, KHANH HOA PROVINCE, WHILE ON A TRAINING MISSION WITH VNSF. ONE PASSENGER WAS INJURED. REF MILREP, PARA 20(1), 181601Z TO 251600Z JULY 64, DTG 271031Z JUL 64, TO DATE, THE VNAF HAS NOT IMPLEMENTED ITS PLAN FOR STAGING A-1H AIRCRAFT OUT OF CAN THO. THE REASON FOR THE DELAY IS A LACK OF A CRANE OF SUFFICIENT WEIGHT TO QUICKLY CLEAR THE RUNWAY IN THE EVENT OF AN ACCIDENT. SUCH A CRANE IS AVAILABLE IN THE VMM FACILITY AT CAN THO, AND PLANS HAVE BEEN MADE TO POSITION THIS CRANE

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AT THE RUNWAY BY 17 AUGUST 1964.

(2) USAF: THE SCOPE AND TEMPO OF AIR OPERATIONS RETURNED TO NORMAL THIS WEEK FOLLOWING LAST WEEK'S WEATHER-CURTAILED ACTIVITY. WHILE COMBAT AIR STRIKES DECLINED SLIGHTLY, THEY WERE BETTER BALANCED WITH A LARGER NUMBER OF CLOSE AIR STRIKES FLOWN IN DIRECT SUPPORT OF GROUND OPERATIONS. THE SCENE OF THE MOST SIGNIFICANT COMBAT AIR ACTIVITY WAS III CTZ. TWO USAF AIRCRAFT RECEIVED BATTLE DAMAGE THIS WEEK; HOWEVER, CREW MEMBERS WERE UNINJURED. SIGNIFICANT INCREASES WERE REPORTED IN LOGISTICS ACTIVITIES WITH THE AMOUNT OF CARGO AND TROOPS AIRLIFTED ALSO INCREASING. THE C-123 AUGMENTED THE VNAF LOGISTICS FORCE IN SATISFYING LOGISTICS REQUIREMENTS THROUGHOUT THE REPUBLIC. PHOTO RECONNAISSANCE SORTIES WERE FLOWN THROUGHOUT THE RVN; BUT THEY WERE CONCENTRATED PRIMARILY AGAINST TARGETS IN II AND III CTZ. AGAIN THIS WEEK, IR EQUIPMENT AND PHOTO FLASH BOMBS WERE EMPLOYED WITH SUCCESS IN III AND IV CTZ. THE PSYWAR SORTIES WERE FLOWN AT LAST WEEK'S PACE AND CONDUCTED MAINLY IN SUPPORT OF OPERATIONS IN IV CTZ AND THE TIEN GIANG TAC/AREA.

(3) ARMY AVIATION:

(A) AVIATION ACTIVITY INCREASED SHARPLY IN

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TASKS AND HOURS FLOWN. SEE PARA 2A(2) ABOVE.

(B) ON 10 AUGUST, THREE ARMED HELICOPTERS FROM THE UTT COMPANY, WHILE WORKING IN CONJUNCTION WITH VNAF A-1H FIGHTERS IN TAY NINH PROVINCE, ENCOUNTERED GROUND FIRE 15 KILOMETERS WEST OF TAY NINH (XT0748). THE AIRCRAFT RETURNED FIRE.

(C) AN AIRMOBILE FORCE OF TWENTY FIX ROTARY WING AND TWO FIXED WING AIRCRAFT, 52D AVIATION BATTALION, STAGED FROM SUOI DA IN SUPPORT OF THE ARVN 22D DIVISION; FOUR HUNDRED TROOPS OF THE A1ST REGIMENT WERE HELILIFTED INTO LANDING ZONES AT BR2141 AND BR2333, GENERALLY SOUTHWEST OF SOUI DA. LIGHT GROUND FIRE WAS RECEIVED IN THE AREA, AND ONE ARMED HELICOPTER RECEIVED SEVERAL HITS. CREWS RETURNED FIRE AND ESTIMATED TWO VIET CONG KILLED AND FIVE STRUCTURES DESTROYED.

(D) ON 11 AUGUST, TWO ARMED HELICOPTERS FROM THE 120TH AVIATION COMPANY ENCOUNTERED GROUND FIRE FIFTEEN KILOMETERS SOUTH OF BEN TRU. AIRCRAFT WERE ON VISUAL SURVEILLANCE MISSIONS IN SUPPORT OF KIEN HOA PROVINCE WHEN THE INCIDENT OCCURRED. CREWS SIGHTED THE ENEMY IN A COCONUT GROVE AND ENGAGED THEM WITH MACHINE GUN AND ROCKET FIRE. THEY ESTIMATED TWELVE VIET CONG KILLED AND TWO

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SAMPANS AND ONE STRUCTURE DESTROYED.

(E) ELSEWHERE IN THE 7TH DIVISION, THREE ARMED HELICOPTERS FROM THE UTILITY TACTICAL TRANSPORT COMPANY, RECEIVED GROUND FIRE FROM A LOCATION TWENTY KILOMETERS WEST OF MOC HOA (WS8888). AIRCRAFT WERE ON VISUAL SURVEILLANCE MISSIONS IN KIEN TUONG PROVINCE WHEN THE INCIDENT OCCURRED. CREWS RETURNED FIRE AND ESTIMATED THIRTY STRUCTURES DESTROYED AS A RESULT OF HEAVY MACHINE GUN AND ROCKET EXPENDITURES. ONE AMERICAN WAS SLIGHTLY WOUNDED, AND ONE AIRCRAFT SUSTAINED MULTIPLE HITS IN THE TAIL SECTION, BUT WAS CAPABLE OF COMPLETING THE MISSION.

(4) USMC: MARINE CORPS AVIATION ACTIVITY INCREASED SLIGHTLY AS THE HMM 162D SQUADRON CONTINUED ROUTINE SUPPORT OF I CORPS. AT 151415H AUG 64 ONE MARINE L-19 WHILE ON AN OBSERVATION MISSION HIT A TREE AND CRASHED, DAMAGING THE AIRCRAFT SEVERELY AND SERIOUSLY INJURING TWO US WHO WERE LATER EVACUATED TO SAIGON. STATUS OF AIRCRAFT IS UNKNOWN. INCIDENT OCCURRED TB910850.

D. SUMMARY OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

(1) GENERAL:

NAVAL ACTIVITY IN THE BUNG SAT SPECIAL AREA REMAINED LIGHT THIS WEEK. A DELAYED REPORT FROM 9 AUGUST

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INDICATES THAT A VC UNIT OF UNKNOWN STRENGTH PLACED HARASSING FIRE INTO THE QUANG XUYEN DISTRICT AREA (XS962708) FROM HIEP PHUOC VILLAGE. VNN RIVER CRAFT WERE EMPLOYED TO CONCENTRATE FIRE ON THE VC POSITIONS. THE VC WITHDREW FROM THE SHORE BOMBARDMENT, AND NO CASUALTIES WERE RECORDED ON EITHER SIDE.

ON 11 AUGUST, A VNN MONITOR PATROLLING THE LONG TAO RIVER IN RUNG SAT WAS ATTACKED BY THE VC NEAR THE JUNCTION OF THE LONG TAO AND LOI GIANG RIVERS. ONE CREWMAN WAS WOUNDED IN THE INITIAL BURST. THE MONITOR COUNTERED THE ATTACK, AND THE VC WITHDREW. THE VNN CRAFT PROCEEDED TO NHA BE FOR TREATMENT OF THE WOUNDED MAN. IT IS BELIEVED THAT THE VC WERE ATTEMPTING TO REPLY TO THE MONITORS WHICH HAD BEEN BOMBARDING VC CONCENTRATIONS FREQUENTLY AND HEAVILY THE PREVIOUS WEEK.

ON 13 AUGUST, A WELL ARMED VC COMPANY ATTACKED TWO NRLH IN LONG THANH VILLAGE AND TWO NRLH OF DONG HOA VILLAGE IN RUNG SAT SPECIAL AREA. RF, PF, AND COASTAL FORCE RANGERS SUPPORTED BY FLARE AIRCRAFT AND RIVER FORCE GUNFIRE DROVE THE VC OFF. THE RF AND PF HAD BEEN OPERATING OUTSIDE OF THE TWO VILLAGES BUT WERE FORCED TO WITHDRAW INTO THE VILLAGES BECAUSE OF HEAVY VC FIRE. NO FRIENDLY OR VC

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CASUALTIES WERE REPORTED.

IN KIEN GIANG PROVINCE, ON 11 AUGUST, A FRENCH DESIGNED VEDETTE, MOORED IN RACH GIA IN FRONT OF THE PROVINCE CHIEF'S HOUSE, WAS ATTACKED WITH A GRENADE THROWN BY A TERRORIST FROM A BICYCLE. THE TERRORIST ESCAPED IN THE ENSUING CONFUSION LEAVING TWO CREWMEN INJURED BY THE EXPLOSION. THE VEDETTE IS ATTACHED TO THE FOURTH NAVAL ZONE AND DAMAGE TO THE BOAT IS CONSIDERED MINOR.

(2) SEA FORCE:

UNITS OF THE FORCE CONTINUED THEIR PRIMARY MISSIONS OF PATROL AND LOGISTICAL SUPPORT THIS WEEK, AND PARTICIPATED IN ONE JOINT OPERATION, CANG LONG. IN GENERAL, DAILY EMPLOYMENT FIGURES WERE HIGH RESULTING FROM THE STATIONING OF UNITS IN A READY STANBY ON THE SOI RAP RIVER. BAD WEATHER AND HEAVY SEAS FROM TYPHOON IDA HAMPERED EMPLOYMENT EARLIER IN THE WEEK AND FORCED MANY UNITS TO FIND SHELTERED ANCHORAGES.

ON 12 AUGUST, AN INFANTRY LANDING SHIP LARGE (LSIL 329), ENROUTE TO OPERATION CANG LONG REPORTEDLY SAVED FIVE PF SOLDIERS WHO WERE BEING PURSUED BY THE VC NEAR THE JUNCTION OF THE VA SI CANAL AND GO GIEN RIVER IN VINH BINH PROVINCE. LOSSES, IF ANY, ARE UNKNOWN.

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ON 13 AUGUST AT 0745 PATROL CRAFT (PCO 11) ON AN ESCORT MISSION PICKED UP A SONAR CONTACT AT 16-43N 111-22E (NEAR THE PARACEL ISLANDS IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA). CONTACT WAS BROKEN FIFTEEN MINUTES LATER. THE CONTACT'S COURSE WAS WESTERLY AT 6 KNOTS. ATTEMPTS TO REESTABLISH CONTACT WERE UNSUCCESSFUL. NO IDENTIFICATION WAS MADE.

(3) RIVER FORCE:

UNITS OF THE FORCE CONTINUED THEIR PATROL MISSIONS, AND WERE EMPLOYED IN THEIR PRIMARY MISSION OF COMBAT SUPPORT IN SIX OPERATIONS DURING THE WEEK, THANG LONG 17, VINH LONG, TRUNG DOAN 13, GANG LONG, MANG THAIT, AND THANG LONG 18.

