

NEWSLETTER 72-73

22nd BRUNN DIV. 1901/12  
1902/13

# AAG

## NEWSLETTER

VOLUME 2

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"MORE SWEAT IN TRAINING, LESS BLOOD IN COMBAT"

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# ARMY ADVISORY GROUP

*Military Assistance Command Vietnam*

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**ARMY ADVISORY GROUP**

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**DIRECTORATES**

PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION  
TRAINING  
COMBINED ARMS  
PLANS, PROGRAMS AND SPECIAL  
ACTIONS  
SUPPORT OPERATIONS  
FIELD LIAISON  
FANK TRAINING COMMAND  
STRATEGIC TECHNICAL  
DIRECTORATE ASSISTANCE TEAM

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REMARKS FROM THE CHIEF

For the past several weeks reports of ceasefire negotiations have overshadowed all other topics of discussion and speculation. I caution each member of the Army Advisory Group that none of us is privy to the substance of these negotiations and that, press reports to the contrary notwithstanding, none of us can be certain of their outcome. Meanwhile there has been NO CHANGE in the AAG MISSION. Should the speculation prove correct that the time remaining to finish our job is limited, that is reason for redoubled effort: not slacking off. I expect each man to carry on without letup in pursuit of his particular portion of our vital mission: the lasting self-sufficiency of RVNAF.

*William S. Coleman*

WILLIAM S. COLEMAN  
Major General, USA  
Chief

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REMARKS FROM THE DEPUTY CHIEF

FUNDAMENTALS OF TRAINING ORGANIZATION

Advisors with RVNAF units and in training installations should concentrate on organization for training and emphasize to counterparts that the fundamentals listed below apply, regardless of subject, terrain or other conditions:

- (1) Provide a principal training area and insure that all previous instruction is INTEGRATED into the new subject.
- (2) Provide supervised CONCURRENT training areas, each of which is pertinent to the new subject lesson or exercise.
- (3) Insure that rotation between instructional areas is CONTROLLED and not rushed.
- (4) Insure that instructors/assistant instructors are PREPARED at every station.
- (5) Insure that troops are GAINFULLY occupied at each station and taught in a relaxed, participatory fashion.
- (6) Designate someone to be IN CHARGE at each station.
- (7) Provide for REMEDIAL TRAINING for slow learners.

COMBINED ARMS OPERATIONS AND TRAINING

Basic principles of combined arms operations and training are set forth below; these fundamentals must be stressed in advice given to RVNAF commanders, staff officers, and to training personnel:

TANK-INFANTRY TEAM. The purpose of the tank on the battlefield is to close with the enemy. Tank armament and armor protection was designed to aid that purpose. Infantry, by knocking out enemy AT weapons, aids accomplishment of that purpose. Tanks and infantry attacking together capitalize on the mobility, fire power and shock action of the tank. In this formation, tanks are used to overrun the objective just ahead of the infantry. After the objective has been

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taken, tanks supported by artillery and air power will provide the needed fire power to stay on the objective. Tank and infantry commanders must work together closely as team members. Planning should be conducted on a combined basis; planning and execution should capitalize on the capabilities of each arm.

**THE ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIER.** Use of the Armored Personnel Carrier (APC) will improve the infantry's mobility and chance for success. There are, however, dangerous limitations inherent in the APC which must be considered. The APC was developed to enable infantry to keep up with tanks on the battlefield. The APC is not a tank and should not be used as such in a conventional or a "mid intensity" environment. Once the objective is taken, the APC, using its machine guns, will add to the strength of the defense position.

**ARTILLERY IN THE COMBINED ARMS TEAM.** The fire plan for combined arms operations will only be as effective as unit procedures for fire support coordination. There is always a need for increased training in coordination of the fire support plan and never enough training time available. All combat arms officers and NCO's should know how to call for and adjust artillery fire. The planning for, use of, and coordination of artillery fire, even though simulated, should be an integral part of each tactical training exercise. Fire support coordination, before and during the combined arms operation, is what it takes to insure decisive results against the enemy.

**COMBAT SUPPORT UNITS.** Each member of the combined arms team should have a full understanding and appreciation of the capabilities, limitations, and functions of all elements of the team. Combat support must not be neglected. Training of combat support units must emphasize that their primary mission is to support combat units. The attack will halt or lose its momentum if combat support operates at a slow pace. Combat support, particularly that of fuel, ammunition, rations and water must be responsive to the forward thrust of the combined arms combat elements. Every opportunity should be aggressively used to bring all members of the combined arms team together in training. Opportunities to do this should be taken during field exercises, during the conduct of officer and non-commissioned officer schools, during examination of unit officers and non-commissioned officers and by the

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use of frequent command post exercises (CPX). In addition, logistical personnel should be brought in early in the planning stage and should participate from beginning to end of training. In this way, a firm foundation will be established for effective combined arms operations on the battlefield.

**COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS.** Command responsibility must be fixed in combat operations. Above all, command responsibility cannot be divided, it must be vested in a single commander. The arrangement and meaning of ATTACHMENT cannot be overemphasized either in training or in practice. This should be a principal point of training emphasis.

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REMARKS FROM LTG PHAN TRONG CHINH  
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF (TRAINING)  
JOINT GENERAL STAFF  
REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM ARMED FORCES  
PRESENTED TO THE SERVICE SCHOOL SENIOR ADVISORS' CONFERENCE  
ON 15 NOV 72

General Coleman, Gentleman:

First, it is my pleasure to welcome all of you here today. I also wish to sincerely thank General Coleman for his kindness in presenting to me this opportunity to speak to the officers of the Training Directorate Staff and Senior Advisors at the CTC Service Schools.

Gentlemen, in the past, each year all the schools have accomplished a number of important tasks, and have made measurable improvements and progress in their efforts to reach the training goals set for them. However, if we consider that no one individual or organization is perfect, it is obvious that the desirable managerial and operating objectives established for the schools will not be free from shortcomings.

In the remaining days of 1972, every school will be working to identify deficiencies and take the necessary corrective actions which will be included in the 1973 training improvement plans. It is my wish to have your cooperation in formulating these plans in order to not only achieve the present goals, but to build a firm foundation for the growth and development of the training capabilities of CTC Service Schools.

In 1973, CTC intends to use all those methods and procedures which have any impact on the success of our training effort. The primary emphasis will be given to the implementation of the instructional systems development program which is concerned with all aspects of training management. We will also be concerned with the acquisition and maximum use of the technical material obtained from the United States through the sister service schools program.

Speaking of training materials, I must acknowledge that we are very short of and in need of a great number of reference materials, and thus need your assistance through the sister service schools program. When we receive these materials, we provide for the translation and additional updating to incorporate our battlefield experiences as well as technical advances in the courses under revision.

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Besides the materials, we must also develop plans and programs to improve the teaching effectiveness of the instructors and cadre serving at our schools. Moreover, sending these personnel for in-country and offshore refresher training to enrich their knowledge and refine their technical skills is an absolute necessity to meet the present and future training demands placed upon the schools.

The management and operation of the school training programs will be given particular attention to improve and expand our training capabilities so that we will be able to respond successfully to unprogrammed as well as long range requirements of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces.

Gentlemen, any problem has a solution under some form or method. I am confident that the difficult tasks to be faced in the future can be accomplished through the efforts made by the schools and the benefits derived from your contributions.

I rely very much on your sincere cooperation and practical assistance to overcome obstacles and to raise high the standards of training at the CTC schools. It has been a distinct pleasure for me to speak to you today and I hope you have an enjoyable and productive conference.

Thank you!

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### PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION

#### INCREASED OCS QUOTAS

HQ USARV/MACV SUPCOM has had its OCS Quotas for the coming fiscal year increased by approximately 100 percent. This means that the opportunity to be selected for attendance at OCS has been significantly increased. Applicants are especially needed for classes starting in March, April and May 1973. Directors and Senior Advisors should encourage eligible personnel to apply for the OCS program. Special efforts should be directed towards encouraging minority group personnel who qualify for this program.



DESTRUCTION OF CLASSIFIED AND OFFICIAL MATERIAL All Directorates and FAEs are reminded that current screening of files, records and publications for destruction of material not necessary for daily operation or historical purposes, does not negate the requirements concerning maintenance, retirement and disposition of permanent files.

OFFICER EVALUATION REPORTING SYSTEM The new Officer Evaluation Report (DA Form 67-7) replaces the present Officer Efficiency Report effective 1 January 1973. The Army Regulation governing the report system has twelve principal changes:

1. Provide instructions for the rater, indorser, reviewer, and rated officer in preparation of DA Form 67-7.
2. Require the rated officers to be given a copy of their completed reports.
3. Provide for each officer, on a personal confidential basis, to be given his annual average score.
4. Require the rating officer to complete a description of the rated officer's duties.

