


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13. One of the island hamlets of Ky Son toward the east. (2 June)

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
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14. Ground view to the southeast from Ky Son Hamlet. (2 June)

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15. Ground view to the northeast from Ky Son. (2 June)

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16. Ground view to the west from Ky Son. (2 June)

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US Liaison Organization for MAENG HO 11.

1. General.

a. The US Army Liaison Team with the Capital ROK Infantry Division (CRID) is organized by MTOE to function at the division and regimental level. One team, consisting of the Senior Liaison Officer and enlisted assistants, habitually remains at the Division CP with the Division Commander and the principal staff. Three teams, each consisting of an officer and enlisted assistant, coordinate US support activities at the regimental level. All teams are equipped with the AN/PRC 25 Radio with an RC 292 antenna, a 1/2 ton truck and trailer, tentage and various items of field equipment for extended field operation.

b. Although the Senior Liaison Officer has no stated function to command or supervise the activities of other US Liaison Officers to CRID, he must maintain a close and continuous supervisory role over them, to insure that the liaison team activities coincide with the activities of the staffs and commanders within CRID.

c. The organization and functions of the Liaison Team are in fact varied to support given situations and are usually detailed by the type and quantity of US support provided for an operation as well as by the liaison personnel and equipment assets available during an operation. The organization and operation of the Liaison Team described below are those specifically applied during Operation MAENG HO 11.

2. Organization and Function of US Liaison Team for Operation MAENG HO 11.

a. The organization of US Liaison activities for Operation MAENG HO 11 is shown schematically at Inclosure 1 to TAB E.

b. COL J. H. Short, the Senior Liaison Officer, moved to the Division Tac CP on 20 April after observing the airlift of the 26th Regiment from Tiger Strip, the Main CP, into the LZ's on Qui Nhon Peninsula. His CP remained at this location until the end of the operation on 27 April. Throughout the operation, he monitored and supervised all US liaison activities; attended morning and evening division staff briefings; accompanied the division commander on visits to the 26th and 1st Regimental areas of operations; submitted a daily summary of activities reports to HQ IFFORCEV; received recommendations from his liaison officers with the 26th and 1st Regiments with regard to employment of US Armored and Mechanized units.

TAB E US Liaison Organization

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TAB E US Liaison Organization

and issued orders for their employment accordingly. He also received and accompanied US personnel visiting for briefings and coordination, and personally briefed and accompanied two US journalists on a tour of the operational area and refugee camps. Because of communication problems with the liaison net, the Senior Liaison Officer found it necessary to visit the forward area frequently. During the battle for Ky Son Hamlet, he worked closely with the 26th ROK Regiment Commander, remaining much of the time at the Regimental OP, where he maintained communication with B Co, 1st Bn, 69th Armor and other US units by means of a radio organic to the attached US search light section. This was necessary because the US Command Track assigned to the Sr LO for control was out of action for three days. The CG, CRID, and 26th Regimental CO both loaned their C and C helicopters to the Sr LO when he needed to go forward to the US units. The weakness in this arrangement was the difficulty in coordinating with the CG and the G3 at the division tactical CP. The original plan, based on experience in MAENG HO 9, was to have direct communication from the Sr LO at division, by means of a command track, with the US units in the regiments and with the liaison officers at the regimental tactical CP's. In MAENG HO 11 both the Sr LO and the two regimental liaison officers had to move down one echelon to maintain control. Resources did not permit the assigning of a helicopter to the Sr LO, which would have helped considerably. In these combined operations, it is essential that the Sr LO maintain the closest coordination with the G3, which means he must stay physically close to the G3 as much as possible and try to accompany the G3 on his visits to the units. Close contact with the CG is also important.

c. Regimental liaison officers joined their regiments prior to the operation to insure coordination between the ROK's and supporting armor and mechanized units. Co A, 1st Bn, 50th Mech and one plat Co C, 1st Bn, 69th Armor were placed in support of the 1st Regt and under OPCON of the CRID Regimental Liaison Officer, LTC McCoy. Co B (-1 plat), 1st Bn, 69th Armor was placed in support of 26th Regt and under OPCON of CRID Regimental Liaison Officer, LTC Carmichael. In both instances, the ROK staffs and commanders were briefed on the employment of supporting armor/mechanized units as arranged by the liaison team. Since CRID has no organic tank unit, the 26th Regt was given a comprehensive demonstration and lecture on the capabilities, limitations, and employment of tanks on the day prior to the operation. Because of the swampy terrain, numerous rice paddies and dikes, both regimental liaison officers found it necessary to remain at battalion level and below and, for the most part, accompany the US units under their OPCON throughout the operation. This procedure also facilitated communications with CRID. Senior Liaison Officer, insured appropriate liaison from supported units, and enabled timely coordination with Battalion and Regimental Commanders thru the ROK command nets.