EVENTS OF SIGNIFICANCE INCLUDE A DELAYED REPORT FROM 9 AUGUST, WHEN UNITS OF THE 21ST RIVER ASSAULT GROUP RETURNING FROM AN OPERATION DECIDED TO CHECK THE CHO GAO CANAL NEAR MY THO IN DINH TUONG PROVINCE. TWO FERRY BOATS AND TWO JUNKS WITH A TOTAL OF SIX PERSONS WERE INTERCEPTED WHILE MONITORING VC BROADCASTS ON TWO TRANSISTORIZED RADIOS. THE PERSONS ARE BELIEVED TO BE SUPPLY AGENTS FOR THE VC AND HAVE BEEN TURNED OVER WITH BOATS AND EQUIPMENT TO 7TH DIVISION FOR INVESTIGATION.

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(4) COASTAL FORCE UNITS OF THE FORCE CONTINUED THEIR PRIMARY MISSION OF COASTAL SURVEILLANCE AND PARTICIPATED IN ONE OPERATION; TU CUONG 124. A DELAYED REPORT FROM 9 AUGUST INDICATES THAT ONE SQUAD OF JUNK FORCE RANGERS OF JUNK DIVISION 34 ENGAGED THE VC ON THE CO LUONG RIVER NEAR AP AN THUAN IN KIEN HOA PROVINCE. THE VC WITHDREW AFTER A SHORT FIREFIGHT. NO FRIENDLY CASUALTIES WERE SUSTAINED, AND THREE VC SUSPECTS WERE CAPTURED.

INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION FROM JUNK DIVISION 11 INDICATES THAT THE VC HAVE DISPATCHED A 9 MAN FROGMAN TEAM TO THE COASTAL AREA OF GOI LINH DISTRICT OF QUANG TRI PROVINCE. THIS TEAM WAS REPORTEDLY TRAINED IN COMMUNIST CHINA FOR THREE MONTHS. IT HAS BEEN DIVIDED INTO THREE GROUPS FOR SABOTAGE WORK AGAINST COASTAL FORCE JUNKS.

E. CIDG:

THE TWO NORTHERN CORPS OF VIETNAM WERE EXTREMELY QUIET WITH FRIENDLY PATROLS REPORTEDLY ONLY NINE CONTACTS DURING THE ENTIRE PERIOD. SIGNIFICANTLY, ON ONLY ONE OF THESE CONTACTS DID THE VIET CONG STAND AND FIGHT. ON 11 AUGUST A PATROL FROM CAMP PLEI TA NANGLE (BR333272),

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LOCATED ABOUT 60 KILOMETERS EAST OF PHU KHU, HAD A HEAVY ENGAGEMENT WITH AN UNKNOWN NUMBER OF VIET CONG. THE FIGHT WHICH ENSUED LASTED FOR ONE HOUR RESULTED IN ONE MONTAGNARD VIET CONG BEING WOUNDED WHILE NO FRIENDLY CASUALTIES WERE SUSTAINED.

IN THE OTHER OPERATIONS NO VC UNIT LARGER THAN A BATTALION WAS ENCOUNTERED, NOR DID THE VC OFFER MORE THAN TOKEN RESISTANCE BEFORE BREAKING OFF THE ACTION.

IN III CTZ, CAMP SUOI DA (APPROX 57 KM NW OF SAIGON) RECEIVED MORTAR FIRE AT 090250H AUG. ONE STRIKE FORCE BATTALION LOCATED THE MORTAR POSITION. UPON WITHDRAWAL THE VC BOOBYTRAPPED THE POSITION WITH GRENADES OR A MINE RESULTING IN ONE STRIKE FORCE KIA AND EIGHT STRIKE FORCE WIA. AT 092230H AUG AN ESTIMATED VC FORCE OF 2 SQUADS FIRED SMALL ARMS FIRE INTO CAMP MOC HOA (APPROX 78 KM WEST OF SAIGON) WITH NEGATIVE RESULTS. CAMP GO DAU HA (APPROX 40 KM NW OF SAIGON) WAS PROBES 122130H AUG BY AN ESTIMATED VC SQUAD. THE PROBE WAS REPELLED WITH NEGATIVE RESULTS. SIX STRIKE FORCE COMPANIES FROM CAMPS SUOI DA AND CAMP MINH THANH (APPROX 65 KM NW OF SAIGON) PARTICIPATED AS PART OF A BLOCKING FORCE FOR A SEARCH/DESTROY OPERATION CONDUCTED BY III CORPS.

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IN IV CTZ, NORMAL PATROLS, AMBUSHES, AND BOAT CHECKS WERE CONDUCTED.

PSYWAR ACTIVITY IN I CORPS CONSISTED OF DISTRIBUTION OF 20,000 LEAFLETS IN KATU LANGUAGE AROUND A RO, WITH THE THEME "GVN HELP TOWARD THE MONTAGNARDS". WHILE IN IV CORPS THE MOST SIGNIFICANT PSYWAR ACTIVITY WAS AN AIRDROP OF 25,000 LEAFLETS TOGETHER WITH LOUDSPEAKER OPERATION ALONG THE CAMBODIAN BORDER VICINITY OF KIEN THONG, AN GIANG, AND KIEN GIANG. LEAFLETS AND LOUDSPEAKER OPERATIONS WERE PRESENTED IN VIETNAMESE AND CAMBODIAN LANGUAGE, THE THEME "PROCLAMATION PUT OUT BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON AND GENERAL KHANH (ACTION BY NORTH VIETNAM)".

THE CIVIC ACTION ACTIVITY WAS HIGHLIGHTED BY THE TREATMENT OF 1575 AND 808 PATIENTS IN II AND III CTZ RESPECTIVELY.

F. CHANGES IN FRIENDLY FORCES:

(1) THE RVN 5TH DIVISION HEADQUARTERS MOVED FROM BIEN HOA TO PHU CUONG (THU DAU MOT), XT8018, BINH DUONG PROVINCE, ON 9 AUGUST 1964.

(2) MAJOR GENERAL TRAN THLEM KHIEM, THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, WAS PROMOTED TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL EFFECTIVE 10 AUGUST 1964. THE FOLLOWING RVNAF COLONELS

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WERE PROMOTED TO SUB-BRIGADIER GENERAL EFFECTIVE 10 AUGUST 1964: NGUYEN CAO, DIRECTOR OF CABINET, OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER; VINH LOC, COMMANDING OFFICER, 9TH DIVISION; HOANG XUAN LAM, COMMANDING OFFICER, 23D DIVISION; NGUYEN KHANG, COMMANDING OFFICER, MARINE BRIGADE; NGUYEN DUC THANG, J-3 HIGH COMMAND; DANG VAN QUANG, COMMANDING OFFICER, 21ST DIVISION; NGUYEN XUAN TRANG, C/S, IV CORPS; AND NGUYEN VAN KIEN, ATTACHED TO RVNAF HIGH COMMAND.

(3) RECENT PROVINCE CHIEF APPOINTMENTS WERE:

MAJOR TANG TU TU SAO, PROVINCE CHIEF OF CON SON PROVINCE; LIEUTENANT COLONEL TRAN HUU TU, PROVINCE CHIEF OF QUANG TRI PROVINCE; AND LIEUTENANT COLONEL NGUYEN VAN THANH, PROVINCE CHIEF OF VINH BINH PROVINCE.

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3. (C) ENEMY SITUATION:

A. VC ACTIVITY:

(1) GENERAL: VIET CONG INITIATED ACTIVITY DURING THE WEEK AT FIRST CONTINUED WITHOUT SHOWING A CHANGE IN TEMPO FROM THAT OF THE WEEK BEFORE. ONLY TOWARD THE END OF THE PERIOD THERE APPEARED TO BE A RISE IN VC TERRORISM POSSIBLY IN RESPONSE TO A "RADIO LIBERATION" BROADCAST OF 10 AUGUST, WHICH CALLED ON "ALL PEOPLE AND ALL PEOPLE'S ARMED FORCES IN SOUTH VIETNAM, AND ESPECIALLY ALL LIBERATION TROOPS, ALL ARMED FORCES, AND ALL PARAMILITARY FORCES TO...STEP UP THE STRUGGLE IN ALL FIELDS AND COMPETE IN SCORING GREATER EXPLOITS AND ACHIEVEMENTS IN ORDER TO LIBERATE SOUTH VIETNAM AND PROTECT BROTHER NORTH VIETNAM". MAJOR VC ACTIONS REPORTED DURING THE WEEK WERE ONE ATTACK POSSIBLY OF BATTALION SIZE IN PHONG DINH PROVINCE, AND A COMPANY SIZE ATTACK IN QUANG TIN. HOWEVER, THE TOTAL NUMBER OF VC ATTACKS, ALTHOUGH NOT EXACTLY DETERMINABLE BY THE END OF THE WEEK, APPEARED TO BE CONSIDERABLY LOWER THAN THE WEEK BEFORE.

(2) I CORPS: OVERALL VC ACTIVITY WITHIN THE CTZ DECLINED DURING THE PAST WEEK EXCEPT FOR QUANG TIN PROVINCE WHICH REPORTED A SLIGHT RISE IN VC TERRORISM. ALSO IN QUANG TIN ON 9 AUGUST, A VC COMPANY ATTACKED AN ARVN COMPANY; FRIENDLY CASUALTIES WERE 5 DEAD AND 30 WOUNDED, AND ONE WEAPON WAS LOST; VC LOSSES WERE ESTIMATED AS 32 KILLED, AND ARVN CAPTURED 11 VC WEAPONS. FIVE BRIDGE MININGS OCCURRED IN QUANG TRI INCLUDING THREE ALONG HIGHWAY 9, AGAIN INDICATING VC

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DETERMINATION TO KEEP THIS EAST-WEST COMMUNICATION ROUTE CLOSED, AT LEAST UNTIL LOCAL ENGINEERS CAN BUILD BY-PASSES TO REPLACE THE BLOWN BRIDGES. THREE ROAD AND BRIDGE MININGS ON HIGHWAY 1 IN THUA THIEN DISRUPTED ROAD TRAFFIC FOR 24 HOURS. AN ENEMY BOAT REPORTEDLY CONTAINING TWO 3.1 CAL MACHINE GUNS WAS SUNK BY POPULAR FORCES OFF THE COAST OF PHU LOC DISTRICT IN THUA THIEN.

(3) II CORPS: VC ACTIVITY IN THIS CTZ ROSE SLIGHTLY THIS WEEK. THERE WAS A CONSIDERABLE INCREASE IN BINH DINH PROVINCE WHICH REPORTED MORE VC INCIDENTS THAN DURING THE WEEK OF 19-25 JULY WHEN THE VC WERE STEPPING UP THEIR EFFORTS TO COMMEMORATE THE SIGNING OF THE GENEVA ACCORD. ABOUT ONE-HALF OF ALL ARMED VC HAMLET ENTRIES WERE OPPOSED BY LOCAL DEFENDERS. A VC ATTACK IN STRENGTH OF TWO PLATOONS ON A TEA PLANTATION IN FLEIKU WAS REPULSED BY POPULAR FORCES SUPPORTED BY AIR STRIKES; WHILE FRIENDLY CASUALTIES WERE LIGHT, THE VC REPORTEDLY LEFT TEN DEAD BEHIND. IN KONTUM, A VC ATTACK ON KIN BRYE NHL HAMLET MANNED BY A POPULAR FORCE PLATOON AND COMBAT YOUTHS LEFT FOUR DEFENDERS WOUNDED, FOUR MISSING, AND FIVE WEAPONS WERE LOST. IN PHU YEN, A USOM REPRESENTATIVE WHO BECAME A PRISONER OF THE VC ON 4 AUGUST WAS REPORTEDLY SEEN ON 9 AUGUST IN LAC CHI VILLAGE WHERE THE VC WERE ALLEGEDLY USING HIM TO SUPPORT A PROPAGANDA LECTURE.