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5. Require the rating officer to provide continual counseling/coaching to the rated officer.
6. Preclude the use of continuation sheets and limit use of inclosures.
7. Provide for computing and periodically publishing an average evaluation score by grade for the Officer Corps.
8. Require membership in Officer Special Career programs and performance in Special Career Program duty positions to be identified.
9. Allow Chaplains to rate other Chaplains.
10. Require explanation of excess nonrated duty days.
11. Provide special considerations pertaining to warrant officer evaluations.
12. Provide for greater use of automation in the monitorship of the system.

Other noteworthy changes are: The period for appeals on reports is changed from 5 to 2 years.

An average score by grade will be published periodically by DA in a series 623 circular. Once annual scores are published by DA an officer can check his relative standing with contemporaries by checking his annual score against the published circular. By automating evaluation data, Department of the Army will be able to collect information on Raters and Indorsers (also commands) to identify habitual DA high and low raters. This identification, followed by notification to the individual or command will help in preventing an inflation in the new rating system. Under the current regulation there are no provisions for indorsement of a para 2-2h report (30-90 days). The change is that an indorser who has been in an appropriate duty position for 30 days or more during the rating period, may indorse the report.

### MILITARY IDENTIFICATION TAGS

Directors and Senior Advisors are reminded that identification tags must be worn by all military personnel in Vietnam.

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These tags are used for identification, casualty reporting, and graves registration purposes. Each member of the Army must have two (2) identification tags and the information contained on the tags must be correct.

Directors and Senior Advisors are requested to notify the 527th PSC, ATTN: 527-PA, thru AAGPA, as soon as possible, of any individuals in need of identification tags by submitting a DA Form 2496 (Disposition Form). The DA Form 2496 should contain:

NAME                      SSAN                      BLOOD TYPE & GP    RELIGIOUS PREF

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
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### TRAINING DIRECTORATE

#### ARVN UNIT TRAINING

Beginning in January 1973, ARVN individual through division annual refresher training will become mandatory for all ARVN units.

On 21 August 1972, COMUSMACV and the Chief, JGS agreed to develop a concept of ARVN annual unit training. The concept and plan was developed by a joint committee from AAG and CTC. The highlights of the concept are:



Unit commanders are responsible for planning and conducting training.

Annual training program — individual through division.

ARVN divisions to conduct an annual mandatory training program based on the CTC Master Training Directive.

Emphasis on combined arms training at all levels.

This is a major change in ARVN training philosophy and policy and is a significant step toward greater ARVN effectiveness.

CTC is now preparing implementing directives. The CTC Master Training Directive will prescribe an annual training program for ARVN units to include infantry, airborne, ranger and marine divisions as well as other combat, combat support and combat service support units.

The annual training program will be conducted in eight progressive phases:

- Phase 1 - Individual
- Phase 2 - Crew and Team
- Phase 3 - Squad
- Phase 4 - Platoon

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- Phase 5 - Company (To include Combined Arms)
- Phase 6 - Battalion (To include Combined Arms)
- Phase 7 - Regiment (To include Combined Arms)
- Phase 8 - Division (To include Combined Arms)

Training will be conducted on-site in the unit's area of operation for Phases 1 through 5, at the Division Training Center for Phase 6 and at a Corps maneuver area for Phases 7 and 8.

Training phases for combat elements have been designed to include combined arms training at all levels through a Division FTX. Included in the combined arms training will be artillery fire direction and a requirement for armored elements to train with each infantry battalion. The headquarters of battalions, regiments and divisions will participate in CPX's.

Combat Support and Combat Service Support units will conduct training with and in support of combat units.

A mandatory 386 hour POI has been developed for individual through company level training. The period in which this program must be accomplished will be dictated by the existing combat situation. However, prior to entering battalion level training the entire 386 hour POI will be successfully completed.

Following the completion of company level training each battalion will have a two week stand-down for refitting, resupply and personnel replacements.

Subsequent to the stand-down period, battalions will conduct an intensive five week training period during which all organic weapons will be fired. ATTs will be administered to companies and will culminate with a battalion FTX/ATT controlled by the regimental headquarters which will be undergoing its own CPX. When all three regiments of the division have completed training through phase 7 the division will conduct, as a minimum, a CPX and an FTX. To insure that this program is fully understood and accepted CTC will incorporate the present concept into the Service School POIs for all Officer, officer producing and NCO courses. It will also serve as an excellent training vehicle for the development of practical exercises that can be performed in the classroom.

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### TRIGGERING DEVICES

During a recent visit to a logistical installation undergoing security training by a CTC/AAG Mobile Training Team, the Chief, AAG observed two ingenious triggering devices used by the security force for mechanical ambushes. Duplicates of these devices have been sent to all logistical installations that have received security training. A bilingual explanation of these devices was also forwarded. In addition, these devices were sent to all training centers. Tear out diagrams are included on page 17 of this newsletter. Additional triggering devices are being manufactured at the CTC Training Aids Center for all training centers and should be available by 15 November. These easily made, highly effective devices should be included in mine and booby trap training at all training centers and schools.

### BEACON-GUNSHIP TRAINING

Beacon-Gunship operations consist of the use of a beacon as a reference point to direct attacks by Air Force gunships (AC-130 or AC-119). During the period 1 September through 14 September 1972, a two man team visited selected service schools and RVNAF Headquarters and presented instruction on the use of the beacon. During the period 4-13 October 1972, two teams presented instruction to FANK Training Command MTT members so that the new technique can be made a part of officer classes for ARVN battalions in retraining. The final phase of the program was conducted during early November when follow-up training was conducted at the Infantry, Armor, Artillery, Signal and Ordnance schools. This training was designed to reinforce the initial training and provide an opportunity to check the serviceability of the beacons issued to schools during the initial training.

### SECURITY UPGRADE PROGRAM (STT) OF KEY RVNAF LOGISTICAL INSTALLATIONS

All 37 national priority installations have been surveyed (Phase I) and trained (Phase II). Phase III of this program is a combined reinspection designed to evaluate the action taken by each installation and supporting units on recommendations made by the Combined Security Training Teams (STT). Director of Operations, MACV, has US responsibility for this phase of the program. US representation includes Inspector General, MACV; Director of Logistics, MACV; Joint Logistics Advisory Division, MACV; AAG; representatives from Area Logistics Commands

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and Regional Assistance Commands. Eleven installations have been reinspected. Without exception, comments on the value and quality of the security training have been very complimentary.

As a direct result of the joint ARVN/US STT program Capitol Military District (CMD) began an independent project to improve security at logistics installations and other critical areas within the CMD using an all ARVN mobile training team. The only US involvement is that one US advisor, CPT William F. Daugherty, is temporarily assigned to the program.

The Chief extends his appreciation for the fine job done by all STT's and for the support given to this program by AAG FAE's.

### STUDENT INPUT FOR OCTOBER 1972

Service Schools student input for October was in excess of 3,000 students. This represents a variation of less than 3% from the programmed input for the year.

### CRATER ANALYSIS TRAINING

Classes were conducted at the RVNAF Artillery School for selected instructors from VNMA, Infantry School, Armor School, NCO Academy and National and Division Training Centers, in crater analysis and weapon location. Advisors should insure that the lesson plans and POI for the course that were given to the instructors before departing from the Artillery School are used in developing a crater analysis class at each training center and the schools mentioned above.

### VIETNAMIZATION OF RECONNAISSANCE COMPANY TRAINING MTT IN MR II

A joint US/ARVN effort to train reconnaissance companies was begun in late September 1972 at PLEIKU Training Center. Thirteen US STDAT personnel plus 15 ARVN counterparts were instructors for the initial training cycle which trained two reconnaissance companies. The second cycle began in late October with an additional 28 instructors from DUC MY and DONG BA THIN on hand to monitor the training in preparation for assuming full responsibility for conducting all classes independent of STDAT assistance in mid-November. This third cycle began in November. Thus the joint ARVN/US MTT has been totally Vietnamized, and training is progressing on schedule.

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### CENTRAL TRAINING COMMAND REFERENCE LIBRARY

The CTC reference library officially opened on 16 October 1972 during ceremonies presided over by LTG Chinh, Chief, CTC. The library, located adjacent to the CTC Headquarters building is available for use by both Vietnamese and US personnel. Follow-up visits to school libraries continue. With the increase of library material arriving at each school, emphasis must be placed on insuring that each school has a permanently assigned, full time librarian.

### SERVICE SCHOOLS STATUS REPORT

Senior Advisors are reminded that a new SSSR form will be used for November's report. AAG Memo 350-14 outlines the procedures to prepare the SSSR. Copies of the Memo have been distributed to all FAE's.

