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USMACV MILITARY REPORT

PERIOD COVERED: 151601Z TO 221600Z AUGUST 1964

1. GENERAL:

A. VIET CONG INITIATED ACTIVITY DURING THE WEEK WAS SLIGHTLY HIGHER THAN THE WEEK BEFORE; HOWEVER, WHILE THE RATE OF TERRORISM INCREASED, THERE WAS A FURTHER DROP IN THE NUMBER OF SMALL SCALE ATTACKS AND AMBUSHES. ACTS OF SABOTAGE ALSO DECLINED. TWO LARGE VC AMBUSH OPERATIONS AGAINST RVNAF REACTION FORCES RESPONDING TO VC ATTACKS ON POSTS, IN PHONG DINH AND KIEN HOA, CAUSED HEAVY FRIENDLY CASUALTIES INCLUDING THE DEATH OF FOUR US PERSONNEL.

B. IN THE SPHERE OF JOINT OPERATIONS THE SCENE OF SIGNIFICANT OPERATIONAL INTEREST WAS INITIALLY IN DINH TUONG PROVINCE OF THE TIEN GIANG TACTICAL AREA, 55 KILOMETERS SOUTHWEST OF SAIGON, WHERE A SUCCESSFUL SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATION TERMINATED ON 16 AUGUST. IN THIS OPERATION THE VC SUFFERED 14 KIA AND MOST 48 MEN AS PW, WHILE THE GOVERNMENT FORCES SUSTAINED ONLY ONE KIA. (SEE PARA 2A(2)).

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IN THE NORTHERN PART OF RVN, IN I CTZ, THE LONG TERM PACIFICATION OPERATIONS, DAN CHIEN 1 IN QUANG TIN PROVINCE, AND DAN CHIEN 2 IN QUANG NAM PROVINCE, WERE TERMINATED DURING THE MIDDLE OF THE WEEK. (SEE PARA 2A(3) AND (4) ).

AS THE WEEK DREW TO A CLOSE, IN KIEN HOA PROVINCE OF THE TIEN GIANG TACTICAL AREA, THE RVNAF FORCES SUFFERED SEVERE LOSSES IN THE MOST SIGNIFICANT MILITARY EVENT OF THE WEEK. AN ARVN INFANTRY BN AND A RANGER CO, ACCOMPANIED BY THE RANGER BN HEADQUARTERS, WERE ASSAULTED BY A STRONG VC FORCE WHEN RETURNING FROM AN OPERATION. THE DETAILS ARE DESCRIBED IN PARA 2A(1) AND PARA 3 BELOW.

THE TEMPO OF MAJOR GROUND OPERATIONS DECREASED SOMEWHAT THIS WEEK. WHILE THE NUMBER OF MAJOR OPERATIONS INCREASED IN NUMBER, THE NUMBER OF DAYS THAT ARVN BATTALIONS SPENT IN THE FIELD DECREASED. HOWEVER, THE INTENSITY LEVEL SHOWED AN INCREASE AS EVIDENCED IN THE NUMBER OF CONTACTS BY MAJOR UNITS. MAJOR PACIFICATION OPERATIONS DECREASED FROM 11 TO NINE WITH THE TERMINATION OF OPERATIONS DAN CHIEN 1 AND 2, REFERRED TO ABOVE. SMALL UNIT ACTIONS INCREASED WHEN COMPARED TO LAST WEEK, BUT THERE WAS ONLY A SLIGHT INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF CONTACTS.

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VNAF/USAF AIR OPERATIONS WERE CONDUCTED AT AN INCREASED TEMPO THIS WEEK. COMBAT AIR STRIKES RANGED THROUGHOUT THE RVN; HOWEVER, THE MOST SIGNIFICANT COMBAT AIR SUPPORT WAS PROVIDED TO GROUND OPERATIONS IN THE IV CTZ. FLARESHIPS AND FIGHTERS WERE ACTIVE IN ALL BUT THE II CTZ IN SUPPORT OF HAMLETS AND POSTS UNDER VC NIGHT ATTACK. LOGISTICS, PHOTO RECONNAISSANCE, AND PSYWAR SORTIES WERE CONDUCTED WITHOUT INCIDENT. ONLY THREE AIRCRAFT RECEIVED BATTLE DAMAGE THIS WEEK; ALL WERE C-123 AIRCRAFT, HIT WHILE ON AIR LANDED RESUPPLY MISSIONS.

TOTAL ARMY AVIATION ACTIVITY IN THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM INCREASED IN INTENSITY FOR THE SECOND CONSECUTIVE WEEK. THE INCREASE RESULTED FROM A STEPUP IN THE TEMPO OF AVIATION OPERATIONS IN THE IV CORPS AREA WHERE A TWENTY FIVE PERCENT INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF TROOPS AND PASSENGERS TRANSPORTED WAS REPORTED. ACTIVITY IN OTHER AREAS REMAINED AT, OR NEAR, THE LEVEL OF THE PRECEDING WEEK.

US MARINE CORPS AVIATION DECREASED SLIGHTLY DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD. WHILE HELICOPTER OPERATIONS REMAINED FAIRLY CONSTANT, FIXED WING OPERATIONS EXPERIENCED A DECLINE.

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VNN EMPLOYMENT OF SEA FORCE UNITS DECREASED THIS WEEK AS UNITS CONTINUED THEIR PATROL AND LOGISTICAL SUPPORT MISSIONS. ADDITIONALLY, ONE SHORE BOMBARDMENT MISSION WAS CONDUCTED IN THE CA MAU AREA.

RIVER FORCE ACTIVITY CONTINUED AT A RELATIVELY HEAVY LEVEL OF EMPLOYMENT ALTHOUGH THE UTILIZATION OF RIVERCRAFT IN THEIR PRIMARY MISSION OF COMBAT SUPPORT DIMINISHED WITH PARTICIPATION IN THREE OPERATIONS RECORDED FOR THE WEEK. FORCE UNITS OPERATED WITH RELATIVELY FEW VC CONTACTS, WITH THESE BEING CENTERED IN THE RUNG SAT SPECIAL AREA. AT 202345H AUGUST TWO LANDING CRAFT MEDIUM AND TWO RIVER PATROL BOATS OF THE 21ST RIVER ASSAULT GROUP ON NIGHT PATROL ON THE BA LAI RIVER, SOUTH OF MY THO IN KIEN HOA PROVINCE, WERE REPORTED TO HAVE BEEN STRAFED BY A HU-1B HELICOPTER. ONE CREWMAN OF THE RIVER FORCE WAS WOUNDED, AND THE BOATS RECEIVED SUPERFICIAL DAMAGE. THE INCIDENT IS BEING INVESTIGATED.

COASTAL FORCE ACTIVITY REMAINED GENERALLY UNCHANGED FROM LAST WEEK.

PACIFICATION PROGRESS IN THE PRIORITY PROVINCES CONTINUED TO MOVE AT A SLOW PACE THIS WEEK. WHILE MOST OF THESE PROVINCES WERE ABLE TO HOLD ON TO GAINS MADE

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PREVIOUSLY, THERE WAS LITTLE HEADWAY OF SIGNIFICANCE. THE SECURITY PROVIDED IN THE AREAS UNDERGOING PACIFICATION IN SEVERAL OF THE PROVINCES WAS INEFFECTIVE. IN LONG AN AND GIA DINH, THE SITUATION REMAINED STATIC. THE PROGRAM IN VUNG LONG APPEARS TO BE PROGRESSING ACCORDING TO SCHEDULE.

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2. FRIENDLY:

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A. SIGNIFICANT OPERATIONS

(1) BDB HAM LONG WAS INITIATED 200800H AUGUST AS A SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATION IN REACTION TO THE VC ATTACK AGAINST PHU TUC POST (XS3940). THIS 12TH REGIMENT CONTROLLED OPERATION TOOK PLACE IN KIEN HOA PROVINCE ABOUT TEN KILOMETERS NORTHWEST OF BEN TRE (XS5032).

THE VC UNITS INVOLVED WERE REPORTED TO BE ELEMENTS OF THE 516TH VC BN.

THE FRIENDLY FORCES CONSISTED OF ONE INFANTRY BN (-), 2 RANGER BATTALIONS, AND ONE AIRBORNE BN SUPPORTED BY TWO PLATOONS OF 105 HOWITZERS. NAVAL SUPPORT WAS PROVIDED BY A RIVER ASSAULT GROUP. ARMY AVIATION FLEW SURVEILLANCE THROUGHOUT THE OPERATION WITH FIXED AND ROTARY WING AIRCRAFT. AN ADDITIONAL RANGER BN CONSTITUTED THE RESERVE FORCE.

THE SCHEME OF MANEUVER PROVIDED FOR THE INFANTRY BN AND ONE RANGER BN TO MOVE BY TRUCK TO THE ROAD JUNCTION AT XS4351 AND USE THAT FOR A POINT OF DEPARTURE. AT 200800H THE RANGER BN WAS TO PROCEED CROSS COUNTRY TO THE NORTHWEST. SIMULTANEOUSLY, THE INFANTRY BN WAS TO PROCEED NORTH ALONG THE ROAD TO THE BA LAI RIVER AND THEN PROCEED WEST. AT

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0900, THE AIRBORNE BN WAS TO CROSS THE MY THO RIVER AND SWEEP SOUTHWEST TO THE VICINITY OF PHU TUC POST. THE OTHER RANGER BN WAS TO CROSS THE MY THO RIVER AND PROCEED DIRECTLY SOUTHEAST TO PHU TUC AT 1200 HOURS. THE RIVER ASSAULT GROUP TRANSPORTED BOTH BATTALIONS ACROSS THE RIVER.

THE OPERATION PROCEEDED AS PLANNED AND THE ONLY VC CONTACT WAS MADE BY THE AIRBORNE BN. TWO SEPARATE ENGAGEMENTS BY THE AIRBORNE BN RESULTED IN NO FRIENDLY CASUALTIES. THEY REPORTED FIVE VC KIA AND ONE PW, PLUS THREE INDIVIDUAL WEAPONS, A FLARE PISTOL, AND 30 PACKS SEIZED. IN ADDITION THREE POPULAR FORCE SOLDIERS WHO HAD BEEN CAPTURED AT PHU TUC WERE LIBERATED.

THE OPERATION CONTINUED TO THE POINT WHERE THE INFANTRY BATTALION AND ONE COMPANY OF RANGERS PLUS THE RANGER BN HEADQUARTERS WERE ORDERED TO MARCH TO A ROAD JUNCTION TO ENTRUCK TO RETURN TO THEIR HOME STATIONS. THE SURVEILLANCE AIRCRAFT WERE RELEASED, AND THE UNITS BEGAN THE MARCH TO THE ROAD JUNCTION.

AT THIS TIME, WHILE ENROUTE TO THE ENTRUCKING POINT THE UNIT WAS AMBUSHED BY A VC FORCE. DETAILS OF THIS AMBUSH ARE DESCRIBED IN PARAGRAPH 3 BELOW.

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INITIAL RESULTS: VC LOSSES: 85 KIA, 60  
WIA, 91 MIA, 119 INDIV WPNS, 3 CREW SERVED WPNS, AND 4  
GRENADE LAUNCHERS. VC LOSSES ARE UNKNOWN AT THIS TIME.  
OPERATION THANG LONG 19, IN THE SAME GENERAL AREA, IS A  
FOLLOW UP OF THIS OPERATION IN ORDER TO PURSUE THE VC AMBUSH  
FORCE.

COMMENTS:

THE AMBUSH WAS WELL EXECUTED BY THE VC. IT IS  
CLEAR THAT THE AMBUSH WAS SETUP FOR THE ANTICIPATED MOVE OF  
A REACTION FORCE EARLY IN THE MORNING OF 20 AUGUST TO PHU  
TUC. UPON COMPLETION OF THE PURSUIT OPERATION LATE IN THE  
AFTERNOON, THE ARVN COMMANDER HAD AN OPTION OF SEVERAL  
ROUTES FOR THE RETURN MARCH OF THE 3D BN, 12TH REGT INF, AND  
THE 41ST RANGER BN. UNFORTUNATELY, HE SELECTED A ROUTE  
THROUGH THE VC POSITION. IF HE HAD CHOSEN ANOTHER ROUTE,  
THE AMBUSH MIGHT HAVE BEEN AVOIDED.

THE FAILURE OF THE ARVN UNITS TO CONDUCT A  
GROUND RECONNAISSANCE OF THE ROUTE IN ADVANCE WAS CRITICAL.  
AIR RECONNAISSANCE WOULD HAVE HAD NO VALUE IN THIS WOODED  
TERRAIN.

IT IS NOTEWORTHY THAT THE PREDOMINANTLY CATHOLIC  
INHABITANTS EITHER VOLUNTARILY OR THROUGH COERCION, DID NOT

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FURNISH ANY INFORMATION TO THE EN UNITS.

THE FACT THAT THE BN COMMANDER OF THE 3D BN, 12TH REGT, WAS WOUNDED EARLY IN THE ACTION UNDOUBTEDLY REDUCED THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE BN.

THE FACT THAT THE PURSUIT OPERATION WAS COMPLETED, AND THE ARVN UNITS WERE RETURNING TO THEIR BASE, AND WERE FATIGUED AFTER THE DAY'S OPERATION, MAY HAVE LED TO A LACK OF SECURITY. THIS, IF TRUE, IS AN INDICTMENT OF THE COMMANDERS, BECAUSE IT IS WELL KNOWN THAT THE DAYLIGHT HOURS FROM ABOUT 1630 ON ARE CRITICAL ONES FROM THE STANDPOINT OF VC AMBUSHES.

(2) THANG LONG 18, A SECTOR CONTROLLED SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATION, WAS INITIATED 140530H AUGUST IN BINH TUONG PROVINCE, APPROXIMATELY SIX KILOMETERS WEST OF MY THO (XT5045), AS A REACTION TO A VC ATTACK ON A GOVERNMENT POST.