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(P) III CORPS: NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN THE TEMPO OF VC ACTIVITY WAS DISCERNABLE BY THE END OF THE WEEK FROM REPORTS THUS FAR RECEIVED. SMALL UNIT ACTIONS AND TERRORISM, PARTICULARLY HARASSING FIRE AGAINST UNITS, POSTS AND NLH'S, PREDOMINATED. MININGS APPEARED TO BE ON THE INCREASE, AND SEVERAL INCIDENTS WERE ILLUSTRATIVE OF VC PLANNING AND COORDINATION. BINH DUONG CONTINUED TO HAVE THE HIGHEST INCIDENT RATE AMONG III CORPS PROVINCES. AN 11 AUGUST ATTACK ON AN SON POST MANNED BY 21 POPULAR FORCES RESULTED IN FRIENDLY LOSSES OF ELEVEN DEAD, TWO MISSING AND NINETEEN WEAPONS LOST. ON 13 AUGUST, VC MINES IN TWO SEPARATE INCIDENTS RESULTED IN TOTAL ARVN CASUALTIES OF FIVE WOUNDED. KIDNAPPINGS HAVE BEEN REPORTED IN TWO BINH DUONG NLH'S. IN HAU NGHIA, A VC ATTACK ON TRUNG HOA NLH OCCURRED ON 10 AUGUST, WITH FRIENDLY CASUALTIES OF ONE HARBET OFFICIAL KILLED AND SEVEN PERSONS WOUNDED. HARASSING FIRE WAS DIRECTED MOSTLY AGAINST UNITS, AND THE CONVOY OF THE DUC HOA DISTRICT CHIEF WAS FIRED ON WHILE EN ROUTE TO THE PROVINCE CAPITAL; HOWEVER, THERE WERE NO CASUALTIES. ON 11 AUGUST A HAU NGHIA PUBLIC WORKS DEPARTMENT VEHICLE WAS DAMAGED BY A VC MINE AND THREE PUBLIC WORKS PERSONNEL WERE REPORTED WOUNDED. SEVERAL INCIDENTS IN TAY NINH ARE OF POSSIBLE INTEREST FROM A VIEWPOINT OF COORDINATED OPERATIONS. CAM GIANG, 12 KILOMETERS SOUTH OF TAY NINH CITY

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RECEIVED VC MORTAR FIRE AT 090205 AUGUST AND AT 090415 THE NEARBY DAU MAN BRIDGE WAS DESTROYED BY A MINE. AT 090200 SOU DA BASE LESS THAN 25 KILOMETERS FARTHER NORTH RECEIVED 81MM MORTAR FIRE RESULTING IN SEVENTEEN FRIENDLY WOUNDED. AN ARVN COMPANY IN PURSUIT OF THE VC ENCOUNTERED A VC MINE AT 090900 AND SUFFERED ONE KILLED AND SIX WOUNDED. AT 100800 VC ENTERED PHUOC NINH NH AND AT THE SAME TIME DIRECTED 60MM MORTAR FIRE INTO PHUOC NINH DISTRICT SEAT. REINFORCEMENTS (ONE REGIONAL FORCE PLATOON AND TWO POPULAR FORCE SQUADS) WERE AMBUSHED AT THE HAMLET GATE WITH FRIENDLY LOSSES OF SIX DEAD, SIX WOUNDED AND SIX WEAPONS LOST. A RANGER BATTALION AND AN ARMORED TROOP PURSUED THE VC WITH NEGATIVE RESULTS. AT 112130 AUGUST, VC ENGAGED A POPULAR FORCE AMBUSH TEAM FROM TIEN THUAN VILLAGE AND SIMULTANEOUSLY ENTERED THE HAMLET AND FIRED ON THE BASE. FRIENDLY LOSSES WERE TWO DEAD (MILITIA), TWO MISSING (ONE SECURITY ASSISTANT AND ONE POPULAR FORCE), AND TWO WEAPONS LOST. IN PHUOC THANH PROVINCE, ON 10 AUGUST THE VC ATTACKED BA KIENG WATCHTOWER MANNED BY ELEVEN REGIONAL FORCE (FRIENDLY LOSSES SIX DEAD, THREE WOUNDED, SIX WEAPONS LOST), AND MINED BA KIENG BRIDGE (BRIDGE DESTROYED). IN BINH LONG, A VILLAGE REPRESENTATIVE INDICATED THAT THREE YOUTHS WHO WERE REPORTEDLY KIDNAPPED FROM A HAMLET ON 8 AUGUST HAD PREVIOUSLY DECIDED TO FOLLOW THE VC AND SO PUT UP NO RESISTANCE.

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(5) CAPITAL DISTRICT: NO SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES WERE REPORTED.

(6) RUNG SAT SPECIAL AREA: THREE INCREASES OF HARASSING FIRE WERE THE ONLY VC INITIATED ACTIVITIES REPORTED FROM THIS NAVY CONTROLLED AREA DURING THE WEEK.

(7) GIANG (7TH DIVISION) TACTICAL AREA: THE NUMBER OF VC INITIATED INCIDENTS INCREASED SLIGHTLY OVER THE LEVEL OF THE PRECEDING WEEK AND CONSISTED MAINLY OF ACTS OF TERRORISM. VC HARASSING FIRES WERE DIRECTED AGAINST REGIONAL FORCE AND POPULAR FORCE POSTS, AND THERE WERE SEVERAL SMALL SCALE ATTACKS. IN GO CONG ON 11 AUGUST, A VC ELEMENT ATTACKED AND OVERRAN A POPULAR FORCE OUTPOST, KILLING NINE POPULAR FORCE AND CAPTURING SEVERAL WEAPONS AND TWO CASES OF GRENADES. INCIDENTS OF SABOTAGE CONTINUED AT A RELATIVELY HIGH LEVEL AND CONSISTED MAINLY OF VC ROAD BLOCKING ACTIONS IN GO CONG, KIEN HOA AND DINH TRUNG.

(8) IV CORPS: VC ACTIVITY WITHIN THE CFZ INCREASED SLIGHTLY OVER THAT OF THE PRECEDING WEEK, APPARENTLY BOTH IN NUMBER AND INTENSITY. IN PHONG DINH PROVINCE ON 12 AUGUST, A VC FORCE POSSIBLY OF BATTALION STRENGTH AND USING MORTARS AND MACHINE GUNS ATTACKED A REGIONAL FORCE COMPANY. FRIENDLY

CASUALTIES WERE FOURTEEN KILLED, TWENTY-THREE WOUNDED AND THREE MISSING, ONE 60MM MORTAR, THIRTEEN INDIVIDUAL WEAPONS AND THREE RADIOS WERE LOST; FOUR VC WERE KILLED AND ONE WAS CAPTURED. IN

... DURING THE PERIOD OF 15 AUGUST,
VC ELEMENTS SIMULTANEOUSLY ATTACKED HUNG HUNG AND HOA MY POSTS,
LESS THAN 3 KILOMETERS APART. EACH POST WAS DEFENDED BY
TWENTY-FIVE POPULAR FORCE AND SUPPORTED BY AIRBORNE; RESULTS
HAVE NOT BEEN REPORTED AT THIS TIME.

B. OTHER INTELLIGENCE REPORTS:

(1) COUNTERINTELLIGENCE: DURING THE PERIOD OF THIS

REPORT THERE WERE THREE EXPLOSIONS OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
INTEREST WHICH WERE ATTRIBUTED TO VC TERRORISTS. ON 9 AUGUST
1964, VC TERRORISTS DETONATED A MINE UNDER A THREE-WHEEL

LAMBRETTA TAXI IN THUA THIEN PROVINCE, KILLING TWO OF THE
PASSENGERS AND WOUNDING SIX. ON 12 AUGUST 1964, A PLASTIC
BOMB ATTACHED TO A BICYCLE WAS EXPLODED IN MY THO, BINH TUONG
PROVINCE, KILLING THREE VIETNAMESE AND WOUNDING 22 VIETNAMESE
AND 5 US PERSONNEL. ON THE 12TH OF AUGUST, A MINE WAS DETONATED
IN THE PARKING AREA OF THE AN XUYEN POLICE HEADQUARTERS. NO
CASUALTIES WERE REPORTED IN THIS TERRORISTIC ACTIVITY.

ON 10 AUGUST 1964, VC TERRORISTS MURDERED THE OLD
WOMAN CARETAKER OF A CAO DAI TEMPLE IN VINH LONG PROVINCE,
AND THEN SET THE TEMPLE ON FIRE. AS THE TERRORISTS RETREATED
FROM TAN THANH HAMLET, WHERE THE ATROCITY OCCURRED, THEY SHOT
ANOTHER WOMAN.

(2) POSSIBLE TERRORISTS: ...

VC WHO DEFECTED IN QUANG NGAI PROVINCE ON 2 AUG 64 AND WHO
ARE EVALUATED AS ... BY THE INTERROGATING

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UNIT - THE 25TH DIVISION - REPORTEDLY STATED DURING THEIR INITIAL INTERROGATION THAT THE PLAN OF THE 25TH MILITARY REGION FOR THE WINTER-SPRING CAMPAIGN 1964-65 WAS AS FOLLOWS:

EMPHASIS WILL BE ON A WAR OF ANNIHILATION. EACH VC UNIT MUST USE ALL WAYS TO ANNIHILATE ONE RVNAF UNIT WITHIN 6 MONTHS. FOR EXAMPLE: A VC BATTALION MUST ANNIHILATE AN RVNAF COMPANY; A VC COMPANY MUST ANNIHILATE AN RVNAF PLATOON. BY WAR OF ANNIHILATION THE VC MEAN THAT, WHEN ATTACKING AN RVNAF UNIT, EVERYONE IN THE UNIT, WITHOUT EXCEPTION, MUST BE ANNIHILATED AND THE UNIT DESIGNATION ERASED FROM THE RVNAF ORGANIZATION SYSTEM.

AN ANTI-AIRCRAFT CAMPAIGN WILL BE "MOTIVATED".

ANTI-TANK CELLS WILL BE ACTIVATED.

ATTACKS AGAINST NRLHS WILL BE INCREASED.

GUERRILLA WARFARE WILL BE DEVELOPED.

ALL AVAILABLE WEAPONS MUST BE EMPLOYED (ESPECIALLY ANTI-TANK WEAPONS).

SECRET GUERRILLAS MUST BE ORGANIZED IN RURAL AREAS.

J2 COMMENT: UNFORTUNATELY THE TWO PWS IN QUESTION WERE INTERROGATED TOGETHER AND IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO DETERMINE WHETHER ONE OR BOTH STATED THE ABOVE. THE FACT THAT BOTH PWS REFLECTED CAUSES DOUBT TO BE CAST ON THE VERACITY OF THEIR INFORMATION AND RAISES THE POSSIBILITY THAT THEY ARE PROVOCATION AGENTS. VC ACTIVITY TO DATE HAS NOT EVIDENCED ANY SUBSTANTIAL

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INDICATIONS OF A SUBSTANTIAL INCREASE IN VC SUBVERSION IN
MILITARY REGION 5 OVER THE PAST 6 MONTHS, THE FULL EXTENT OF
WHICH CANNOT YET BE DETERMINED OR CONFIRMED FROM PRESENTLY
AVAILABLE INFORMATION, MAY BE RELATED TO THIS REPORTED CHANGE
IN FUTURE VC TACTICS, SINCE SUCH TACTICS WOULD REQUIRE MORE
PERSONNEL AND LOGISTICAL SUPPORT THAN DO GUERRILLA TACTICS.