### SENIOR ADVISORS CONFERENCE

The Service Schools Senior Advisors' Conference was held 14-16 November 1972. Keynote addresses were given by LTG Chinh, Chief, CTC and MG Coleman, Chief, AAG.

### DEVELOPMENT OF ARMY TRAINING PROGRAMS (ATP)

JGS/CTC Internal DF #173/TTM/TCQH/442, dated 24 Oct 72 reviews the progress of ATP development for 1973 and lists programmed future actions. The ATP development and revision schedule follows:

- 1 Sep 72: Training Centers submitted copies of assigned ATP's to Central Training Command for review.
- 30 Sep 72: The recommended ATP's were temporarily approved by CTC for use at training centers.
- 2 Oct 72: The ATP's were disseminated to training centers for application in 1973.
- 6 Oct 72: Proponent training centers began preparing lesson plans based on the temporarily approved ATP's.
- 15 Dec 72: ATP lesson plans from proponent training centers are due at CTC for review.

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- 25 Dec 72: Lesson plans will be approved and disseminated to all training centers.
- 1 Jan 73: Training centers will begin to apply the new ATP's and lesson plans and will begin preparing recommendations for ATP and lesson plan modifications and revisions based on training experience.
- 30 Apr 73: Proposed revisions to temporarily approved ATP and lesson plans will be submitted to CTC.
- 1 May 73: CTC reviews recommendations for changes to ATP's and lesson plans.
- 30 Jun 73: CTC approval of ATP revisions and lesson plan revisions.
- 1 Jul 73: CTC publishes approved ATP's and lesson plans for application at all Training Centers.

Training center FAE's are reminded of their responsibility to advise and assist during all phases of ATP development. Prompt submission of English versions of ATP's will insure that AAG staffing will be completed on time and that English versions of ATP's will be published and disseminated to FAE's with minimum delay.

### COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF (C&GSC) RELOCATION

Plans to move the RVNAF C&GSC from DALAT to LONG BINH are being firmed up. The move began following turnover of USARV HQ complex and will be completed in March 1973. The C&GSC facilities at DALAT will be utilized by the Political Warfare College.

### WEEKLY RADIO PROGRAM

The Polwar College (DALAT) recently initiated a weekly 45 minute radio program in cooperation with a local station. The programs are conducted by cadets with faculty supervision. Content of the programs includes news, commentary and music.

### BATTALION REFRESHER TRAINING BY MTTs

The retraining program using joint ARVN/US MTTs is continuing at three sites. A total of 49 ARVN, Airborne and Armor Battalion sized units and 14 Ranger Battalions were trained by 1 December 1972.


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### MTTs WITHOUT US ASSISTANCE


The success of Vietnamization can often be measured by the ability of RVNAF agencies to implement necessary actions without US advice and assistance. Recently, CTC directed PLEIKU TC and PHU CAT to establish Mobile Training Groups of 10 instructors each. The purpose of the MTT is to conduct refresher training for three Border Ranger Battalions at PLEIKU TC. The directive was complete and specified the necessary command and control measures as well as addressing items such as transportation, ammunition requirements, POI to be used etc. This action was taken without any request for US advice or comment. A training problem arose and a Vietnamese solution was developed. Good work and carry on.

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TRIGGERING DEVICES



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TRIGGERING DEVICES



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### TRAINING ITEMS

The following publications, training aids, and training devices were sent to Service Schools and Training Centers during the period 15 Oct - 15 Nov:

1. Bilingual pamphlet describing fabrication and use of two mechanical ambush triggering devices (all TC's).
2. Tactics Info Bulletin #84 & #85 (all TC's).
3. 1:50,000 maps to Intelligence School.
4. Mechanical ambush triggering devices, samples sent to NTCs and ALCs for distribution to depots trained under Security Training Program.
5. PS Magazines to all Service Schools.
6. Leavenworth POI, lesson plans and handouts to Chief, Plans and Studies, CTC.
7. FM's on Psychological Warfare to Intelligence School.
8. FM's & TM's on compressors and air conditioners to Engineer School.
9. 175mm Gun TM to Artillery School.
10. 5 Ton Crane TM to Engineer School.
11. MOI material from Ft. Belvoir to Engineer School.
12. Training publications on dog training to Dog School.
13. Financial management publications to NDC.


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### FIRST SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (ISFG)

### SPECIAL FORCES TRAINING EFFORTS

The 1972 Spring - Summer enemy offensive (Nguyen Hue) in South Vietnam created considerable training problems for the ARVN Army. Foremost was the need to rapidly integrate newly trained, but inexperienced replacements into ARVN units which had suffered severe personnel losses during battle. The plan was to strengthen these units by conducting accelerated basic and advanced unit training at battalion level, with strong emphasis on Combined Arms Techniques. The enemy situation dictated that most of this training be conducted "in place," in other words, in the forward defensive areas where the ARVN army was making a determined stand against further enemy advances.



The ARVN Central Training Command (CTC) and Army Advisory Group (AAG) organized and fielded combined US/ARVN Mobile Training Teams (MTT) to accomplish this mission. The United States forces from AAG were Special Forces soldiers from FANK Training Command, whose primary mission was training Cambodian Army (FANK) mobile infantry battalions. The training concept began in the northern portion of Military Region I (MR I) by training 2 infantry battalions and a tank battalion concurrently. The success of the program quickly became evident. The newly retrained units wasted no time in applying the technique taught them or in absorbing the lessons learned from the start of the offensive.

The obvious result of the success of this program was its expansion to all military regions in the Republic. The resource needed to expand the program was a number of highly motivated and skilled US trainers in Vietnam. FANK Training Command and AAG field advisory elements were strained to the breaking point in order to meet the requirement, and more people were still needed.

At this point in time, a small mobile training team of Special Forces instructors from the 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne) (1st SFGA)

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1st Special Forces on Okinawa, were in Vietnam performing another training mission when they informally suggested to AAG that their unit would be interested in assisting in the ARVN Battalion Refresher training program. Within a matter of weeks, the necessary staff actions had been completed. A 40 man team arrived at BIEN HOA from Okinawa on 6 July 1972. A need for further participation was seen and a 24 man augmentation arrived at BIEN HOA on 28 July 1972.

All of the 64 soldiers from the 1st SFGA were employed in the training mission within days, and in some cases, hours of their arrival in the Republic. Their enthusiasm and skills were everything that was expected of Special Forces soldiers. Although the mission consisted of training only, it was a 12 hour-a-day, seven day-a-week job. The combined ARVN/US team worked with the same vigor as the battalions they were training were later to show in combat.

In August 1972, the frequency of sapper attacks on key logistical installations increased. These attacks resulted in another joint ARVN/US effort to strengthen the security at these installations. Once again, the 1st SFGA was requested to assist in the program and responded by sending 29 soldiers to FANK Training Command at BIEN HOA. This program deployed training teams all over the Republic, where they worked at every major ammunition and fuel depot of tactical and commercial significance. It was apparent that many of these installations needed additional training from the security point of view and the expertise shown by the teams was exactly what they needed to keep them intact during the critical pre-cessé fire weeks.


Although the 1st SFGA participation is continuing into November 1972, an analysis of the training accomplished will give an indication of the magnitude of the job. A total 9 divisions were trained, by battalions or companies, to a varying degree of completeness depending upon the combat situation. An additional division equivalent of separate ranger battalions was also trained. In all, the training was conducted in every military region and affected most of the RVNAF major infantry units. The security training at key installations completed training at the 37 most important locations in the Republic.

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### NEW ZEALAND TRAINING

#### THE NEW ZEALAND CONTRIBUTION TO AAG

New Zealand first entered the training/advisory role early in 1971 at the stage when New Zealand combat troops were starting to withdraw from Vietnam, their job completed. There was a transition period when both combat forces and training teams were in the country, but now only a small headquarters in SAIGON and two training teams remain, one at CHI LANG NTC and the other at DONG BA THIN.



CHI LANG NTC. 1st NZ Army Training Team, Vietnam (1 NZATTV) was established at CHI LANG early in 1971 with the somewhat difficult mission of "up-grading the RF in the Delta". After lengthy consultation with Central Training Command and the MACV Training Directorate, it was decided that this mission could best be accomplished by conducting leadership courses for RF platoon commanders.

Up to 150 platoon leaders were accepted for each five week course, run at first entirely by NZ instructors, but with Vietnamese instructors gradually taking more and more responsibility. Today, these courses are conducted entirely by the Vietnamese staff with minimal NZ advice. This leaves most of the Team available to help the recently inaugurated RF battalion refresher training courses being conducted at CHI LANG. The New Zealanders are responsible for the weapon training portions of these courses.

