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SUBJECT: Letter of Transmittal

TO: See Distribution

1. This PHUNG HOANG (PHOENIX) End of Year Report for 1969 is being distributed to inform and update addressees concerning the nature and status of the Government of Vietnam PHUNG HOANG Program which is advised by US PHOENIX personnel.

2. Comments, recommendations or requests for additional information are welcome and may be addressed to Commander, United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, Attn: ACofS, CORDS, APO 96222.

W. E. Colby
W. E. COLBY
DEPCORDS/MACV

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UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM**

28 Feb 1970

**PHUNG HOANG (PHOENIX) PROGRAM
1969 END OF YEAR REPORT**

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ANNEXES

- A. Background and Purpose of the PHUNG HOANG (PHOENIX) Program
- B. PHUNG HOANG Operations
- C. Neutralization Statistics
- D. Enemy Situation and Reaction to PHUNG HOANG
- E. US Personnel Situation and Organization of PHOENIX
- F. Status of Local National Personnel
- G. Funding - 1970

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**Subject: The PHUNG HOANG (PHOENIX) Program
End of Year Report for 1969**

SUMMARY

1. Purpose.

The purpose of this report is to inform interested agencies about the activities of the PHUNG HOANG (PHOENIX) Program during calendar year 1969 and the status of the Program as the year ended.

2. General.

a. Primary efforts in 1969 were directed toward improving the program by solving existing problems and increasing GVN interest and expertise at all levels.

b. An Annex is included which gives the background and purpose of the program for use by those who are not familiar with PHUNG HOANG (PHOENIX) or have not kept abreast with the problems and achievements that have occurred as the program was initiated and expanded.

c. Programs are being developed to improve GVN capabilities to the point where US PHOENIX advisory efforts and logistical support can be phased downward.

3. Management and Support.

a. Effective 1 July 1969 management and support responsibilities for the US PHOENIX advisory effort were officially transferred from the Office of the Special Assistant to the Ambassador (OSA) to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (ACofS, CORDS).

b. Funding became difficult during the year as monetary allocations were reduced.

c. Personnel problems were encountered in the areas of interpreters, clerical help and a shortage of Majors and Captains authorized to fill advisory positions in Provinces and Districts.

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4. Operations.

- a. Operations against the VCI improved during the year as more personnel in more agencies became familiar with the program and its purpose.
- b. Increased emphasis was placed on increasing the role of the National Police as the primary operating element of the program.
- c. Operational techniques were stressed during all inspections at all echelons and a new operational planning guide was developed.

5. Training.

- a. The PHOENIX Coordinators' Orientation Course had trained 850 personnel at the Vung Tau School by the end of 1969.
- b. Efforts were made to establish a PHOENIX Advisors' training course in CONUS which would include Vietnamese language training.
- c. PHUNG HOANG Training Schools were opened in each of the Corps Tactical Zones for training of GVN personnel associated with the program.

6. Statistics.

- a. During the year 19,534 VCI were reported as neutralized. Approximately 60% of these were priority targets.
- b. The estimated number of remaining VCI targets against the GVN was approximately 74,000 at the end of 1969.

7. Prognosis.

- a. Further improvements in the program will depend on the capability and enthusiasm of the National Police as they take over a larger share of responsibility for the program.
- b. The amount of involvement that the Publicity and Education Campaign will elicit from the Vietnamese citizens will influence the degree of success.

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8. Conclusions.

- a. The apparatus is in place for the program to be successful.
- b. The importance of the program to the future of a non-Communist South Vietnam is well recognized by the current leadership.
- c. A sufficient number of Vietnamese are being educated to execute the program effectively.
- d. The success of the program now depends on Vietnamese willingness to apply available resources in an aggressive and professional manner to prevent the Communist leadership apparatus from taking over South Vietnam.

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THE PHUNG HOANG (PHOENIX) PROGRAM

1969 END OF YEAR REPORT

1. Background

a. PHOENIX (originally known as ICEX - Intelligence Coordination and Exploitation for the attack on the Viet Cong Infrastructure) was established by MACV Directive 381-41, dated 9 July 1967, as the Action Program for mounting an attack on the Viet Cong Infrastructure.

b. The foundation of the PHUNG HOANG Program is Article 4 of the Constitution of 1967, which states: (1) The Republic of Vietnam opposes Communism in any form; (2) any activity designed to publicize or carry out Communism is prohibited.

c. The Government of Vietnam (GVN) launched the PHUNG HOANG Program on 20 December 1967 when the Prime Minister issued a Letter of Instruction. However, it was not until the issuance of Presidential Decree No. 280-a/TT/SL, dated 1 July 1968, that the GVN was fully committed to the attack on the VC political organization. The Presidential Decree was followed by promulgation of a Standing Operating Procedure on 23 July 1968, which directed the organization of PHUNG HOANG Committees at all echelons from National to District level. Issuance of these two documents reflected the GVN's ultimate acceptance of the necessity for and vital importance of initiating direct action against the VCI. They also provided the authority needed to direct cooperation of participating GVN agencies at subordinate levels. Operations started to advance after July 1968 and by the end of that year, all of the goals established for the PHOENIX/PHUNG HOANG Program had been achieved or surpassed. The goals were directed toward getting the necessary "machinery" in place as well as conducting the attack on the VCI. See Annex A for more detailed background and purpose of the program.

2. Status at Beginning of Calendar Year 1969

a. The 1968 PHUNG HOANG Program closed on notes of continued organization, embryonic success, logistical entanglements, maximum US involvement, statistical analysis, and hope. It was recognized that continued success of PHUNG HOANG could grow only from increased GVN involvement, understanding and desire.

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b. The US effort had succeeded in placing an organization with its physical and monetary assets at the disposal of the GVN. What remained to be done was to supervise, guide, assist and advise the Vietnamese in the control and conduct of the PHUNG HOANG Program.

3. Objectives for 1969

a. The objectives for 1969 were directed toward improving the program by solving existing problems. Primary among these were:

- (1) Command Emphasis from National to Hamlet level.
- (2) Classification and Legal processing of detainees.
- (3) Improved quality of personnel responsible for PHUNG HOANG.
- (4) More detailed instruction for PHUNG HOANG operating personnel.
- (5) Improved inspection program.
- (6) Improved operations for more selective targeting.
- (7) More detailed plans and guidance from National level.
- (8) Greater involvement of National Police in the Program.
- (9) Increased understanding of the program by convincing the Vietnamese people that the PHUNG HOANG Campaign was designed to protect them from terrorism.
- (10) Increased participation of GVN PHUNG HOANG officials at the National level.
- (11) Improved training programs for both US and GVN personnel directly responsible for support and execution of the PHUNG HOANG Plan.
- (12) Improved participation of Tactical Units and other agencies responsible by national directive (US and GVN) to coordinate with and provide support to the PHUNG HOANG Plan.
- (13) Improvement of agency exchange of information.

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b. Modification and adjustments to these objectives were applied periodically during the year as felt necessary by US and GVN leadership.

4. PHUNG HOANG/PHOENIX Accomplishments

a. The primary objective of the US PHOENIX effort during 1969 was to increase GVN participation in and direction of the PHUNG HOANG Program. This objective was accomplished by assisting and persuading the GVN at the National level to operate the PHUNG HOANG Program in accordance with established decrees, directives and guidelines. Emphasis was placed on advising the Office of the President, the Prime Minister, the Ministry of Interior, the Central Pacification and Development Council (CPDC), the Central PHUNG HOANG Committee, and the Central PHUNG HOANG Permanent Office (CPHPO).

b. Direct personal action by the US Ambassador, COMUSMACV, and DEPCORDS/MACV effected the involvement of the highest GVN levels in the PHUNG HOANG Program, i.e., the President, the Prime Minister and the Minister of Interior. During 1969, this objective was achieved. In almost every public appearance, television presentation, and field trip, President Thieu and Prime Minister Khien emphasized the importance of PHUNG HOANG to the freedom and future of the Vietnamese people. The following is an excerpt from a speech made by the President on 28 November 1969:

"The VCI must be eliminated. Because of the enemy's weakness in conventional warfare he must still resort to inciting the people to struggle against the government, organizing revolutionary committees for political struggle, and so forth. The Communists cannot afford to lose their infrastructure and the commo-liaison, tax collection capabilities, etc., that the VCI give them. Ho Chi Minh stated that as long as he had two cadre in every hamlet, he could continue the political struggle regardless of the number of allied forces or fire power available to the GVN Regular Forces. Ho Chi Minh was correct in this appraisal, but it also follows that as we eliminate these two cadre in every hamlet, that North Vietnam cannot continue their political struggle and therefore the Communists in the end will be defeated by the PHUNG HOANG Program. Without PHUNG HOANG the Communists could remain indefinitely within the fabric of society, later to begin their struggle anew at some future time. Thus the PHUNG HOANG Program is the most important in eliminating the Communists as a political threat."