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**SUMMARY OF ARMS AND WEAPONS AND WEAPONS LOSSES
(CONTINUING IN APPENDIX)**

**A. ARMS AND WEAPONS TOTALLED 166 KIA, 145 WIA, 121
MIA, 13 CAPTURED DURING THE WEEK. THIS IS A DECREASE FROM
THE PREVIOUS WEEK'S TOTAL OF 504 CASUALTIES. A
TOTAL OF 307 WEAPONS WERE LOST, AN INCREASE FROM
THE 211 WEAPONS REPORTED AS LOST LAST WEEK.**

**B. THE VC SUFFERED 167 KNOWN CASUALTIES (154 KIA AND
13 CAPTURED) DURING THE WEEK. THIS WAS A DECREASE COMPARED
TO LAST WEEK'S 379 (299 KIA AND 80 CAPTURED). GOVERNMENT
FORCES CAPTURED 68 INDIVIDUAL WEAPONS. LAST WEEK 102
INDIVIDUAL WEAPONS WERE CAPTURED.**

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5. CRITICAL PROVINCES

A. GENERAL: ONLY LIMITED PROGRESS WAS MADE IN THE PACIFICATION OF THE PRIORITY PROVINCES DURING THE PAST WEEK. MOST EFFORTS APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN DIRECTED TOWARD CONSOLIDATION OF PREVIOUS GAINS RATHER THAN ANY CONCERTED DRIVE TO EXPAND THE OIL SPOTS. NEARLY 1,000 POLICEMEN GRADUATED FROM THE FIVE WEEK TRAINING COURSE CONDUCTED AT CAMP IE VAY DUYET NEAR SAIGON. ADDED TO THE POLICEMEN PREVIOUSLY TRAINED (MILREP 20-27 JUNE), THE LATEST CLASS BRINGS THE TOTAL TRAINED SINCE 6 MAY TO 2,200 OUT OF 10,500 PROGRAMMED FOR 1964. ANOTHER 1,000 TRAINEES WILL BEGIN THE COURSE AT THE SAME CENTER ON 17 AUGUST. THE MAJORITY OF THESE GRADUATES WILL BE ASSIGNED THROUGHOUT THE PROVINCES WHERE THEY ARE SORELY NEEDED TO BOLSTER THE POPULATION AND RESOURCES CONTROL PROGRAM. PACIFICATION PROGRESS IN THE ONLY PRIORITY PROVINCE IN I CORPS ZONE WAS CONFINED TO REORGANIZATION OF FORGES AND REASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITIES IN ORDER TO INSURE BETTER COOPERATION AND SUPPORT OF THE PROGRAM. IN II CORPS, QUANG NGAI MADE SOME PROGRESS DESPITE VC TERRORISM AND HAMLET INCIDENTS. IN BINH DINH PROGRESS CONTINUES THROUGH SMALL UNIT OPERATIONS AND ASSISTANCE TO 8,500 RELOCATEES. NEW EFFORTS IN THE INFORMATION AND INTELLIGENCE PROGRAMS AND APPROVAL OF RELOCATION FUNDS WERE THE SIGNIFICANT MOVES IN PHUOC THANH. THE OTHER THREE PRIORITY PROVINCES IN III CORPS INDICATED NO MARKED PROGRESS DUE TO THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE SECURITY PROBLEM THERE. IN THE 7TH DIVISION AREA, DIFFICULTIES IN RECRUITING MOBILE ACTION CADRE

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C. QUANG NGAI: ONE PARAMILITARY OPERATION IN SUPPORT OF PACIFICATION IN MO DUC DISTRICT DURING THE PERIOD 6-11 AUGUST PRODUCED SIGNIFICANT RESULTS. VC ACTS OF TERRORISM, ASSASSINATION AND HARASSMENTS CONTINUE IN REACTION TO THE PACIFICATION PROGRAM. ONE SUCH ACT OCCURRED ON 9 AUGUST WHEN THE VC ENTERED A HAMLET IN SON TINH DISTRICT, AN AREA CONSIDERED PACIFIED, AND ASSASSINATED A FORMER HAMLET CHIEF. THE US SEA BEES ARE ENGAGED IN PREPARING A PROPOSED SITE FOR 200 MONTAGNARDS TO BE RELOCATED ON COMPLETION OF HARVESTING THEIR CROP. THE WORK OF MEDCAP AND THE CIVILIAN MEDCO TEAM CONTINUES TO CREATE FAVORABLE PUBLIC REACTION WITH TIMELY MEDICAL AID FOR THE PEOPLE. THE RECENT ISSUE OF NEW VEHICLES AND UNIFORMS TO THE NATIONAL POLICE RAISED THEIR MORALE.

D. BINH DINH: PACIFICATION PROGRAM CONTINUES TO SHOW PROGRESS. BINH DINH CAMPAIGN AND SMALL UNIT OPERATIONS BY MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY ORGANIZATIONS CONTINUED, AND ON MONDAY, THE CHIEF VC POLITICAL INSTRUCTOR IN THE PROVINCE WAS CAPTURED. SUPPORT FOR 8,500 RELOCATIONS IN THE DISTRICTS OF HOAI AN, AN LAO AND PHU CAT CONTINUES ON A TWO WEEK RESUPPLY BASIS. PROVINCE OFFICIALS HAVE PAID HAMLET HEALTH WORKERS BACK WAGES, AND A NEW MONTHLY WAGE SCALE HAS BEEN INSTITUTED. II CORPS HAS DIRECTED THAT THE 11 MOBILE ACTION CADRE TEAMS BE RETRAINED TO INCREASE THEIR EFFECTIVENESS.

E. PHUOC THANH: PACIFICATION OPERATIONS CONTINUED TO MOVE SLOWLY; HOWEVER, SIGNIFICANT ADVANCES IN THE NEW LIFE HAMLET

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RELOCATION PROGRAM, THE DISSEMINATION OF NEWS, AND THE COLLECTION OF INTELLIGENCE WERE ACHIEVED. FUNDS HAVE BEEN APPROVED BY THE CENTRAL PACIFICATION COMMITTEE FOR THE RELOCATION OF 231 FAMILIES TO THE VAM GIA NEW LIFE HAMLET. CONSTRUCTION OF THE BUSINESS DISTRICT IS NEAR COMPLETION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF HOUSES SHOULD BE COMPLETED SHORTLY. REFUGEES FROM THE BAU CA TLE AREA HAVE ALREADY BEEN RESETTLED IN COMPLETED HOUSES, AND LAND IS BEING CLEARED FOR THEM BY THE GOVERNMENT. THE THIRD ISSUE OF THE TAN UYEN DISTRICT NEWSPAPER HAS BEEN PUBLISHED. ALTHOUGH SMALL AND LIMITED IN DISTRIBUTION, THIS IS AN EXCELLENT NEWSPAPER. AS A MEDIUM FOR CARRYING ARVN PSYWAR EFFORTS TO THE PUBLIC, ITS POTENTIAL IS GREAT. THE PROVINCIAL INTELLIGENCE NET IS CONTINUING TO IMPROVE. REPORTS ON MOVEMENT OF VC UNITS ARE TIMELY AND RELIABLE. THIS IS REFLECTED IN THE INCREASED EFFECTIVENESS OF AIR STRIKES AND CONFIRMED LOCATION OF ENEMY UNITS.

F. TAY NINH: OPERATIONS WERE LIMITED PRIMARILY TO THE REESTABLISHMENT OF SECURITY WITHIN EXISTING HAMLETS OF THE PACIFICATION AREA AND IN RUSHING NEW SCHOOL CLASSROOMS TO COMPLETION FOR USE WITHIN THE CURRENT SCHOOL YEAR. UNITS OF THE 9TH INFANTRY REGIMENT HAVE BEEN REDEPLOYED TO PROVIDE SECURITY TO THE PROVINCIAL PACIFICATION AREA. A DETERMINED EFFORT TO CONVINCE THE INHABITANTS OF NEW LIFE HAMLETS THAT GVN WILL PROTECT THEM IS BEING MADE. THE SCHOOL CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM IS PROGRESSING RAPIDLY IN THE PROVINCE. NUMEROUS EXCELLENT NEW CLASSROOMS ARE NEARING COMPLETION IN NEW LIFE

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AND SHOULD BE IN OPERATION SOON. SUFFICIENT TEACHERS ARE NOT PRESENTLY AVAILABLE TO STAFF ALL NEW SCHOOLS. HOWEVER, A TEACHERS TRAINING PROGRAM HAS BEEN INITIATED, AND THE SHORTAGE SHOULD BE ALLEVIATED IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

G. BINH DUONG: INCREASED VC ACTIVITY, LOSS OF MOBILE ACTION CADRE TEAM PERSONNEL, AND THE CONTINUED INABILITY OF GVN TO PROVIDE EFFECTIVE SECURITY TO HAMLETS IN BEN CAT, TRI TAN, AND PHU CUONG DISTRICTS HAMPERED PACIFICATION OPERATIONS THIS WEEK. VC UNITS OF BATTALION SIZE CONDUCT RAIDS AND AMBUSHES WITHIN THE ACTUAL PACIFICATION AREA OF THE PROVINCE. TROOPS AVAILABLE TO THE PROVINCE CHIEF ARE UNABLE TO CONTROL OR COUNTER VC ACTIVITY, AND ARVN OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS CONDUCTED WITHIN THE PROVINCE APPEAR TO HAVE ACHIEVED LITTLE SUCCESS. A TOTAL OF 534 MOBILE ACTION CADRE HAVE BEEN PROGRAMMED FOR THE PROVINCE; HOWEVER, IT APPEARS HIGHLY DEPROBABLE THAT THIS NUMBER CAN BE ACHIEVED. OF 212 MOBILE ACTION CADRE TEAM MEMBERS RECRUITED AND TRAINED FOR DUTY WITHIN THE PROVINCE, ONLY 109 REMAIN. MANY TEAM LEADERS AND MEMBERS HAVE DEPARTED FOR SAIGON AND OTHER AREAS TO SECURE JOBS AS TEACHERS. LOW PAY AND LACK OF SECURITY ARE CONSIDERED MAJOR REASONS FOR THE INABILITY TO ATTRACT AND RETAIN GOOD PERSONNEL. CREDIT SHOULD BE GIVEN TO THE BS-GVN MEDCAP TEAM WHICH HAS ACHIEVED SINGULAR SUCCESS IN THE FIELD OF CIVIC ACTION. THE TEAM TREATS AN AVERAGE OF 1,500-2,000 PATIENTS PER WEEK AND IS MAKING A SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTION.

H. HAU NGHIA: PACIFICATION HAS REACHED A STANDSTILL IN HAU

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NGHIA, DUE PRIMARILY TO THE NECESSITY OF REMOVING SECURITY FORCES FOR OTHER ESSENTIAL OPERATIONS. VC REACTION HAS BEEN RARE, AND THEY CONTINUE TO MOVE AND OPERATE WITHIN THE PRIORITY I PACIFICATION AREA. TWENTY MOBILE ACTION CADRE COMMENCED TRAINING ON 1 AUGUST AND WILL GRADUATE ON 22 AUGUST. THESE TRAINERS ARE FROM DUC HOA DISTRICT AND WILL BE EMPLOYED ONLY IN THEIR HAMLETS OF RESIDENCE.