DONG BA THIN. The 2d NZATTV was established at DONG BA THIN early in 1972 as an integral part of the DONG BA THIN Training Battalion, FANK Training Command. New Zealanders (or "Kiwis") occupy command, administrative and instructional appointments within the organizational structure of DBTTB, working in close co-operation with the US, FANK and ARVN staff.

All New Zealanders are unanimous that their association with AAG has reinforced their respect for the dedication and professionalism of the US Army. They join in wishing all members of AAG continued success in their very important task.

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AUSTRALIAN TRAINING

AUSTRALIAN TRAINING ACTIVITIES IN SVN

Australia first became involved in training the South Vietnamese Army in 1962 when on 31 July a small group of advisors consisting of 15 Officers and 15 Warrant Officers arrived. This was the beginning of the Australian Army Training Team Vietnam (AATTV).

In 1964 the AATTV was increased to 80 advisors and began training Regional and Popular Forces. Australian advisors also joined the newly formed ARVN Battalion Advisory Team in MR I. AATTV was again increased in 1965 to 100. Since that time Australian Advisors have served with every ARVN Battalion in MR I and with ARVN Armor, Artillery and Medical Units. Others have served with Special Forces, Regional and Popular Forces and at various training centers throughout the country.

During the first half of 1970 the unit strength was raised to over 200. This was to provide 12 Mobile Advisory Training Teams and to assist in the establishment of the Jungle Warfare Training Center at VAN KIEP in PHUOC TUY Province.

Towards the end of 1971 the AATTV began to be reduced in strength. By early 1972 it had been reduced to 68 officers and enlisted men, which is its current strength. In January 1972, a portion of the team joined the FANK Training Command in training Cambodians at LONG HAI and PHUOC TUY Camps. This element of the training mission ends on 30 November 1972 with the closing of these two camps.

On 6 Mar 72, the closing of Australian Forces Vietnam (AFV) brought the end of an era. In its place the Australian Army Assistance Group Vietnam (AAAGV) was formed. This residual force comprises two main elements; a headquarters located in SAIGON to provide administrative, logistic and communications support and AATTV located in PHUOC TUY Province. The established strength of AAAGV is 140.

AAAGV is presently involved in a number of other training activities in PHUOC TUY Province. Instructors are located at VAN KIEP at the Jungle Warfare Training Center, and with Mobile Advisory Training Teams, training RF and PF.

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### COMBINED ARMS DIRECTORATE

#### AIRBORNE DIV AWARDS

At 1000 hours on 15 October an awards ceremony was held by the Airborne Division Assistance Team at LZ Sally in QUANG TRI Province. MG Howard Cooksey, Commander of FRAC presented awards to five Advisors and two Vietnamese Officers. CPT Don P. Dickinson, DSA 7th Airborne

Battalion was awarded the Silver Star. CPT Dale R. Nelson, DSA 3rd Brigade was awarded the Soldier's Medal. SSG Elvert W. Bush, Light Weapons Infantry Advisor, 8th Airborne Battalion was awarded the Bronze Star Medal with "V" Device. 1LT Ross S. Kelly, DSA 5th Airborne Battalion was awarded the Bronze Star Medal for meritorious achievement. Majors Tran Hoai Chau and Vo Tan Loc, Deputy G-3 and Deputy G2 respectively of the Airborne Division were awarded the Air Medal with "V" Device. MAJ John D. Howard, SA, 11th Airborne Battalion was awarded the Purple Heart. The ceremony was attended by I Corps Deputy CG MG Hoang Lac and the Assistant Division Commander of the Airborne Division, BG Le Quang Luong.

MEDEVAC TECHNIQUE Due to the concentration of anti-aircraft weapons on the QUANG TRI battlefield, the use of the helicopter for medevac operations has been seriously curtailed. Therefore, daylight medical evacuations have been carried out using APC's to bring the wounded from the battalion aid station to a collection point on QL-1. From there they were taken either by road or by helicopter to the division clearing point at LZ Sally. The more seriously wounded were taken directly to the hospital at HUE. Evacuation from forward locations normally is carried out at night with the helicopters flying into the LZ's with all lights extinguished. This has proven to be an excellent technique especially in an area where the landing of a helicopter will draw enemy artillery fire.

ARMOR DESTRUCTION The Airborne Division tank destruction techniques call for an immediate adjustment of artillery smoke rounds on the tank.



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Also mixed HE and CS rounds will be fired. The intention is for the smoke to blind the tank crew to allow friendly infantry to maneuver their anti-tank weapons for a good shot. Meanwhile the artillery HE might also knock out the tank. The CS will force the crew from the tank and allow the infantry to destroy them. This technique offers several possibilities of destroying enemy tanks and has contributed to the Airborne Division's successes in anti-tank warfare. Additional techniques can be found in the recently published RVNAF anti-tank manual entitled "Tactics of Anti-Tank Warfare", TL-002 CT/CM, dated 1 Nov 72.

### ARMOR COMMAND

#### FIRE SUPPRESSION KIT

A little known aspect of armor development in the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces is the research and development program carried on by RVNAF Armor Command in conjunction with the RVNAF Advanced Research Project Agency (ARPA). This program includes extensive testing of various new pieces of equipment manufactured in the United States to meet operational requirements of the Vietnamese Armed Forces. Commanders at all echelons are encouraged to submit their ideas concerning new ways to meet the enemy threat throughout Vietnam.

The most recent tests of one of these ideas was held at the Armor School last month. In response to requests for a means to extinguish M113 fuel tank fires resulting from penetration of enemy shaped charge weapons, a fire suppression kit was developed for the vehicle. The kit consists of an activation and dispersion system which includes three fire extinguishers that release a fire suppressant gas when the vehicle is hit or an accidental fire raises the temperature within the vehicle's compartment. The system can also be activated manually.

There is no question that the vulnerability of the gas tank to explosion is the "Achilles Heel" of the ARVN fleet. ARVN combat vehicles are frequently penetrated by various shaped charge projectiles, but they are not destroyed unless the jet stream strikes the fuel tank. This weakness is well known to the enemy who deliberately concentrates his fire on the gas tank. ARVN in turn seeks to protect itself by refusing the vulnerable left rear of the vehicle, presenting the right front to the enemy and needlessly stereotyping his response to enemy fires.

If the fire suppression kit performed as expected, vehicular and personnel losses to shaped charge weapons could be virtually eliminated and tactical flexibility could be greatly enhanced. Seventeen kits were brought into the ARVN inventory for test under combat conditions however, none of the vehicles with the kit installed were subjected to a shaped charge hit during

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two months of heavy combat. Thus, it was decided to test the kit under controlled conditions to establish information on the desirability of installing the piece of equipment on the ARVN Armored Cavalry Vehicle. The Armor Command and ARPA installed a fire suppression kit on a mine damaged personnel carrier, and set up a test using the Chicom B40 rocket as the penetration medium. Six live rabbits and two chickens were placed in the crew stations and the test was on. The rocket penetrated the vehicle precisely on target thanks to the expertise of an ex-Viet-Cong gunner currently serving as a soldier in the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces. Upon penetration, the nitrogen filled bottles released their contents and although a fire started, an explosion did not materialize and within a fraction of a second, the fire was suppressed. The success of the test can be measured as well in the list of casualties. Six rabbits and two chickens are alive and well and awaiting their next assignment.

### RANGER COMMAND

Although most of RVNAF spends considerable time upgrading various items of equipment as more sophisticated systems become available, Ranger Command is currently undergoing a transition from gunships to water buffalo. As anyone who has been in the advisory business knows, one of the occupational hazards is living with the nicknames inevitably acquired among your counterparts. For the past ten months, staff officers at Ranger Command have known their advisor not as Major McGushin, but as Major McGunship. With the impending retrograde of McGunship, a replacement arrived at Ranger Command, Major Dick Wandke. If you happen to be around the area and want to meet Dick, ask instead for Major Water Buffalo, you'll be taken directly to his office.

In an effort to insure that leaders throughout the chain of command are fully cognizant of their responsibilities, Brigadier General Giai, CG, Ranger Command, recently directed that every leader from squad level up, carry a pocket notebook with essential information. Items to be included vary depending on leadership level. For example, each squad leader will list biographic data on squad members, status of weapons and individual equipment, chain of command, etc. At each progressive level of command the required information reflects the appropriate priorities of information. Any time a leader will be absent from his unit, the notebook will be given to the next man in the chain of command. The notebooks are subject to spot inspection by BG Giai and his staff officers during field visits.