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c. The second action taken (all actions were initiated concurrently) was to effect strong GVN directives in support of PHUNG HOANG. During 1969, several significant GVN directives were published, three of the most important were:

- (1) MOI Circular 757, Classification and Rehabilitation Guidelines for the Proper Processing of VCI was published on 21 March 1969. Heretofore, the GVN effort was a myriad of unrelated local actions, which tended to downgrade the GVN in the eyes of the Vietnamese people.
- (2) On 20 August 1969 MOI Circular 2212, Improvements of the Methods of Resolving the Status of Offenders, was published. This Circular added refinement and purpose to 757 and it is more specific in the evidence required to prosecute the methods of handling offenders.
- (3) Current Breakout of VCI Executive and Significant Cadres (Green Book) was revised effective 1 Jan 1970. This book lists Communist offenders, who are considered VCI. It is used by operational personnel and for judicial processing.

d. In addition to these actions, the GVN appointed a Senior Colonel to command the CPHPO thereby raising the status of the PHUNG HOANG effort within the GVN, and in addition, assigned a highly qualified Lieutenant Colonel with a great deal of intelligence experience. These assignments proved to be most significant. The CPHPO began to produce their own intelligence products in lieu of translating American Advisor products. There was an immediate upswing in the tempo of operations and work at CPHPO, and the result was felt throughout the PHUNG HOANG Program. A prime example of this PHUNG HOANG country-wide acceptance could be seen in the immediate use and requests for additional copies of the revised Green Book.

e. SOP-3, the National Directive for all PHUNG HOANG agencies which outlines responsibilities, actions, reporting, operations and support was written during 1969 by GVN personnel of the CPHPO. The Vietnamese language version was distributed on 20 January 1970. The English translation was published for use by US Advisors in February 1970.

f. CPHPO was successful in producing several directives and guidance documents carrying the signatures of the President and Prime Minister which effectively levied requirements and actions on Province Chiefs, thereby involving the Province Chiefs more deeply into PHUNG HOANG operations.

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g. A more effective inspection system was developed and tested in 1969, and will be used throughout the PHUNG HOANG Program in 1970. The inspection guide allows in-depth inspection and assistance to be performed by PHUNG HOANG inspectors at any echelon and concentrates on operations rather than on statistics and briefings.

h. A new Operational Planning Guide was developed and field-tested in 1969. It also will be used throughout PHUNG HOANG in 1970. The Operational Planning Guide concentrates on operational security, more effective targeting, the specific steps required to ensure proper dossiers being compiled, and the requirement that secure operations are conducted. Annex B contains examples of PHUNG HOANG operations.

i. Late in 1969, CPHPO in conjunction with MACCORDS/PHOENIX produced Annex II, "Protection of the People From Terrorism", for the GVN 1970 Pacification and Development Plan. Annex II includes goals for the PHUNG HOANG Program from National to village level; each goal being coordinated closely with all GVN agencies having responsibilities in pacification and development. CPHPO also produced Annex C, to the 1970 AB 145 Plan, a national plan considering military support to all GVN activities. This Annex provides instructions to tactical units for cooperation and coordination with the PHUNG HOANG Program.

j. Of special significance during the year was the preparation by CPHPO of a study recommending that PHUNG HOANG be integrated into the National Police. The study and concept has been approved in principle by the Prime Minister who has directed that details for the integration be prepared for implementation. The proposed integration will solve many of the past and present problems of PHUNG HOANG as follows:

- (1) PHUNG HOANG will become part of an official agency of the GVN, allowing proper budgeting, support and permanency.
- (2) The entire facilities of the National Police Force will be in direct support of PHUNG HOANG activities from national to hamlet level.
- (3) Command and communications channels will be available for immediate use for PHUNG HOANG activities.
- (4) A focal point will be maintained for the advisory effort.
- (5) Monitoring and supervision will remain at the highest police level.

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- (6) The ability to rapidly initiate, approve and promulgate national level doctrine, guidance and directives will remain.

k. Publicity for the PHUNG HOANG Program was undertaken. In August 1969 the President directed the Minister of Interior to prepare a PHUNG HOANG Publicity Plan. During August and September 1969 the Publicity Plan was finalized. The Plan required the participation of every GVN agency. On 1 October 1969 Prime Minister Kiem presided over the kick-off rally and parade in Saigon which launched the PHUNG HOANG Publicity Campaign at the national level. Concurrent television and news releases were made and hundreds of thousands of PHUNG HOANG leaflets were distributed. The publicity campaign was designed to bring the Vietnamese people into the national attack against the VCI. From 1 October through the end of 1969, the publicity campaign was expanded to include a separate campaign for each province throughout the country. As the year closed the campaign was beginning to be felt in villages and hamlets throughout the Republic. The effect has been dramatic and the initial results most gratifying. Acceleration of the publicity campaign at village and hamlet level during the coming year will greatly add to the overall effectiveness of the PHUNG HOANG Plan.

1. More participation at GVN PHUNG HOANG National level has been a significant improvement during 1969. The Central PHUNG HOANG Permanent Office is now actively engaged in the preparation of PHUNG HOANG directives and policies. Heretofore, most PHUNG HOANG directives and policies were written by US personnel, translated into Vietnamese, and issued by CPHPO. The professionalism of CPHPO has steadily increased and more and more actions are being issued by CPHPO personnel.

5. Training of PHOENIX Advisors and PHUNG HOANG Personnel

a. A regularly scheduled (semi-monthly), ten-day PHOENIX Coordinators' Orientation Course was instituted at Vung Tau in November 1968. This course was designed to increase the effectiveness of PHOENIX Coordinators at province and district levels. Beginning in February 1969, non-PHOENIX personnel from US tactical units, US advisors to ARVN units, US advisors to GVN civil agencies and Free World Military Assistance Forces (FWMAF) were included in each group of students. By the end of 1969, 850 personnel had completed the PHOENIX course. Of this number, 293 were non-PHOENIX personnel, while 557 were assigned PHOENIX duties.

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b. MACCORDS PHOENIX Directorate conducts a briefing program to inform newly assigned province and district advisors, personnel assigned to MACV staff elements, and personnel in supporting agencies of PHOENIX activities and to enlist their support and assistance as appropriate.

c. In addition to the training of US personnel, the PHOENIX Directorate advises and supports the training of Vietnamese personnel assigned PHUNG HOANG duties. Centralized PHUNG HOANG training courses were started at Corps level by III CTZ in December 1968, by I CTZ in June 1969, and by II and IV CTZs in October 1969. When all assigned Vietnamese personnel have attended the courses, it is anticipated that the Corps level courses will be phased out to be replaced by a national level course and mobile training teams. By the end of 1969, the Corps centers had trained 596 students from I CTZ, 110 from II CTZ, 886 from III CTZ, and 240 from IV CTZ.

d. In order to improve training in language, background subjects, and basic operational techniques of PHOENIX personnel prior to their arrival in Vietnam, MACCORDS PHOENIX Directorate coordinated changes in their selection and preparation during 1969. Department of the Army personnel management and training agencies agreed to identify PHOENIX personnel earlier and to train them more thoroughly in the U.S. Subsequently, a 15-week course, including 180 hours of instruction in Vietnamese language, was developed for presentation in CONUS.

e. MACCORDS PHOENIX Directorate regularly mails pertinent training material to US centers for use in their instruction. The regular mailing list includes the Foreign Service Institute, Vietnam Training Center, Washington, D.C.; the Defense Intelligence School, Washington, D.C., the US Army Intelligence School, Fort Holabird, Maryland, the US Army Institute for Military Assistance, Fort Bragg, N.C., US Army Civil Affairs School, Fort Gordon, Georgia, the US Army Pacific Intelligence School, Okinawa, and MACTHAI/JUSMAG, Thailand.