I. LONG AN: PROVINCE CONTINUES TO REPORT 19 HAMLETS AS CONSTRUCTED; HOWEVER, THE SECTOR ADVISOR CONTENDS THAT NONE OF THE PROVINCE'S HAMLETS MEET ALL SIX CRITERIA FOR PACIFICATION. TANGIBLE DEFICIENCIES ARE LACK OF COMMUNICATIONS, LACK OF DEFENSE AND RELIEF PLANS, AND LACK OF ADEQUATE PHYSICAL DEFENSES. PACIFICATION OPERATIONS ARE CURRENTLY BEING CONDUCTED IN 29 HAMLETS, INCLUDING THE 19 "CONSTRUCTED" HAMLETS. ARTILLERY HAS REGISTERED IN SUPPORT OF EIGHT HAMLET AREAS AND IS CONTINUING TO REGISTER IN ADDITIONAL AREAS. NUMBER OF MOBILE ACTION CADRE TEAMS WORKING REMAINS AT 16. RECRUITING QUALIFIED PERSONNEL WITHIN PROVINCE IS ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE. THOSE PEOPLE WHO ARE RECRUITED MUST BE TRAINED AS TECHNICIANS AS WELL AS CADREMAN. SECTOR ADVISOR RATES TEAMS AS POOR TO FAIR AND ASSERTS THAT THE DETERMINING FACTOR OF A TEAM'S EFFECTIVENESS IS THE COMPETENCY OF THE TEAM LEADER. HIGHWAY 5 IS OPEN FROM SAIGON TO GO CONG, SECURED BY THE 2D MARINE BATTALION. VC REACTION HAS BEEN POSITIVE. A KEY BRIDGE AT CHO-TRAN WAS BLOWN UP ABOUT 4 AUGUST AND THE CAN DUC DISTRICT TOWN WAS SUBJECTED TO A COMPANY SIZE ATTACK ON THE NIGHT OF 6-7 AUGUST. THE ATTACK WAS REPULSED, AND THE BRIDGE HAS BEEN REPLACED.

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1. LINE TROUGH: THE PROVINCE CHIEF, COL NHIEU, SEEMS OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE PROGRESS ATTAINED IN PACIFICATION. PROVINCE CLAIMS 37 HAMLETS CONSTRUCTED (ONLY SIX HAVE BEEN INSPECTED BY A JOINT US/GVN TEAM) AND 95 CURRENTLY UNDER CONSTRUCTION. THE GOAL OF THE PROVINCE CHIEF IS 171, WHICH IS TWO MORE THAN ORIGINAL ESTIMATES MADE IN MARCH 1964. ACCORDING TO COL NHIEU, IF PROGRESS CONTINUES TO ADVANCE AT THE PRESENT PACE, HE WILL COMPLETE HIS GOAL (171) BY THE END OF THE YEAR. THIS OPTIMISM IS NOT FULLY SHARED BY THE SECTOR ADVISOR. A CHIEU HOI LEAFLET DROP GRANTING PIASTERS FOR VC MINES AND WEAPONS TURNED IN HAS PROVED VERY SUCCESSFUL. DURING A 60-DAY PERIOD, SEVEN MINES AND 11 RIFLES WERE SURRENDERED. THE PROVINCE CHIEF EXPRESSED CONCERN FOR THE CONTINUANCE OF THIS PROGRAM SINCE HE SAID FUNDS FOR THE PROGRAM WERE EXHAUSTED. A SOLUTION TO THIS PROBLEM WAS FOUND THIS WEEK WHEN PROVINCE RECEIVED PERMISSION TO USE THEIR MISCELLANEOUS FUND FOR THIS PURPOSE UNTIL THE CHIEU HOI FUND WAS RECEIVED. A NEW OIL SPOT IS EMERGING IN PHU KIET VILLAGE ABOUT FOUR KILOMETERS NORTHEAST OF MY THO. A RECENT VISIT TO THIS AREA BY THE PROVINCE CHIEF, THE SECTOR ADVISOR AND A REPRESENTATIVE FROM THE OFFICE OF SECTOR AFFAIRS, REVEALED THAT THE MOBILE ACTION GADRE TEAM OPERATING IN THE VILLAGE HAD COMPLETED TAKING THE CENSUS OF 118 FAMILIES. SEVERAL SELF-HELP PROJECTS WERE DISCUSSED, THE MOST URGENT OF WHICH WAS A NEW ROOF FOR THE VILLAGE SCHOOL. TROOPS ARRIVED IN THIS AREA IN MARCH 64; HOWEVER, PROGRESS WAS HALTED SHORTLY THEREAFTER BECAUSE OF THE DEATH OF THE PROVINCE CHIEF IN A MINING INCIDENT. JUST

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OUTSIDE THE VILLAGE. PRESENTLY, 30 POPULAR FORCES MAN THE POST WHICH GUARDS THE VILLAGE. A VC GUERRILLA CAPTURED NEAR THE POST REFUSED TO JOIN THE POPULAR FORCE WHEN GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY BY THE PROVINCE CHIEF. THE REASON GIVEN BY THE GUERRILLA WAS THAT HE WAS AFRAID OF VC REPRISALS AGAINST HIMSELF AND HIS FAMILY.

K. GO CONG: ACCORDING TO PROVINCE, APPROXIMATELY 18,000 PEOPLE OR APPROXIMATELY 10% OF THE POPULATION ARE IN 21 COMPLETED HAMLETS. HOWEVER, ONLY SEVEN HAMLETS HAVE BEEN INSPECTED BY A US/GVN TEAM, SIX OF WHICH MEET NATIONAL STANDARDS. TO ASSIST MORE ACCURATE REPORTING OF COMPLETED HAMLETS A BILINGUAL HAMLET INSPECTION CHECK LIST HAS BEEN DEVISED IN GO CONG TO VERIFY HAMLETS MEETING THE SIX POINT CRITERIA. PROVINCE HAS RECENTLY RECEIVED OVER TWO MILLION PIASTERS TO BUILD 11 PRIMARY SCHOOLS AND PAY SALARIES OF 43 TEACHERS. SEVEN OF THESE SCHOOLS ARE PLANNED IN THE AL-PACIFICATION AREA.

L. KIEN HOA: ACCORDING TO THE DISTRICT ADVISOR, SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE IN HAM LONG DISTRICT, 30 KILOMETERS NORTHWEST OF THE PROVINCE CAPITAL, AFTER THE OLD DISTRICT CHIEF WAS REPLACED FOUR MONTHS AGO. CURRENTLY, THERE ARE THREE MOBILE ACTION CADRE TEAMS EMPLOYED IN THE AREA. THE DISTRICT CHIEF REPORTS THREE OR FOUR HAMLETS MEETING THE SIX POINT CRITERIA, BUT THE DISTRICT ADVISOR DOES NOT ACCEPT THIS. SECURITY OF THE DISTRICT IS PROVIDED BY 30 POPULAR FORCE, THE 853D REGIONAL COMPANY AND TWO 105 HOWITZERS. IN ADDITION, THERE ARE 120 COMBAT YOUTH IN HAMLETS, ONE-HALF OF WHICH ARE ARMED. RECENTLY, TWO SELF-HELP PROJECTS, A FIVE CLASSROOM SCHOOL

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AND A MARKET PLACE WERE COMPLETED. DISTRICT HAS RECEIVED A BRICK MAKING MACHINE THROUGH USOM CHANNELS AND PLANS TO START A BRICK FACTORY. VC ACTIVITY HAS BEEN KEPT AT A LOW LEVEL BY THE EFFORTS OF THE DISTRICT CHIEF'S SPECIAL FORCE WHICH CONDUCTS DAY AND NIGHT PATROLS.

M. KIEN TUONG: PACIFICATION OPERATIONS IN KIEN QUAN HAMLETS I, II AND III CONTINUED THIS WEEK WITH THE PUBLIC WORKS DIVISION COMPLETING A ONE LANE, LIGHT VEHICLE BRIDGE OVER THE LA GRANGE CANAL. STRENGTHENING OF THE HAMLETS' DEFENSES WITH BARBED WIRE FENCES IS BEING ACCOMPLISHED BY CIVILIAN AND MILITARY PERSONNEL. AN AMERICAN-VIETNAMESE TEAM RECENTLY CONSTRUCTED A FOOT BRIDGE OVER THE CANAL, AND WORK ON ANOTHER LIGHT VEHICLE BRIDGE HAS BEGUN AT BIEN HIEP.

N. CHUONG THIEN: THE IV CORPS COMMANDER IS RELIEVING THE PROVINCE CHIEF, LT COL LY BA PHAM, AND REPLACING HIM WITH LT COL NGUYEN DIEP, THE "A" BRIGADE COMMANDER, LOCATED IN CA MAU. THE CHANGE IN PROVINCE CHIEFS WILL TAKE PLACE NEXT WEEK. CHIEF REASON FOR LT COL PHAM'S RELIEF IS GIVEN AS HIS COMMITMENT OF THE UNTRAINED HOA HAO REGIONAL FORCES ON 10 JULY, WHO SUBSEQUENTLY SUSTAINED HEAVY CASUALTIES. FURTHER CONTRIBUTING TO THIS RELIEF WAS THE AMBUSH OF THE 1/31ST IN KIEN HUNG DISTRICT ON 20 JULY. AFTER THESE TWO SETBACKS LT COL PHAM WITHDREW TO HIMSELF, BECAME VERY PESSIMISTIC AND INEFFECTIVE AS PROVINCE CHIEF. AS A RESULT, THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTAL MACHINERY HAS GENERALLY BEEN INOPERATIVE AND PROGRAMS

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THE REPORTING OFFICER HAS BEEN ADVISED THAT THE INFORMATION BEING MADE IS DUE TO THE REPORTS OF US MILITARY AND USMC MEMBERS AND DISTRICT OFFICERS. THE REPORTING OFFICER IS NOT UNHAPPY OVER BEING BELIEVED, BUT IS UNHAPPY THAT THE DEPUTY MAJ NEMHA WAS NOT BELIEVED AS HIS SUCCESSOR. MAJ NEMHA WANTED THE POSITION VERY MUCH AND HAS VOICED BETTER DISAPPOINTMENT OVER NOT BEING SELECTED. HE HAS SINCE VISITED IV CORPS HEADQUARTERS SEVERAL TIMES WITH THE IV CORPS COMMANDER. MAJ NEMHA, THE DEPUTY DISTRICT CHIEF, IS CONSIDERED TO BE THE KEY FIGURE IN THE HOA HAS SUBMITTED IN CHUNG TRIEN. HIS ATTITUDE AND ACTIONS HAVE A DIRECT INFLUENCE ON THOSE OF THE HOA MASS. THERE IS SOME CONCERN ABOUT MAJ NEMHA'S ATTITUDE. LT COL DEBE, THE NEW PROVINCE CHIEF, IS CONSIDERED TO BE HIGHLY QUALIFIED, EXCEPT FOR SEVERAL WEEKS AS THE 1st BRIGADE COMMANDER, HE HAS BEEN THE 21ST DIVISION C2 AND WAS INSTRUMENTAL IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF PARTICIPATION PLANS IN THE DIVISION. HE IS NOT A HOA HAO. THE MOSTER ACTION CELLS ARE STILL PRESENT IN GO QUANG AND DINH AN VILLAGES IN KIEN HUNG, BUT THESE OPERATIONS ARE VERY LIMITED DUE TO SECURITY CONDITIONS. THE 32ND BATTALION WAS MOVED TO DINH AN TO SECURE THE AREA AND THE RESEARCH GROUPS ARE BY THE 2ND AND 3RD REGTS. THE BATTALION HAS A PRESENT FIVE COMPANY STRENGTH OF 220. PARTICIPATION PROGRAMS IS EXPECTED TO BE THE MAIN METHOD IN THIS DISTRICT UNTIL INCREASED SECURITY FORCES ARE AVAILABLE. IN GO QUANG DISTRICT THE MOSTER ACTION CELLS ARE BEING ORGANIZED. THESE CELLS ARE BEING ORGANIZED, FORMED AND ARE ORGANIZED TO BE USED IN THE DISTRICT. PAGE 4 OF 5

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PROGRESSING RAPIDLY, POLITICAL EDUCATION AND SANITATION PROGRAMS ARE IN EFFECT. IN LONG MY, NINE MOBILE ACTION CADRE TEAMS AND TWO POPULAR FORCE PLATOONS COMPLETED TRAINING ON 13 AUG AND WILL COMMENCE OPERATIONS IN LONG BINH AND LONG TRI VILLAGES.

