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After the vehicle was stopped, the ground security element formed a tight cordon around the target. After ground security had been established, the Search Element was inserted. This element thoroughly searched vehicles, cargo, and personnel for contraband items, and checked identification cards with lists of communist offenders. Detained personnel were taken to the PIOCC or nearest DIOCC for interrogation. At this point, detainees were classified as "innocent civilians," "insurgency supporters," or "VCI." Innocent civilians were released immediately, while those believed to be supporting the enemy were transferred to the Province Interrogation/ Detention Center for further interrogation and processing.

c. Operation CUTOFF I.

- (1) Mission: Conduct a search of cordon and search operations designed to apprehend personnel known to provide support to the enemy.
- (2) Concept: Each DIOCC prepared a list of target hamlets for Operation CUTOFF I. These lists were submitted through the PIOCC to the province chief, who personally selected target hamlet priorities. A total of 38 hamlets were selected. Lists of communist offenders, family records, VC relative lists, and other pertinent information was obtained for each targeted hamlet.
- (3) Execution: In most instances, cordon elements were composed of combined RF/PF 18th ARVN Division, and US 199th LIB elements. In other instances, the cordon consisted entirely of RF/PF. Most operations were conducted during the early morning hours, with the cordon being set by 0400 hours. The Search element was composed of National Police, National Police Field Force and PRU personnel. Search elements were divided into four teams of eight men each. Each team was assigned an area of operation within the hamlet. The search element usually began their search at first light. PSYOPS

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loudspeakers announced that a search was taking place, and advised residents to stay in their homes until this search team instructed them to move to the hamlet market place. Search teams moved from building to building. Where possible, the search was conducted in the presence of the owner or occupant of the building. This was done to preclude later charges of looting or theft. After the search of each building was concluded the occupants were instructed to go to the market place for final processing, and told that their ID cards would be returned to them after processing was completed. When residents arrived at the market place they were rapidly processed. The processing station was manned by personnel from the National Police and Police Special Branch. Processing included matching ID cards with lists of communist offenders and examining family and occupational papers. Personnel with papers in order were moved to a "PSYOPS area." The PSYOPS area was manned by performing Culture/Drama Teams, Hoi Chanhs speaking in behalf of the GVN and US/VN MEDCAP teams. Those personnel whose names appeared on the communist offenders' list or who were lacking in proper documentation/identification were moved to an interrogation area. Interrogation teams were composed of personnel from Police Special Branch, various S-2 offices, the Military Security Service (MSS), and the 179th MID (US). Based on the results of the interrogations, residents were either released, used in immediate exploitation operations or sent to the Province Interrogation/Detention Center for further interrogation. At the termination of the operation residents were freed to continue their normal activities. The entire search/interrogation/PSYOPS phase of the operation required approximately 3 hours for the "average" size hamlet (500 population).

5. During the Resource Control Campaign, 168 VC suppliers were apprehended and placed in confinement. The campaign was extremely successful. Although suppliers/supporters are not VCI, they are an essential element in any insurgency movement. Their importance was dramatically emphasized as a result of this campaign. During the months immediately following the campaign, the VCI neutralization rate was the highest ever recorded in Long Khanh Province for a three-month period. In most instances, captured and rallier VCI stated that the lack of supporters and supplies had severely demoralized enemy political and tactical elements. In

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addition, the Hoi Chanh rate was the highest recorded within a two-year period. Hoi Chanh stated that a severe shortage of food and medical supplies caused them to rally.

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APPENDIX 3, ANNEX B

DISTRICT LEVEL OPERATION

BEN CAT DISTRICT, BINH DUONG PROVINCE

The PRU of Ben Cat District, working in conjunction with the PIOCC/DIOCC, and the Province Interrogation Center, were successful in neutralizing fourteen (14) Viet Cong Infrastructure members of the Chau Thanh District Committee. This operation took place between 13 and 30 August 1969 in Binh Duong Province, RVN. The operation commenced through information furnished by a Hoi Chanh that was sufficient to target Nguyen Van Dang, the assistant party secretary of the Chau Thanh district committee. Dang was captured outside of his safe tunnel location that the Hoi Chanh had provided. A field interrogation of Dang revealed the location of another tunnel, occupied by Dang Van Mai, former assistant party secretary; and Vo Van Banh, security section chief. The PRU reacted to this information and captured both persons and a quantity of documents in the disclosed tunnel. Banh was wounded and medically evacuated by helicopter before an interrogation could be conducted. However, Mai was captured unharmed and was immediately transported to the PIC for interrogation by the PRU advisor. By using the captured documents in conjunction with Mai's interrogation, five more party members were identified complete with their description and their usual areas of operation. The district party committee chairman, Nguyen Van Kia, became the main target. It was known that Kia had legal documentation and worked as a legitimate horse cart driver in order to make his necessary contacts with other infrastructure members. The PRU, dressed as civilians and armed with pistols, were divided into four or five man cells and were stationed at the main traffic intersections in Kia's known area of operation. Kia was captured the same day without incident due largely to the detailed description provided by the PIC through Mai's interrogation. The other four identified party members were also legal residents in the same village where Kia lived. Their addresses had been revealed by the captured documents and through information maintained by the PIOCC. A simultaneous snatch operation was conducted during the early evening hours in order to minimize the possibility of prior

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warning to the targeted individuals. The operation was a success. The chairman of the PRP executive committee, the civilian proselyting section chief, commo-liaison section chief, and a district security cadre were all captured in their homes. These four persons were turned over to the DIOCC, that ultimately uncovered the five remaining district committee members. Phan Van Mua was identified as the chief of the supply and transportation section. During the day he watched over his Viet Cong purchased water buffalo; at night he would use them to transport rice for the VC to a nearby river crossing point. He was captured in the field while tending his buffalo. The next target was Nguyen Thi Bah, the message section chief; description and route of travel furnished by the DIOCC. The PRU posed as VC and set up an ambush along her usual route. On the second evening of the trail watch Bah was captured. The civilian proselyting section chief, Mia, had by this time become most cooperative and led the PRU to the remaining three cadre.