AT 140210H AUG, AN ESTIMATED TWO VC COMPANIES ATTACKED BINH DUC POST (XT4443). IT WAS DEFENDED BY A POPULAR FORCE UNIT WITH A STRENGTH OF 63 MEN. WITHIN 20 MINUTES OF THE ATTACK, TWO ARMORED CARS AND TWO MACHINE GUN VEHICLES ARRIVED FROM MY THO TO REINFORCE THE POST. AS A RESULT OF THIS RAPID REACTION, THE VC BROKE OFF THEIR ATTACK ON THE POST WITHOUT INFLECTING ANY CASUALTIES. A VNAF

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FLARESHIP ARRIVED ON THE 100TH AT 0325H AND DROPPED 84 FLARES UNTIL 0500H WHEN THEY WERE RELEASED. THREE DEAD VC WERE LEFT BEHIND, WHILE AN ESTIMATED 30 MORE DEAD AND WOUNDED WERE REPORTED AS CARRIED AWAY. ALSO ONE VC PRISONER WAS CAPTURED AT THIS TIME. EVALUATION OF AVAILABLE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION INDICATED THAT ONE COMPANY OF THE 514TH LOCAL FORCE VC BN AND THE 207TH LOCAL FORCE VC CO HAD PARTICIPATED IN THE ATTACK.

AT 0530H THE RVN REACTION FORCE WAS COMPRISED OF TWO RANGER BATTALIONS, AN AIRBORNE BN, TWO INFANTRY BATTALIONS, AND AN ML13 TROOP. TWO PLATOONS OF 105 HOWITZERS PROVIDED ARTILLERY SUPPORT, AND A RIVER ASSAULT GROUP PATROLLED THE MY THO RIVER ON THE SOUTH FLANK AND THE KINH XANG CANAL ON THE WEST FLANK. ARMY AVIATION PROVIDED VISUAL SURVEILLANCE DURING THE OPERATION.

THE PLAN FOR THE REACTION FORCE WAS FOR ONE RANGER BN TO ATTACK TO THE NORTH FROM BINH DUC POST. SIMULTANEOUSLY, THE OTHER RANGER BN, ONE INFANTRY BN AND THE AIRBORNE BN WERE TO SWEEP SOUTH THRU THE AREA USING NATIONAL HIGHWAY 1, LOCATED APPROXIMATELY 5 KILOMETERS TO THE NORTH, AS A LINE OF DEPARTURE. THEIR MISSION WAS TO DESTROY THE VC AS THEY FLED FROM THE RANGER BN ATTACKING TO

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THE NORTH. ONE INFANTRY COMPANY WAS TO SCREEN THE EAST FLANK; THE MIL3 TROOP WAS TO SCREEN THE WEST FLANK, AND AN INFANTRY BN WAS TO BE IN A BLOCKING POSITION ON THE WEST BANK OF THE KINH XANG CANAL.

THE PLAN WAS EXECUTED BY ALL UNITS WITHOUT AN APPARENT MISTAKE. THE AIRBORNE BN CAPTURED 27 VC; THE INFANTRY BN CAPTURED 15 VC, AND THE RANGER BN THAT ATTACKED TO THE SOUTH CAPTURED 6 VC FOR A TOTAL OF 48 CONFIRMED VC PRISONERS. THE INFORMATION GAINED FROM ONE OF THESE PRISONERS HAS LED TO THE ARREST OF EIGHT VC AGENTS IN MY THO TO DATE.

DURING THE OPERATION US ARMY AVIATION EFFORTS WERE DIRECTED PRIMARILY TOWARDS VISUAL SURVEILLANCE MISSIONS. ARMED HELICOPTERS FROM THE 120TH AVIATION COMPANY RECEIVED INEFFECTIVE GROUND FIRE FROM FIVE SEPARATE LOCATIONS WHILE ON ESCORT MISSIONS DURING THE OPERATION AND DID RETURN THE FIRE. PILOTS ESTIMATED FORTY SIX VIET CONG KILLED, AND NINETEEN STRUCTURES AND FOUR BARRIERS DESTROYED, AS A RESULT OF ARMED HELICOPTER ORDNANCE EXPENDITURES.

THE TOTAL FINAL RESULTS OF THE OPERATION WERE:  
FRIENDLY: 1 WIA; VC: 14 KIA, 48 PW, 11 SUSPECTS, AND A QUANTITY OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO INCLUDE MINES, INDIVIDUAL

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WEAPONS, AMMUNITION, AND DOCUMENTS. THE OPERATION  
TERMINATED AT 161700H AUG.

ANALYSIS OF THIS OPERATION REVEALS A WELL  
PLANNED MANEUVER, EXECUTED WITH AGGRESSIVENESS IN A HIGHLY  
PROFESSIONAL MANNER. THE MOST SIGNIFICANT ASPECT OF THE  
OPERATION WAS THE FACT THAT 73 CASUALTIES WERE INFLICTED ON  
THE VC, WHILE ARVN SUFFERED ONLY ONE MAN WOUNDED. THIS IS  
INDICATIVE OF THOROUGH PLANNING AND THE COMPETENCE OF THE  
IMPLEMENTING FORCES. THE EXCELLENT COORDINATION BETWEEN THE  
UNITS IN THE MANEUVER PHASE OF THE OPERATION RESULTED IN A  
VERY SUCCESSFUL OPERATION.

(3) DAN CHIEN 1 WAS A LONG TERM SECURING CAMPAIGN  
WHICH EXTENDED OVER THE EASTERN HALF OF QUANG TIN PROVINCE.  
IT WAS INITIATED ON 12 FEBRUARY 1964, UNDER CONTROL OF THE  
2D DIV IN I CTZ. THE OBJECTIVE OF THE CAMPAIGN WAS TO  
CONSOLIDATE THE COASTAL PLAIN AREA AND TO EXTEND GOVERNMENT  
CONTROL WESTWARD THROUGH THE FOOTHILLS TO THE TRANH RIVER,  
WITH EMPHASIS ON SECURING THE MORE POPULATED AREAS. THIS  
CAMPAIGN WAS DESCRIBED PREVIOUSLY IN THE MILREP FOR THE  
PERIOD OF 181601Z TO 251600Z APRIL 64. THIS COVERAGE  
WILL INCLUDE A REVIEW OF THE CAMPAIGN AND THE RESULTS  
ATTAINED.

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IN THE AREA INCLUDED A REGIMENT  
HEADQUARTERS WITH SUPPORT COMPANIES AND TWO BATTALIONS,  
WITH AN OVERALL STRENGTH ESTIMATED AT 1100. IN ADDITION,  
THE CHU HANG MAIN FORCE BATTALION, STRENGTH UNKNOWN,  
WAS REPORTED TO BE IN THE AREA. LOCAL VC FORCES INCLUDED  
THREE COMPANIES AND ONE PLATOON WITH A TOTAL STRENGTH OF  
240. ONE VC CHARACTERISTIC WAS NOTED AS THE CAMPAIGN  
PROGRESSED. THIS WAS THAT THE VC MOVED FROM THE POPULATED  
COASTAL PLAIN TO THE MOUNTAINOUS REGION OF THE QUANG TIN -  
QUANG NGAI BORDER. AS THE VC WITHDREW TO THE SOUTH, THEIR  
INFRASTRUCTURE IN THE VILLAGES AND MARKETS FELT THE LOSS  
OF SUPPORT, AND ARE NOW CONSIDERED TO BE PARTIALLY  
NEUTRALIZED.

TWO BATTLE GROUPS CONSTITUTED THE FRIENDLY  
FORCES. EACH OF THESE BATTLE GROUPS WAS BUILT AROUND AN  
INFANTRY REGT WITH SUPPORTING TROOPS, AND EACH HAD AN  
ARTILLERY BATTERY IN SUPPORT. VNAF PROVIDED THE COMBAT AIR  
SUPPORT, WITH INTERDICTION MISSIONS PREDOMINANT. THE US  
MARINE CORPS AND VNAF HELICOPTER SQUADRONS SUPPORTED THE  
CAMPAIGN WITH AIR LANDED ASSAULTS, AND WITH RESUPPLY AND  
MEDICAL EVACUATION MISSIONS. THE PRINCIPAL CONTRIBUTION  
OF ARMY AVIATION WAS ARMED ESCORT SUPPORT BY HH-1B

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**HELICOPTERS**

THE AREA OF QUANG TIN PROVINCE BETWEEN THE COASTAL FLAIN AND THE TRANH RIVER WAS THE SCENE OF MOST OF THE MILITARY ACTIVITY. THE TROOP UNITS EMPLOYED AREA SATURATION TECHNIQUES IN A HIGHLY EFFECTIVE MANEUVER. IN ADDITION TO MILITARY OPERATIONS, JOINT VIETNAMESE-US TEAMS FROM PROVINCE AND DIVISION SURVEYED THE HAMLETS IN THE CAMPAIGN AREA IN ORDER TO DETERMINE THE SOCIOLOGICAL, ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, AND MILITARY STATUS OF EACH HAMLET WITH EMPHASIS ON THEIR EXISTING DEFENSIVE MEASURES. RESETTLEMENT PROJECTS ARE UNDERWAY FOR PEOPLE RECOVERED FROM VC CONTROL. THE CAMPAIGN TERMINATED ON 18 AUGUST.

LOSSES: 106 KIA, 131 WIA, 5 MIA, 3 DESERTERS, 38 INDIVIDUAL WFNs, 2 AN/PRC-10 RADIOS, 2 BINOCULARS, AND 1 COMPASS. VC LOSSES: 316 KIA, 24 PW, 15 SUSPECTS, 143 INDIVIDUAL WFNs, 17 GRENADES, 8 TNT BLOCKS, 47 FIELD PACKS, 1 RADIO, AND 1 COMPASS. A QUANTITY OF MISCELLANEOUS EQUIPMENT, EXPLOSIVES, AND DOCUMENTS WERE ALSO SEIZED BY THE GOVERNMENT FORCES.

OTHER ACCOMPLISHMENTS BY THE GVN INCLUDED DISTRIBUTION OF LEAFLETS, PSYWAR BROADCASTS, ORIENTATION

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VISITS TO FAMILIES, AND MEDICAL ADVICE IN THE CIVIC ACTION  
SPHERE.

THE DAN CHIEN CAMPAIGN APPEARS TO HAVE  
BEEN A SUCCESS. THE 2D DIVISION UNITS WITHIN THE CAMPAIGN  
WELL GAINED AND MAINTAINED THE INITIATIVE OVER THE VC BY  
EMPLOYING AREA SATURATION TECHNIQUES. MILITARILY, THE  
CAMPAIGN DEMONSTRATED THAT THE VC ARE UNABLE TO COPE WITH  
OPERATIONS OF EXTENDED DURATION WHEN KENNEDYED BY CONSTANT  
PATROLLING, BECAUSE SUCH TACTICS INHIBIT THEIR MOVEMENT AND  
RESUPPLY. MAJOR PROBLEMS REMAIN, HOWEVER. SO FAR THE AREA  
HAS BEEN UNABLE TO GENERATE A SIGNIFICANT ECONOMIC SURPLUS.  
A POTENTIAL EXISTS FOR PRODUCING AND MARKETING FRUITS,  
COCONUTS, AND TEA; BUT LIMITED TRANSPORTATION MEANS HAVE  
TENDED TO INHIBIT DEVELOPMENT OF THESE CROPS. WHILE  
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS AND CIVIC ACTION PROJECTS WERE  
UNDERTAKEN, THE OVERALL OPERATION WOULD HAVE BENEFITED FROM  
AN INCREASED EMPHASIS IN THESE FIELDS.

(4) CAMPAIGN DAN CHIEN 2 WAS CONDUCTED TO THE  
NORTH OF DAN CHIEN 1, DESCRIBED ABOVE. THE AREA OF  
OPERATIONS WAS NORTH OF AND CONTIGUOUS TO DAN CHIEN 1, AND  
COVERED THE EASTERN HALF OF QUANG NAM PROVINCE. FEB 24

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DIVISION ALSO CONTROLLED THE CAMPAIGN WHICH WAS THE SAME TYPE OF OPERATION, SECURING, AND WHICH COMMENCED AT THE SAME TIME, 12 FEBRUARY 1964.

AT THE BEGINNING OF THE CAMPAIGN THERE WERE REPORTEDLY 850 VC IN THE AREA. THEIR ORGANIZATION CONSISTED OF ONE MAIN FORCE REGIMENTAL HEADQUARTERS, ONE MAIN FORCE BATTALION, AND SIX LOCAL FORCE COMPANIES. WHEN THE CAMPAIGN WAS TERMINATED, THE VC HAD GAINED IN OVERALL STRENGTH, REPORTEDLY AIDED BY INFILTRATION, DESPITE THE GOVERNMENT INFLECTED CASUALTIES. HOWEVER, THE VC FORCES HAD WITHDRAWN FARTHER INLAND INTO THE MOUNTAINOUS AREAS.

FRIENDLY TROOP UNITS AT THE BEGINNING OF THE CAMPAIGN CONSISTED OF THE 2<sup>ND</sup> BN, 5TH REGT; A RANGER BN, FIVE COMPOSITE RF AND PF COMPANIES, AND A SUPPORTING PLATOON OF 105 HOWITZERS. AS THE CAMPAIGN PROGRESSED, THE RANGER BN WAS WITHDRAWN, AND THE OTHER TWO BATTALIONS OF THE 5TH REGT WERE ADDED TO THE TROOP LIST. THE RVN UNITS OPERATED INITIALLY IN THE SOUTHEASTERN PART OF QUANG NAM, AND THEN LATER EXTENDED THEIR CONTROL NORTHWARD TO THE BORDER OF THUA THIEN PROVINCE. AREA SATURATION TECHNIQUES WERE SUCCESSFULLY APPLIED THROUGHOUT THE OPERATION. VNAF PROVIDED THE COMBAT AIR SUPPORT, WITH INTERDICTION MISSIONS PREDOMINANT. US

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ARMY, AND US MARINE CORPS HELICOPTER EFFORTS DURING THE INITIAL STAGES WERE DIRECTED PRIMARILY TOWARD TROOP LIFTS AND ESCORT HELICOPTER MISSIONS. AS THE OPERATION PROGRESSED, THE HELICOPTER ROLE CHANGED TO AIRLANDED RESUPPLY AND COMMAND AND LIAISON MISSIONS. THE OPERATION TERMINATED ON 18 AUGUST 1964.