O. AN-KUEN: PACIFICATION OPERATIONS IN THIS PROVINCE ARE VERY LIMITED AND AGAIN ARE BEING OVERSHADOWED BY SECURITY CONDITIONS. MOBILE ACTION CADRE ARE OPERATING EFFECTIVELY IN SIX HAMLETS IN QUAN LONG DISTRICT. THREE CADRE TEAMS HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO BEGIN PACIFICATION OPERATIONS IN THREE HAMLETS BECAUSE OF VC CONTROL OF THE HAMLETS AND INADEQUATE SECURITY FORCES. VC TERRORISM HAS INCREASED IN THE CA MAU AREA. THE THEATER IN TOWN WAS BOMBED, A GUARD POST ADJACENT TO THE US ADVISOR COMPOUND WAS GRENADED, AND THE VC PLANTED FOUR MINES IN THE SPECIAL POLICE BUILDING AND JAIL, EXPLODING TWO OF THEM. THE HAMLET CHIEF OF TAN PHU B HAMLET WAS MURDERED. THIS HAMLET, LOCATED FOUR KILOMETERS FROM CA MAU, IS BEING SUBJECTED TO DAYLIGHT ATTACKS BY VC. THE BOLDNESS OF VC ACTIONS INDICATE THEY ARE AWARE OF THE LIMITED CAPABILITY OF PROVINCE TO REACT TO THESE ATTACKS AND HARASSMENTS. UNTIL THE SECURITY FORCES ARE INCREASED IN THIS PROVINCE, PACIFICATION PROGRESS WILL CONTINUE TO BE VERY LIMITED. IN HAI YEN, AN ARVN MAJOR HAS ARRIVED TO COMMAND THE REGIONAL FORCE BATTALION. FIVE MOBILE ACTION CADRE HAVE COMPLETED TRAINING, NO ADDITIONAL CADRE ARE SCHEDULED FOR TRAINING AT THIS TIME.

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6. SUPPORTING PROGRAMS

A. PSYWAR/CIVIC ACTION

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS HAD ENCOURAGING RESULTS IN PERSUADING VIET CONG SOLDIERS TO DEFECT DURING THE WEEK. IN HAU NGHIA PROVINCE A PREVIOUS DEFECTOR WROTE A LETTER TO HIS FORMER COMRADES ENCOURAGING THEM TO COME IN ALSO. THE LETTER WAS REPRODUCED ON A LEAFLET AND DISTRIBUTED. WITHIN THE FIRST TEN DAYS FOLLOWING INITIAL DISTRIBUTION, FIVE VC SOLDIERS HAD SURRENDERED. THREE OF THE DEFECTORS WERE DEFINITELY ESTABLISHED TO HAVE COME IN AS A DIRECT RESULT OF THE LEAFLET. IN THE 7TH DIVISION TACTICAL AREA A VC SOLDIER CAME IN BRINGING SIX WEAPONS WITH HIM. HE STATED THAT HE DECIDED TO COME IN BECAUSE LIFE AMONG THE VC WAS SO MISERABLE, AND HE KNEW THAT HE WOULD BE WELL RECEIVED AND TREATED BECAUSE HE HAD SEEN CHIEU HOI LEAFLETS.

THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY PSYWAR/GA UNITS CONTINUE NORMAL OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF THE CHIEU HOI, PACIFICATION, AND RECRUITING PROGRAMS.

I CORPS

ALL PROVINCES ARE ORGANIZING NIGHT PSYWAR TEAMS. THESE TEAMS WILL MAKE PROPAGANDA TEAMS WITH HAND HELD LOUDSPEAKERS TO VC AT NIGHT.

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IN QUANG TIN PROVINCE THERE ARE 25 SELF-HELP SCHOOLS
~~UNDER~~ CONSTRUCTION AS A PART OF THE CIVIC ACTION PROGRAM.
IN ADDITION, APPLICATIONS ARE BEING PROCESSED FOR 46 MORE
SCHOOLS.

II CORPS

IN REFERENCE TO THE PREVIOUSLY REPORTED BURNING OF
HOMES BELONGING TO BUDDHIST FAMILIES IN BINH DINH PROVINCE,
THE PROVINCE CHIEF, HIS STAFF, AND US ADVISORY PERSONNEL
VISITED THE HOMELESS FAMILIES AND DISTRIBUTED RELIEF
SUPPLIES.

III CORPS

NOTHING SIGNIFICANT.

IV CORPS

IV CORPS HAS ESTABLISHED A COMMITTEE WHICH IS TO
STUDY AND ALLOCATE CIVIC ACTION FUNDS. THE MEMBERS OF THE
COMMITTEE INCLUDE THE CORPS PACIFICATION CHIEF AS CHAIRMAN,
PSYWAR BATTALION COMMANDER, CORPS DEPUTY G3, CORPS DEPUTY
G4, US G5 ADVISOR, AND US PSYWAR ADVISOR. THE ORDER
ESTABLISHING THIS COMMITTEE WAS PUBLISHED AND COSIGNED BY
THE CORPS COMMANDER AND THE US SENIOR ADVISOR. THIS
COMMITTEE SHOULD IMPROVE HANDLING OF FUNDS WHICH HAS BEEN A
CONSTANT PROBLEM.

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B. PERSONNEL:

(1) RVNAF STRENGTH: FRAGMENTARY REPORTS INDICATE REGULAR FORCE END JULY 1964 AUDITED STRENGTH WILL BE SLIGHTLY OVER 220,000 AS COMPARED TO END JUNE STRENGTH OF 215,235; REGIONAL FORCE 88,500 AS COMPARED TO END JUNE STRENGTH OF 87,317; POPULAR FORCE 127,450 AS COMPARED TO END JUNE STRENGTH OF 99,611; AND COASTAL FORCE 3,350 AS COMPARED TO END JUNE STRENGTH OF 3,311. REFERENCE (PARA 6-B MILREP OF LAST WEEK, PER 011601Z - 081600Z AUG 64: SUBPARA (1) RVNAF STRENGTH SHOULD BE CHANGED FROM 10,484 REGIONAL FORCE DESERTIONS TO 1,084 REGIONAL FORCE DESERTIONS.

(2) REPLACEMENTS: OF THE 3,889 CONSCRIPTS COMPLETING BASIC TRAINING AT THE VARIOUS TRAINING CENTERS DURING AUGUST 1964, ALL BUT 102 ARE ALLOCATED TO THE CRITICALLY UNDERSTRENGTH 5TH, 7TH, 9TH, AND 21ST DIVISIONS. WITH THE ASSIGNMENT OF THESE CONSCRIPTS, THESE DIVISIONS WILL HAVE APPROXIMATELY 90 PERCENT OF THEIR AUTHORIZED STRENGTH.

(3) PRINTING AND PUBLICATIONS CENTER: A MOBILE TRAINING TEAM FROM THE US ARMY PRINTING, PUBLICATIONS AND RECORDS CENTER, JAPAN, WILL ARRIVE IN RVNA ON OR ABOUT 24 AUGUST TO ASSIST IN THE INSTALLATION OF PRINTING EQUIPMENT

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FOR THE NEW RVNAF PRINTING PLANT. THIS TEAM WILL ALSO PROVIDE LIMITED TRAINING TO THE VN OPERATORS.

C. DEPENDENT HOUSING: THE FIRST CONTRACTS IN SUPPORT OF THE CY 64 PROGRAM, FOR LUMBER AND ROOFING MATERIALS, HAVE BEEN SIGNED. DURING 10-14 AUGUST 1964, 450 63 TYPE FAMILY UNITS WERE DISTRIBUTED TO UNITS, 150 OF THESE TO RF AT TAY NINH. THIS IS THE FIRST DELIVERY TO RF UNITS SINCE THEY WERE INCLUDED IN THE PROGRAM.

D. COMMUNICATIONS:

(1) THIS HEADQUARTERS HAS REQUESTED OF UNITED STATES ARMY STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS COMMAND IMMEDIATE SHIPMENT OF SATELLITE GROUND STATION MARK IV (X) TO SAIGON FOR COMMUNICATIONS. THE STATION AND OPERATING TEAM ARE TO ARRIVE SAIGON 18 AUGUST 1964 AND WILL BE SITED AT TAN SON NHUT. THIS STATION WILL PROVIDE ONE VOICE AND ONE TELETYPE CIRCUIT FROM SAIGON TO HAWAII, THE LOCATION WITH WHICH SAIGON WILL HAVE THE MOST COMMUNICATIONS TRAFFIC.

(2) A BASIC COMPONENT 339 HIGH FREQUENCY TRANSMITTER WAS RELOCATED FROM DEFENSE COMMUNICATIONS AGENCY STATION, SAIGON, TO THE ARMY VIETNAM COMMUNICATIONS SITE AT TAN SON NHUT TO PROVIDE CONTINGENCY OUT OF COUNTRY COMMUNICATIONS

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CAPABILITY. THIS TRANSMITTER WILL BE USED FOR COMMUNICATIONS TO OKINAWA IN CASE THE OTHER OUT OF COUNTRY CIRCUITS AT STRATEGIC ARMY COMMUNICATIONS SAIGON ARE OFF THE AIR.

(3) A VERY HIGH FREQUENCY RADIO CIRCUIT AND MOBILE COMMUNICATIONS CENTER WERE INSTALLED AT VUNG TAU TO SUPPORT CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR COMMANDER, UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM, ALTERNATE COMMAND POST.

(4) A COMMON USER VOICE CIRCUIT WAS ACTIVATED AT 092220Z BETWEEN BIEN HOA AND DA NANG TO SUPPORT EMERGENCY CONTINGENCY PLANS PER REQUEST OF JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF.