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APPENDIX 4, ANNEX B

VILLAGE LEVEL OPERATION

TAN NIEN TAY VILLAGE, GO CONG PROVINCE

1. On 26 December 1969 at 1630 hours a twelve year old boy from Xom Chua Hamlet, while working in the rice fields, observed one VC passing through his area. The boy immediately informed the Hamlet Chief of the VC's presence. The Hamlet Chief raced by Honda to Tan Nien Tay Village Headquarters to inform the Deputy for Security. Realizing that time was of the essence, the Deputy for Security quickly assembled a reaction force of 7 PF soldiers and 8 PSDF. Before leaving, the Deputy instructed a PF outpost in the vicinity of the sighting to block the VC's retreat. Obviously, the VC would attempt to make it back to the dense forest area if pursued. The PF outpost members denied him this exit. The reaction force used Hondas to cover the 3 kilometer distance back to Xom Chua Hamlet. Leaving their bikes on the road, the unit proceeded on foot. After going 400 meters, the VC was sighted and hurriedly was flanked on all sides. Though encircled, the VC would not surrender. In the ensuing conflict, he was wounded in the groin. Time of capture was approximately 1700 hours, thus representing an excellent reaction example.

2. After bringing the VC back to District Headquarters, his identify was established as an Eastern District Level VCI. One kilo of documents and a hand-sketched map of Tan Nien Tay Village were found in his possession. Through immediate reaction, due to highly perishable intelligence, an important VCI was captured. The 12-year old boy was given a monetary reward of 5,000 piasters from the volunteer informant program.

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APPENDIX 5, ANNEX B

COMBINED OPERATION

1. Acting on information supplied by a reliable informant in coordination with the Cu Chi DIOCC, the Counterintelligence Section, 25th Military Intelligence Detachment, 25th Infantry Division (US), mounted a VCI "snatch" operation which resulted in the successful apprehension of the target, rapid exploitation and subsequent roll-up of five hamlet-level VCI and one VC assassination cell member.
2. On 25 September 1969, two Ranger Teams of F Company, 75th Infantry, 25th Infantry Division, one CI Exploitation Team, comprised of two CI personnel, three Rangers and one ARVN interpreter, and one MI observer team, departed Cu Chi Base Camp at 1630 hours on a vehicular snatch operation targeted against Muoi That, Farmer's Association and Finance Cadreman in Hau Hoa (3) Hamlet, Duc Lap Village, Duc Hoa District, Hau Nghia Province, Republic of Vietnam.
3. The convoy, consisting of four 1/4-ton vehicles, proceeded south from Cu Chi on Highway SA to Ap Chanh (3), Duc Lap Village, there turning east on Highway 249. After proceeding approximately one-half kilometer, the convoy stopped and conducted a communications check with Fire Support Base Chamberlain and 75th Ranger Headquarters at Cu Chi Base Camp. The assault element then continued along Highway 249 to the Duc Lap/Duc Hoa Intersection. Upon arrival at the intersection, the convoy accelerated and deployed to their preassigned positions on the Duc Lap/Duc Hoa Road. Vehicle #1, with a team of rangers, deployed to the end of the wood line east of the targeted individual's house and set up security to the north and west approximately fifty meters west of the house. Vehicle #2 drove as far off the road as possible and the CI Exploitation Team rapidly deployed around the target house, denying egress. Vehicle #3, with the MI observation team, proceeded behind the Exploitation team.
4. Muoi That was apprehended by the Rangers and, after a brief but thorough search of the house and its surroundings, the entire snatch team withdrew along the route of advance.

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5. Upon detailed interrogation of Muoi, the location of a group of VCI was learned, the reaction team was sent back into the area and captured the remaining VCI and assassination cell member. All prisoners were evacuated through GVN channels for further exploitation and judicial processing.

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APPENDIX 6, ANNEX B

PSYOPS OPERATION

1. One of the most dramatic examples of a well conceived and conducted PSYOPS campaign can be seen in the IV Corps Province of Kien Phong. There the publication and distribution by the PHUNG HOANG Committee of a wanted poster proved highly rewarding. The poster featured the photograph of eight members of the Cao Lanh City Sapper Unit and was distributed throughout the district.

2. While a Revolutionary Development Cadreman was tacking up a poster he saw one of the members passing by. He called the police who arrested the suspect. Two other members were later arrested. Three were induced to rally claiming they were rendered ineffective by having their names and faces known. This was all accomplished within a one-week period.

3. Seven different agencies and their advisors combined their assets and objectives to obtain these results which gave a noteworthy start to the Province PHUNG HOANG PSYOPS and Publicity Campaign.

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APPENDIX 7, ANNEX B

VIS PSYOPS OPERATION IN SUPPORT OF PHUNG HOANG

In October 1969 the Vietnamese Information Service (VIS) provided PSYOP support to the Phung Dinh Province, IV CTZ, PHUNG HOANG Program. One of the VIS activities consisted of broadcasting the names of members of the VCI through loudspeakers mounted on sampans. In Phung Hiep District one VIS team was traveling the canals and broadcasting the names of the members of the Chau Thanh "B" (VC) District Peoples' Revolutionary Committee. While the team was conducting this operation, a village level VCI cadre walked into the Phung Thuan DIOCC. He said that he wanted to rally to the GVN through the Chieu Hoi Program, because PHUNG HOANG must know about him if the members of the District Revolutionary Committee were known to PHUNG HOANG, as broadcasted by VIS.