6. Tactical Unit Support

Tactical unit support and participation steadily improved throughout the year. Many US units conducted special anti-VCI operations. Most notable of these was the 101st Airborne and the 25th Infantry Divisions. In I CTZ the Marine support given to the PHUNG HOANG Program contributed immeasurably to the tremendous success being achieved. Experienced USMC intelligence specialists were placed full time in support of several PIOCcs and DIOCcs. In IV CTZ, the Navy Intelligence Liaison Officers cooperated extensively with PHUNG HOANG/PHOENIX. Other US units contributed to PHUNG HOANG in varying degrees depending on the tactical

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situation. ARVN units participation improved slightly but not to the degree directed by national level exhortations. Cooperation by the Australian Task Force was continuous and highly professional in their area of operations. Republic of Korea Forces provided only slight and infrequent support or cooperation with PHUNG HOANG efforts.

7. Exchange of Information

Improvement of exchange of information between agencies responsible for PLOCC and DIOCC operations occurred only where strong Province Chief of District Chief interest and pressure was applied. The reluctance to exchange or share information has had an adverse effect in several districts and provinces. In some cases, however, operational security has been enhanced by such unilateral action - most notably the Special Police in the Saigon Metropolitan Area.

8. Neutralization Results

a. The PHUNG HOANG machinery has the potential to function effectively. This was evidenced by the fact that 19,534 VCI were reported as neutralized during the period 1 January through 31 December 1969. This compares to a total of 15,776 neutralized in 1968. The 1969 total represents a significant improvement because the criteria for qualifying as a VCI was made much stricter than the 1968 criteria. (Neutralization statistics are at Annex C.)

b. Operational results experienced a sharp increase from July through December. The GVN established a monthly goal of 1800 neutralizations. This figure was exceeded in four of the last six months of the year. The average number of neutralizations in the last six months was 1835, exceeding the six-month goal of 10,800. However, the yearly goal of 21,600 neutralizations was not met due to poor results in the first six months of the year. Total neutralizations of 19,534 achieved 90.4 percent of the goal.

c. The quality of neutralizations in 1969 also improved as more VCI occupying positions at district and higher level were neutralized. Among those neutralized were 21 COSVN level VCI. In 1968, 13 percent of the VCI neutralized were occupying positions at district and higher level. In 1969 this increased to an average of 21 percent of the infrastructure.

d. Four of the more important priority targets of PHUNG HOANG were Security Personnel, Finance and Economy, Revolutionary Committee Personnel and Current Affairs Committee personnel. Neutralizations were 4007, 3670, 1108 and 609

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respectively, for a total of 9,394. Allowing for the 2281 other VCI who were from district level or higher, the total priority VCI targets neutralized were 11,675, or about 60% of the 19,534 total neutralizations.

9. Enemy Situation and Reactions to PHUNG HOANG

a. By the end of 1969, estimates of the number of VCI targeted against the GVN were approximately 74,000.

b. The estimate may be much too high in terms of hard core Communist leaders because of the tremendous efforts being made by the enemy to fill all important leadership positions, regardless of individual capability, in order to claim an "in place" government as an alternative to the present Government of Viet Nam.

c. There is much evidence of VCI filling two or more positions and other evidence of Liberation Committees or Revolutionary Committees existing on paper only.

d. Recruitment is becoming more and more difficult as territorial security and pacification is expanded.

e. As VCI cadres are lost there is frantic upgrading of personnel in some areas and downgrading of personnel in other areas to fill positions, thereby decreasing efficiency.

f. Tactical Unit actions, Pacification and PHUNG HOANG have caused more covert methods of operation such as exercising control from safe-havens through commo-liaison couriers. (See Annex D for a more detailed discussion.)

10. US Personnel in Support of PHUNG HOANG

a. Current US JTD personnel authorization provides for a total of 441 military and 21 civilian spaces in the PHOENIX Program. Not shown in the JTD are the Director and his secretary who are detailed from the Office of the Special Assistant to the US Ambassador (OSA).

b. Of the total of military and civilian personnel authorized, 256 serve at District/City level, 132 at Province, 41 at Corps, and 33 at the PHOENIX Directorate in Saigon. Those PHOENIX personnel serving outside the immediate Saigon/Cholon area are assigned as integral members of MACV Advisory Teams. They are charged with the responsibility for advising the PHUNG HOANG Program at their echelon. The PHOENIX Directorate is assigned to the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS), MACV.

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c. MACCORDS PHOENIX Directorate is organized into three functional divisions - Program Administration, Training, and Plans and Operations - and is charged with overall program supervision throughout the Republic.

d. Attached at Annex E are the following: Strength Status - Assigned Personnel, Civilian Personnel Authorization in Field Elements, and Organizational Chart - PHOENIX Directorate.

11. Local National Employee Situation

a. Most US PHOENIX Coordinators do not read or speak Vietnamese. There is a great need for qualified interpreter-translators in the PHUNG HOANG/PHOENIX Program. The current Table of Distribution for local national civilians provides a total of 779 spaces for PHOENIX in RVN. Of these, 764 serve at District, Province and CTZ level. The remaining 15 spaces are at the MACV Headquarters level. As of 20 January 1970, 625 of the 779 authorized spaces were filled while 154 spaces were vacant. (See Annex F.) The total 779 allocation was computed by adding district allocations (one interpreter/translator and one clerk/typist), province allocations (two interpreter/translators and three clerk/typists) to the regional (CTZ) and Saigon allocations. Presently most vacancies occur in the district interpreter/translator slot as there is a reluctance on the part of most educated Vietnamese civilians to leave urban areas to work in a sparsely populated and remote area. The present wage system increases this problem as the wage scales are the same for all areas. Thus, there is no monetary incentive to go to a remote area.

b. The current shortage of qualified interpreter/translators is also due to loss of draft deferred status by individuals already employed. Prior to 1 December 1969 local nationals employed by PHUNG HOANG/PHOENIX as interpreters/translators, even though of draft age, had deferments from military service. However, in December 1969 the GVN Mobilization Directorate issued a directive stating that all draft eligible interpreter/translators would be drafted into military service. As a result of this action, the PHUNG HOANG/PHOENIX Program is in the process of losing most of its male civilian interpreters. This will seriously affect the program at district and province level. Qualified replacement individuals are in short supply and are reluctant to work at district level.

c. A partial solution has been the assignment of ARVN interpreters but to date these have not been made available in sufficient numbers to completely alleviate the problem.

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However, getting more ARVN interpreters assigned to PIOCCs and DIOCCs is the best short-range solution to the problem.

d. A long-range solution to the problem is a campaign that is underway to recruit interested local nationals at the local level (PIOCC or DIOCC) and send them to the Central Training Institute in Saigon. The major attribute of this program is that locally recruited personnel would be more likely to return and remain at their home than people recruited from other areas. Only draft deferrable individuals are eligible. Women and over-draft age men have to be the primary targets of any recruiting that is done. This is not a short term solution, however, in the long run it should be an effective solution to the interpreter problem. It will take a student from 32 to 56 weeks to complete the interpreter/translator course depending on the level of comprehension that he or she had attained prior to entering the course.

12. Logistical Support

a. Prior to 1 July 1969, the Office of the Special Assistant to the U.S. Ambassador (OSA) in South Vietnam was primarily responsible for logistical support to both the US PHOENIX and GVN PHUNG HOANG Programs. Support was directly monitored by US PHOENIX to provide adequate resources, through OSA channels, for the initial foundation and continued development of GVN PHUNG HOANG activities throughout South Vietnam (SVN). OSA leadership, experience, and flexibility was considered essential by the US Government to lay the necessary groundwork and develop the initial framework for PHUNG HOANG/PHOENIX activities and support requirements. The professional attention allocated by OSA to both the US and GVN programs supported the establishment of over 300 PHUNG HOANG/PHOENIX activities by 30 June 1969.

b. By December 1968, the program was functioning and both the GVN and US accepted and supported the concept. At the beginning of CY 1969 actions were initiated to effect the transfer of management functions and responsibilities for the program from OSA to the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV); specifically, for incorporation under the auspices of MACV's Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS) Staff. In direct coordination with OSA and MACCORDS PHOENIX representatives, essential MACV staff offices (under the direction of the Chief of Staff, MACV) began developing the management policies and procedures for assumption of MACV support of PHUNG HOANG/PHOENIX in lieu of OSA.