FINAL MILITARY RESULTS: FRIENDLY LOSSES:

70 KIA, 71 MIA, 15 MIA, AND 34 INDIVIDUAL WPNs. VC LOSSES: 121 KIA, 16 PW, 73 INDIVIDUAL WPNs, 3 RADIOS, AND 1 TAA3 TELEPHONE. A QUANTITY OF MISCELLANEOUS EQUIPMENT, MINES, EXPLOSIVES, AND SOME DOCUMENTS WERE SEIZED. NINE LIAISON POSTS, 34 UNDERGROUND HIDEOUTS, 20 HECTARES OF CROPS, 2 TONS OF PADDY, 12 SPIKE-TRAPS, AND 2 MINES WERE DESTROYED. OTHER ADDITIONAL RESULTS INCLUDED 408 HAMLETS REPORTED AS CONSTRUCTED AND 24 UNDER CONSTRUCTION, 34 HAMLET COUNCILS AND 16 VILLAGE COUNCILS ELECTED, AND DISTRIBUTION OF OVER 20,000 LEAFLETS.

DAN CHIEM 2 COMPANIES OPERATED...

SUCCESS, ALTHOUGH ON A SOMEWHAT LESSEER SCALE THAN DAN CHIEM 1, BECAUSE THE VC STRENGTH IN THE AREA OF OPERATIONS WAS LESS AND THE GOVERNMENT TROOP UNITS FEWER THAN IN DAN CHIEM 1. HOWEVER, 2D DIV, BY APPLYING ITS AREA SATURATION

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TECHNIQUES FORCED THE VC TO REMAIN IN THE MOUNTAINOUS AREAS. THE VC REMAINED IN THE MOUNTAINS UNTIL THE AREA OF OPERATIONS HAVE BEEN FORCED UNDERGROUND BY THE GVN OPERATIONS. MAJOR PROBLEM AREAS PERSIST. THERE ARE TOO MANY PEOPLE FOR THE GOOD LAND AVAILABLE; POVERTY AND APATHY CONTINUE. THE MAIN ECONOMIC ACTIVITY IS AGRICULTURE, BUT THE PEOPLE DO NOT GROW ENOUGH TO SUPPORT THEMSELVES. RICE MUST BE IMPORTED. US AID PROGRAMS ARE HELPING, BUT ARE NOT A COMPLETE SOLUTION. FOLLOW-UP CIVIC ACTION AND PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS ARE IN PROGRESS, BUT NEED MORE EMPHASIS AND GUIDANCE IF THEY ARE TO SUCCEED.

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D. SUMMARY OF GROUND OPERATIONS (STATISTICS IN ANNEX A)

(1) LARGE AND SMALL UNIT OPERATIONS:

(A) ARVN GROUND OPERATIONS EMPLOYING FORCES OF THREE RIFLE COMPANIES OR LARGER INCREASED FROM LAST WEEK'S FIGURE OF 56 TO 68. OF THESE OPERATIONS, 38 RESULTED IN ONE OR MORE VC CONTACTS. I CORPS HAD ELEVEN CONTACTS, IV CORPS AND TIEN GIANG EACH HAD EIGHT, III CORPS HAD SIX, AND II CORPS HAD FIVE.

(B) SMALL UNIT OPERATIONS INCREASED FROM 13781 TO 14244; CONTACTS INCREASED FROM 62 TO 66.

(2) NIGHT OPERATIONS:

(A) BATTALION SIZE OR LARGER OPERATIONS INITIATED PRIOR TO DAYLIGHT INCREASED FROM 20 TO 26.

(B) THE NUMBER OF SMALL UNIT ACTIONS WITH CONTACT AT NIGHT DECREASED FROM 26 TO 25.

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C. SUMMARY OF AIR OPERATIONS:

(1) **WNAF:** THERE WAS A MODERATE INCREASE IN AIR ACTIVITY THIS WEEK OCCASIONED BY A RISE IN TRAINING AND LOGISTICS SORTIES WHILE THE REMAINING AIR ACTIVITIES KEPT PACE WITH LAST WEEK'S ACCOMPLISHMENTS. COMBAT AIR STRIKES WERE EVENLY DIVIDED BETWEEN CLOSE AIR SUPPORT SORTIES AND ATTACKS AGAINST INTERDICTION TARGETS. WHILE SUPPORTING A SERIES OF OPERATIONS IN IV CTZ, WNAF FIGHTERS FLEW FIFTY-SIX CLOSE AIR SUPPORT SORTIES THERE, AND THE BALANCE OF THEIR ATTACKS WERE PRIMARILY AGAINST INTERDICTION TARGETS IN THE OTHER CTZ'S. WNAF FIGHTERS WERE MORE ACTIVE THIS WEEK IN SUPPORTING POSTS AND HAMLETS UNDER VC NIGHT ATTACK, DUE TO AN INCREASED REQUIREMENT TO SUPPORT THESE INSTALLATIONS. THE NUMBER OF FLARESHIPS REQUIRED WAS SLIGHTLY REDUCED FROM LAST WEEK'S LEVEL DUE TO THE USAF'S PROVIDING INCREASED SUPPORT IN THIS AREA. WNAF CH-34 PARTICIPATED IN GROUND OPERATIONS THIS WEEK WITH THE MOST SIGNIFICANT SUPPORT PROVIDED TO SPECIAL FORCES OPERATIONS IN TAY NINH PROVINCE AND DAN CHI 57 IN IV CTZ. RC-47 AIRCRAFT OPERATED IN III AND IV CORPS AREAS IN SATISFYING PHOTO RECONNAISSANCE REQUIREMENTS. NO PSYWAR SORTIES WERE FLOWN THIS WEEK. THE AIR LOGISTICS OPERATIONS WERE CONFINED TO ~~THE~~ LANDED RESUPPLY MISSIONS OF A ROUTINE NATURE CONDUCTED AT A PACE

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SLIGHTLY LARGER THAN LAST WEEK WITH CORRESPONDING INCREASES IN PASSENGERS TRANSPORTED AND CARGO HAULED.

(2) USAF: IN KEEPING WITH THE VNAF PATTERN OF ACTIVITY THIS WEEK, THERE WAS AN INCREASE IN USAF AIR ACTIVITY, PRIMARILY AS A RESULT OF AN INCREASE IN TRAINING SORTIES WHILE OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY GENERALLY KEPT PACE WITH LAST WEEK'S LEVELS. COMBAT AIR STRIKES WERE CONDUCTED THROUGHOUT THE III AND IV CTZ AND THE TIEN GIANG TAC/AREA, WITH THE BULK OF THE CLOSE AIR SUPPORT STRIKES CONDUCTED IN SUPPORT OF GROUND OPERATIONS IN THE IV CTZ. LOGISTICS OPERATIONS INCLUDED BOTH AIR LANDED RESUPPLY SORTIES AND THE AIRDROPPING OF SUPPLIES, AND WERE CONDUCTED AT A SLIGHTLY REDUCED SCALE, WITH INCREASES NOTED IN THE PASSENGERS TRANSPORTED, WHILE CARGO HAULED DECLINED. THREE C-123 AIRCRAFT RECEIVED BATTLE DAMAGE THIS WEEK WHILE ON AIRLANDED RESUPPLY MISSIONS; ONE A119 PASSENGER WAS SLIGHTLY WOUNDED. USAF FIGHTERS AND FLARESHIPS WERE ACTIVE IN AIDING THE VNAF IN DEFENDING POSTS AND HAMLETS UNDER VC NIGHT ATTACK. THE USAF FIGHTER FORCE WAS BUILTUP TO A TOTAL OF 30 A-1E AIRCRAFT DURING THIS PERIOD. WEATHER IMPEDED PHOTO RECON OPERATIONS THIS WEEK. MORE THAN HALF THE TARGETS ASSIGNED WERE COVERED BY CLOUDS FORCING REACCOMPLISHMENT OF THESE

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MISSIONS. ~~REDACTED~~ ACHIEVED EXCELLENT RESULTS THIS WEEK SUCCESSFULLY ACCOMPLISHING COMPLETE COVERAGE OF 14 OF THE 16 TARGETS ASSIGNED. THIS EFFORT WAS DIRECTED PRIMARILY AGAINST TARGETS IN WAR ZONE C. PHOTO FLASH BOMBS WERE EMPLOYED AGAIN THIS WEEK AGAINST VC CONCENTRATIONS IN BINH DINH PROVINCE.

(3) ARMY AVIATION:

(A) AVIATION ACTIVITY IN THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM INCREASED IN TASKS AND HOURS FLOWN. THIS RESULTED FROM A HIGHER TEMPO OF ACTIVITY IN THE IV CORPS TACTICAL ZONE. ACTIVITY IN I CORPS, II CORPS, III CORPS, AND THE TIEN GIANG TACTICAL AREA REMAINED STABLE IN RELATION TO THE PREVIOUS WEEK. EFFECTIVE 15 AUGUST, THE UTT COMPANY WAS REDESIGNATED THE 68TH AIRMOBILE COMPANY (AIRMOBILE LIGHT) (PROV).

(B) ON THE 16TH OF AUGUST, AN AIRMOBILE FORCE OF TWENTY-SIX HELICOPTERS FROM THE DELTA AVIATION BATTALION STAGED FROM VI THANH TO A LANDING ZONE IN SOUTHERN PHONG DINH PROVINCE. THREE HUNDRED AND SIXTY-EIGHT TROOPS OF THE 42D RANGER BATTALION WERE TRANSPORTED IN THREE LIFTS IN SUPPORT OF OPERATION DAN CHI 455. ENEMY GROUND FIRE WAS ENCOUNTERED WHICH RESULTED IN ONE ARMED UH-1B HELICOPTER

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BEING HIT. THE CREWS RETURNED FIRE AND REPORTED THREE VIET CONG KILLED IN THE ENCOUNTER.

(C) ON 17 AUGUST, AN AIRMOBILE FORCE OF 25 HELICOPTERS FROM THE DELTA AVIATION BATTALION LIFTED 356 ARVN TROOPS OF THE 14TH RANGER BATTALION IN SUPPORT OF OPERATION DAN CHI 455. THE FORCE STAGED FROM VI THANH AND MOVED IN THREE LIFTS TO A LANDING ZONE IN EASTERN CHUONG THON PROVINCE. DURING THIS ACTION, THREE HELICOPTERS SUSTAINED HITS FROM GROUND FIRE. FIRE WAS RETURNED BY THE CREWS OF THE ARMED HELICOPTERS, AND PILOTS ESTIMATED NINE VIET CONG KILLED AS A RESULT OF THEIR ORDNANCE EXPENDITURES.

(D) AGAIN ON 18 AUGUST, 15 HELICOPTERS FROM THE DELTA AVIATION COMPANY, STAGED FROM CAO LANH TO TRANSPORT 200 TROOPS OF THE 15TH INF REGIMENT. THE TROOPS WERE LIFTED INTO TWO LANDING ZONES EIGHT KILOMETERS NORTHWEST OF THE STAGING AREA, WHICH HAD BEEN MARKED FOR THEM BY AN OBSERVATION AIRPLANE. TWO HELICOPTERS WERE HIT BY GROUND FIRE FROM THE LANDING ZONES. CREWS RETURNED THE FIRE AND ESTIMATED TWELVE KILLED.

(E) ON THE SAME DAY, IN I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE, HELICOPTERS FROM THE HMM 162 SQUADRON AND THE VNAF 213TH SQUADRON STAGED FROM HUE IN JOINT-SUPPORT OF THE 3RD INF

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REGIMENT. THE AIRMOBILE FORCE, ESCORTED BY ARMED HELICOPTERS FROM THE 52D AIRLIFT PLATOON, TRANSPORTED 64 ARVN TROOPS, COMMITTED AS A BLOCKING FORCE TO SUPPORT ELEMENTS OF THE 3RD INF REGIMENT, WHICH HAD BEEN ATTACKED BY A GROUND FORCE EIGHT KILOMETERS WEST OF HUE. THE MOVE WAS ACCOMPLISHED IN ONE LIFT WITHOUT INCIDENT.

(F) ALSO ON 18 AUGUST, HELICOPTERS OF THE 52D AVIATION BATTALION LIFTED 122 ARVN TROOPS OF THE 22D DIVISION FROM CHEO REO TO A LANDING ZONE 30 KILOMETERS SOUTH OF A SEARCH AND DESTROY MISSION.

(G) ON 19 AUGUST, ARMED HELICOPTERS OF THE 68TH AIRMOBILE COMPANY SUPPORTED THE 5TH DIVISION WITH SURVEILLANCE MISSIONS IN TAY NINH PROVINCE. GROUND FIRE WAS RECEIVED IN THE OPERATIONAL AREA AND MUNITIONS EXPENDED IN RESPONSE TO THE FIRE ACCOUNTED FOR FOUR ENEMY STRUCTURES DESTROYED.

(H) NINE HELICOPTERS FROM THE 126TH AVIATION COMPANY, SUPPORTED THE 7TH DIVISION BY TRANSPORTING 356 TROOPS IN SEVEN LIFTS FROM TAN AN TO THREE LANDING ZONES IN WESTERN LONG AN PROVINCE. THE FLIGHT ENCOUNTERED INEFFECTIVE GROUND FIRE ENROUTE, AND THEIR ORDNANCE

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OPERATIONS RESULTED IN FIVE VIET CONG KILLED AND SIX SAMPANS DESTROYED.

(I) ON 20 AUGUST, A HELICOPTER OF THE 120TH AVIATION COMPANY, SUPPORTING THE 7TH DIVISION WITH VISUAL SURVEILLANCE MISSIONS, WAS FORCED TO LAND AS A RESULT OF HOSTILE GROUND FIRE. ESCORT HELICOPTERS RETURNED THE FIRE, AND PILOTS ESTIMATED TWENTY FIVE VIET CONG KILLED AND TWELVE STRUCTURES AND ONE SAMPAN DESTROYED.

(J) ON 22 AUGUST 1964, THE DELTA AVIATION BATTALION SUPPORTED OPERATION DAN CHI 57 IN THE IV CORPS AREA. ELEMENTS OF THE 42D AND 44TH RANGER BATTALIONS WERE LIFTED INTO TWO LANDING ZONES 15 MILES NORTHWEST OF SOC TRANG. FOUR LIFTS WERE EXECUTED COMMENCING AT 1330 AND TERMINATING AT 1915 HOURS. GROUND FIRE WAS RECEIVED FROM THE VICINITY OF THE LANDING ZONE; ONE UH-1B HELICOPTER SUSTAINED ELEVEN HITS WITH ONE US BEING WOUNDED. CREWS RETURNED THE FIRE AND REPORTED THIRTY VIET CONG KILLED.

(4) USMC:

(A) A MODERATE DECREASE IN FIXED WING ACTIVITY CAUSED A DECREASE IN OVERALL MARINE CORPS AVIATION ACTIVITY IN THE I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE.