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On 3 November officers and men from Ranger Command conducted a series of demonstrations for participants in the local "Junior Olympics". The athletic games, sponsored by the Joint General Staff in conjunction with the Ministry of Education, is a competition among school children in the SAIGON area. Several hundred young athletes, representing 15 schools, competed in a multitude of events. As part of the festivities Rangers from the 5th Ranger Group rappelled from helicopters into the stadium and were subsequently extracted using Maguire rigs.

### THE EVOLUTION OF RANGER COMMAND

Since its origin nearly thirteen years ago, Ranger Command has undergone an evolutionary process which reflects the ever-changing face of the Vietnam battlefield. Originally created as a unique counter-insurgency force, the Ministry of National Defense called for the formation of independent Ranger Companies, capable of seeking out the Viet Cong in their "safe areas". In the early 1960's, as the enemy forces began operating in battalion-size configurations, Ranger Command was directed to reorganize a portion of its forces as special Ranger battalions. The success of this experiment led to the subsequent reorganization of remaining Ranger units. In 1970-71, as US Special Forces phased down their Vietnam operations, the Civilian Irregular Defense Groups were transferred to Ranger Command, which assumed the mission of border security, converting the CIDG into Ranger Border Defense Battalions. Over the years Ranger Command has continued to develop and enhance the unique skills inherent to the Rangers, but has vastly broadened the scope and operational capabilities of its forces. While small unit, long range operations remain the Ranger forte, Rangers have clearly demonstrated that they can match the enemy on the conventional battlefield as well. Whatever future combat requirements may be, Ranger Command has proven its flexibility to respond to every challenge.

### ARVN COMBAT PAY

Numerous allowances are authorized for regular and regional force soldiers to compensate them for skill proficiency, hazard, responsibility and/or hardship. The most important of these allowances are:

1. Technical supplemental allowance.

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2. High cost of living allowance.
3. Family allowance.
4. Provisional special allowance - i.e. combat pay.

The provisional special allowance - combat pay - authorizes 4,500 \$VN for personnel assigned to regular force maneuver battalions and Ranger units (133 Infantry battalions, 9 Airborne battalions, 9 Marine Corps battalions and 57 Ranger Corps battalions) and 2,000 \$VN to 46 Regional Force Mobile battalions.

Established by decree in November 1971, the intent of the combat pay was to induce additional volunteers into and deter desertion from those combat units suffering the highest desertion rates.

The disadvantage of ARVN combat pay is that it ignores armor, artillery, engineer, and other high risk forces. The fact that these units were not as gravely affected by procurement or desertion problems as were infantry units was taken into consideration by COMUSMACV when he proposed combat pay to the GVN Ministry of National Defense (MOND) on 7 Sep 71.


### ARVN COMBAT PAY FOR NCO TRAINEES

The Ministry of National Defense has revised its guidelines to permit continuance of combat pay for soldiers attending special NCO training courses at division and other training centers. The MOND Directive is effective 7 November 1972 and payment is to be retroactive.

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PLANS PROGRAMS AND SPECIAL  
ACTIONS



AAG HISTORICAL PROGRAM

On 6 November the AAG Historical Program was formalized with the publication of AAG Memo 870-1. This document delineates not only the quarterly reporting requirements and format, but also discusses the proper disposition of "documents of historical interest". It is suggested that each directorate and FAE obtain a copy and become familiar with the provisions of this memo.

ARTICLE BY COLONEL CHHIM OM YON

Colonel Chhim Om Yon, Senior FANK Representative to RVNAF and US Forces, Vietnam, has recently submitted an article to JGS/FANK for insertion in the Army Magazine.

Colonel Om Yon's article, entitled Reflections on Military Training, is a series of observations which places the current Khmer military situation in a historical perspective.

Colonel Om Yon comments on the poor state of training that formerly existed in the Khmer military. In recent years poorly trained FANK soldiers have been faced with a massive invasion of VC and NVA troops. Despite this, the FANK soldiers acquitted themselves well, although at great sacrifice.

This should not be taken as an indication that training is not necessary, cautions Colonel Om Yon. On the contrary, history tells us that proper training with new weapons coupled with the current doctrine of warfare have always been of value.

Citing the Communist military threat existing today in Cambodia, Colonel Om Yon stresses the Khmer High Command's continuing interest in developing a self-sufficient incountry training capability.

Colonel Om Yon concludes that effective weapons in the hands of well trained and carefully managed troops are necessary in order to make an Army invincible.

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### SUPPORT OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE

#### SUPPORT FOR CO2 EXTINGUISHERS

Engineer Materiel Advisory Branch (EMAB), reports that the Office, Chief of Engineers has the responsibility for procurement, servicing and supply of all extinguishers within RVNAF. The current capability of ARVN Engineers to support CO2 extinguishers is as follows:

- The 40th Engineer Base Depot handles bulk tanks or bottles. These are standard 50 pound tanks. These tanks are distributed to the Engineer Direct Support Units through normal supply channels.

- Each Engineer Direct Support Unit at each ALC has transfer pumps to recharge the individual extinguishers from the 50 pound tanks.

- There is no known shortage of equipment for recharging of CO2 extinguishers. EMAB reports that during a recent tour of the Engineer Direct Spt Units there was no indication of a shortage of transfer equipment or repair parts.

- According to EMAB, CO2 extinguishers are in short supply country wide.

#### UNAUTHORIZED ENEMY EQUIPMENT/WAR TROPHIES

A number of individuals have enemy equipment that cannot be shipped to CONUS except by the Combined Materiel Exploitation Center (CMEC). Many of these items (i. e., AK-47's, inert hand grenades, RPG's) are currently located in offices and rooms for display purposes. It is requested that the items be turned in to CMEC as soon as possible for shipment to CONUS. The equipment will be provided to museums, organizations and installations upon request. CMEC is located in building 614, Avenue "M" TAN SON NHUT Air Base. CMEC action officer is Major Edison, telephone 924-3057/2112.



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### **BATTERY MAINTENANCE**

There is a misconception that electrolyte, rather than water, should be added to batteries when the fluid level is low. The proper procedure is to add distilled water. The only times electrolyte should be added are when the fluid has been completely spilled, or when a test for specific gravity of a fully charged battery indicates less than required, or in the case of a new (unfilled) battery. Normal loss of fluid is due to evaporation, which does not require electrolyte replacement. Replacing the evaporation loss with electrolyte will increase the concentration of sulfuric acid beyond that which is safe for battery operation. The result will be decreased battery life through deterioration of the plates but no increase in voltage or amperage.

### **BATTERIES FOR GROUND SENSOR DEVICES**

Nine volt batteries, for use with the Patrol Seismic Intrusion Detector, AN/GSQ-151, are available in the RVNAF supply system. Requisitions should be submitted to supporting units for battery, BA-1090/V, FSN 6135-835-1023. The BA-90/V is an acceptable substitute.


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FIELD LIAISON DIRECTORATE

TRAINING MANAGEMENT

The success of any training program is directly attributable to the training management system exercised by the commander and his staff. Consequently, every senior advisor should periodically analyze present training management procedures employed by his counterpart in order to identify areas in which improvements can be suggested. The following are important training management techniques and common deficiencies associated with these techniques that have been found during previous combined inspections.



An effective and comprehensive inspection system is required to properly evaluate the implementation of programs of instruction and directives from higher headquarters. Although all training centers and schools have developed a system for inspecting training, all too often those inspecting training are satisfied with outward appearances and have not concerned themselves with the requirements of approved Armed Forces Subject Schedules. For example, several classes inspected on range firing appeared well managed until such things as number of rounds fired, type of targets, and firing positions were compared to the requirements of the Basic Rifle Marksmanship Program and found to be incorrect. Inspecting cadre should first familiarize themselves with the appropriate Armed Forces Subject Schedule prior to inspecting training to insure compliance with the Subject Schedule. Inspecting officers should conduct unannounced training inspections and complete a comprehensive inspection report on each class inspected with appropriate follow up action. The report should be used to counsel the instructor on all aspects of his presentation. Deficiencies noted during the training week should then be discussed during the weekly training conference in the context of "lessons-learned" so as to be beneficial to all concerned. It has

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been found that full advantage of this important management tool has not been taken and in many instances the inspection report serves only to meet a requirement and is promptly filed and forgotten.

Proper scheduling of training is an important technique in itself. The best instruction can meet with certain disaster through improper scheduling of classes. Scheduling two companies for tactics training in adjoining tactical training areas at the same time has been a recurring deficiency. This is distracting not only to the students but also to the instructors and will definitely influence the quality of instruction and the degree of learning. Scheduling three hours of a four block of instruction one day and the remaining one hour the following day has been noted on several occasions. When this occurs, many of the fundamentals normally taught at the beginning of the class are forgotten and valuable training time is lost moving to and from training areas. Four hour and smaller blocks of instruction should not be split between days or between morning and afternoon. Training such as proficiency testing, which requires more than the average number of instructors, should not be scheduled concurrently with training also requiring many instructors since each class will suffer to meet the instructor demands of the other. This scheduling deficiency may result in the student learning incorrect procedures and techniques because instructors are not available to make on the spot corrections.