(5) A THOROUGH REVIEW OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM NAVIGATIONAL AIDS POSTURE WAS ACCOMPLISHED. NO ADDITIONAL NAVIGATIONAL AIDS ARE NECESSARY TO SUPPORT UNITED STATES NAVY OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS. DUE TO THE INCREASED NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT OPERATING FROM THE BIEN HOI AIR BASE; 2ND AIR DIVISION REQUESTED IMMEDIATE DEPLOYMENT OF A GROUND CONTROLLED APPROACH AND TACTICAL AIR NAVIGATION SYSTEM TO BIEN HOI. THE GROUND CONTROLLED APPROACH WAS DEPLOYED ON 9 AUGUST 1964 AND THE TACTICAL AIR NAVIGATION SYSTEM ON 13 AUGUST. BOTH UNITS ARE SCHEDULED FOR OPERATIONAL STATUS ON 15 AUGUST. ALSO, DUE TO THE BUILDUP OF AIRCRAFT IN THE DA

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NANG AREA; EQUIPMENT FOR TWO ADDITIONAL ULTRA HIGH FREQUENCY FREQUENCIES WAS DEPLOYED TO DA NANG ON 12 AUGUST. THESE CHANNELS ARE ESSENTIAL TO PROVIDE SEPARATE CONTROL TOWER, APPROACH CONTROL, GROUND CONTROL, AND EMERGENCY ULTRA HIGH FREQUENCY COMMUNICATIONS IN THE DA NANG CONTROL TOWER. THE ADDITIONAL CHANNELS INSURE MAXIMUM AIR AND GROUND AIRCRAFT SAFETY, AND PROVIDE EXPEDITED AIR TRAFFIC.

E. CHIEU HOI: DURING THE PERIOD 122 PERSONS RETURNED TO GVN CONTROL. THEY INCLUDED 33 MILITARY, 13 POLITICAL, 60 DRAFT DODGERS AND DESERTERS, AND 16 CIVILIANS. FIFTEEN INDIVIDUAL WEAPONS WERE TURNED OVER TO THE AUTHORITIES.

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ANNEX A (SUMMARY OF GROUND OPERATIONS)

1. BATTALION SIZE AND LARGER (THREE LINE COMPANIES EQUIVALENT OR MORE) READ IN NINE COLUMNS; AS TITLED/I/II/III/IV CORPS/TIEN GIANG TA/CMD/HUNG SAT SP AREA/TOTAL.

- (A) SEARCH AND DESTROY /3/11/7/14/3/0/0/38.
(B) CLEARING /2/0/0/0/0/0/0/2.
(C) SECURING /2/0/1/0/6/0/0/9.
(D) RECONNAISSANCE /1/0/0/1/0/0/0/2.
(E) GUARD & ESCORT /0/0/2/1/2/0/0/5.
(F) TOTAL /8/11/10/16/11/0/0/56.

2. BATTALION SIZE AND LARGER WITH VC CONTACT: READ IN NINE COLUMNS; AS TITLED/I/II/III/IV CORPS/TIEN GIANG TA/CMD/HUNG SAT SP AREA/TOTAL.

- (A) SEARCH AND DESTROY /0/6/5/9/3/0/0/23.
(B) CLEARING /1/0/0/0/0/0/0/1.
(C) SECURING /2/0/0/0/2/0/0/4.
(D) RECONNAISSANCE /1/0/0/1/0/0/0/2.
(E) GUARD AND ESCORT /0/0/0/0/1/0/0/1.
(F) TOTAL /4/6/5/10/6/0/0/31.

3. BATTALION DAYS OF OPERATIONS (TOTAL NUMBER OF DAYS EMPLOYED IN OP-UNITS EQUATED TO BN BASE OF 3 RIFLE CO EQUIVALENT) READ IN NINE COLUMNS; AS TITLED/I/II/III/

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IV CORPS/TIEN GIANG TA/CMD/RUNG SAT SP AREA/TOTAL.

(A) SEARCH AND DESTROY /22/73/80/66/23/0/0/264.
(B) CLEARING /51/0/0/0/0/0/0/51.
(C) SECURING /84/0/16/0/116/0/0/216.
(D) RECONNAISSANCE /7/0/0/1/0/0/0/8.
(E) GUARD AND ESCORT /0/0/6/1/11/0/0/18.
(F) TOTAL /164/73/102/68/150/0/0/557.

4. BATTALION OPERATIONS INITIATED PRIOR TO DAYLIGHT:

I/1, II/6, III/4, IV/5, TIEN GIANG TA/4, CMD/0, RUNG
SAT SP AREA/0, TOTAL 20.

5. BATTALION NIGHTS IN FIELD DURING COURSE OF OPERATIONS:

I/163, II/66, III/80, IV/45, TIEN GIANG TA/132, CMD/0, RUNG
SAT SP AREA/0, TOTAL 467.

6. SMALL UNIT ACTIONS (LESS THAN 3 RIFLE CO EQUIVALENT)

READ IN NINE COLUMNS; AS TITLED/I/II/III/IV CORPS/TIEN
GIANG TA/CMD/RUNG SAT SP AREA/TOTAL.

(A) WITH DAY CONTACT /9/12/13/6/20/2/0/62.
(B) WITH NIGHT CONTACT /5/4/2/4/9/2/0/26.
(C) WITHOUT CONTACT /1513/3236/3078/2829/
2132/882/23/13,693.
(D) TOTAL /1527/3252/3093/2839/
2161/886/23/13,781.

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ANNEX B

AIR OPERATIONS

TABLE I. AIR OPERATIONS MUNITIONS EXPENDITURES

READ IN FIVE COLUMNS/TYPE MUNITION/USAF/VNAF/USA/USMC

1000 GP/0/2/0/0.

750 GP/0/0/0/0.

500 GP/174/226/0/0.

250 GP/0/0/0/0.

100 GP/0/296/0/0.

260 FR/120/869/0/0.

220 FR/0/0/0/0.

120 FR/137/0/0/0.

100 WP/296/24/0/0.

NAPALM/177/52/0/0.

ROCKET/0/195/2680/0.

20 MM/17,000/22,190/0/0.

50 CAL/0/0/0/0.

7.62 MM/0/0/178,505/0.

TABLE II. AIR OPERATIONS CLAIMS

READ IN FIVE COLUMNS/TYPE TARGET/USAF/VNAF/USA/USMC

VC PERSONNEL 2/171/0.

STRUCTURES DESTROYED 20/75/0.

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STRUCTURES DAMAGED /39/28/0/0.

SAMPANS DESTROYED /0/0/8/0.

SAMPANS DAMAGED /1/5/0/0.

TABLE III. AIR SUPPORT TO NEW LIFE HAMLETS AND OUTPOSTS

READ IN SIX COLUMNS/CORPS/PROVINCE/ATTACKS/FLARESHIPS/

FLARES/FIGHTERS

I/QUANG TIN/2/2/140/0.

II/0/0/0/0/0.

III/TAY NINH/1/1/37/0.

III/BINH DUONG/1/4/9/0.

III/BINH HOA/2/2/136/2.

III/HAU NGHIA/1/1/50/0.

III/PHUOC THANH/ 2/1/40/0.

IV/VINH LONG/3/5/207/2.

IV/VINH BINH/2/4/162/2.

IV/PHONG DINH/2/5/294/2.

IV/BA XUYEN/2/4/145/2.

IV/AN XUYEN/1/1/73/2.

TG/KIEN HOA/2/2/124/2.

TG/LONG AN/2/3/40/2.

TG/DINH TUONG/1/2/68/0.

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TABLE IV. AIRCRAFT INCIDENTS

READ IN SIX COLUMNS: DATE/TIME AIRCRAFT/CODES/COUNTS/
MIA/REMARKS

USAF: 14 AUG/G-10B/RS340430/TG/FRW/1 HIT, NO INJURIES.

15 AUG/G-123/TC49883B/I/ALB/1 HIT, NO INJURIES.

USAF: 13 AUG/G-47/WT730825/IV/ABR/1 HIT, PILOT WIA.

USAF: 10 AUG/UE-1B/XS325434/7TH DIV/SF/1 HIT, NO

INJURIES.

11 AUG/UE-1B/BR232332/II/ALA/1 HIT, NO INJURIES.

11 AUG/G-1B/WT75270/IV/RR/2 HITS, 1 US WIA.

11 AUG/UE-1B/WS880880/IV/VR/4 HITS, 1 US WIA.

12 AUG/UE-1B/RS605490/7TH DIV/SF/1 HIT, NO

INJURIES.

12 AUG/UE-1B/XS655417/7TH DIV/SF/1 HIT, 1 US

WIA, 1 US WIA.

12 AUG/UE-1B/XS85650/7TH DIV/SF/1 HIT, NO

INJURIES.

12 AUG/UE-1B/RS623482/II/SF/1 HIT, NO INJURIES.

14 AUG/UE-1B/RS35760/7TH DIV/CAL/1 HIT, NO

INJURIES.

14 AUG/UE-1B/RS7030/IV/RR/2 HITS, NO INJURIES.

14 AUG/UE-1B/RS7030/IV/RR/2 HITS, NO INJURIES.

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15 AUG/UM-1B/WR569649/IV/SF/1 HIT, NO INJURIES.

15 AUG/UM-1B/WR620630/IV/SF/1 HIT, NO INJURIES.

15 AUG/UM-1B/XT801540/7TH DIV/BA/1 HIT, NO

INJURIES.

USMC: 8 AUG/UM-34D/BT207126/I/TAB/1 HIT, NO INJURIES.

TABLE V. AIRCRAFT STATUS

READ IN SIX COLUMNS/SERVICE/TYPER ACFT/AUTH/ASSIGN/

AVAIL/REMARKS

USAF/T-28/0/0/0/0.

USAF/O-1F/22/19.7/19.7/0.

USAF/U-10B/4/4/4/0.

USAF/C-123/52/52.1/49.1/0.

USAF/C-47/7/7/8/0.

USAF/C-54/4/4/4/0.

USAF/A-1E/55/25.7/25.7/0.

USAF/B-EB-57/0/0/2/0.

USAF/BF-101/0/0/12.6/0.

USAF/U-3B/2/2/2/0.

USAF/B-57/0/0/38/0.

USAF/F-100/0/0/8/0.

USAF/F-102/0/0/12/0.

VNAF/A-1H/75/74/67/0.

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USMC/O-283/25/25/0.

USMC/O-14/77/12/37/0.

USMC/O-178/18/31/11/0.

USMC/O-178/12/3/0.

USMC/O-158/17/16/16/0 STORAGE.

USMC/O-20/18/17/14/0.

USMC/O-178/1/1/1/0.

USMC/O-178/25/25/25/0.

USMC/O-61/9/8/8/0.

USMC/O-71/30/53/30/0.

USMC/O-18/197/197/174.

USMC/O-28/16/16/12.

USMC/O-1/6/6/4.

USMC/O-17/50/49/46.

USMC/O-11/26/26/23.

USMC/O-37/6/6/6.

USMC/O-6/15/15/11.

USMC/O-8/9/9/6.

USMC/O-21/21/21/22.

USMC/O-15/3/3/3.

USMC/O-117/1/1/0.

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**TABLE VI. SUMMARY OF AIR TASKS, SORTIES, CARGO, PASSENGERS,
AND FLYING HOURS**

USAF: 12-AA, 50-ABR, 9-AC, 2-AD, 536-AIR, 12-CA,
2-CSL, 8-DPL, 5-DFS, 28-EA, 4-EH, 4-ET, 10-FL, 58-ID,
97-PR, 12-PSW, 4-VR, 1-M, 45-A, 41-T, 940 TASKS, 852
SORTIES, 877.2 TONS/CARGO, 4030 PAX, TOTAL FLYING HOURS
1182.3.