(B) ON THE 20TH OF AUGUST, ONE MARINE CORPS

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HELICOPTER CREW CHIEF SUSTAINED MINOR INJURIES FROM HOSTILE  
GROUND FIRE. THE INCIDENT OCCURRED IN QUANG NAM PROVINCE  
DURING THE OFF-LOADING PHASE OF AN AIRLANDED RESUPPLY  
MISSION IN SUPPORT OF THE 11TH RANGER BATTALION.

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D. SUMMARY OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

(1) GENERAL:

THE TEMPO OF ACTIVITY WITHIN THE RUNG SAT SPECIAL AREA REMAINED UNCHANGED THIS WEEK. A DELAYED REPORT FROM 14 AUGUST INDICATES THAT A NUMBER OF VC TROOPS BEGAN CONCENTRATING NEAR LONG THANH VILLAGE AT 142000H AUG. THESE TROOPS, HAVING APPARENTLY BEEN POSITIONED BY MOTORIZED SAMPANS AND DISSEMBARKED ALONG THE HA THANH CANAL, SURROUNDED THE VILLAGE AND AT 150200H AUG COMMENCED AN ATTACK. PF UNITS AND VNM RIVERCRAFT WERE DISPATCHED IMMEDIATELY TO REINFORCE FRIENDLY FORCES WITHIN THE VILLAGE. FIRE FROM RIVERCRAFT AND THE PF UNITS FORCED A VC WITHDRAWAL AT 0330H. FRIENDLY FORCES SUFFERED NO PERSONNEL LOSSES DURING THE 1 1/2 HOUR ENCOUNTER; ALTHOUGH THE VC MANAGED TO DESTROY SOME FORTY METERS OF BARBED WIRE FENCING SURROUNDING THE VILLAGE. AFTER THE VC HAD WITHDRAWN FROM LONG THANH VILLAGE, LEAVING NO CASUALTIES, REPORTS OF A SUSPECTED REGROUPING OF THE UNIT NORTH OF THE VILLAGE PROMPTED THE ASSIGNMENT OF VNM UNITS FOR BOMBARDMENT WITHIN THE SUSPECTED AREAS. AGAIN THE VC WERE FORCED TO WITHDRAW AS THE HEAVY SHORE BOMBARDMENT PROGRESSED.

ON THE NIGHT OF 18/19 AUGUST, A UTILITY

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LANDING CRAFT (LCU 535) WAS FIRED ON FROM THE SHORE BY AN UNKNOWN NUMBER OF VC AS IT PATROLLED NEAR THE RACH RAO CANAL IN THE HUNG SAT SPECIAL AREA. VC FIRE CEASED WHEN THE LCU RETURNED WITH 20MM GARRON AND 30 CAL MG FIRE. NO FRIENDLY CASUALTIES WERE REPORTED, AND VC LOSSES REMAIN UNKNOWN.

IN VINH BINH PROVINCE, PROGMEN LOCATED AN M113 THAT HAD SUNK ON THE CO CHIEU RIVER NEAR RACH BO SI. THE PROGMEN WERE ABLE TO RECOVER ONE 30 CAL MG, ONE 50 CAL MG, FIVE M1 RIFLES, ONE CARBINE, ONE PRC-10, AND A QUANTITY OF AMMO FROM THE VEHICLE. LCU 537 WAS DISPATCHED TO THE SCENE TO ATTEMPT SALVAGE OPERATIONS ON THE VEHICLE ITSELF.

(2) SEA FORCE:

VIN SEA FORCE EMPLOYMENT DECREASED THIS WEEK AS UNITS OF THE FORCE CONTINUED THEIR MISSIONS OF PATROL AND LOGISTICAL SUPPORT. NO PARTICIPATION ON COMBAT OPERATIONS WAS REPORTED; HOWEVER, ONE SHORE BOMBARDMENT MISSION WAS LAUNCHED AGAINST VC CONCENTRATIONS IN CA MAU. RESULTS OF THE BOMBARDMENT ARE UNKNOWN.

AT 2100Z ON 16 AUGUST, A LANDING SHIP SUPPORT, LARGE (LSSL 225), OPERATING ON THE BASSAC RIVER IN PHONG DINH PROVINCE APPREHENDED ONE BOAT AND ONE PERSON OPERATING

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DURING CURFEW HOURS. A SEARCH OF THE CRAFT REVEALED SMALL QUANTITIES OF MEDICAL SUPPLIES. BOTH THE BOAT AND PERSON WERE TURNED OVER TO THE SECTOR FOR INVESTIGATION.

**(3) RIVER FORCE:**

UNITS OF THE RIVER FORCE CONTINUED THEIR PATROL MISSIONS THIS WEEK AND WERE EMPLOYED IN THEIR PRIMARY MISSIONS OF COMBAT SUPPORT IN THESE SECTOR OPERATIONS, QUAN LONG, THANG LONG 21, AND BEE HAN LONG. ALTHOUGH EMPLOYMENT OF UNITS ON A DAILY BASIS WAS RELATIVELY HIGH, THE NUMBER OF UNITS ACTUALLY UTILIZED FOR COMBAT OPERATIONS DECREASED FROM LAST WEEK.

EVENTS OF SIGNIFICANCE WERE SPARSE THIS WEEK AND REFERRED TO THE HUNG SAT SPECIAL AREA REPORTED IN PARAGRAPH 2D (1) ABOVE.

**(4) COASTAL FORCE:**

UNITS OF THE FORCE CONTINUED THEIR PRIMARY MISSIONS OF COASTAL SURVEILLANCE DURING THE WEEK. NO PARTICIPATION IN OPERATIONS WAS RECORDED.

ON THE NIGHT OF 17/18 AUGUST, AN UNKNOWN NUMBER OF VC ATTACKED SONG ONG DOC DISTRICT TOWN IN AN XUYEN PROVINCE. PF UNITS AND JUNK DIVISION PERSONNEL COUNTERED THE ATTACK AND SUCCEEDED IN DRIVING THE VC OFF.

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FOUR FRIENDLY PERSONNEL, ONE JUNKMAN AND THREE PF SOLDIERS, WERE WOUNDED BY VC FIRE, BUT CASUALTIES IMPLICATED ON THE VC TOTALLED FIVE KILLED.

DURING THE MORNING OF 18 AUGUST, TWO COMMAND JUNKS OF THE 31ST JUNK DIVISION, ENGAGED IN SURVEILLANCE MISSIONS OFF THE COAST OF XOM TRAM IN BINH TRUAN PROVINCE, ENGAGED AN UNKNOWN NUMBER OF VC IN FISHING BOATS. THE JUNKMEN AND THE VC EXCHANGED FIRE FOR ABOUT 30 MINUTES BEFORE THE VC MANAGED TO ESCAPE. NO CASUALTIES WERE SUSTAINED BY FRIENDLY FORCES. TWO VC WERE WOUNDED BUT CARRIED AWAY, AND ONE FISHING BOAT WITH APPROXIMATELY 100 METERS OF NET WAS SEIZED.

E. CIDG:

CAMPS IN THE I CTZ REPORTED NO CONTACTS AS A RESULT OF NORMAL PATROLLING. II AND III CTZ HAD NO SIGNIFICANT OPERATIONS. HOWEVER, IN IV CTZ, OPERATIONS RESULTED IN SIX CONTACTS WITH THE VC BETWEEN THE 16TH AND 18TH OF AUGUST. THESE CONTACTS OCCURRED IN THE VICINITY OF THE CAMBODIAN BORDER. EVALUATION OF THE NUMBER OF CONTACTS ALONG THE CAMBODIAN BORDER INDICATES THAT AGGRESSIVE OPERATIONS BY SPECIAL FORCES ARE RESTRICTING VC MOVEMENTS IN THE WESTERN PART OF THE

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IV CORPS

SIGNIFICANT CIGS SPONSORED PSYWAR ACTIVITY IN I CORPS CONSISTED OF DISTRIBUTION OF 50,000 LEAFLETS IN THE DATU LANGUAGE AROUND A BO AND A HAUM BY DETACHMENT B-410 PERSONNEL; THE THEME WAS "COME TO A BO".

SIGNIFICANT CA ACTIVITY REPORTED FROM II CORPS FOR THE REPORTING PERIOD WAS THE TREATMENT OF 1,338 PATIENTS.

PSYWAR ACTIVITIES IN IV CORPS CONSISTED PRIMARILY OF DISTRIBUTION OF 15,000 LEAFLETS (VIETNAMESE ON ONE SIDE AND CAMBODIAN ON THE OTHER) ON VC RETURNEES, AROUND BINH BINH; AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF 12,000 LEAFLETS AROUND CAMP DON PHUOC, CONCERNING A CHILD WHO WAS INJURED BY A VC MINE.

F. CHANGES IN FRIENDLY FORCES: LT COL DIEP REPLACED LT COL PHAM AS PROVINCE CHIEF OF CHUONG TIEN PROVINCE EFFECTIVE 17 AUGUST.

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3. (S) [REDACTED]

A. [REDACTED]

(1) [REDACTED] WITH SOME RELATED ACTIVITY DURING THE WEEK SHOWED A SLIGHT RISE IN THE TOTAL NUMBER OF INCIDENTS FROM THAT OF THE WEEK BEFORE. HOWEVER, WHILE ACTS OF TERRORISM CONTINUED TO INCREASE, THERE WAS A FURTHER DECLINE IN THE NUMBER OF SMALL SCALE ATTACKS AND AMBUSHES. HARASSMENTS, HARASSING FIRES, KIDNAPPINGS AND PROPAGANDA INCIDENTS WERE NUMEROUS AND WIDESPREAD. THERE WERE THREE INCIDENTS AGAINST THE RAILROAD, BUT ACTS OF SABOTAGE IN GENERAL WERE FEWER THAN DURING THE PRECEDING WEEK. THE TWO MOST SIGNIFICANT VC ACTIONS OF THE WEEK OCCURRED IN PHONG BINH AND IN KIEN HOA AND CAUSED HEAVY FRIENDLY CASUALTIES INCLUDING THE DEATH OF FOUR US ADVISORS. IN BOTH INSTANCES, ATTACKS ON POSTS WERE USED BY THE VC TO DRAW FRIENDLY REACTION FORCES INTO THE AREA, WHICH WERE THEN ENGAGED OR AMBUSHED BY VC ELEMENTS IN TWO-COMPANY TO BATTALION STRENGTH.

(2) I CORPS: VC ACTIVITY WITHIN THE CTZ IN GENERAL REMAINED AT THE SAME RELATIVELY LOW LEVEL AS DURING THE PRECEDING WEEK. ONLY QUANG TRI PROVINCE REPORTED A SLIGHT INCREASE IN VC TERRORISM. INCLUDED IN THESE ACTS WERE THE MURDER OF A VILLAGE CHIEF AND THE MINING OF A CIVILIAN BUS WHICH KILLED TWO PASSENGERS. HIGHWAY 9 WAS OPEN FOR TRAFFIC FROM THE JUNCTION WITH HIGHWAY 7 (YD 010456), A DISTANCE OF ABOUT 40

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KILOMETERS. TWO BRIDGES WERE STILL OUT WEST OF THIS POINT BUT BYPASSES SHOULD BE COMPLETED WITHIN THE COMING WEEK. THERE WERE TWO ACTS OF SABOTAGE, ONE AGAINST THE RAILROAD IN QUANG BINH AND ANOTHER AGAINST A BRIDGE IN THUA THIEN. IN THUA THIEN ON 21 AUGUST, A US ADVISOR WAS KILLED BY VC SNIPER FIRE.

(3) II CORPS: VC ACTIVITY IN THIS CTZ SHOWED NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGE FROM THE PRECEDING WEEK. THE HIGHEST NUMBER OF INCIDENTS, MOSTLY ACTS OF TERRORISM AGAINST THE POPULATION SUCH AS HARASSMENTS AND HARASSING FIRES AGAINST NEW RURAL LIFE HAMLETS, AND KIDNAPPINGS AGAIN OCCURRED IN BINH DINH AND PHU YEN PROVINCES. CORPSWIDE, THERE WERE TWO SMALL SCALE ATTACKS AND TWO AMBUSHES. PROPAGANDA INCIDENTS AND ACTS OF SABOTAGE WERE FEWER THAN THE WEEK BEFORE. TWO RAIL SABOTAGE INCIDENTS WERE REPORTED FROM QUANG NGAI PROVINCE. THROUGHOUT THE CTZ, DESPITE CONSIDERABLE MAIN FORCE STRENGTH KNOWN TO EXIST IN SEVERAL PROVINCES, VC ACTIVITY APPEARED TO BE CARRIED OUT BY ELEMENTS OF LESS THAN COMPANY SIZE.