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c. Effective 1 July 1969, management and support function responsibilities for the US PHOENIX (which supports the GVN PHUNG HOANG Program) were officially transferred in-country from OSA to MACV. The MACV staffs developed the support procedures which were officially disseminated to the field in the form of Annex I (PHOENIX Administration and Logistics Support) to MACV Directive 10-20 (PHOENIX). The procedures contained in the six sections of Annex I were developed by the MACV staff offices of the Comptroller (Section I - Funding), J-1 (Section II - Personnel and Force Structure), J-4 (Section III - Supply and Equipment Maintenance), Directorate of Construction (Section IV - Construction and Facilities Maintenance), J-3 (Section V - Airlift Support), and J-6 (Section VI - Communications Support) in coordination with CORDS, OSA, and PHOENIX.

d. Primary support to GVN PHUNG HOANG activities is provided through the use of Assistance-in-Kind (AIK) funds (piasters) for local in-country procurement of necessary supplies and equipment. Support to US PHOENIX activities was to be provided through military property book officers, General Services Officers, and Civilian Support Officers (depending on Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ) locations). However, subsequent to publication and dissemination of support procedures, it became apparent that the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) did not intend to use its resources or manpower in support of US PHOENIX activities. USAID's position specifically affected the rendering of adequate support to the US PHOENIX Directorate in Saigon, US PHOENIX staffs at all levels (District, Province, and Region) in I and IV CTZs, and to Corps level US PHOENIX staffs in II and III CTZs. The Management Support Directorate of CORDS was given the task of coordinating with USAID and appropriate MACV staffs to resolve the situation. Upon consideration of all aspects, USAID's position of non-support was accepted by MACV; and, subsequently, MACV prescribed appropriate military sources of support to US PHOENIX in lieu of USAID sources. J-4, MACV determined new support sources for US PHOENIX and issued appropriate directions to the field.

e. The Vietnamese in their 1970 Pacification and Development Plan do not address fiscal and logistical aspects required to support GVN PHUNG HOANG activities. Accordingly, the US Department of Defense, through MACCORDS/PHOENIX, is committed to support the GVN PHUNG HOANG Program during 1970. Approximately 52 million piasters from AIK funds will be made available for support of GVN PHUNG HOANG activities. These monies will be used to support over 300 PHUNG HOANG Centers throughout SVN and to sponsor four regional level PHUNG HOANG Schools.

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13. Overview of Funding Support

a. Dollar and AIK piaster expenditures prior to 1 July 1969 were considerably higher than they now are due to large initial costs involved in establishing the program. During the organizational phase, AIK piaster funds were used to construct PIOCCs (Province Intelligence Operations Coordinating Centers) and DIOCCs (District Intelligence Operations Coordinating Centers). AIK funds were also used to pay local national employees and to equip the PIOCCs and DIOCCs after they were constructed.

b. During the period of OSA management, OSA was reimbursed by MACV for 2/3 of all PHUNG HOANG related piaster expenditures. Thus, the AIK piaster support for the PHUNG HOANG/PHOENIX Program, prior to 1 July 1969 was funded 1/3 with OSA funds and 2/3 with MACV AIK funds.

c. AIK Piaster Funds

(1) AIK piaster funds of 236,000,000 \$VN were allocated to support the PHUNG HOANG/PHOENIX Program in CY 1969. Although final computations are not available, there is every indication that most of these funds have been either expended or obligated in CY 1969. The primary expenditure classes were pay of local national employees, supplies and equipment, and construction.

(2) The first quarter of CY 1970 will see the end of the construction phase. No new funds are currently budgeted for construction in CY 1970. Pay for local nationals was transferred 1 July 1969 to MACV so that is no longer an active consideration of PHOENIX. Pay for local nationals in CY 1969 was budgeted at 129,223,750 \$VN. The piaster requirements which remain are those needed to fund normal operating expenses of over 300 PHUNG HOANG/PHOENIX Centers. 36,000,000 \$VN of AIK funds have been earmarked for this purpose in CY 1970. This is more than a 50% reduction compared with the same object classes in CY 1969. Support for PHUNG HOANG Schools in each of the CTZs amounts to 15,700,000 \$VN, all of which was obligated in CY 1969 but most of which will be spent in CY 1970.

(3) Until 1 January 1970 the GVN did not budget any funds to support the PHUNG HOANG Program. However, 5,880,000 \$VN was approved for support of the PHUNG HOANG Program in CY 1970. This 5,880,000 \$VN is only a step in the direction of full GVN support.

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d. Dollar Funds

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(1) Dollar requirements used to support US PHOENIX activities have also been quite variable since the start of the program. Past dollar expenditures have been used primarily to purchase items of office equipment for use by US PHOENIX Coordinators, vehicles, and for payment of salaries of civilians assigned to the PHOENIX Program.

(2) A dollar budget of \$667,600 was submitted for FY 1970. However, it now appears that actual expenditures will not approach this original estimate for FY 1970. The biggest short-fall occurs in the personnel area. Currently only 12 of 22 civilian positions are filled with the aim of further reducing this to 10 spaces by the end of FY 1970. Taking a straight percentage of the \$445,800 budgeted for personnel this would mean a reduction of \$200,000 or more in FY 1970. According to the MACV Comptroller's staff, there is also considerable shortfall in other areas regarding FY 1970 Budget estimates. At the moment it would appear that actual dollar requirements needed to support the PHOENIX Program in FY 1970 will be in the neighborhood of \$300,000 to \$350,000 with a strong possibility that total expenditures for FY 1970 may drop below \$300,000. (See Annex G.)

14. Action Program Against the VCI

a. The PHOENIX Action Program Against the VCI is the basic US planning document designed to insure continued improvement in the GVN PHUNG HOANG Program. The Action Program consists of four elements: (1) Improve Operational Performance, (2) Improve Legal Processing, (3) Improve Training, and (4) Improve Data Base and Reporting. Specific goals for each element and actions required to achieve each goal have been established. Attached as TAB E is a copy of the Action Program together with Fact Sheets which present the latest updated information on the current status of action taken to achieve the established goals at National level and/or within each CTZ.

b. The Republic of Vietnam Central Pacification and Development Council (CPDC) Plan for 1970, Annex II, "Protection of the People from Terrorism", is the basic GVN PHUNG HOANG planning document. Appropriate bi-lateral US/GVN goals from the PHOENIX Action Program have been included in Annex II of the CPDC Plan. Based upon the objectives and guidance contained in the National Plan, province level PHUNG HOANG personnel have developed Annexes to the Province Pacification and Development Plan.

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c. As previously noted the neutralization of VCI at the village and hamlet level has damaged the effectiveness of the Communist Revolutionary Committees. The hard core VCI Communist Party cadre have been forced to continue dissipating their efforts by performing day-to-day governmental functions and they have been forced to conduct these activities from isolated base areas and from across adjacent province and even international boundaries. The plans of attack on the VCI in 1970 are targeted primarily on these hard core VCI, both those who are still functioning among the people and those in the base areas. The level of attack on the VCI has also been broadened. Plans now require neutralization of significant VCI cadre operating from region level to the village/hamlet VCI echelons. To capitalize on the successes of 1969 at the village and hamlet level, the CPDC has directed Province Chiefs to select villages in which the entire VC Infrastructure will be neutralized during 1970.

d. Other highlights of actions being taken to improve the PHUNG HOANG Program are:

(1) Improve Operational Performance:

(a) As in 1969, the 1970 plans have also established a country-wide VCI neutralization goal of 1800 per month. The CPDC has assigned monthly goals for each CTZ and the CTZs have assigned goals for each province. These goals are met when VCI have rallied to the GVN Chieu Hoi Program, have been captured by GVN or Allied Security Forces, or have been killed-in-action as the result of resistance to capture or engagement during tactical operations. Significantly, however, 1970 plans require that captured VCI be sentenced and incarcerated by Province Security Committees (PSC) before they may be counted as VCI neutralized. This change is designed to encourage PHUNG HOANG agencies to accumulate sufficient evidence for sentencing by PSCs, prior to arresting the VCI. It will also encourage rapid processing of captured VCI for sentencing. Another requirement of the 1970 plan is that two-thirds of all VCI arrested each month must be processed to the PSC for trial.