VNAF: 9-AA, 37-AC, 182-AIR, 65-GA, 17-COB, 7-CSL,
24-EA, 5-EC, 2-EH, 18-ET, 20-FL, 35-FAC, 101-ID, 10-PR,
1-PSW, 7-VR, 591-T, 1133 TASKS, 1077 SORTIES, 38.7 TONS/
CARGO, 811 PAX, TOTAL FLYING HOURS 1714.1.

USA:

ROTARY WING: 53-AE, 4-ACA, 9-ACP, 12-AIR, 282-ALA,
140-AIR, 17-AR, 2-COB, 619-CSL, 63-CL, 10-DFS, 302-EA,
17-PR, 12-PSW, 22-RR, 8-SAR, 267-SF, 25-TAE, 173-VR,
2037 TASKS, 4123 SORTIES, 89.7 TONS/CARGO, 6150 PASSENGERS,
TOTAL FLYING HOURS 1867.1.

FIXED WING: 5-AE, 17-ACA, 8-ABR, 13-ALA, 152-AIR,
2-AR, 46-ART, 80-COB, 317-CSL, 211-CL, 8-EA, 7-FAC, 8-PR,
20-PSW, 43-RR, 1-SAR, 217-VR, 1155 TASKS, 1626 SORTIES,
249.4 TONS/CARGO, 3555 PASSENGERS, TOTAL FLYING HOURS
1406.0.

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USMC:

REGULAR MISSIONS: 116-AIR, 96-CGL, 22-TR, 110-SAB,

30-TAB, 4-TR, 1158-TASKS, 714-SORTIES, 114.5 TONS/CARGO,

784-PASSENGERS, TOTAL FLYING HOURS 251.7.

FIELD MISSIONS: 118-CGL, 24-SAB, 66-TAB, 13-TR, 399-TASKS,

265-SORTIES, 21.9 TONS/CARGO, 198-PASSENGERS, TOTAL

FLYING HOURS 86.2.

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ANNEX C: (VMN OPERATIONS DATA)

	<u>SEA</u> <u>FORCE</u>	<u>RIVER</u> <u>FORCE</u>	<u>COASTAL</u> <u>FORCE</u>	<u>CF</u> <u>ICD</u>	<u>CF</u> <u>2CD</u>	<u>CF</u> <u>3CD</u>	<u>CF</u> <u>4CD</u>
TOTAL							
ASN	44	159	555	113	178	119	145
TOTAL							
AVL (AVG)	33	112	406	93	138	90	85
TOTAL							
EMP (AVG)	28	84	230	55	92	30	53

TABLE II EMPLOYMENT (DAILY AVERAGE)

GBT SPT	0	13	0	0	0	0	0
SEA PTL	4	0	0	0	0	0	0
RIV PTL	3	27	0	0	0	0	0
CSTL SURVL	5	0	230	55	92	30	53
CONVOY							
SGTY	0	13	0	0	0	0	0
PROV SPT	0	10	0	0	0	0	0
STAT DEF	0	5	0	0	0	0	0
LOG SPT	6	4	0	0	0	0	0
TNG	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OTHER	10	12	0	0	0	0	0

TABLE III SURVEILLANCE RESULTS

JUNKS SEARCHED	108	54	397	890	2059	239	91
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PERSONS SEARCHED	450	165	12,748	1,608	6,821	879	440
JUNKS DETAINED	2	4	1	0	1	0	0
PERSONS DETAINED	11	6	46	3	43	0	0
CONFIRMED VC	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

TABLE IV LOGISTICS (TOTALS)

TONS (TONS)	0
POL (TONS)	500
AMMO (TONS)	520
VEHICLES (NR)	15
PEOPLE (NR)	0

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ANNEX D - (C) - VC INCIDENTS

(READ IN 8 COLUMNS: CORPS/PROVINCE/ATTACKS/TERRORISM/SABOTAGE/
PROPAGANDA/AA FIRE/TOTAL)

<u>I/TOTAL/4/81/8/18/4/115</u>	II/QUANG DUC/0/0/0/0/0/0
I/1 DIV/2/43/7/15/1/68	II/TUYEN DUC/0/0/0/0/0/0
I/QUANG TRI/1/22/5/1/1/30	<u>III/TOTAL/7/54/12/10/7/90</u>
I/THUA THIEN/1/21/2/14/0/38	III/BL SZ/1/1/0/6/0/8
I/2 DIV/2/38/1/3/3/47	III/BINH THUAN/1/0/0/3/0/4
I/QUANG NAM/0/30/0/3/0/33	III/BINH TUY/0/2/0/1/0/2
I/QUANG TIN/2/8/1/0/3/14	III/LAM DONG/0/0/0/2/0/2
<u>II/TOTAL/4/80/7/11/4/106</u>	III/LONG KHANH/0/0/0/0/0/0
II/25 DIV/3/43/1/5/2/54	III/PBT SZ/2/8/2/0/1/13
II/QUANG HGAY/1/10/1/2/0/14	III/BINH LONG/0/4/1/0/0/5
II/BINH DINH/2/33/0/3/2/10	III/PHUOC LONG/0/0/0/0/1/1
II/22 DIV/1/16/3/3/1/24	III/PHUOC THANH/2/4/1/0/0/7
II/KONTUM/1/4/0/2/0/7	III/PB SZ/2/11/1/1/0/15
II/PHU BON/0/2/0/0/0/2	III/BIEN HOA/1/6/0/0/0/7
II/PLEIKU/0/10/3/1/1/15	III/PHUOC TUY/1/5/1/1/0/8
II/23 DIV/0/21/3/3/1/28	<u>III/5 DIV/2/34/9/3/6/54</u>
II/DARLAC/0/6/0/1/0/7	III/BINH DUONG/1/13/1/2/1/21
II/KHANH HOA/0/7/0/0/1/8	III/HAU NGHIA/1/12/4/0/0/17
II/NINH THUAN/0/0/0/2/0/2	III/TAI BINH/0/9/4/1/2/16
II/PHU YEN/0/8/3/0/0/11	CMD/GIA DINH/1/6/0/0/0/7

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

RUNG SAT/BIEN HOA/0/2/0/0/0/2	IV/KIEN PHONG/0/11/3/0/1/15
<u>TG/TOTAL/1/60/31/1/13/106</u>	IV/VINH BINH/1/33/0/0/1/35
TG/DINH TUONG/0/15/8/0/8/31	IV/VINH LONG/1/16/1/0/2/20
TG/GO CONG/0/3/11/0/0/14	IV/21 DIV/6/67/10/0/2/85
TG/KIEN HOA/1/23/8/1/2/35	IV/AN XUYEN/2/18/1/0/0/21
TG/KIEN TUONG/0/2/1/0/2/5	IV/BA XUYEN/0/20/1/0/2/23
TG/LONG AN/0/17/3/0/1/21	IV/CHUONG THIEN/1/8/3/0/0/12
<u>IV/TOTAL/8/138/15/1/7/169</u>	IV/KIEN GIANG/0/8/0/0/0/8
IV/9 DIV/2/71/5/1/5/84	IV/PHONG DINH/3/13/5/0/0/21
IV/AN GIANG/0/11/1/1/1/14	
COUNTRY TOTALS/25/421/73/41/35/595	

NOTE: BIEN HOA PROVINCE DIVIDED BETWEEN PHUOC BIEN SPECIAL ZONE
(III CORPS) AND RUNG SAT SPECIAL AREA (VNN).

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**ANNEX E (STATISTICAL DATA/RVN AND VC PERSONNEL AND WEAPON
LOSSES)**

1. RVN PERSONNEL AND WEAPON LOSSES

**A. PERSONNEL LOSSES (READ IN 9 COLM; AS TITLED/I/
II/III/IV CORPS/TIEN GIANG TA/CMD/RONG SAT SA/TOTAL.**

(1) **REGULAR:** KIA /16/1/5/1/18/1/0/12.
WIA /54/4/27/28/63/0/0/176.
MIA-CPTR /0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0.

(2) **RF:** KIA /4/2/2/16/4/0/0/38.
WIA /13/10/19/30/5/0/0/77.
MIA-CPTR /1/0/13/0/0/0/0/14.

(3) **PF:** KIA /8/20/28/20/11/0/0/87.
WIA /18/76/56/37/5/0/0/192.
MIA-CPTR /8/44/14/38/3/0/0/107.

(4) **OTHER:** KIA /0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0.
WIA /0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0.
MIA-CPTR /0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0.

(5) **TOTAL:** 733 (167 KIA, 445 WIA, 121 MIA-CPTR).

**B. WEAPON LOSSES: TOTAL: 307; PISTOLS/CARBINES/
RIFLES 294, AUTOMATIC RIFLES 8, CAL 30 MACHINE GUNS 1,
MORTARS 60MM 4. BY AREAS: I/24, II/89, III/94, IV CORPS/
77, TIEN GIANG TA/23, CMD/RONG SAT SA/AREA.0.**

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

2. VC PERSONNEL AND WEAPON LOSSES 9-15 AUGUST 64:

READ IN 8 COLUMNS: I/II/III/IV CORPS/THIEN GIANG/CMD/RUNG SAT/

TOTAL

A. CASUALTIES:

KIA 41/73/29/16/4/0/0/154

CPTD 1/7/4/1/0/0/0/13

B. WEAPONS:

INDIVIDUAL 16/33/10/7/2/0/0/68

CREW SERVED NONE

C. RADIOS: NONE

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ANNEX F (CRITICAL PROVINCES)

READ ALL TABULATIONS IN 14 COLUMNS: AS TITLED/BINH DUONG/DINH
TUONG/GO CONG/HAU NGHIA/KIEN HOA/KIEN TUONG/LONG AN/TAY NINH/AN XUYEN/
CHUONG THIEN/QUANG TIN/QUANG NGAI/BINH DINH/PHUOC THANH.

- (A) COMP OF APPR/24/C/06/C/C/C/C/C/C/C/71/C/C/C.
- (B) POP IN COMPL/40/C/02/C/C/C/C/C/C/C/C/38/C.
- (C) POP IN U CONSTR/C/C/16/C/0/C/C/C/C/C/C/C/59/C.
- (D) SH W SCH/19/C/37/C/C/C/C/C/C/C/C/C.
- (E) SH W DISP/C/C/34/C/C/C/C/43/C/C/C/C/C.
- (F) ONE SELF-HELP PROJ/0/C/C/C/C/C/C/57/C/C/C/C/C.
- (G) TWO SELF-HELP PROJ/C/C/0/C/C/C/C/C/C/C/C.
- (H) SH MIL TNG/C/C/11/C/C/C/C/50/C/C/76/C/C/C.
- (I) SH MIL ARM/C/C/C/C/C/C/27/C/C/53/C/C/C.
- (J) W AUTH SQD/48/C/100/C/C/C/C/54/C/C/43/C/87/C.
- (K) AUG SH/C/C/100/C/C/C/C/C/C/26/C/19/C.
- (L) W REINF CPBL/C/C/100/C/C/C/C/C/C/63/C/87/C.

NOTE A: NOT USED

NOTE B: NO INFORMATION AVAILABLE

NOTE C: NO CHANGE

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