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APPENDIX 8, ANNEX B

VILLAGE INFORMATION PROGRAM

1. Dinh Tuong was the first province in IV CTZ to implement the concepts of extending the PHUNG HOANG Plan to the village level. Under the guidance of the Province PHUNG HOANG Committee, district chiefs are advising the supporting village officials in implementing the plan. Once these officials understand what PHUNG HOANG is and how they can contribute, they have been enthusiastic in their support.
2. The District Chief in Ben Tranh District started early to instruct the village people. His efforts paid off. Recently villagers learned that VCI tax collectors would be in their area on that night. They notified the District Chief who sent an RF platoon to set an ambush. When the VC entered the village the trap was sprung. They were told to throw down their weapons and surrender. Instead the VC tried to escape. One was shot to death and the other was wounded but escaped.
3. The next morning the village police chief was told by a villager that a wounded man was hiding in one of the houses at the edge of the village. Fearing that the man would again escape and not having time to send for help, the village police chief and several members of the PSDF surrounded the house. The man was called on to surrender. No sound was heard. The policeman entered the house and arrested the VC who later died from the wounds suffered the previous night.
4. There have been no VC tax collection efforts made in this village since that night.

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APPENDIX 9, ANNEX B

VILLAGE EDUCATION PROGRAM

November marked the second half of the two month program of intensified efforts to neutralize VC/VCI operating in Vinh Tho Village. The first phase of the program updated information concerning the target. The second phase consisted of two main parts: (1) individual targeting and (2) classes conducted on GVN programs, progress, potential, and ideology for residents of Vinh Tho, who have VC/VCI relatives, or leanings. Agencies participating were CG, RD, PSB, NP, VIS, MSS, S-2, and Chieu Hoi. The basic course lasted one week, with extensions for problem individuals. Vacant PF housing was utilized to house the classes and the people, who stayed at the location both day and night. Food and water were arranged as well as child care since no children were allowed in the class areas. One building was used as a counseling center, where class members could state opinions, pass information, and ask questions about GVN programs privately of a counselor. Special emphasis was put on the Chieu Hoi Program and inducement of VC relatives. The counseling sessions resulted in 3 VCI revealed as class members and they contributed to the development of 5 individual targets which resulted in the elimination of 5 VCI. Most of the people have been released and hopefully have Chieu Hoi inducement in mind. The District APT is to be utilized in helping Hoi Chanhs to come over to the GVN. Agents continue to search for information. Also fifteen suspects were developed: 5 were taken into custody and the remainder are under surveillance by the National Police.

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APPENDIX 10, ANNEX B

COUNTER GUERRILLA OPERATION

1. On 24 December 1969, a screening operation was being conducted in Thanh Loc, An Nhon, and An Phu Dong villages of Go Vap District, Gia Dinh Province. The National Police were checking residents' identification papers while local PSDF cordoned off and blocked designated areas. At 0830 hours, the PSDF received small arms fire from an undetermined number of VC. A member of the District Intelligence Squad was dispatched to notify the DIOCC Advisor of the contact. The Advisor and Mr. Vien, his interpreter, together with LT Vien, the Special Zone S-2, drove to the area of the action. There they were met by a squad of PF's who were moving into position.
2. The VC were firing from a sugar cane field; and the PFs (once in position) returned M-70 and small arms fire. At this point one VC with an AK-47 surrendered, and disclosed that there were three others in the field. By this time, the 148 RF Company, under the command of CPT Khanh had arrived. The DIOCC Advisor suggested to CPT Khanh and LT Vien that a gunship be employed, and they both agreed. The DIOCC Advisor then called the Go Vap Senior Military Advisor, who after conferring with the District Chief, LTC Tan, contacted the 120 HHC through the Province S-3.
3. Two gunships arrived approximately 20 minutes later. One landed and was boarded by Mr. Vien and LT Vien, who maintained contact with the DIOCC Advisor on the ground through Vietnamese radio channels. The chopper pilot asked for smoke to mark the enemy position. The DIOCC Advisor had none so he had to orient the chopper by terrain features. Each gunship made two passes over the sugar cane field, saturating the area with M-60 machine gun and 5" rocket fire.
4. The 148 RF Company made a sweep and found 1 KIA, 1 POW and 2 AB's. The POW indicated that Nguyen Van Chot, their commander had managed to escape to an adjacent rice field and that he was armed with an AK and Chicom type pistol. The POW further stated that after the initial contact, all four had tried to escape, but only Chot had succeeded.

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5. CPT Khanh then ordered a careful sweep of the "indicated" rice field. Foot prints were found and he had his men recon the area by fire. However, the results were negative. A squad size ambush was set up for a 24 hour period.

6. The two POWs were interrogated at the DIOCC. One prisoner, a boy of seventeen was quite informative. His testimony led to the discovery of a weapons cache, which yielded 1 M-60, 4 M-16's, 1 M-14, 2 M-1's and several old French weapons.

7. On the following day it was necessary to transfer the prisoners to higher headquarters for further exploitation. The POWs had operated in the Go Vap area for approximately 11 months and through their willing cooperation, especially that of the 17 year old, much valuable information was obtained. Acting on the results of its interrogation, the DIOCC, coordinating with its higher headquarters, effected the detention of eleven suspects. Eight of them proved to be members of the Viet Cong Infrastructure.

8. In an attempt to further exploit the incident, the Go Vap SZ/S-2, acting in cooperation with the Go Vap/S-5, drafted a leaflet which was forwarded to the SZ/S-5 for mass reproduction. A waiting period of fifteen to twenty days was expected for the production of the leaflets. However, the Province S-5 Advisor, acting to assist the Go Vap DIOCC Advisor, arranged for the leaflets to be produced within two days.