(b) Concurrent with this more sophisticated attack on the VCI, 1970 plans call for improvements in PHUNG HOANG operational efficiency. Two documents are designed to have a major impact during 1970 toward improving operational efficiency. These are: (1) Standing Operating Procedure (SOP) 3, and (2) the revised "Green Book" ("Current Breakout of VCI Executive and Significant Cadre"). SOP 3 was written by experienced GVN police and military intelligence personnel and accumulates doctrine and operational procedures and experience developed since the commencement of the PHUNG HOANG Program. The "Green Book" lists all known executive, leadership and functional positions within the VCI organization, from Central to hamlet level. VCI who occupy the positions listed in the "Green Book" are the targets of the 1970 PHUNG HOANG campaign.

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(c) The PHUNG HOANG organization will be improved during 1970 by integrating the program's national level coordinating office, the Central PHUNG HOANG Permanent Office (CPHPO), into the National Police. Responsibility for the program at each echelon will remain with the Prime Minister as Chairman of the Central PHUNG HOANG Committee, and with CTZ Commanders, Province Chiefs and District Chiefs, as Chairman of their respective PHUNG HOANG Committees. However, the operational command and communication channels of the National Police will improve performance within the PHUNG HOANG Program. This necessary integration will properly contribute to the establishment of the PHUNG HOANG Program as a civilian police counterintelligence effort, designed to identify and neutralize espionage, sabotage, subversion, and sedition directed against the government and citizens of South Vietnam. The end result should be an FBI type organization as it exists in the US.

(d) A concerted effort began in 1969 and the 1970 plans stress the involvement of village and hamlet officials and all citizens in the PHUNG HOANG Program. Information and education programs are underway in all provinces to enlist the support of the people and increase their understanding that the PHUNG HOANG Program is designed to protect them from the terrorism directed by the VCI. SOP 3 had established procedures for identification of known VCI cadre. The operational elements of agencies participating in the PHUNG HOANG Program have also been directed to cooperate and coordinate with village officials in the conduct of operations in the villages and to notify the village officials of the apprehension and disposition of villagers detained as VCI suspects.

(2) Improve Legal Processing:

(a) A Political Security Office has been formed within the Ministry of Interior to provide overall policy guidance for all GVN agencies involved in the post-apprehension processing of Communist offenders.

(b) A new Short Form Offender Dossier will be distributed to improve methods of gathering evidence, intelligence, and information to be used for sentencing Communist offenders by Province Security Committees.

(c) A computer-compatible VCI Tracking System is presently being completed, which will provide a more accurate means of tracking VCI after they have been apprehended. The new tracking system is scheduled to be operative by April 1970. It is designed to trace the location of VCI who have rallied through the Chieu Hoi Program, as well as captured VCI.

(3) Improve Training:

(a) By June 1970 it is anticipated that all GVN personnel assigned to province and district level PHUNG HOANG Centers will have completed training at the four Regional

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PHUNG HOANG training facilities. Plans are underway to establish a National PHUNG HOANG training facility for that training required subsequent to June 1970. Additional required training is also to be conducted by a mobile training team.

(b) Training of US PHOENIX Advisors will also be improved by the commencement in about March 1970 of a course at Fort Holabird, Maryland. The course is specifically tailored to meet the requirements of the PHOENIX Program to include Vietnamese language training.

(4) Improve Data Base and Reporting:

(a) A combined US/GVN neutralization report is planned for implementation in early 1970. Implementation date is dependent upon approval by the Central Pacification and Development Council and the publication of GVN directives and instructions. Revised MACV Directive 3E1-43 and neutralization report worksheets are being published. They should be distributed early in February. It is hoped that the system can be implemented with the March reporting cycle. Until the new system is implemented, the present reporting system has been modified to permit reporting of VCI who were sentenced during the reporting month. Under the 1970 Pacification and Development Plan, a captured VCI is not considered neutralized until he is sentenced. Beginning with January 1970, computer printouts of the monthly neutralization report will indicate VCI killed, sentenced, and rallied as neutralized.

(b) The Public Safety Directorate, CORDS, is working with the Director General National Police (DGNP) in developing a VCI Arrest Accountability System which will track VCI from the time of capture to imprisonment and/or release. The system will be used for all detained VCI and other persons detained by the police and in civil custody. In conjunction with this system, a Hoi Chanh Tracking System is being developed for tracking the Hoi Chanh after his release from the rehabilitation system. Both systems are currently under development. They will be tied-in with the neutralization reporting system by compatible data consisting of an arrest number for VCI and an identification number for Hoi Chanh. From these systems all Hoi Chanh and captured VCI will be positively identified and only counted as neutralizations when actually rehabilitated or imprisoned.

15. Prognosis for the Future

a. The Communists have come to realize that the GVN's pacification efforts and the PHUNG HOANG Program against the VCI pose formidable threats. During the 1969 Summer Offensive,

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their priority targets specifically included pacification cadres, civilian self-defense personnel and PHUNG HOANG "spies". The PHUNG HOANG Program and other pacification efforts have inflicted the most damage to the Communists and have caused VCI personnel shortages in villages and hamlets. A great deal of confusion is reported to exist among these lower level VCI. This may be the result of inexperienced personnel being rapidly promoted to fill existing vacancies caused by deaths, capture, or by ralliers leaving VCI ranks to join the GVN.

b. During 1970, the PHUNG HOANG Program will continue to target the VCI at the village/hamlet level. The experience gained in 1969 plus the greater involvement of village officials and all citizens in the program should increase the destruction of VCI organizations at this level. In some areas, the entire VC Infrastructure will be rooted out of the villages and hamlets. The elimination of the higher district, province, and regional level VCI organization will, however, receive special emphasis during 1970. The VCI organization at province level and above is relatively intact. It is axiomatic that this higher level cadre will, in time, rebuild the organization at the village/hamlet level. The plans for 1970, therefore, call for a greater sophistication of the PHUNG HOANG effort. While maintaining and increasing the effort in the village and hamlets, the ability to neutralize the VCI organization at district, province and region must be improved. Two factors should have the greatest effect on the PHUNG HOANG Program's ability to meet this challenge. Efforts are underway to improve the operational planning of district and province level PHUNG HOANG organizations in 1970. This new operational guidance calls for more sophisticated procedures for the collection of intelligence information and its analysis, targeting of specific VCI individuals and entire elements of VCI organizations at a given echelon, and assignment of PHUNG HOANG personnel as case officers to be responsible for coordinating intelligence collection and operational planning for the neutralization of assigned targets. The success of this first factor is also dependent on the following critical factor. The integration of the Central PHUNG HOANG Permanent Office at the national level into the National Police will provide a depth of more qualified manpower at all PHUNG HOANG echelons to be assigned as case officers responsible for designated VCI targets. Although the National Police have been a critical participating agency within the PHUNG HOANG Program, integration of the national level PHUNG HOANG office will place National Police participation in its proper perspective, i.e., the primary agency responsible for the program. Acceptance of this responsibility by the police will ensure that qualified police counterintelligence personnel, particularly those in the Police Special Branch, are engaged directly in the PHUNG HOANG Program. There has been a growing trend at all echelons of PHUNG HOANG to utilize National Police assets

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in PHUNG HOANG planning and operations. It is felt that this trend is sound and will accelerate the complete integration of PHUNG HOANG into the National Police during 1970. Beginning in the metropolitan areas and gradually spreading out to the more pacified areas, there has been a slow but steady trend toward the conduct of more sophisticated PHUNG HOANG operations. There is also a growing awareness for the necessity of increased operational security in the field elements of PHUNG HOANG.

c. As the understanding of the legal ramifications of PHUNG HOANG has become more apparent to Province Security Councils (PSC), there has been a noticeable trend of PSCs acting more rapidly and following GVN MOI Circulars 757 and 2212 more closely. Sentences are becoming more realistic in some areas and detainees are being processed more effectively.

d. Notable among the remaining problems is the lack of interest shown by some province and district chiefs whose whole-hearted backing is absolutely essential to the success of PHUNG HOANG. The problem is complex and affected by many outside circumstances. In some areas it has been noted that CTZ Commanders and Province Chiefs are allowing their responsibilities for PHUNG HOANG to become diffused thereby making it difficult to hold responsible individuals accountable for the actions or lack thereof. This is traditionally a Vietnamese modus operandi and wherever direct supervision is lacking the trend will continue.

e. The continued application of command emphasis from the National level down to the Hamlet level and continued training, education and PSYOPS programs should result in improvements of all facets of the program in 1970.

f. The increasing involvement of GVN officials in the PHUNG HOANG Program will contribute toward the final goal of complete Vietnamization, with minimal US assistance required for support and management of the program.