The use of training aids can spell the difference between an effective and an ineffective period of instruction. The use of training aids in a presentation should be thoroughly planned and rehearsed so as to gain the most benefit from their use. Improper use of training aids is a continuous source of deficiencies at most training centers and service schools. One of the greatest problems associated with locally produced charts and graphs is that the lettering is too small to be read by all students. Lettering should be no smaller than 1 1/4 inches in order to be easily read by all students in a normal size classroom. The only training aid that should be exposed to the view of the students at any one time should be the one that the instructor is using at the time. The remainder should be hidden from view to prevent student distraction.

Outstanding training management is one of the commander's important keys to a successful training program. The ability of the senior advisor to recognize it as such and to orient his actions accordingly, will prove instrumental in meeting his goal of an outstanding training program.


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FORCES ARMEES NATIONALES  
KHMERES

TRAINING RESULTS

The 1st Ranger Group which was trained by the original MTT-1 in June was recently observed conducting combined arms training at LZ Tango (North of HUE). They were using all the principles and techniques taught them by MTT-1, which demonstrates that our MTT program is having a lasting effect.



**FANK TRAINING COMMAND**

CIVILIAN WAR CASUALTY PROGRAM Reference: USARV Reg No. 40 dated 2 Jan '68.

The following information is promulgated to provide guidance as to the conditions under which indigenous civilians may receive medical treatment at US Army Hospitals.

USARV Reg No. 40-46 dated 2 Jan 68 is still in effect, although many of the units referred to have phased out and bed spaces available must weigh in favor of US and Free World Military Forces personnel.

According to information received from USAH, SGN Joint Medical Regulation Office (Tel. 923-4701, CPT Barton OIC), civilian patients are considered in two categories.

- (1) Victims of hostile fire.
- (2) Other (i.e. accidents involving USA facilities, and activities).

Quoting Captain Barton, "Other" would be any patient a USA physician takes upon himself to treat, thus making USA Med facilities responsible for follow thru (to include medevac to appropriate med facility in event local treatment is not feasible).

Medevac: When treatment of civilian patients requires medevac to fixed USA Med facilities, routine dust-off can be utilized from the DBTTB thru the 575th Dispensary NHA TRANG to USAH SGN.

Note: Medical records and reports must accompany patient.

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On admittance to USAH, patient will be given either:

- (1) Complete treatment.
- (2) Treatment until stabilized then transferred to civilian or ARVN Hosp.

Degree of treatment given depends on many variables:

- (1) Patient load at USAH.
- (2) Policy changes.
- (3) Treatment availability at district and province level.

Medics on MTT's may treat civilians and ARVN if necessary, however, medics' primary responsibility is toward the team. Civilians should be referred to district or province medical facilities and ARVN referred to ARVN Medical facilities.

Note: Reminder to team medics and FANK training sites:

- (1) All personnel to take malaria prophylaxis once per week.
- (2) FANK training sites insure replacements for teams have up to date shot records.

SERIOUS INCIDENT REPORTS Reference: USARV Reg 190-47.

Serious Incident Report (SIR): A report of a significant incident, crime, accident, wrongdoing or mismanagement, which involves personnel, property or equipment of this command; and which may reasonably be expected to arouse local public interest, cause continued or widespread publicity, embarrass the US Government or Military Command, or warrant the personal attention of the Chief, AAG.

Any person having knowledge of a serious incident is responsible for reporting the fact to his immediate Commanding Officer or nearest Military Police station. Commanders who are informed of a SI will immediately notify the nearest PMO and advise this headquarters.

Reportable incidents:

- (1) Non-battle deaths from other than natural causes, to include the deaths of foreign nationals, whenever US personnel or equipment are

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involved. Nonbattle deaths resulting from aircraft accidents and incidents will be reported through Army aircraft safety channels in accordance with USARV Reg 385-10.

- (2) Murder, voluntary or involuntary manslaughter, or assault with intent to commit murder or manslaughter.
- (3) Rape or assault with intent to commit rape.
- (4) Other serious sex offenses when unfavorable publicity can be expected.
- (5) Aggravated assault, to include assaults against foreign nationals.
- (6) Unlawful or unauthorized discharge of firearms when injury occurs or unfavorable publicity can be expected.
- (7) Arson or attempted arson.
- (8) Burglary, housebreaking, or robbery, to include offenses committed against foreign nationals.
- (9) Larceny over \$500, wrongful appropriation, fraud, or extortion of major significance (do not report routine larceny or wrongful appropriation of vehicles).
- (10) Blackmarketing, smuggling, counterfeiting, currency manipulations, or postal violations of \$100 value or more.
- (11) Significant narcotic or drug offenses (i.e., involving hard narcotics, dealers, pushers or large quantities of marijuana or dangerous drugs).
- (12) Riot or mutiny.
- (13) Instances involving apprehension or use of force by US Army personnel against US civilian personnel, military or civilian personnel of a friendly foreign power, or other incidents of immediate or potentially serious significance from a political, military, or public relations standpoint.
- (14) Terrorist activities involving US personnel or US Government property.

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(15) Aircraft incidents or accidents in which malicious destruction of, damage to, or unauthorized tampering with the aircraft is suspected; or accidents in which unfavorable publicity to the US could result.

(16) Fatal traffic accidents, traffic accidents resulting in serious injury, or hit and run accidents involving circumstances likely to cause unfavorable publicity.

(17) Acts involving moral turpitude considered of sufficient importance to warrant the attention of this Headquarters.

(18) Serious incidents involving prisoners of war or detainees in the custody of US Forces or other persons for which the US has responsibility under the Geneva Convention, including deaths or serious injury, maltreatment, riot and escape, to include attempts (do not include battle deaths incurred prior to US Forces assuming custody of the PW or detainee concerned).

(19) Escape of prisoners who have been ordered into confinement and not released by proper authority.

(20) Suicides, attempted suicides, or self inflicted gunshot wounds resulting in disabling injury.

(21) Major fires, disasters, or serious training accidents which involve the death of US or US employed personnel, or extensive damage to US property, equipment or installation.

(22) Gatherings, demonstrations or disorders in which racial overtones are evident.

(23) Thefts, evidence of kickbacks, mismanagement or any other irregularity discovered in the operation of a club or mess.

d. Commanders at all echelons are requested to insure that all personnel under their command are thoroughly familiar with identification and reporting procedures for SIR.

### FANK SOLDIERS LEARN HOW TO TRAIN THEMSELVES

With a view toward the time when US forces will no longer be training Asian soldiers, FANK Training Command recently completed a program designed to teach Cambodians how to train themselves.

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On 29 September 1972, 100 highly motivated, parachute qualified Cambodians arrived at LONG HAI Training Battalion. Led by a colorful paracommando captain, this group had been hand-picked by the FANK High Command to staff a planned School of Patrolling at REAM. CPT Tony Chap made it clear at the outset that his men were at LONG HAI to learn all they could about teaching patrolling techniques.

The two Special Forces A Teams who worked with CPT Chap's group were extremely impressed with the caliber of the men they trained. They had never before seen a group so eager to learn.

The six-week program of instruction of Medium Range Reconnaissance Patrol (MRRP) techniques was completed on 8 November 1972. During the training, the FANK soldiers learned everything the Special Forces cadre could teach them. The program of instruction included classes in rappelling, the use of helicopter and air support assets, map and compass reading, infiltration techniques, raids and ambushes, engineer operations, first aid, river crossing, and radio-telephone procedures. Each student led at least one patrol in an enemy contested area, and was critiqued by a member of the cadre. The real highlight of the course, however, was a one-week period during which each student learned how to teach others what he had been taught.

By the time the course was finished, CPT Tony Chap had organized his men to staff the school to be established in Cambodia. He divided his men into special subjects committees and a school staff. CPT Tony Chap left LONG HAI armed with most of the lesson plans and training aids he would need to begin training at the Cambodian School of Patrolling.

CPT Tony Chap's men were one of the finest groups ever trained by the FANK Training Command. Those of us who were fortunate enough to be involved with their training watched them go home with new hope for the future of the Cambodian Army.