(4) III CORPS: NO BATTALION OR COMPANY SIZE ACTIONS WERE REPORTED DURING THE WEEK. THREE SMALL SCALE ATTACKS (IN ONE CASE INVOLVING AN ESTIMATED TWO VC PLATOONS) WERE REPORTED THUS FAR CONTRASTED WITH SIX ATTACKS AND TWO AMBUSHES LAST WEEK. TERRORISM, PARTICULARLY HARASSMENT OF GVN TROOPS, POSTS, BASES AND NEW RURAL LIFE HAMLETS, WAS THE PREDOMINANT FORM OF

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ACTIVITY. WHEN ALL REPORTS FOR THE WEEK ARE IN, THE RATE OF TERRORISM WILL PROBABLY BE ABOUT THE SAME AS THE PAST WEEK'S EXPERIENCE IN THIS AREA. VC INCIDENTS IN THE 5TH DIVISION AREA REMAINED SUBSTANTIALLY HIGHER THAN EXPERIENCE IN III CORPS TZ. BINH DUONG CONTINUED TO EXPERIENCE THE HIGHEST INCIDENT RATE AMONG III CORPS PROVINCES, MAINLY IN THE FORM OF HARASSMENTS OF GVN BASES AND TROOPS. AT 2300 HRS THE VC ATTACKED AND OVERRAN BEN CUI WATCHTOWER IN NORTHWESTERN BINH DUONG. OF THE THIRTEEN PF AND MILITIA AT THE WT THERE WERE TWO KILLED, SIX WOUNDED AND FIVE MISSING WITH TWELVE WEAPONS LOST. THE VC FIRED MORTARS ON CHANH LUU ON TWO DAYS DURING THE WEEK MARKING THE EIGHTH TIME THIS POST HAS BEEN HIT SINCE 10 JULY 64. IN HAU NGHIA THE VC ATTACKED GLOOM POST. FRIENDLY LOSSES WERE TWO DEAD AND FOUR WOUNDED, WHILE THE VC LOST 3 KILLED. IN SOUTHEASTERN HAU NGHIA THE VC CONTINUED ROAD BLOCKING ACTIVITIES. VC ACTIONS IN TAY NINH CONSISTED MAINLY OF HARASSMENTS. IN PHUOC LONG THE VC ENTERED BU LU NEW LIFE HAMLET, GAVE A PROPAGANDA LECTURE, DESTROYED THE FENCE, KIDNAPPED SIX CIVILIANS AND CAPTURED ONE PF. IN BIEN HOA AN ESTIMATED TWO VC PLATOONS ATTACKED PHUOC THIEN BASE MANNED BY A COMBAT YOUTH PLATOON. FRIENDLY LOSSES WERE THREE KILLED, THREE WOUNDED AND SEVEN WEAPONS. ON 19 AUGUST THE FIRST ARMED INCIDENT REPORTED IN LAM DONG PROVINCE THIS WEEK INVOLVED VC

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FIRING UPON AND DETONATION OF MINES AGAINST AN ARTILLERY TRUCK IN THE VICINITY OF AT 119 760. THE TRUCK WAS DAMAGED AT THE TIME IN COLLECTING LIMBER FOR GUN EMPLACEMENTS. THIS IS POSSIBLY THE SAME VIET CONG GROUP THAT WAS REPORTED GIVING PROPAGANDA LECTURES TO TEA PLANTATION WORKERS IN THE SAME GENERAL AREA EARLIER IN THE MONTH.

(5) CAPITAL MILITARY DISTRICT: REPORTED VC ACTIVITY, SLIGHTLY HIGHER THAN THE WEEK BEFORE, CONSISTED OF TEN INCIDENTS OF VILLAGE AND HAMLET HARASSMENT WITH NO CHANGE IN PATTERN.

(6) BUNG SAT SPECIAL AREA: ONE INCIDENT OF VC HARASSING FIRE WAS REPORTED FROM THIS NAVY CONTROLLED SPECIAL AREA.

(7) TIEN GIANG (7TH DIVISION) TACTICAL AREA: VC ACTIVITY IN THIS TACTICAL AREA APPEARED TO INCREASE BOTH IN NUMBER AND INTENSITY. THERE WERE MANY ACTS OF TERRORISM AND HARASSMENTS OF SMALL POSTS. SABOTAGE AND PROPAGANDA INCIDENTS DECLINED SLIGHTLY FROM THE LEVEL OF THE PRECEDING WEEK. A MAJOR VC ACTION OCCURRED ON 20 AUG IN KIEN HOA PROVINCE, WHICH RESULTED IN HEAVY FRIENDLY CASUALTIES INCLUDING THE DEATH OF FOUR AMERICANS. THE ACTION WAS INITIATED BY A VC ATTACK AT 200255 AUG AGAINST PHU TUC POST, HAM LONG DISTRICT IN NORTHERN KIEN HOA. THE 7TH DIVISION WAS REQUESTED BY THE KIEN HOA PROVINCE CHIEF TO MOUNT A FORCE TO CUT OFF THE VC WHO WERE HERETOFORE WITHDRAWING FROM PHU TUC TO THE EAST. A REACTION FORCE, CONSISTING OF ELEMENTS OF THE 11ST RANGER BN AND 3RD BN, 12TH INFANTRY, WAS FORMED AND MOVED OUT AT 0730 IN A PURSUIT

OPERATION (FOR DETAILS SEE PAR 2A, ABOVE). UPON COMPLETION OF  
THEIR OPERATION, WHICH WAS MADE WITHOUT CONTACT, THE UNITS  
STARTED THEIR RETURN MARCH. AT 1750, THE BOMBERS, WHO WERE ON  
THE RIGHT, RECEIVED HEAVY MORTAR, RECOLLESS RIFLE AND SMALL  
ARMS FIRE FROM THEIR RIGHT FLANK. THE COMMANDER CALLED THE  
3/12TH FOR REINFORCEMENT. MOMENTS LATER 60 MEN IN ARVN  
FATIGUES WITHOUT CAPS, APPEARED FROM THE DIRECTION OF THE  
3/12TH. THEY WERE AT FIRST BELIEVED TO BE THE REINFORCEMENTS.  
THE 60 MEN THEN OPENED FIRE AT CLOSE RANGE AND OVERRAN THE  
BOMBERS. AT THIS TIME THE 3/12TH STARTED RECEIVING FIRE FROM  
THEIR RIGHT (WEST) FLANK AS WELL AS FROM THEIR LEFT FLANK AND  
FROM THE SOUTH. THE MAIN ASSAULT, HOWEVER, WAS FROM THE WEST.  
ARTILLERY SUPPORT WAS CALLED FOR AND FIRE MISSIONS CONTINUED  
UNTIL 1930. AIR STRIKES WERE CALLED FOR AND THE PLANES  
ARRIVED ON TARGET AT ABOUT 1900. HOWEVER, NO STRIKES WERE  
CONDUCTED DUE TO THE DANGER OF HITTING FRIENDLY TROOPS.  
FLARESHIP STAYED OVER THE AREA ALL NIGHT. FOUR AMERICANS  
DIED IN THIS ENCOUNTER, ALONG WITH 61 ARVN. IN ADDITION,  
THERE WERE 60 WIA INCLUDING BOTH BN COMMANDERS, AND 91 MIA.  
THE 3/12TH BN COMMANDER WAS WOUNDED EARLY IN THE ACTION, AND  
THIS UNDOUBTEDLY LESSENED THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE UNIT. VC  
LOSSES ARE UNKNOWN, AS THEY APPARENTLY CARRIED THEIR DEAD  
AWAY. AN ARVN SOLDIER, WHO HAD BEEN CAPTURED AND THEN ESCAPED,  
RELATED THAT THE VC SUFFERED MANY CASUALTIES. SIGNIFICANTLY,  
IT WAS LATER DISCOVERED THAT THE CIVILIAN POPULATION HAD

APPARENTLY EVACUATED THEIR HOMES LOCATED IN THE AMBUSH AREA. IT IS NOT KNOWN WHETHER THEY WITHHELD INTELLIGENCE OF VC PREPARATIONS VOLUNTARILY OR UNDER COERCION. A CATHOLIC PRIEST TOLD OFFICIALS LATER THAT NEW VC UNITS HAD COME INTO THE AREA TO REVITALIZE THE VC EFFORT. HE HAD TO REMAIN IN THE CHURCH AND WAS UNABLE TO WARN THE ARVN UNITS. ALSO AFTER THE AMBUSH, THIRTY VC PACKS AND SOME DOCUMENTS WERE FOUND IN ONE OF THE NEARBY HOUSES. ONE OF THE DOCUMENTS CONTAINED THE LIST OF NAMES AND BIRTH DATES OF THE MEMBERS OF THE 550TH VC DISTRICT COMPANY AND SHOWED THAT THE YOUNGEST AGE LISTED WAS FOURTEEN AND THE AVERAGE AGE OF MEN IN THE UNIT WAS SEVENTEEN YEARS.

(8) IV CORPS: THE TOTAL NUMBER OF VC INITIATED INCIDENTS APPEARED TO INCREASE SLIGHTLY DURING THE WEEK AND CONSISTED MAINLY OF ACTS OF TERRORISM AND HARASSING FIRE. IN KIEN PHONG PROVINCE, THE NINH TU POST WAS ATTACKED BY A VC FORCE USING 57MM RECOILLESS RIFLES. EIGHT PF WERE KILLED, ONE WAS WOUNDED, TWO WERE MISSING, AND TWENTY WEAPONS WERE LOST. IN VINH BINH, IN ADDITION TO HARASSING FIRE ON POSTS, PHONG PHU NINH WAS ATTACKED AT 2115 HOURS ON 19 AUGUST. IN THIS ATTACK, THE VC LOST SEVEN DEAD, WHILE ONE PF WAS KILLED. ALSO IN VINH BINH, AN ESTIMATED 100 VC FIRED ON A BOAT AND REPORTEDLY SUFFERED TEN KILLED IN THE ENSUING FIGHT. THE PRINCIPAL ACTIVITY OF THE WEEK IN THIS CTZ TOOK PLACE IN PHONG BINH PROVINCE. AT 0300 ON 15 AUGUST, THE POSTS OF HOA MY AND KIEP HUNG, ONLY 3 KM APART, WERE ATTACKED BY AN UNKNOWN NUMBER OF VC.

A PURSUIT OPERATION COMMENCED AT 1400 HOURS COMMENCED AT 1400 OF THE 15TH. THE VC FORCE WAS CONTACTED AND PRESSED BACK AT 2100 OF THE 15TH. THE TWO POSTS WERE AGAIN ATTACKED, THIS TIME BY A VC FORCE ESTIMATED TO NUMBER 400 AND BEING 60 AND 81MM MORTARS. FRIENDLY ARTILLERY WAS BROUGHT TO BEAR, ALONG WITH FLAREMORPH AND AIR STRIKES. THE VC WITHDREW AT 1650 ON THE 16TH. THE TWO POSTS WERE AGAIN ATTACKED. AT 2005 THE PURSUIT OPERATION WAS REINFORCED. IT NOW CONSISTED OF TWO BATTALIONS, THE 42ND RANGER BATTALION AND AN RF BATTALION WHO MOVED OUT TO PURSUE THE VC ATTACKING FORCE. AT 2005 THE PURSUING FORCE WAS AMBUSHED BY AN ESTIMATED VC BATTALION. TOTAL FRIENDLY LOSSES WERE 22 KIA, 15 WIA, 15 MIA, 2 AR15, 24 FRIENDLY WEAPONS AND ONE 81MM MORTAR. AT 0100, ON 17 AUGUST, THE TWO POSTS WERE HIT ONCE MORE. TOTAL LOSSES AT THE POSTS FOR THE 3 DAYS WERE 9 KIA AND 20 WIA. AN ANALYSIS OF THE OVERALL OPERATION INDICATES THAT THE REPEATED ATTACKS ON THE TWO POSTS WERE PROBABLY CONDUCTED AS "BAIT" IN ORDER TO INDUCE LARGE RVN FORCES TO COME TO THE AID OF THE BESIEGED POSTS. THIS CLASSIC RUSE, DESIGNED TO INFLECT MAXIMUM DAMAGE ON ARVN UNITS AT LIMITED RISK TO THE VC AND IN TERRAIN OF THEIR CHOOSING, HAS BEEN FOR SOME TIME A FAVORITE TACTIC OF THE VIET CONG.

B. OTHER INTELLIGENCE REPORTS:

(1) COUNTERINTELLIGENCE: DURING THE PERIOD OF THIS REPORT THERE WAS ONE INSTANCE OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE INTEREST ATTRIBUTABLE TO VC TERRORISTS. AT 2045 HOURS ON 22 AUGUST 1964,

AN EXPLOSION OCCURRED AT THE ENTRANCE TO THE NEW THEATER,  
BEN ARCADE, IN DOWNTOWN SAIGON. THE EXPLOSIVE DEVICE WAS  
ESTIMATED TO HAVE BEEN AN IRON-BOMB SHAPED DEVICE, DIRECTED  
TOWARD THE AUDIENCE IN THE THEATER. MINOR DAMAGE WAS  
CAUSED TO THE THEATER. ONE US ENLISTED MAN WAS WOUNDED IN THE  
BLAST, AND ONE VIETNAMESE MALE WHO WAS RIDING PAST THE THEATER  
ON A MOTOR SCOOTER DIED FROM INJURIES CAUSED BY THE EXPLOSION.

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4. SUMMARY OF ARVN AND VC PERSONNEL AND WEAPONS LOSSES  
(STATISTICS IN ANNEX E)

A. ARVN CASUALTIES TOTAL 251 KIA, 446 WIA, 179 MIA/  
CAPTURED FOR THE WEEK. THIS IS A SIZEABLE INCREASE FROM THE  
PREVIOUS WEEK'S TOTAL OF 732 CASUALTIES. A TOTAL OF 347  
WEAPONS REPORTED LOST, AN INCREASE FROM THE 307 REPORTED AS  
LOST LAST WEEK.

B. THE VC SUFFERED 801 KNOWN CASUALTIES (666 KIA AND  
135 CAPTURED) DURING THE WEEK. THIS WAS AN INCREASE IN  
COMPARISON TO LAST WEEK'S 167 (154 KIA AND 13 CAPTURED).  
GOVERNMENT FORCES CAPTURED 295 INDIVIDUAL WEAPONS. LAST  
WEEK'S TOTAL WAS 68 INDIVIDUAL WEAPONS CAPTURED. THESE VC  
LOSSES INCLUDE THE TOTAL CASUALTIES INFLICTED DURING  
OPERATIONS DAN CHIEN 1 AND DAN CHIEN 2 WHICH BEGAN IN  
FEBRUARY 64 AND TERMINATED DURING THE CURRENT PERIOD.

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5. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

The situation in the province has remained relatively stable since the beginning of the year. Provincial forces have been able to maintain control over the priority zone to permit the restriction and containment of paramilitary forces and the facilitation of the new left development. While he has been unable to expand the initial GEL area, he is making steady progress within this area. The severe tactics of the VC in Binh Duong have all but halted efforts to pacify this province. VC harassment continues, even in the Phung Hiep area, and the effects of all previous actions are renewed in reaction to enemy acts. A similar situation exists in Mau Nghia where pacification efforts remain at a standstill. The mobile action teams are hampered by VC harassment, and the VC effort has recently been expanded to include anti-aircraft operations in the Phung Hiep area. In the Phung Hiep area, the VC have been active in the lowland areas, and the VC have been active in all areas. The pace of pacification remains slow in the Phung Hiep area.

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HALF THE PROGRAMMED HAMLETS ARE REPORTED CONSTRUCTED, SHORTAGES OF MOBILE ACTION CADRE, TEACHERS, AND TRAINED ADMINISTRATORS HAMPER THE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT IN THE REMAINING HAMLETS.