9. On 22 January 1970, thirty-eight thousand leaflets were dropped over the villages of Thanh Loc, An Phu Dong and Thanh My Tay in Go Vap District. Further results are pending. The text of the leaflet was as follows:

Dear: CHAM, HIEP, SO, CHOT, NGHIA, HO, CHAU, CHAN, CO, CHAI, DANG, DEN, HUM, HAI, MEN, TRONG, NGHIA, NUA, TIEN, TUONG, TINH, TUYET, BON, CAU, DUA, KIP, KIET, MAN, NGHIA, TU, THANG, VIEN tu CHUNG, THO, TAM, SAU, who are guerrilla members of An Phu and Thanh Loc Villages.

Since you joined the NLF SVN, what have you done for your family or your Village and Hamlet? Or have you just broken up the happiness of many families and destroyed houses and land?

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Some people among you have been awakened recently, they deserted the Communist ranks and they were received by the GVN and the people with open arms in a family affection.

You should be ready for the end if you remain in the Communist ranks. You will be dealing with difficulties bigger from day to day and you will suffer serious failure when the ARVN expand strongly.

You had better return to your family where you will be guaranteed security and helped to establish a new life.

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ANNEX C

NEUTRALIZATION STATISTICS

I. In 1969, the primary targets were those VCI serving at district level and above and those serving in Revolutionary Committees, Current Affairs Committees, Finance-Economy Sections, and Security Sections at all echelons. In 1969, of the total neutralizations of 19,534, 4,229 served in positions at district and higher level (approximately 21%). The neutralizations in the priority elements totaled 9,394 (approximately 48%). The total number of primary target neutralizations was 11,675 (approximately 60%). This consisted of the 9,394 serving in priority elements and the 2,281 other VCI who were from district level or higher.

II. Functions of significant VCI elements are as follows:

A. Revolutionary Committees. Revolutionary Committees are intended to serve as transitory organs for Communist Party governmental control of the South Vietnamese population. They not only influence the people to support the insurgency but they also perform civil administrative functions in VC controlled and contested areas. They perform day-to-day governmental functions. The Communist Party intends to establish Revolutionary Committees throughout South Vietnam so that, in the event of a ceasefire, they can claim defacto governmental control of the countryside. The Communist Party's ability to achieve this objective was diminished during 1969.

B. Current Affairs Committee. The top management of any echelon of the Communist Party (e.g. village, district, province, etc.) is the Current Affairs Committee. The Chiefs of the most important Party staff elements are members of this committee (i.e. Security Section, Finance and Economy Section, Military Affairs Section, etc.). The committee conducts the day-to-day business of the Party. The members of the Current Affairs Committee are, if they have not already been neutralized, the "hard-core" Communists who have been functioning since the days of the Viet Minh.

C. Security Section. The Security Section conducts intelligence collections and counterintelligence functions. It maintains covert agents, whose identity are unknown to

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APPENDIX 1, ANNEX C

VCI RESULTS

	<u>1968</u>	<u>1969</u>
Captured	11,288	8,515
Rallied	2,229	4,832
Killed in Action	2,259	6,187
(Priority Targets)	(3,091)	(11,675)
TOTAL	<u>15,776</u>	<u>19,534</u>

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other members of the VCI, within VC controlled villages and hamlets. It also administers "courts" and detention camps - to include U. S. POW camps - within VC controlled areas. In GVN controlled and contested areas, the Security Section maintains clandestine resident agents to collect information on GVN and allied activities, and to penetrate allied security and intelligence organizations. The Security Section selects GVN and allied personnel for assassination by its agents or by VCI Sapper Cadre.

D. Finance and Economy Section. The Finance and Economy Section at each VCI echelon is responsible for the collection of "taxes" and budgeting of VCI funds. It establishes tax quotas to be collected or extorted from the populace. This section also supervises the allocation of war materiel and operates small manufacturing centers and food production areas in support of VC and NVA military units.

III. Statistical displays of neutralizations are contained in the five appendices to this Annex.

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APPENDIX 3, ANNEX C

1969 VCI NEUTRALIZATIONS BY ECHELON AND PRIORITY TARGETS

<u>All Personnel</u>	<u>Hamlet</u>	<u>Village</u>	<u>City</u>	<u>District</u>	<u>Province</u>	<u>Region</u>	<u>COSVN</u>	<u>Total</u>
Killed-in-action	941	3,746	87	1,158	219	34	2	6,187
Captured	1,668	4,651	719	1,077	319	63	18	8,515
Rallied	1,232	2,487	53	796	232	29	3	4,832
<u>TOTALS</u>	<u>3,841</u>	<u>10,884</u>	<u>859</u>	<u>3,031</u>	<u>770</u>	<u>126</u>	<u>23</u>	<u>19,534</u>
<u>1969 PRIORITY TARGETS</u>								
Revolutionary Committee	569	491	19	23	6			1,108
Current Affairs Committee	203	271	24	97	13	1		609
Finance-Economy Section	581	2,455	125	409	87	12	1	3,670
Security Section	511	2,087	235	881	226	64	3	4,007
<u>TOTALS</u>	<u>1,864</u>	<u>5,304</u>	<u>403</u>	<u>1,410</u>	<u>332</u>	<u>77</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>9,394</u>