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ANNEX A

BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE OF
THE PHUNG HOANG (PHOENIX) PROGRAM

The PHUNG HOANG program of the Government of Vietnam is designed to protect the people from Communist terrorism by

- securing information about the Viet Cong Infrastructure
- identifying the individuals who make it up, and
- conducting operations against them.

I. The Viet Cong Infrastructure

A. Function:

The VCI is an essential and integral element of the effort being directed from Hanoi to overthrow and replace the Government of Vietnam. In the Communist doctrine of the People's War, the VCI is the leadership structure of the Communist insurgency. It constitutes the political, administrative, supply and recruitment apparatus by which the Communists seek to impose their authority upon the people of South Vietnam. The VCI supports military operations of VC and North Vietnamese Army Units by providing guides, caches of food, clothing, weapons, medical supplies and other war materials, logistics support, and by directing and implementing a systematic campaign of terrorism, extortion, subversion, sabotage, abduction and murder to achieve Communist objectives. It also is attempting to establish a society, developed, sustained and directed by Hanoi.

B. VCI Organization:

The core of the VCI is the membership of the "People's Revolutionary Party" (PRP - the southern branch of the Vietnamese Communist Party, the Lao Dong Party). It also includes the leaders of various of its front organizations, such as the National Liberation Front for South Vietnam, the Alliance for National Democratic and Peace

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Forces, and other front "parties." It is headed by the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN), and includes PRP provincial committees, district committees, and village and hamlet committees. The VCI has also mounted the pretended "Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam" and its subordinate "Revolutionary Committees," in the provinces and villages claiming to exert local administrative authority in certain areas of the country. While it claims that these are "elected" bodies and representatives, these elections have been few, hidden, carefully staged, with no real choice, and substantially less free and authentic than the GVN's. The estimated strength of the VCI at the end of 1969 was approximately 74,000. (This estimate is very rough and is derived from the numbers of known VCI and interpolation of data on the organizational pattern of the People's Revolutionary Party and the cadre structure of the VCI.)

C. Methods:

The VCI seeks to achieve Communist war aims by actively prosecuting its campaign to separate the South Vietnamese people from their government. During the period when the Vietnamese Government was unable to successfully oppose the Communist insurgency in the countryside, the VC were able to extort support with a minimum of overt terrorist activity, this directed at local representatives of the Government, or private citizens who were, for one reason or another, unpopular with the local population. Prior to the deployment of Territorial Security Forces to the countryside, the rural people had little alternative but to acquiesce to the demands of local VCI cadre. In these circumstances, the implication of force alone was sufficient to insure that the people would comply with Communist demands. The local farmer could see over the shoulder of the VCI cadre, the armed guerillas, the local forces and the North Vietnamese Army units. He could not see a counterbalance to that force representing the National Government.

But with the defeat of the Communist main force units in the 1968 offensives, the subsequent expansion of security in the countryside, the expansion of the Regional and Popular Forces and their continually widening deployment, and with the arming of the people through the People's Self Defense Program, the people were provided with an alternative.

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It became more and more difficult for the VCI to extort the food, clothing, money, recruits and services required to sustain their insurgency from a rapidly decreasing population base. VC "recruiting" agents who had formerly been able to fill the ranks under the guise of giving the head of the family an opportunity to "volunteer" a son or daughter to fight for "freedom" now had to resort to outright kidnapping of adolescent children. VC tax collectors had to resort to methods amounting to armed robbery to fill their coffers. VC terrorists who had formerly "tried and executed" local administrators appointed by the Government were now publicly murdering hamlet and village officials elected by their neighbors.

The extent of this terror is amply demonstrated by the fact that in 1969, in one year alone, the Viet Cong Infrastructure murdered more than 6,000 officials and ordinary citizens in South Vietnam, including 23 Village Chiefs, 126 Hamlet Chiefs, 229 Refugees and 4,350 private citizens. In the same period, the VCI wounded over 15,000 and kidnapped more than 6,000 people from among the civilian population. The purpose of the PHUNG HOANG (PHOENIX) Program is to protect the people of South Vietnam from this terror.

II. The PHUNG HOANG (PHOENIX) Program

A. Legal Basis of the Program

The foundation of the PHUNG HOANG program is Article 4 of the Constitution of 1967, which states: (1) The Republic of Vietnam opposes Communism in any form; and (2), any activity designed to publicize or carry out Communism is prohibited. This constitutional provision is implemented by a series of ordinances and laws against the crimes of treason, espionage, insurgency, revolt, or terrorism. Some of these were enacted as early as 1956. Conviction of these crimes is determined by military courts, in accordance with the legislation which establishes these crimes against National Security.

This formal judicial process is supplemented by a procedure for administrative sentencing for a maximum of two years, of persons regarded as dangerous to National Security. This procedure rests on the declarations of National Emergency and of War in 1964 and 1965 respectively,

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and on a series of implementing Decree laws and Ordinances. Similar detention procedures have been used during National Emergencies in other countries such as Malaya, Kenya and the Philippines, and even the United States has legislation which would allow for the detention of members of subversive organizations in time of an "Internal Security Emergency." (U.S. Code Title 50, Sections 792 et. seq.)

The PHUNG HOANG program itself stemmed from Presidential Decree 280-a/TT/SL, dated 1 July 1968, defining the VCI target and establishing PHUNG HOANG committees from central down to district level to coordinate plans, programs and operations against the VCI. Ministry of Interior Decree 757 of 21 March 1969 provided specific definitions of classes of Communist offenders and outlined the appropriate periods of detention, depending upon their party status and responsibilities. The preamble to this decree stated "The government policy is to completely eliminate the VCI by capturing as many as possible which the lenient rehabilitation policy aims at releasing as many as possible."

B. Forces

All elements of the government participate in the PHUNG HOANG program. A leading role is, of course, played by the National Police with the support of its components, the Special Police, National Police Field Force, and a more recent component, the Provincial Reconnaissance Units (PRU). The military participates in the PHUNG HOANG Program through its intelligence and security services and through the operations of its Regular, Regional and Popular Forces. The People's Self Defense Force, the RD Cadre, the Information Services, local officials and all other elements of the government further contribute to the effort.

The Provincial Reconnaissance Units were developed and funded by the United States to conduct operations against the VCI and functioned under the authority of the GVN Joint General Staff. On 31 March 1969, by Decree 044-SL/NV, the PRU was designated a Police program controlled by the Director General of National Police, and an ARVN officer was assigned as National Commander. While the PRU is still funded by the United States, plans are in progress for the transition of the PRU to full GVN funding and support. In each province the PRU is controlled by the Province Chief, with a subordinate Province PRU Commander who is in most instances an ARVN officer. The American role in this program is now limited to an advisory function.

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C. Organization of the PHUNG HOANG Plan

1. The PHUNG HOANG Plan conceives and directs cooperation of all GVN agencies from national to hamlet level to join in a combined attack against the Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI). To accomplish this end PHUNG HOANG SOP Number 1, dated 23 July 1968, outlines the organization of a series of PH committees from national to province level which provide guidance, direction and policy at the appropriate level to all GVN agencies concerned. Membership in these committees is required of each participating agency.
 - a. The Central PHUNG HOANG Committee is the highest committee in the organization. (Appendix 1) It is chaired by the Minister of Interior and reports directly to the Prime Minister. The Director General, National Police is Vice Chairman concurrently Secretary General and its members are: Defense Ministry representative; Revolutionary Development Ministry representative; Chief, Military Security Service; Chief, J2, Joint General Staff; Chief J3, Joint General Staff; Director, Revolutionary Development Cadre; Chief, Special Police, DGNP; and Chief, National Police Support Block.
 - b. Regional PH Committees are chaired by the Commanding General of each of the four Corps Tactical Zones and GVN agencies operating at that level are represented on the committee. (Appendix 2)
 - c. Provincial PH Committees are chaired by the Province Chief. The organization is similar to that of Region Committees.
 - d. At province and district level there are Intelligence and Operations Coordinating Centers (PIOCC/DIOCC) which are the Intelligence Collection & Reaction Centers for PHUNG HOANG operations. PIOCC/DIOCC are organized into three sections: the Message Section, the Situation Section and the

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Plans & Operations Section (Appendix 3 and 4). Status of these centers is shown at Appendix 5.