B. QUANG NGAI: IN AN APPARENT ATTEMPT TO PREVENT PROGRESS IN PACIFICATION OPERATIONS VC INITIATED INCIDENTS CONTINUE AT A HIGH RATE. THE MAIN EFFORT IS CENTERED IN SON TINH, BINH SON, NGHIA HANH AND DUC PHO DISTRICTS. VC INCIDENTS IN SON TINH DISTRICT THUS FAR IN AUGUST EXCEED THE COMBINED TOTALS FOR JUNE AND JULY. MOST SERIOUS INCIDENTS INCLUDED ENTRY OF VC ELEMENT INTO VINH LAC HAMLET, DUC PHO DISTRICT, AND KIDNAPPING OF TEN COMBAT YOUTH. A VC COMPANY ATTACK AGAINST PHO LOI VILLAGE IN DUC PHO DISTRICT RESULTED IN 6 POPULAR FORCES KIA AND 6 WIA. ON THE BRIGHTER SIDE, THE PROVINCE CHIEF APPEARS TO BE MAKING SOME PROGRESS IN THE ORGANIZATION AND SUPPORT OF PROVINCIAL OFFICIALS. IN EFFECT HE HAS TOLD THEM TO QUIT TALKING AND GO TO WORK. MAJOR LY HAS ACCEPTED THE FACT THAT PREVIOUSLY ESTABLISHED GOALS FOR CY 64 CANNOT BE MET. ADVISORS FEEL THAT HE WILL MAKE A MORE REALISTIC ESTIMATE OF THE GOALS WHICH CAN BE ATTAINED AND WILL DIRECT THE EFFORTS OF HIS SUBORDINATES TOWARD THEIR ORDERLY ACCOMPLISHMENT.

C. TAY NINH: PACIFICATION OPERATIONS CONTINUED TO MAKE SLOW BUT STEADY PROGRESS IN TAY NINH WITH SCHOOL CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS BEING AMONG THE MOST NOTEWORTHY ACHIEVEMENTS. SINCE AUGUST 1963, SOME 142 CLASSROOMS HAVE BEEN CONSTRUCTED AND 27 ARE PRESENTLY UNDER CONSTRUCTION IN THE PACIFICATION AREA. USCM IS PRESENTLY

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TRAINING 176 TEACHERS WHO WILL RUN THESE CLASSROOMS BY THE END OF  
SEPTEMBER.

D. BINH DUNG: LITTLE PROGRESS IN PACIFICATION IS EVIDENT IN  
BINH DUNG. VC HARASSMENT CONTINUES TO PLAGUE THE PROVINCE AND  
GVN EFFORTS ARE DISSIPATED LARGELY THROUGH REACTION TO VC ACTIVITIES.  
THE VC CONTINUED THEIR "BEEHIVE" TACTICS AGAINST ISOLATED VILLAGES  
AND HAMLETS. THIS TACTIC, IN WHICH THE VC SURROUND A HAMLET, DIG  
EXTENSIVE TRENCHES AND FIELD FORTIFICATIONS, HARASS THE HAMLET WITH  
SMALL ARMS AND MORTAR FIRE, AND ATTEMPT TO ISOLATE THE HAMLET FROM  
FOOD AND OTHER SUPPLIES, HAS BEEN EFFECTIVE IN FURTHER AGGRAVATING  
EXISTING SECURITY PROBLEMS. THE PROVINCE CHIEF HAS DIRECTED THAT  
A SPECIAL STUDY BE MADE OF THE FAILURE OF ITS MOBILE ACTION CADRE  
PROGRAM. OF 534 TEAM CADRE PROGRAMMED FOR THE PROVINCE, ONLY  
212 WERE RECRUITED AND TRAINED, AND MORE THAN HALF OF THOSE TRAINED  
HAVE DEPARTED THE PROVINCE FOR BETTER JOBS. BECAUSE OF THIS,  
PACIFICATION OPERATIONS BY MOBILE ACTION CADRE HAVE BEEN NEGLIGIBLE.  
MOVEMENT OF THE 5TH DIVISION HEADQUARTERS TO THU DAT MGT SHOULD  
IMPROVE COORDINATION BETWEEN ARVN FORCES AND THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT.  
THE COORDINATION BETWEEN THE BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS, PREVIOUSLY CONTROLLING  
THE TWO ARVN REGIMENTS IN BINH DUNG, AND THE SECTOR HEADQUARTERS LEFT  
MUCH TO BE DESIRED.

E. HAU SON: PACIFICATION EFFORTS IN HAU SON REMAIN AT A  
NEAR STANDSTILL. MOBILE ACTION CADRE HAVE BEEN ASSIGNED TO OPERATE  
IN NINE PRIORITY HAMLETS; HOWEVER RECENT INSPECTIONS REVEAL THAT

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THE TEAMS ARE NOT WORKING IN THE HAMLETS EVERY DAY. THIS IS BECAUSE OF THEIR FEAR THAT THE SECURITY PROVIDED THEM IS NOT ADEQUATE, COUPLED WITH INTIMIDATION BY THE VC. US ADVISORS FEEL THAT ADDITIONAL ARVN TROOPS WILL BE REQUIRED TO ESTABLISH SECURITY BEFORE ANY SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS CAN BE MADE TOWARDS PACIFICATION. ON 16 AUGUST, A VC INSPIRED DEMONSTRATION TOOK PLACE IN THE PROVINCIAL CAPITAL. APPROXIMATELY 500 DEMONSTRATORS, MOSTLY WOMEN, MARCHED INTO BAO TRAI FROM NEIGHBORING HAMLETS. THE THEME OF THE DEMONSTRATION WAS "GO HOME AMERICANS." PROVINCIAL OFFICIALS EXPLAINED THE AMERICAN POSITION, PASSED OUT GVN LITERATURE, AND CONVINCED THE CROWD TO DISPERSE AND RETURN TO THEIR HAMLETS. TWO COMPANIES OF THE 53RD ENGINEER BATTALION HAVE BEEN REMOVED FROM HAU NGHIA LEAVING ONE COMPANY IN THE PROVINCE. THE RVNAF HIGH COMMAND DIRECTED THE REMOVAL OF THESE TWO COMPANIES FOR PRIORITY PROJECTS IN PHUOC TUY. PRESENT PLANS CALL FOR THEIR RETURN TO HAU NGHIA IN ABOUT TWO MONTHS. THIS BATTALION HAS BEEN THE MAINSTAY OF CIVIC ACTION IN HAU NGHIA AND REDUCING ITS STRENGTH WILL SERIOUSLY SLOW THE PACIFICATION EFFORT. THE ONE ENGINEER COMPANY REMAINING IN THE PROVINCE IS BEING USED PRIMARILY AS A ROAD CLEARING DETAIL.

F. LONG AN: THE SITUATION IN THE A1 PACIFICATION AREA ASTRIDE HIGHWAY 4 IS STILL STATIC; ALONG HIGHWAY 5 IN THE A2 AREA, THERE HAS BEEN A NOTICEABLE INCREASE IN THE MORALE OF THE PEOPLE SINCE THE MARINE BATTALION OPENED THE ROAD SEVERAL WEEKS AGO. LAST WEEK, A VC CELL, OPERATING IN THE PROVINCE CAPITAL, WHILE CHECKING THE ELECTRICAL

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**[REDACTED]**

CIRCUIT OF A 18-20 KILO MINE, ACCIDENTALLY DETONATED IT KILLING FIVE. ACCORDING TO A POLICE REPORT THE PROPERTY AND MANAGEMENT OF THE MINE WAS THE RE ADVISORS: BILLETS AND THE TAN AN BRIDGE. AS A RESULT OF THIS INCIDENT, EIGHT ARRESTS HAVE BEEN MADE BY LOCAL AUTHORITIES. FURTHERMORE, A LIST OF 39 VC SYMPATHIZERS WAS FOUND IN THE HOUSE. MOST OF THE NAMES WERE FROM LONG AN AND PROVINCES CONTIGUOUS TO IT. REPORTEDLY, A 20 YEAR OLD GIRL, WHO WAS KILLED, WAS THE CELL LEADER. EVIDENTLY A GOVERNMENT CENSUS HAD BEEN TAKEN IN THIS AREA, SINCE PHOTOGRAPHS OF THE CELL MEMBERS WERE INCLUDED IN THE POLICE REPORT. A PSYWAR LEAFLET WAS PUBLISHED 24 HOURS AFTER THE INCIDENT WITH THE THEME: THIS IS WHAT HAPPENS IF YOU COLLABORATE WITH THE VC.

G. DINH TUONG: THE ORIGINAL PROVINCE PLAN FOR PACIFICATION HAS BEEN CHANGED FROM EXPANDING FROM THE ONE OIL SPOT CONCEPT TO SIMULTANEOUSLY EXPANDING FROM SIX OIL SPOTS. THIS WEEK PROVINCE CLAIMS 51 HAMLETS "COMPLETED" BY NATIONAL STANDARDS. THIS IS AN INCREASE OF 24 IN THE LAST THREE WEEKS. THESE 51 COMPLETED OIL SPOT HAMLETS ARE BROKEN DOWN AS FOLLOWS: 18 IN BEN TRANH, 3 IN LONG DINH, 6 IN KHUEN ICH, 10 IN SONG HIEU, 9 IN GIANG DUC AND 15 IN CHAU GAO DISTRICTS. ACCORDING TO THE PROVINCE CHIEF, PHU THIEU, HE REQUIRES AN ADDITIONAL AUTHORIZATION TO PAY 755 MORE POPULAR FORCE PERSONNEL THIS YEAR TO SUSTAIN HIS PACIFICATION PROGRESS. THIS PROBLEM WILL BE DISCUSSED AT THE SAIGON LEVEL NEXT WEEK, AND IT APPEARS THERE WILL BE AN ADJUSTMENT IN THE NUMBER OF PROVINCE POPULAR FORCE PERSONNEL AUTHORIZED.

H. GO CONG: THE FIRST SIGNIFICANT VC REACTION TO PACIFICATION OPERATIONS IN THE PRIORITY AREA OCCURRED LAST WEEK. AN ESTIMATED PLATOON OF VC, WITH THREE AUTOMATIC WEAPONS ATTACKED THE VAN LANG FISHING VILLAGE. THE ATTACK CAME FROM THE DIRECTION OF THE MANGROVE SWAMP NORTH OF TOWN. (A REQUEST TO DEFOLIATE THIS AREA HAS BEEN APPROVED). ACCORDING TO SECTOR, THE VC IN GO CONG HAVE STARTED A CAMPAIGN OF TEARING UP THE PEOPLE'S IDENTIFICATION CARDS TO PREVENT THEM FROM VOTING IN THE OCTOBER ELECTIONS.

I. VINH LONG: PACIFICATION OPERATIONS ARE BEING CONDUCTED IN ALL NINE DISTRICTS. MOBILE ACTION CADRES INITIALLY TRAINED IN APRIL AND SUBSEQUENTLY PLACED IN EACH DISTRICT ARE BEING RETRAINED TO IMPROVE THEIR EFFECTIVENESS. THE RETRAINING IS BEING CONDUCTED BY THE SECTOR TRAINING TEAM WHICH IS CURRENTLY IN LAP VO DISTRICT. POPULAR FORCE PLATOONS ARE ALSO BEING TRAINED AS AN ELEMENT OF THE PACIFICATION TEAM TO ASSIST AND PROVIDE SECURITY FOR THE MOBILE ACTION CADRE ELEMENT. CURRENTLY THE MOBILE ACTION CADRE ARE CONDUCTING CENSUS, UPDATING FAMILY IDENTIFICATION IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE NATIONAL POLICE, ORGANIZING FAMILY GROUPS AND IMPROVING LOCAL SECURITY. PROGRESS IS SLOW. THE 2ND BN, 13TH REGT, IS SUPPORTING PACIFICATION OPERATIONS IN TAM BINH DISTRICT. IN THE REMAINING DISTRICTS THE REGIONAL AND POPULAR FORCES ARE THE PRIMARY SECURITY FORCES FOR PACIFICATION OPERATIONS. ADDITIONAL PACIFICATION FORCES AND MOBILE ACTION CADRE ARE NEEDED TO INCREASE THE SPEED OF PACIFICATION OPERATIONS. A HAO HOA REGIONAL BATTALION CONSISTING OF

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FOUR COMPANIES IS PRESENTLY RECEIVING BASIC TRAINING IN THE PROVINCE. PROVINCE IS CONSIDERING THE USE OF THESE FORCES TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL SECURITY IN AREAS WHERE THE MOBILE ACTION CADRE ARE OPERATING.

J. GIA DINH: OF THE 308 PROGRAMMED HAMLETS 184 ARE REPORTED BY VN OFFICIALS AS MEETING THE SIX POINT CRITERIA. THE REMAINING 124 ARE BEING IMPROVED; ALTHOUGH ONLY SIX MOBILE ACTION CADRE TEAMS ARE CURRENTLY BEING EMPLOYED. AN ADDITIONAL 190 CADRE ARE BEING RECRUITED, AND A TRAINING PROGRAM FOR NEWLY RECRUITED CADRE IS SCHEDULED TO BEGIN NEXT WEEK. THE PACE OF PACIFICATION REMAINS SLOW. SHORTAGES OF TEACHERS AND OTHER TRAINED PERSONNEL CONTINUE TO BE A PROBLEM. ESTABLISHED SALARIES FOR SUCH PERSONNEL ARE NOT COMPETITIVE WITH INDUSTRIAL JOBS AVAILABLE IN SAIGON. THE PROVINCE CHIEF, COLONEL NHAN MINH TRANG, WAS PROMOTED FROM THE GRADE OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL ON 19 AUGUST. US ADVISORS FEEL THE PROMOTION WAS WELL DESERVED. PROVINCE PSYOPS COMMITTEE HAD ITS FIRST REGULAR MEETING THIS WEEK. ORGANIZATION OF THIS COMMITTEE IS PART OF THE INCREASED EMPHASIS BEING PLACED ON PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS BY THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT. THE PROVINCE CHIEF, THE US ADVISOR, AND THE USOM REPRESENTATIVE ENJOY EXCELLENT WORKING RELATIONSHIPS AND CONTINUE TO MAKE VISITS TO A MINIMUM OF TWO TO FOUR HAMLETS A WEEK TO REIMBURSE FAMILIES FOR RELOCATION, TO TENDER REWARDS, AND TO PROVIDE FUNDS FOR SELF-HELP PROJECTS. THE MORALE OF THE HAMLET IN VINH LOC VILLAGE, WHICH REPULSED A TWO COMPANY ATTACK ON 31 JULY REMAINS HIGH.