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APPENDIX 4, ANNEX C

1969 VCI NEUTRALIZATIONS OF PRIORITY TARGETS

	<u>Hamlet</u>	<u>Village</u>	<u>City</u>	<u>District</u>	<u>Province</u>	<u>Region</u>	<u>COSVN</u>	<u>Total</u>
<u>Revolutionary Committee</u>								
Killed-in-action	125	248	-	12	2			387
Captured	273	172	19	5	3			472
Rallied	171	71	-	6	1			249
<u>TOTALS</u>	<u>569</u>	<u>491</u>	<u>19</u>	<u>23</u>	<u>6</u>			<u>1,108</u>
<u>Current Affairs Committee</u>								
Killed-in-action	48	129	10	63	13	1		264
Captured	79	86	13	24	-	-		202
Rallied	76	56	1	10	-	-		143
<u>TOTALS</u>	<u>203</u>	<u>271</u>	<u>24</u>	<u>97</u>	<u>13</u>	<u>1</u>		<u>609</u>
<u>Finance- Economy Section</u>								
Killed-in-action	139	689	18	152	31	6		1,035
Captured	294	1,182	97	123	26	6	1	1,729
Rallied	148	584	10	134	30	-		906
<u>TOTALS</u>	<u>581</u>	<u>2,455</u>	<u>125</u>	<u>409</u>	<u>87</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>3,670</u>
<u>Security Section</u>								
Killed-in-action	194	869	25	334	45	18	3	1,488
Captured	218	829	189	353	132	36	-	1,757
Rallied	99	389	21	194	49	10	-	762
<u>TOTALS</u>	<u>511</u>	<u>2,087</u>	<u>235</u>	<u>881</u>	<u>226</u>	<u>64</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4,007</u>
<u>GRAND TOTAL</u>	<u>1,864</u>	<u>5,304</u>	<u>403</u>	<u>1,410</u>	<u>332</u>	<u>77</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>9,394</u>

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APPENDIX 5, ANNEX C

**PHUNG HOANG/PHOENIX PERCENT OF HIGHER LEVEL
NEUTRALIZATIONS FOR 1969**

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>TOTAL NEUTRALIZED</u>	<u>PERCENT OF DISTRICT AND HIGHER LEVEL VCI</u>
January	1,294	18
February	1,230	17
March	1,481	19
April	1,795	17
May	1,384	20
June	1,343	22
July	1,790	22
August	1,839	23
September	2,005	23
October	1,906	22
November	1,830	24
December	1,637	24
TOTAL	19,534	Average 21

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ANNEX D

ENEMY SITUATION AND REACTION TO PHUNG HOANG

I. The Viet Cong Infrastructure has two basic missions: (1) to provide funds, materiel, manpower, intelligence, refuge and guides to VC and NVA military units, and (2) to develop an organization capable of governing SVN with the support of the population. Intelligence reports indicate that the VCI capability to perform these two basic missions diminished during 1969. This was due to three factors: (1) RVNAF and FWMAF military pressure on the VC and NVA military units and the VCI, (2) the success of the overall GVN Accelerated Pacification Campaign which is winning the support of the population toward the GVN, and (3) the effects of the PHUNG HOANG Program's neutralization of VCI at the village and hamlet levels.

II. VCI capability to govern SVN with the support of the population:

A. Since the advent of US/NVN negotiations in Paris in the spring of 1968 Communist political activity in SVN has been designed not only to complement military operations, but also to establish a governmental organization which would give the appearance of legitimacy to their position in SVN. To accomplish this political objective Liberation Committees were established at the village level. These Liberation Committees were to bridge the gap between the covert government which had been provided by the Communist Party in VC-controlled areas and an overt government with which the population could identify. It was through these committees that the communists intended to claim defacto control of the countryside.

B. On 10 June 1969, the Communists announced the establishment of the Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG) of the Republic of South Vietnam. This new "shadow" government was designed to rival the GVN politically in the South and diplomatically at Paris and around the world. Thus, in one swift stroke of diplomacy, the Communists confronted the allies with a self-proclaimed representative government to rival the GVN in SVN as well as at the peace table in Paris. The Liberation Committees, which had been established since the spring of 1968, were redesignated as Revolutionary Committees and were to be subordinate to the PRG.

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1. By proclaiming the new government, the Communists strengthened their hand diplomatically. Recognition of the PRG by foreign powers strengthened its pretensions of legitimacy. Shortly after its founding, the PRG was accorded full diplomatic recognition by 13 Communist countries. North Vietnam withheld full diplomatic recognition so as not to legitimize the concept of a separate government in the South. Hanoi recognized a "special relationship" with the PRG and supported it as "the authorized representative of the South Vietnamese people." Within a month of its unveiling, the PRG was given full diplomatic recognition by ten non-Communist countries consisting of Algeria, Cambodia, Congo (Brazzaville), Iraq, Mali, Mauritania, Southern Yemen, Sudan, Syria, and the United Arab Republic. Algeria, Cambodia, Syria, and the UAR had previously given quasi-diplomatic recognition to the NFLSVN. Tanzania and Indonesia, which had played host to NFLSVN missions, withheld full diplomatic recognition to the PRG. Tanzania, however, welcomed a permanent "PRG Special Diplomatic Mission," while Indonesia allowed the NFLSVN to remain in Djakarta as long as it did not portray itself as representative of the PRG. The NFLSVN Information Offices in Paris and Stockholm were allowed to remain in existence, as long as they did not identify themselves as organs of the PRG. The initial rush of recognitions has died out. However, it would seem that Scandinavian, African and Near Eastern countries offer the PRG the greatest potential for further diplomatic gains. Thus, during 1969, the Vietnamese Communists could be encouraged by the apparent partial obtainment of PRG foreign policy objectives contained in the PRG's "Program of Action":

"To win the sympathy, support, and aid of all countries and progressive people in the world, including the American people, for the South Vietnamese people's struggle against US aggression, for national salvation. To actively support the national independence movement of the Asian, American, and Latin American peoples struggling against imperialists, colonialism, and neocolonialism. To achieve active coordination with the American people's

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struggle against the US imperialists' war of aggression in Vietnam, to actively support the just struggle of the Afro-Americans for their fundamental national rights."

The Vietnamese Communists were encouraged by the anti-war demonstrations in the US, particularly by the magnitude of the demonstrations conducted in October and November 1969 and the amount of attention they attracted around the world. The Vietnamese Communists readily identified the anti-war activity in the US with their foreign policy objectives and they have increasingly referred to this "support" of the American people in their propaganda within SVN as proof of the ultimate obtainment of their objectives.