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### AAG CERTIFICATE OF ACHIEVEMENT

The AAG Certificate of Achievement may be awarded to any person, military or civilian, in recognition of service, acts, or achievements. An award of a certificate will not bar a subsequently submitted recommendation for a decoration if the individual is otherwise eligible. Certificates of Achievement will not automatically be prepared based upon a board action downgrading or disapproving a recommendation for decoration. Certificates must be specifically requested giving full name, rank, SSAN, period of service to be covered, and date certificate is required for presentation. Recommendation may be submitted telephonically (923-3547) in urgent cases.

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# ARMY ADVISORY GROUP



## Certificate of Achievement

is awarded to

SERGEANT FIRST CLASS JOHN J. DOE, 000-00-0000, US ARMY

for meritorious service

on 1 Sep 72 to 30 Nov 72

*during which time he displayed an exceptional degree of professional competence and devotion to duty in support of the Republic of Vietnam's and the Republic of Khmer's struggle against the oppression of world wide communism. This performance of duty is in keeping with the highest traditions of the military service.*

GIVEN IN SAIGON REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

THIS 5th DAY OF Dec 19 72

WILLIAM S. COLEMAN  
MAJOR GENERAL USA  
CHIEF

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39A

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ARRIVALS 11 OCT - 23 NOV

LTC	Everett L. Alvey	SFC	Raymond Holland
CPT	Steven C. Anthony	SSG	James S. Hodierne
SGT	Michael J. Angalich	MAJ	William R. Henson
SGT	Richard Aeschbach	CPT	Harold D. Horton
SGT	Rocky W. Bennetts	CW3	Fred M. Hearne
SFC	William B. Bowers	CPT	Claude Huggins
SSG	Bobby D. Bosman	COL	George H. Isley Jr.
SSG	Richard N. Bernsteil	ISG	Robert C. Jerry
MAJ	Paul Barrera	SGT	Michael R. Johnson
MAJ	Raymond F. Beall	CPT	Robert B. Killebrew
SGT	Walter E. Braun	MAJ	Richard Kutschall
SSG	Fred P. Campbell	SP4	George R. Lavoie
SFC	Jose P. Cruz	MAJ	William E. Lakey
SSG	James T. Chapman	COL	Vincent W. Lang
SSG	Paul Cockman	CPT	Kurtis J. McGrata
CPT	George J. Chu	CPT	James A. Minor Jr.
MAJ	Benjamin Covington	SSG	David M. Mills
CPT	William J. Croft	CPT	John I. McBeth
SFC	Frank J. Dillon	MAJ	Robert C. Murphy
COL	Victor F. Diaz	SFC	James R. May
MAJ	Floyd Dawson	SP4	Forrest Noel
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SSG	Gerald Fitzgerald	MAJ	Ronald B. Rykowski
SSG	Thomas S. Gordon	CPT	Clifford T. Rock
LTC	Bily R. Goodall	MAJ	Ransford Reinhard
MAJ	Chester Garrett	SSG	James E. Sargent
MAJ	Victor G. Gilliland	SSG	Ehas Seda
SFC	Carl E. Gerard	LTC	Robin J. Speiser
SP4	Brian H. Gray	SP4	Lyal E. Shaw
MAJ	Howard H. Guilhaus	SSG	John H. Streetman
SSG	Frank J. Hutson	MAJ	Thomas H. Snider
SFC	McArthur Hill	MAJ	Ronald L. Schule
SFC	Walter N. Heslin	CPT	Max V. Terrien
COL	Clarence M. Hurtt	LTC	George R. Underhill
COL	Robert N. Habermehl	LTC	Gustave Villaret

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SFC	Bruce Willette	SSG	Kenneth W. Williams
CPT	Harold P. Wales	SSG	Guy D. Whitmer
CPT	Thomas R. William	MAJ	Gary B. Whitlock
SFC	Finley Williamson	MAJ	Hugh D. Walker
MAJ	Peter D. Wentworth	CPT	Robert A. Wignall

### DEPARTURES 11 OCT - 23 NOV

SSG	Joseph L. Allen	SP4	Bonifacio B. Gorpuy
SSG	Jerry G. Adams	1LT	Winston A. L. Cover
SFC	Samuel L. Adams	SGT	Glen S. Collins
SP5	Thomas M. Abram	SSG	George F. Connor
SSG	Andrew S. Alexander	CPT	Joseph F. Clare
SSG	Ramon Angulo Jr.	1LT	Robert J. Conway
SSG	Frank A. Allen	MAJ	James R. Crockett
SGT	William Armachain	1LT	Keith Colliver
SFC	Kenneth R. Akers	SP4	Robert G. Cunha
SSG	Phillip D. Berger	CPT	Carl D. Cutts Jr.
SFC	Tommy M. Berry	MAJ	Phillip C. Cox
CPT	Garret G. Burkhardt	SFC	John L. Cansletti
LTC	Vincent F. Byrnes	SSG	Christian F. Conde
SFC	Charles A. Buckley	COL	Richard S. Craig
SGT	William D. Bartee	SGT	John Campbell III
MAJ	Phillip L. Blake	SGT	Bobby L. Caulder
SFC	Leon T. Blevins	SFC	Charles Callaghan
1LT	Kenneth R. Bowra	MSG	Johnny F. Cooper
SP4	Terry W. Beckering	SGT	Samuel H. Cathey
CPT	Patrick M. Brosnahan	SFC	Carson Combs
MSG	Charlie B. Belcher	MSG	Lonnie M. Chumley
CPT	Michael E. Black	SGT	Reynaldo O. Castro
SGT	Gary R. Ballard	SFC	Donald R. Coburn
SP5	Merle W. Brown	SGT	David G. Casarez
SP4	Jerome L. Bell	SFC	Robert J. Choate
SGT	Glenn F. Boyelle	LTC	Phillip J. Clements
SSG	Gary L. Baura	LTC	William H. Dankers
SSG	Ronnie C. Braden	CW3	Johnnie Davis
MSG	Billy G. Baird	SFC	Eugene W. Draper
SGT	William R. Boggs	MSG	V. Szentivanyi-Deak
CPT	Robert E. Bowen	SFC	Roy F. Devane
SFC	Delbert E. Barron	SP5	Michael J. Deuser
SSG	Stanford D. Cane	SFC	Joseph T. Davis
SSG	William F. Calkins	SFC	Robert F. Dunn Jr.

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SFC	Harold Dale	SSG	Freddie L. Howard
SSG	Sylvester Dove	SP5	Raymond R. Hooper
MAJ	Benjamin E. Dishman	SGT	John D. Halcomb
SFC	Ralph D. Delozier	MAJ	James H. Hamilton
MSG	Luis J. Esparza	SFC	Hugh A. Havermale
MSG	Billy R. Evans	SFC	James F. Hetrick
MAJ	Robert Evans	1LT	Carl Hilton
MSG	James W. Edgell	SP5	Eric L. Hoover
CPT	Robert D. Eldridge	SSG	Roger B. Hyser
SSG	Richard G. Fomaugh	MAJ	Anthony L. Hittner
PVT	Daniel W. Frost	SFC	Lavaughn H. Hayes
SSG	Roy G. Flournoy	CPT	Earl L. Isabell
CPT	Gail W. Furrow	SP4	Dennis R. Jennings
MAJ	Robert D. Frayier	SFC	Issac Jacobs
MAJ	Charles G. Fields	SSG	William W. Johnson
SGT	Richard V. Fetrow	SGT	Frank E. Jones
1LT	Casey Gaines	SSG	Leonard H. Johnson
1LT	Terry A. Griswold	SFC	Allan G. Jones
SGM	Hasker J. Gilmore	SSG	Clyde U. Jackson
CW3	Loren J. Grauel	LTC	Robert A. Jones
SSG	Thomas M. Groll	CPT	Claude D. Johnson
MAJ	Benjamin Gamey	MAJ	Clifton T. Johnson
SGT	Standley R. Gibson	1LT	Ross S. Kelly
MSG	Jesse L. Gamey	SGT	Julian A. Kight
MSG	Champ H. Grindstaff	CPT	Jackie L. Keys
SGT	Donley E. Gandee	SFC	Earl E. Kinsey Jr.
CPT	David K. Gordon	MAJ	Richard L. Kail
SGT	Frederick Giltyow	MSG	Edward E. Kitchen
SGT	Alvin B. Granen	SGM	Gerhard Kunert
SGT	Michael D. Greer	1LT	Larry J. Lust
SSG	Freddie A. Hanks	SFC	Dennis F. Lightner
SSG	Robert L. Holland	SFC	David C. Lee Jr.
SSG	Allan L. Houghton	SSG	Thomas R. Lawson Jr.
SSG	Clarence Huffstetler	SSG	Douglas L. Lack
CPT	James A. Huffman	SFC	Willie J. Lucas
SSG	Walter P. Hoskin	SFC	Thomas G. Lake
SSG	William I. Hohnes	SSG	Estwill M. Lee
SGT	Richard D. Howson	SGT	David A. Lindenberg
SP4	Rau J. Hoffman	SGT	Austin W. Lee Jr.
SFC	Samuel E. Hull	SGT	Donald D. Latham
SFC	Roy T. Helms	SFC	Robert T. Long
SP4	Danied W. Henderson	SFC	Jose A. Lopez
SFC	Cecil B. Hamilton	1LT	James C. Luczynski