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THIS TENDS TO CONFIRM THE EXPERIENCE THAT SUCCESSFUL RESISTANCE  
TO VC ATTACKS SERVES AS A MAJOR PSYCHOLOGICAL STIMULUS.

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**6. SUPPORTING PROGRAMS:**

**A. PSYWAR/CIVIC ACTION:**

TWENTY-EIGHT SPECIALISTS FROM THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES ARRIVED IN VIETNAM ON 16 AUGUST. TWELVE ARE MEDICAL PERSONNEL, AND 16 ARE CIVIC ACTION OFFICERS. WITH THEIR EXTENSIVE EXPERIENCE GAINED DURING THE HUK INSURGENCY, THESE PERSONNEL SHOULD MAKE A VALUABLE ADDITION TO THE MILITARY CIVIC ACTION PROGRAM IN VIETNAM.

**I CORPS:**

NOTHING SIGNIFICANT.

**II CORPS:**

IN REFERENCE TO THE PREVIOUSLY REPORTED BURNING OF HOMES IN BINH DINH PROVINCE, PRESIDENT KHANH, THE II CORPS COMMANDER, AND THE PROVINCE CHIEF VISITED PHUOC LY VILLAGE WHERE THE HOMES WERE DESTROYED. AFTER SPEAKING TO THE PEOPLE, THE PRESIDENT DISTRIBUTED 200,000 VND, PACKETS OF BLANKETS, COOKING OIL, AND OTHER ITEMS TO FAMILIES THAT HAD SUFFERED LOSSES. GENERAL KHANH'S PERSONAL APPEARANCE DID MUCH TO RESTORE THE POSITION OF THE GVN IN THE MIND OF THE PEOPLE.

**III CORPS:**

NOTHING SIGNIFICANT.

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IV CORPS:

WHEN THE HOA MY AND HIEP HUNG OUTPOSTS IN PHONG DINH PROVINCE WERE ATTACKED ON 16 AUG, A LOUDSPEAKER AIRCRAFT WHICH WAS ATTACHED TO IV CORPS WAS USED TO PROVIDE ENCOURAGEMENT TO THE TROOPS IN THE OUTPOSTS. IN ADDITION, THE PLANE FLEW OVER THE RELIEF COLUMN, WHICH WAS FIGHTING TO GET TO THE OUTPOSTS, URGING THEM ON. IT IS FEELT THAT THIS IMAGINATIVE USE OF THE LOUDSPEAKER AIRCRAFT MADE A MAJOR CONTRIBUTION TO THE OPERATION BY BOLSTERING THE MORALE OF THE OUTPOST PERSONNEL THUS ENABLING THEM TO HOLD OUT UNTIL THE RELIEF COLUMN ARRIVED. THE VIETNAMESE INFORMATION SERVICE IS PRODUCING 20,000 LEAFLETS FOR THE 23RD RIVER ASSAULT GROUP. THESE LEAFLETS EXPLAIN WHY ALL MOVING VESSELS MUST BE SEARCHED FOR VIET CONG AND ARMS. THE LEAFLETS WILL BE GIVEN TO CIVILIANS ON THE CANALS WHEN THEIR VESSELS ARE SEARCHED.

B. PERSONNEL.

(1) RVNAF STRENGTH: REGULAR FORCE AUDITED STRENGTH FOR END JULY RESULTED IN AN INCREASE OF 4,719 MEN (219,954). REGIONAL FORCE INCREASED BY 1,243 (88,560). POPULAR FORCE INCREASED BY 27,842 AS A RESULT OF INTEGRATION OF COMBAT YOUTH (127,453).

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(2) DESERTIONS: THERE WERE 1,164 REGULAR FORCE DESERTERS FOR THE MONTH OF JULY FOR A RATE OF 5.29 PER THOUSAND. THIS IS THE LOWEST MONTHLY DESERTION RATE FOR 1964 AND REFLECTS INCREASED INTEREST BY GVN IN THE RVNAF AND IMPROVED MORALE OF THE RVNAF TROOPS. DESERTIONS IN THE REGIONAL FORCE TOTALED 1,704 FOR A RATE OF 19.24 PER THOUSAND. THIS REPRESENTS AN INCREASE FROM LAST MONTH; HOWEVER, RATES HAVE HISTORICALLY SHOWN GREAT VARIANCE FROM MONTH TO MONTH DUE TO REPORTING SYSTEM. POPULAR FORCE TOTALED 2,214, WHICH REPRESENTS AN INCREASE AS A RESULT OF INCREASED STRENGTH; HOWEVER, RATE/1000 DECREASED TO 17.37.

(3) APPREHENSION OF DESERTERS: DURING THE MONTH OF JULY 907 REQUESTS FOR APPREHENSIONS OF DESERTERS WERE ISSUED TO THE GENDARMERIE WITH 793 BEING APPREHENDED. THERE WERE 8,396 OUTSTANDING REQUESTS FOR APPREHENSIONS OF DESERTERS AS OF 31 JULY 1964. THERE WERE 620 DESERTERS TRIED DURING JULY 64 AND 1,119 REMAINING AWAITING TRIAL.

C. DEPENDENT HOUSING. THE FIRST BIDS FOR PRECUT LUMBER WERE OPENED ON 19 AUG 64, WITH INDICATION THAT CONTRACTS FOR A LARGE AMOUNT OF FAMILY UNITS WILL BE SIGNED BY END OF AUG 64. INCREASED INTEREST IS BEING DISPLAYED BY CONTRACTORS SINCE ESTABLISHMENT OF REALISTIC

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CEILING PRICES AND PROMPT PAYMENT UPON DELIVERY OF MATERIALS.

D. COMMUNICATIONS. THE MARK IV (X) (EXPERIMENTAL) SATELLITE GROUND STATION ARRIVED IN THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM, 19 AUG 64, AND WAS ERECTED AT TAN SON NHUT AIR BASE ON 20 AUG 64. THIS STATION WILL PROVIDE VITAL VOICE AND TELETYPE COMMUNICATIONS TO HAWAII AND THE CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES. THE MARK IV (X) IS IN THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM FOR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT TESTING; ALTHOUGH SOME OPERATIONAL USE MAY BE MADE OF THE AVAILABLE CIRCUITS AS PART OF THE TESTING PROGRAM. THE MARK IV (PRODUCTION MODEL) GROUND STATION IS TO ARRIVE IN THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM APPROXIMATELY 17 SEP 64, TO REPLACE THE MARK IV (X). THE MARK IV IS SCHEDULED TO BE IN THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM UNTIL APPROXIMATELY 15 JAN 65, WHICH IS AFTER THE ANTICIPATED COMPLETION DATE OF THE NETWASH CABLE INTO NHA TRANG. THE DIRECTOR OF DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING HAS STATED THAT NO PUBLICITY IS TO BE GIVEN TO THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE MARK IV (X) SATELLITE GROUND STATION IN SAIGON.

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E. CHIEU HOI: DURING THE PERIOD 221 PERSONS RETURNED TO GVN CONTROL. THEY INCLUDED 86 MILITARY, 17 POLITICAL, 30 DRAFT DODGERS AND DESERTERS, AND 88 CIVILIANS. SIXTEEN INDIVIDUAL WEAPONS AND 12 GRENADES WERE TURNED IN TO THE AUTHORITIES. THE CIVILIAN REFUGEES WERE TRANSFERRED TO THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT FOR TEMPORARY RESETTLEMENT IN NRL HAMLETS. THE INCREASE IN THE TOTAL FIGURE OVER THE 122 REPORTED THE PREVIOUS WEEK IS NOT SIGNIFICANT UNLESS THE BREAKDOWN IS EXAMINED. IT IS NOTEWORTHY THAT THE 86 MILITARY RETURNEES REPRESENT THE SECOND HIGHEST WEEKLY TOTAL IN THIS CATEGORY REPORTED THIS YEAR, AND IS MORE THAN DOUBLE THE WEEKLY AVERAGE OF 36 ESTABLISHED FOR THE PERIOD 1 JAN - 15 AUG 64. THE HIGHEST WEEKLY TOTAL THIS YEAR WAS 115 MILITARY REPORTED FOR THE PERIOD 15-21 MARCH. THE 86 MILITARY RETURNEES LAST WEEK WERE GENERALLY DISTRIBUTED THROUGHOUT THE RVN. THE HIGHEST NUMBER BY CORPS AREA WAS THE 23 REPORTED BY THE III CTZ.

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ANNEX A (SUMMARY OF GROUND OPERATIONS)

1. BATTALION SIZE AND LARGER (THREE LINE COMPANIES EQUIVALENT OR MORE) READ IN NINE COLUMNS; AS TITLED/I/II/III/IV CORPS/TIEN GIANG TA/CMD/RUNG SAT SP AREA/TOTAL.

- (A) SEARCH AND DESTROY /6/13/10/19/7/0/0/55.
- (B) CLEARING /2/0/0/0/0/0/0/2.
- (C) SECURING /2/0/1/0/6/0/0/9.
- (D) DEVELOPMENT /0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0.
- (E) RECONNAISSANCE /1/0/0/0/0/0/0/1.
- (F) GUARD AND ESCORT /0/0/0/1/0/0/0/1.
- (G) TOTAL /11/13/11/20/13/0/0/68.

2. BATTALION SIZE AND LARGER WITH VC CONTACT: READ IN NINE COLUMNS; AS TITLED/I/II/III/IV CORPS/TIEN GIANG TA/CMD/RUNG SAT SP AREA/TOTAL.

- (A) SEARCH AND DESTROY /6/5/5/7/5/0/0/28.
- (B) CLEARING /2/0/0/0/0/0/0/2.
- (C) SECURING /2/0/1/0/3/0/0/6.
- (D) DEVELOPMENT /0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0.
- (E) RECONNAISSANCE /1/0/0/0/0/0/0/1.
- (F) GUARD AND ESCORT /0/0/0/1/0/0/0/1.
- (G) TOTAL /11/5/6/8/8/0/0/38.

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3. BATTALION DAYS OF OPERATIONS (LESS THAN 24 HOURS)  
DAYS EMPLOYED IN OPERATIONS (READ IN NINE COLUMNS: I/II/III/IV CORPS/TIEN  
GIANG TA/CMD/HUNG SAT SP AREA/TOTAL)

(A) SEARCH AND DESTROY	/55/85/44/54/38/0/0/28
(B) CLEARING	/52/0/0/0/0/0/0/52
(C) SECURING	/24/0/16/0/11/7/0/0/157
(D) DEVELOPMENT	/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0
(E) RECONNAISSANCE	/1/0/0/0/0/0/0/7
(F) GUARD AND ESCORT	/0/0/0/2/0/0/0/2
(G) TOTAL	/137/85/60/54/155/0/0/500

4. BATTALION OPERATIONS INITIATED PRIOR TO DAYLIGHT:  
I/5, II/8, III/5, IV/4, TIEN GIANG TA/4, CMD/0, HUNG SAT SP  
AREA/0, TOTAL/26.

5. BATTALION NIGHTS IN FIELD DURING COURSE OF OPERATIONS:  
I/29, II/78, III/41, IV/32, TIEN GIANG TA/141, CMD/0, HUNG  
SAT SP AREA/0, TOTAL 421.

6. SMALL UNIT ACTIONS (LESS THAN 3 REPS CO EQUIVALENT)  
READ IN NINE COLUMNS; AS TITLED I/II/III/IV CORPS/TIEN  
GIANG TA/CMD/HUNG SAT SP AREA/TOTAL

(A) W/IN DAY CONTACT	/1/0/0/0/0/0/0/7/0/66
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(B) WITH NIGHT BOMB [REDACTED] /3/6/25.

(C) WITHOUT CONTACT /1115/3318/3318/3697/1861/

512/31/14153.

(D) TOTAL /1106/3339/3335/3707/1874/

522/31/14111.

NOTE: THE ABOVE LISTED NUMBERS ARE APPROXIMATE.

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ANNEX B

AIR OPERATIONS

TABLE I. AIR OPERATIONS MUNITIONS EXPENDITURES

READ IN FIVE COLUMNS/TYPE MUNITION/USAF/VNAF/USA/USMC

1000 GP/0/0/0/0.

750 GP/0/0/0/0.

500 GP/260/99/0/0.

250 GP/0/0/0/0.

100 GP/16/229/0/0.

260 FR/172/626/0/0.

220 FR/8/0/0/0.

120 FR/220/68/0/0.

100 WP/90/0/0/0.

NAPALM/216/10/0/0.

ROCKET/0/326/2213/0.

20 MM/28,400/20,350/0/0.

50 CAL/0/0/0/0.

7.62 MM/0/0/355,850/0.

TABLE II. AIR OPERATIONS CLAIMS

READ IN FIVE COLUMNS/TYPE TARGET/USAF/VNAF/USA/USMC

VC PERSONNEL /0/34/228/0.

STRUCTURES DESTROYED /97/66/60/0.

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STRUCTURES DAMAGED /6/1/60.  
SAMPAIS DESTROYED /6/6/60.  
SAMPAIS DAMAGED /6/6/60.  
BRIDGES DESTROYED /6/1/60.

**TABLE III. AIR SUPPORT TO NEW LIFE BATTALIONS AND COMPANIES**  
HEAD IN SIX COLUMNS/CORPS/PROVINCE/ATTACKS/FLARESHIPS/  
FLARES/FIGHTERS

I/THUA THIEN/1/1/94/0.  
II/0/0/0/6/0.  
III/PHUOC THANH/1/1/60/0.  
III/BINH DUONG/2/2/180/4.  
IV/PHONG DINH/4/10/608/18.  
IV/KIEN PHONG/1/1/89/0.  
IV/VINH BINH/2/3/290/8.  
IV/CHUONG THIEN/1/2/117/4.  
TIEN GIANG TA/KIEN HOA/6/12/325/6.

**TABLE IV. AIRCRAFT INCIDENTS**

HEAD IN SIX COLUMNS/DATE/TIME AIRCRAFT/COORDS/CORPS/  
MSN/REMARKS

USAF: 20 AUG/C-123/AT20400/I/AIR/1 HIT, NO INJURIES.  
20 AUG/C-123/AT20400/III/AIR/2 MISS, 1 MISS VIA  
22 AUG/C-123/AT20400/IV/AIR/1 HIT, NO INJURIES.

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WEAP: /0/0/0/0/0.