2. Ironically, the PRG with its subordinate Revolutionary Committees has had more success in convincing members of the international community that it is a viable alternative to the GVN than it has had in convincing the people of South Vietnam. One of the primary objectives of COSVN Resolution Number 9, which was covertly promulgated by the VCI in July 1969, was for the VCI to prepare political cadre to insure a capability to govern in anticipation of a coalition government in SVN. This is a long-term goal, but the VCI capability to govern at the village/hamlet level diminished during 1969. Although the Revolutionary Committees were to serve the purpose of adding legitimacy to Vietnamese Communist claims that the PRG is the defacto government in SVN, they have not been able to project themselves as a viable government in the countryside. The GVN Accelerated Pacification Campaign promises for a "better tomorrow" by providing the people with the reality of improved public services and security. The influence of the Revolutionary Committee was also hampered because they were not able to project an image of popular local government independent of the Communist Party.

3. Although the Liberation Committees were designed to bridge the gap between the covert government functions of the Communist Party and an overt government with which the people could identify, the Party staff sections in the villages and hamlets conducted the day-to-day governmental services and functions. However, with the advent of the PRG and Revolutionary Committees in 1969, the Party had hoped that sufficient personnel would be

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attracted to the overt government to conduct governmental services without continuing to immerse the Party bureaucracy in these day-to-day functions. The Party would then be free to direct, not conduct, these governmental functions and other elements of the insurgency. In October 1969, reports from II CTZ indicated the Party had been forced to maintain direct support of Revolutionary Committees because of a lack of trained members. The committees had not been able to organize vital staff sections. Party staff sections were placed in as many Revolutionary Committee staff positions as possible. Similar problems in I CTZ were compounded by apparent purges during 1969 of Non-Party members from Party and committee staff sections. The quality of performance was reported not to be a consideration for purging these trained personnel from their vital positions. Reports from III CTZ indicated that elements of VC Sub-Region I were being moved to Cambodia. The VC leadership felt that these people could not be trusted and considered it necessary to isolate them from access to or contact with allied personnel. They were reported to have relatives with the GVN and to have shown signs of disenchantment during 1969. Restructuring of the VCI organization also occurred in IV CTZ due to significant loss of trained VCI cadre.

4. During 1969, the PHUNG HOANG Program neutralized 19,534 Viet Cong Infrastructure personnel of which 15,305 were operating at the village and hamlet level. The loss of these leaders and trained personnel fulfilling vital staff functions was a primary factor contributing to the inability of the Revolutionary Committees to function independent of direct and obvious Party control. It also diminished the Party's ability to replace the committees' losses with other cadre or Party members.

III. VCI capability to support the VC and NVA military units:

A. The reduction of VCI cadre and that portion of the SVN population which is subject to extortion for logistical support begins a vicious circle for VCI efforts. VCI methods for extracting support from the population have steadily become more harsh and demanding resulting in visible disenchantment among the populace. This leads many rural Vietnamese to resettle in areas more influenced by the GVN, which leaves an even smaller base of support. By December 1969, due to the relocation of the populace to areas influenced by the GVN in I CTZ, the decrease in agricultural production and the loss

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of food caches, the VC/NVA military forces were unable to procure sufficient quantities of foodstuffs. In II CTZ the VCI was purchasing rice in Dalat City at blackmarket prices to alleviate food shortages. In Binh Dinh Province the VCI had attained only about 20% of its planned 1969 goal in rice "tax" collections. In III CTZ, a lack of trained personnel in Sub-Region I led to the use of inexperienced and incompetent logistics cadre which led to ineffective control of rice distribution. This was compounded by financial shortages, thus limiting the ability to purchase food on the open market. However, because of the high post-harvest supply, the VC will probably accumulate enough rice to alleviate acute immediate food shortages. In IV CTZ, COSVN has ordered all VC troops in the area to provide for themselves and has reserved all food stores for use by NVA troops only. "Tax" money collected during 1969 in Kien Giang Province has reportedly already been spent and collection efforts are lagging. These and other events have created serious logistical problems for the VC and are probably a direct reflection of the effectiveness of ARVN and Allied interdiction of lines of communications and disrupting food caches. Additionally, the GVN Accelerated Pacification Campaign has made the people less inclined to submit to "VC taxation," and the PHUNG HOANG Program has reduced the number of trained VCI cadre.

B. In the area of manpower shortages, there was evidence in 1969 that the VC began to recruit and train females for VC military and VCI functions where they were previously infrequently found, particularly as members of main force VC units and as sapper cadre. By the end of the year, a great deal of emphasis had also been placed on recruiting youths, most notably in IV CTZ. Although the use of youths was not a new phenomenon, there was increasing evidence by the end of the year that children between the ages of ten and fourteen were being trained to function as VCI cadre. These youths are reported to receive intensive military and political training. The age limit for this particular training has apparently been set at 14 because the GVN requires all people over 16 to carry an ID card. As the use of new ID cards, which are extremely hard to forge, becomes more widespread, the importance of recruiting and training youths will probably increase.

1. In Phu Yen Province, II CTZ, the VCI encountered personnel shortage problems in attempting to establish Revolutionary Committees. As late as November 1969, the VCI claimed that about 60% of

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the villages had committees; however, in several districts, as many as 80% of these committees existed on paper only. In some cases, the villages are uninhabited and exist in name only. The admission of the foregoing by the captured Deputy Chairman of the Tuy Hoa City Communist Party organization confirmed the widely held belief that many Revolutionary Committees are fabrications designed to create an image of a functioning Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG) structure as an alternative to the legitimate Government of South Vietnam.

2. In areas of Long An Province, III CTZ, the attrition rate of VCI members has considerably reduced their ranks and affected their ability to accomplish Party functions. In villages throughout eastern Long An Province, Party members are being assigned two or more functions due to the lack of personnel to fill existing vacancies. Unable to cope with the GVN accelerated pacification campaign, VCI members, by November 1969, had fled to areas of sparse population and even Cambodia, where they could exert little influence over the populace. Reports received in late November indicated that district level and below VCI members had been ordered back to their villages from their Cambodian sanctuaries. However, in Can Duoc District a complete turnover of VCI village members has taken place since pre-TET 1969 and, currently, most positions are double-slotted or remain vacant for lack of personnel. In Can Giuoc District there has been a complete turnover of personnel during 1969 and, in some cases, the turnover has occurred two or more times.