- e. To operate the PHUNG HOANG Program on a daily basis at the national level the Central PHUNG HOANG Permanent Office (CPHPO) has been established (Appendix 6). CPHPO reports directly to the Central PHUNG HOANG Committee. CPHPO functions as a planning and policy staff for CPHC.
 - f. The primary operating element for the PHUNG HOANG Plan is the National Police of which the Special Police remains an extremely important key element and assumes direct responsibilities.
2. The GVN has amplified the already key role of the National Police in the attack against the VCI, and has approved a concept of integrating PHUNG HOANG into the National Police, while leaving the PHUNG HOANG committees at national, regional and provincial levels intact. This concept of integrating PHUNG HOANG into the National Police will resolve many problems now facing the proper operation of the plan. In addition, leaving the PH committee system intact insures continued cooperation of the GVN agencies and responsible participation of Region and Province commanders.
3. The organization of the PH Committee system is inherently weak since it tends to detract from clear-cut lines of responsibility, control and action. However, this system has been useful during the organizational phases of PHUNG HOANG, and should continue to be useful during the organizational phases of PHUNG HOANG, and should continue to be useful in requiring agency cooperation as PHUNG HOANG, is integrated into the National Police. At the time in the future when the National Police becomes capable of continued control of the attack on the VCI without aid from other GVN agencies the committee system should be eliminated.

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4. Since PHUNG HOANG is a plan of cooperation there are no organic PHUNG HOANG units for collection of intelligence or reaction to intelligence. Each contributing agency must utilize its own collection capability as required, and each agency possessing a reaction capability must utilize this capability as directed. This method of operation is cumbersome and dependent on the spirit of cooperation which can and does vary widely throughout the Republic. Continued success by ARVN and FWMAF in reducing the military threat and continued success of Pacification and Development should allow more direct, sophisticated collection and reaction to the Communist political threat.

D. U. S. Role:

The US role with respect to PHUNG HOANG is one of advice and assistance. This advisory relationship is maintained by CORDS under COMUSMACV. It is called the PHOENIX Program. (PHOENIX is a literal translation of the Vietnamese "PHUNG HOANG".) American PHUNG HOANG advisors are present in most Province and District Intelligence and Operations Coordinating Centers (PIOCC and DIOCC) and US advisory staffs are present at region and at the national level, to work with the appropriate GVN PHUNG HOANG Committees at those levels. These advisors work closely with their Vietnamese counterparts in the PIOCC and DIOCC, which operate on a 24-hour basis, receiving, collating verifying, and coordinating intelligence on the VCI from all sources on the one hand, and on the other hand facilitating the exploitation of the intelligence by the various action arms of the PHOENIX program. The advisors also obtain and coordinate US technical, material and fire support for the PIOCC and DIOCC and its action arms. Most of the American advisory personnel are military. In addition to those American advisory personnel working directly with the PHUNG HOANG program other American advisory personnel are closely involved with many of the GVN services participating in the program, such as the military, the police, and others. On 15 October 1969, a memorandum was distributed to members of the PHUNG HOANG advisory staff and forwarded for inclusion in the training of PHUNG HOANG advisors in Vietnam and at Fort Holabird, Maryland. It pointed out that the PHUNG HOANG program against the VCI is an inherent part of the war effort in Vietnam. US personnel

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are under the same legal and moral constraints with respect to operations under this program as with respect to military operations against enemy units in the field. In case US personnel come in contact with activities which do not meet the standards of the rules of land warfare, they are instructed to refuse further participation, to make their objections known, and to report the circumstances to the next higher US authority.

E. Procedures:

The key element of the PHUNG HOANG program is the District Intelligence and Operations Coordinating Center (DIOCC). This is a center established at each of the 250-odd districts of Vietnam to serve as a central point of information and coordination of operations against the VCI. Its chairman is the District Chief, and its membership consists of all the services which have information on the VCI or conduct operations against them. Thus, the National Police, the military, the Chieu Hoi service, Revolutionary Development Cadre and others provide to this center such information as they have on the VCI. The center collates this material and develops from it, lists of VCI in the neighborhood, organizational charts and operational plans and targets. Similar PHUNG HOANG procedures are conducted at province, regional, and national levels, and some village officials are beginning to collate information on the VCI in their village.

To reduce the threat of the VCI, the GVN established VCI operational goals for the PHUNG HOANG agencies in each geographic area of South Vietnam. These goals were based on the estimated strength of the VCI, local security situations and the capabilities of the various GVN agencies. These goals can be met by counting VCI who rally or are induced to rally, those who are captured and sentenced and those who are killed in the course of security operations. The desirability of capturing VCI is stressed, for the intelligence and other values they can offer. Hoi Chanh (ralliers to the GVN Chieu Hoi or "Open Arms" program) frequently provide important intelligence and their information serves as the basis of many operations.

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
APPENDIX 1, ANNEX A

ORGANIZATIONAL CHART

OF

PHUNG HOANG COMMITTEE

Decree No. 280-a/TT/SL dated 1 July 1968
of the President of the Republic of Vietnam
establishing the PHUNG HOANG program




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APPENDIX 2, ANNEX A




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APPENDIX 3, ANNEX A




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APPENDIX 4, ANNEX A



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APPENDIX 5 ANNEX A

STATUS OF RIOCC'S, PIOCC'S, CIOCC'S & DIOCC'S

1. There are now 253 DIOCC's and each of them is staffed with US military PHOENIX Coordinators/Advisors.

2. Region Province District RIOCC PIOCC CIOCC DIOCC IOCC Zone

I	5	49	1	5	2	46		1
II	12	53	1	12	1	52		
III	10	45	1	10	1	45	1	
IV	16	92	1	16		89		
CMD	1	19*		1	1	19*		
<u>TOTAL</u>	44	258	4	44	5	251	1**	1**

*Includes 11 Saigon NP precincts.


**Classified as DIOCC's.

3. Points of Interest.

- a. The 1968 year-end goal was to establish 200 DIOCC's. This was exceeded by 32 and an additional 21 DIOCC's have opened since the beginning of 1969.
- b. The Saigon precincts have increased from 9 to 11.
- c. The cities of Da Nang and Hue have been divided into three districts with a DIOCC in each district.
- d. The establishment of additional centers will increase the requirement for PHOENIX Advisors.

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APPENDIX 6, ANNEX A



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ANNEX B

PHUNG HOANG OPERATIONS

I. The degree of sophistication of PHUNG HOANG operations has been steadily improving. As the tempo of the war has reduced in tactical ferocity it has become increasingly evident that improvement in operational techniques must be realized if PHUNG HOANG is to succeed in rooting out the hard-core, dedicated, covert VCI.

II. The attached Appendices are selected examples of PHUNG HOANG operations from National to Village level. While many VCI neutralizations still occur as the by-product of tactical operations, there have been significant strides made toward "pure" specific targeting operations. The examples chosen indicate this trend and highlight rapid reaction to perishable intelligence and the conduct of longer term more sophisticated operations.

- 10 Appendices:
1. National Level Special Police Operation
 2. Province Level Operation
 3. District Level Operation
 4. Village Level Operation
 5. Combined Operation
 6. PSYOPS Operation
 7. VIS PSYOPS Operation
 8. Village Information Program
 9. Village Education Program
 10. Counter Guerrilla Operation

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APPENDIX 1, ANNEX B

NATIONAL LEVEL SPECIAL POLICE OPERATION

1. Phase of Discovery and Surveillance:

- a. In early March 1969 a People's Intelligence Organization (PIO) agent submitted a report to the 1st Precinct Special Police. Subject of the report was Nguyen Nuoi. The report stated that Nuoi was a former acquaintance and had been a VC agent in Binh Duong Province. It was further reported that Nuoi was engaged in some type VC activity in Saigon.
- b. Special Police assigned a surveillance team of six men to observe the activities of Nuoi. Each two man team consisted of a man walking and one with a motor bike. After his residence, place of business and frequent contact points were established, the surveillance team was cut to four persons. Police placed one agent near his home and one near his business and set them up with a type of business. In this case a soup shop was established less than one block from his home and a bicycle repair stall was established near a place where he was known to frequent. The other two members of the team continued to follow Nuoi during daylight hours. Special Police also placed three houses that Nuoi was known to frequent under surveillance.