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TAB E US Liaison Organization

d. The Naval Liaison Officer, LT Cmdr Mabry, established his communications with supporting naval elements at the Sr LO communications tent in the CRID Tac CP. From here he maintained 24 hour communications with the PBR's (keeping four on station, two in the north and two in the south of the bay, around the clock). He also coordinated for gunship support of the PBR's and maintained contact with the supporting LST, PCF, and swift boats blocking the Qui Nhon harbor in the south. PBR relief was coordinated with Air Force and Artillery, and was scheduled during high tide to avoid grounding the boats. Lt Cmdr Mabry exercised control of the PBR's thru two liaison officers, one on the peninsula and one on the mainland sides of the bay. At night three army searchlights and A/F "Spooky" aircraft provided illumination of the bay area.

e. The Artillery (CPT Smith), Aviation (MAJ Allen), and Air Force (LTC Flynn) Liaison Officers occupied their normal operational posts at the division Tac CP and conducted liaison functions normal to combat operations.

(1) "Spooky" aircraft provided most of the night's illumination.

(2) Artillery support was scheduled after the airstrikes. H and I fires were used during darkness and some illumination was used during the absence of Air Force "Spooky" aircraft.

(3) Slicks, Chinooks, Gunships and Medevac helicopters performed normal missions.

f. While the Liaison Officer from the II ARVN Corps, MAJ Mai, cannot be considered a part of or under the supervision of the Sr LO, CRID, he performed a valuable service in coordinating the movement of RF/PF units into the operational area coincidental with the termination of MAENG HO 11 and withdrawal of the ROK forces.

3. Problem Areas Encountered by the CRID Liaison Team.

a. Communications. Manpack AN/PRC 25 radios proved inadequate for the operation. They failed to provide continuous reliable contact between the Regimental Liaison Officers and the Senior Liaison Officer. The command track (APC) provided by the 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) became inoperative and was not available until the third day of the operation. A definite requirement exists for AN/PRC 46 radios with the Sr LO level and Regt LO's especially when the Sr LO is charged with the operational control of US units supporting the division. The use of supporting units' command nets and radios by LO's must be avoided.

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TAB E US Liaison Organization

b. Transportation. With all vehicles operating, transport assigned to the liaison team is adequate to support liaison activities in a division operation. However, age of vehicles and rugged terrain, invariably causes vehicle breakdown and shortage of spare parts precludes timely repair. A requirement exists for an additional two vehicles (preferably a 2 1/4 Ton Truck and a 3/4 Ton Truck) for support of an operation such as MAENG HO 11.

c. Personnel. To provide adequate liaison for a division operation the liaison team requires all authorized officer personnel. In MAENG HO 11, US units at the initial stage were placed in support of all three CRID regiments. Had elements of the Cav Regt been committed with a supporting tank platoon, there would have been no US LO to exercise OPCON of the tank platoon. One COL and three LTC's would be marginally adequate to provide required liaison for division operations involving all three regiments, if each were supported by US ground combat forces.

d. ROK Liaison. Liaison by ROK Officers, who understand and speak English, to all US supporting units is highly desirable. In one instance the 6th Bn, 84th Arty was requested to fire two rounds at a given target. The ROK's later complained that the request was for two rounds per gun. Such misunderstandings can be avoided by liaison personnel who can verify such requests.


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ORGANIZATION US LN ACTIVITIES TO CRID
OPERATION MAENG HO 11

Incl 1 to TAB E



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- Command and OPCON
- . - OPCON
- - - Coordination and Supervision
- Support provided Sr LO. RTT with 54th Sig Bn at Nha Trang for reports submission.
- * Close liaison was also provided US Tank and Mech units by ROK Bn and Co units supported.

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