3. In Vinh Long and Sa Dec Provinces, IV CTZ, VCI manpower shortages at district, village and hamlet levels ranged from 45 to 100 percent during 1969. Province level units had fewer problems as they drafted replacements from lower echelons when necessary. The bulk of the manpower shortages were caused by deserters who rallied to the GVN. The extensive rallier rate resulted in Province level directives to subordinate VCI members that relatives of VCI deserters would be penalized and could be executed.

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4. The depletion of VCI ranks at COSVN and Regional levels has occurred primarily due to operations conducted by the GVN National Police Special Branch (PSB) and the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) Military Security Service (MSS). PSB successes have been most notable in the large urban areas of Saigon, Da Nang and Hue. For example, during 1969 the PSB effectively neutralized a COSVN level intelligence net directed against the office of the President of South Vietnam and other ministries of the GVN. As the result of MSS operations the effectiveness of the COSVN Military Proselyting Section has been reduced by approximately 30 percent. Because of the extensive depletion of high-level personnel, the "first generation" of COSVN military proselyters has been reduced to seven personnel.

IV. The demoralization of the VCI during 1969 was expressed by a member of the VC Sub-Region 5 Political Struggle Section who was arrested on 7 November 1969. Sub-Region 5 is immediately northwest of the Saigon Military District. He stated that the recent period of VC inactivity in both the military and political fields was not a sign of willingness for peace, but rather a period needed by the VC to reorganize their military and political strategies. He said that COSVN Resolution 9, which places a greater degree of emphasis on political activities, was an example of this new planning. He viewed Resolution 9 as a desperate VC plan, written in an attempt to save an otherwise hopeless political and military situation. He said that the PHUNG HOANG (PHOENIX) Program has been given top priority for destruction by the VC.

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ANNEX E

US PERSONNEL SITUATION AND ORGANIZATION OF PHOENIX

Strength Status - Assigned Personnel

1. Current Status (as of 19 Jan 70)

<u>Corps</u>	<u>Authorized</u>	<u>Assigned</u>	<u>Losses thru 28 Feb 70</u>	<u>Replacements Required</u>
I	62	75	8	2
II	105	98	6	14
III	84	85	17	17
IV	144	140	11	16
CMD	13	14	1	-
SCAG/PHX	9	13	2	-
Staff	<u>24</u>	<u>25</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>-</u>
TOTAL	441	450	46	49

2. Discussion

a. Our current overstrength of 12 personnel is a result of MACV AG's effort to place advisors in areas where the GVN have opened new Districts and Precincts. Recently two new Police precincts were opened in Saigon, 3 districts in Danang, and 3 districts in Hue. The remaining four are Legal Officers, one in each Region.

b. Replacement personnel are arriving daily to offset our losses. MACV AG has programmed 46 known gain replacements to cover losses through 28 Feb 70.

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APPENDIX 1, ANNEX E

CIVILIAN PERSONNEL AUTHORIZATION

1. General

In addition to military authorization of 441 personnel for PHOENIX and the 9 civilian personnel authorized for the staff, 12 FSO/DAC personnel are also authorized throughout SVN as follows:

<u>Area</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Level</u>
I	2	Region
II	3	Region
III	1	Region
IV	2	Region
CMD	1	Region
SCAG/PHX	1	Saigon CIOCC
	2	Saigon City NP Precincts

2. Current Status

Four of the above positions are filled.

- 1 - I CTZ
- 1 - II CTZ
- 2 - IV CTZ

Recruitment is underway to fill vacant positions.

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APPENDIX 2, ANNEX E

ORGANIZATION

DIRECTOR
PHOENIX

Note 1
C-3
M-3

Plans &
Operations
Division

C-3
M-9
LN-9

Program
Administration
Division

C-2
M-2
LN-2

Training
Division

C-3
M-4

Personnel in
Field

Note 2
CTZ C-9
M-32
LN-779
Prov M-132
Dist M-234
City C-3
M-19

PHOENIX
Coordinators
Orientation
Course

M-6
LN-4

Personnel Summary (Saigon)

Off	EM	US Civ	LN
17	7	9	15

Personnel Summary (Field)

Off	EM	US Civ	LN
353	64	12	764

Note 1. Two OSA personnel are detailed to the Directorate, one as the Director, and one as his secretary.

Note 2. Local Nationals are given by bulk allocation to CTZ level. They in turn distribute them down to province and district level.

Field Summary represents the number of civilian and military located at Corps, Province and District level. The field summary reflects totals.

Key

C - Civilian
M - Military
LN - Local National

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ANNEX F

STATUS OF LOCAL NATIONAL PERSONNEL EMPLOYED BY PHOENIX (as of 19 January 1970)

<u>Corps</u>	<u>Authorized</u>	<u>On Hand</u>	<u>Overage/Shortage</u>
I	141	108	-33
II	108	59	-49
III	*249	252	+ 3
IV	266	194	-72
Staff	<u>15</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>- 3</u>
TOTAL	779	625	-154

*Includes CMD and SCAG/PHX

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ANNEX G

FUNDING - 1970

1. PROGRAM TITLE: MACCORDS-PHOENIX
2. TOTAL FUNDS BY SOURCE:

<u>FY 1970 Dollars</u>		<u>CY 1970 Piasters</u>	
<u>AID</u>	<u>DOD</u>	<u>Counterpart</u>	<u>GVN Regular Budget</u>
-0-	\$667,600	51,700,000 \$VN	5,880,000 \$VN

3. Two-thirds of the \$667,600 budgeted for support of the PHOENIX Program was programmed for payment of 21 civilians authorized to work with the program in FY 1970. Currently only 11 of these civilian spaces are actually filled by civilians. Although these vacancies are actively being recruited for, it does not appear that they will all be filled with civilians by the end of FY 1970. Thus, it is anticipated that there will be a short fall of over \$200,000 between actual expenditures for civilian pay and the FY 1970 programmed expenditures. By the end of FY 1971 it is planned that authorized civilian spaces for PHOENIX will be reduced to 19. At present it also appears that expenditures for the other third of the budget, which was programmed for supplies and equipment, will only utilize about 50% of the amount programmed. Thus, it is very likely that actual dollar requirements will be in the neighborhood of \$300,000 to \$350,000 with a strong possibility that actual expenditures in FY 1970 for support of PHOENIX may drop below \$300,000.