2. Phase of Activity:

- a. Within three weeks from initiation of surveillance Nuoi was arrested by Special Police agents with 200 leaflets of the Saigon Cholon Women's Liberation Association in his possession. The arrest was made on 25 March 1969. From initial interrogation of Nuoi, Special Police learned that he was a member of the Market Party Committee, cover designator: L2, subordinate to the Women's Proselyting Section of Sub-Region 6. The mission of L2 was to disseminate communist propaganda leaflets in the market places throughout the Saigon area.
- b. Acting on the statement made by Nuoi, the Special Police, on 26 March 1969, arrested Nguyen Van Thanh, Secretary of L2; Nguyen Van Sang, Deputy Secretary

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of L2; and Huynh Van Hao, also believed to be a member of the L2 organization. Within the next 24 hours Special Police arrested 19 more persons on the charge of being involved with the activities of Nuoi, Thanh, Sang and Hao. In addition to the individuals arrested, police confiscated 1400 more leaflets of the Women's Liberation Association and cloth to be used in making NFLSVN flags. Three persons were arrested in each of the three houses the police had under surveillance and the remaining ten persons were arrested in various locations of the city. The whereabouts of these ten persons were disclosed by other prisoners that the Special Police had arrested.

- c. Meanwhile, on 28 March 1969, another PIO agent report was received by 1st Precinct Special Police. Information contained in this report led Special Police to believe that Huynh Van Hao (whom they captured on 26 Mar 69) had further VC connections which he had not disclosed. After reinterrogating Hao it was learned that he was a member of a newly formed 10th Precinct Party Committee. Specifically, he was in charge of propaganda and training in this new organization, thus establishing the connection between himself and the Market Party Committee, also a propaganda section. Hao's second interrogation revealed the whereabouts of the following members of the 10th Precinct Party Committee: Tran Van Phuoc, Secretary; Tran Thi Phuong, Current Affairs Committee member and Ly Huu Chau and Huynh Van Tuan; both members of the Finance and Economy Section. Phuoc, Phuong, Chau and Tuan were arrested between 29 March and 2 April 1969.

By 3 April Ly Huu Chau had given the police the entire organization of the 10th Precinct Party Committee, complete with names and their positions. Using Chau's organization chart and statements of the other members of the 10th Precinct Committee, police arrested 22 additional persons of the organization. Of these, nine were district-level cadre, eight were village-level cadre and five were hamlet-level cadre. Chau also informed the police that the 10th Precinct was in the process of consolidating with the 11th Precinct cadre to form 10-11 Inter-precinct Party Committee.

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- d. Having been made aware of the consolidation effort and certain that the VC would rebuild their organization, the Special Police released one of their prisoners from the 10th Precinct organization and enticed him to work for the police. After three months of police surveillance and information from their penetration agent, the Special Police knew enough of the plans and activities of the new organization to conduct an operation and make valid arrests. The main reason for conducting the operation this time was based on information from the penetration agent that the said 10th and 11th Inter-precinct unit had developed to the point where they were capable of and were planning to conduct sabotage activities against key GVN installations in Saigon (installations were unspecified).
- e. Before allowing their penetration agent to be freed, Special Police personnel took photos of the agent enjoying himself in the company of other Special Police agents and required him to sign a sworn statement that he in fact was working for the GVN. These documents would find their way back to the VC if the agent did not cooperate with the police in the future. A surveillance team was assigned to watch the agent's activities as an added precautionary measure.
- f. The actual arrests of personalities in the 10-11 Inter-precinct Party Committee was initiated on 5 July 1969 with the arrest of Le Minh Tieng; member of the organization's Current Affairs Committee, concurrently the Youth Proselyting Section Chief and a member of the People's Revolutionary Party since 1965. On 5 July 1969 Special Police personnel acting on statements by Tieng arrested Tran Van Hoang and Nguyen Van Vy, members of the Security Section, and Tran Cong Thoai, Chief of the Military Affairs Section, and a member of the Current Affairs Committee. From statements made by these individuals, Special Police arrested 13 additional persons in the organization and the SMPD Special Police arrested six more persons.

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APPENDIX 2, ANNEX B

PROVINCE LEVEL OPERATION

LONG KHANH PROVINCE

1. Under normal circumstances, resources control is a National Police function and responsibility. However, during April and early May 1969, intelligence reports, PW interrogations and Hoi Chanh debriefings indicated that large quantities of enemy food and medical supplies were being transported into and within Long Khanh Province. It became obvious that the National Police could not effectively control or eliminate the problem. In an attempt to improve the situation, the province chief assigned PHUNG HOANG an additional, temporary mission of resources control. He felt that PHUNG HOANG was in a position to plan, coordinate, and execute operations that would render the enemy supply system ineffective. He reasoned that all agencies with an intelligence production/reaction capability were already involved in PHUNG HOANG and that by assigning PHUNG HOANG to conduct this campaign, it would not be necessary to establish a new task force organization. The mission order for the Resource Control Campaign was as follows: "Utilize all available assets to interdict the movement of illegal/unauthorized commodities intended for enemy use."
2. After receiving the mission order in mid-May, PHUNG HOANG officials and US PHOENIX Coordinators began a systematic approach to the problem. As a starting point, it was decided that if PHUNG HOANG was to succeed in this task, it was necessary to determine why the National Police had failed to satisfactorily accomplish their resources control mission.
3. It was ascertained that the National Police had failed to interrupt enemy supply activity due to the following factors:
 - a. The police had established permanent checkpoints along the major lines of communication (National Highways 1 and 20). These checkpoints were never moved, and their location was known to everyone who travelled these roads. As a result, enemy suppliers were using secondary roads and trails to avoid the checkpoints.

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- b. Permanent checkpoints were manned from 0800 - 1700 hours each day. Enemy supplies were being transported through the checkpoints during the hours when personnel were not on duty.
 - c. The police were not conducting thorough inspections of vehicles. As a result much contraband material passed undetected through the checkpoints.
4. In order to accomplish the resource control mission, PHUNG HOANG established a campaign plan that involved three (3) concurrent, long-term operations. The campaign began on 1 June and terminated 31 July 1969. A brief synopsis of each of the three operations follows:
- a. Operation MOBILE I.
 - (1) Mission: Establish mobile resources control checkpoints to augment permanent National Police checkpoints.
 - (2) Concept: Three mobile resource control teams were established. Each team consisted of two National Policemen (NP), two members of the National Police Field Force (NPF), and two members of the Provincial Reconnaissance Unit (PRU). On a daily basis, the PIOCC assigned each team several specific locations for checkpoints. The National Police provided two 1/2-ton trucks for each team. Lists of Communist offenders were provided by the PIOCC.
 - (3) Execution: Each team moved to the assigned location each morning at 0800. A roadblock was constructed by placing team vehicles across the road. All pedestrians and vehicular traffic was stopped and examined. One National Policeman examined ID cards and cargo authorization papers. Another National Policeman and the two PRU members conducted a thorough search of vehicles and their contents. The NPF were used to provide security for the other team members. Detained personnel (and material) were taken to the PIOCC for processing and interrogation.

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- (4) Based on the results of interrogations, detainees were either released, utilized in immediate exploitation operations, or taken to the Province Interrogation/ Detention Center for further interrogation, finger-printing and detention.

b. Operation SARC X.

- (1) **Mission:** Establish and utilize a special airmobile resources control (SARC) team in order to interdict the movement of illegal/unauthorized commodities intended for enemy use.
- (2) **Concept:** One SARC Team was established. It consisted of three elements: command, search, and ground security. Elements were composed of the following personnel:
 - (a) **Command Element:** Operation commander (the PIOCC Secretary), PHOENIX Coordinator, and an interpreter.
 - (b) **Search Element:** 2 PRU, 3 PSB, 1 NP, one interpreter and one advisor.
 - (c) **Ground Security Element:** 2 squads from the Aerorifle Platoon, C Troop, 1/17 Cav (US).
- (3) **Execution:** C Troop, 1/17 Cav provided air assets to include 01 Command and Control ship (for the command element), and 01 Hunter/Killer Team (consisting of 01 LOH and 01 Cobra) for air support. Areas of operation were selected after carefully analyzing current intelligence reports. The SARC Team flew over roads, trails, fields, and the jungle within the area of operation. The objective was to locate targets of opportunity. Once a target was selected (usually a vehicle) the ground security element was inserted and the Hunter/Killer Team dropped red smoke grenades and hovered over the target vehicle.