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SGT	Gary A. Logan	SFC	Charles B. Preble
CPT	Henry P. Mansky Jr.	SSG	Donald E. Pringle
1LT	Donald R. Moran	SFC	Bobby G. Pruett
SFC	Raymond D. Maxwell	SP5	Bogusław A. Przybyla
SFC	Jesse E. McNew	CSM	John Pearce
SGM	Edward P. Morgan	SGT	Michael A. Pelaez
MSG	Robert L. Marple	SP4	Petro J. Pawluk
SP4	Robert S. Michalak	SFC	Travis B. Price
SGT	Charles E. Masterson	SP4	Thomas E. Parker
SFC	Charles Mack	SP4	Dennis L. Petrick
SFC	Charles W. Martin	CPT	Robert A. Pitz
SFC	Richard MacDougall	CPT	Joel M. Pelis
CPT	John E. Matthews	LTC	Oscar G. Price Jr.
CPT	Walter R. Machnicki	SFC	Thomas Quensenberry
SSG	Timothy J. Mattison	SFC	Willie Quintanilla
SGT	James S. McDonald	SGT	David W. Ramsey
SGT	Bruce B. May	CPT	Doyle L. Raymer
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SFC	Otis Martin	MSG	Edgar J. Ross
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SFC	Robert L. Meadows	SP4	Dock Reid III
SFC	Phillip Muldrow Jr.	SGT	Dennis E. Rudolph
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SSG	Roy T. McElroy	LTC	Larry M. Ripple
MSG	John Nastasiak	SSG	Daniel L. Rutledge
MSG	Thomas S. Newhaus	SGT	Jonathan D. Revels
CPT	Charles A. Newton	MAJ	Richard E. Rice
MAJ	George S. Nikotich	LTC	Robert M. Rugg
SGT	Robert L. O'Connor	MAJ	Ronald M. Robinson
SSG	Russel F. Ornburn	MAJ	Daniel A. Reid
SGT	Arlin L. Olson	SSG	Larry J. Rhodes
SSG	Risto O. Onerma	CPT	Clark F. Rehberg
CPT	John H. Ostrich	SGT	Gregorio H. Reyes
CPT	William J. Orscher	SFC	George T. Royster
MAJ	Gerald C. Osborne	SSG	John C. Reynolds
CPT	Lawrence L. Purcell	SFC	Phillip Rwere - Rivera
SGT	James W. Pierce	MSG	Thurman D. Ramsey
SFC	Vance H. Patterson	1LT	Charles M. Stoehr
CPT	Robert L. Pyner	SSG	George A. Screws
SGT	Rexford A. Plank Jr.	SFC	Roger E. Smith
CPT	William J. Passow	1LT	John G. Señor III
SFC	William T. Picknell	SGT	John W. Sumpter
SGM	Norman R. Purcy	SSG	John A. Stewart Jr.

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SFC	Donald Strickland	SGT	Dave H. Williams
SSG	Frederick Short	1LT	Ernest K. Whitener
SFC	Ben W. Stripling	SSG	Louie C. Wombaugh
CPT	Donald A. Schreiber	SSG	Melvin L. Wick
CPT	Homer T. Stokes	SGT	James R. Weaver
CPT	Henry W. Sterbenz	MAJ	Philip C. Wahlborn Jr.
SGT	Robert G. Scott	MAJ	Jerry G. Williamson
SSG	Carl L. Sullivan	SGT	Edward Yanowski Jr.
MAJ	James W. Stewart	1LT	Neill A. Yarborough
1LT	Gene N. Tassone	SSG	Michael A. Young
SFC	Stanley J. Tomsick	SSG	William Zimmerman
SSG	Theodore E. Thorb	SSG	Richard H. Zinkhen
SGT	Robert C. Teslow Jr.		
SP5	David L. Triplett		
SFC	Robert Thompson		
SP5	Danny W. Tizen		
LTC	Arthur E. Taylor Jr.		
SFC	James F. Tibbit		
SGT	Gary L. Toombs		
SFC	Lonnie G. Thomas		
SSG	Willie W. Taylor		
SGT	Michael P. Tanchak		
SP5	David M. Thompson		
SSG	Bruce H. Thompson		
SSG	Thomas M. Uldall		
SSG	Benjamin Vega		
SFC	Grady C. Vines		
MAJ	Donald J. Voss		
LTC	Russell Vermillion		
SP5	Michael W. White		
CPT	Daniel E. Wilson		
PFC	Wesley L. Williams		
CPT	Gregory K. Wade		
SFC	Raymond Whittington		
SSG	Paul I. C. Willis		
SFC	Wade G. Webb		
SFC	Haward W. Wyckoff		
SFC	Charles L. West		
MAJ	Colbert Woolfork		
SSG	Bernard H. Wheeler		
SGT	Ronald J. Wind		
SSG	Sidney L. Williams		
CPT	Kay B. Witt		

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The following personnel received decorations for valor during the period 11 Oct 72 to 23 Nov 72.

AWARD OF THE DISTINGUISHED SERVICE CROSS

<u>RANK</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>UNIT</u>
1LT	WINSTON A. L. COVER	Abn Div
CPT	CHARLES R. HUGGINS	81st Ranger Gp
1LT	ROSS S. KELLY	Abn Div
CPT	MICHAEL A. McDERMOTT	Abn Div
SFC	JESSE L. YEARTA	81st Ranger Gp

AWARD OF THE SILVER STAR

<u>RANK</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>UNIT</u>
CPT	DON P. DICKINSON	Abn Div
MAJ	EDWARD F. McGUSHIN	Ranger Command
CPT	ROBERT C. RIDDELL	Abn Div

AWARD OF THE SOLDIERS MEDAL

<u>RANK</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>UNIT</u>
CPT	DALE R. NELSON	Abn Div
1LT	ROBERT J. CONWAY	FTC

AWARD OF THE BRONZE STAR WITH "V" DEVICE

<u>RANK</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>UNIT</u>
SSG	ELVERT W. BUSH	Abn Div
1LT	PERRY A. GRISWOLD	Abn Div (IOLC)

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AWARD OF THE AIR MEDAL WITH "V" DEVICE

<u>RANK</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>UNIT</u>
MAJ	TRAN HOAI CHAU	Abn Div
MAJ	VO TAN LOC	Abn Div

AWARD OF THE ARMY COMMENDATION MEDAL WITH "V" DEVICE

<u>RANK</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>UNIT</u>
SSG	LUCIOUS O. HILL	Abn Div
1LT	JOHN NORTON JR. (1OLC)	Abn Div
CPT	DON P. DICKINSON (1 + 2 OLC)	Abn Div

AWARD OF THE PURPLE HEART

<u>RANK</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>UNIT</u>
MAJ	JOHN D. HOWARD	Abn Div

The following personnel received the Legion of Merit during the period 11 Oct 72 to 23 Nov 72.

AWARD OF THE LEGION OF MERIT

<u>RANK</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>UNIT</u>
LTC	PHILLIP J. CLEMENTS	SA, PLEIKU TC
COL	RICHARD S. CRAIG (2OLC)	DIR, FLD

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MAJ	EDWARD F. MCGUSHIN	RNGR CMD
LTC	LARRY M. RIPPLE	DIR, SPT OPNS
COL	NICHOLAS H. SEBASTIAN (2OLC)	DIR, TNG DIR

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### UNDERSTANDING THE VIETNAMESE

The mysterious Oriental smile has been a source of confusion to Occidentals since East first met West. To an American, a smile normally means either happiness and amusement or ridicule and contempt. It is our basic nature to be straight forward and often rather blunt in our relations with others and the hidden meanings of a smile often escape us. On the other hand, the Vietnamese prefer the more subtle and indirect means of communication. They normally avoid open displays of emotion and attempt to maintain a polite atmosphere wherever possible. In order to sustain a pleasant relationship, a Vietnamese may smile to mask his feelings of anger or embarrassment. Therefore, if you should find it necessary to reprimand a Vietnamese don't be surprised if you receive a smile in reply. However, recognize the smile for what it represents; a polite submission to an unpleasant situation and not a sign of contempt. Understanding permits communication across cultural barriers and paves the way to more pleasant and productive relations. Understanding breeds understanding.

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