4. The same two-third, one-third ratio between payment of employees and payment for supplies and equipment should also hold true for CY 1970 piaster expenditures. In CY 1969 129,223,750 \$VN was programmed for payment of local national personnel. However, this 129,223,750 \$VN was programmed on the basis of 95% job-fill. At present only 80% of the authorized civilian spaces are filled, with most of the vacancies occurring in the relatively higher salaried interpreter/translator slots. With dim prospects of recruiting more interpreter/translators in CY 1970, it would appear that a realistic range of CY 1970 personnel payments for people working in support of the PHUNG HOANG/PHOENIX Program would be 105,000,000 \$VN - 108,000,000 \$VN. This would be a difficult figure to compute exactly, as local national personnel working for PHUNG HOANG/PHOENIX are paid out of the same MACV pot of piasters that pays all local national salaries. Adding the 51,700,000 \$VN AIC funded figure

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(36,000,000 \$VN) for support of over 300 PHUNG HOANG/PHOENIX Centers and 15,700,000 \$VN for the operation of PHUNG HOANG Schools in each CTZ) to the 5,880,000 \$VN allocated by the GVN budget, we get a total of 57,580,000 \$VN. This 57,580,000 \$VN which is basically for supplies and equipment is approximately one-third of the total piaster funds that will be expended to support the PHUNG HOANG/PHOENIX Program with both local national manpower and supplies and equipment.

i.e. 57,580,000 \$VN (Supplies and Equipment)
 108,000,000 \$VN (Pay of Local Nationals)
 165,580,000 \$VN Total Piaster Requirement.

57,580,000 \$VN - Approx 1/3
165,580,000

5. During the conceptual stages of the PHUNG HOANG/PHOENIX Program approximately 50% of total expenditures were utilized for construction and non-expendable type items to furnish these newly constructed buildings. However, as the construction period abated the relative percentage of total expenditures spent for this item declined and started to stabilize at the present 1/3 for supplies and equipment and 2/3 for personnel support.

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APPENDIX 1, ANNEX G

BREAKOUT OF PHUNG HOANG BUDGET PIASTERS AND DOLLARS

PIASTERS

	<u>GVN Regular Budget</u>	<u>Counterpart (AIK)</u>
CY 1969	-	236,000,000 \$VN (1)
	5,880,000	51,700,000 \$VN (2)

Note (1) - Includes 129,223,750 \$VN budgeted for pay and allowances of Local National civilian employees authorized by MACV LNCTD. This requirement is not included in the CY 1970 budget of PHOENIX.

Note (2) - Broken down as follows: 36,000,000 \$VN for operational support of over 300 PHUNG HOANG/PHOENIX Centers and 15,700,000 \$VN for support of the four regional PHUNG HOANG Schools.

DOLLARS

FY 70 and FY 71 Budget Estimates (DOD Funded)

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>FY 70</u>		<u>FY 71</u>	
	<u>Units</u>	<u>Amount</u>	<u>Units</u>	<u>Amount</u>
Total Permanent Positions Authorized	22	\$231,200	22	\$237,600
Pay above Stated Annual Rate		900		900
Net Permanent	22	\$232,100		\$238,500
Overtime & Holiday Pay		155,900		155,900
Post Differential		57,800		59,400
Sub-Total Personnel	22	\$445,800		\$453,500
<u>Other Purchased Services</u>				
Rental of XEROX Machine	1	4,500		4,500
<u>Supplies and Materials</u>				
Office Supplies		90,000		90,000
Clothing		5,400		5,400
Sub-Total Supplies & Materials		\$ 95,400		\$ 95,400

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Equipment

Office

Safes - 4 dwr Diebold	40	9,400	2,400
Vu-Graphs	12	4,100	1,400
35 mm Projectors	15	5,100	1,700
Typewriters	220	48,000	10,800
Duplicating Machines	60	15,200	5,100
Adding Machines - Electric	10	2,200	-
Copiers - Electric	12	<u>4,300</u>	<u>700</u>
Sub-Total		88,300	22,100
<u>Other</u>			
Generators (4.25 KW)	30	18,800	6,300
Generators (2.50 KW)	30	<u>6,600</u>	<u>2,200</u>
Sub-Total, Other Equipment		25,400	8,500
Sub-Total Equipment		113,700	30,600
<u>Other Support Equipment</u>			
Compact Sedan	2	3,600	-
Jeep	2	<u>4,600</u>	-
Sub-Total Other Support Equipment		8,200	
GRAND TOTAL		<u>\$667,600</u>	<u>\$584,000</u>

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APPENDIX 2, ANNEX G

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CY 1970 GVN BUDGET FOR SUPPORT OF
THE PHUNG HOANG PROGRAM

Of the 5,880,000 \$VN allocated, the following breakdown was given:

Printing	1,700,000 \$VN
Office Supplies	2,592,000 \$VN
Seminars	588,000 \$VN
Miscellaneous	<u>1,000,000 \$VN</u>
TOTAL	5,880,000 \$VN

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