USA: 15 AUG/JOV-1/BT135016/I/VR/1 HIT, NO INJURIES.  
16 AUG/UH-1B/WR50712/IV/EA/2 HITS, NO INJURIES.  
17 AUG/UH-1B/BR320325/II/VR/3 HITS, NO INJURIES.  
17 AUG/UH-1B/WR760765/IV/ALA/1 HIT, NO INJURIES.  
17 AUG/UH-1B/WR760765/IV/SF/1 HIT, NO INJURIES.  
17 AUG/UH-1B/WR760765/IV/SF/3 HITS, NO INJURIES.  
17 AUG/UH-1B/XT860260/III/VR/1 HIT, NO INJURIES.  
18 AUG/UH-1B/BR380480/II/ALR/1 HIT, NO INJURIES.  
18 AUG/UH-1B/WS788575/IV/EA/1 HIT, NO INJURIES.  
18 AUG/UH-1B/WS788575/IV/EA/1 HIT, NO INJURIES.  
19 AUG/JOV-1/UNK/UNK/VR/1 HIT, NO INJURIES.  
20 AUG/UH-1B/XS339380/7TH DIV/SF/1 HIT, NO INJURIES.  
22 AUG/UH-1B/CRO35445/II/EA/1 HIT, 2 US WIA.  
22 AUG/UH-1B/XS450337/7TH DIV/EH/1 HIT.  
22 AUG/UH-1B/XS450397/7TH DIV/EH/1 HIT.  
22 AUG/UH-1B/WR825770/IV/EH/11 HITS, 1 US WIA.  
22 AUG/OV-1/XS410380/7TH DIV/VR/1 HIT.  
USMC: 15 AUG/UH-34/Z0040676/I/ALR/1 HIT, NO INJURIES.  
20 AUG/UH-34/YC840617/I/ALR/1 HIT, 1 US WIA.  
20 AUG/UH-34/ZC105666/I/ALR/ 2 HITS, NO INJURIES.

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UNIT 7

READ IN FIVE GROUPS/...

USAF/A-12/3/24/24.

USAF/B-100/4/4/4.

USAF/C-102/22/53/19/4.

USAF/D-47/3/7/6.

USAF/E-54/4/4/4.

USAF/F-37/55/30/30.

USAF/G-57/0/0/38.

USAF/H-57/0/0/2.

USAF/I-101/0/0/12.

USAF/J-102/0/0/12/4.

USAF/K-38/2/2/2.

USAF/L-100/0/0/1/9.

VNAF/A-1E/75/76/66.

VNAF/B-28B/25/23/4.

VNAF/C-1A/71/11/36.

VNAF/D-47D/18/31/27.

VNAF/E-47D/3/3/3.

VNAF/F-105/17/16/0.

VNAF/G-28/18/17/14.

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VNAF/EC-47B/1/1/1.

VNAF/U-17A/25/25/25.

VNAF/U-6A/9/8/8.

VNAF/H-34/80/58/55.

USA/UH-1B/197/197/182.

USA/CV-2B/16/16/12.

USA/JOV-1/6/6/5.

USA/O-1F/50/49/47.

USA/U-1A/26/26/25.

USA/CH-37/6/6/6.

USA/U-6/15/15/NA.

USA/U-8/9/9/6.

USMC/UH-34/24/24/21.

USMC/O-1B/3/2/1.

USMC/C-117/1/1/0.

**TABLE VI. SUMMARY OF AIR TASKS, SORTIES, CARGO, PASSENGERS,  
AND FLYING HOURS**

USAF: 6-AA, 55-ABR, 32-AC, 2-AD, 502-ALR, 20-CA,  
15-CSL, 3-DFS, 11-EA, 11-ES, 11-ET, 17-FL, 1-FAC, 81-ID,  
61-FR, 11-PSW, 5-SAR, 2-VR, 4-M, 30-A, 159-T, 1032 TASKS.  
952 SORTIES. 877.0 TONS/CARGO, 3640 PAX, TOTAL FLYING  
HOURS 1109.1.

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THAF: 11-BA, 27-AB, 202-AC, 3-AD, 14-CA, 13-COB,  
3-CSL, 18-DA, 4-EC, 8-EB, 1-ED, 15-EE, 17-EL, 43-FAC,  
89-IB, 14-FE, 8-VR, 652-T, 1126 TASKS. 1342 SORTIES.  
40.0 TONS/CARGO, 810 PAX, TOTAL FLYING HOURS 1924.5.

**USA:**

FIXED WING: 6-AA, 3-ACA, 3-ACP, 5-AER, 1-AIR,  
12-ALA, 139-AIR, 23-ART, 63-COB, 303-CSL, 322-CL, 1-EFS,  
34-EA, 2-FAG, 2-PR, 3-PSW, 47-RR, 2-SAR, 32-SF, 1-TAB,  
196-VR, 1220 TASKS. 1946 SORTIES. 330.4 TONS/CARGO,  
4012 PAX, FLYING HOURS 1344.2.

ROTARY WING: 64-AE, 2-AA, 6-ACA, 10-ACP, 4-AIR,  
152-ALA, 133-AIR, 1-AR, 9-COB, 600-CSL, 69-CL, 412-EA,  
46-PSW, 7-RR, 15-SAR, 239-SF, 12-TAB, 36-TAE, 192-VR,  
2089 TASKS. 4545 SORTIES. 118.4 TONS/CARGO, 6908 PAX,  
FLYING HOURS 2269.5.

**USMC:**

FIXED WING: 1-CSL, 5-VR, 6 TASKS. 30 SORTIES.  
0 CARGO, 0 PAX, FLYING HOURS 14.1.

ROTARY WING: 10-ALA, 29-AIR, 7-CSL, 2-ER, 16-SAR,  
6-TAB, 18-TAE, 155 TASKS. 697 SORTIES. 31.2 TONS/CARGO,  
1068 PAX, FLYING HOURS 323.3.

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ANNEX C: (VNN OPERATIONS DATA)

SEA RIVER COASTAL CF CF CF CF  
FORCE FORCE FORCE IGD 2GD 3GD 4GD

TABLE I UTILIZATION (DAILY AVERAGE)

TOTAL ASN	44	159	555	113	178	119	145
TOTAL AVL (AVG)	30	115	376	88	137	81	70
TOTAL EMP (AVG)	22	90	232	57	89	31	55

TABLE II EMPLOYMENT (DAILY AVERAGE)

CBT SPT	0	7	0	0	0	0	0
SEA PTL	5	0	0	0	0	0	0
RIV PTL	3	42	0	0	0	0	0
CSTL SURVL	4	0	232	57	89	31	55
CONVOY SCTY	0	19	0	0	0	0	0
PROV SPT	0	10	0	0	0	0	0
STAT DEF	0	3	0	0	0	0	0
LOG SPT	6	5	0	0	0	0	0
TNG	0	2	0	0	0	0	0
OTHER	4	2	0	0	0	0	0

TABLE III SURVEILLANCE RESULTS

JUNKS SEARCHED	164	99	5611	1250	3076	1017	268
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**S E C R E T**

<b>PERSONS SEABOARD</b>	<b>705</b>	<b>356</b>	<b>24,005</b>	<b>6723</b>	<b>10,361</b>	<b>6045</b>	<b>876</b>
<b>JUNKS DETAINED</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>PERSONS DETAINED</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>CONFIRMED VC</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>

**TABLE IV LOGISTICS (TOTALS)**

<b>RICE (TONS)</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>POL (TONS)</b>	<b>228</b>
<b>AMMO (TONS)</b>	<b>1350</b>
<b>VEHICLES (NR)</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>PEOPLE (NR)</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>GENERAL CARGO</b>	<b>35</b>

**S E C R E T**

C O N F I D E N T I A L

ANNEX D - (C) - VC INCIDENTS

(READ IN 8 COLUMNS: CORPS/REGIMENT/ATTACHES/TERRORISM/SABOTAGE/  
PROPAGANDA/AA FIRE/TOTAL)

<u>I/TOTAL/2/76/3/22/14/117</u>	II/QUANG DUC/0/0/0/1/0/1
I/1ST DIV/1/49/2/19/3/74	II/TUYEN DUC/0/0/0/0/0/0
I/QUANG TRI/1/26/0/11/1/39	<u>III/TOTAL/6/67/22/13/9/119</u>
I/THUA THIEN/0/23/2/8/2/35	III/BL SZ/1/6/0/6/0/13
I/2ND DIV/1/27/1/3/11/43	III/BINH THUAN/1/3/0/1/0/5
I/QUANG NAM/0/15/0/2/6/23	III/BINH TUY/0/0/0/0/0/0
I/QUANG TIN/1/12/1/1/5/20	III/LAM DONG/0/1/0/3/0/4
<u>II/TOTAL/4/125/10/13/4/156</u>	III/LONG KHANH/0/2/0/2/0/4
II/25 DIV/3/78/8/4/3/96	III/PBT SZ/0/7/4/3/1/15
II/QUANG NGAI/3/34/6/3/0/46	III/BINH LONG/0/5/0/1/0/6
II/BINH DINH/0/44/2/1/3/50	III/PHUOC LONG/0/1/0/0/0/1
II/22 DIV/1/23/1/2/1/28	III/PHUOC THANH/0/1/4/2/1/8
II/KONTUM/0/1/0/1/0/2	III/PB SZ/1/10/0/1/2/14
II/PHU BOI/1/9/0/0/0/10	III/BIEN HOA/1/3/0/0/2/6
II/BIERIKU/0/13/1/1/1/16	III/PHUOC TUY/0/7/0/1/0/8
II/23 DIV/0/24/1/7/0/32	III/5 DIV/4/12/18/5/6/77
II/DABLAS/0/6/0/1/0/7	III/BINH BINH/2/26/4/4/4/40
II/THANH HOA/0/1/0/2/0/3	III/1ST DIV/2/3/0/0/2/0
II/PHU THUAN/0/3/0/0/0/3	III/2ND DIV/1/5/3/0/0/7
II/PHU THUAN/0/14/1/3/0/18	III/3RD DIV/0/12/1/0/0/14

**S E C R E T**

<u>RUNG SAT/BIEN HOA/0/1/0/0/0/1</u>	IV/BIEN HOA/1/1/0/0/1/9
TG/TOTAL/1/83/26/3/22/138	IV/VINH BINH/3/14/2/1/3/23
TG/DINH TUONG/0/15/2/1/1/20	IV/VINH LONG/2/13/1/0/1/17
TG/GO CONG/0/15/7/1/4/27	IV/21 DIV/5/52/21/6/6/90
TG/KIEN HOA/2/30/7/0/15/54	IV/AN XUYEN/0/12/3/0/1/16
TG/KIEN TUONG/0/4/1/0/1/6	IV/BA XUYEN/1/11/2/2/0/19
TG/LONG AN/1/19/9/1/1/31	IV/CHUONG THIEN/1/8/8/1/4/22
<u>IV/TOTAL/11/86/25/7/15/144</u>	IV/KIEN GIANG/0/6/0/0/0/6
IV/9DIV/6/34/4/1/9/54	IV/PHONG DINH/3/12/8/3/1/27
IV/AN GIANG/0/3/1/0/1/5	
COUNTRY TOTAL/27/451/87/60/64/689	

NOTE: BIEN HOA PROVINCE DIVIDED BETWEEN PHUOC BIEN  
SPECIAL ZONE (III CORPS) AND RUNG SAT SPECIAL AREA (VNN).

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ANNEX E (STATISTICAL DATA ON PERSONNEL AND WEAPON LOSSES)

1. RVN PERSONNEL AND WEAPON LOSSES

A. PERSONNEL LOSSES (READ IN 9 COLUMNS AS FOLLOWS: I/II/III/IV CORPS/TIEN GIANG TA/UMD/HUNG SAT SA/TOTAL.)

(1) REGULAR: KIA 7/12/13/26/81/1/0/110.

WIA 11/20/70/61/69/8/0/272.

MIA-GPER 0/3/0/0/61/0/0/61.

(2) RF: KIA 1/0/1/6/3/0/0/15.

WIA 7/3/4/19/9/0/0/42.

MIA-GPER 0/2/0/15/0/0/0/17.

(3) PF: KIA 1/8/22/6/39/1/0/0/96.

WIA 27/23/15/52/11/0/0/132.

MIA-GPER 2/62/6/22/6/0/0/98.

TOTAL: 876 (251 KIA, 446 WIA, 179 MIA-GPER).

B. WEAPON LOSSES: TOTAL: 347; PISTOLS/CARTRIDGES/REFLES 330, AUTOMATIC REFLES 13, CAL 30 MACHINE GUNS 2, MORTARS 60MM 2. BY ARMS: I/8, II/71, III/22, IV CORPS/96, TIEN GIANG TA/110, UMD/0, HUNG SAT SA/42/6.

C O [REDACTED] A L

2. VC PERSONNEL AND WEAPON LOSSES 16 AUG 64 TO 22 AUG 64

(READ IN 8 COLUMNS: I/II/III/IV CORPS/TIEN GIANG/CMD/RUMG SAT/  
TOTAL)

A. CASUALTIES:

KIA 486/59/32/50/39/666

CPTD 66/48/2/16/3/135

B. WEAPONS:

INDIVIDUAL 213/17/12/12/11/295

CREW SERVED NONE

C. RADIOS:

NONE

[REDACTED]

ANNEX 7 (Continued)

REVISIONS TO THE ANNEX

REVISIONS TO THE ANNEX

- (A) ADD OF APPL/C/100/C/C/C/C/R/B.
- (B) ADD OF APPL/C/100/C/C/C/C/R/B.
- (C) ADD OF APPL/C/100/C/C/C/C/R/B.
- (D) SH W SCH/C/C/C/C/C/C/R/B.
- (E) SH W DISF/C/C/C/C/C/C/R/B.
- (F) ONE SELF-HELP PROJ/C/C/C/C/C/C/R/B.
- (G) TWO SELF-HELP PROJ/C/C/C/C/C/C/R/B.
- (H) SH MIL TRG/C/C/C/C/C/C/R/B.
- (I) SH MIL ARM/C/C/C/C/C/C/R/B.
- (J) W AUTH SQHD/C/100/C/C/C/C/R/B.
- (K) AUG SH/C/100/C/C/C/C/R/B.
- (L) W REINF CPRL/C/100/C/C/C/C/R/B.

NOTE A: NOT USED

NOTE B: NO INFORMATION AVAILABLE

NOTE C: NO CHANGE